In defence of Popper on the logical possibility of universal laws : a reply to Contessa
Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Philosophical Writings
Publication Date
Spring 1-1-2006
Volume
31
Issue
1
First Page
53
Last Page
60
Abstract
This paper is a critique of Contessa’s (in the same issue). First, I show that Popper in The Logic of Scientific Discovery argues against the view that the logical probability of a hypothesis is identical to its degree of confirmation (or corroboration), rather than against Bayesianism. Second, I explain that his argument to this effect does not depend on the assumption that ‘the universe is infinite’. Third, and finally, I refine Popper’s case by developing an argument which requires only that some universal laws have a logical probability of zero relative to any finite evidence, and providing an example concerning Newtonian mechanics.
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2006 Durham University Department of Philosophy
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Language
English
Recommended Citation
Rowbottom, D. P. (2006). In defence of Popper on the logical possibility of universal laws: A reply to Contessa. Philosophical Writings, 31(1), 53-60.