Chinese approaches to institutionalizing regional multilateralism

Chien Peng CHUNG

Lingnan University, Hong Kong, cp2chung@ln.edu.hk

Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.ln.edu.hk/capswp

Part of the Political Science Commons, and the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons

Recommended Citation


This Paper Series is brought to you for free and open access by the Centre for Asian Pacific Studies 亞洲太平洋研究中心 at Digital Commons @ Lingnan University. It has been accepted for inclusion in CAPS Working Paper Series by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Lingnan University.
Working Paper Series
Centre for Asian Pacific Studies

No. 161 (Oct 05) CAPS

Chinese Approaches to Institutionalizing Regional Multilateralism

Chien-peng Chung

Lingnan University
Hong Kong
Chinese Approaches to
Institutionalizing Regional Multilateralism

Chien-peng Chung

October 2005
Dr. Chien-peng Chung is Assistant Professor in Department of Politics and Sociology, Lingnan University, Hong Kong.

Centre for Asian Pacific Studies
Lingnan University
Tuen Mun
Hong Kong
Tel: (852) 2616 7427
Fax: (852) 2465 5786
Email: caps@LN.edu.hk
http://www.LN.edu.hk/caps/

CAPS and CPPS Working Papers are circulated to invite discussion and critical comment. Opinions expressed in them are the author’s and should not be taken as representing the opinions of the Centres or Lingnan University. These papers may be freely circulated but they are not to be quoted without the written permission of the author. Please address comments and suggestions to the author.
Abstract

Over the last few years, China has promoted all kinds of regional and sub-regional cooperation in Asia. However, the extent of China’s drive for institutionalization of cooperative regional multilateral processes is limited by two realist considerations: I) Distribution of power among the forum participants, and whether the major players are well-disposed towards China or not so and II) the importance of the issues that the specific forum is set up to deal with, particularly to the political, economic or security interests of China, but also that of other participating states.

China has successfully pushed for a high degree of institutionalization with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) because the only other major participant (Russia) is a friend, and members have a salient accord in pursuing the aims of anti-terrorism and trade promotion. The Six-Party Talks (6PT) is minimally institutionalized because, although the issue of nuclear disarmament of North Korea is important to China, there are many heavy players with their own agenda in the forum (U.S., Japan, and Russia). North Korea itself is a maverick, and the participants have yet to take concrete steps in resolving many issues pertaining to North Korea giving up its nuclear weapons program. The semi-institutionalized character of the ASEAN + 3 reflects the consultative nature of the forum that leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China, Japan and

---

1 This paper was written with the help of my research assistant; Fong Pui Chi. The author gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Lingnan University Research and Postgraduate Studies Committee for the funding of this project. Readers are invited to share comments on this first draft with the author (cp2chung@LN.edu.hk).
South Korea have decided upon, and competition for influence between China and Japan. To increase cooperation with ASEAN without the presence of foreign powers, China has worked towards institutionalizing a separate China-ASEAN axis within the rubric of ASEAN + 3.

Over the last few years, a major development in international politics has been the institutionalization of several regional multilateral processes in Northeast, East and Central Asia, with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a prime mover of this development. Institutionalization helps promote greater international cooperation, but the process occurs only when actors make a conscious and public decision to create a specific ruled-based organizational form to facilitate their cooperation. The potential for institutionalization thus depends on the actors who are entitled to participate, the distribution of power held by these actors, their interests in establishing institutionalized cooperation, and the characteristics of the issue-area to be addressed, in constituting a multilateral regime.

A multilateral regime refers to a set of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, organization plans, efforts and commitments that have been accepted by a group of states. Multilateral regimes are formed for the purpose of promoting cooperation among states with shared interests, establishing expectations of patterns of behavior, and reducing transaction and search costs. Such collective arrangements are turned to by states when national objectives cannot be achieved unilaterally or through bilateral arrangements. It is not necessary for the constituent states of a regime to share similar values or outlooks, as long as they share common policy purposes.

---

The most elemental evidence of institutionalization is a clearer articulation of the functional goals and behavioral norms of the regime. This usually involves creating a greater number of norms, clarifying those norms in more detail, changing from informal norms to formal rules, and bringing more rules and permanent forums into the process.5

The establishment of a permanent organization to administer some policy domain represents an additional degree of institutionalization beyond a decentralized communications network and a set of rules to guide actors.6 An organization is thus a relatively stable group of officials bound by a common purpose, which often extends to concrete entities with headquarters, permanent staffs, budgets, internal procedures, and other resources that can shape policies or norms.7

The political scientist Samuel P. Huntington has devised several criteria for measuring political institutionalization in an organization:8 1) the longer an organization has been in existence, the higher the level of institutionalization. 2) An organization that has survived one or more changes in its principal functions is more institutionalized than one that is not. 3) The more complex an organization is, the more institutionalized it is. Complexity may involve both multiplication of organizational subunits, hierarchically and functionally, and differentiation of separate types of the organizational subunits. 4) Political institutionalization, in the sense of autonomy, means the development of political organizations and procedures that are more than just expressions of the interests of a particular individual, family, clan or social group.

The above measurements are yardsticks against which China’s achievements in institutionalizing regional multilateral regimes in the Asian region can be appraised. China’s involvement in constructing multilateral regimes or institutions reflects not only an aspiration to

6 Smith, Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy, 46.
7 Smith, Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy, 46.
shape the rules of the game for regional cooperation, but also its increasing level of comfort in subscribing to norms of predictable and interdependent behavior among states. So doing also advances China’s national interest and projects its influence by raising its positive profile and dispelling concerns and misgivings about China’s growing economic and military strengths. Apart from China’s rising power, its expanding diplomatic influence and increasing activism in regional multilateral institutions, some of which do not involve the United States, is recognized as a key development in Asian affairs.

As recently as ten years ago, academic conventional wisdom held that the government of the PRC conducted its diplomacy at multilateral economic and security forums in the East Asia-Western Pacific region in a tepid manner, and opposed efforts at institutionalizing these forums, for fear that giving them structure would constrain its own national interests and lead to its sovereignty claims over Taiwan being questioned.

Between 1997 and 2001, the Chinese government’s perception of regional and particularly security-related multilateral organizations evolved from suspicion, to uncertainty, to supportiveness. China’s increasingly positive assessment of regional dialogue groups and organizations principally reflects its evolving recognition that these institutions are neither intrinsically hostile to China nor potential tools of the U.S. set on constraining it. China has in fact come to realize

---

10 This point was made by Alastair Ian Johnston in his chapter on “Socialization in International Institutions: The ASEAN Way and International Relations Theory,” in International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, ed. G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 107-162. Johnston was describing China’s willingness to be “socialized” into certain norms adopted by member states of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), but the parallel is close enough to be applied here.
13 Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia,” 69, 73.
that these groupings wish to engage China in the long-term, are open to Chinese perspectives on preserving sovereignty norms and seeking cooperative rather than collective security in interstate discourse, and may even be of use in balancing U.S. power and influence in the region. Diplomats from the Department of Asian Affairs of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs who attended various official multilateral forums led the way in convincing their bureaucratic superiors and national leaders that China’s cooperation in multilateral settings help reassure others of its best intentions and avert hostile reactions to its growing power. By 1999-2000, Chinese international affairs experts concluded that for a peaceful environment conducive to domestic political stability and economic development to take place, China needed to be more proactive in shaping its regional environment and pursuing a “Good Neighbor Policy.”

Overcoming traditional nationalistic sensitivities and fears of possible obstructionist policies being pursued by some foreign countries in multilateral forums, China’s third generation leaders under Jiang Zemin perceived that China should discharge its responsibilities in international society commensurate with its status and influence as a rising power with one-fifth of the world’s population. More than anything else, this understanding has led to China’s late but full-blown participation in a plethora of regional multilateral organizations. China’s leaders have given multilateral cooperation a prominent place in its national security doctrine, which envisages the development of a virtuous cycle of mutual security through cooperative means. China has since successfully tied its national economic and security interest and international standing to its promotion of multilateral cooperative

strategies and organizations, as a form of "sovereignty enlargement" and "extension of nationalism."\(^\text{17}\)

To convince Asian states that China's rise will not threaten the present regional order and their national interests, and to use its role and diplomacy in Asia as a launch pad for greater influence in world affairs, China has eagerly promoted all kinds of regional and sub-regional cooperation in Asia. China is making active and skillful use of regional multilateral economic and security institutions, such as the ASEAN+3 (10+3) / ASEAN + China (10+1),\(^\text{18}\) Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and Six-Party Talks (6PT), where PRC officials regularly attend summit meetings, ministerial conferences, and working conferences, to accelerate regional integration and cooperation with neighboring states. In the process of Asian integration, China is playing the role of the leading state, or that of the principal facilitator or mediator, with the support or at least acquiescence of the U.S., Russia, Japan, and ASEAN, to further the process of structuralizing or institutionalizing the 6PT, SCO and the 10+3/10+1.

According to Fu Ying, former Director-General of the PRC Foreign Ministry's Department of Asian Affairs and current PRC Ambassador to Australia, China supports de-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula and will establish a framework to strengthen regional cooperation with ASEAN+3 and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as two key points.\(^\text{19}\) The PRC will also carry out political and security dialogues and cooperation within the structure of ASEAN+3, and will continue to push for trilateral cooperation involving China, Japan and Korea.\(^\text{20}\) Both the ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+1 processes have been managed since the mid-1990s within the same PRC Foreign Ministry apparatus.


\(^{18}\) In this article, the terms ASEAN+3 and 10+3 are used interchangeably, as are the terms ASEAN + China, ASEAN+1, and 10+1, as all these terms are invariably used in the scholarly literature to refer to these processes.


\(^{20}\) Fu, "China and ASEAN in a New Era," 311.
namely, the Division for Regional Cooperation of the Asian Department.\textsuperscript{21}

In keeping with the measures laid out at the beginning, the degree of institutionalization of a regional multilateral organization is more or less collectively determined by an upward index of objectives outlined and achieved, established norms and procedures or written set of rules, presence or size of physical structures or a permanent staff, committees created, regularity and level of meetings, and longevity. It is difficult to address the issue of age, since the organizations under analysis are all created within the last ten years. However, notwithstanding China's obvious enthusiasm for helping to establish, develop and structuralize regional multilateral organizations, it is apparent that the 6PT, 10+3 and SCO reflect low, middle and high levels of institutionalization. (See Appendix) This is even though the forums have become progressively institutionalized as the four party talks (4PT) transformed into the six party talks (6PT), the Shanghai-5 expanded to become the SCO, and China's relations with ASEAN consolidated within the 10+3 structure into the 10+1.

This paper assert that the extent of China's push for institutionalization of cooperative regional multilateral processes rests primarily on two rather realist considerations: I) Distribution of power among the forum participants, and whether the major players are well-disposed towards China or not so and II) the importance of the issues that the specific forum is set up to deal with, particularly in relation to the political, economic or security interests of China, but also that of other participating states. The process of institutionalizing the 6PT, SCO and the concurrent 10+3/10+1, and the obstacles faced in their structural development, serves to show up these differences.

This paper could find no support for the popular claims that either membership size of a multilateral organization affects the degree of cooperation among its participants, or that China has a certain preference for institutionalizing economic multilateral forums but not

security-oriented ones, although it is true that China will not allow the status of Taiwan to be discussed at any of these forums, which it considers to be an internal affairs of the Chinese nation. We shall return to these two claims at the conclusion.

This study looks at China's involvement in constructing and institutionalizing regional inter-governmental multilateral regimes or structures, centered on Asian countries, and aimed at addressing regional challenges; namely, the 4PT/6PT, Shanghai-5/Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and ASEAN+3/ASEAN+1. Reasons why other multilateral institutions that involve China, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), or Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), are excluded from this discussion are that they are not primarily driven by China, and are really inter-regional or inter-continental organizations that are largely forums for discussions and consultative in nature. The interests, concerns and values of the countries involved are just too diverse for any degree of institutionalization to occur. To call the APEC or ARF regional institutions is really to stretch the term "regional" to breaking point — unless the vast Pacific Ocean is to be considered the heart of a "region," and the ASEM countries are geographically non-contiguous. Although the U.S. is not geographically part of East Asia, heavy East Asian trade dependence on the U.S., plus its network of alliances and commitments in the region left over from the Cold War, makes it a power with compelling regional interests and concerns in East Asia.

China's Approaches to the 4PT / 6PT

The 4PT and the subsequent 6PT flowed out of the failure to fulfill the terms of the Framework Accord reached in 1994 between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), or North Korea, and the US, under which North Korea would give up its nuclear-weapons making capabilities, in exchange for fuel oil deliveries from the US and assistance to build two light-water reactors from Japan and South Korea. The 4PT between the US, North Korea, China and South Korea on keeping the Korean peninsula nuclear-free, held in three preparatory meetings and six rounds of talks between December 1997 and August
1999, failed largely because North Korea had wanted direct talks with the US, which was also China's position then, while the US had wanted to involve at least Japan, if not Russia as well, in the talks, especially if economic incentives or sanctions were to be considered as options to induce North Korea to abandon its nuclear program.

Since the North Korean leadership admitted to visiting US Assistant Secretary James Kelly in October 2002 that the DPRK was enriching uranium for nuclear weapons, then expelled the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors who monitored North Korea's compliance with the Accord, and in January 2003, withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the US had wanted the nuclear issue settled through multilateral diplomacy, while North Korea wanted to conclude a bilateral non-aggression treaty with the US. By providing a neutral "good office," and brokering a trilateral talk among the US, DPRK and China in April 2003, as a compromise for the other two parties, China played a pivoted role in breaking the standoff. The US then impressed upon an initially reluctant China the need to host an expanded series of talks comprising the six parties of the US, China, North Korea, South Korea, Japan and Russia.

To bring all parties of the proposed 6PT to the table, Chinese diplomats engaged in a flurry of "shuttle diplomacy" between Pyongyang, Washington, Tokyo, Seoul and Moscow in July 2003. As host of the 6PT, the Chinese spared no efforts to cater to the sensibilities of the negotiating parties. At the Beijing Diaoyutai State Guest House meeting venue, the six delegations were arranged in an alphabetical order around a large hexagonal table, with the DPRK diplomats sitting to the left of the US delegation and opposite the South Korean team. These shuttle and tabular arrangements would be the order of business for all subsequent 6PTs.

After the second round of talks, China successfully pushed the participating states to set up a permanent working group of senior

---

officials, and after both second and third rounds of talks, China issued a written Chairman’s Statement. In the latest fourth round, host Beijing presented a joint document draft for the consideration of the delegates, but despite having to revise it twice, still could not get it accepted by all the participants before that round went into recess.

Although the 6PT is conducted at the level of the deputy foreign minister of participating countries rather than the slightly lower rank of assistant foreign minister or ambassador at the 4PT, when the fourth round went into recess after twelve days of negotiation on 6 August 2005, the 6PT is still ad hoc or minimally institutionalized because:

- Although the issue of nuclear disarmament of North Korea and the preservation of a nuclear-weapons-free Korean peninsula is important to China, the participants have yet to agree on what they should do to induce North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons program.

- Although China was trusted enough by all participants to host the 6PT, there are many heavy players in the forum with their own agenda.

  - North Korea itself is a maverick and no other participant in the 6PT knows what it will accept to give up its nuclear weapons program. North Korea has demanded US economic aid, security guarantees and diplomatic recognition prior to giving any promises of eliminating its nuclear weapons program. Pyongyang has not agreed to a Chinese draft proposal at the 4th round of the 6PT that would have required it to give up its entire nuclear program, even for electricity generation.

  - US demands “complete, verifiable and irreversible” abandonment of North Korea’s highly-enriched uranium

---

(HEU) program, as well as its plutonium program, either for weapons making or electricity generation, before it will provide that country with the security guarantees, including diplomatic recognition, that it had asked for. Washington opposes a peaceful nuclear power program for electricity generation out of proliferation concerns. 26

- Japan wants to include human rights and past cases of abduction of Japanese citizens to North Korea in 6PT discussions.

- China considers North Korea a buffer state against US forces in South Korea and does not wish to see the collapse of the Kim Jong-il regime as a result of US coercive action on North Korea.

- South Korea has indicated that it is willing to supply the North with all of its electricity, and both Russia and China promised more economic aid, if Pyongyang pledges to give up its nuclear weapons program.

- China’s leverage is by far the greatest because it is the major provider of food and fuel to the malfunctioning economy of North Korea. China, Russia and South Korea are against economic sanctions or military strikes against North Korea to coerce it into giving up its nuclear power program.

- The Chinese, together with the Koreans, have strong memories of Japanese imperialism and its atrocities, and oppose the use of the North Korean nuclear issue or terrorism as a means for the Japanese government to justify an increased role for Japan’s Self-Defense Forces in regional security and international

peacekeeping activities, as well as any augmentation of its military capabilities. 27

- Even though China and the U.S. share the objective of a nuclear weapons-free Korean Peninsula, the interests and policies of China and the U.S. diverge across a number of important regional issues, notably U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, and China’s increasingly warm ties with ASEAN, Russia, and South Korea. China is now the largest trading partner of South Korea, a U.S. ally, and the strong state of bilateral ties has been a key factor in forging the 6PT, as Beijing has been closely coordinating its position with Seoul in the talks. 28

After the fourth round of talks resumed on 13 September 2005, the PRC presented the delegates with another draft, which was debated upon and accepted after six days. In the final Joint Statement, North Korea agreed in principle to halt its nuclear-weapons program, rejoin the NPT, and allow IAEA inspectors back into the country, while the US gave an assurance not to attack North Korea, and the other five countries promised to provide an unspecified amount of energy aid to North Korea. 29 Issues such as the peaceful use of nuclear energy by North Korea and the normalization of its relations with US and Japan are left for future discussions. Based on past behavior, there is every possibility that North Korea might renege on the deal. 30 To implement the commitments agreed upon, and work out remaining differences, further rounds of the 6PT will have to be held.

China’s Approaches to the 10+3/10+1

The 10+3 forum was instituted when the leaders of China, Japan and South Korea met as a group with their counterparts from the 10

countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Kuala Lumpur in December 1997 amidst the Asian financial crisis. The leaders issued their first “Joint Statement on East Asian Cooperation” at the third 10+3 Summit held in Manila in November 1999, and set in motion a series of meetings between the foreign, finance and economic ministers of the grouping.\(^{31}\)

As the original goal of the grouping was to stabilize East Asia’s economies after the Asian crisis, the finance ministers of all 10+3 states came together in the Thai city of Chiang Mai in 1999 to work out a regional currency-swap mechanism, by which the thirteen countries would lend one another part of their hard currency reserves if any of their currencies came under speculative pressure. The financial crisis which inspired the Chiang Mai Initiative led to a series of meetings that in turn developed trust among the 10+3 countries. China enhanced its reputation in the region by maintaining the value of its currency and contributing to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) rescue package for Thailand.

At the 6\(^{th}\) ASEAN+3 Summit held in Phnom Penh on 4 November 2002, China announced that it would waive all or most of the debt owed to it by Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Burma. By acting responsibly in not devaluing its currency, as widely feared, and by offering aid packages and low-interest loans to several Southeast Asian countries, the PRC government did much to replace the image of China as aloof or arrogant with one of China as a helpful neighbor and responsible power, and the welcomed response boosted the confidence of China’s leaders in their roles as regional actors.\(^{32}\)

China’s interest in institutionalizing regional multilateral processes in Asia coincides with, and is propelled by, the substantial intensification of intra-regional trade and investment within the last two decades and the growth of regional production networks and supply chains centered

---


\(^{32}\) Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia,” 68.
first on Japan, and increasingly on China. Asian leaders have been given a strong incentive, especially since the 1990s, to pursue closer relations to give the region balance against the possible development of exclusive blocs elsewhere, particularly in Europe and North America. The stronger than expected growth of China and the recovery and strengthening of foreign direct investment between ASEAN and the other three countries are also significant forces in consolidating the grouping. There are also arguments increasingly made by East Asians that the region needs to develop a regional identity to balance the influence of the U.S. in Asia, increase its weight in the world and have a stronger voice in global financial and trade institutions. These material and ideational vectors for Asian regionalism have, if anything, become more salient as time passes.

China has supported the formation of the East Asian Vision Group of academics in 1999, which came up with the blueprint report “Towards an East Asian Community” in 2002. China has also taken the initiative to push for the creation of a Network of East Asia Think-Tanks (NEAT). In November 2001, a group of experts from member states of the ASEAN+3 presented a proposal to their leaders calling not only for trade and financial liberalization, but also for strengthened cooperation in the political, security, social and cultural fields to create a regional community. At the 10+3 summit in 2002, China suggested that the ASEAN+3 process be expanded to include regional political

33 Paul Evans, “Nascent Asian regionalism and Its Implications for Canada,” unpublished manuscript prepared for the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada’s Roundtable on the Foreign Policy Dialogue and Canada-Asia Relations, 4. According to Evans, while intra-Asian trade in the early 1980s was about 25% of all trade conducted by Asian countries, twenty years later, the figure had exceeded 50%.


36 Evans, “Nascent Asian regionalism and Its Implications for Canada,” 5.


and security issues such as combating terrorism and other trans-national crime. Since then, ASEAN+3 has evolved into something much more complex, including the promotion of confidence-building measures and traditional and non-traditional security in the region. At the ASEAN+3 Summit in October 2003, PRC Premier Wen Jiabao formally enunciated a “Good Neighbor Policy” for China specifically directed toward its Asian neighbors, which it had already been practicing since the 1980s, albeit then on a largely bilateral basis, and indicated that China is fully amendable to the “ASEAN Way” of incremental consensus building and group decision-making. Lately, South Korea has proposed creating an integrated ASEAN+3 “e-government center” in Seoul in 2006 to act as a bridge to smooth exchanges in such fields as human resources, technical support, education and training, a move that is supported by China.

On the verge of consolidating a distinct regional identity as the East Asian Community, ASEAN+3 promises much and is displaying signs of institutional consolidation. There are currently 48 dialogue mechanisms under the 10+3 process, coordinating 16 areas of cooperation, which include economics, finance, foreign affairs, politics, security, labor, health, tourism, environment, agriculture, forestry, social welfare, energy, transnational crime, information and communications technology (ICT) and youth affairs. By April 2005, 16 bilateral currency swap arrangements have been signed under the Chiang Mai Initiative, amounting to US$37.5 billion, although this represents only a mere fraction of the combined foreign exchange reserves of around US$2.5 trillion at the disposal of East Asian states.

39 Joint Communiqué of the First ASEAN Plus Three Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC+3) Bangkok, 10 January 2004; http://www.aseansec.org/15645.htm
However, despite talks of setting up a free trade area, an Asian Bonds Market that would issue bonds denominated in local currencies,\(^43\) and an Asian Monetary Fund type of financial arrangement,\(^44\) the grouping has arguably delivered relatively little so far.\(^45\) Although there are regular meetings of 10+3 leaders, ministers, and senior officials, and documents to set and record the agenda of these meetings, there is no secretariat, permanent staff, binding agreement, or written set of rules to structure the grouping.

The semi-institutionalized character of the 10+3 principally reflects several factors:

- The preference exhibited by the leaders and ministers of the 10 ASEAN countries and China, Japan and South Korea for maintaining the consensual-building approach of the forum and non-binding nature of understandings reached - the fabled “ASEAN Way” - to avoid or minimize open conflict.

- Except for Malaysia’s erstwhile Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohammed, almost all the other leaders of ASEAN were not in favor of creating a separate 10+3 secretariat,\(^46\) for fear of diluting ASEAN’s own influence within the enlarged grouping, but consented to the establishment of a 10+3 Unit within the existing ASEAN Secretariat in December 2003 to coordinate and monitor 10+3 cooperation.

- China’s proposal at the sixth 10+3 Summit in November 2002, which suggested that the 10+3 process be expanded from economic cooperation to include regional political and security

---

\(^{43}\) Dent, “Taiwan and the New Regional Political Economy of East Asia,” 392.

\(^{44}\) Nabers, “The Social Construction of international institutions: the case of ASEAN+3,” 130.


issues such as combating terrorism and other trans-national crime, may actually have diffused the focus of the process.

- Even though the 10+3 countries have developed a non-traditional security agenda for cooperation and consultation, to address “piracy, drug-trafficking, illegal migration, smuggling of small arms, money laundering, cyber crime, international terrorism and other issues affecting human security,” they have been very cautious about expanding cooperation or even discussion beyond a non-traditional security agenda, for fear of provoking US concerns that it will turn into an institution that provides China with a vehicle to dominate East Asian politics and undermine US presence and interest in the region.

- Head-to-head competition for influence in Southeast Asia between China and Japan, and Japan’s refusal so far to acquiesce in China’s leadership in the 10+3:

  One of the main reasons for Japan’s participation in 10+3 is to balance or dilute the influence of China in Southeast Asia, which Japan has for decades considered to be its investment destination, export platform, and resource area. By aggressively pursuing a strong China-ASEAN axis within the 10+3 since the 2001 to establish a free trade area (FTA) between China and ASEAN, China has triggered strong competition between itself and Japan for influence in Southeast Asia. Observers widely see the Japanese government’s decision to set up a study group to look into the conclusion of a “closer economic partnership” with ASEAN as a belated attempt to compete and catch up with China’s proposal for the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area.

---

Japan is seeking cooperation with 10+3 countries, but because of its important trade and investment links with the US and western countries, wants to prevent the forum from integrating into an exclusionary economic bloc, and desires an East Asian “community” of nations that would include 10+3 countries as well as Australia, New Zealand, and even India.  

Japan launched an initiative to set up an Asian Monetary Fund in the midst of the Asian crisis as a lender of last resort to affected countries, but quickly retracted the idea once the U.S. objected to it as an avenue to circumvent International Monetary Fund conditionality. Japan desires to act as the leader of the region, yet it tries to do nothing within or without the 10+3 that might earn it the disapproval of the U.S. government and harm their close bilateral economic relations and security alliance.

To increase across-the-board and yet more concrete cooperation with ASEAN without the presence of a potentially obstructionist foreign power, and to some extent, marginalize Taiwan’s diplomatic and economic involvement with Southeast Asian states, China has worked toward institutionalizing a separate China-ASEAN 10+1 axis within the rubric of 10+3. Within 10+1, China is taking the leading role in sub-regional integration with Southeast Asia, with strengthening economic ties laying a solid foundation for political, security and other functional relationships between China and ASEAN. China is pushing institutionalization of the 10+1 along the “ASEAN Way,” at a pace that both China and ASEAN countries are comfortable with.

10+1 has as its genesis the first China-ASEAN Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOM) at Hangzhou, China, in April 1995. Despite Beijing’s initial reluctance to discuss disputes about sovereignty and jurisdiction in the South China Sea, following the PLA occupation of the disputed Mischief Reef, Chinese senior officials agreed to informal discussions on the Spratlys at the first China-ASEAN SOM, and accepted that this

issue would be broached and tabled in subsequent China-ASEAN meetings.\textsuperscript{50} At the second China-ASEAN SOM in June 1996, Beijing avowed the norms of restraint, non-use of force, and peaceful settlement of conflict.\textsuperscript{51}

The China-ASEAN dialogue was instituted in July 1996. There are five parallel mechanisms that form the overall structure of the ASEAN-China dialogue. They are the ASEAN-China Joint Cooperation Committee (ACJCC), ASEAN-China Senior Officials Political Consultations, ASEAN-China Joint Committee on Economic and Trade Cooperation, ASEAN-China Joint Science and Technology Committee, and ASEAN Committee in Beijing. Inaugurated in February 1997, the ACJCC acts as the coordinator of all ASEAN-China dialogue mechanisms at the working group level,\textsuperscript{52} and manage the small ASEAN-China Co-operative Fund which finances studies for joint projects. December 1997 witnessed China's attendance at the first informal China-ASEAN summit.

At their summit in 2002, China and ASEAN signed four key agreements: The Declaration on Conduct (DOC) in the South China Sea; the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation and Establishment of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area; the Joint Declaration on Cooperation in the Field of Non-traditional Security Issues; and the Memorandum of Understanding on Agricultural Cooperation.

With the DOC, Beijing reaffirmed the norms of restraint, non-use of force, and peaceful settlement of conflict in handling its disputes with other claimants over the South China Sea islands. The Sino-ASEAN Economic Agreement in 2002 aims to build a China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) by 2010. A particularly enticing aspect of the Agricultural Memorandum to Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and Myanmar

\textsuperscript{50} Jurgen Haacke, \textit{Asean's diplomatic and security culture, origins, development and prospects} (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon 2003), 125.
\textsuperscript{51} Haacke, \textit{Asean's diplomatic and security culture}, 129.
is its “Early Harvest” provision, by which China undertakes to extend preferential tariff and other treatments to the agricultural, fruit and meat imports of these countries immediately without expectation of reciprocity for five years. The Joint Declaration on Non-traditional Security aims to promote cooperation in combating cross-border drug smuggling, human trafficking, money-laundering, spread of epidemics, and terrorist activities.

Under the 10+1 mechanism, China has identified five important areas for cooperation, in agriculture, information technology, human resource development, mutual economic investments, and development of the Mekong River Basin. Accordingly, since 2002, a tri-annual summit has been held among heads of government and business leaders from China, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and Myanmar, countries connected by the river, on the development of the highways, railways and custom services linking the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS), and the PRC government has backed soft loans to Chinese business interests in the Mekong region. Trade between China and the other GMS countries totaled US$ 25.82 billion in 2004.

At the 7th China-ASEAN summit in Bali, Indonesia, held on 8 October 2003, China entered into a strategic partnership agreement with ASEAN, and became the first non-ASEAN state to formally accede to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), which commits China to respecting the principles of nonaggression and non-interference in the domestic affairs of signatory states.

Although a number of ASEAN states actually compete directly with China in terms of low-wage labor-intensive export manufacturing industries, China is a vast marketplace for ASEAN produce, and ASEAN leaders and business persons generally perceive China and the proposed CAFTA to be much more as an opportunity than as a threat.

---

53 Clarissa Oon, “Beijing to spur investment with soft loans,” Straits Times (Singapore), 5 July 2005, 9.
Trade between China and ASEAN reached US$ 105.8 billion in 2004. It has been said that, “ASEAN countries have realized that China has already become the fastest engine of Asia’s economies, and whoever gets on this locomotive will have a bright future.” China has carried a trade deficit with ASEAN as a whole for the past five years. Unlike during the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, with the improvement in the ASEAN economies, diversion of foreign direct investments (FDI) from Southeast Asia to China is no longer much of an issue.

The political initiative to promote regional stability and coordinate economic policies in East Asia seems to come mostly from China, as it will be difficult for Japan to make its weight felt as long as its economy remains more or less stagnant, as it has been for most of the last fifteen years. Still, neither 10+3 nor 10+1 has yet to establish specific rules or the mechanisms to enforce the common objectives of member-states. China’s sheer size, its authoritarian political structure, and its history of hegemonic attempts over parts of Southeast Asia, together with the unresolved claims to the South China Sea islands, also make it hard to dispel the unease that Southeast Asian countries have toward China. China’s activism in a multilateral setting is a reassuring signal to its neighbors, but not a guarantee of future non-aggressive actions.

**China’s Approaches to the Shanghai-5 / SCO**

After the fall of the Soviet Union in late 1991, the primary concerns of the Russia, China, and the new states of Central Asia – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan – have progressively shifted from demarcating boundaries to promoting border security to establishing regional confidence-building measures to combating what regional policy makers have termed the “three evils”

---

56 Oon, “Beijing to spur investment with soft loans.”


of terrorism, religious extremism and secessionism. To address these transnational issues and challenges, Russia, China and the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstanz and Tajikistan decided to create a regional multilateral forum dubbed the Shanghai-Five — so-called because the first meeting of the heads of state of the grouping took place in China's Shanghai on the 26 April 1996. Since June 2001, with the admission of Uzbekistan into the grouping, its name was changed to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The SCO has in recent years added to its core focus of fighting the “three evils" by advancing cooperation in the fields of interdicting all forms of cross-border smuggling and promoting economic interaction among member states.

The SCO, and its predecessor, the Shanghai-5, is the first multilateral security organization largely initiated and promoted by China. The SCO looks well-institutionalized, as seen from the structure of its organization.  

On 15 June 2001, the day on which the SCO was founded in Shanghai, the ‘Shanghai Convention against Terrorism, Separatism and (Religious) Extremism' was signed by leaders of the member states, clearly defining the cardinal purpose of the organization. China's main goal is to gain the cooperation of Central Asian governments to reduce the threat of Muslim Uighur separatism in Xinjiang.

The SCO Charter, which provides the purposes, principles, structure and operational rules of the organization, by laying a legal foundation for its growth, was adopted by the heads of SCO states meeting in St. Petersburg in June 2002.

The supreme decision-making body of the SCO is the Council of Heads of States. It holds regular sessions once a year and makes decision and issues instructions on all important matters pertaining to the organization.

60 Wang, ‘China's Multilateral Diplomacy in the New Millennium,” 182.
Below this level of meeting, the Council of Heads of Government has held regular meetings once a year since September 2001 to discuss strategies of multilateral cooperation and priorities for the organization, as well as to approve the budget for the following year.

Lower down, there exists the mechanism of annual meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Economy, Transport, Culture, Defence, Law Enforcement; Heads of Department on Extreme Measures (disaster coordination), and General Public Prosecutors.

SCO functions are coordinated by a Council of National Coordinators of SCO member states meeting at least three times a year, and joint working groups under the charge of senior officials in the relevant ministries of member states have been established to tackle issues of common concern.

The SCO has two permanent bodies: 1) The SCO Secretariat, located in Beijing, consists of 30 people delegated by the member countries in proportion to their financial contribution to the SCO budget. The Secretariat works closely with the Council of National Coordinators in preparing drafts, making suggestions, implementing resolutions, and exercising budgetary supervision for the organization. The largest contingent of delegates is from the PRC. 2) The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) in Tashkent. The Secretariat was inaugurated on 15 January 2004 and the 1st meeting of RATS Executive Committee was on 31 October 2003. The combine budget for both the Secretariat and the RATS came to $3.5 million in 2004, with China and Russia each paying 24% of it.

---

Both the SCO Executive Secretary and the RATS Executive Committee Director are appointed by the Council of Heads of States for a period of three years. The first SCO Secretary-General is China’s Zhang Deguang, and the first Director of RATS is Vyacheslav Kasymov from Uzbekistan. Members take turns according to the Russian alphabetical order of their country’s name to serve a three year term. The Secretary is assisted by three deputies in charge of political-security, economic-humanitarian, and administrative-legal-budget affairs, and an assistant secretary in charge of external and media relations.64

What accounts for the high degree of institutionalization in the SCO structure in the relatively short period of 5 years since it was formed?

- The process of institutionalization was already started under the predecessor of the SCO, the Shanghai-Five forum.

  - The “Shanghai-5” mechanism for boundary demarcations and confidence-building between the head of state of China, and those of Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, was established with the holding of its first summit in Shanghai on 26 April 1996. On 26 April 1997, heads of the five countries held a second meeting in Moscow and signed the Agreement on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces along China’s borders with Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

  - At the third summit in Kazakhstan’s Almaty on 3 July 1998, discussions expanded into non-border issues such as cooperation against their common threat of terrorism, religious fundamentalism, and separatism, which soon became the focus of the Shanghai-5 and subsequently the SCO. At the fourth summit in Kyrgyzstan’s Bishkek on 24 August 1999, the group agreed to institute constant meetings between officials of various government departments in member-states.

In November 1999, the heads of law enforcement agencies among the Shanghai-5 countries met for the first time. The first meeting of defence ministers of the group was held in Kazakhstan’s Astana in March 29-30, 2000. The first meeting of the group’s foreign ministers was held on 5 July 2000, just before the fifth Summit at Tajikistan’s Dushanbe. The Dushanbe Summit mooted the idea of establishing a Shanghai-5 Council of National Coordinators to foster regularized coordination for organizational support, which was realized under the SCO. These set of important meetings would become annualized and institutionalized when the Shanghai-5 became the SCO the following year, with the addition of Uzbekistan.

The operating principles of the SCO are under girded by shared norms and interests among its member states.

Although the Shanghai-5 / SCO has stated that it is not a military alliance directed against any external parties, both leadership of China and Russia has been united in a strategic partnership since 1996 against what they see as “hegemonism” and “unipolarity.”

Being newly-independent, Central Asian countries desired international attention and recognition, the support of Russia and China to help them fight Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Hizb-ut-Tahrir, and a reduction of their trade dependence on Russia, and these aims could be achieved in part through joining up with China first in the Shanghai-5 and subsequently the SCO. Even after the overthrow of President Askar Akayev, the new leadership of Kyrgyzstan apparently saw enough value in the SCO

such that it did not even contemplate withdrawing from the organization.

The Dushanbe Declaration issued at the closed of the fifth summit of Shanghai-5 leaders on July 5, 2000, confirmed the right of each state to choose its own path of political, economic, and public policy development, declared against intervention into the internal affairs of other states under the pretext of “humanitarian intervention” and “human rights protection,” and support efforts by member states to protect the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and social stability of member states. This declaration, more than any other document, defines the norms of the Shanghai-5 forum and the succeeding SCO.

At the time that the SCO was founded, member states quickly set about planning for the organization a flag and emblem, permanent secretariat, regional anti-terrorist structure, and budget.

Cooperation among governments against terrorism, religious fundamentalism, and separatism has remained the focus of the SCO, although it has expanded to economic cooperation in the form of encouraging trade, investment and infrastructural development among member countries since the 2003 SCO summit at Moscow, and the crackdown on the trafficking of illicit arms, ammunition, explosives, and particularly narcotics, as well as organized international crime, illegal immigration and mercenary activities, since the 2004 summit at Tashkent.

---

The joint declaration at the end of the July 2005 SCO summit at Kazakhstan's capital Astana called for a timetable for the withdrawal of US-led anti-terrorist forces in Afghanistan, and for a deadline to end the use of temporary facilities and their military contingents' presence in SCO countries, citing the end of large-scale operations against terrorism in Afghanistan. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the US, two SCO countries, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, provided air-base facilities for use by the US military in its actions against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which the US has accused of harboring the master-minds of the 9-11 attacks. Accordingly, the Uzbek government gave U.S. forces 180 days from 29 July 2005 to evict its Karshi-Khanabad air base.

According to SCO Secretary-General Zhang, the organization has initiated 120 projects concerning customs cooperation, cross-border transportation, laws and regulation coherence, energy, and railway construction. The organization has set itself the goal of realizing the free flow of goods, services, capital and technology within a twenty-year time frame from 2005.

The driving force of the SCO is clearly China, as it is an obvious tool for enhancing Chinese power and influence in the region.

China's main goals are to stabilize the region, which is turning out to be a potentially important source of oil and gas for its growing economy, and to get the support of Central Asian governments in its fight against Uighur.

---

74 Xinhua News Agency, "SCO summit starts to push for closer regional cooperation,"
separatists to deny them cross-border funding, equipment or sanctuary. Jiang Zemin became the first PRC Head of State to visit Central Asia in 1996. Since then, either the president or prime minister of China has visited the region at least once a year.

To avoid the SCO from being sidelined by the post 9-11 US military presence in Central Asia, Beijing pushed hard for the institutionalization of a regional anti-terrorist center at the 2002 St. Petersburg summit. At that summit, China managed to pressure the group into taking a stand against the deployment of the theatre missile defense (TMD), for such a US missile shield would make China’s relatively small nuclear deterrent force obsolete.

Reflecting China’s goal of building comprehensive strategic partnerships, at its 2003 annual meeting in Moscow, the SCO expanded its focus from primarily counterterrorism to economic cooperation. The Chinese president made a strong push for an early focus on building transport infrastructure throughout Eurasia.

The joint military exercise between Chinese and Kyrgyz forces in October 2002, and the joint “anti-terrorist” exercise of SCO militaries at the Chinese-Kazakh border in August 2003 effectively turns the grouping into a quasi-military bloc. When China and Russia engaged in their first joint military exercise in August 2005, only observers from other SCO member states were allowed.

Further reflecting China’s instrumental role and influence, a permanent secretariat largely funded by the PRC was

77 Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia,” 74.
created in Beijing in late 2003, and where the PRC maintains the largest number of staff members. China’s Zhang Deguang, former ambassador to Russia, became the first SCO Secretary-General.

Ahead of the 2005 SCO summit at Astana, China’s President Hu Jintao separately forged a strategic partnership with Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev, pledging to support Kazakhstan’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in exchange for a commitment from the latter to help it counter attempts by Xinjiang’s Islamic rebels to seek sanctuary in Kazakhstan. Beijing would also like the Kazakh leader to guarantee delivery of the mutually agreed upon amount of oil and gas through the pipelines which the Chinese are building across his country.

Hu said that China would set aside a special fund for the training of 1500 people from other SCO countries within the next three years, chiefly in the areas of economic, scientific-technical and humanitarian cooperation.

China implicitly condoned the harsh actions of Uzbekistan President Ismail Karimov in putting down protests in Andijan, eastern Uzbekistan, in May 2005, with SCO Secretary Zhang from China calling the disturbance “a terror attack carried out by armed religious extremists.”

When Russia suggested admitting India as an observer, China agreed only if Pakistan and Iran were also admitted.

80 Goh Sui Noi, “Security summit will also discuss economic ties,” Straits Times (Singapore), 5 July 2005.
82 Goh, “Security summit will also discuss economic ties.”
as observers at the same time. Hence, Iran, Pakistan and India became observer members of the SCO at its 2005 summit, joining Mongolia, which was admitted to observer status the year before. The close relationship between China, Russia and Iran may prove to become a major obstacle to American policy in the Central Asian region.

Given China’s dedication to developing the SCO, the only way in which the SCO can fail is if Russia and a majority of its Central Asian members perceive that it is no longer in their interest to stay in the organization, but the SCO has so far remained intact despite one unconstitutional change in the leadership of a constituent state, albeit a small one. This is due not to the fear of displeasing China by withdrawing from the organization, but rather to the shared norms and interests that member states have, and in the greatest likelihood, to the high level of institutionalization exhibited by the SCO, constituting a thickening web of regularized engagement and multiplying issues within which the member states are enmeshed.

Conclusion

The record of China’s attempts at institutionalizing regional multilateral organizations is uneven. China has successfully pushed for a high degree of institutionalization with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) because the only other major participant (Russia) is a friend, and members have a salient accord in pursuing the aims of anti-terrorism and trade promotion. The Six-Party Talks (6PT) is minimally institutionalized because, although the issue of nuclear disarmament of North Korea is important to China, there are many heavy players with their own agenda in the forum (U.S., Japan, and Russia), North Korea itself is a maverick, and the participants have yet to completely agree on what they should do to induce North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons program. The semi-institutionalized

---

character of the ASEAN + 3 reflects the consultative nature of the forum that leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China, Japan and South Korea have decided upon, and competition for influence between China and Japan. To increase cooperation with ASEAN without the presence of foreign powers, China has worked towards institutionalizing a separate China-ASEAN axis within the rubric of ASEAN + 3.

There seems to have been much agreement among scholars in the field of integration studies that increasing the number of participants in a multilateral institution will lead to a decrease in its effectiveness, with more players pursuing their own agenda within the group, increasing transaction costs, and complicating the lines of communication. Yet, increasing the number of parties in the talks on North Korean nuclear disarmament from four to six did not seem to have increased or decreased the effectiveness of the forum in moving it closer to finding a resolution. By expanding its membership from five to six with the addition of Uzbekistan, the transformation of the Shanghai-5 into the SCO actually saw more measures of institutionalization being put in place. When China dealt with ASEAN in a more bilateral fashion by pushing cooperation in the 10+1 within the rubric of the 10+3, the number of countries involved obviously went down, but the efficacy of this sub-grouping seems to be higher than the larger forum. Of course, it will be hard to predict the future effectiveness of the 10+3 when it turns into the East Asian Community in December 2005 with the addition of India, Australia, and New Zealand, or that of the SCO, with the admission of Mongolia, Iran, Pakistan and India as observers.

There exists a minority view that multilateral institutions that start out small will tend to develop a deeper web of cooperation than those that start out with many members, if the cooperative norms of behavior are already well-established by the initial players and adhered to by the new-comers. Indeed, there is some support for this contention, looking at the expansion of the 4PT into the 6PT, the Shanghai-5 into

---

the SCO, and ASEAN into the 10+3/10+1, which saw the broadening and deepening of institutionalization measures. However, this postulation cannot explain the differences in the degree of institutionalization among these forums in which China played a, if not the, leading role. Neither, it seems, can China’s apparent equal enthusiasm in promoting both regional multilateral security forums, such as the 6PT and SCO, or economic ones, such as the ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+1.

East Asian regionalism has been criticized by many observers for lacking a country that is ready and able to play a leadership role in overriding structural difficulties and resolving differences of opinion in integrating the region. China is apparently willing to bear the cost of leading the drive for greater institutionalization in Asian regional organizations because, as compared to reaping the benefits of raising its international status and securing a peaceful and stable external environment for continuing its economic growth, the price tag of leadership, such as hosting and setting the agenda for 6PTs, opening up its market to agricultural imports from the poorest Southeast Asian countries with very low or no tariffs, or budgeting for a secretariat and its permanent staff for the SCO, is really quite low and can be kept relatively well-hidden for a large and authoritarian country like China. As well, the states of Southeast Asia and Central Asia are still concerned with keeping their sovereign independence by subscribing to the principle of non-interference in the affairs of neighboring states, and to the extent that this thinking is shared by China, pursuing cooperative security and functional interdependence with China could pose very little risk to the other Asian states.

This is not the place to discuss whether China’s multilateral diplomacy is a carefully cultivated effort to advance national interests by “reassuring those who might collaborate against a putative China threat,”86 or a genuine conversion to cooperative definitions of national security socialized by the experience of participating in multilateral

organizations. As China scholar Susan Shirk has noted, realpolitick pursuit of national interest does not preclude an idealist commitment to the values of multilateralism, as was the case of the U.S. after World War II, which was able to convince other states that it would not threaten them by creating multilateral global institutions and submitting itself to their authority. \(^{87}\) Suffice to note that China’s enthusiasm toward crafting, sustaining and deepening regional multilateral institutions has only waxed unmitigated.

In Asia, the challenge is to deepen multilateral negotiations and build institutions. However, institutionalization of the Asian regional multilateral processes, in many ways led by China, faces two major limitations. Firstly, no one in Asia is seriously contemplating any schemes for a customs union or common currency, let alone political federation on the scale of the European Union, given the vast differences in the history, culture, and institutions of regional countries. Secondly, the proliferation of bilateral trading arrangements in East Asia, with its “spaghetti bowl effect with different rules and regulations,” may lead to an “interlocking web of FTAs in the region,” but may also hinder the process of regional integration.\(^{88}\)

To the extent that China is pushing for the institutionalization of regional multilateral processes, the scope of its achievement has been shown to be limited by two primary considerations - distribution of power among the forum participants and whether the major players are friendly towards China or not so, which showed up China’s influence relative to the other members; and the importance of the issues that the specific forum is set up to deal with, which shows up the relevance and saliency of China’s proposals to itself and participating countries. Whether China’s institutionalization objectives can transcend these realist constraints remains to be seen.

\(^{87}\) Shirk, “China’s Multilateral Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific,” 5.
\(^{88}\) Ba, “The Politics and Economics of ‘East Asia’ in ASEAN-China Relations,” 182.
Appendix

Table of Comparative Institutionalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6PT</th>
<th>10+3</th>
<th>SCO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President meeting</td>
<td>Head of state meeting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(x1)</td>
<td>(x5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice President meeting</td>
<td>(x1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Premier meeting</td>
<td>Premier meeting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(x6)</td>
<td>(x4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Host: PRC Beijing State Guest House
10+3 Unit established within ASEAN Secretariat
ASEAN TAC signatory
Chairman’s post-talk Statement
Secretariat
RATS
Charter
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6PT</th>
<th>10+3</th>
<th>SCO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Meeting of Ministers</td>
<td>Meeting of Ministers (12 Forums)</td>
<td>Meeting of Ministers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Level of Vice/Deputy Foreign Minister</td>
<td>-Foreign Affairs Till July 2005 (6x)</td>
<td>- Foreign Affairs Till June 2005 (8x)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Minister Till July 2005 (4x) (Irregular)</td>
<td>-Economics Till September 2004 (7x)</td>
<td>(3 extraordinary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Finance Till May 2005 (8x)</td>
<td>- Defense Till May 2002 (2x)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Agriculture and Forestry Till October 2004 (4x)</td>
<td>-Culture Till April 2002 (1x)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Labor Till May 2004 (4x)</td>
<td>-Economy and Trade Till September 2003 (2x)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Tourism Till January 2005 (4x)</td>
<td>-Transport Till Sept 2003 (2x)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Environmental Till October 2004 (3x)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Health Till April 2004 (1x)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Information and Communications Technology Till August 2004 (1x)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Social Welfare and Development Till December 2004 (1x)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Transnational Crime Meeting Till August 2005 (2x)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Energy Ministers meeting Till July 2005 (2x)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6PT Meetings of Working Group Heads</td>
<td>10+3 Meetings of Senior Officials</td>
<td>SCO Meetings of Department Heads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head or Deputy Head of Bureau in Foreign Ministry, position below level of Deputy / Vice Foreign Minister</td>
<td>Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime</td>
<td>Meeting of Heads of law-enforcement bodies and security services (Bishkek Group) Till May 2002 (2x)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ASEAN + 3 Senior Health Officials Meeting on SARS held from 8 to 9 June 2003</td>
<td>Meeting of Heads of Departments on situations and liquidations of consequences of elemental acts Till April 2002 (1x)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Special Senior Labour Officials Meeting on SARS in early July 2003</td>
<td>Meeting of General Public Prosecutors Till September 2003 (2x)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senior Officials Meeting on &quot;Creative Management for Government&quot; May 26, 2005</td>
<td>Meeting of RATS Council Till March 2005 (4x)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Centre for Asian Pacific Studies

Centre Fellows

Department of Economics
Dr. FAN, Chengze Simon (范承澤)
Professor HO, Lok-sang (何潔生)
Professor LIN, Ping (林平)
Professor MA, Yue (馬躍)
Dr. RAN, Jimmy (冉齊鳴)
Dr. VOON, Thomas (溫演鏢)
Professor WEI, Xiangdong (魏向東)

Department of History
Dr. LAU, Chi-pang (劉智鵬)

Department of Politics and Sociology
Professor BAEHR, Peter
Professor BRIDGES, Brian
Dr. CHAN, Che-po (陳智博)
Dr. CHUNG, Chien-peng (鍾健平)
Dr. HARRIS, Paul
Professor LEE, Keng-mun William (李經文)
Professor SIU, Oi-ling (蕭愛玲)
Dr. WONG, Yiu-chung (王耀宗)

Honorary Fellows

Professor LEUNG, Kit-fun, Beatrice (梁潔芬)

Dr. LU, Fei-yun (陸緯云)

Dr. YU, Hongyuan (于宏源)
Centre for Public Policy Studies

Centre Fellows

Department of Economics

Dr. FAN, Cheng-ze Simon (范承澤)
Professor LIN, Ping (林平)
Professor MA, Yue (馬躍)
Dr. VOON, Jan-piaw Thomas (溫演鏢)
Professor WEI, Xiangdong (魏向東)

Department of Politics and Sociology

Dr. HARRIS, Paul
Professor SIU, Oi-ling (蕭愛鈴)

Honorary Fellows

Professor Shi, Kan (時勘)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Author</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>140 (7/03) CPPS</td>
<td>Structural Change and the Narrowing Gender Gap in Wages: Theory and Evidence from Hong Kong</td>
<td>C. Simon Fan and Hon-Kwong Lui</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141 (8/03) CPPS</td>
<td>Managers’ Occupational Stress in China: The Role of Self-efficacy</td>
<td>Chang-qin Lu, Oi-ling Siu and Cary L. Cooper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>142 (9/03) CAPS</td>
<td>Societal Stability and Political Reform: Chinese Politics in the 1990s</td>
<td>Wong Yiu-chung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>143 (10/03) CPPS</td>
<td>The Nexus between Housing and the Macro Economy: Hong Kong as a Case Study</td>
<td>Lok Sang Ho and Gary Wai-chung Wong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>144 (11/03) CAPS</td>
<td>Yesterday's Lei Feng and Today's Young People's Liberation Army Soldiers</td>
<td>Che-po Chan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>145 (12/03) CPPS</td>
<td>A New (and Old) Macroeconomic Policy Framework</td>
<td>Lok Sang Ho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>146 (Jan 04) CAPS</td>
<td>The Economic Challenges for the New Chinese Leadership</td>
<td>Yue Ma (馬躍) and Wang Ping (王平)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>147 (Feb 04) CAPS</td>
<td>China’s Domestic and International Policies on Global Warming: Explanations and Assessment</td>
<td>Paul G. Harris and Yu Hongyuan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>148 (Mar 04) CAPS</td>
<td>Exchange Rate Regimes and the Twin Economies of Hong Kong and Singapore</td>
<td>Yue Ma, Y.Y. Kueh and Raymond C.W. Ng</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>149 (Mar 04) CPPS</td>
<td>Macroeconomic Instability in Hong Kong: Internal and External Factors</td>
<td>Yue Ma, Y.Y. Kueh and Raymond C.W. Ng</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150 (Jul 04) CPPS</td>
<td>Privatization of Public Housing: Did It Cause the 1998 Recession in Hong Kong?</td>
<td>Lok Sang Ho and Gary Wai-chung Wong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151 (Sep 04) CPPS</td>
<td>Globalization, Unemployment, and Excess Capacity: A Model and a Conjecture</td>
<td>Lok Sang Ho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>152 (Oct 04) CPPS</td>
<td>An Alternative Roadmap to Middle East Peace</td>
<td>Lok Sang Ho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>153 (Nov 04) CAPS</td>
<td>Chinese Environmental Attitudes and Climate Change: Survey Findings on Precursors of China’s Domestic and International Policies on Global Warming</td>
<td>Paul G. Harris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>154 (Jan 05) CPPS</td>
<td>Child Labor and the Interaction between the Quantity and Quality of Children</td>
<td>C. Simon Fan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155 (Jan 05) CPPS</td>
<td>Happiness and Public Policy</td>
<td>Lok Sang Ho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>156 (Jun 05) CPPS</td>
<td>True Democracy without Powerful Parties</td>
<td>Lok Sang Ho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Topic</td>
<td>Author</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>157 (Jun 05) CAPS</td>
<td>Distant Neighbours? : Japan-Korea Relations Revisited</td>
<td>Brian Bridges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>158 (Jun 05) CAPS</td>
<td>上海經濟龍頭作用中台商的影響與作用</td>
<td>邱端雲</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>159 (Sep 05) CPPS</td>
<td>Sticky Wage, Efficiency Wage, and Keynesian Unemployment</td>
<td>C. Simon Fan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160 (Oct 05) CAPS</td>
<td>開於中國建立反壟断法體系的幾個基本問題 Some Basic Issues about Establishing an Anti-Monopoly System in China</td>
<td>林平 (Ping LIN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>161 (Oct 05) CAPS</td>
<td>Chinese Approaches to Institutionalizing Regional Multilateralism</td>
<td>Chien-peng Chung</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A full list of working papers titles is also available at the Centre homepages: http://www.LN.edu.hk/caps/ and http://www.LN.edu.hk/cpps/