Title

The hard road to presentism

Document Type

Journal article

Source Publication

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly

Publication Date

9-1-2014

Volume

95

Issue

3

First Page

314

Last Page

335

Abstract

It is a common criticism of presentism - the view according to which only the present exists - that it errs against truthmaker theory. Recent attempts to resolve the truthmaker objection against presentism proceed by restricting truthmaker maximalism (the view that all truths have truthmakers), maintaining that propositions concerning the past are not made true by anything, but are true nonetheless. Support for this view is typically garnered from the case for negative existential propositions, which some philosophers contend are exceptions to truthmaker maximalism. In this article, we argue that a 'no truthmakers' approach to the truthmaker objection is critically flawed.

DOI

10.1111/papq.12029

Print ISSN

02790750

E-ISSN

14680114

Publisher Statement

Copyright © 2014 University of Southern California and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

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Recommended Citation

Asay, J., & Baron, S. (2014). The hard road to presentism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 95(3), 314-335. doi: 10.1111/papq.12029