Title

Political decentralization and corruption : evidence from around the world

Document Type

Journal article

Source Publication

Journal of Public Economics

Publication Date

2-1-2009

Volume

93

Issue

1-2

First Page

14

Last Page

34

Abstract

How does political decentralization affect the frequency and costliness of bribe extraction by corrupt officials? Previous empirical studies, using subjective indexes of perceived corruption and mostly fiscal indicators of decentralization, have suggested conflicting conclusions. In search of more precise findings, we combine and explore two new data sources-an original cross-national data set on particular types of decentralization and the results of a firm level survey conducted in 80 countries about firms' concrete experiences with bribery. In countries with a larger number of government or administrative tiers and (given local revenues) a larger number of local public employees, reported bribery was more frequent When local-or central-governments received a larger share of GDP in revenue, bribery was less frequent Overall, the results suggest the danger of uncoordinated rent-seeking as government structures become more complex.

DOI

10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.09.001

Print ISSN

00472727

Publisher Statement

Copyright © 2008 Elsevier B.V.

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Full-text Version

Publisher’s Version

Recommended Citation

Fan, C. S., Lin, C., & Treisman, D. (2009). Political decentralization and corruption: Evidence from around the world. Journal of Public Economics, 93(1-2), 14-34. doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.09.001