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The economic challenges for the New Chinese leadership

Yue MA
Ping WANG

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The Economic Challenges for the New Chinese Leadership

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Lingnan University
Hong Kong
The Economic Challenges for the New Chinese Leadership

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January 2004
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Introduction

For the past decades or so China has been recording spectacular economic growth as it has implemented a wide-ranging transformation of its economic system. China has moved from a closed centrally-planned economy to become one of the world’s major trading nations and the largest recipient of foreign investment. However, these dramatic economic changes have brought with them changes in the social and political perceptions, values and aspirations of the Chinese people. The challenge for the Chinese leadership is to manage the various competing demands and chart a balanced mode of development and modernization.

The new Chinese leadership, encapsulated in Hu Jintao, who became Party Secretary-General in November 2002 and State President in March 2003, and Wen Jiabao, who became Premier in March 2003, has stressed the elements of continuity with the past, but at the same time has begun to slowly establish a more populist style of governance. The SARS outbreak was an early test of the new leaders’ mettle from which they emerged with some credit, but other challenges have also had to be faced: rising concern over corruption, the war in Iraq and its aftermath, heightened rhetoric as Taiwanese presidential elections come closer, and international pressures for currency revaluation.

In late September 2003, the Centre for Asian Pacific Studies hosted a Workshop on ‘China under the New Leadership’ to examine some of the challenges that the Hu-Wen
leadership faces and assess their record to date. The participants and presenters drawn from academia, the media, the diplomatic community and the business world joined in discussions which ranged widely over domestic politics, foreign policy, economic policy and social issues. Included in this Working Paper are two of the presentations, which have been up-dated and revised; they are printed in the original language of presentation. Dr Ma Yue, from Lingnan University’s Department of Economics, examines the implications of China’s entry into the World Trade Organisation, while Wang Ping, the Deputy Editor-in-Chief with *China Review*, discusses the impact of the development of the private sector on China’s economy.

In conclusion, I would like to thank Dr Wong Yiu-chung, of Lingnan University’s Department of Politics and Sociology, for conceiving and planning this Workshop.

Brian Bridges
Associate Director of CAPS
The Impact of China's Accession to the WTO*

Abstract

This paper will first review the early concerns about China's entry to the WTO. Then we will evaluate the preliminary impact of the WTO membership on the Chinese economy, which turned out to be better than expected. We also discuss the current international debate on the Chinese currency renminbi revaluation and suggest that a gradual improvement of the current Chinese rigid exchange rate system will be inevitable.

*y Paper prepared for the Workshop on China under New Leadership which was held on 30 September 2003 and organized by the Centre for Asian Pacific Studies, Lingnan University, Hong Kong. I would like to thank Dr Y C Wong to invite me to present this paper in the Workshop and Professor Barton Starr and other workshop participants for their useful comments on an early draft of this paper.

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Finally we will explore the potential problems and challenges to both economies of mainland China and Hong Kong in the future. We argue that international competitions apparently are competitions among quality of goods and services, technological software and hardware. In fact, it is competitions among the institutions. As only the better institutions may attract more resources internationally including both physical capital and human capital. China's determination to enter the WTO after 15 years of long negotiations is as significant as her initial reform from the central planned economy towards a market economy. It signifies that China will reform her traditional market economy towards an internationally competitive market for the 21st century's New Economy. Furthermore, Without doubt, facing such unprecedented challenges both from mainland China and new world economy, Hong Kong must reform her political and economic institutions to foster a new economic partnership with mainland China to sustain her high income and high growth rate in the future.

In this paper I'll first review the early concerns about China's entry to the WTO. Then I will evaluate the preliminary impact of the WTO membership on the Chinese economy. Finally I will discuss the potential problems and challenges to both economies of mainland China and Hong Kong in the future.

At the time when China joined the WTO, the main concerns were focused on her agricultural. The Chinese
agricultural sector has been fully-protected by the government's high tariff policy in the past.

The productivity of Chinese agricultural sector is low and its international competitiveness is weak. The concessions that the Chinese government made in the WTO agreement was believed to be detrimental to the agricultural sector. Given the fact that the Chinese agricultural population is about 60-70% of the total population, the negative impact on the agricultural sector might spill over to other sectors and might create social unrest that would disruptive to national economy as a whole.

Another major concern at that time was the competitiveness of domestic industrial sector. It turned out that in January and March 2003, one year after China joined the WTO, the Chinese trade balances went into deficits at the first time after consecutive seven years of surplus since 1994 (cf. Table 1). People started to concern about the stability of the Chinese currency renminbi as well.

Furthermore, with the intensified competition from foreign enterprises, the banking sector’s bad debt problem becomes only more difficult and takes more time to resolve (Zhao, et al, 2002). The picture of the WTO membership was unclear. There was even suggestion for China to withdraw from the WTO!

Today, after more than one year WTO membership, the initial impact, however, does not seem to be severe. In fact, the economy is better than people expected.
The GDP growth rate in year 2002 was 8%. Despite the SARS, the GDP growth rates at the 1st and 2nd quarters in 2003 were 9.9% and 8.2%, respectively (cf. Table 2). All are higher than 7.3% in year 2001 before China joined the WTO.

The agricultural sector survived well with growth rate of 2.9% in 2002 and average growth rate of 3.1% in the 1st half of 2003. All are higher than the 2.8% growth rate in 2001 before the entry to the WTO.

The exports of the agricultural products have been actually increased, thanks to the unexpected rise of international price of agricultural products during 2002. The imports of agricultural products have been constrained because of the slow reduction of tariffs along the WTO agreement and the fact that the import agents are restricted to be only the state-owned trading companies.

For the Chinese economy as a whole, overall trading surplus reemerged as well after the temporary trade deficits in the early 2003. At the first time, the China’s trade surplus against US is larger than the Japan’s trade surplus against US. Also at the same time, foreign direct investment surged and China has taken over the US to become the largest recipient country of FDI in the world in 2002. The beneficial effects of FDI on the Chinese economy are well-documented (Tsang and Ma, 1997).

The trade surplus together with a large inflow of FDI is good news for China. However, every coin has its two sides. International pressure on the renminbi revaluation has been
increasing. Ironically, this time the pressure is not from speculators but from politicians of Chinese major trading partners in US, Europe, and Asia. China has been subject to repeated criticisms from her trading partners recently on her fixed exchange rate policy. An economic problem has turned into a political dispute. How to resolve this dispute has become an urgent research topic.

Unfortunately, there is no easy answer to this problem. Let me just spell out some aspects of the complexity of this issue without getting too much details due to time constraint. The reform of the Chinese exchange rate system is related to the sequence of the Chinese capital account liberalization and the process of full convertibility of the renminbi (Liu, et al., 2002). It is also related to the problem of bad debt problem of the Chinese banking sector. More importantly, it is related to the impact on the economy here in Hong Kong, especially on the stability of the Hong Kong dollar since the China factor on the economy of Hong Kong is prominent (Ma, et al., 1998).

Internationally, an unstable renminbi and the consequential economic slow down in China would also generate negative impacts on the world economy, especially on the US and other Asian regional economies (Tsang and Ma, 2002). Furthermore, a large sale of US government bonds by the Chinese government at the eve before a large reevaluation of renminbi would increase the market interest rates in the US. This clearly is not the consequence the US government would like to see. In fact, the Chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce in China pointed out that one of the major beneficiaries of the
stable renminbi is the US multinationals invested in China and the US domestic consumers who enjoyed the cheap Chinese goods (Kynge, 2003).

However, on the other hand, a rigid, non-market determined exchange rate system is also no good for the Chinese economy in the long run. This is especially true when the domestic market of China will have been built up and is big and strong enough to buffer international shocks on the renminbi.

Therefore, on the balance, we would expect that another well-accepted gradual reform on the renminbi system in the near future is inevitable, both to release the international political pressure and to improve the exchange rate system itself. In addition, it is like to inject a vaccine into the Chinese trading sector, the industrial sector, the banking sector, and the Chinese individuals to enhance their ability to cope with the future full-scale fluctuations of renminbi (Ma, 2003).

Looking into the future, China's entry to the WTO is a challenge to the economy and institutions in Hong Kong as well. International competitions apparently are competitions among the quality of goods and services, technological software and hardware. In fact, it is competitions among the institutions. As only the better institutions may attract more resources internationally including both physical capital and human capital.

China's determination to enter the WTO after 15 years of long negotiations is as significant as her initial reform from the central planned economy towards a market economy (Ma, 2001).
It signifies that China will reform her traditional market economy towards an internationally competitive market for the 21st century's New Economy.

Furthermore, China has also started her reform of government structures. For example, more than 2,300 legal and regulations have been abolished or have been replaced by the new ones to comply with the WTO accession agreement. Indeed, in the testimony before the U.S. Trade Representative in Washington, D.C., in August 2002, the Chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce in China commented, "In our view, the Chinese government is demonstrating a serious commitment to meeting its WTO obligations."

However, skepticism about China's willingness to keep its WTO promises has increased since then. Only 20 percent of companies, responding to a survey of the American Chamber of Commerce in China and the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, said Beijing is "willing, able and prepared to implement changes in the spirit of the WTO agreement" (McDonald, 2003). At the other extreme, 30 percent of respondents thought China was willing to follow only the letter of WTO commitments or is looking for ways to avoid making changes.

On the positive side, four out of five businesses surveyed said their revenues in China rose last year, while 75 percent said they were profitable, the report said. Nevertheless, it says, China has to show that it is responsive to rising foreign concern about its compliance with WTO commitments.
It is also interesting to point out the recent shift of the regional distribution of the FDI within China. Just after a few months after China entered the WTO, the share of FDI in Yangtze River Delta around Shanghai has surpassed the Pearl River Delta in Guangdong. The regional competition for resources is intensive (Li and Ma, 1996). Most of these new FDI to Shanghai are hi-tech or knowledge-based industries rather than those labour intensive, traditional ones in the Guangdong province. If this trend continues, the relative importance of Pearl River Delta would decline and her neighbour Hong Kong would be affected as well.

Without doubt, facing such unprecedented challenges both from mainland China and new world economy, Hong Kong must reform her political and economic institutions to foster a new economic partnership with mainland China to sustain her high income and high growth rate in the future.

Reference


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Source: China’s Customs Statistical Office (海关总署综合统计司)
Website: http://www.customs.gov.cn/tongjishujv/Book1.files/sheet003.htm
Table 2. China’s Economic Annual Growth Rates (%)

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Source: Statistical Yearbook of China.
Abstract

The paper argues that the development of the private sector has, in fact, become the indicator of China’s national economy. A norm could be derived from the economic development during the reform and open era in the past two decades: the fewer restrictions imposed by the state, the faster is the economy development of China. Furthermore, the paper argues that there is a close relationship between economic modernization and traditional cultural traits which are based on Confucian clan-familial network. The paper believes that these traits would become powerful facilitators in China’s modernization drive.

中文

中国大陸的經濟發展這幾年為世界矚目，是大型經濟體裏面成就最為顯著的。去年大陸的 GDP 已經達到十萬億港幣，今年雖然受到“非典”影響，但是總體上超過去年應該是没有問題的。

中國大陸經濟的發展與私營經濟的逐步興盛，無疑是密切相關的；而國家對於私營經濟的態度，對於市場經濟在大陸的政治認同、自主自由思想的肯定具有指標意義。因此，我們可以通過觀察私營經濟過去二十年的萌芽、曲
折發展、逐步興盛，來研究中國大陸政治經濟的變革過程。

經濟風向標

在二零零二年，非國有經濟的產值約佔 GDP 份額的三分之一，其中真正由私營企業完成的份額在二分之一以上。目前中國在製造業裏面，有一百多種產品據於世界第一，比如電視機、電冰箱、DVD、微波爐、摩托車等。

一定意義上說，中國私營經濟已經成為大陸經濟持續發展的主要動力。與國有企業、三資企業、外商獨資相比，這些年成長最快的還是本土型的私營企業。

我們大家都非常熟悉的大陸語言就是“改革開放”，有觀點認為改革主要是對內的，開放主要是對外的。其實我們回過頭來看，自七十年代末八十年代初開始，中國大陸對於私營經濟也是採取“逐步開放”的方式，只是早期由於政治生態和社會觀念的限制，步履非常艱難。

隨著市場力量強化，特別市場手段的廣泛運用，私營經濟的實力迅速擴張，使得民間企業已經逐漸有能力充任以往由國家控制的諸多行業。關注中國大陸經濟的人士會發現，國營企業的產品已經從二十年前的包羅萬有，縮減到只有那些對於國家的政治安全、軍事安全、經濟安全、環境安全具有決定性意義的領域，比如軍工企業、航天航空。隨著市場經濟體制的進一步完善，金融、通訊、能源等以往嚴格限制私營經濟包括外國資本進入的領域，現在已經逐漸“開放”了。
由於中國大陸政府有意圖地推動國退民進，未來私營企業在中國經濟中的地位將會進一步得到提升。

總結過去二十多年中國大陸的經濟發展，可以說，當私營經濟發展比較順利的時候，每當國家對私營經濟的約束比較寬鬆的時候，注注也是大陸經濟發展比較快的時期，因為這種階段注注伴隨著行政干預的降低、左倒意識形態影響的下降。因此可以說私營企業具有經濟風向標的作用。

中國私營企業已佔中國經濟半壁江山，經濟力量已經逐漸延伸到政治領域，但是受傳統的影響，私營企業主介入政治，目前的基本功能還是“紅頂商人”。而從马克思“經濟基礎決定上層建築”來看，中國的紅頂商人對於權力的影響將會愈來愈大。十六大有一些私營企業家如蔣錫培、沈文榮等出任全國黨代表，有人認為十七大時會有私營企業家獲選中央委員。

從宏觀上看，政治和經濟是難以分家的，在某些時候，經濟成長本身就是執政者最重要的政治資本；而在很多時候，政治與經濟的良性互動，乃是經濟平穩快速發展的重要條件。當年大陸安徽省鳳陽地區也就是明太祖朱元璋的老家的幾戶農民，就是用訂立“生死文書”的形式，來偷偷地實行包產到戶這種原始的生產合作方式的。這種方式在香港人眼中簡直是天經地義的落後生產方式，但是在當時的中國大陸，這種行為面對的政治風險是巨大，隨時會給他們的生命造成災難。也正是這種歷史的環境因素，使得這些農民在生存本能的驅使下作出的經濟行為，其對中國社會所具有的長遠政治意義，絕對不低於其現實的經濟意義。
因此，我接下來就從私營企業主政治地位的變化來佐
證私營企業作為中國政經風向標的判斷。

政治風向標

大家都知道，大陸著名影星劉曉慶在十六大前因為偷
稅漏稅被抓，其在全國多處地方的約二十處房產被拍賣。
但是最近又被放了出來。但是這件事情的影響還在於十六
大前有關富人財富來源問題爭論。當時三個代表推出，有
觀點認為可以讓私營企業家入黨，也有人堅決反對。

為甚麼“三個代表”和私營企業家入黨會在中國大陸引起
廣泛的討論，至今還爭論不休？

在香港長大的年輕一代，可能對共產黨的認識似是而
非，甚至由於媒體的緣故而對共產黨具有妖魔化的認識。
一個香港的高中生曾經問我：“是不是只有共產國家的人才
吃狗？”，我當時哭笑不得，只好問他韓國是不是共產國
家？他說不是；我說，世界上啖狗肉最出名的絕對不是中
國人，而是韓國人。

公平而論，中國大陸最優秀的人才，有很大部分是加
入了中國共產黨的。因為一個基本的因素就是，如果你沒
有能力，沒有好的群眾基礎，是比較難以通過支部評議這
一關的。也正是因為共產黨擁有政治資源並集中了大批優
秀人才，在大陸社會具有強大的影響力，才有私營企業主
希望加入中國共產黨。

雖然我們從很多媒體上看到大陸很多貪官都是共產黨
員，但是我們也應該看到，畢竟中國共產黨差不多有七千
萬黨員，且“無才不足以濟惡”，一方面這些貪官只是少數害
群之馬，另一方面說明共產黨還是注重吸納人才的；而這些貪官，也並非一開始就是壞人，否則他們也很難有機會被晉升到很高的位置。

但是，從共產黨的性質來說是要最終消滅剝削階級的，而私營企業主就是傳統定義下的典型的剝削階級。那麼，將一群自己最終要消滅的人吸納到自己的陣營裏面來，並且這個群體非常可能通過改變共產黨的機體，進而改變共產黨的性質，這是不合邏輯的。那麼，這預示著甚麼？

其實，中國共產黨從來就不是不折不扣的前蘇聯式的共產黨，歷史也證明不能完全按照共產國際的指示在中國進行革命。當年斯大林也不認為毛澤東是真正的布爾什維克，所以他們之間的關係會從接受指導、深化矛盾到最終決裂。中國共產黨成功的關鍵在於中國化，也就是後來所說的“走中國式的社會主義道路”。

馬克思的著名論斷就是經濟基礎決定上層建築，當大陸逐步放開諸多領域讓私營經濟進入之後，隨著市場經濟觀念的深入人心，對上層建築的蠶食就必然是無法避免的了。私營經濟發展到一定程度的時候，特別是如今已經佔有中國經濟半壁江山的時候，其政治訴求必然會逐步提升，其改變上層建築的欲望也就會越來越強烈地表現出來。而且，作為一個對全社會影響越來越大的經濟群體，任何執政的力量都不可能忽視他們的存在，將他們繼續當作消滅的對象無異於給自己製造大量的足以擾亂其有效管治中國社會的敵人，最終必然會被這個日益壯大的群體所淹沒。
允許私營經濟發展之所以步履艱難，實在是其中牽涉到太多的政體鬥爭。甚至可以說，二十多年來私營經濟的發展，是通過持續的與中國大陸左傾思想來實現的。

允許私營企業家入黨，其政治意義是巨大的，對於中國大陸具有深遠的社會意義。長期在中國大陸具有重要作用的意識形態鬥爭，將因為“三個代表”被淡化，有關階級對立的聲音將難以引領社會。如果以正統、傳統的定義，十年前的眼光，將無法認識十年之淺的中國共產黨。

而由私營企業主入黨引發深層社會變革對中華民族的復興具有重大意義——五十年前可以高唱沒有共產黨就沒有新中國，當中國共產黨奪取了政權、驅逐了外國在中國的殖民勢力之濤，就必須完成從革命黨到執政黨的轉換；而三個代表的提出，正是為這種轉換提供了理論基礎，使執政黨的民衆基礎覆蓋整個社會，而不是某個特定階級的代言人。甚至說很可能通過政黨的分職，通過比較平和的方式構建民主的堅實基礎。這樣，中國大陸的民主將可能由此步入快速發展階段。

從這個意義上說，由於經濟貢獻而逐漸為社會高度重視的私營經濟，其在政治發展趨向方面的貢獻也是令人高度關注的；這個群體被允許加入中國共產黨，其作爲中國大陸政治風向標的角色也是當之無愧的。

私營企業動態與傳統文化特質

一個地區在某些方面獲得持續發展，一般來說都具有文化特質的支撐。香港是把海邊的地段都用來賣錢興建寫字樓，但是原來的青島市委書記、後來任建設部長的俞正聲，將青島幾千米最好的海邊地帶建成充滿文化氣息的海
濱長廊。他認為，一個城市如果沒有堅實的文化底蘊，是難以培植自身的內在發展動力的。

我們都知道，近十幾年來，很多發展中國家如同中國一樣，都積極向外資招手，而且給外商提供的優惠條件很多是超過中國的，但是為什麼中國經濟的發展一枝獨秀？除了本地市場巨大、勞動力充裕之外，還有甚麼與衆不同的因素？

我們可以從兩個事例來看傳統文化特質的問題。一個是台灣中華經濟研究院院長陳添枝博士說：“大陸提供了非常低廉的勞動力，而且是非常有效率的勞動力，也是台灣人最會管理的勞動力，這是其他國家都沒有辦法管過那麼好的勞動力”。另一個事例是，日本的原町俊道教授在《東亞經濟管理》一書中說，日本對中國投資的中小企業，有百分之四十到五十，因為忍受不了各種麻煩而撤資；另有調查顯示，日本企業派駐中國的員工，百分之三十認為存在文化背景的衝突。

另外，日本從中國進口的農產品，很多來自大陸的山東。據知，日本在山東投資農業產業，產品出口日本，企業採用的是一種非常奇特的架構——日本人出資，合資人管理，用大陸的土地和勞工。結果，企業相當成功。

這是甚麼呢？日本、韓國都深受儒家影響，為甚麼日本中小企業在中國改革開放之初就進入中國大陸，但是發展並不順利，而後來進入的台灣企業卻發展很好，對大陸員工管理得比其他任何地方都好呢？可以說此中就有文化傳統的問題，就有儒家和宗法人族“同源不同流”的問題。
中國私營企業的高速發展與傳統文化有關，但是由於日本曾經作爲東亞經濟奇跡的典範，西方又是從日本、韓國的經濟發展來認識並肯定儒家對企業管理的良性影響的，但是這種理解套用到中國並不完全適用。

中國作爲四大農業文明古國中唯一沒有中斷發展的國家，穩定的宗法國家形態起著重要作用。而中國從宋代開始成型的普及型宗法倫理規範以及長期積澱形成的相關意識，更是世界獨有的。宋朝以前，特別是唐朝宗族宗族倫理觀念和運作模式，由於當時中國是世界特別是東方的政治、經濟、文化中心，作爲先進文明的代表，其文化輸出的主動接受者衆多，文化移植的成活率也更高，日本當年通過大化革新而進入當時的現代國家行列，在很大程度上是依賴對唐朝文明的大量移植甚至拷貝。

但是，由於五代十國、五胡亂華的戰亂，宋朝國力羸弱，中華文化作爲世界文明之代表的地位下降，文化輸出的能力也就大大下降，移植的成活率同時大大下降。比如對中國漢代儒學影響巨大的朱子學說，在傳入日本之淺後很快就遭到了日本大儒荻生徂徠以及日本國學派的批判，因此朱子學說在日本的地位遠遠不及在日本的地位。

由於中華文化的輸出能力大大降低，因此張載、二程、朱熹倡導並推動的普及型宗法倫理規範，對日本等國的影響就不是很大，但是在中國卻波及深遠。而且當滿清入主中原的時候，由於自己本身是一個依賴特權維持國家運作的小民族，就通過賦予基層宗族更大的政治權力的方式，來鞏固基層政權。這樣作爲中國特有的普及型宗法宗族倫理規範及其意識，就成為一種中國人群體特有的文化
特質。本人認為，這種文化特質對於中國實現工業化並向
淺工業化社會發展，具有非常重要的作用。

我們現在已經看到的是“中國製造”的日用品充斥世界各地
的貨架。我的一個朋友從紐約買了一頂帽子給我，還誇
耀帽子做得很漂亮，但是我在香港看了看標籤，原來還是
“中國製造”。其實，中國大陸的工業化和淺工業化產業已經
不僅僅限於那些低技術產品的加工，在很多領域已經進入
世界的先進行列。比如我們經常講的“兩彈一星”，其科技含
量是非常高的。我以前在北京的衛星氣象中心工作，一個
不到五百人的單位，就涉及氣象、大氣物理、紅外遙感、
計算機與圖像處理、同步衛星與靜止衛星等方面。中國今
年在計算機的中央處理器也就是我們常說的 CPU 方面，已
經取得重大突破，這對於中國未來的經濟安全、國防安全
具有非常重要的意義。

之所以列舉這些事實，是因為我認為中國的普及型宗
法文化特質，對於中國實現工業化並向淺工業化社會過
渡，可以產生重要的助推動力。

中國經濟近二十年的高速成長，已經引起全球的廣泛
關注，一些企業管理方面的研究，已經從文化的角度來思
考這種持續的高速增長是否與中國的文化特質有關，其中
包括一些西方學者根據儒家經濟圈的觀點來分析中國大陸
的經濟發展現象。我們應該思考，中國大陸的文化特質特
別是宗法宗族思想觀念，是否有利於中國民衆適應當今這
種混合了不同質的發展類型的轉變階段？

簡單而言，在普及型宗法宗族觀念倫理的影響下，中
國人群體往住擁有比高於歐美的但是低於日本的集體主義，
可以在利益同向的基礎上整合大工業相對更加需要的團體

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力量；而由於肯定能力、認同競爭，同時擁有高於日本低於歐美的個性主義、個性張揚，可以激勵淺工業化社會所重視的創新能力。隨著生產力技術水平的提高，從土地上游離出來、受傳統觀念影響相對較深的農地農民，將持續為工業化提供廉價勞力；而隨著教育的普及、整體經濟力量的提高、世界普世價值的廣泛接納，中國人羣體中適應淺工業化社會要求的勞力，也將不断增加。

而且，隨著中國民衆整體受教育水平的提高，包括工業化、城市化的快速發展，中國民衆對於現代思想的接觸必然增加，擺脫威權壓制下的集體主義、追求個性張揚就成為一種趨勢，這樣對於適應淺工業化社會的人口數量必然將逐步增加。這樣，一方面從中國受教育程度較低的人群主要是中國農村和非中心城市地區，會不斷產生適應工業化社會的大量勞動力；另一方面在受教育程度較高的人群及中心城市中會不斷產生適應淺工業化社會需要的人力資源，而中國對此兩種人力資源都可以提供較大的數量，因此具有提供這種混存型社會經濟發展階段所需要的人力資源，為中國經濟的持續發展提供人力上的支持。

由於出資人的單一，企業管理中的宗法宗族倫理觀念一在企業企業中表現得最為強烈，導致的利弊也是最為明確。我們應該看到，由於私營企業在中國經濟中的地位越來越重要，其管理文化乃是促成其經濟成就的重要組成部分，因此我們應該加強對中國傳統文化對企業管理的影響的研究。

文化在一定的時候是需要“金妝”的，就是一種文化特質能否被肯定乃至推崇，與這種文化所依附的實體的綜合國力特別是經濟實力，具有非常密切的關係。唐朝文化之所
以被認為先進，很大程度上在於當時的中國擁有比周邊國家更多的財富；英國的君主立憲制度曾經被廣泛宣揚，很大程度在於英國的工業文明創造了更多的財富；美國文化之所以能夠成為當今世界的主流文化，絕對不是依賴二戰以後日益明顯的霸道蠻橫，而是在於支撐其橫行無忌的強大國力；日本這樣一個在亞洲血債疊疊的戰敗國，其文化潮流之所以還能夠經常引領亞洲，主要是依靠雄厚的財力。那麼，既然日本管理文化可以因為經濟繁榮而被稱為“世界第一”，當中國經濟獲得長足發展、在當今世界廣受關注的時候，我們沒有理由懷疑自身文化的現代因子，也沒有理由不認真研究中國文化特質對於中國實現現代化的積極作用。