Title

Intuitions

Document Type

Edited book

Publication Date

2014

Publisher

Oxford University Press

Keywords

metaphilosophy, methodology, intuitions, science, epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, experimental philosophy

Abstract

What are intuitions? Should we ever trust them? And if so, when? Do they have an indispensable role in science, e.g. in thought experiments, as well as in philosophy? Or should appeal to intuitions be abandoned altogether? This book brings together leading early- to late-career philosophers, to tackle such questions. It presents state-of-the-art thinking on the topic. The chapters in the first part of the book discuss the epistemological and metaphysical standing of intuitions; the chapters in the second part look at how intuitions are used in disciplines besides philosophy, and in sub-disciplines of philosophy; the chapters in the final part consider the challenges to intuitions-driven philosophy from experimental philosophy and contemporary analytic metaphysics.

DOI

10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609192.001.0001

ISBN

9780191669125

Publisher Statement

Copyright © Oxford University Press 2014.

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Full-text Version

Publisher’s Version

Recommended Citation

Booth, A. R., & Rowbottom, D. P. (Eds.) (2014). Intuitions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609192.001.0001