Media ownership, concentration and corruption in bank lending
Journal of Financial Economics
Bank lending, Bank supervision, Corruption, Media concentration, Ownership
Building on the pioneering study by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2006), this study examines the effects of media ownership and concentration on corruption in bank lending using a unique World Bank data set covering more than 5,000 firms across 59 countries. We find strong evidence that state ownership of media is associated with higher levels of bank corruption. We also find that media concentration increases corruption both directly and indirectly through its interaction with media state ownership. In addition, we find that media state ownership and media concentration both accentuate the positive link between official supervisory power and lending corruption and attenuate the negative link between the regulations that empower private monitoring and corruption in lending. Media state ownership or media concentration also accentuates the positive link between banking concentration and corruption in lending. Furthermore, the links between media structure and corruption are more pronounced when the borrowing firm is privately owned.
Copyright © 2010 Elsevier B.V.
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Houston, J. F., Lin, C., & Ma, Y. (2011). Media ownership, concentration and corruption in bank lending. Journal of Financial Economics, 100(2), 326-350. doi: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.12.003