Document Type

Journal article

Source Publication

Economics Letters

Publication Date

10-2012

Volume

117

Issue

1

First Page

337

Last Page

339

Keywords

Visibility; Incentive pay; Implicit regulation

Abstract

This paper seeks evidence of implicit regulation of executive pay. The implicit regulation hypothesis suggests highly visible companies will constrain their behavior to avoid potential reprisals from constituents, politicians and potential regulators. We extend this literature using a measure of corporate visibility based on the number of news stories about each firm in a balanced panel of 242 public companies.

DOI

10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.044

Print ISSN

01651765

E-ISSN

18737374

Publisher Statement

Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.

Full-text Version

Accepted Author Manuscript

Recommended Citation

Rayton, B. A., Brammer, S., & Cheng, S. (2012). Corporate visibility and executive pay. Economics Letters, 117(1), 337-339. doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.044