2015

Structural realism and the New Cold War

Ka Ho WONG

Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.ln.edu.hk/socsci_fyp

Part of the International Relations Commons

Recommended Citation

This UG Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Undergraduate Open Access Dissertations at Digital Commons @ Lingnan University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Bachelor of Social Sciences – Senior Theses by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Lingnan University.
Table of Content

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Abstract

1.2 Research Background and Questions

1.3 Research Significance

1.4 Research Design and Methods

Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 Conceptual Framework

2.1.1 The New “Cold War”

2.1.2 The “New” Cold War

2.2 Theoretical Framework: Structural Realism

Chapter 3: The Geopolitical Struggle in the CIS Region

3.1 The Institutional Expansion of NATO

3.2 The Colored Revolution

3.2.1 Georgian Rose Revolution

3.2.2 Ukrainian Orange Revolution

3.3 The Missile Defense System
Chapter 4: The Geopolitics Shift

4.1 The Division of the West

4.1.1 The Spilt of European Union

4.1.2 The Division of the United States and European Union

4.2 The Russia’s Asia Pivot

4.2.1 The Rationale of Sino-Russian Cooperation

4.2.2 The Feature of Sino-Russian Cooperation

4.2.3 The United States: Over-exaggeration of Sino-Russian Cooperation

4.2.4 The United States: Prepare for the Worst

Chapter 5: Russia: Geostrategic Resurgence in Energy

5.1 Structural Realism’s views of Energy

5.2 Gas Weapon & Pipeline Diplomacy

5.2.1 Control over Former Soviet Republics

5.2.2 Dominate European Gas Market

5.2.3 The Diversity of Energy Exports in Asia

5.3 Perception and Misperception

5.4 The Reactions of the United States
Chapter 6: Russian revisionism in its near abroad

6.1 Case Study: The Russo-Georgian War

6.1.1 Georgia is Turning to the West

6.1.2 The Reactions of Russia

6.1.3 The Implications of the Five-Day War

6.2 Case Study: The Ukrainian Crisis

6.2.1 The Russian Aggression

6.2.2 Perceptions and Misperceptions

6.2.3 The Reactions of the United States

Chapter 7: Conclusion

Chapter 8: Reference List
Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Abstract

The Cold War mentality such as misperception which is deep-rooted in the American and Russian government has triggered the revival of U.S.-Russian conflicts. The new Cold War would be a continuation from the past that operates with an action-and-reactions model. However, with the change of geopolitical situation, the new Cold War would be conducted in different means.

The structural constraints suggested by the structural realist would be an explanation for the emergence of new Cold War. The structural realism makes contributions of the idea of misperception, over-exaggeration, and balance of power that is a product of an anarchic international system. The concept of security dilemma would also deliver a theoretical foundation of the action-and-reaction approach between the United States and Russia.

The geopolitical struggles between the Untied States and Russia in the CIS region, Europe and Asia would be illustrated to explain the new Cold War style of confrontation. Furthermore, the geostrategic analysis emphasizes the Russian resurgence through energy to exert greater influences in a variety of regions. Last of all, the Russo-Georgian war and Ukrainian crisis would be selected as the case study to clarify the Russian revisionism in the near abroad.
1.2. Research Background and Research Questions

After the collapse of Soviet Union, which was described as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe” by Putin, Russia lost the status of global power and suffered from economic and political failure. (President of Russia, 2005; Schnabel, 2001)

When President Putin came to power, due to the high oil price, Russia achieved rapid economic growth that accounted for 60% increase of Gross Domestic Products (GDP) in his first two presidency. (Herspring, 2007; Maltsev, 2011) The economic recovery not surprisingly resulted in a more belligerent and ambitious Russia to regain the great power status and defend its security interests. (Robinson, 2012) For instance, Russian government launched the military reform for modernization and increased defense budgets with the purpose of enhancing strategic military capability. (Nichol, 2011) Russia also have new security posture that being more assertive to the West, such as publicly criticizing United States’ unilateralism, using vetoes with China in the United Nations over Syria issues, and making claims in the Arctic region. (Tsygankov, 2013; Hale et al., 2013; Greene, 2011)

Besides, the threat of the West’s expansion forced Russian government to respond hostilely for Russia’s survival. (Boon et al., 2011) The West initiated the institutional enlargement since 1990s, such as the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Union to the Eastern European and
Structural Realism and the New Cold War

‘Eastern bloc’ countries. (Lasas, 2010) The enlargement program which excluded Russia only created the impression that the West used the modern means to contain Russia which is similar to the containments in Cold War period. (Charap & Shapiro, 2014) The NATO’s invasion of Kosovo, United States’ withdrawal of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) and the establishment of the anti-missile shield intensified Russia’s distrust to the West. (Rukavishnikov, n.d.) Russia would lose the geopolitical and security interests, such as losing influences over the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and being weaker in the future conflicts. (DeBardeleben, 2008) To defend strategic interest of Russia, Kremlin is willing to respond the West through the military means. For example, Russia invaded Georgia after NATO’s Bucharest Summit declaring that Georgia was allowed to join the Membership Action Plan (MAP). (NATO, 2008; Schiffer & Shorr, 2009)

The recent Ukraine crisis that Russia annexed Crimea after President Yanukovich was removed alongside with mass protests has frayed the U.S.-Russia relations and Kremlin’s relations with Europe. (Hille, 2014) The escalation of mutually distrust between Russia and the West is perceived as a return to the Cold War since both side criticized another as an adversary and the West repeatedly adopted sanctions against Russia. (Duclos, 2014; Press TV, 2014; Croft & Mohammed, 2014)
These are the Research Questions to be examined in conducting the research:

1. What is the difference between the Cold War and the new Cold War?

2. How the new Cold War emerged?

3. What is the threat from the West perceived by Russia?

4. What is the strategy of Russia to respond the West?

1.3 Research Significance

The research attempted to signify the revival of the Cold War. Scholars and journalists such as Stephen Cohen and Edward Lucas have provided their arguments to explain the emergence of the new Cold War. For instance, Cohen (2006) put the blame on the United States-led expansion in his article while Lucas's (2009) book stressed the ambitions and aggressiveness of Putin administration. The research would supplement their idea through referring the recent incidents that are absent from their writings, such as the Russo-Georgian War, the Syrian Crisis, the Arctic incident and the Ukraine crisis. Also, new arguments would be presented such as the geopolitics shift that the West would potentially be divided and the developing of Sino-Russian alliance.

Besides, recognizing the change of the international system would be the contribution of the research. The hegemonic era of the United States was ended because of the relative decline of the United States and the challenges from the rising
Structural Realism and the New Cold War

powers. (Nye, 2012) If one enter the era of a new Cold War, the international system would transmit from unipolar to either bipolar or multipolar when Russia and China are rivals against the United States.

The research also make an effort to illustrate the development of Russia and Russia’s threats to the West. The Russian resurgence of economic and military, which was mentioned in articles by Dadak (2010) and Crone (2008), would be examined. Moreover, as Goldman (2008) suggested in his book, natural gas become the secret weapon of Putin administration, which could be a threat to the West while Eastern Europe heavily dependent on Russia’s energy supplies. Another threat to the West is Russia’s strategy of ‘Near Abroad’ to re-exert its influence in the neighboring countries with impunity thanks to the nuclear deterrence.

Last but not least, this research provided a review of the United States’ foreign policy in last two decades. One would study the eastward expansion of NATO directed by American Presidents, which has been regarded as aggressive by Vankovska (2014). The geopolitical analysis also elaborate the issue of NATO expansion, such as the promise of non-intervention between NATO and Gorbachev (Sarotte, 2014) and Putin’s red line (BBC, 2014).

1.4 Research Design and Methods

The research would be conducted in qualitative nature, based on the analysis of
non-numerical information. The research proposes to explore the phenomenon and offer an in-depth understanding and rationale of political context. The ‘new Cold War’, the ‘Near Abroad strategy’, ‘divide and rule’, ‘pipeline politics’ and the new ‘Eastern bloc’ are the predominant phenomenon the research would examine mainly through the realist approach emphasizing interests and powers. Moreover, the use of quantitate nature in this research would be problematic. Firstly, one could not use of the numerical information to quantify the above phenomenon. Secondly, the operation of conducting a quantitate research is challenging in this case to regulate the independent variables and dependent variables.

Case study would be a research strategy of the research to explore causation and find out the underlying principles. The Georgia War and the Ukraine crisis would be chosen to explore Russia’ military adventurism in the Near Abroad. Furthermore, one select the Nord Stream and Nabucco pipeline to explore the pipeline politics.

The data formation in the research would be textual and non-numerical for the most part. Books, journals articles and newspaper articles was the main sources of the research. The internet materials such as e-Book, online documentary videos are readily accessible and used as reference.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 Conceptual Framework: The New Cold War

The New Cold War is a continuation of cold war in terms of conflicts and confrontations between the United States and Russia. The Cold War’s action-reaction spiral set and misperceptions have persisted among two countries and develop a foundation of a new Cold War. Yet, the New Cold War would be conducted in new manifestation with the geopolitical change among two countries in post-Cold-War period.

2.1.1 The New “Cold War”

The Cold War mentality of misperceptions and the dynamics of action and reactions motivated under the anarchic system persist among the United States and Russia, which provide the foundation of new confrontation.

Perceptions and Misperception

The structural constraint under the anarchic system produces sense of insecurity among countries. A state existing in the international structure is uncertain about another state’s intentions. (Waltz, 1979) These structural factors force each state to distrust and over exaggerate other state’s foreign policies, and assume for the worst situation that other’s actions are intended to harm a state’s security. (Mearsheimer, 2006) Consequently, states are intended to have misperceptions over another in order
to protect its own security. The misperceptions among the American and Russian foreign policy makers trigger the over exaggeration of another’s policy as threats.

The old Cold War was a diplomatic displacement and replacement that led by mutual misperceptions. (Harasymiw, 2010) For instance, the speeches of Stalin backed by the ideology of communism to consolidate the Soviet people arouse the West’s suspicions over Russian expansionism, and vice versa. (Judge & Langdon, 2011) The misperceptions among two camps were also well-illustrated by the issues of Eastern Europe. When the Soviet Union consolidated its sphere of influence by invading the Eastern Europe through security calculation, the West rejected the idea due to the fears of Soviet’s further expansion in Central Europe. (Kissinger, 1994) The diverse interpretations and misperceptions over Eastern Europe among two countries stimulated threat perceptions and criticisms over another’s expansionism. The old Cold War was eventually occurred after the West and East leaders issued confrontational rhetoric and policies to check another camp’s imperialism. (Todd, 2011) The Kennan’s X-Article, Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech and Truman Doctrine inspired the beginning of Cold War.

The misunderstandings between the United States and Russia are still extensive in the post-Cold-War period. When American modified its worldview in the era of globalization, the mindset of zero sum thinking has not been abandoned by the
Russian leadership. (Stent, n.d.) The distraction of global security issues in America and flooding of conspiracy theories in the Kremlin accumulate two camp's flawed understanding towards each other without improvement. (Roxburgh, 2014) The persistence of mutual misinterpretation is demonstrated by the American's enduring views of the Russian imperial threats, while Russian criticizes the unilateral American policies in its near abroad. (Judge & Langdon, 2011) The American expansion of influence in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region backed by democracy promotion is perceived as a security threat to Russia with beautiful language. (Allison, 2013) The mutual misperceptions and over exaggeration of another's policies in the CIS region, Europe and Asia Pacific would intensify the hostility between the United States and Russia. The confrontation triggered by the geopolitical conflicts in these regions would possibly initiate a larger scale of confrontation.

Actions and Reactions

In the old Cold War, the bipolar system, either of the superpowers are forced to follow another's strategies and respond in the similar approach in order to maintain the equivalent capabilities and balancing. (Yost, 2011) There were numerous of example illustrating actions and reactions process between the United States and Soviet Union. For instance, the Marshall Plan was an American initiative to support
the reform of European economies, while the Molotov Plan was similarly initiated by the Soviet Union to aid its allies in the Eastern Europe. Another example was the establishment of Warsaw Pact in response to the U.S.-led NATO, which were both a collective defense treaty to maintain military control in the Eastern Europe and across North America and Europe respectively.

In the post-Cold-War era, the actions and reactions spiral set has been resumed among the United States and Russia. (Charap & Shapiro, 2014) There are two reasons motivating the declining Russia to pursue a similar strategy with the United States. Firstly, by taking the United States as the reference point of Russian foreign policy making, Russia could acquire a status of great power equivalent to its rivals. (J. Mankoff, 2012) In other words, the Russian Government is seeking diplomatic disparity and reciprocity to the hegemonic United States. Secondly, the failure of responding the United States would be regarded as a symbol of retreat in the Russian leader's logic of revenge. (Shevtsova, 2010) In the Russian's view, the response is necessary in the logic that if Russia retreat, the United States would advance. Therefore, Russia is adopting a tit-for-tat approach towards the American foreign policy to counter the United States' imperialism. The Russian philosophy could be acknowledged in the situation that the Russian aggression responded the West's expansion in the post-Soviet space.
For example, the invasion of Georgia and declaration of independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia happened just after Georgia was allowed to participate the Membership Action Plan in the Bucharest summit declaration. Similarly, when Ukrainian publics demanded closer ties with the EU and overthrew the current President Yanukovych who refused to sign an association agreement with the EU, Russia invaded Crimea subsequently. These diplomatic events were perceived as President Putin’s payback to the West on the struggle in the CIS region.

2.1.2 The “New” Cold War

When the Cold-War-style mentality such as misperceptions and action and reactions model persist, the struggle between the United States and Russia would take place differently in the new Cold War. The geopolitical changes contribute to four differences of the new Cold War, including the change of power status, the fading of ideology war, the differences of nuclear deterrence and geopolitics shift.

The Change of Power Status

In the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union are the two superpowers that correspondingly shared power and capabilities in the bipolar international system. However, the status of Russia has been changed after the end of Cold War and collapse of Soviet Union. The United States become the only superpower that dominates the global system and enjoys hegemonic power and supremacy in military
and economic that the declining Russia could not compete with. (Dadak, 2010)

Militarily, the United States maintain military supremacy compared with Russia in terms of military expenditure. The military spending of the United States accounted for more than seven times of Russia’s and the United States possess a more advanced conventional forces. (OECD, 2015) Economically, although Russia has enjoyed greater economic growth at 4.72% (2002-2012) compared with 1.73% growth of American economy, the Russian aggregate GDP is less than a quarter as large as the America’s. (OECD, 2015)

Russia lost its great power status as a consequence due to the rapid drop of power capabilities compared with the United States. Russia could at most be regarded as a regional power through domination of the region with the nuclear superiority. (Borger, 2014) When compared with the nuclear capabilities, the difference between Russia and the United States becomes insignificant. Russia possess almost an equal quantity of nuclear weapons with the United States after the New START Treaty was signed. (Nichols, Stuart, & McCausland, 2012) The nuclear parity reinforced Russia’s imperialism regional policy in exerting greater influences in its near abroad. The Russian government could also turn its weaknesses into strengths. Russia benefits from the downgrade of power status and consequently concentrates the resources in the region and shares less responsibility in the global issues. (Saunders, 2014)
The war on terror has indicated the differences of role between the United States and Russia. The hegemonic United States, as a major global player, lead the world to fight against terrorism against the ‘rogue states’. On the other hand, Russia played a secondary role mainly responsible for resources supplement and intelligence sharing.

The Fading of Ideology War

Another mean of Cold War could be regarded as the ideological struggle between liberal democracy and communism. Two superpowers expanded influences and attracted its allies worldwide through ideological power. Apart from ideological expansion, ideology provides the foreign policy makers with greater understandings of another’s strategy since the policies of the United States and Soviet Union in some extent were guided by the ideological principles. (Van Den Bercken, William, n.d.) For instance, the Marxism’s concept of world revolution to overthrow capitalism worldwide raised the West’s fear over Soviet expansionist ambitions and resulted in the containment over Soviet Union.

The end of Cold War justified the reality that communism was faded away after the collapse of Soviet Union and the democratization in Eastern Europe. With the fall of communism, the Western liberal democracy is dominated and become the universal ideology. The United States continue to expand its influence through democracy promotion in the Middle East and the colored revolutions in post-Soviet space.
Nevertheless, Russia has showed no desires in rebuilding an ideology that could challenge the United States’ liberal democracy. The Russian government developed ‘Sovereign Democracy’, a new state ideology which emphasized on independence and non-interference in the global affairs. (Okara, 2007) The new Russian ideology upholding authoritarianism and nationalism would not obtain widespread support globally as the Soviet Union did. The new state ideology is regarded as a defensive concept in legitimizing Russian independent policy making to resist the Western influences rather than as an attractive belief in re-attracting its allies globally. (Horvath, 2011)

Without the ideological burdens, Russian foreign policy making is adopting a pragmatic approach. Russian foreign policies are more flexible and changeable when the Kremlin looks for the maximization of national interests in a case-by-case basis. (Roberts, 2010) The Russian foreign policies driven by pragmatism illustrate a sharp distinct with the United States in the post-Cold-War period, which is constrained by liberalism.

The Differences of Nuclear Deterrence

In the Cold War era, the nuclear weapons work as a mutual assured destruction to avoid the direct armed conflicts between the United States and Soviet Union. The fears of causing complete annihilation from nuclear strikes stop neither side initiating
the nuclear warfare. The two superpowers, for mutual self-interest, cooperated in
eliminating nuclear materials globally and maintained the status quo. (Marx &
Saetren, 2015)

When the Cold War is passed and some treaties on the non-proliferation of
nuclear weapons have been signed, the difference of nuclear capabilities between the
United States and Russia has no significant change. As a regional power, Russia have
possessed nuclear disparity strategically compared with the United States.

The nuclear security is alarming when Russia is demanding a status change
through its nuclear capabilities. The Russian government is seeking to change the
status quo by means of the nuclear weapons. (The Economist, 2015) The nuclear
threat is Russia’s strategy to intimidate the West through manipulating nuclear strike
as an offensive weapon rather than a traditional mean of deterrence. The strategy is
backed by the belief among the Kremlin that the Washington would not jeopardize
over small states through nuclear strike since the United States as a hegemony has
more to lose than the declining Russia. (Edwards & Kemp, 2006)

The Kremlin has proved their belief correct through the intervention of its
neighboring countries. The Russia’s aggressive invasions in Georgia and Ukraine are
convincing the world that with nuclear weapons Russia could advance its near abroad
with impunity. Oppositely, the crisis also demonstrated the reluctance of the United
Structural Realism and the New Cold War

States to confront Russia through nuclear strikes. Hence, the nuclear threat become
the most powerful weapons of Russia to challenge the United States, especially in the
Eurasian region.

The Geopolitics Shift

The Cold War indicated a bipolar containment that divides the East and West.
The Eastern bloc refers to the group of states aligned with the Soviet Union, which
has almost been collapsed after a series of democratic revolutions in the Eastern
European countries. Besides, Russia has maintained ambiguous relationship with the
post-Soviet states. While the Central Asian countries remain as Russia’s sphere of
influence, the Baltics states, Ukraine and Georgia are struggling to resist Russia’s
influences through turning to the West.

On the other hand, the Western bloc was composed of Western European
countries who uphold the values of democracy and capitalism. China has joined the
Western camp in the 1970s following the Sino-Soviet split and the United States’
rapprochement with China. The composition of the Western bloc has also changed in
the post-Cold-War period. Russia has been exerting its influence in Europe, such as
establishing business ties with Western European countries and creating energy
dependence in Europe. The greater interdependence between Russia and European
countries has raised the United States’ concerns over the division of the West. In
addition, the relationship between the United States and China has been tense when China’s rapid economic growth posed a threat to challenge the global order. The United States’ pivot to Asia introduced by President Obama correspondingly showed a more provocative approach against the rising China. In contrast, Sino-Russian cooperation are more intensifed in terms of military, economic, political and cultural perspective. The closing Sino-Russian coalition is capable of competing the hegemonic power of the United States and reshaping the status quo.

Therefore, the geopolitics has been shifted after the end of Cold War. While the Eastern European countries turned to the West and were coopted in the Western institutions, there are the potential of division between the United States and European Union, and also the emergence of Sino-Russian alliance.

2.2 Theoretical Framework: Structural Realism

Structural realist theories provide a logical foundation of international politics to illustrate the emergence of a new Cold War. Structural realism is comprised of two key elements. The structural realists firstly assume an anarchic international system that would initiate the security dilemma and competition among the great powers. Second, the structural realist also suggests the balance of power as a product of the anarchic structure. The notion of security dilemma and balance of power under the assumption of anarchy provided an argument to analyze the emergence of the new
Cold War. In general, the structural realism is a theory that could predict an occurrence of a phenomenon, such as the new Cold War, rather than forecasting when and where the new Cold War will be emerged.

**Anarchic International System**

Structural realists considered anarchy as a predominant assumption that provides initial understanding of international politics. The international system is anarchic that there is lack of an external or higher authority above states. In the anarchic international structure, states play an independent role in protecting its own security and therefore the world system could also be regarded as a self-help system. Each state who has the rights to use force in safeguarding national security is intended to maximize its relative power compared with others. (Zala, 2013)

The international system is distinguished from the domestic political system. The domestic structure maintains hierarchy order and centralized power on the hands of government while the order of international structure is decentralized. (Waltz, 1979) The government who possesses superior and coercive power plays a role of mediator to resolve disputes and enforce law and order in the domestic society. In contrast, with the absence of external central authority, the inter-state conflicts emerged in the international system could not be halted by the third party but arbitrated only by the states itself.
Security Dilemma

Security dilemma occurred when a state enhance its security and other states react in a similar way to heighten its security. Structural realists explain the phenomenon by assuming the survival as the ultimate goal of states that other national objectives could be achievable only if survival is guaranteed. To ensure survival, the maximization of national security is the means for each state to pursue when there are no external authority. (Mearsheimer, 2006) However, security is a zero-sum game that the defensive measures taken by one state to strengthen its security would lessen the security of others.

When a state perceive its security measures as a defensive way to protect its survival, these actions would be interpreted differently by others. A defensive security measure would be perceived as offensive, when states are uncertain about another’s intention and tend to prepare for the worst of other’s intention. The structural constraints produce mutual distrust among states and result in over-exaggeration over other’s security measures. The over-stressing of other’s policies as a threat triggers the competition of security development. Each state under the self-help system are forced to follow other states to strengthen the security capabilities or a state’s survival would be threatened. Therefore, the security dilemma would be an unintended phenomenon produced by the structural constraint.
The nuclear arms races between the United States and Soviet Union in the Cold War to compete for supremacy over nuclear capabilities have best illustrated the security dilemma. When there were the uncertainty of the adversary’s capacity of nuclear weapons, both states spent massively in the proliferation of nuclear arsenals. Each state preferred to possess an aggressive military buildup that best serves for its survival when a state was unaware of another’s intentions.

As a hegemonic power, the United States continues to strengthen its security capabilities. The fear and suspicious of Russian government to the West is widespread since Russia has lost his buffering zone and natural barrier provided by Eastern European countries after the collapse of Soviet Union and NATO expansion. The further expansion of the West in the post-Soviet space including Georgia and Ukraine was interpreted differently among the two camps. While the West is intended to coopt these states to strengthen its security, Russia perceived the expansion as an aggressive action that would pose a threat to Russia’s security. Accordingly, the Russian government has launched the military reform, initiated ambitious military spending plan, and invaded its neighboring countries in response to the perceived security threats from the West.

The Balance of Power

The Balance of power theory projects that a hegemonic state would make use of
its relative power advantage to offend the weaker state, which would stimulate a balancing coalition in resisting the hegemony. In the structural realist thinking, the balance of power is a product of structural constraint rather than coordinated state’s behavior. (Kenneth N. Waltz, 2000) The importance of state’s survival under anarchy encourages states to check other’s desires of expansion and hegemony through balancing. The balance of power could be established through internal balancing, which emphasizes on the enhancement of a state’s internal capabilities, and external balancing such as forming alliances with other states. The structural realist asserted that the balance of power will be restored even if balances are once interrupted in the unipolar system.

The United States enjoy hegemony since the collapse of the Soviet Union as the American powers in terms of political, military, economic and technological are incomparable with other great powers. The unchecked hegemonic power of the United States was demonstrated by the withdrawal of ABM Treaty, NATO expansion and Iraq War. The United States have took its advantage of power to exert its influences further in the Middle East, the CIS region and also Asia pacific.

However, as structural realist anticipated, the balancing to the hegemonic America would be repaired and the counter-hegemonic structures are emerged. (Jakobsen, 2014) Internally, Russia initiates an aggressive resurgence economically
and militarily thanks to the rise of energy prices in the early 2000s. The revisionist Russia seeks to recover its great power status and reciprocity for the Russia-U.S. relations. With improved capabilities, the Russian government has posed a more aggressive attitude to counter the expansion of the West in its 'Near Abroad' where Russia proclaimed to preserve the privileged interests.

The Russian government, apart from internal balancing, has been intended to build the Anti-Americanism alliance to counter the hegemonic United States. For instance, Russia established an alternative intergovernmental military alliance, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), to consolidate the Russia’s sphere of influence in the CIS region and prevent the American’s expansion. Furthermore, the Kremlin also allies with Iran and Syria in the Middle East, with China in Asia to check the United States.

**Chapter 3: Geopolitical Struggle in the CIS Region**

The most provocative struggle between the United States and Russia in the post-Cold War era is the enlargement of American influence eastward in the post-Soviet space. The NATO expansion, Colored Revolution and the establishment of Missile Defense Shield are the example of the West’s expansion of influence in the CIS region. Misperceptions occurred when the American foreign policy is intended to
strengthen its defense to tackle new global security issues and the Kremlin perceive the United States’ actions as the competition of sphere of influence and a threat to Russia’s security. Mutual mistrust driven by the anarchic system persists especially in Russia against the United States, despite of the end of global rivalry. The Russian government’s responses are reasonable for structural realist when Russia are unsure about the Washington’s intentions and survival remains as the predominance component in Russian foreign policy making. In response, Russia has carried out an aggressive approach to preserve its privileged interests in the near abroad.

3.1 The Institutional Expansion of NATO

In the post-Cold War period, the West expand its influences through NATO which could be divided by three phases. The first wave of NATO enlargement accessed Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Afterwards, seven Central and Eastern European countries including the Baltics states, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania joined the institutions in the second wave of expansion. The NATO expansions have escalated the tensions between Russia and the West, especially in the third wave of NATO expansion that commits on future membership of Georgia and Ukraine in the Bucharest Summit.

Perception and Misperception

The West has assured the Russian government that the NATO expansions are not
intended to contain Russia but provide collective security in Europe. The NATO declared ‘three nos’ commitment that the organization “have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members” in the NATO-Russia Founding Act. (NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2009) Moreover, the NATO enlargements were reciprocal agreements between the West and these new member states, rather than a unilateral actions. (Blank, 1997) The fears among the new member states towards Russian resurgences have also legitimated the expansion of NATO.

On the contrary, the Russian government perceived the NATO enlargement as a geopolitical challenge that touched on Russia’s national interests. (Bugajski, 2004) The Russian’s perception of the U.S.-led NATO is undesirable when the military organization keep existing after the dissolution of Warsaw Pact. The NATO’s unilateral action in Kosovo that ignored Russia’s interests and opposition has deteriorated the NATO-Russian relations. (Johnson, n.d.) The hostile perception and suspicious against NATO has been intensified in Russia following the Kosovo crisis. Consequently, the Kremlin saw the exploitation of the United States over Russia’s weaknesses in the 1990s when Russia was not capable of objecting the acquiring of former Soviet republics into NATO. (Hassig, 2009) For instance, Russia blackmailed the Baltic States through economic sanctions as a leverage to deter the NATO
accession instead of directly confronting with the Untied States. The Russian
government also alleged the United States has adopted a winner-takes-all approach to
seek for unconditional accommodations from the defeated Russia. (Cohen, 2006) The
crossing of the ‘red line’ drew by former Russian President Yeltsin around the Baltic
States was the case.

In the way of Russian thinking, security is a zero-sum term that the approval of
NATO expansion in the Central and Eastern Europe is equivalent to the loss of
Russia’s security interests provided by these European states as a buffering zone.
(Tsygankov, 2013) The greater defense involvement of the United States in Europe
and the potential of deployment of NATO troops and military facilities in the newly-coopted member states also posed a threat to Russia’s security.

Furthermore, the integration between NATO and the former Soviet republics
except Russia has triggered the Kremlin’s suspicions over the encirclement by the
West. (Didymus, 2014) The modern containment, military encirclement and strategic
isolation of Russia are the common argument among the Russian officials in opposing
the NATO enlargement. The over exaggeration of NATO enlargement that the West is
intended to weaken Russia’s security landscape in the region and threaten to its
survival has forced the Kremlin to prepare for the worst over the United States’
intentions.
3.2 The Colored Revolution

Colored revolutions refers to a phenomenon of non-violent demonstrations that involve thousands of people expressing their dissatisfaction in the streets with colored symbols. The governments would be overthrown by the mass or forced to compromise for political changes. Most of the colored revolutions, including the Georgian Rose Revolution, Ukrainian Orange Revolution and Kyrgyzstani Tulip Revolution, took place in the post-Soviet space. When the majority of upheavals took place near Russian border, the involvement of international supports in these revolutions exacerbate the criticism over the West’s challenges to Russia’s sphere of influence.

The contribution of foreign forces during the democratic movement is the major dispute between the United States and Russia. The ambiguity of foreign assistance owing to the difficulty in measurement provides each side a room to defend its arguments and trigger diplomatic conflicts.

Foreign assistances through political and economic channel such as the development aid are the major arguments for the Russian government to criticize the West. However, the influences of development aid are limited and ineffective in the senses that the economic assistances were generally captured by the tyrants rather than reaching the local people. (Stiglitz, 2002) When the Western powers might not be successful in interference through political and economic way, the civil society is
rapidly developed in the post-Soviet states thanks to the assistance from the West.

(Tordjman, 2008)

3.2.1 Georgian Rose Revolution

The Revolution of Roses was a regime change in Georgia in 2003. The Rose Revolution was triggered after widespread protests over the disputes of fraud parliamentary elections. Consequently, President Shevardnadze was forced to resign and the pro-Western leader Saakashvili became the Georgian President.

There are no significant external interferences in the 2003 Georgian parliamentary election. The major Western participation was the establishment of exit polls which was conducted under the cooperation between the American Global Strategy Group and four Georgian organizations. (Kandelaki, 2006) Despite of Shevardnadze’s criticism on the Open Society Foundation over interfering Georgia’s internal affairs through funding the opposition, the organization deny the claims of interferences in the elections. The Open Society Foundation has spent no more than a half of million dollars to prepare for the elections, and did not funded the domestic civil groups. (Angley, 2013)

However, although the direct foreign interference was no substantial in the Rose revolution, the West has exerted political influences through financial assistances by the international institutions. The West consistently provided the Georgian
government with conditional financial aids that the development of the third sector in Georgia was part of the package. (Lutsevych, 2013) For instance, the National Endowment for Democracy has stimulated the politicization of the Georgian NGOs, when the Open Society Foundation also encouraged the alliance among NGOs to consolidate the political power. The Westernized leaders of the Georgian NGOs who are educated in the West also facilitated the impacts from the Western organizations.

The suspension of financial grants from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund during the revolutions posed a long term financial influence to the Georgian government. (Grey & Volkov, 2003) The cut off of financial supports from the United States Department of State further manipulate the financial pressures to Georgia. As a result, the long term financial influences from the West has played a role in overthrowing the Shevardnadze administration and initiating the Rose revolution.

3.2.2 Ukrainian Orange Revolution

The Orange Revolution was also a democratic movements in Ukraine through a series of demonstrations taking place in Kiev. Thousands of Ukrainian protesters were driven by the disputed run-off vote of presidential election by means of corruption and electoral fraud. Accordingly, the pro-Western Yushchenko was elected and defeated the pro-Russian candidate Yanukovych in the second run-off of election.
The role of external forces was also controversial in the Orange Revolution in the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election. Similar to Georgia, the indirect assistance in the development of Ukrainian civil society was the major contribution of the West. (Polese, 2008) For instance, the transfer of knowledge, sharing of experience and networking are the training materials for the expansion of the Ukrainian civil organizations subsidized by the West.

Besides, the West’s another support is the mobilization of the Ukrainian protestors in complaining about massive corruption and election fraud in the Kiev’s Independence Square. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), a Western-led institution, was responsible for monitoring the presidential election campaign in Ukraine. The international observer group complained of voting irregularities in the elections and the European Union correspondingly condemned the Russia’s interventions in the disputed election. (Ukraine, presidential election., 2005)

The condemnation was regarded as a fuel of mobilizing Ukrainian protestors and resulted in the victory of a pro-Western politician Yushchenko in the re-run election.

Perceptions and Misperceptions

The Western diplomats refuted Russian’s allegation of the United States’ direct interference in the Colored Revolution. In the West’s points of views, the local people in the post-Soviet states is more decisive in the movements than the foreign forces.
(Sussman & Krader, 2008) Instead of championing the Western assistance in the democratic movements, the West put the emphasis on the participation of the domestic people. Besides, the West was intended to keep the democratic movements conducted peacefully without bloodshed based on humanitarianism rather than overthrowing the government. (Ó Beacháin & Polese, 2010) For instance, the Western states asserted pressures on Shevardnadze not to use forces against the protesters in Georgia.

On the other hand, Russia has identified the involvement of foreign forces in the democratic movements in its Near Abroad. The exaggeration of the West’s role in developing civil society generate the anti-Western condemnations from the Russian government. The Kremlin perceives the colored revolution not as the expression of popular determination and the victory of people power as what the Western countries perceived. (Wright, 2015) Instead, the Moscow considers it as a US-driven strategic plan threaten to challenge Russia’s sphere of influence. The Russian government used to criticize the West using dazzling words and democracy promotion as a cover of its imperialism that exerts its influences in the post-Soviet space. (Allison, 2013) In the opinions of the Russian leadership, the colored revolution is a geopolitical and strategic struggle between the United States and Russia, especially in Ukraine which is strategically important to Russia in the Eurasian integration. (Papert, 2014) Some
Russian officials even exacerbate the United States’ intention behind the movements as a mean of weakening the Russian dominance in the post-Soviet space and reshaping the CIS regional order.

**Actions and Reactions**

Responding the West’s aggressiveness in the CIS region, such as the institutional expansion and colored revolutions, the Russian government enforce an adventure ‘Near Abroad’ strategy in the region in order to restore the sphere of influence. The ‘Near Abroad’ suggested by the Russian government is the security zone that Russia preserves privileged and exclusive interests. The Russian leadership has insisted that Russia has the primacy in shaping the order in the CIS region which has long be considered as its sphere of influence. (Oguzlu, 2014) The Moscow also stressed the preservation of the first strike rights of the use of nuclear weapons in the region to counter the West’s expansionism in its near abroad. (Van Herpen, 2011)

The Kremlin’s main instrument of exerting political influences in the CIS region is the backing of separatism. The supports of Russia over separatist sentiments have initiated the ‘frozen conflicts’ in the neighboring states that would threaten the integrity of former Soviet republics. (Ora, 2006) The manipulation of the separatist sentiments and frozen conflicts offers the Russian government a bargaining chip and leverage to influence these states’ policies. (George, 2010) For instance, the major
objective of Russian foreign policy to prevent Georgia and Ukraine from joining NATO has been reached through the threats of frozen conflicts.

Most recently, the initiation of armed conflicts with its neighboring countries has become the major Russian strategy in asserting its influence in the region and prevent further NATO accession in the post-Soviet space. The Kremlin’s manipulation of separatism in its near abroad plus the assertion of its rights to protect the interest of the Russian diaspora and Russian citizens throughout post-Soviet states has been the strategy of launching armed conflicts with the neighboring countries. (Simonsen, 2001) The Russian involvement in the means of ‘third party peacekeeping’ ensures a short and glory war that offer the Moscow greater bargaining power to deal with the former Soviet republics.

For instance, the invasion of Georgia and the declaration of independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia has been achieved after the Five-Day War with the participation of the Russian troops through Russian-style of peacekeeping to protect the Russian diaspora in the republics. (Nichol, 2009) Similarly, the Russian government annexed Crimea due to its rights to protect the interests of Crimean population. The manipulation of separatism and frozen conflicts has effectively stopped Georgia and Ukraine joining the NATO, when the Kremlin invade Georgia and Ukraine with impunity due to its nuclear disparity with the United States.
3.3 Missile Defense system

The United States has long desired to develop a more confound ballistic missile defense since the Clinton administration through the supplement of defensive missile interceptors. (Shirinov, 2008) After the withdrawal of the ABM Treaty in Bush administration, the United States is more flexible in developing missile defense system regardless of the treaty clause. The Bush administration launched a plan of the establishment of a ballistic missile defense system in 2007. According to President Bush’s proposal, there would be 10 interceptor missiles placed in Poland when a radar station would also be constructed in the Czech Republic. The missile defense shield has aggravated the tense U.S.-Russian relationships with Russia’s strong opposition. Afterwards, the ballistic missile defense system has been modified when President Obama came to power. In 2009, the Obama administration announced the "Phased, Adaptive Approach" for Missile Defense in Europe as a replacement of President Bush’s proposed missile defense system. The European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) missile defense system cancelled the planned deployment of missile defense interceptors and equipment in the Eastern Europe. The strategic adjustment of the missile defense system was regarded as a component of Obama’s reset policy to improve the relationships with Russia.

Perceptions and Misperceptions
The ‘rogue state’s possession of missile capacities has posed a new security threat to the United States in the post-Cold War period. The nuclear threat of the ‘rogue states’ has illustrated the shift of missile strikes beyond the context of superpowers. (Glaser & Fetter, 2001) The missile report suggested that the Iranian and North Korean missile capabilities would reach the level that could launch a missile attack directed to the United States after five years. (Thielmann, 2003) The missile threat from the ‘rogue states’ is the explanation of the Washington over the proposed missile defense system in the Eastern Europe.

The United States also make clear that the missile defense system is a defensive measure in response to the nuclear threat from the ‘rogue states’, but not an intention of containing Russia’s missile capabilities. The Washington justified its intentions through exposing the operational details and capabilities of the system. To begin with, the military expert’s advice that all missile attacks directing to the United States from Iran must first fly over Central Europe has justified the geographical allocation of the missile interceptors and equipment in Poland and the Czech Republic. (Eshel, 2007) As well, in terms of capabilities, the American missile defense is insignificant in combating Russian advanced missile strikes. (Adomanis, 2014) Instead, the ballistic missile defense system is more capable of preventing the less developed missiles from the ‘rogue states’.
Conversely, Russia considers the missile defense system based on its strategic
calculation. The missile defense, in the judgments of Russian officials, is the United
States’ efforts to destroy the strategic balance between two great powers. (Cirlig, 
2012) The Russian strategic deterrent reinforced by the nuclear capabilities would be 
challenged after the United States’ deployment of interceptors in Poland. The United 
States could further pursue of an unchecked nuclear supremacy when the Russian 
strategic parity is undermined. (Eshel, 2007) What the Kremlin worry most is not only 
the fear of the loss of Russia’s strategic balance, but also the exclusion from the 
European defense architecture. 

Russia’s worries have been supported by the following three reasons. First, the 
Russian government recognizes that the United States’ have overstressed the Iranian 
threats. (Mizin, 2000) Russia does not perceive Iran who has been a client of the 
Soviet Union as a threat, but rather a market for arm trade. The Russian officials also 
dismiss the Iranian threat through the report published by the NIE in 2007 declaring 
that Iran would not pose an imminent missile threat to the United States. (Thompson, 
2007) 

Second, the proximity of missile defense system to the Russian ICBMs based in 
Europe has stimulated the Russian fears. Russia worries that Russian ICBMs would 
lose its effectiveness when checked by the deployment of missile interceptors nearby.
(Lewis & Postol, 2007) Consequently, the Russian’s nuclear capabilities in Europe would be paralyzed and Russia eventually lose the strategic balance to counter the United States.

Third, the Russian government is suspicious about the lack of constraints of the missile defense proposed by the United States. The Washington has yet to commit in imposing legal bindings that provide long term limitations on the system. The open-ended nature of the missile defense raise Russia’s concerns over further enrichment of the system’s capabilities, and even worse, the transformation of defensive equipment to offensive weapons. (Felgenhauer, 2007)

Actions and Reactions

In response, the Russian government adopts a strategy of containment towards the missile defense proposed by the United States. Russia has proposed an alternative plan that offers Gabala Radar Station in Azerbaijan to be jointly used by the United States and Russia, which has been turned down by the United States. In fact, the Kremlin’s principal reaction is the threat of termination of all disarmament and arms control treaties, including the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II Treaty and the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. (Stephanova, 2007) Another response of Russia is the deployment of offensive weapons, such as directing the nuclear ballistic and cruise missiles to the European countries. (Hunt, 2012)
Russian military even advised a more aggressive response that would launch a pre-emptive strike against the missile defense.

The Russian government’s reactions of the missile defense are provocative since the weakness of Russian conventional forces was disposed during the Georgia war and Russia is intended to adopt a nuclear first-use policy to maintain its military capabilities through nuclear weapons. (Fedorov, 2010)

**Chapter 4: The Geopolitics Shift**

This part would analyze the shift among the Eastern bloc and Western bloc.

There would be a potential split among the European Union and the United States, when the former have dependence on Russia energy supply and inclines to adopt a conciliatory approach towards Russia. On the other hand, the Sino-Russian relations become warmer with the shared anti-Americanism and common interests for a multipolar world. The politics, economic and energy ties between Russia and China have also been intensified.

**4.1 The Division of the West**

The division among the West would be illustrated in the following paragraphs.

To begin with, the division within the European Union would be identified that the ‘old Europe’ tends to be pro-Russian when the ‘new Europe’ is more hostile against
Russia. The lack of unity in Europe prevent the institutions from implementing aggressive foreign policy against Russia. (Goldthau, 2008) The pro-Russian Western European states has discouraged the provocative anti-Russian approach not only in the European Union, but also in the Western bloc. There would be a risk that the Europe would be reluctant to follow the United States' containment against Russia.

4.1.1 The Spilt of European Union

The remarkable reality is that the European Union fails to commit into the Common Foreign and Security Policy and to reach consensuses when it comes to the relations with Russia. The EU could be divided into two camps that are New Europe and Old Europe, which have diverse interpretations and reactions against Russia's aggression in its near abroad. The camp of the new European member states, which are mostly the former communist states such as Poland and the Baltics states, perceives Russian aggression as a security threat and upholds a tougher containment against Russia. (Rettman, 2010) On the other side are the Western European states and the EU founding members, including France, Germany, and Italy, which place greater concerns over energy supplies and adopt a conciliatory approach to Russia. The Russian-Ukrainian gas disputes in 2009 is a case to illustrate the spilt within the EU. The gas conflict was perceived by the new EU member states as a Russian aggression in Ukraine with the intention of exerting greater political influence and ultimately
Structural Realism and the New Cold War

challenging the security over the post-Soviet space. On the contrary, the Old Europe responded to the event only after the European energy supplies were also disrupted. (Smith, 2010) The major concerns of Old Europe over the dispute are energy issues, rather than security. Consequently, except for deploying an independent monitoring mission, the EU were refused to intervene and put the blame on Russia over the gas disputes. When the old Europe preserve a significant role in the EU policy making, the EU’s attitude towards Russia is likely to be appeasing that complies with the interests of the old Europe, regardless of the new member states’ fears over security.

The Russian government is intended to divide the EU which fits for Russia’s interests. The bilateral approach to deal with the separate EU member states is Russia’s divide and rule strategy to exploit the political leverage and differences among the EU members against another. (Petersen, 2013) Instead of signing bilateral agreements with the EU, Russia prefers compromising the gas deals bilaterally with distinct European countries. The construction of Nord Stream pipeline illustrate the bilateral cooperation compromised between Russia and Germany. The Russian bilateral energy agreements with different European countries offer Russia political leverages to accomplish its political will based on the differences and the exploitation of energy dependence. (Weitz, 2014) While Russia adopts a coercive approach towards the Baltics states which are completely reliance on Russian gas supply, the
Russian policy towards Western Europe is friendlier in order to maintain sustainable energy relations. (Kanet, 2009) The Russian’s divide and conquer approach has generated separated European attitudes toward Russia that some are more tolerant and others are more aggressive. The lack of solidarity within EU prevent the institutions from initiating aggressive policies that threaten Russia’s interests, given the unanimous decision-making style in the EU.

4.1.2 The Division of the United States and European Union

In contrast to trade where the United States and European Union have almost equal power, the alliance is dominated by the United States in terms of military and defense. (Thimm, 2014) The United States enjoying global military supremacy perceive its European allies as instrumental and a junior partner. In the post-Cold-War era, the threat perception has changed that when the United States continues to perceive Russia as a threat apart from the rogue states, Europe consider Russia as an economic partner. (Larivé, 2008) The securitization of Russia which is deep-rooted in the United States diplomats produces confrontational policies against Russia which would affect Europe’s interests. The diverse of interpretation over Russia among the transatlantic alliance contribute to the division of partnership.

The EU-U.S. spilt would be showed by an amount of global affairs. The terrorist attacks such as the 9/11 attack have posed a new threat to the global security in the
21st century and the U.S.-led war on terror against the ‘rogue’ states has started the division between the EU and US. (Pew Research Center, 2002) The Iraq War in 2003 demonstrated the divided positions among the United States and Western European countries when the latter were hesitate to support the invasion of Iraq. (Kanet, 2009) The Old Europe has soft-balanced the United States in the Iraq War that France and Germany refused to endorse the invasion of Iraq in the United Nations Security Council. The Iraq War launched by the United States despite of the lack of support in Europe, in the views of Europeans, was a unilateral military action based on its hegemonic power. (Schwarz, 2002)

Since then, the transatlantic alliance has become more conflictual over the global issues. For instance, the United States could not reach the consensus with the Europe in the issues of diversification of European energy supplies, NATO Membership Action Plan over Georgia and Ukraine and Russian aggression in its near abroad. The division of the West would hamper its capabilities in combating the Russian aggression. (J. Mankoff, 2012; Smith, 2010) For instance, The United States’ economic weapons against Russian aggression would be significant only if the contribution of EU is involved. The lack of U.S.-Russian economic ties illustrates the ineffectiveness of its economic weapons in countering Russia without the EU’s help.
Perceptions and Misperceptions

The Western diplomats have overstated the significance of Russian’s divide and rule strategy in the broken relationship between the United States and EU. (EurActiv, 2015) There is beyond doubt that Russia has created extensive business and energy relations with European countries which could shape the policies of European Union against Russia. The warmer bilateral relationship between Russia and the Old Europe such as France and Germany has also banned EU’s confrontational common foreign policies against Russia.

However, the improved Russian-EU relations doesn’t necessarily means the deteriorated partnership among the West. The crucial factor contributing to the spilt of transatlantic alliance is the diverse of foreign policy making of the West. Apart from the Iraq War, the United States’ confrontational policies against the Russian aggression were also undesirable to the EU. Instead of containing Russia, the Old Europe is intended to deal with Russia through a conciliatory approach to prevent further Russian aggression. (Archick & Mix, 2015) In contrast, the United States perceive the EU’s strategy as tolerant and appeasing that would trigger further Russian aggression. The difference between the United States’ approach and EU’s strategy towards the Russian aggression has signified the division of the transatlantic alliance.
Despite of the latent division among the West, the EU is not turning to the East. Despite of economic interdependence, the EU-Russian relations are not harmonious due to the clashes of norms and values. (Aggestam, 2007) The EU has criticized the authoritarianism of Putin regime and the weakening of rule of law and press freedom in Russia. The lack of consensus over European norms and values has deterred the greater integration between the EU and Russia. Therefore, the coalitions among the Europe and Russia would unlikely occur under the conflicts of the human rights issues.

4.2 Russia’s Asia Pivot: The Sino-Russian Cooperation

Following the Obama administration’s pivot to Asia, Russia also turns to the East and put emphasis on the importance in Asia-pacific region. Differing from the United States’ Asia pivot, Russia has insufficient strategic presences and is intended to cooperate with China, rather than to compete. (Ghoshal, 2013) The following paragraphs would first examine the rationale and features of the Sino-Russian cooperation. Further, one would argue the United States has overestimated the threat of Sino-Russian cooperation but still has to prepare for the worst.

4.2.1 The Rationale behind the Sino-Russian Cooperation

The American foreign policy is the driving force putting Russia and China into coalition. (Feng, 2015) The Sino-Russian relations is more integrated militarily and
economically motivated by the threats perceived from the United States’ foreign policy. Hence, the Sino-Russian cooperation is established more in the basis of common aversions over the West than the common interests. (Cheng & Cohen, 2013) Both Russia and China have perceived threats and pressures from the unilateral American policies. When the Russian government has been threatened by the NATO expansion and colored revolutions in the post-Soviet space, the American pivot to Asia consolidating with its Asian allies and its support of Taiwan put pressures on the Chinese government.

The recent events in addition pushed Russian foreign policies turned to the East. The objective of economic sanctions imposed by the West is to isolate Russia economically and diplomatically. Nevertheless, the sanctions have brought Russia to form a closer relationship with China. The Kremlin is intended to preserve good relations with Asian countries to avoid marginalization and reduce the dependence on Europe. (Klein, 2014) Thus, the West’s measures have motivated Russia to have greater involvement in Asia-pacific region, especially in the relationship with China.

Apart from the common threats posed by the United States, the Sino-Russian cooperation is mutually beneficial in the strategic means. The strategic partnership among Russia and China could threaten or offset the United States’ hegemony. (Hancock & Lobell, 2014) The coalition delivers a diplomatic multiplier that combine...
Russian military capabilities with Chinese economics power to check the American hegemonic power. (Kuhrt, 2013) The United States would also be limited by a balance from Sino-Russian coalition when exerting greater influences in the Eurasian region.

4.2.2 The Features of the Sino-Russian Cooperation

When the global economic primacy has shifted to the Asia-pacific region, the Russian government has recognized the economic integration in Asia would be crucial for Russia’s development. (Kuchins, 2014) The hydrocarbon products become the predominant component of Russia’s economic integration in Asia. Consequently, the Asia pivot of Russia has intensified the Sino-Russian energy cooperation.

Russia has signed a 30-year gas deal with China during President Putin’s state visit to China in 2014. The compromise of the gas deal signifies the greater achievement of energy cooperation among Russia and China. The deteriorated relationship between Russia and the West after Ukraine crisis forced Russia to reallocate its energy export to the Asian market. The rapidly growing China provides an alternative energy export market to Russia. To facilitate the gas deal, Russian has dropped the gas price from $400 per 1,000 cubic meters to $350, according to the expert’s estimation. (Rodkiewicz, 2014) Russia is expected to have greater degree of energy connections in the Asia-pacific region that would account for about 25% of
Russian oil exports and about 20% of its gas exports in 2030. (Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, 2010)

Apart from energy cooperation, the strategic cooperation is another crucial component of the Sino-Russian coalition. The Russian and Chinese government have jointly acknowledged the appeal of multipolarity in response to the perceived unipolarity of the United States. (Korybko, 2014) Advocating the new multipolar international order and seeking for reforms in global institutions is a shared strategy of Russia and China to balance the American unilateralism. Acting as a leading role above the emerging countries, Russia and China demanded the United States to decentralize its dominant powers in the international organization as well as the global affairs to other important global players. (Kaczmarski, 2015) For instance, Russia and China have created the BRICS Development Bank and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to provide an alternative voice to the Western-led institutions. In addition, one of the principal objectives of the establishment of SCO is to introduce joint strategy to counterbalance the American hegemony. (A. Cohen, 2001) Playing as a more important global player, both Russia and China are seeking greater influences to check the hegemonic United States.

**4.2.3 The United States’ Over-exaggeration over Sino-Russian Alliance**

The Sino-Russian integration has become more intensified especially when the
West are growing antagonistic against Russia. Nevertheless, the formal alliance among Russia and China would be unlikely to materialize.

To begin with, the economic and military disparity prevent the forming of Sino-Russian alliance. Economically, Russia have imbalance trade relationship with China in terms of the component of trade that while Russia mainly supply raw materials to China, the Chinese major exports to Russia is manufactured goods. (Weitz, 2015) The Russian government has been frustrated with the trade imbalance and want to expand the bilateral trade to Russian manufactured products, which is not favorable to the Chinese citizens and Chinese government. Besides, the Russian government used to consider China as the less significant trading partners than the European countries. The historical issues and proximity makes Europe remain as the most important trading companions to Russia. On the other hands, China was perceived as the last resort of partner by the Russian government since Russia cooperate with China only when other trading opportunities are blocked. (Hill & Lo, 2013) For instance, the Russia-China gas deals signed last year was a product of the West’s sanctions against Russia.

The military disparity has also hindered further Sino-Russian coalition. The Chinese’s military budget is incomparable with the Russian’s. While China’s military spending has skyrocketed to $216 billion as the second largest military spending
countries, Russia spent only $84.5 billion. (Chamberlain, 2015) Besides, the diverse interpretation of the nature of SCO and the inharmonious arms trading relationship also pinpoint the military disparity of Russia and China. Despite the fact that Russia perceives the SCO as a military institutions to counter the U.S.-led NATO, the Chinese government is unenthusiastic in following the Russian line to confront the United States with the fears of economic isolation. (Kaczmarski, 2007) Similarly, the friction of arms sale has also persisted among two great powers. The Russian government is reluctant to export the top military technology to China in order to prevent its potential enemy from strengthening military capabilities. (Cole, 2012) Consequently, Russia’s arms exports to China have been decreased substantially during President Putin’s second presidency.

Aside from the economic and military disparity, the geopolitical competition would hold up the possibility of Sino-Russian alliance. China has exerted greater influences into Central Asia, which has long been considered as the sphere of influence of Russia, to gain access to natural resources. (Marantidou & Cossa, 2014) The Chinese government has been intended to initiate bilateral energy deals with Central Asian countries separately through the hands of the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and Sinopec. (Zhuangzhi, 2007) For instance, China have energy cooperation with Kazakhstan in the Sino-Kazakh gas deal and Atasu-
Alashankou pipeline project, with Turkmenistan such as the Sino-Central Asian gas pipeline and Amu Darya natural gas project, and with Uzbekistan in creating a joint venture, UzCNPC Petroleum. (Laruelle & Peyrouse, 2012) The Russian government is fear of losing strategic interests from its traditional backyard when the natural resources of Central Asia were re-export to Europe for manipulation and exertion of political influences. The Russian suspicious of encirclement has also been intensified following with the Chinese economic expansion in Central Asia.

Another geopolitical conflict between Russia and China has been occurred in the Russian Far East. The abundant of natural resources in East Siberian region is the backbone of Russian energy production. However, the depopulation of Russian and the growing Chinese population through migration in the Far East have generated Russia's concerns over the thought of Chinese demographic invasion. (Zeihan, 2014) The threat perception that a strengthened China is prepared to invade the Russian Far East so as to penetrate the natural resources has also flooded in the Russian leadership.

The problem of status also mixed up the Sino-Russian alliance. There is an undeniable truth that both countries are unenthusiastic to serve as a junior partner to another when Russia is a traditional superpower and China is rising rapidly. (Trenin, 2012) When compared with the state capabilities, the relatively weak Russia would
suck into a junior partnership with China, similar to the role of Europe in the Atlantic alliance. Hence, the inferior status prevent Russia from creating formal alliance with the rising China.

On the whole, with the disparities, geopolitical conflicts and the status problem, the establishment of formal Sino-Russian alliance is questionable. Instead, the Russian government has been intended to hedge in Asia-pacific region. (J. Mankoff, 2015) The Russia’s Asia pivot has constructed closer relations not only with China but also other Asian key players. For instance, Russia has explored cooperation with India in nuclear development, with Japan such as holding a “2+2” meetings, and with Vietnam in arms trade. The Russia’s closer ties with other Asian countries played a role in checking the rise of China in the region.

4.2.4 The United States would prepare for the worst

Although the formal Sino-Russian alliance is unlikely to materialize, the United States would prepare for the worst when the intentions of Russia and China are uncertain. The American diplomats would not underestimate the creation of informal alliance among Russia and China. The informal Sino-Russian coalition is inclined to soft balance the United States through non-military means. (Bergfeldt, 2008) The bandwagon, buck passing, free-riding and partial diplomatic coalitions are the common strategies both Russia and China used in checking the United States. For
instance, Russia opposed the unilateral military actions of United States in Iraq through aligning other permanent member states in the United Nations Security Councils offer an example of soft balancing the United States.

Apart from the soft balancing, the United States would be cautious in further intensifying the Sino-Russian alliance. (Hancock & Lobell, 2014) When the Sino-Russian relations are in a large extent influenced by their relations with the West, the American foreign policies that severely offended two countries’ interest would trigger the advancement of Sino-Russian alliance.

**Chapter 5: Russia: Geostrategic Resurgence in Energy**

The Russian officials, including President Putin, have expressed their understandings of energy as a strategic resource not only to improve its economy but also exert greater geopolitical influences. (Schneider, 2014) In other words, the Russian energy deals with other states are compromised on business interests as well as the national interests. The rise of energy price and the use of “national champions”, such as Gazprom & Transneft which are both monopolized after President Putin came to power, makes the Russian government effectively expand greater influences abroad through the manipulation of the energy weapon. The sustained economic growth produces a more assert Russia in defending its interests against the United States and
having greater involvement globally through expansion.

5.1 Structural Realism over Energy

The realist perceives energy as a strategic commodity that obtaining energy security is one of the national objectives for states to pursue. (Belyi, n.d.) The energy security would be achieved for an energy exporting country when the export market is diversified, and for an energy consumer country when the sources of energy supply are expanded.

The realist’s state-centered approach is also upholding in the energy perspective. (Beri, 2009) The structural realist theories suggested Russia as an energy exporting country would maximize its relative power through energy trade to accumulate national wealth and ultimately protect the national security. However, states are cautious in cooperating in politically sensitive area such as energy resources since the structural realist see cooperation conducted in an asymmetric way that benefit a state more than another. (Wieclawski, 2011)

5.2 Gas Weapon and Pipeline Diplomacy

The Russian government is intended to use natural gas rather than oil as a predominant energy weapon. The natural gas is the most valuable Russian energy weapon due to its nature and the tremendous reserves of Russia. In contrast to oil which is less vulnerable for industrial states on account of the diversified sources of
supply in the global market, natural gas is shipped through pipeline linked directly from exporters to importers. (Shaffer, 2009) Hence, the transactions of natural gas are principally compromised in bilateral and long-term agreements. (AEMC, 2015) The gas trades are also less diversified than oil as a consequence of logistical constraints that involve high costs and lengthy time in constructing transport infrastructures. The bilateral energy cooperation offers Russia a leverage to influence another state’s politics. For instance, the use of gas disruption such as the blockage of natural gas supply to Ukraine demonstrates how the Russian use energy weapons to shape the Ukrainian policies.

5.2.1. Control over Former Soviet Republics

The first objective Russia pursuit through its energy weapons is the control over the post-Soviet states. The Russian government is intended not only to reduce dependence on the transit state, but also to create energy dependence in post-Soviet space.

Due to the unfavorable weather conditions that most of the Russian ports could not operate throughout the year, the export of Russia’s energy is dependent on the transit states, such as Belarus and Ukraine. (Chyong, 2014) The Russian dependency on transit states would be potentially exploited by the transit states to obtain greater interests. Moreover, the dependency would also generates instability of energy exports.
Structural Realism and the New Cold War

when most gas disruption are initiated by the transit states. (Shaffer, 2009) For example, the Russia’s gas exports to Europe were affected when Russia has cut off gas supply to Ukraine. Consequently, Russia is intended to reduce dependency over the transit states through energy policies.

Acquiring energy transport infrastructures in the neighboring countries is the Russian’s strategy in reducing dependency on the transit states. The Russian government has adopted a carrot and stick approach to gain control of the pipeline network in the neighboring states. (Robinson, 2014) On one hand, Russia provides incentives to its neighboring countries, such as offering a more reasonable gas price in order to acquire the local transport and distribution networks. For instance, Armenia and Belarus endorsed Russia’s purchase of its domestic energy infrastructure in exchange for energy subsidies. On the other hand, the neighboring states who refused to support Russia’s acquisitions have been punished. Georgia and Azerbaijan are the example who rejected to abandon the domestic pipeline networks and accordingly were told to pay the higher European price. The Russian’s control over the pipeline networks in its neighboring countries would weaken its dependency on the transit states. In addition, Russia has built the alternative pipelines to export energy in direct routes that bypass the unstable transit states. (Socor, 2014) The Nord Stream Pipeline that directly linked up Germany and Russia has showed the Kremlin’s effort in
bypassing the transit countries. In contrast to the traditional export routes, the Nord Stream pipeline allows Russia to directly export natural gas to Germany. By reducing the dependency on the transit states, the Russian government is regaining political leverage over its neighboring countries.

Apart from bypassing the transit states, Russia has also deliberately created the energy dependence for the former Soviet states. The lower gas price charged for the natural gas destined to the post-Soviet states through energy subsidies is a strategy for the Russian to create gas dependence in its near abroad. (Woehrel, 2009) Russia would exert political influences through the threat of charging higher “market” price or intimidation of gas disruption. For instance, the Russia–Ukraine gas dispute in 2006 was perceived as a political issue rather than an economic dispute. The Russian gas supply to Ukraine was cut-off since Ukraine refused to fulfil Russia’s request of paying the “market” gas price. The application of the gas dispute is that Russia would exclude energy subsidy to those countries that align closer with the West, such as Ukraine after the former President Yushchenko came to power.

5.2.2 Dominate European Gas Market

Another objective of the Russian energy policy is to preserve its position as the major exporter of natural gas in Europe. In 2012, Russia exported 32% of natural gas consumed in the EU. (Eurostat, 2015) The Kremlin has successfully created energy
dependence among the EU, especially in the Eastern Europe. For instance, when the
Baltics states and Finland completely rely on Russian gas for domestic consumption,
Russian also export accounts for more than three-quarters of natural gas imports in
Slovakia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, and Greece. The reliance on Russian natural gas
would pose a vulnerability of the EU towards Russia’s political leverage and
influence (Jacobs, 2015)

Aside from the domination of gas market of the EU, the Russian leaderships are
also ambitious in acquiring the domestic pipeline networks in Europe. As anticipated,
the Russian government financially supports Gazprom through the sovereign
investment fund to purchase the downstream assets in Europe. (Arevordi, 2008) The
Gazprom’s asset swap with Wintershall was an example that the Russian energy giant
acquired the natural gas storage facilities in Germany and Austria. The Kremlin’s
attempts to acquire downstream assets in Europe further raise the concerns of EU over
energy security, especially when the purchase lacks reciprocal commitment. (Belyi,
2009) The Russian government has been reluctant in compromising with the EU over
the Energy Charter Treaty. The refusal of this energy instrument allows Russia to keep
restraining the access of European petroleum businesses to Russian distribution
networks.
5.2.3. The Diversity of Energy Exports in Asia

Russia, as a natural gas exporter, seek for diversity of the export market alongside with Europe. The geographical location of Russia placed in Eurasia provides two directions of energy export routes and export markets in Europe and Asia. The diversity would strengthen Russia’s security with variety of export options. (Goodrich & Lanthemann, 2013)

When the diversification of energy export market is accomplished, the variety of export markets delivers a bargaining chip for Russia to raise the price of exported gas to Europe. (Shaffer, 2009) The Russian government has developed an alternative export market in Asia after the long term gas deals was signed with China. Consequently, the excessive demand of Russian natural gas would occur when the Russian gas exports are insufficient to fulfil the combined demand from Europe and China. The competition of Russian gas exports among Europe and China would motivate the rise of gas price. Hence, the Russian government benefits from the diversity of energy export markets in the enhancement of security and the potential rise of gas price.

5.3. Perception & Misperception

Whether the notion of Russia’s energy weapons is valid depend on the energy dependency between Russia and the EU. In general, the EU would suffer an
asymmetric interdependence relations with Russia in the short term. Finding a substitute of Russian natural gas supply would be challenging for the EU when the alternative import capability is limited due to the weighty bill of constructing pipeline infrastructure. (DE MICCO, 2014) Yet, the natural gas supply relations in the long term would be interdependent when the EU has sufficient time in finding alternative supply and Russia could also find a substituted export market.

The Western energy experts are more inclined to illustrate the E.U.-Russian natural gas supply relations as interdependent. (Harsem & Harald Claes, 2013) The history of the absence of gas disruption for more than 30 years justified the relative symmetry of dependence between Russia and the EU in gas trade. The speeches from the Russian officials that when the EU have little supply options Russia is also short of alternative markets, further validated the interdependence between Russia and the EU.

However, Russia’s assertive conducts has demonstrated the interpretation of Russian government towards its energy relations with Europe. The Russia–Ukrainian gas dispute in 2006 proved that Russia is prepared to abandon the interest of Europe and the image as a reliable exporters when it comes to the geopolitical issues with its near abroad. The Russian’s gas cutoff without frightening of Europe’s payback illustrated that Russia takes European energy demand as granted. Beside, the recent
Ukraine crisis also showed the Europe’s worries of interruption of energy imports from Russia. The gas supply cut-offs would be more detrimental to the European than the Russian who would lose hard currency from energy exports. These events have acknowledged the asymmetric interdependency among the energy relations between the EU and Russia.

Furthermore, despite the fact that there has been much more variety of gas diversification projects, the willpower of European member states to counter Russian energy dependence is questionable. (Umbach, n.d.) The Kremlin has penetrated some European countries and politicians through economic interests in exchange for their support of Russian-backed projects. For instance, the South Stream pipeline which would maintain the EU’s gas dependence on Russia is supported by Bulgaria, Austria, Italy and other European states. Therefore, the failure of acting in solidarity with other EU member states would remain European dependence on Russia’s natural gas supply.

5.4 The Reactions of the United States

Although the Russian energy weapons would not pose a direct security threat to the United States, since the United States is not a component of Russia’s pipeline networks and is certainly not importing gas from Russia, the EU’s gas dependence on Russia would destabilize the unities within the West. (Kemp, 2014) The failure of
acting in accords among the United States and European Union would undermine its capabilities in confronting Russia. Consequently, the United States has different approaches in reacting the Russian energy weapons.

The United States has encouraged the building of pipelines that bypass Russia's monopolized pipeline networks to undermine the dependence on Russia. The proposed pipelines that offer an alternative source of energy supply would enhance the energy security of Europe with a greater bargaining with Russian gas companies. For instance, the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline is a crude oil pipeline supported by the United States with the purpose of strengthening global energy security through diversity. (Blum, 2002) The pipeline project Russia refused to participate would deteriorate the Russian influence in the Caucasus and would further diversify the global oil supply that threaten to Russia's interests. Another pipeline bypassing Russia is the Nabucco pipeline which is a natural gas pipeline expected to diversify the natural gas supply and export routes for Europe. The U.S. backed Nabucco pipeline allows European countries to gain access to the natural gas sources in the Caspian Sea in order to reduce the dependence on Russian natural gas. (Dickel, 2014)

On the other hand, the effectiveness of the pipeline projects intended to diversify global energy supply is questionable with the strong opposition from Russia. The
Russian government would make their efforts to paralyze these projects, such as persuading other European countries to reject. The Kremlin is also proposed to create rivalry pipelines such as the Blue Stream, South European Gas Pipeline, and South Stream pipeline. (Than & Kahn, 2015) The competition of pipelines would be a foreseeable battlefield among the United States and Russia in competing the geostrategic interests from energy.

In addition, the development of the shale gas is another strategy for the United States to counterbalance Russia’s energy weapons. The availability of shale gas potentially expand the global energy supply and provide substitute of the Russian natural gas supply. (Bordoff & Houser, 2014) There is no doubt that under the principle of free market the American government would unlikely interfere the export destinations of shale gas based on geopolitical interests. The shale gas in the United States is expected to be exported to Asian market which is a most profitable export market for the American petroleum companies. Although the United States is less likely to displace Russia’s gas supply to Europe, the development of shale gas helps reforming the gas markets into a more competitive platform. (Forbes, 2013) The United States’ role as a backup of global gas supply protect the Europe from the energy dependence on Russia that the energy cooperation between EU and Russia would return to an equal footing. The efforts of the United States’ shale gas to
Structural Realism and the New Cold War

diversify global energy supply is possible when the West has rapidly develop the distribution infrastructure with the aim of diversity.

Chapter 6: Russian Revisionism in its Near Abroad

6.1 Case Study: The Russo-Georgian War

The Russo-Georgian War was a military conflict between Russia and Georgia. The Russian troops were deployed officially as a peacekeeper to participate the fighting in the Transcaucasia region. Eventually, the breakaway republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia declared the independence and Russian military has occupied these republics after the war. The Five-day War has indicated a revival of global rivalry to compete for the sphere of influences based on geopolitical considerations in the post-Soviet space.

6.1.1 Georgia is turning to the West

Georgia has come closer in the relations with the Western camp and been intended to separate itself from the Moscow’s control. On one hand, the Georgian government wished for building greater relations with the West after President Saakashvili was elected following with the Rose revolutions. President Saakashvili introduced the Westernize policies not only by launching political and economic reforms, but also declared the intentions of joining the NATO and EU.
On the other hand, the West is also keen to coopt this former Soviet satellite state based on strategic calculation. Georgia has played a fundamental role in diversity of the energy supply in Europe and weakening Russia’s domination in energy delivery routes. The Georgian government has participated in the South Caucasus Pipeline and Nabucco pipeline, which provides an alternative energy sources to European countries from the Caspian Sea. The diversification of natural gas supply is strategic importance in the sense that weakening the Russian leverage to the European countries and reducing European dependence on Russian energy. (Nuriyev, 2007)

Apart from the strategic interests of energy diversification, Georgia also delivers security and economic benefits to the West. Georgia has significant security cooperation with the West. For instance, Georgia formed the air corridor with Azerbaijan to facilitate the NATO’s accesses over Afghanistan. (Muzalevsky, 2010)

Furthermore, when the Georgian deployment of troops become the largest contributor of non-NATO states in the Afghanistan mission, the capabilities of Georgian military have been enhanced thanks to the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) funded by the United States. (Davey, 2010) The European states also provides a market for Georgia as an alternative of Russian market.

The confrontation between the United States and Russia was escalated
specifically after the further extension of the NATO membership of Georgia and Ukraine. The Bucharest NATO Summit Declaration asserted that both Georgia and Ukraine would ultimately join the institutions once the requirements of membership are accomplished. (Gallis, 2008) The further engagement among the West and the post-Soviet states with the promise of memberships have frustrated the Russian government. The closer association justified Russia's desire to preserve its sphere of influences through the invasion of Georgia. The NATO Bucharest summit motivated Russia's rapid military response that Russia initiated the Russo-Georgian War three weeks after the summit held.

6.1.2 The Response of Russia

The well-prepared Russian invasion of Georgia has illustrated the Russia's desire of preserving its interest in the post-Soviet states. The assertiveness of Russia in confronting the West's expansion in Georgia was demonstrated before the Russo-Georgian War. In 2007, Russia deployed an unmarked Russian military aircraft to penetrate Georgian airspace and arranged a Russian fighter jet to fire air-to-surface weapons in Georgia. (Sadri & Burns, 2010) The "silence" of the OSCE report investigating these incidents and refusing to criticize Russia assured Russia's further aggression. (Cornell, Popjanevski, & Nilsson, 2007)

The preparation of Russian in the Russo-Georgian War could trace back the
events long before from the Georgian attack on South Ossetia. For instance, the
Russian government delivered passports to the populations of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia in 2002, after Russia introduced visa regime with Georgia in 2000. The
distribution of Russian passport has placed the foundation of the creeping annexation
of two breakaway Georgian regions. Moreover, few months earlier than the crisis, the
Russian military had moved the railway soldiers to the Caucasus to establish the
logistical routes, moved the combat groups on positions and filled up the supply
dumps. (Sadri & Burns, 2010)

In the crisis, the Moscow described the Russian military deployment as a "peace
enforcement" operation to counter Georgia’s aggressive military actions in South
Ossetia. The Russian proclamations of the rights to protect the Russian minority in
Georgia and their right to self-determination were intended to offer a legal foundation
for Russia’s aggressiveness. (Kolstø, 1993) While Russia invade Georgia and
recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia eventually
suffered limited punishments from the West except for severe international criticisms.

6.1.3. The Implications of the Five-Day War

The Russo-Georgian war offers four implications among the confrontation
between the United States and Russia.
Projection of Russia’s Privileged Interests in the Region

First, the Russian asserted its privileged interests in the CIS region that the United States should respect Russia’s geopolitical interests and the Russian-dominated regional order. (Kramer, 2008) In other words, the Russian government signaled the high prices for the West’s further expansions in the region. Thus, the Russian adventurism in Georgia prevents Georgia and Ukraine from joining the NATO.

Exploitation of the split over the West

Second, Russia was exploiting the division among the Europe and the United States. In response to Russian aggression in Georgia, the EU is divided into “Russian-friendly” and “Russia-hostile” camps. (Rettman, 2010) For instance, the pro-Russian camp led by France and Germany block the proposals of the suspension of NATO-Russia Council and the issue of a hostile statement against Russia. France and Germany initially also opposed the United States’ supports over the NATO membership to Georgia and Ukraine in the Bucharest summit. The Europe’s comprehensive business and energy ties with Russia prevents its institutions from adopting an antagonistic approach against Russia. Without the overwhelming supports from Europe, the United States was also reluctant to confront against Russia, given the Obama Administration’s agenda of ‘reset’ policy with Russia. The Russian
government eventually achieved its political goals through the invasion of Georgia without severe costs from the West except for international criticism and objections. The Georgia war also demonstrated how Russia exploits the weaknesses of the EU-U.S. split.

**Revenge of Kosovo Crisis**

Third, Russia is playing the revenge game to the West. The NATO unilateral actions in the Kosovo crisis, which ignored Russia’s interests in Serbia, triggered severe opposition from Russia. (J. Mankoff 1977, 2012) The warning of Russian officials that the independence of Kosovo set a precedent for the independence of the separatist regions in the post-Soviet states was also disregarded by the West. Accordingly, declaring the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is the feedbacks of the West’s humiliations to Russia. (Shevtsova, 2010) The West’s recognition of Kosovo’s independence also restricted the American’s criticisms over Russia in the crisis or the double standard of the West would be signified.

**The Use of Hybrid Warfare**

In addition, Russia used a strategy of ‘hybrid warfare’ that combine conventional warfare with irregular forces and cyberwar in the crisis over Georgia. Apart from deploying conventional force into Georgia, Russia has other means of attacks in terms of unconventional forces. (Ancker, 2003) For instance, Russia has imposed economic
sanctions against Georgia after the controversy of Georgian–Russian espionage in 2006. The information warfare is another Russian's strategy in the Russo-Georgian war. (Giles, 2011) Russia used the propaganda through national Television channel to gain popular supports from the separatist regions. While the television footage spread over the Georgian atrocities, the Russian military actions were labelled as rescuing the Russian citizens. Further, cyber-attacks were also involved by the Russian to swamp and disable the website of Georgian organizations. (Lomidze, 2011)

6.2. Case Study: The Ukrainian Crisis

When Russia accomplish diplomatic parity with the United States in the Syrian crisis and the grant of asylum of Edward Snowden, the Ukraine crisis was not an isolated diplomatic accident but a deliberate actions that indicate a restart of East-West confrontation. (Trenin, 2014)

The Ukraine crisis was initiated by the former Ukrainian President Yanukovych’s decision of abandoning the free trade agreements with the European Union and instead seeking for closer integration with Russia. Afterwards, thousands of people protested in Kiev and Yanukovych eventually fled to Russia. In response, the Russian government annexed Crimea and legitimated the invasion through holding the Crimean status referendum. The conflicts in Donbass have persisted despite of the ceasefire deal of “Minsk Agreement”.
6.2.1. The Russian Aggression

Defending of Russia’s Security Interests

The actions of Russian government in the crisis are intended to defend its vital interests in the post-Soviet space. Ukraine has posed a threat to Russia when Ukraine is turning to the West that is flooded with the pro-Western elites and anti-Russian nationalists. (Trenin, 2014) The potential shift of Ukraine would hamper Russia’s dominant position in this former Soviet republics and more importantly lead to the membership of NATO. Preventing Ukraine from joining NATO is the major objective of the Kremlin to maintain its position in the CIS region. Further, the zero-sum thinking is rooted in Russian leadership that the loss of Ukraine would challenge Russia’s security and strengthen encirclement from the West. (WashingtonsBlog, 2014) The integration of Ukraine into the Western institutions of NATO would also infer Ukraine’s denial of Russian-led Eurasian Union with the purpose of post-Soviet integration. Thus, the zero-sum mentality motivated Russia’s aggression in Ukraine.

Strategic Importance of Crimea

The Russia’s argument of the protection of national security is sensible given the strategic importance of Crimea. The annexation of Crimea would allow the Russian Black Sea Fleet to be based Sevastopol that strengthen Russia’s capability to project its naval power. The Russian government has emphasized on the significance of
foreign naval bases, which are the geostrategic instrument for Russia to revive its status of global power. (Rogoway, 2014) For instance, the access of Russia’s only Mediterranean naval port in Syria’s Tartus motivated Russia’s support of Assad regime. The presence of Russian naval base in the Black Sea deters the entry of NATO ships into the region as well as allows Russian annexation over the entire Ukraine as a leverage to manipulate Ukrainian foreign policy. Thus, the Russia’s annexation of Crimea could be based on long term strategic consideration.

The Use of Hybrid Warfare

Although the Russian government is intended to launch a full scale of confrontation against the West, Russia’s flexible strategy in the Ukraine crisis prevents direct military conflict with the West. With the weakness of conventional military capabilities, the Kremlin adopted a strategy of hybrid warfare that combine regular and irregular means of attack. Alongside with the unofficial involvement of Russian troops, the irregular Russian forces includes sanctions, energy disruption, political destabilization, information warfare, and cyber-attack. (Lucas, 2014) For instance, the Kremlin has sent the “Russian volunteer forces” and the “little green men” to support pro-Russian separatists in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. The Russia government also threaten the gas supply cut-offs to Ukraine because of Ukraine’s stealing of Russian gas supplying to Europe and destabilize Ukraine’s integrity
through the war in Donbass. The information and cyber warfare were also launched through the propaganda of national televisions since most Ukrainians watch Russian-speaking broadcasting, and through cyber-attack such as DDoS attacks and tampering. (Schindler, 2014) The variety of Russian irregular forces plus the nuclear deterrence provide Russia an effective weapons to destabilize Ukraine and invade Crimea without violation of the international law. When Russia avoid the abuse of international law, the West have no legitimacy in responding militarily. The Moscow’s hybrid warfare in Ukraine generate a preferable result for Russia that acquire territories of its neighboring countries with impunity.

The Lack of solidarity between the West

Apart from the designated Russian hybrid warfare, the division of the West would also be illustrated in the Ukraine crisis. The Europe led by Germany and France initially respond the crisis differently with the United States through appeasing Russia to prevent further Russian aggression triggered by the confrontational approach. (Kanet, 2009) Although the EU cooperates with the United States to impose economic sanctions against Russia, the negotiation has spent a long time to compromise given the business and energy interdependence among the EU and Russia. The sanctions imposed by European Union are less confrontational than the U.S. that the EU sectorial sanctions were cautiously drafted to protect the interests of
European businesses. For instance, while the EU restrictions on the energy exploration applies to future deals only, the American companies were required to undo the current energy projects. (Archick & Mix, 2015) The European Union is also reluctant in imposing additional sanctions to Russia, when the current imposed sanctions expire at July 2015. Some European countries are even seeking for lifting the sanctions against Russia to maintain its own economic interests. Hence, the EU-U.S. spilt was demonstrated through the differences of sanctions imposed by the United States and EU respectively.

6.2.2. Perception & Misperception

The Ukraine crisis has become a blame game between the United States and Russia that shifts the responsibility to another reciprocally. Indeed, the Ukraine crisis was a product of the uncertainty about each other’s intentions and thus interpreting another’s security measures as an aggressive behavior.

The Russian government criticized the Ukraine crisis was a product of the United States’ unilateral imperialism. The expansion of the West in the CIS region was perceived by the Kremlin as a challenge to Russia that is intended to infringe Russia’s sphere of influence. (Rasmussen, 2014) Following the Moscow’s logic, the Ukrainian revolution that protested in Kiev and overthrew President Yanukovych was motivated not by the people’s power but by the United States. (J. Mankoff 1977, 2012)
Therefore, the Russian aggression in Ukraine was a defense measure in response to the United States’ imperialism in the region.

On the other hand, the United States regarded Russian aggression as a revisionist action that contributes to the Ukraine crisis. The Washington recognized the Russian invasion of Ukraine is motivated by its ambitions in acquiring Ukraine for the Eurasian integration. (Trenin, 2014) The violence in Ukraine offers a bargaining chip to Russia to intimidate and blackmail the Ukrainian government to rejoin the Russian sphere of influence. The contribution of Ukraine in the Eurasian integration enhance capabilities of the alliance and ultimately permit the revisionist Russia reshaping the global order. Hence, the United States considered the Ukraine crisis as a product of the Russian revisionism.

6.2.3. The Reactions of the United States

The United States react the Russian aggression in Ukraine crisis through the political, economic, and military means. Politically, the West’s inter-state and institutional cooperation with Russia has been withheld. For instance, Russia has been expelled from the Group of Eight (G8) and its relations with the EU and NATO are also deteriorated. Economically, the West has imposed economic sanctions such as travel bans and asset freezes against the specific Russian personnel and business. Militarily, the U.S.-led military institution NATO is adopting a more confrontational
against Russia. Accordingly, the West has launched a full-scale confrontation response to the Russian aggression in Ukraine.

**Chapter 7: Conclusion**

The Ukrainian Crisis has illustrated the revival of international confrontation between the United States and Russia and the collapse of post-Cold-War status quo. The Russian government would be expected to be more provocative in defending its interests against the United States.

In the CIS region, the main objective of Russia is to prevent the former Soviet republics turning to the West and return to the Eurasian integration. On one hand, the Kremlin is acquiring more bargaining chips to deter the post-Soviet states from joining NATO. For instance, the war in Donbass illustrates not Russia's desire of territory gain but its manipulation of Ukraine's policy. On the other hand, Russia could also invade its neighboring countries such as the Baltic States to strengthen its security.

In Europe, the more "independent" role of EU between the United States and Russia is a good news for the Kremlin. The EU is hesitant to follow the United States' strategy against the perceived revisionist states based on its interests. For instance, the major Western European countries are joining the Asian Infrastructure Investment
Structural Realism and the New Cold War

Bank (AIIB) proposed by China, despite of the United States’ discouragement. The prospect of the joint strategy between the West against Russia is also questionable when considering the extensive EU-Russian business and energy relationship. The United States’ economic weapons against Russia would be weakened without the support of Europe, given the underdeveloped U.S.-Russian economic ties.

In Asia-pacific region, the China factor would be the battleground between the United States and Russia according to the strategic triangle. While the United States offer economic initiatives to China, the Sino-Russian coalition is strategic attractive in order to offset the United States’ hegemony. Yet, the Sino-Russian cooperation in a large extent is the unintentional consequences triggered by the American’s policies. The American’s assertiveness in the region and its sanctions against Russia threatening both countries’ interests has encouraged the greater integration between Russia and China.

The recent tension between the United States and Russia is comparable with the Cold War period. According to the structural realist, the escalation of struggles are foreseeable generated by the misperception and over-exaggerations. Consequently, the balance of power would be reestablished and the new Cold War would also be emerged after the repeated intensification of conflicts. The recent development of the Ukrainian crisis that the United States’ troop deployment in Ukraine would be a
turning point to initiate the new Cold War, just like the Berlin Blockade which
signified the Cold War.


Aggestam, J. (2007). *Norms and interests in the EU’s ‘Strategic partnership’ with russia*


Angley, R. (2013). Escaping the kmara box: Reframing the role of civil society in georgia’s rose revolution. *Studies of Transition States and Societies,* 5(1)


http://theriseofrussia.blogspot.hk/2009/02/russia-creates-32-billion-
sovereign.html


Academic Foundation.


Borger, J. (2014). Barack obama: Russia is a regional power showing weakness over ukraine. The Guardian


Cirlig, C. C. (2012). Russian reactions to NATO missile defence. Retrieved from
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheca/briefing/2012/120352/LD
M_BRI(2012)120352_REV1_EN.pdf

Shift in Eurasia. The Heritage Foundation.

L.P.

Cole, J. M. (2012). Russia’s ‘no’ on arms sale to china aids taiwan. Taipei Time

Implications and recommendations. Central Asia-Caucasus & Silk Road Studies
Program,


Davey, L. M. (2010). Ceremony marks deployment of second georgian battalion
to afghanistan. Retrieved from
http://www.marforieur.marines.mil/News/NewsArticleDisplay/tabid/7617/Article/
520902/ceremony-marks-deployment-of-second-georgian-battalion-to-
afghanistan.aspx
DE MICCO, P. (2014). A cold winter to come? the EU seeks alternatives to 

Russian gas. European Union,


natural gas security from geopolitics. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies,

Didymus, J (2014). Ukraine crisis is the backlash against NATO's policy of 

encirclement of russia. Retrieved from 

http://www.allvoices.com/article/16789885

Edwards, J., & Kemp, J. (2006). Russia's wrong direction <br />What the united 

states can and should do.


Retrieved from http://defense-update.com/newscast/0307/analysis/analysis-

150307.htm

EurActiv. (2015). Tusk to obama: Russia is trying to divide us. Retrieved from 

http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/tusk-obama-russia-trying-

divide-us-312758

EURODIALOGUE. (2012). GEORGIA APPROACHES TO NATO. Retrieved

from http://www.eurodialogue.eu/nato/Georgia-approaches-to-NATO


Fedorov, Y. E. (2010). Russia’s nuclear policy.


Feng, H. (2015). China and russia vs. the united states?. Retrieved from

http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/china-and-russia-vs-the-united-states/


George, J. A. (2010). The politics of ethnic separatism in russia and georgia

Palgrave Macmillan.

Ghoshal, B. (2013). Moscow-beijing strategic partnership & beyond <br

/>The russian pivot to asia pacific. IPCS Issue Briefs, 242


Hancock, K. J., & Lobell, S. E. (2014). *Realism and the changing international system: Will china and russia challenge the status quo?. China & Eurasia Forum Quarterly, 8*(4)

Harasymiw, B. (2010). Russia, the united states, and the new cold war. *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, 12*(2)

doi: [http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.04.035](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.04.035)


Structural Realism and the New Cold War


Johnson, R. J. (n.d.). Russian responses to crisis management in the balkans how NATO's past actions may shape russia's future involvement.


Kuchins, A. C. (2014). *Russia and the CIS in 2013: Russia's pivot to Asia* *Asian Survey*, 54(1)


Lutsevych, O. (2013). How to finish a revolution: Civil society and democracy in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.

Mankoff, J. (2015). **Russia's asia pivot: Confrontation or cooperation?.** Asia Policy, 19


Structural Realism and the New Cold War


Nichols, T., Stuart, D., & McCausland, J. D. (2012). Tactical nuclear weapons and NATO.


Okara, A. (2007). *Sovereign democracy: A new russian idea or a PR project?*. 5(3)


() ESTONIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS YEARBOOK.

Petersen, A. (2013). **European energy security is not up to europe.** Retrieved from https://euobserver.com/economic/119420


Polese, A. (2008). *Russia, the US, “the others” and the “101 things to do to win a (colour) revolution”: Reflections on georgia and ukraine.* *Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe,*

Rasmussen, M. V. (2014). *The ukraine crisis and the end of the post-cold war european order: Options for NATO and the EU.*


Stent, A. (n.d.). An american view on russia's security policy and EU-russian relations.


Ukraine, presidential election, 31 October, 21 November and 26 December 2004:


Umbach, F. (n.d.), Russian-ukrainian-EU gas conflict: Who stands to lose most?. NATO Review Magazine,


Wieclawski, J. (2011). Contemporary realism and the foreign policy of the russian federation. International Journal of Business and Social Science, 02(01)


MAGAZINE,


http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=82969


Thomas Hale & David Held & Kevin Young (2013), “Gridlock: Why Global Cooperation is Failing when We Need It Most”, John Wiley & Sons


Kathrin Hille, (2014), “Putin aims to cement China links as ties with west fray”, Financial Times, retrieved from http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/31e95c5e-68b8-11e4-af00-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3IvPdgycP


Oliver Crone, (2008), “Putin's Army: Between Decline, Reform and Revival”

