Document Type

Journal article

Source Publication

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Publication Date

5-2009

Volume

78

Issue

3

First Page

646

Last Page

672

Abstract

An intrinsic property is roughly a property things have in virtue of how they are, as opposed to how they are related to things outside of them. This paper argues that it is not possible to give a definition of ‘intrinsic’ that involves only logical, modal and mereological notions, and does not depend on any special assumptions about either properties or possible worlds.

DOI

10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00259.x

Print ISSN

00318205

E-ISSN

19331592

Publisher Statement

Copyright © 2009 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC.

Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.

Full-text Version

Accepted Author Manuscript

Recommended Citation

Marshall, D. (2009). Can ‘intrinsic’ be defined using only broadly logical notions? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 78(3), 646-672. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00259.x