

新自由主義與新道德主義

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新自由主義在本文中被當作這兩三百年由西方民族國家所主導的資本主義全球化的最晚近階段之方案，與西方民族國家曾實施之禁運、圍堵、貿易關稅壁壘屬於同類的擴張一支配邏輯。這一邏輯推進的效果不只在經濟面向，而且在政治、文化、法律、農業、技術、生態等方面，可以說其實是西方文明的更全面的全球現代化，其企圖或前提也許是歷史的終結，但是首先卻引向了文明的衝突。文明衝突實際上聚攏了資本主義的諸多矛盾，以及主權國家之間、各民族或地方文化之間、各種身分之間、個人想望與現實之間等各種矛盾的多重決定。但是文明衝突之所以能凝聚各種矛盾而成為症候性的表述，仍是因為新自由主義的全球現代性產生同質性的效果，所謂劃平世界的力量，也就是朝向單一的文明現代性。對這個單一的（主要是西方個人自由主義的）文明現代性的批評無法在本文中展開；然而，這篇文章認為在抵抗新自由主義全球化方面，多樣現代性的提法雖然不是充分的，但卻是不可或缺的，並且在這個多樣現代性的冠銜下，聚攏對於國際政治、經濟、文化的不平等秩序之抵抗，指向了非西方模式的經濟、政治、文化的可能，由此開展多樣現代性之間的競逐，這將是我們這個時代最主要的局勢發展。以上是這篇文章前半部份的背景說明，本文第二部份則是注意新自由主義在文化與價值方面產生的政治效果與治理方式，我將之稱為「新道德主義」，它的起初環節是新自由主義內涵的普世進步主義，普世進步主義就是說：進步不是相對於特定歷史社會、一種倡議的進步與否不是在具體脈絡中被評價，進步體現了普世價值故而是內在地自我証成；性別平等、動物保護、憲政民主、同性婚姻、環境保護、兒童保護等等普世進步價值乃是西方文明現代所揭櫫的人類永恆理想，在任何時空都適用。然而上述這種道德進步主義在爭取成為主流的實踐上，卻吸納了許多道德保守派的面向，後者也因此採用了許多進步主義修辭而同樣地佔據了主流空間，由此，由道德進步主義與道德保守派共治或輪流作莊的情況出現了，我將之稱為「新道德主義」——雖然我主要描述的是台灣情況，但是或許這是個觀察冷戰以後世界的一個參考座標。

新自由主義不只是一個由資本主義利潤驅使的經濟全球化力量，它除了還是美國為首的西方霸權的政治支配（軍事威嚇則時隱時現）、將世界劃平的商品文化推土機（造成許多本土地方會有傳統宗教與文化的抵抗），也包含新自由主義的知識生產，這理應得

到我們大學學術人的高度關注。目前對新自由主義抗拒的知識努力，主要來自國際主義的左派話語與知識生產，然而這樣的話語與知識在多大程度上與新自由主義分享同樣的前提，或是因為我們第三世界在接收左派話語時本身的態度因而產生共謀的效果，也必須是我們注意的焦點。

例如，新自由主義這一特定的經濟（以致於政治、文化）治理方案是目前全球化持續形成單一現代性的力量。從這個角度來看，新自由主義不過是延續著西方在資本主義全球化歷程中曾經採取過的殖民主義、帝國主義等方案之又一變化而已，其目標或效果之一則是創造單一文明的現代性。左派馬克思主義曾經設想過在資本主義現代性的基礎上建立社會主義現代性，這也是單一現代性的假設。相對於單一現代性，則有多樣現代性的說法，一種常見的理解主要是指文化的多樣性，所以其實是在一些普世的政治、經濟、知識、文化的現代性基礎上增加一些地方性的差異與調整，這也呼應了所謂的「全球在地化」，並將地方風味樂觀地設想為全球性之多元文化主義，於是很輕便地將世界現實設想為早已經是現成的多樣現代了。在這個用法上，「多樣現代」只是個承認現狀的標籤。的確，你走到世界各地的現代社會，很容易感受到由語言、風土帶來的文化差異，這似乎就是多樣現代的現實，人類文化傳統多樣性的表現，彷彿不經競逐的政治過程就能達成充分發展的多樣現代性。不過這是「多樣現代」被「去政治化」的用法，而且和新自由主義的單一現代性沒有什麼矛盾。

檢討多樣現代說法的緣起與某些人的挪用，並不是我在這裡要做的，我只想指出：真正與西方單一現代性對立的「多樣現代」，就是至少不承諾西方現代的歷史觀（「進步」以及與之相近但不同的「進化」），不承諾西方現代發展的歷史經驗與模式（例如自由市場模式的經濟現代化、民族國家的政治現代化、法治的法律現代化等等），不承諾西方現代的啟蒙及其相關價值與認識論（「自然」的社會建構、人文主義、個人主義、主體性、事實與價值的區分...）。不承諾不等於全盤否定，而是不再將之視為理所當然，這是健康的懷疑主義。我們還沒有確切的答案與問題，因為與現存知識競逐的新知識範式還有待發展，這個新的競逐知識範式則是著眼於當前多樣現代話語的目標，亦即，在政治上創造一個以區域或文明圈為主的、和平的、均勢的多極世界，互相認可的文化文明。

多樣現代主要是關於國際秩序的話語，但是也會對國內秩序有所蘊涵。原本的分配正義、認可、政治民主、文化傳統、個人自由的問題在多樣現代彼此競逐的局勢下，也勢必要與多樣現代的目標相協調，這意味著國家不必然非採取什麼「普世公認」的政治經濟模式。如果說沒有全球現代發展的必由之路，所有的「普世模式」也就是一時一地的工具價值，那麼在這種多樣現代的脈絡下，新自由主義有可能被剝離其政治、文化與全

球性的意義，不再是經濟的普遍理性，而只是局部的、應時的經濟治理術或政策工具（對於這樣局部意義的新自由主義，我也想不出有什麼必然反對理由）。總之，如此設想的多樣現代，當然不是烏托邦或歷史終點，在邁向這樣的多樣現代競逐道路之後會是什麼，我們現在無法想像與規定，也就是無法投射一個終極的進化路徑。

起初新自由主義話語在西方左翼知識界成為萬惡的警語時，許多地區的許多部門還沒有充分認識到其操作與影響，對這些地區而言，新自由主義只是資本主義或象徵總體權力的時髦代名詞。當後來新自由主義的方方面面對這些非西方地區造成或深或淺的影響已成現實時，非西方左翼知識份子才譴責新自由主義所造成的結果，但是對新自由主義如何逐步進駐到這些非西方地區、其部署的歷史過程與社會文化支援（亦即，如何在各個面向、以何種價值與文化逐漸剷平非西方地區），則是選擇性地含混以對。例如將自身偏好的現代進步價值與傳統保守價值區分，有時將後者當作新自由主義的推動助力，卻無能力去分析前者與新自由主義共謀的意含，因為這超越了目前他們的知識範式。

在台灣，據我的觀察，反新自由主義不會是能引起當權派或反對派及群眾共鳴的。這超越了政客與人民被新自由主義綁架的問題，也不只是人們對於新自由主義意識形態的積極同意使然。事實上，在台灣熱烈擁抱與西方自由貿易之同時、卻積極的反對與中國的自由貿易；我相信這類人可能還會以反新自由主義為名來反對與中國的廣泛貿易。就這一點而論，我不認為「（反）新自由主義」應該在全球都有同樣的意義或強調重點。新自由主義在我看來，對於邊緣國家而言，是核心國家進一步去國界、去主權、去傳統、去民族的運動，也就是說，新自由主義的意義不但要放在世界體系「核心—邊緣」的經濟脈絡裡來看，也要放在「核心—邊緣」的主權面向的脈絡裡來思考。到目前為止，主權國家還是邊緣唯一能有限防禦核心的主權國家之有力的作用者；如果反新自由主義是「沒有國家的反新自由主義」，那麼這和「沒有國家的新自由主義」其實是互相呼應的。不過，將世界停留在單一「核心—邊緣」的軸線，仍然不脫新自由主義的佈局，促進「多核心—邊緣」的區域主權聯合恐怕才是反新自由主義的現實方向。

我在台灣察覺到有些人將新自由主義當作反對姿態的流行口號，只因為新自由主義在西方知識運動界是焦點問題，所以將自己的論文納入新自由主義的大標題下，可以顯得不落後於全球化的國際學術。對我來說，這只是加入了把世界鏟得更平一點的知識推土機大軍。事實上，現在的世界還不是那麼平的，因此我們的知識生產不能設想一種普世通行無阻的知識流通（預設著單一現代知識典範，對應著新自由主義設想的自由市場流通）。然而，難道要建立阻礙知識容易交流的萬里長城嗎？其實歷史上的萬里長城同時

有著保障與便利長途貿易、文明互動的功能，知識障礙對求索知識而言，有時不是急著要去除的，畢竟，困頓而學。

下面我要談的是「新道德主義」，我將之視為新自由主義的一個文化後果。我的切入點是台灣的同性婚姻運動在 2013 年「意外的」遭遇到來自基督教社群的挑戰，意外是因為在此之前，同性戀群體在台灣大抵感受到的是頗為文明的寬容，台灣彷彿是最同性戀友善的亞洲社會。誠然，就我的觀察，無論在主流大眾或小眾媒體、在菁英階層或甚至中產階級，在政治、文化或教育界，基本都（不敢不）持同性戀友善態度，而且至今看來依然如此。原因也很簡單，同性戀在台灣已屬於政治正確、代表著全球進步文明開化的普世價值。然而一場人數可觀的基督徒大遊行，之中不少年輕人參加，意味著沈默大眾其實平常依舊隱藏著對同性戀的「非我族類」心理，可以（口頭上）尊重，但是絕非（發自內心的）尊敬的認可，這也意味著政客們將對同性婚姻的立法三思。對於台灣同性戀社群而言，這是一大失望，這場同性戀與基督徒的交鋒至今仍在持續中。或者說，類似的現象發生在法國等其他地方也無甚稀奇，但是台灣這樣的發展其來有自，這是本篇論文接下來要分析陳述的。由於以下的內容我在其他地方已經寫過較長的版本，在此則針對更廣泛的讀者群，素描最核心的一些想法，故而會盡量簡短。

台灣社會（就像其他社會）的主流，即使在社會與政治保守主義不再當道的情況下，在道德方面向來當道的仍是保守派。在解嚴以後 1990 年代的社會、政治與文化的**激進主義**運動中，隨著老國民黨（執政黨）瓦解改造、民進黨（反對黨）成長奪權成功之權力轉移，壓抑激進情感以爭取主流認同的改良主義色彩之**進步主義**也逐漸抬頭（對應著西方有些自由主義自我標榜為「中間偏左」的位置）。易言之，進步主義所對應的乃是等待著或已經分享了主流權力之社會位置，而激進主義則仍處於邊緣或被排斥的位置，這在性／別運動特別明顯。當然激進主義路線或修辭有時可能變成一種超級進步主義，被進步主義在某些情境中挪用，以爭取更多的主流權力；因此，激進主義的功能既包括批判日益主流化的進步主義，也可能間接促進進步主義的壯大。這些年來，「底層」、「邊緣」、「性解放」或「酷兒」，不論什麼名稱，其內涵批判了運動向主流的靠攏，也發揮了攪亂的影響，使得主流性／別運動無法放棄邊緣話語，必須容忍非主流的聲音、有限的劃清界線，例如在提出同性婚姻、伴侶制度時還提出了多元成家，以求面面顧到，但是卻也聲明這不是「性解放」。

必須說明的是，激進主義的思想情感在西化的青壯年知識階層是相當普遍的，這是中國、台灣或第三世界在遭遇西方侵略後採取的急切徹底改造自身以追趕現代化後的情感

態度，特別是在壓迫性的專制政權與不公平的社會下更容易衍生激進主義。同時，台灣雖然曾有或仍有強大的社會文化保守派力量，但是沒有智識底蘊，無論是守舊或宗教信徒的保守派並沒有像西方柏克（Edmund Burke）之類的保守主義或美國的新保守主義思想，因此保守派在面對進步主義或激進主義（這兩者對保守派是一丘之貉）的政治正確、文明開化時是失語的。如果有任何智識辯論，那是存在於進步主義與激進主義之間（例如台灣的女性主義與酷兒之間很偶而稀少的辯論）。台灣的進步主義（比起激進主義）之所以趨向保守，不是因為和保守主義思想辯論而修正折衷，而是為了取得主流位置與國家權力，而必須討好更多中間的、不頑固保守民眾

然而，由於台灣整體的進步主義是在親美反共的後冷戰體制與族群政治下成長，因此也成為台灣分離主義意識形態之一部份，也就是西方現代的、世界主義的文明開化想像——對照著中國大陸的不文明，以及東方主義或歐洲中心下的歷史與現實之知識範式與「普世」價值。至於台灣一些左翼或邊緣的激進主義社會運動，即使抗拒進步主義的主流化傾向，但是卻和主流的進步主義一樣，都接受「沒有國家的」（因而也是沒有歷史民族的）之批判知識範式：一方面隱含地接受了自由主義的「國家乃（必要之）惡」，另一方面，也沒有對抗美日核心國家的真正議程，而且在知識與文化資源方面只移植與挪用西方批判理論話語，而不是發展與之**競逐**的話語知識。激進主義運動對自我道德進步的認識則是處於現代文明的歷史最高點，能以絕對的道德自我成立（self-justified）之正當性自居；既然已經是更高的道德—政治正確，進一步發展新思想知識的用途也有限，這種反智主義的自滿因而無法在國際或世界體系層次上產生不同於分離主義的知識範式，因此也都被裹挾或根本接受這樣的分離主義現實（畢竟，這被認為是更進步的），只能效力有限的批判主流，卻不由自主地成為幫襯的多元。大抵上，這或曾也是性／別激進主義的可能滑波歸向。

台灣的進步主義壯大也受到新自由主義全球化下國際進步主義潮流的影響。我的意思是：自由主義背景的道德進步主義（moral progressivism）在許多西方與親西方社會的文化戰爭中越來越進取，不是沒有結構原因的。在西方，特別是美國，道德保守主義下形成的國際政治與軍事鷹派幫助美國贏得了冷戰，但是在冷戰結束後的新自由主義全球化下，走向道德進步主義才是大勢所趨（雖然與道德保守主義有激烈的文化戰爭，而在許多議題上，如墮胎等，道德保守主義贏過道德進步主義）。特別是因為全球化激化了穆斯林世界的道德保守主義，以及其他地區的本土主義，此時西方的道德保守主義（也就是預設了以基督教為核心的西方文化傳統）失去了正面的現實作用（因為一來對外無法向非基督教社會推銷西方的道德保守主義，二來道德保守主義容易被西方國內的極右派挪用做

激進的反移民運動而造成社會分裂的問題），故而道德進步主義所揭櫫的普世價值、普世人權、多元文化主義等等才被視為合乎新自由主義主流的需要。由此也形成了新的文明開化（civilizing mission），例如經常在西方媒體中建構的簡化圖像：一方面是「先進地區」的同性婚姻潮流，另一方面是「落後地區」的同性戀非法化。台灣的道德進步主義也受到這個國際大潮流的影響給力，而逐漸能與台灣的道德保守派分庭抗禮。不過除了在台灣外部有西方道德進步主義的全球化趨勢之影響，在台灣內部本身也同時有融入國際社會、加入國際給定的各種文明秩序的強烈需要，因此無論在話語知識、社會運動、政治形勢、國族打造等方面，道德進步主義都提供極大的動能，推著許多女性團體、同志團體與個人，無法抵抗地往道德進步主義移動。

然而道德進步主義在取得主流地位時也不得不吸納了部份道德保守（畢竟道德進步主義是根據西方現代未完成的計畫，「未完成」故而必須和現實妥協才能主流化），可是當道德進步主義「向中間靠攏」而成為主流時，這也迫使某些較有彈性的道德保守派同樣在贏取主流空間時不得不部份地採用進步主義的策略與話語。在台灣最能代表後者的，是一些婦女兒童保護的非政府組織，不過也可以說她們太成功了，因為她們靈活地挪用道德進步主義的修辭和策略，在短時間內成功地進入主流體制，以致於有時或逐漸地把其他大批的基督徒與道德保守群眾留在後方，無法與時俱進、跟上形勢，後者就是當前反同性婚姻（不接受「同性戀是道德正確」）的主力。

下面我要解釋為何我採用「道德」這樣的詞語來描述進步主義，以及「新道德主義」的意思。

在國家轉變治理方式、與社會協同治理（governance）以及全球治理的形勢之下，原本社會運動的主張逐漸成為道德性質的價值規範（例如「個人即政治」：性別平等、環保或動物解放均必須表現於個人道德實踐中），由此，社會與政治的進步主義成為道德進步主義，且將歷史想像為道德不斷進步的歷史，例如認為人類歷史中的各類型暴力正不斷減少。道德進步主義（moral progressivism）與道德保守主義均進入治理的主流空間，逐漸出現偶而短兵相接卻又和平共存的狀態，形成進步教化（progressive moralism）與保守教化（conservative moralism）同時並行的新文明開化（new civilizing mission），我將之稱為「新道德主義」（neo-moralism），因為它以普世價值的政治正確或道德理想來規範現實、進行教化。例如在台灣，各學校、機關、企業都必須依法設立性別平等委員會，執行促進性別平等的各種實踐，這些基本上都是新道德主義的治理途徑。特別要指出的是

，台灣新道德主義中的雙方——道德進步與道德保守有時都援引同樣的國際公約，有時則分別從西方進步與保守陣營移植話語資源。

新道德主義之所以是「教化」的模式，正是因為自居道德高地，已經是道德—政治正確（因為得到先進國家的肯認），無論社會現實的構成、階級差異或文化傳統為何，現在的任務只能是將文明開化的普世價值規範從專家菁英強加到大眾（透過國家、主流媒體與機構的由上而下的教化），要求現實順應服從，以現代「文明道德」的願景來規範現在與過去的現實。在這個教化過程裡，台灣的新道德主義紛紛採取各級立法（國家的法律、行政的法規等等）來懲罰違規者（例如性騷擾、霸凌、虐待動物、歧視等等），並且鼓吹只有法的懲罰才能直接標舉善惡對錯、才能有效的保護弱者。這是以管理代替說理。同性婚姻的推動策略大抵也是同一理路，也就是藉著同性婚姻的立法，教化社會認可同性戀的善惡對錯，因為同婚推動者認為有些人（像基督徒或保守者）是永遠無法被說服的，因此只能用法律手段去懲罰、強迫或管理他們。推動同性婚姻的輿論，想要爭取不明究裡的中間派，採取的則是公關手段，如美化同性戀的形象、呈現同性戀也是道德的或符合主流價值的、訴諸溫情感人的故事等等。

道德進步主義與道德保守派合流的新道德主義，是二十一世紀第一個十年中顯著的發展。然而，道德進步主義是左翼激進主義不經意滋養壯大的，同時，進入主流空間的某些道德保守派卻也遺棄並激化出基本教義派的激進保守派。目前道德進步主義主導的同性婚姻浪潮同時遭到位處文化秩序邊緣地位的酷兒激進主義的反對，也遭到新興保守或基本教義派激進保守派的反對，在左右夾擊的情況下，這是否會導致新道德主義內兩股力量的更堅固結合？即，道德進步主義（為了有別於酷兒激進而趨向保守）與道德保守派（為了有別於激進右翼基要派而趨於進步）的趨合？或者相反，有無可能導致新道德主義的分家（即，居於主流的道德保守與道德進步走向分裂）？此外，酷兒左翼激進主義將要如何面對基本教義的激進保守派之興起？以超級進步姿態批判進步主義的同性婚姻是否可行？又將如何面對晚近台灣分離主義在中國崛起後的新激進浪潮（分離主義往往是台灣社運的黏合劑與分化力）？

由於酷兒激進主義與道德進步主義其實分享著同樣的現代性之知識—世界觀前提，勢必需要新競逐知識計畫的轉向，例如從世界主義現代性的視野走向多元現代性，這意味著競逐話語不能只是考慮「個人」與「人民（社群或集體身分）」這兩種作用者，還需要考慮「民族」與「國家」，因為沒有後面這兩種作用者就不可能帶來多元的文明現代。

Neoliberalism and Neo-moralism

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Translated by Ernest LEUNG

In this article, neoliberalism refers to the project marking the latest stage of the globalization of capitalism, a process that has been directed during the past two to three hundred years by western nation-states. Neoliberalism shares the same logic of expansion-dominance as the erstwhile strategy of western nation-states in setting up trade and customs barriers, embargo or encirclement. The effects of the imposition of this logic are seen not only in the economy, but also in politics, culture, law, agriculture, technology and ecology. It may be possible to regard neoliberalism as a more comprehensive way of global modernization by western civilization. Its attempt or premise might have been the end of history, but its first fruit was the conflict of civilizations – a conflict that saw the condensation of the many contradictions of capitalism, and the overdetermination of the contradictions between sovereign states, nations, regional cultures, identities, personal aspirations and realities. Nevertheless, the reason why civilizational conflict has been able to condense the various contradictions and emerge as their symptomatic expression would be due to the homogenising effect of neoliberalism on global modernity – a force that flattens the world, or in other words, a force that creates a singular civilizational modernity. It would be impossible to analyze within the space of this article this singular civilizational modernity. Yet, this article argues that in resisting the globalization of neoliberalism, the notion of diverse modernities, though insufficient, is indispensable. Under the heading of diverse-modernity, we find a clustering of resistances against the unequal order of international politics, economics and cultures. They point to the possibilities of non-western economic, political and cultural models of modernity. Thus began the contending between the diverse modernities. This serves to explain the background to the first half of the article; its second half deals with the political effect and the mode of governance of neoliberalism in the field of culture and values. I call this “neo-Moralism”, whose initial moment consisted of the universal progressivism that makes up neoliberalism. Universal progressivism meant that progressiveness is not seen as relative to a specific and historical societal condition; that the progressiveness of a cause is not measured against a specific context, but the embodiment of a universal value. Thus it is self-justified and intrinsically good--Gender equality, animal protection, constitutional democracy, same-sex marriage, environmental protection and the protection of minors – such universal values are the eternal ideals of humanity as demonstrated by modern western civilization, applicable in any time and space. And yet, in its struggle to become mainstream practice, moral progressivism has absorbed many aspects of moral conservatism, whilst the latter has also occupied the mainstream by appropriating many elements of progressive rhetoric and ideas. Thus emerged the situation where moral progressivism and moral conservatism alternate in dominance or govern jointly – and this scenario is what I refer to as “neo-Moralism”. Although my main object of description is the situation in Taiwan, this might be a point of reference in our observation of the world after the Cold War.

Neoliberalism is more than just a globalising economic force driven by capitalist profit; it is political domination by the leading industrialised countries, which, with the United States at its head, occasionally presents itself as a military menace. It is a bulldozer of commodity culture erasing all unevenness from the surface of the earth, in its process incurring resistance from traditional religions and indigenous cultures. Neoliberalism however also includes globalized knowledge production – which deserves much attention from us academics. The present intellectual effort in the resistance against Neoliberalism is largely issued from the knowledge production of the Internationalist discourse of the Left; and yet we must draw our attention to the fact that, probably as a result of the attitude with which we, the Third World, had absorbed the Left-wing discourse, a situation has emerged in which there is effective complicity between the discourse and knowledge of the Left and Neoliberalism, which to a great extent appear to share the same premises.

For example, the economic, even political and cultural project of governance that is Neoliberalism, is the present force behind the continued creation of a singular modernity through globalisation. From this angle, Neoliberalism is nothing but another regime after colonialism, imperialism and so on, of the unfinished project of the west in the globalisation of capitalism, of which an objective, or effect, is to create the modernity of a singular civilisation. Left-wing or Marxism had once envisaged the establishment of a socialist modernity upon the basis of capitalistic modernity, but this hypothesis was again for a singular modernity. In contrast to this singular modernity is the notion of multiple modernities, of which a common interpretation refers in principle to cultural variety, thus implying the addition of regional variations and adjustments to the universality of Modern politics, economics, knowledge and culture, corresponding with what is known as “glocalisation”. It presumes local flavour/variety rather optimistically as global multiculturalism and conveniently assumes therefore, that the real world as it is, has long been readily existing, diverse modernities (a term I prefer to multiple modernities). In this sense “multiple modernities” is merely a label donned on the status quo. Indeed, one feels the cultural differences brought with by language and etiquette as one visits the various modern societies around the world, and this difference would seemingly signify the diversity of cultural traditions and of modernities, rather than the underdevelopment of such diversity which comes with contending process in the politics of mutual recognition. This depoliticised perception of “diverse (multiple) modernities” hardly contradicts the singular modernity of Neoliberalism.

It is not the purpose of this essay to discuss the origins of the notion of multiple modernities and its appropriation by certain individuals. What I want to point out is this : in opposition to the singular, occidental modernity, real “diverse modernities” should at least be non-committal towards the modern, western view of history in its attitude towards “progress” and the associated but different concept of “evolution”; non-committal towards the western experience and model of development – that being, for example, the free-market model of economic modernisation, the nation-state model of political modernisation, rule-of-law in legal modernisation, and so forth. Real “diverse modernities” should also be non-committal towards modern, western enlightenment and its associated system of values and epistemology. Being non-committal to something doesn’t entail its wholesale rejection; it is, rather, to not take it for granted, and it is thus healthy scepticism. We do not, at the moment, have the right answers, or even the right questions, because the contending paradigm of knowledge has yet to be developed. This new contending paradigm should place its focus on the objectives of the contemporary discourse on diverse modernities, that is, to create a multi-polar world that is

peaceful, balanced, mutually-recognized and based on regional or civilizational spheres of diversity.

Diverse modernity concerns itself mainly with the discourse of international order. But it is also implicated in the internal order of states. The pre-existing questions of distributive justice, recognition, political democracy, cultural tradition and personal freedom will need to position themselves in accordance with the contending process of diverse modernities, and this implies the state not necessarily adopting any universal model of economic or political institutions. However, if there is no universally adoptable path to modernities, all the “universal” models are of instrumental value. Under diverse modernities, Neoliberalism hence could be taken out of its political, economic and global context – that it is no longer a universal economic rationality, but only a confined and contingent instrument or policy of economic governance – and I personally cannot come up with any viable objection to this localised practice of Neoliberalism. In any case the diverse modernities envisaged in this way would certainly neither be utopia nor the end of history; at present we are unable to prescribe or even to imagine where this path of diverse modernities would lead us – that is, we are unable to project an ultimate evolutionary course for ourselves.

At first, when Neoliberalism began to acquire its diabolical connotations in the intellectual world of the western Left, its operation and function had not been fully grasped in many other regions, to whom Neoliberalism was just a fashionable synonym for capitalism and signified its totality of power. It was only later, when the various aspects of Neoliberalism began to encroach on these non-western regions, that the Left-wing intellectuals there started to protest against the consequences of Neoliberalism. Yet they have always glossed over, selectively, the historical process of how Neoliberalism came to acquire a presence in these non-western areas of the world, how it strategized and gained socio-cultural support – that is, how the various faces and values of Neoliberalism gradually bulldozed non-western society and culture. For example, in perceiving traditional conservatism not just as a hindrance to values of modern progressivism, but as an aide to Neoliberalism, one is rendered incapable of analysing the complicity between the modern progressivism and Neoliberalism – because this would have exceeded the capacities of that intellectual paradigm.

As far as I can see in Taiwan, antagonism towards Neoliberalism hardly arouses any reverberations amongst either those in power or in opposition, or the masses. This goes well beyond the question of the hijacking of politicians and the people by Neoliberalism, and it is not merely caused by their active consent to the Neoliberalist ideology. In fact, whilst free trade with the west is embraced enthusiastically, Taiwan actively opposes free trade with China even on the pretext of an objection to Neoliberalism. On this particular point I do not think that “(Anti-) Neoliberalism” should have the same significance or focus around the world. Neoliberalism, in my view, and in the context of the countries on the margin, is a movement of the core countries to eliminate boundaries, sovereignty, tradition and ethnicity. This is to say that the significance of Neoliberalism is not only to be found within the economic context of the “core-margin” international order, but also within that of the sovereign aspect of this “core-margin” hierarchy. Up to now, sovereign states at the margin seem to be the only agent with eroding capacity of defending against the core sovereign states. If the opposition to Neoliberalism were to be a “stateless opposition to Neoliberalism”, then this would in fact correspond directly with “stateless Neoliberalism”. However, to stay on the single axis of core-margin is no escape from the Neo-liberalism’s scheme. Encouraging the tendency of the regional or civilizational alliance of the sovereign states, that is, multiple core-margin systems, might be a realistic direction.

I noticed in Taiwan, that some with an oppositional stance have begun to use Neoliberalism as a rallying call, only because Neoliberalism is a central question in the western intellectual movement; they have thus put their academic work on the great bandwagon of Neoliberalism so as to appear in-sync with the globalised academia. To me, this is nothing but joining an army of intellectual bulldozers that would serve to flatten the world even more. The world as it is today, as a matter of fact, is not as flat as it is assumed to be. Hence, it would be wrong as well to suggest that our intellectual or knowledge production should assume the form of an unobstructed, universal intellectual mobility (premised on knowledge paradigm of singular modernity) in accordance with the free-market flows imagined by Neoliberalism. But then, would it be necessary to construct a wall between knowledge producers, a barrier to impede the easy communication of knowledge? Incidentally the Great Wall in history served as well to protect and facilitate long-distance trade and civilizational interaction. The barriers of knowledge may not always be something that should be urgently removed, as they say, “learns by way of ‘no way out’”.

In the following parts of the essay I am going to talk about “Neo-moralism”, which I regard as a cultural consequence to Neoliberalism. My point of departure is 2013, when the same-sex marriage movement in Taiwan was “surprisingly” confronted with the challenge mounted by the Christian community; surprising, because up until then, the LGBT community in Taiwan has probably been subject to a very civilised form of toleration, and Taiwan seemed to be the most gay-friendly of all Asian societies. Indeed, as far as I am aware, this gay-friendly attitude has always been prevalent and still is prevalent in mainstream and non-mainstream media since early 21st century; amongst the elites and even in the middle classes; in politics, in culture and well as in education – but they are gay-friendly, because they dare not be otherwise. The reason is simple – homosexuality has become politically correct in Taiwan, and represents the universal value of a civilising and progressivist globalisation. The well-attended Christian protest, which had amongst the ranks of its participants a sizeable proportion of young people, is symbolic of the long-hidden, but still existent, animosity of the silent masses towards homosexuality. Lip service might have been paid, but this was far from a respect stemming from genuine recognition. It meant that politicians would now hesitate from legalising same-sex marriage. To the homosexual community in Taiwan this was a cause of great disappointment, and its rivalry with the Christians is still ongoing as of now. Or should we say that similar phenomena, should they happen in France or other places, would not have been as strange as when they do happen in Taiwan, where the problem took on a peculiar model of development, as this essay will attempt to explain. In this essay, aimed at a wider audience, I will attempt to be brief with my ideas, as they have been explained at length elsewhere.

Morality, for the mainstream in Taiwanese society, as it is for most other societies, has been dominated by moral conservatives, even when the mainstream has ceased to be a bastion of social and political conservatism. Taiwanese society during the 1990s, following the lifting of martial law, was marked by social, political and cultural radicalist movements; however with the ongoing power transfer that was the disintegration and restructuring of the ruling party, Kuomintang, and the successful growth and take-over of power by the Democratic Progressive Party then in opposition, what began to take shape was a progressivism which bore the colours of reformism, and which suppressed radical sentiment in exchange for mainstream recognition, somewhat in correspondence with what would consist a “centre-left” position amongst certain strands of western liberalism. Progressivism, in other words, corresponded with a social position in which mainstream power has already been, or will be, shared, whilst radicalism remained in a marginal, if not excluded, position. This is particularly obvious in the

gender/sexuality movement. Of course the radicalism and its rhetoric would sometimes evolve into a sort of ultra-progressivism, and then in certain scenarios, find itself expropriated by progressivism in its bid for mainstream power. The function of radicalism is thus both to criticise an increasingly mainstream progressivism and to promote indirectly the expansion of this progressivism. Since then, a range of terms – “underclass”, “marginal”, “sexual liberation” or “queer” – have not only served to critique the rapprochement between the movement and the mainstream, but also to create much disturbance, to the extent where the mainstream gender/sexuality movement could no longer afford to abandon radical rhetoric, and had to tolerate non-mainstream voices whilst demarcating itself from the marginal. For example when the question of same-sex marriage and civil partnership was raised, it was necessary, simply to be circumspect, to propose a multiple-person family system at the same time, even though they took care to state that this would not be “sexual liberation”.

What must be explained is that the sentiment and thinking of radicalism is commonly shared by the young and middle-aged, westernised, intellectual classes. In China and Taiwan, as it is in the Third World, this is a sentiment borne out of the urgent need for fundamental restructuring in the pursuit of modernisation in the aftermath of western invasion; and radicalism easily finds breeding ground particularly in oppressive, authoritarian regimes or social inequalities. In the meantime, although Taiwan had, or still has, a powerful socio-cultural conservative force, there is no underlying intellectual capacity and respectability to it; neither the traditionalist nor religious conservatives can boast a conservatism of the kind found in Edmund Burke or the Neo-conservatism of the American model. As a result, when confronted with the rhetoric of the politically-correct and civilising progressivism or radicalism – both of whom appear to the conservatives to be made by the same mould – Conservatives often find themselves aphasic. Intellectual debate – should such exist – would take place between progressivism and radicalism; a case of this would be the infrequent polemics between feminists and queers in Taiwan. The turn towards conservatism in Taiwanese progressivism – in contrast with radicalism – is due less to the revisionism that is the result of debates with conservatives, and more to the need to appease a centrist and not-too-stubbornly-conservative crowd, in an attempt to gain a mainstream position and thence, state power.

And yet, progressivism in Taiwan as a whole grew in the context of the pro-American and anti-Communist post-Cold War system and the identity politics of ethnic groups. This meant that progressivism was submerged under the ideology of Taiwanese separatism, that is, a western, modern, cosmopolitan civilising imagination in direct contrast with the incivility of Continental China – the Orientalist, Euro-centric intellectual paradigm of history and reality, and its system of “universal” values. As for certain strands of Left-wing or marginal radicalist social movements in Taiwan, although they may run counter to the mainstream inclinations of progressivism, they accept, as with mainstream progressivism, a paradigm of critique that is “stateless” – and therefore devoid of history and nation. On one hand there is an implicit acknowledgement of the liberal notion of the “state as necessary evil”; but there is, on the other hand, no real agenda of resistance against the core states of America and Japan. In terms of knowledge and cultural resource there was only a transplantation and appropriation of western critical theoretical discourse, instead of developing contending discourse. The self-understanding of the radicalist movement is its vision of moral progress has reached the summit of human history; it claims an absolute, self-justified legitimacy. There is thus little purpose in fomenting new alternative ideas and knowledge, when one is already at the height of moral and political correctness. As a consequence of this anti-intellectual conceit, the radicalist is unable to produce, in the face of unequal international order and world system, anything in effect different

from the intellectual paradigm of regional separatism. The radicalist is rendered an ineffectual critic of the mainstream and the unwitting decoration of an ornamental plurality. This could largely have been, or could even be, a slippery slope for the gender/sexuality movement.

The strengthening of Taiwanese progressivism has been influenced by international progressivism under the globalisation of Neoliberalism. What I mean is this : it is not without structural reason that moral progressivism, with its liberal background, have become increasingly aggressive in the cultural wars of many western or pro-western societies. In the west, especially in America, the hawks of international policy and military strategy, as part and parcel of cultural and moral conservatism, helped the United States win the Cold War; but beyond the Cold War and in the era of Neoliberalist globalisation, the future now lies in moral progressivism, even though the latter has frequently lost out to moral conservatism in the brutal cultural wars surrounding questions such as abortion. This is especially because occidental moral conservatism, which presumes a western cultural tradition with Christianity at its core, has lost its real positive influence in the face of globalisation's intensification of Muslim moral conservatism. It is impossible, on one hand, to sell western moral conservatism to non-Christian societies; on the other, social divisions are fuelled by moral conservatism that can be expropriated by the far-right in western countries to spur radical anti-immigration movements. As a result, the platform of moral progressivism – universal values, universal human rights, multi-culturalism, and so on – is regarded as more fitting to the agenda of Neoliberalism. Hence the creation of a new civilising mission which is exemplified by the reductive image portrayed by western media – that of the legalisation of same-sex marriage in the “progressive nations” and the criminalization of gay relationship in the “backward nations”. Taiwanese moral progressivism was boosted by this global current and gradually prevailed over the Taiwanese moral conservatives. However, apart from the globalising influences of an occidental moral progressivism external to Taiwan, there is, internal to Taiwan as well, a strong need to integrate into the international community and to seek for itself a place in the given civilizational hierarchy. Moral progressivism thus provided an immense momentum in terms of discursive knowledge, social activism, political strategizing and state-building, for feminist and LGBT onto an irresistible course towards moral progressivism.

And yet, for moral progressivism, compromising with reality is essential to achieving mainstream status, and thus it was compelled to articulate a number of morally conservative elements. . But then, as soon as moral progressivism becomes mainstream as a result of its “displacement towards the centre”, certain, more flexible, strands of moral conservatism, in its bid for mainstream recognition, have equally been compelled to take up selectively the strategy and discourse of progressivism. What is most representative of the latter in Taiwan would be certain non-governmental organisations for the protection of women and children, and one could even say that they have become too successful in entering the mainstream institutions in a remarkably short time by flexibly appropriating the rhetoric and strategy of moral progressivism; so successful, to the extent where they have sometimes left behind gradually large numbers of Christians and moral conservatives, who have found themselves unable to catch up with the changing times – and these have since become the main driving force of the movement against same-sex marriage which refuses to acknowledge the argument that “homosexuality is the morally correct”.

In the following part I am going to explain why I have used the adjective “moral” to describe progressivism, and what is meant by “Neo-moralism”.

In the context of changing patterns of governance (e.g., state outsourcing its functions to NGO and the rise of global governance), what was originally a social movement platform gradually transformed itself into a moralistic value paradigm, as illustrated by an individualist reading of “the personal is political” – in other words, gender equality, environmental protection and animal liberation become an issue of the moral practice of the individual. One’s politics demonstrates one’s moral character. Socio-political progressivism hence became moral progressivism, by imagining history as a process of constant moral evolution, for example in the belief that all kinds of violence in human history are on the decrease. Moral progressivism and moral conservatism both entered into a mainstream governing position and are contradictorily locked in close combat as well as peaceful coexistence. This created a new civilising mission within which *progressive* moralism and *conservative* moralism run parallel to each other. I call this Neo-moralism, because it moralizes by imposing on reality the normative ideal, the political correctness of the universal values. For example all schools, offices and enterprises in Taiwan are obliged by law to establish specialised committees to oversee various measures to improve gender equality, which is in essence a form of Neo-moralistic governance. What must be particularly pointed out is that in Taiwanese Neo-moralism, both sides – the moralistic progressives and the moralistic conservatives – have made references to the same international conventions, whilst on other occasions they have transplanted discursive resources respectively from the western progressive or conservative camps.

Neo-moralism is a “moralizing” model precisely because it claims a moral high ground; and since it is already morally-politically correct, having been recognised by the advanced nations, the present task – no matter the actual composition of social reality, of class difference and of cultural tradition – could only be to impose the universal values from the professional experts onto the masses, through a top-down moralizing process with the aide of state and mainstream media and institutions. It is a process that requires reality, *present and past*, to submit itself to a self-imposing vision of civilized norms. Neo-moralists have gradually adopted, in this moralizing process, a legalistic approach via the laws of the state and administrative decrees to inflict sanctions on the violator, such as when it comes to sexual harassment, bullying, animal abuse and discrimination. They say, that only punishment by law could distinguish the right from the wrong and protect the weak effectively. Argumentation is replaced by administration. The promotion of same-sex marriage followed largely the same moralizing logic, which assumed that legalisation could *moralize* society *into* recognising homosexuality as morally correct, because the promoters believed that there would always be some groups, such as the Christians, who would never be moved by logical argumentation. They must thus be punished, coerced or governed by legal means. When it came to garnering the support of the unsuspecting centrists, the promoters of same-sex marriage resorted to publicity, by embellishing homosexuality with heart-warming stories and portraying it as a morally and mainstream-acceptable value.

Neo-moralism, the product of the convergence of moral progressivism and moral conservatism, is a notable development of the first decade of the second millennia. Yet moral progressivism is also a bastard son of Left-wing radicalism. In contrast, the portion of moral conservatives who have entered into mainstream space has abandoned the Fundamentalist Christians, who became radicalized in due course. At the moment, the same-sex marriage movement, directed in large part by moral progressivism, has encountered simultaneous resistance from queer radicalism at the margins of the cultural order and from Fundamentalist Christian radical conservatism. Would this be conducive to the cementing of the two forces within Neo-moralism? In other words, would moral progressivism, which has made its turn towards conservatism in order to distinguish itself from queer radicalism, converge with a moral

conservatism, which has become increasingly progressive in order to distinguish itself from Right-wing radicalist Fundamentalists? Or would it produce the reverse effect of partitioning Neo-moralism between the moral conservatives and moral progressives, both of whom are in the mainstream? Besides, how should Left-wing queer radicalism confront the rise of Fundamentalist Christian radical conservatives? Would it be possible to critique the progressive notion of same-sex marriage from the point of view of ultra-progressivism? And how should we confront the emergent radicalist current of Taiwanese separatism in the wake of the recent rise of China, in view of the fact that separatism has always been both solidifying and divisive to Taiwanese social activism?

Since queer radicalism and moral progressivism have in fact been sharing the same presumptions derived from the knowledge and world-view of modernity, it would be of utmost necessity in a new project of contending knowledge to turn away from the vision of cosmopolitan modernity towards that of diverse modernities. This implies that the contending discourse must not only consider the effects of the “individual” or the “people” in either its communal or collective identity, but also those of the “nation” and the “state”, for only with the influences carried by the latter two would be capable of bringing about a diverse civilizational modernity.