Title

On the proximity of the logical and 'Objective Bayesian' interpretations of probability

Document Type

Journal article

Source Publication

Erkenntnis

Publication Date

11-1-2008

Volume

69

Issue

3

First Page

335

Last Page

349

Abstract

In his Bayesian Nets and Causality, Jon Williamson presents an ‘Objective Bayesian’ interpretation of probability, which he endeavours to distance from the logical interpretation yet associate with the subjective interpretation. In doing so, he suggests that the logical interpretation suffers from severe epistemological problems that do not affect his alternative. In this paper, I present a challenge to his analysis. First, I closely examine the relationship between the logical and ‘Objective Bayesian’ views, and show how, and why, they are highly similar. Second, I argue that the logical interpretation is not manifestly inferior, at least for the reasons that Williamson offers. I suggest that the key difference between the logical and ‘Objective Bayesian’ views is in the domain of the philosophy of logic; and that the genuine disagreement appears to be over Platonism versus nominalism (within weak psychologism).

DOI

10.1007/s10670-008-9117-y

Print ISSN

01650106

E-ISSN

15728420

Publisher Statement

Copyright © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

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Publisher’s Version

Recommended Citation

Rowbottom, D. P. (2008). On the proximity of the logical and 'Objective Bayesian' interpretations of probability. Erkenntnis, 69(3), 335-349. doi: 10.1007/s10670-008-9117-y