Title

Friend or foe? The role of state and mutual fund ownership in the split share structure reform in China

Document Type

Journal article

Source Publication

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis

Publication Date

6-1-2010

Volume

45

Issue

3

First Page

685

Last Page

706

Abstract

The recent split share structure reform in China involves the nontradable shareholders proposing a compensation package to the tradable shareholders in exchange for the listing rights of their shares. We find that state ownership (the major owners of nontradable shares) has a positive effect on the final compensation ratio. In contrast, mutual fund ownership (the major institutional owner of tradable shares) has a negative effect on the compensation ratio and especially in state-owned firms. The evidence is consistent with our predictions that state shareholders have incentives to complete the reform quickly and exert political pressure on mutual funds to accept the terms without a fight.

DOI

10.1017/S0022109010000190

Print ISSN

00221090

E-ISSN

17566916

Publisher Statement

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Full-text Version

Publisher’s Version

Recommended Citation

Firth, M., Lin, C., & Zou, H. (2010). Friend or foe? The role of state and mutual fund ownership in the split share structure reform in China. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 45(3), 685-706. doi: 10.1017/S0022109010000190