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Traces of Desire and Fantasy:
the government-generated discourse on technology in
post-handover Hong Kong

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September 2004

Traces of Desire and Fantasy:

the government-generated discourse on technology in
post-handover Hong Kong

Abstract

Information technology almost became the saviour for Hong Kong in the process of recovering from the Asian financial crisis immediately after the Handover. The claims to establish and further the development of information technology were made against a certain perception of Hong Kong, in which the place in past decades had indulged in the wrong direction of labour-intensive, cut-throat production in the manufacturing industries and bubble-like speculation in the real-estate sector, and against a certain vision of the future, with more and more competition in the age of globalization, neo-liberal economies, and so on.

This thesis demonstrates, firstly, how the governance of Hong Kong can be seen from the perspective of contingent articulations of dissimilar elements rather than any step-by-step progression along any necessary, objective historical path. Secondly, through analyses of the governmental discourses and the business trajectory of Pacific-Century CyberWorks, the flagship group for Hong Kong's 'new-economy', the thesis depicts the complexity and nexus of knowledge, governance, bureaucratic and financial considerations of and within the project of information technology in Hong Kong, and the mechanisms by which this particular discourse is produced and circulated.

Finally, comparing the discourse of Hong Kong's early industrialisation in the early 1950s, the thesis identifies the desire-creating workings of ideology in this particular discourse of information technology in Hong Kong. Also, through theoretical prisms, the thesis provides examples of how the government's trumpeted notions of (and, probably, people's faith in) *laissez-faire*, positive non-intervention are able to coexist in apparent harmony with the highly active participation of the Hong Kong SAR government in society and industry.

I declare that this is an original work based primarily on my own research, and I warrant that all citations of previous research, published or unpublished, have been duly acknowledged.

(Chow Sze Chung)

Certificate of Approval of Thesis

Traces of Desire and Fantasy:
the government-generated discourse on technology
in post-handover Hong Kong
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Introduction

On December 18, 2003, an award ceremony took place in Government House in Central. The website of ESDLife (Electronic Service Delivery Life) won the award for 'Best e-Government Services in Asia' in 2003 -- a prize awarded by the Geneva-based, United Nations-endorsed World Summit on the Information Society.

Promoting information technology has been one of the most prominent government agendas of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region since its establishment on July 1, 1997. The 'digital 21IT Strategy' (which is basically a list of self-declared government goals which include buzzwords like government leadership, sustainable e-government programme, infrastructure and business environment, institutional review, technological development, vibrant IT industry, human resources in a knowledge economy, bridging the digital divide) was initiated as a government initiative to face the (so-called) challenges brought about by information technologyⁱ. ESDLife as a portal website through which people can gain access to a whole range of government and business services as well as information such as booking leisure venues, public examination applications, appointment bookings for giving marriage notice, etc., is a better-known part of this strategy.

In fact, news about the ranking exercises of various IT-related aspects are common in this age in which information technology seems to play an important role in our lives. We see the ranking of the '100 largest IT corporations'ⁱⁱ, a 'World Knowledge Competitiveness Index'ⁱⁱⁱ, 'popularity of online learning'^{iv}, '500 growing Hi-Tech companies in the Asia-Pacific'^v, an 'index of popularity of digital technology'^{vi}, the 'most technologically advanced country and region'^{vii}, to name but a few. Although the competitions in the IT sector are simply countless, and critics are often questioning the standards and criteria by which the rankings are done, the prize won by ESDLife should still be recognized as significant enough to attract even the Chief Executive Tung Chee-wah to come to Government House to celebrate.

However, the very same day also witnessed the arrest of a number of senior executives of ESDLife for allegedly inflating the number of hits on the website.^{viii} The case in fact involved more than 30 people, staff or ex-staff and their friends and relatives, who, according to official claims, altogether made about 100,000 bookings (mostly of sports facilities), which cost over HK\$7,000,000, within 9 months. Those sports facilities were in fact booked, paid, but not used.

To explain briefly, the website is run by a joint venture between Hutchison Whampoa Limited and Hewlett-Packard HKSAR Limited. The Hong Kong SAR Government granted the tender to the joint venture, and one of the requirements was the number of bookings on the

website. The number is crucial because once online bookings exceed a certain number (2,300,000), the government will have to pay a monthly fee to the website. But the fact is that, not only has the government simply not begun to pay, the number of hits was also far from satisfactory – the website accumulated only 200,000 hits in its first year of operation.^{ix}

As commentator Hau Luen-kwai reminds us, there is no further coverage of the case,^x we do not know what the result of the investigation and the judgment of the court are, whether all of them have been found guilty, and what the punishment is. But even if all allegations turn out to be false, this case can still function as a miniature in which the basic nexuses at the time when information technology is so prominent are adequately and abundantly present. What we see here are officials and business elites celebrating something which indeed requires far more than simple celebration; the profiteering tendency of business meeting a government which likes to contract out services; the government setting up empty numbers as a criterion for measuring success; finally, the high profile and saviour-like image of information technologies which, in fact, lack users, at a time when optimism in regard to advanced technology has long been a norm. As a result, what figures in this case under the guise of information technology, or technology more generally, has to be queried and critiqued in a series of questions from highly varying directions, or, to put it in another way: probably no element in this case can assume a central position, defining exclusively what this case is all

about.

From this perspective, this thesis seeks to capture and make visible the manifold intentions, implications, and operations of both the business sector and the government in the discourse of information technology; it seeks to ask what kinds of subjects are constructed in this discourse, to what extent they accept or even celebrate the discourse of IT, and what this kind of acceptance and celebration is about. Finally, the thesis will discuss how we can make sense of this discourse of IT in relation to the conventional discourse of Hong Kong's economic development.

In terms of nothing technological as such

This essay seeks to discuss the discourses of science and technology in terms of nothing technological as such. Science and technology are discussed in various aspects that are different from what might appear inside the science and computer magazines freshly issued at the newsstands every week (although, in fact, the contents of these magazines also vary widely, ranging from personal interviews that do not have much to do with any technology, to the introduction of fashionable and related accessories, to guidelines for using computers safely and healthily, etc.). They are discussed in relation to the whole process of the development of human 'civilization', in the work of a wide range of thinkers and critics (such as those from the Frankfurt School and Heidegger, see below for elaborate discussion), these processes are considered to constitute either the impetus of the (declining) human civilization all the way to its self-destruction or the possibility of its salvation. Feminists have joined this discussion by uncovering the gender dimension, regardless of whether science and technology is heading towards salvation or self-destruction, feminists argue that the contributions from women or, more generally, the oppressed are intentionally obliterated: the cultural politics of a clean narrative of history of European man and the determinism of science and technology. Science and technology is also discussed by

historians of colonialism in order explain what the process of encounter between the colonizers and colonized indeed was all about, what changes these scientific and technological encounters brought to a society, and their effects on the culture of the colony even after the end of colonization.

The effect of science and technology in our daily life is also diversely studied. Nowadays, our senses and feelings, and the structure of perception itself are largely mediated by technology. For instance, the automobile can change our very perception of the city, work and home; the invasion of domestic technology is related to the cultural project of cleanliness. The final section of this chapter takes issue with the political economy of science and technology, especially in the global and urban context.

All these perspectives have their different aspects of science and technology as their content, they emerge from thinkers of varying time and place, with a view to solving different problems. Therefore putting them together is not intended to align or measure them according to any single particular standard or to make a comparison between them. Similarly, putting them together does not mean to exhaust the field of the science and technology discussion. Indeed, drawing on Heidegger's famous notion that 'the essence of technology is by no means anything technological'^{xi} or Adorno and Horkheimer's that 'science is technical practice... far removed from reflective consideration of its own goal'^{xii}, I argue that in order to make sense of

science and technology in a particular context, no matter whether it is in a philosophical, cultural, political, economical etc. sense, it does not quite help to stare at the technical details of science and technology. Instead it has to be acknowledged that all these perspectives articulate the notion of science and technology into a wider context.

Truth and essence in technology

Noticing the disadvantage of the Greek word *techne* of being related closely to the specific word 'technology', Michel Foucault nevertheless found it interesting that we now consider 'architecture, like the practices of government and the practice of other forms of social organization ... using elements of sciences like physics, for example, or statistics, and so on'^{xiii}. In other words, what interests Foucault is the fact that people considered these heterogeneous kinds of knowledge and practice as *techne* of different kinds.

The meaning of the word *techne* is described by Foucault as 'a practical rationality governed by a conscious goal'^{xiv}. By unearthing the age-old elements in the word technology, the meaning and our understanding of 'technology' immediately expand, allowing people to understand technology not exclusively in terms of cogs or chips; and, at the same time, open up the possibilities for people to discover the technological moments and operations in areas that we do not usually associate with 'science' as we use the term today, such as social sciences or humanities. A parallel effort to unearth the etymological elements of the word 'technology' can be found in Raymond

Williams's work. According to his explanation, the root word of technology is *tekhne*, a Greek word meaning an art or craft. Technology as 'a systematic study of the arts' can be dated back to the 17th century, specialized to the meaning of 'practical arts' in the 19th century, and within the terms 'practical arts', the element of 'mechanical arts' had already been emphasized since the 18th century.^{xv}

What might be surprising to many readers is the proximity of technology in the course of the development of its meaning from *techne*, to 'arts', instead of science, especially when we all now are too familiar with the (apparent) connection between science and technology. As we can see spatially, for instance, in Hong Kong, the two major science parks, the Hong Kong Science and Technology Park and Cyberport, are located next to the Chinese University of Hong Kong and The University of Hong Kong respectively, where research of 'pure' sciences are supposed to carry out. The basic concept is ultimately that these facilities, which blend research and application, would be more appropriately situated next to academies that produce ivory tower scientific knowledge. However, Williams tells us that until late 17th century, 'art' 'was widely applied, without predominant specialization ... in matters as various as mathematics, medicine and angling'^{xvi}, whereas, when introduced into English in the 14th century, the meaning of science is simply knowledge as such. Our contemporary sense of science, as the theoretical and methodical study of nature with the quality of 'objectiveness', became significant

only after the early 19th century^{xvii}. The specialization of the meaning of art to skills of painting, sculpture, drawing, and the distinction of science and arts as 'contrasted areas of human skill and effort, with fundamentally different methods and purposes', was not fully established until the mid- or even late 19 century.^{xviii} As a result, the sense of science as we know it today indeed has a rather short history, and overlooking this point might lead to strange and far-fetched appropriations. (The discussion of the symbolism of the Innovation and Technology Commission in chapter 3 will demonstrate this.)

Williams's explanation regarding the separation of these two long-intermingled realms of art and science as knowledge and practice is the historical change of the practical division of labour and the 'practical definitions of the purposes of the exercise of skill'.^{xix} That is to say, this separation is the result of a 'defensive specialization' on the side of the arts and humanities whose forms of use and purposes are not to be determined by capitalist commodity production and immediate exchanges.^{xx} This is also the point of separation of 'fine arts' and 'useful arts', which latter acquired the new word of 'technology'.

Alongside Williams' etymological investigation, Martin Heidegger's philosophical reflection on the essence of technology may also shed light on the possible scope of studying technology. Heidegger's inquiry of technology is inseparable from his analysis of modern industrial society. According to Heidegger, the essence of modern technology is what he called 'Enframing' (*Ge-stell*), meaning 'that unconcealment

comes to pass in conformity with which the work of modern technology reveals the real as standing-reserve'. More specifically, Enframing 'is the gathering together that belongs to that setting-upon which set upon man and puts him in a position to reveal the real, in the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve.'^{xxi} Hence Heidegger asserts that 'the essence of technology is nothing technological'.^{xxii}

Modern technology, he argues, increasingly summons and 'sets upon' (in another word, 'reveals' in a particular way) nature and human alike to become standing-reserve, mainly as stored-up energy and exploitable productions. Nature and the human even 'lose their character as objects when they are caught up in the standing-reserve'^{xxiii}, which is then pathetically nothing more than what the modern technology needs them for.

While Heidegger recognizes in this situation of modern industrial society the decline of the west, he considers this decline to originate twenty five hundred years ago, 'with the dawn of metaphysics at the hands of Plato.'^{xxiv} According to Michael E. Zimmerman's study of Heidegger's thought, in the Greek tradition 'to produce' had 2 meanings, one of it is '“actualizing” or “effecting” a thing, in the sense of causing it to be present'; the other is being 'as a “letting be” or a “freeing” which enabled an entity to come into presence, to show itself, to emerge.'^{xxv} The former is closer to the philosophical tradition since Plato and Aristotle, and is called a 'productionist metaphysic' by Zimmerman, while the latter belongs more to the pre-platonic tradition.

According to Heidegger, this productionist metaphysics, underlined by concepts such as the form-matter distinction, four causes^{xxvi}, etc. paved the way for the rise of the enlightenment as well as modernity, which, above all and almost exclusively emphasize a particular kind of rationality, science and technology, summoning and revealing nature and human being alike into a system of modern society as standing-reserve.

Combining this long philosophical tradition with the social and political situation of Germany in the 1920s and 30s, when Heidegger was hugely frustrated by the idle everydayness and inauthenticity, Heidegger believed German people at that time were uprooted and homeless. Mass culture freed 'the "anyone self" from having to understand anything in a genuine, original way'^{xxvii}. Indeed, he determines that both the theoretical stances of liberalism and socialism could shed no light or provide no answer to the problem, precisely because both of them are fundamentally the products of the problem, namely modernity.^{xxviii}

This is the philosophical and social context in which Heidegger seeks art, the highest form of *techne*, as the remedy for the crisis of the West. This is also how the quotation of the line of German poet Hölderlin '*But where danger is, grows The saving power also*'^{xxix} is intelligible. As mentioned above, art, among the 2 meanings, is ' "letting be" or a "freeing" which enabled an entity to come into presence, to show

itself, to emerge'. He believes it is precisely being in the reign of Enframing which tries to, but ultimately cannot, block all illuminations of every revealing, all appearances of truth, that the human being needs to recover the elements of art -- letting-be, freeing -- in technology. In order to allow human beings to see the real opening, a break with this particular version of modern industrial society is necessary.^{xxx} And this break may at the first instance seem to be against the will of the people enjoying themselves as the anyone self, however, to Heidegger, 'the essence of freedom is originally not connected to the will or even the causality with human willing.'^{xxxi} Unfortunately, he did not quite explain under which conditions and how human beings might be able to realize the importance of the manifesting, revealing effect of art, especially when human beings have already been summoned into the Enframing since the Greek antiquity.

The whole body of Heidegger's philosophy is of course notoriously difficult to grasp. If his philosophy of technology is too abstract and far-fetched, juxtaposing his philosophy with Slavoj Žižek's inspirational appropriation of Heidegger's thought on the topic of biogenetics and bioethics may provide a more focused and 'applicable' understanding. Engaging with the debate between bioethics and science, Žižek thinks that the problem lies in an observation by Francis Fukuyama that 'the notion of humanity relies on the belief that we possess an essentially inherited "human nature", that we are born with an unfathomable dimension of ourselves.'^{xxxii} Habermas's position on the problem, which extends from Fukuyama's thesis, namely

biogenetic intervention, is straightforward. In a talk given in 2001, he states 2 reasons to oppose biogenetic intervention. Firstly, it will blur the borderline between what is made and what is spontaneous. Secondly, if human characters can be manipulated, probably some individuals will be more privileged, like those who can manipulate and those who are favourably manipulated^{xxxiii}.

Žižek considers this position as an obstacle to the potential conversation between bioethics and science, as it unreasonably splits bioethics and science into two separate and discrete regions, 'a split which already prevents us from seeing the way these new conditions compel us to transform and reinvent the notions of freedom, autonomy and ethical responsibility.' And the consequence is that, if human integrity and dignity are to be maintained, scientific inquiry into the human being should better be curtailed. Žižek suggests that 'every advance in knowledge has to be earned in a painful struggle against our spontaneous propensity from ignorance', and the implication of Habermas's position embraces ignorance but leaves the problem of knowledge advancement untouched. This insight can also be referred back to Heidegger's observation about the 'homeless and uprooted' Germans after the Great War: avoiding understanding anything in a genuine, original way. Habermas's position, as a result, would not be able to answer the questions revealed by the advancement of science and technology even regarding our essentially inherited 'human nature', before we make our decision of whether to support it or be against it.

Consider an example raised by Žižek. In a quiz in which I take part, I am driven by self-esteem to win. The stake of winning is to memorize as much as possible the relevant data. Žižek asks: does it matter morally if I take drugs to strengthen my memory? Or stepping back a bit, if I take drugs which strengthen my self-esteem, so I would want more desperately to win the quiz, especially when scientists found that the level of self-esteem is controlled by a chemical in the brain called 'serotonin'?^{xxxiv} Which questions would be revealed once we know that what we have always regarded as 'natural' talents, incomprehensible and given, as it were, are indeed manipulable by adjusting a certain chemical in the brain? Does it still make sense to hold on to the assumption of an integrated and given 'self', on which the whole debate of science and bioethics is built? Or should the advance of knowledge in biogenetics still be understood as infringing on the dignity and freedom of the self? Or does it rather tell us that 'we never had them in the first place'?

These considerations bring us back to Heidegger's unanswered question regarding the saving power against the destructive reign of Enframing. If Žižek's position to the debate of bioethics vs. science is to ask: what questions does scientific advancement pose, and how do these questions fundamentally confront our basic categories in considering the debates? Then we can also rethink Heidegger's secret saving power along the same path. Žižek's position though might lead to the charge of conformism, accepting everything technology brings

us as a layer of the truth confronting us. However, this seems to suggest precisely that we are required not to conclude the discussion too soon.

Enlightenment reason, science, self-destruction?

Another classic text that discusses the relation between western civilization and science and technology, in quite a different tone, however, is certainly the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. Written by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer of the Frankfurt School after witnessing the atrocities and catastrophes caused by the Nazis, the text seeks to discuss the failure of Enlightenment to turn mankind into 'a truly human condition', creating a new kind of barbarism' instead.^{xxxv}

Enlightenment is commonly understood as a radical break from the previous superstitious and religious worldview, and is the emergence of rational man from his 'self-incurred immaturity', which means the 'inability to use one's understanding without the guidance of another person', according to the founding figure of the Enlightenment, Immanuel Kant^{xxxvi}. Drawing widely on Nietzsche, Sade, and even Homer, the analysis of *Dialectic* reveals the striking similarities between Enlightenment and myth to such an extent that myth becomes enlightenment, and vice versa. Since myth is what Enlightenment seeks to overcome, this dialectic of Enlightenment simply leads to self-destruction.

(a) Myth as Enlightenment

Through the interpretation of Homer's *Odyssey*, which Adorno and

Horkheimer consider the 'basic text of European civilization', the authors argue that one can identify traces of the 'prototype of the bourgeois individual'^{xxxvii}. The authors cite the same poem by Hölderlin that was cited by Heidegger: 'But where there is danger, there salvation grows too', to elaborate the moment of the birth of the bourgeois individual: informed beforehand by Circe about the Sirens who are going to harm Odysseus and his men by singing sweet songs when Odysseus has to sail back to Ithaca in the well-known scene, one can see a clear hierarchical division of labour between Odysseus and his rowing men. While his men's ears have to be waxed in order to prevent them from listening to the songs of Sirens and keep them rowing, Odysseus himself is tied tightly to the mast of the ship, so he can enjoy the song of the Sirens without risking reacting in any dangerous and harmful way. To Adorno and Horkheimer, this is precisely an indication that 'throughout the many mortal perils he has had to endure, the unity of his own life, the identity of the individual, has been confirmed for him' ^{xxxviii}. And through the way the bourgeois individual finds his prototype in Homer's *Odysseus* is exactly through 'cunning, rational calculation, deceit, and above all, self-restraint and renunciation', 'he confirms his own identity and integrity through confronting and enduring challenges and danger' ^{xxxix}.

(b) Enlightenment as myth

Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer argue, is the attempt of reason to extend from the principle of perception to the objects of perception in a harmonious and unitary system. When facing the previously

untamable nature, if reason fails to structure our perception in accordance with the understanding of the system, and at the same time, if particular and factual knowledge cannot be derived from principles of the unitary system, the system fails to constitute the 'a priori assumption of judgment'. As a result, reason either fails to self-preserve or it successfully reaches a state in which 'the conceptual apparatus determines the senses, even before perception occurs; a priori, the citizen sees the world as the matter from which he himself manufactures it.'^{xli}

Science, consisting of mathematical abstraction, is the system in question for the Enlightenment. On the one hand, having been equated with truth by the Enlightenment, and being 'unable to question or determine the ends it serves, reason loses its critical dimension and becomes a tool for affirming and reproducing existing reality.'^{xlii} On the other hand, in terms of the contents of this system, 'moral forces are no less neutral impulses and modes of behaviors than the immoral forces.'^{xlii} This equation of science with truth and hence the instrumentalisation of reason render reason purposively purposeless, as well as Enlightenment as myth. Values fail to effect any negative power to query or change this unitary and harmonious system, all negative powers are readily tamed as they are compartmentalized in an orderly way.

As mentioned before, Kant considers man to be immature if he is unable to use his understanding without the guidance of another

person, and the Enlightenment is the advent of the opposite situation. Indeed, this phenomenon is relevant to the authors of *Dialectic* because they think this phenomenon has already been elevated from the level of the person to the level of an organizing principle of society, no matter whether this occurs in Nazi Germany or in the culture industry they experienced in America. Just like science has to structure our perception and adjust the world so as to fit it into perception, the individual in the culture industry, the authors argue, is also deceived so that the 'individual is an illusion not merely because of the standardization of the means of production. He is tolerated only so long as his complete identification with the generality is unquestioned.'^{xliii} Mediated by the culture industry, the authors point out, individuals can live well in a very orderly manner, even if they are living under total control, such as those of the Nazi era or the American-style capitalist society. The culture industry is such a concept that 'emptied subject and totality immobilize each. The world appears frozen in the nightmare.'^{xliv}

A text such as the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* certainly attracts enormous discussion regarding different aspects. In the light of Heidegger's 'The question concerning technology', I would like to compare and contrast it with the *Dialectic* in order to highlight some points for discussion. Firstly, Heidegger's essay, as we have seen above, is ambiguously optimistic, while the *Dialectic* can be easily taken as a closed statement of the authors' pessimism for the future even after the fall of Nazi Germany. One can try to justify this claim by contrasting

their different appropriations of Hölderlin's poem. In the hand of Heidegger, Hölderlin's lines refer to the potential overcoming of the danger of being overwhelmed by Enframing of technology, which is by the revealing of the being conditioned by technology in the form of art. However, in the *Dialectic*, these lines refer to beginnings of the bourgeois individual of the Enlightenment, which subsequently paves the way for the domination of Enlightenment reason and finally leads to its self-destruction. Rather than seeing salvation in the midst of the all-powerful domination of technology, overcoming the threat around us for self-preservation and construction of a unitary self is the opening of the tragedy of the self-destruction of reason.

Regarding Heidegger, it is always one option to read his philosophy of technology closely with his political orientation: to seek the essence and hence the liberating potential of technology against the technological society of American capitalism and communism. It is not my intention here to judge whether the somewhat noticeable consistence between the political orientation of the pre-war Heidegger and the Heidegger of 'the Question Concerning Technology', which was written in 1953, is the result of his failure to learn from all the atrocities of the Nazi experience. In this context, it is, however, tempting to interpret the *Dialectic* (written at the beginning of the 1940s) as closed, total, elitist, as the result of their lesson learned from the Nazis, which is in this sense a direct contrast with the case of Heidegger.

Yet, juxtaposing these thinkers in respect to their political stance towards the Nazis alone may not be the most meaningful way to grasp their philosophies of technology. Indeed, instead of consolidating their respective antagonistic stances, a more fruitful analysis should be directed towards the problematization of their stances. Huyssen rightly argues that both the attempts to bury and resurrect the authors 'tend to sap the energy from a body of texts that maintain their provocation for us.'^{xlv} So the point is not to affirm the authors of the *Dialectic* as a pair of hopeless elitists who criticize the deceived and helpless mass from a panorama viewpoint, or otherwise to interpret them as hidden believers in the power and potential of the mass and the proletariat.

In what follows, I would like to focus on the notion of 'self' in *Dialectic* and Heidegger, to investigate what indeed goes wrong with science and technology. As far as Heidegger is concerned, he observes that understanding things in a genuine and original way by people in Germany in the period around the Great War is avoided. In his own words, 'we take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as the anyone self take pleasure, we read, see, and judge about literature and art as the anyone self see and judge... the anyone self, which is nothing definite, and which all are, though not as the sum, prescribe the kind of being of everydayness.'^{xlvi} This view of the self is highly comparable to the deceived mass in Adorno and Horkheimer's totally administered society, where 'in spite of all the progress in reproduction techniques; in controls and the specialties, and in spite of all the restless industry, the bread the culture industry offers man is the stone of stereotype'.^{xlvii}

Huyssen offers the idea of 'ego-weakness' or 'ego decay' to supplement the observation given in the *Dialectic*. He argues that the decline of the traditional paternal authority in the bourgeois family, 'complemented by the ontogenetically subsequently invasion of the psyche by the laws of capitalist production', led to a change of personality, which was originally based upon conformity to an external standard. Therefore, 'in Germany, Hitler could become the substitute father, and fascist culture and propaganda provided the external guidance for the weak, gullible ego.'^{xlviii}

To these thinkers, modern technological society and hence its cultural apparatus are all manoeuvred to effect ignorance, insensitivity and conformity of the people. And yet, the very starting point of this historical process is ironically human fear, the fear of the incomprehensible nature, the fear of the unknown and uncontrollable. It is precisely this human fear that started men to demythologize, objectivize, scientize, and finally gain mastery over nature, 'nothing at all may remain outside (of the comprehensible), because the mere idea of outsideness is the very source of fear.'^{xlix} However, what remained unspecified are the specific historical moments when human fear changed to domination, if the word 'gradual' (instead of contingent, chaotic, uneven) is appropriate for a complex historical journey. The same question can also be raised for the philosophy of Heidegger: what exactly is the situation in which the Platonic and Aristotelian tradition would adopt the 'productionist metaphysics' out of the two quite different meanings of 'to produce'? What is the milieu

in which this choice was consolidated? And finally, how, in the historical process, do all these moments inform and constitute the self, from having a burning fear of being ignorance, and hence a will to know, to a will or an enjoyment of the unknown?

Regarding the grand historico-philosophical projects of these thinkers, these plural and particular moments might look trivial; they might indeed not aim to work in this direction. Yet, without historical specifications, we can only judge their theories by result, which is the existing situation. In other words, we do not know, apart from abstract rationality, what the notion 'society' really refers to, in what way and when it is jeopardized. We also do not know what indeed the relations and effects upon each other between different social and cultural institutions, such as government officials of high and low ranks, businesses of different sizes, etc., are. Yet, we have to convince ourselves that we are being severely oppressed, controlled and organized into repetitive reserves in order to be able to make sense of their theories.

Furthermore, without the depiction and analysis of the concrete and crucial historical, political and cultural nexus, the shift from the will to know to ignorance of the self would remain quite incomprehensible. Huyssen points out insightfully that 'one does not need to resort to a critique of the whole trajectory of Western metaphysics in order to see that the notion of a stable "self" is historically datable and dated with the bourgeois age'. In fact, if the formation of a stable and unitary self

is crucial to the transformation of the organizing principles of society into total administration and the transformation in turn of the constitution and orientation of the self, then what is at least equally worthy of being depicted is the actual process 'littered' along this history of Western civilization – if we are to learn from history to escape from this cage of instrumental reason or Enframing, or if escaping is ever possible.

Science, technology, colonialism

After the historico-philosophical projects dealing with western civilization, science and technology, power and politics, the numerous studies of the colonial experience of India can be a rich example.

There are different frameworks that try to explain the trajectory of the development of science and technology in India, or more generally 'backward' colonies, some of them explicitly, some implicitly political. A famous model is the three-phase linear diffusionist and Eurocentric model by George Basalla. In phase I of this model, non-European areas are conceived of as non-scientific society, and function only as providers of exploitable data and resources. In phase II, the colony establishes its own community of locally born scientists, who are dependent upon an external scientific culture, yet not 'fully participating member(s) of that culture'.¹ Phase III marks the beginning of an independent colonial scientific culture.

Though admitting Basalla had made 'the most important statement of

the diffusionist model of Western Science'ⁱⁱ, David Arnold rightly points out what is intentionally or unintentionally left out in Basalla's simplified and abstract model. Firstly, echoing the documentary findings of Kumar, Arnold reminds us that rather than the colonizer's intention to bring scientific culture to the colony, it was a commercial drive that provided some impetus for the original scientific practices of the colonizers. That is why the first 'research interests' of the colonizers from the East India Company are botany, geology and geography. Arnold also points out that Basalla's ignorance of the enormous difference of the background and experience of the different colonies is what made his model probable. Moreover, Basalla's model fails to address the problem of the neutrality of science. If the assumptions of science are 'value neutral, objective, empirically demonstrated, somehow transcending time and thus universally valid',ⁱⁱⁱ then the spread of Western science to the rest of the globe is both beneficial and inevitable. And if this version of science and this spread are both inevitable and beneficial, then what is the possibility of an independent colonial scientific culture in phase III of Basalla's model? What does that independence mean then, when science 'culture' is paradoxically culturally irrelevant?^{iv}

Apart from viewing the history of science in India in terms of colonial science, a related perspective, science as modernity, is also often employed. From this perspective, Indians were superstitious, inferior and backward. Europeans were subsequently superior and responsible for civilizing and enlightening the Indians. The authority derived from

this superiority and responsibility of Western advancement was not only exercised by the European colonizers, but also by young Indians who had received Western education. However, by defining the inferiority and backwardness of Indians against the modernity and advancement of the West, Arnold argued, catching up with the West will only be a myth, as the Indians will always find themselves inadequate and way behind the ideal West. And this is exactly where Partha Chatterjee's warning comes in: how could Indians accept and assimilate the modernity of the colonising West while at the same time seeking to contest colonial authority and its assertion of the Indians' inferiority?^{lv}

Facing this premise of modernity discourse, which was built upon a binary with one side advanced and superior and the other backward and inferior, it is tempting for critics to fall also into a binary, equating Europeans to oppressors and Indians to the oppressed. To Gyan Prakash, this kind of response just 'does not unravel the narrative'^M, and sacrifices the detailed operation and position of science, the dominated subjects and knowledge for revealing the 'colonizing impulse' of modernity. Along this line of thought, what Prakesh wants to seek is the process of negotiation between the 'colonizing' science and the subordinated subjects and knowledge.

This kind of ambivalence is common and yet important for us to actually understand how the working of science and technology involves both colonizer and colonized. Deepak Kumar is certainly right

to point out that the history and material of the discursive conflicts between conquerors and natives is too dense to permit 'a genuinely confused spectacle', in which natives do share or possess colonial power.^{lvii} However, pointing out that Indian historians do not easily permit the claim that 'natives do share or possess colonial power' is different from implying that there is no role for natives to play, or that the role of the natives is only something to be passively acted upon. Another implication may also be that the position of relying solely on the antagonism between colonizer and colonized as such is openly called into question.

Let us consider two cases, one provided by Prakesh and one by Kumar. Being coherent with his thesis that Indians were the oppressed, Kumar recognizes that in the history of colonial India, racial discrimination was a very serious problem. Although in the late 19th century there were already laws in India to secure posts in medical and engineering services for the Indians, the terms regarding paid leave, pensions etc. were simply different and far worse than those offered to Europeans. Many distinguished Indian scientists, Kumar recorded, even graduated from prestigious British universities, and yet, when they came back to India, the positions and terms offered to them were just unreasonably bad and unacceptable compared to their European counterparts.^{lviii}

Apart from the discrimination of Indians by Europeans as such, Kumar also offers cases with greater complexity within India. He documents cases in which Western-educated Indians criticized the Hindu ethos

severely. One such person was the founder of the Indian Association for the Cultivation of Science in 1869, Mahebdra Lal Sarkar. He criticized the Hindu ethos as ' a chaotic mass of crude and undigested and unfounded opinions on all subjects, enunciated and enforced in the most dogmatic way imaginable.'^{lix} Another case happened in 1896, when young Indian western-educated elites were upset by some of their young fellow Indians who imitated the European ideas and habits ' blindly' . Those elites wrote an article to defend their traditional costume and dietary habits from a scientific point of view. They argued that under the traditional and superstitious appearance, these habits and ideas are indeed rational and can be accounted for scientifically.^{lx}

In considering the power relation in the cases mentioned above, if we follow the line of the European/Indian distinction, complexities and ambiguity certainly arise when we take into account that hierarchy, structured according to the possession of scientific knowledge, exists even within Indian society. So if claiming that ' Indians do share or possess colonial power' is too naïve, the degree of naiveté might be no less in saying ancient values and faith had been resurrected (only) through scientific validation.

Recognition of the differentiated roles of different Indians in the working of science and technology allows for the formation of a tension, a tension between the assertion of colonizer/colonized distinction and the sharing and possession of colonial power by Indians.

This complicated tension is helpful for understanding the term 'colonial science', argued Arnold paradoxically, which is 'worth retaining and using ... to describe the various technologies in power operating within and through a science in a colonial setting', although the term itself 'may be flawed'.^{lxi} Arnold seems to suggest that the cultural politics here may not be to search for a stance in which any one side could possess absolute moral innocence. We have to situate ourselves in an ambivalent and sometimes contradictory condition to keep the dynamics of resistance alive, instead of feeling comfortable behind any fundamental demarcation settling the boundary between who are the oppressors and who are the oppressed. The resistance against oppression by science and technology cannot rely solely on the most oppressed and then morally innocent, at the same time essentializing the 'have' and 'have not' regarding colonial power and scientific and technological knowledge.

Yet, no matter how sophisticated those postcolonial critics are, there is always a common-sense position against the above criticisms that blend together science, technology, violence, and politics: pure science is itself neutral, and the effect of pure science is subject to application, which is technology. Moreover, the benevolent and appropriate way to use technology is the way to solve chaotic, dirty social and political problems. Obviously, this kind of position is particularly popular not for justifying the colonial history of science and technology, but for advocating the on-going development of science and technology.

Drawing on the post-war experience in India, the time when India had become independent of British colonial rule after 1947, Ashis Nandy refuses to accept the discourse that masked the inherent relation between science, technology and power. He argues the discourse that attributes the qualities of 'purity' and 'neutrality' to science and 'applied' to technology shifts the responsibility away from pure science. On the other hand, the same discourse further defers responsibility by purifying technology and claiming all the violence caused by technology is just accidental, and is just the result of misuses by wicked politicians, militarists and multinationals, again shifts all the responsibility away from the nature and the operational logic of technology.^{lxii}

This view of a stain-free science had become a constitutive part of the Indian governance, or what Nandy calls 'the reason of state'. Nandy explicates the situation in which a legitimate, stain-free and indeed violent scientific discourse is produced. Firstly, as did their early European predecessors, science is posed as a cure for both superstitious, backward, traditional Indians and the chaotic, nasty political and social problems. The second is a somewhat circular one, feeding back positively around the legitimacy of science and the legitimacy of the experts giving scientific judgments about Indian society and tradition. The third explains a miserable, or painful, as expressed by Nandy, situation in which 'highly visible short-term technological performance in small areas yields nation-wide political dividends',^{lxiii} as India did not have adequate resources to reach the

consumption levels of the developed west.

Piyush Mathur's convincing analysis of the nuclear test in India in May 1998 illustrates Nandy's point. Citing the remark of Nandy on this test, Mathur points out that nuclearism is one of the 'universals' of our time which disallows cultural adaptation and edition.^{lxiv} In other words, its meaning and the way it is articulated with other forces are 'the same in Paris and Pokharan, Lahore and Los Alamos'^{lxv} To Mathur, the nuclear test is a nexus where the interests of Hindu nationalism, fundamentalism, and masculinism coincide. The test seeks to stage a show to threaten neighboring Pakistan. This sudden and dramatic unification of the nation within the state around the nuclear test, Mathur argues, can be attributed to the supposedly autonomous and democratic Indian press who 'found too little time and too narrow a range of choices in covering an event that hit it with unprecedented speed and without prior notice'.^{lxvi} As a result, the press is not able to control their own agenda, totally subscribes to the state project and becomes its amplifier in trumpeting violence against both Pakistan and the ecology.

The case of the plantation of eucalyptus in India, provided by Vandana Shiva, may also help to illuminate the violent nature of modern science. In response to desertification and its consequences such as famine from the 1960s onward, institutions like the World Bank started to prescribe Eucalyptus for various afforestation schemes, with the official reason of its fast-growth quality. However, on drought land

eucalyptus is notorious for its high level of water consumption, which destroys the natural process through which soil moisture is replenished. On fertile land, its fast growing property heavily diminishes the soil nutrients and affects also its replenishment.^{lxvii} The species of eucalyptus is actually chosen, Shiva reveals, only for its demand by the pulp industry, which can thus maintain a cheap supply of pulp through the massive plantation of this otherwise useless and even destructive species.

Modern industry, intriguingly combined with modern science, maximizes its own gain, Shiva argues, and at the same time maximizes and disregards the social and ecological costs in the production process.^{lxviii} Before we consider this example moralistically: if we think of the 'inevitability' of the reasons for choosing eucalyptus, we may better understand why Nandy and Shiva assert that violence is inherent in science. Moreover, since there is no evidence that methods, assumptions, principles, etc. changed fundamentally with the coming of Independence in India, all these examples effectively and distantly echo Arnold and Prakesh in regard to the complicated and ambiguous relationship between science and Indians.

Feminists' dissidence

Discussing more generally the approaches to account for the history of the progress and advancement of science and technology, Sandra Harding provides and analyses a classification including categories of diffusionist, internalist, externalist, world system theory and postcolonial

approaches.^{lxix}

According to Harding, the internalist approach to the history of science and technology refers to a kind of thought in which historical time can be represented as a 'tunnel of time', where everything important, or whatever at least happened, is accumulated and confined along the tunnel. For the Europeans, this tunnel stretches 'from the present back to the Garden of Eden.'^{lxx} Indeed every other people has their own tunnel, but according to the most dominant version of the understanding of the progress of human civilization, or what Harding calls the Eurocentric account of human civilization, these other tunnels are almost negligible. The metaphor of the tunnel also indicates that progresses of civilizations were generated exclusively out of the essential quality of the people inside the tunnel. And the diffusionist approach assumes that prior to the beginning of the period of colonialism, European science and technology had already attained a level which is sufficient to spread over their acquired colonies and lead their development.

The externalist approach rejects the internal, essential qualities of the European minds and culture as the reason for development of modern science and technology. On the contrary, this approach positively emphasizes the effects of the social, political and economic factors at those times. Say for instance, in the account of Boris Hessen, a Soviet Historian, at the time around Newton's development of his theory, there were some unresolved problems 'in the air' attracting scientific

minds to pursue, and Newton's significance was just 'precisely the *subsequent* importance of the issue he addressed'.^{lxxi} The externalist approach seeks to understand the history of science and technology in terms of the absence of human beings, scientific and technological progresses just so happened to be realized through human beings, who are nothing more than a nexus through which particular trajectories intersect.

The third approach analyzed by Harding is called the world system account; this account overcomes the shortcomings of the previous approaches by introducing the element of European colonial expansion in explaining the European industrial development. Industrialization and the advancement of science and technology were neither the result of the intrinsic qualities of the European minds and culture, nor was it the sole result of the social, economic and political demands of European societies. This approach is not satisfied with barely identifying the different impetuses other than European scientific qualities, it seeks to discover the dimension of power connecting all these impetuses, and how these relationships are situated in the space and time of European colonialism. The colonial expansion and the contributions from other cultures indeed have a due role to be acknowledged. And the successful side of this process is of course the progress in European science and technology, while the original influence and contribution from places and cultures other than Europe and the de-development of the colonial process remain the unmentioned side.^{lxxii}

The final approach is the postcolonial approach, which for Harding is at the same time an anti-eurocentric approach. This approach shares with the externalist and world system approaches that it rejects the 'purely internal epistemological feature of modern scientific processes' as the impetus for the progress of European science and technology. It even goes further to argue that other cultures not only influence the development of European modern science and technology, their roles are indeed obscured, regardless of the intention, by the conventional account. The possibilities opened up by this approach not only include the problematization of the origin of modern European science and technology, but also the problematization of the geographical 'Europe', as we knew it. According to Harding, the standard eurocentric tunnel of time stretches from the present all the way back to ancient Greece. However, the political and cultural boundaries of 'Europe' have never been the same from Aristotle's Greece to the Holy Roman Empire to the Present Europe. This dimension, Harding reminds us, is particularly at stake as Aristotle's Greece actually was 'part of a Mediterranean world that included the Near East and Northern Africa, and excluded all peoples lying to the north of Greece'^{lxxiii}

These different approaches of accounting for the progress of modern European science and technology did not come out of a vacuum, the same social and philosophical background. Say for instance, in a condition in which science is conceived as 'singular– there is one and only one science– and its components are harmoniously integrated by

such an internal feature^{lxxiv}, recognition of the presence of other cultures and the differences between the cultures are unimportant. And in fact, to understand different approaches to account for this history of progress, different kinds of epistemologies may also be even more important in allowing different accounts to emerge.

This epistemology problem, in a way, interests feminists. If non-feminists' concern is the problem of what counts as knowledge, and scientific knowledge in particular, the objectivity of knowledge, and so on and so forth, feminists ask further questions of whether there is a gender dimension in the issues above. It is impossible to describe, however briefly, different schools of feminist epistemology in this context. However, I will highlight some important questions regarding the zigzag path by which the theoretical development of different feminist epistemologies proceeds. The birth of modern science is considered as roughly coinciding with the period of the Enlightenment, from which the distinctions of nature vs. culture, public vs. private, rationality vs. emotion, etc., emerge. Feminists argue that the modern science enterprise was built upon association with the former qualities of these binaries, therefore are masculine and hostile to its imaginative opposites. Responding to such a conception of science, some feminists reject those binaries by arguing that women can equally possess the qualities possessed by men. And with the contribution of women, 'more accurate and less androcentric' forms of science can be obtained. Feminists subscribed to this theoretical orientation are generally called feminist empiricists.

According to Harding, these feminists most closely resemble the conventional unitary view of science, in which 'one true story about nature's order' can be told. She argues, however, that it is impossible to conceive of any system of knowledge which 'represent[s] no particular set of social interests and desires, and thus exist[s] outside of societies' power relations.^{'lxxv} According to this assumption, she is calling for a feminist standpoint epistemology in which 'men's dominating position in social life results in partial and perverse understandings, whereas women's subjugated position provides the possibility of more complete and less perverse understanding.'^{lxxvi} Since universal objectiveness is impossible, therefore the objectiveness of this theory is grounded in 'the unique resources of the particular social locations.'^{lxxvii} Through the living situation of women, the scientific knowledge obtained will no longer be apolitical and static, instead, it is associated with the daily struggle of women against male supremacy as a constitutive factor, and it can also mark changing gender relations and global political economies.

Certainly, this approach resolves as much as it inflicts further theoretical problems. One kind of critique points to its dangers of essentializing the situation of women. Social locations and situations of women are not fixed categories anyway, 'therefore women's subjectivity, caring, holism and harmony, to which they (standpoint epistemology feminists) appeal, cannot be universal aspects of women's experience.'^{lxxviii} Further critique of course includes the danger of 'epistemology

inflation' , which is to say, women, no matter how subtle their difference, will be entitled to their own epistemologies. However, understanding Harding not from an either-or viewpoint, instead of encouraging an 'everything goes' attitude, feminist standpoint epistemology grounds the possibility of scientific knowledge of difference, and the tension between the differences.

Another line of critique, explicated by Helen Longino, argues that if standpoint epistemology seeks to reject traditional empiricism, which fundamentally assumes unconditioned knowing objects, by inserting the conception of knowing objects at standpoints, on the one hand, the problem would be:

if genuine or better knowledge depends on the correct or a more correct standpoint, social theory is needed to ascertain which of these locations is the epistemologically privileged one. But in a standpoint epistemology, a standpoint is needed to justify such a theory. What is that standpoint and how to identify it?^{lxxix}

On the other hand, Longino discovers that standpoint epistemology, the traditional empiricism, and even the tradition of rationalism since Rene Descartes, rely on an individual as knowing object, conditioned or unconditioned. This assumption is then exactly the origin of the inadequacy of the standpoint epistemology, even after exposing the oppressiveness and impossibility of traditional empiricism. As a solution, she suggests a strategy of 'multiplying the subjects' by attributing to a science community, rather than an individual knowing subject, the

basic unit of scientific knowledge production.^{lxxx}

I would like to raise two points which I believe are crucial. First, if the concept of 'scientific community' is appropriated to resolve the problem of the singularity of an individual knowing subject, on one side of the extremes, then how are we to guard against the temptation of reverting back to the all-embracing, unconditioned knowing subject which claims to represent us all? Secondly, the notion of community, like the notion of science, knowledge and so on, is never given and fixed. One can unearth the process of the construction of the notion of science and technology as well as community. This point would easily lead one to recall the fact that the right to vote, to attend schools for girls are all very late developments. However, not to count one as a member of the community does not only mean not allowing one to do something, the recognition of something already done is also important to the construction of membership. Say for instance, in the history of technology, women indeed contributed during the industrial era: the cotton gin, sewing machine, small electric motor, etc. are all inventions by women. Yet, all of them are not recognized and written into history; instead, the patent records of all these inventions are registered with the names of their husbands, or the one who provided the capital.^{lxxxi} Even if the concept of community is not a project intended to incorporate every one of us, what and who are 'us' is still utterly relevant.

Technologies of power, power of technologies

From all these historical-philosophical reflections upon science and technology, the idea that science and technology is heavily power-invested is manifest. This situation of our modern science and technology is perhaps best illustrated with Foucault's idea of the panopticon. The panopticon works by generating self-discipline on the part of the prisoners, who know well enough that in the darkened chamber at the top of the central tower it is always possible to have a watchman up there observing them. Whether the prisoners really discipline their bodies and their minds, whether they do it unconsciously or pretentiously, is another important empirical problem, however, the whole organization of the penitentiary space is intended to make sure the prisoners know that they are being watched constantly and that they have to behave accordingly.

With the panopticon, we can further understand the subtle relation between power, science and technology, not only in terms of the oppressor/oppressed distinction, no matter who the oppressors and the oppressed are. Yet, this conception may seem suspicious enough to resurrect the charge of neutrality regarding the nature of science and technology: the panopticon seems to suggest a kind of political neutrality whether the guard in the monitoring chamber is, say, politically to the left or right. However, it is exactly this apparent neutrality that leads Foucault to investigate the conditions and processes by which these technologies of power work, instead of just seeking to identify who is the ultimate agent.^{lxxxii} And in the case of

modern science and technology, then, that means to investigate the conditions and ways that technologies, and the 'technologies of science and technologies' as well, generate power, instead of only who are the abused and the abusers.

Historians of science and technology also address the problem of the extent to which technologies and techniques of various kinds effect social change, and these changes in turn feed back into the technologies and techniques: the thesis of technological determinism.^{lxxxiii} Leo Marx and Merritt Roe Smith offer a pair of analytical tools for this thesis: hard determinism and soft determinism. For hard determinism, 'the power to effect change is imputed to technology itself... thus the advance of technology leads to a situation of inescapable necessity.' Soft determinism, 'instead of treating "technology" *per se* as the locus of historical agency, locates technology in a far more various and complex ... matrix.' Manuel Castells, however, further argues that the point is not to choose whether 'the momentum to effect necessary social changes lies in technology' or 'different socio-politico-economico- historical factors are the reason for scientific and technological innovations'. Comparing the history of technological and scientific advance in Japan and China, Castells shows that the two positions in the debate of technological determinism are both non-answers.^{lxxxiv}

Historians have already pointed out that China before the 14th century indeed was ahead of the world in terms of scientific and technological

advancement. Examples include iron-casting blast furnaces, water clocks, weaving equipment, gun powder, paper and printing techniques, and so on and so forth. According to one historian, 'China came within a hair's breadth of industrializing in the fourteenth century.'^{lxxxv} However, between the 14th and 19 century, the progress in this regard came almost to a complete stop. Quoting historian Joel Mokyr, Castells maintains that the intervention of the state is the origin of the sudden stagnation. Yet, state intervention does not essentially bring negative effects to science and technological progress. This can be illustrated in the case of Japan, where the state built the academy, imported technique and personnel, assisted in founding firms, etc. To Castells, therefore, understanding the relations between different parties and changes is more important than arguing for either side of the determinism debate.

Nevertheless, before going so far as to say that there is no position reasonable enough or that all the answers are non-answers in the debate of technological determinism, it is helpful to first reconsider some basic categories by which we think about this issue. Very often, one of which is the notion of 'growth'. Arnold Pacey argues that 'growth' is largely what a chart or graph represents, what is included and excluded in these charts and graphs restricts and constructs our notion of growth. As a result it is important to be aware that the representations of 'growth' tend to be 'over-selective, and lead us to overlook the fact that improvements in one dimension are sometimes accompanied by less desirable developments elsewhere.'^{lxxxvi}

If technological determinism gains its convincing force solely from the supposed connection between scientific and technological progress on the one hand, and the general growth in productivity of all kinds on the other, then it might be worthwhile to juxtapose the above connection and Pacey's insight. In the process of progress of science and technology, we have always focused only on what positive changes it brings to our daily life and society, and ignored the other -- all too many -- operations occurring simultaneously, for instance, changes in the organization of labour, which can be quite devastating. Harry Braverman, in his classic work *Labour and Monopoly of Capital* (1974), already analysed the changes that management and organization of labour in terms of time and body motion bring to the process of production.^{lxxxvii}

As a result, we have to rethink whether the scientization and mechanization of the production site is the trigger of social progress. Also, it would be a mistake to ignore the simultaneous negative effects, like de-skilling, and even massive laying off of manufacturing workers^{lxxxviii} brought about by the mechanization and the change of organization of labour. After all, it is precisely the ignorance or even the intentional oblivion of those processes that makes the connections between progress in technology and science and positive growth of various kinds hegemonic.

Susan J. Douglas's study of the early development of American radio

broadcasting by amateur operators also argues for the complexity of relations of determination. Her study shows that amateur radio operation was already very well developed in the early 20th century, and even played a crucial role in various accidents by relaying asking-for-rescue messages, all at a time when corporations still did not quite see the profit potential of it and were not interested in it. However, due to the managerial discourse of government, amateur operations were portrayed as evil. As a result, the once autonomous and energetic development of these amateur operations became stagnant through bureaucratic administrative intervention. Finally, they were even almost replaced by the monopoly of corporate radio broadcasting.^{xxxix}

Robin Mansell and Roger Silverstone take another route to frame the question of information technology as the question of interaction between information technology and the users in the process of innovation.^{xc} They borrow the sociological concepts of structure and agency to explain the dynamics in the technical and institutional innovation process, to look at the interface between structure and agency where 'meanings are produced and values created and enforced and so too are the material artifacts'.^{xcii} They cite Paul Quintas's study of software as an example. The politics of software innovation is between the tendency of the software producers to standardize and normalize the production process on the one hand, and the increasing demand of the users to participate in determining the operating language of organizations, institutions as well as the

machine' on another.^{xcii} This approach is obviously strong in revealing the actual constructive tension between end users and producers, and in particular the role of users in negotiating for their own needs. However, methodologically speaking, in focusing on the role of users, this approach risks overlooking the various factors crossing over and constituting the preferences of the users, and treating users as intact, closed and given entities emitting unexplainable decisions.

Arguing that no position in the debate of technological determinism is viable leads only to the conclusion that there is no point in insisting on deciding whether technology determines society or vice versa. It nevertheless does not imply that technology is effect-neutral or effect-free. David Morley's study on broadcasting and the construction of the national family shows that through public broadcasting such as national weather forecasts and the royal Christmas broadcast in the UK, a synchronized experience is generated among the audience. By the way the imagined audience is addressed, a sense of unity is created, a unity of different people in the forms of family and nation. However, Morley also argues that such a broadcasting-created unity, or a public sphere, if it is the only single one, is a public space full of discriminations and prejudices towards, say for instance, women and non-white persons. ^{xciii} Women and non-white people nevertheless enjoy watching or being watched (i.e. being in the show) in programmes or even TV stations catering to them specifically, even though these programmes are stereotypically perceived as irrational and chaotic.

Though Morley's project is to investigate the concept of 'home', to see how the identity of people is affected by the changing meanings of home, nation, public, private, as effected by information technology, his general description of methodology is still relevant for the study of science and technology. He takes TV and radio broadcasting as a 'conceptual space through which a number of trajectories pass', in other words, the method is to identify and articulate the different discourses passing through that conceptual space extended by TV and radio broadcasting.^{xciiv}

For the methodological requirements suggested by Morley, Kristin Ross's excellent cultural history of the period between the late 1950s and early 1960s, the decade prior to the full-fledged modernization of the French -- the decade 'after electricity but before electronics' -- is a more illustrative example. She seeks to explain the emergence of the particular mode of French modernization: Americanized and implicitly racial. She argues that this mode of modernization is possible due to the cross-weaving of various discourses: the industrialization (hence the rise of the middle-class), decolonization of Algeria (hence excluding Algerians from the French national memory and experience), the internal spatial rearrangement of the city of Paris (resulting in the automobile-transported middle-class living in the inner area 'surrounded by islands of immigrant communities a long RER ride away'), the intellectual movement of structuralism and the *Annales* school of historiography are all central around and catalyzed by the important physical artifacts and imaginary of the then-advanced

technology of automobile and domestic appliances such as the refrigerator and washing machine, or chemical laundry detergents.^{xcv}

One of Ross's main arguments is the ambiguous relationship between the French, especially the emerging middle-class, *jeune cadre*, and the Algerians, especially the revolutionary *cadre*. While Frantz Fanon was calling for the birth of 'new man' as the de-colonial revolutionary subject in the late 50s and early 60s, the intellectual movement of structuralism and the *Annales* school of historiography were trying to proclaim 'the death of man' and trivialized 'event' for the *longue duree*'. Ross argues that it was precisely this intellectual atmosphere in France that rendered the French intellectuals role-less in the process of Algerian decolonization. Ross, however, discovers the conceptual and historical similarities between the collusion of both the ideas of 'new man' and 'death of man'. She insightfully points out the technocratic nature inherent in both the Algerian revolutionary *cadre* and the French *jeune cadre*. Both are more or less middle persons responsible for organization and management -- of the proletariats on the part of *jeune cadre*, and the Algerian national on the part of revolutionary *cadre*. Their jobs require high, machine-like discipline and order. While the *jeune cadre* are usually working in Fordist factories, securing their positions by accumulating technically advanced skilled, the revolutionary *cadre* also equip themselves with all the technicalities for organizing and mediating the bureaucratically structured revolutionary body.

On the other hand, a sense of complex emphasis of hygiene and cleanliness is also noticed by Ross. We have seen in the experience of India and elsewhere that the elements of hygiene and cleanliness both physically and metaphysically are important in the project of scientific and technological modernization. Ross sees no exception in her study. *Jeune cadre* require a modern, hygienic, easily manipulable interior in their homes, made possible and mediated by the domestic electrical appliances of washing machine and refrigerator, isolating them from the outside world. As for the revolutionary *cadre*, their concern is more mental and behavioral. To Ross, therefore, the *jeune cadre* 'is both the agent and the product of capitalist modernization just as Fanon's 'new man' is both the agent and the product of decolonization'.^{xvii} As a result, it is in the colluded embrace of the principle of technicality by both the French *jeune cadre* and the Algerian revolutionary *cadre* that French modernization is clearly demonstrated as a nexus through which different discourses pass through. Simultaneously, this same collusion paradoxically renders the French and Algerian the constituted factors of their own mutual exclusion in the modernized, homogeneous and hygienic French national identity and memory.

Political economy of science and technology

Home, the common focus of Morley's and Ross's studies, is also, but a bit differently, studied in relation to information technology from the more empirically oriented perspective of political economy, in the framework of the locale or city.

Manuel Castells argues that aided by information technology, the 'space of flow' is emerging to replace the space of places. In his own words, this trend is 'the deployment of the functional logic of power holding organizations in asymmetric networks of exchanges which do not depend on the characteristics of any specific locale for the fulfillment of their fundamental goals.'^{xcvii} Once the large corporations are able to escape from being confined to any particular place, once they are able to take advantage of the information technology in organizing their business around the globe, they also escape from social, economic and political controls that are particular to any particular place. Consequently, these place-based societies will have to succumb to the requirements of the corporations if they are to compete and survive. As one critic puts it, 'for business, networked information circuits free business clusters to choose the location of their operational headquarters for command and control. Firms can now circumvent government disincentives whether embodied as taxes, rules, interest payments or capital restrictions.'^{xcviii}

According to Castells's observation, resistance of communities to such forms of transformation usually takes the form of isolating and fundamentalizing themselves, in order to affirm their local identities. However, Castells argues that this strategy risks cutting them off from communities that are also facing the same situation, thus rendering themselves powerless. Consequently, 'between a historical flow and irreducible identities of local communities, cities and regions disappear as socially meaningful places.'^{xcix} In order to revert this situation,

Castells calls for a 'network of flows' constituted by different place-based communities, to share their information, to come up with more specific bargaining agenda, to respond to the demands of corporations' more flexibly.

Saskia Sassen has similar observations of the current global situation caused by the advanced information technology. She also points out that a network linking major centers, or nodes, as she sometimes calls them, is enabled by information technology.^c These centers are more than the sum of the headquarters of the big corporations, these centers are also where firms such as those specializing in legal, accounting, financial, and advertising services are concentrated. For her, these centers, though articulated through cyberroutes or digital highways, and scattered throughout the world, are basically detached from the region where they are located. As a result, places outside this net of centers and digital highways 'are peripheralized.'^d She also sees the paradoxon of the current global situation, a paradoxon that she cannot account for satisfactorily.^{cii} If globalization fuelled by information technology is about expansion and dispersion beyond what had been the confined realm of national economies and floor trading, 'why [do] financial centers matter at all'^{ciii}?

This paradoxon, involving at least the entangled rhetoric and theories of both globalization and information technology, is very important but out of scope here. What might be of interest here is the difference between Sassen and Castells, who have similar observations, but

different attitudes and prescriptions. While Sassen keeps being critical of the inequality generated by the phenomenon of global cities, Castells sees the possibility of a win-win situation. Basically, he thinks that what local communities, including both the local governments and the people, should do is to equip themselves to face the dramatic and abrupt changes brought about by advanced capitalism as a result of the development of information technology.

John Downey argues, however, in the context of the EU, this possibility in which everyone has the capability and easy accessibility to the Internet provided publicly is fundamentally contradictory to the attitude of the EU on information technology, which puts a heavy emphasis on deregulation and privatization. The greater use of information technology is likely to bring more benefits, he argues, but this assumption, does not guarantee that the benefit will be distributed equally.^{civ} Some often-cited examples are worth mentioning again here. Until 1999, 29 OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries had less than 20% of the world's population but transmitted more than 80% of the world's telephone traffic (9 of them with three-quarters of all telephones) with 90% of the world's mobile telephone users and 95% of all computers. Almost 85% of the world's people have no telephones, and well over half have never made a telephone call.^{cv}

Inequality resulting from the uneven development of information technology certainly requires our attention, yet, the supposedly

positive side of the information technology should not be accepted uncritically. A team of researchers consisting of Doreen Massey, Paul Quintas and David Wield look into the working of science parks in the UK, examining the hierarchical social structure, the assumed model of innovation, and the spatial arrangement unfolded in the various science parks. They point out that the whole conception of science parks in the industry is founded upon a linear model in which the processes of innovation and production are strictly separated, and upon a scientific elitism (in contrast to the actual production process) which believes that technocrats know best. However, they argue that this conception is neither realistic nor plausible.^{cv}

And indeed, even evaluating according to the official objectives, science parks in the UK right from the establishment of the first one in 1972 until the early 1990s, they powerfully demonstrated that science parks are far from being successful. One major objective of the Science Park is the facilitation of R&D and technology transfer. However, in an atmosphere of university budget cuts, the opportunities for university staff to start up firms in the science park have been transformed into a tactic the university adopts to live with a decreasing budget. In extreme cases, universities redeployed staff to set up part-time businesses, some are even set up by the universities to 'continue the contracts which the university department formerly undertook!' ^{cvi} This kind of firms, nevertheless, is already part of a start-up minority in the park --the majority of them are relocated units, subsidiaries or branches. Contrary to this situation, promoting new

start-ups is one of the major objectives of the parks. With the support of the development of advanced technology by the government, Science Parks become an outlet for the university to actualize their academic entrepreneurship.

Conclusion

In conclusion, before we go into the particular analysis of the governance and the discourse of both the government and business sector on technology, we can see that the terrain extended by the notion of science and technology is indeed quite large. Every theory or analysis can be enormously interesting and inspiring, yet they can only articulate a limited amount of elements in the terrain or discursive field. What may be a more important implication from the above, precisely because every theory or analysis can only dominate the relation and assigning of meaning in the discursive field partially: one might argue that the meaning and the terrain of the notion of science and technology are still yet to be completely settled, and maybe ultimately uncompletable, or -- from another perspective -- at least none of them can claim an almighty prominence.

HK as a blackbox of 'rational progress'?

Wolfgang Becker's recent movie *Goodbye, Lenin!* is a film about the efforts of Alex, the son of a mother who totally devotes herself to socialism, to pretend in front of his mother that the socialist regime in East Germany is perfectly normal and intact. He has to protect his mother from emotional shocks, however slight, after she wakes up from a ten-month coma, during which the fall of the Berlin wall, the unification of East and West Germany and, most relevant to his mother, the influx of the capitalist way of life into her socialist home country are witnessed. Although this project, or lie, as some may say, does not last forever, the film does not end with a passive adaptation to, or acceptance of, the capitalist 'reality' *per se*.

It is seemingly tempting to read *Goodbye, Lenin!* in terms of a cold war mindset, one that lures us to reach the conclusion that the film is either anti-capitalist or anti-communist. For instance, the effort of Alex for his mother is simply futile, and the socialist 'reality' created will certainly be ruthlessly crushed by capitalist reality that is more 'natural' or 'inevitable'. Yet, instead of being chained by this blackmail of choices, which is antagonistic and mutually exclusive by design or even by definition, it is more fruitful to read the story in terms of, say, the meaning of faith and aspiration, their coming to terms with what is

supposedly mutually exclusive, how this coming to terms after the original meanings of the so-called communism and capitalism works, the situation of people in these circumstances, and all the above in respect to the imagination and ontological status of the state. Or from another perspective, it can be analyzed how those abstract categories are themselves transformed as a result of this particular story, in that particular articulation of elements.

Owing to, and despite, all the efforts of Alex, East Germany persists only as long as Alex keeps putting up various symbols and artifacts of the socialist regime of East Germany. And it is precisely by putting up all these that the socialism of Alex's mother can remain intact. When the ex-astronaut (who was Alex's hero when he was still a child) dresses up as the leader of East Germany, and proclaims the rather sympathetic acceptance of West Germany as a result of the decision of unification, the 'leader' insists on asking people to be brotherly, loving and supportive of each other. Whether this is the case for Germans is not our concern here, yet in any case, if this were the case, the resulting unified Germany can no longer be comprehended by the aggressive, and conceptual, dichotomy of capitalism and communism, and hence an ultimate 'defeat' of communism by its capitalist counterpart. After all, the request of the 'leader'-- brotherhood, love and support-- should be ready to form some very heterogeneous and contradictory constituents of the liberal, free market capitalism that is supposedly based upon atomic and selfish individual subjects.

That the nature of state is performative, and even theatrical, that is to say, that the state exists nowhere else but in what the state does is precisely captured by what the anthropologist Clifford Geertz termed the 'theatre state'. An understanding of this dimension of politics is certainly helpful for us to reconceptualize the meaning of politics and state. For Geertz, all the political performances, the demonstrations, 'the pageants were not the mere aesthetic embellishments, celebrations of a domination independently existing: they were the thing itself.'^{cvi} According to his ethnographical studies and historical record, Geertz observes, in other words, that the relationship between the state, large-scale public performances of the state, and the kings is not one of instrumentality. There is no independent state whose power and status can be enhanced 'externally' by large-scale performance. Public performance is no mere performance, for it implies fundamentally an ability to stage such a thing; it is the ability to 'express a view of the ultimate nature of reality and, at the same time, to shape the existing conditions of life to be consonant with the reality.'^{cix} In *Goodbye, Lenin!*, Alexander is of course not comparable to the king of Bali, yet the basic structure is similar, and it is even precisely the extent to which one can mobilize reality and at the same time lay down the standard and rules of reality that determines the status and the magnitude of power.

In this sense, the conception of state and politics no longer relies on the assumption of a political essence or core, which is usually assumed as being signified by certain arbitrary political operations, events or

symbols. And the mission of political analysis is then no longer an exercise of decipherment. In other words, it is tempting to conclude that the meaning of state and power, and their terrain as well, is retroactively defined by which public performances are held, and it is hardly likely to have any transcendental and necessary characteristic of state and power. As a result, instead of simply sticking only to such notions as coercive or fictitious, which may sometimes be too crass, Geertz's conception is insightful for the recovering of the etymological themes originally condensed in the word 'state'.^{cx} The conceptual tools from the theory of performative utterance can furthermore break down and expose the significance of the different parts within political actions and processes.

For any utterance to be performative, the utterance should not merely be 'a description of some action, inner or outer, prior or posterior, occurring elsewhere than in the utterance itself.'^{cx} Yet, as Timothy Gould reminds us, the illocutionary force of a performative utterance does not depend on whether there is a true correspondence of the utterance to the outside world. However, it also does not mean that the effect of the utterance, or the 'perlocutionary force', is irrelevant or can be ignored by the theory of performative utterance.^{cxii} And indeed, it is Gould's insight that the perlocutionary effect that subsequently happens is not necessarily what a certain illocutionary utterance desires. Nonetheless, this situation does not prevent the utterance from being performative. To cite one example offered by Gould: I have successfully advised you – but I have not succeeded in

influencing you.^{cxiii} This discrepancy is referred to by Gould as 'illocutionary suspense' or 'perlocutionary delay', and he emphasizes that it has to be recognized.

This recognition is significant in the following sense: If a performative utterance is defined as non-descriptive, and hence not subjected to verification on the one hand, and not grounded in any 'extralinguistic' reality^{cxiv} in any way on the other, then this over-retreated version of performative utterance will ultimately confine itself within a little isolated domain, debilitating itself rather severely. However, with the recognition of the delay or suspense, performative utterance can still be possible and confirmed even if incoherence exists between the illocutionary intention and the perlocutionary effect.

Judith Butler's analysis takes a step back. By calling the subject of the utterance into question, she situates the subject back in a genealogy of the subject of the utterance. She observes that in regard to the illocutionary part, an uttering subject has to be assumed. This subject is only interpellated when a certain action, and hence accountability, has to be attributed to someone as its initiator, its origin.^{cxv} However, it is this very consideration of the subject that brings forth a paradoxon. Butler points out, citing Derrida, that no performative utterance could have succeeded if the utterance pronounced 'in order to open a meeting, launch a ship or a marriage were not identifiable in some way as a *conforming* with an iterable model, if it were not then identifiable in some way as a "citation"' (original emphasis).^{cxvi} In other

words, without echoing prior actions and accumulating 'the force of authority through the repetition or citation of a prior and authoritative set of practices', ^{cxvii} the transitivity of illocutionary intention could not possibly be effective. Butler even argues that without this historical establishment of a model of iterability, the 'singularity and discreteness' of any action and utterance could not be effectively defined. However, the paradoxon is that, should the accumulation history not be dissimulated, no accountability and responsibility could be established with the subject, who is exactly and only intelligible as long as accountability and responsibility are attributed to him/her. To sum up, the performative works only by forbidding its own constitutive convention and model by which it is essentially made possible and effective.

Butler's argument is certainly inspiring in that it urges one to situate different performatives back to their proper context, whereas the same performative will subsequently become the constituting convention for other performatives to come. And at the same time, it is then possible for one to map out the location, level and relationship of and between various performatives that constitute our situation. It is this double characteristic of the performative that brings us back to Geertz. In his study of Bali, Geertz points out that power in Bali is manifest through the ability to physically occupy and perform the standard, the convention in public ceremonies, which in turn invests power to the one occupying the position. In the rituals, 'it was in the ability to stage productions of an eleven-roof scale, to mobilize the men, the resources,

and not least, the expertise, that made one an eleven-roof lord.^{'cxviii} It might seem strange that power is exercised and manifested through this very 'sitting' on the eleven-roof: a common person like me sitting on a common seat like the one I am now sitting on does not have any power effect. With the conception of the genealogy of the constitutive conventions supplemented by Butler, the performative not only becomes intelligible, new areas of research are also opened up. Say for instance, in the case of hate speech analyzed by Butler, legal precedents form the ground and resources by which the court judges certain acts to constitute hate speech. A genealogy of these precedents will reveal the basis and meaning of what Butler calls the 'transitivity'^{cxix} of words into injurious illocutionary force.

Introducing this theatrical and performative dimension of state and politics is expected to elicit objections, especially when the theoretical elaboration of this dimension is originated from the context of Bali in the nineteenth century: the problem of validity. The modern state is conventionally characterized by its legal-bureaucratic nature, which includes qualities such as effectiveness, efficiency, hierarchy, impersonality, system, and so on. All these qualities seem to be in an extreme opposition to the large-scale rituals and religious performance/ceremonies-orientated conception of state and politics. Especially when aspiration, religious faith, and struggle are the main protagonists of the latter.

According to the official version, especially before the financial crisis in

1997, Hong Kong is well-known for possessing three major strengths that make Hong Kong out-perform other places. Fundamentally, Hong Kong has a solid foundation in the 'rule of law'; we have a solid foundation in its finance; as well as in its civil service. According to a speech delivered by the Chief Executive, Mr. Tung Chee Hwa, at the sixth Annual World Economic Development Congress, the civil servants are 'very valuable assets' to Hong Kong because of their locally and internationally renowned 'efficiency and productivity'.^{cxx} Mr. Tung even revealed in his first policy address that, after working with the civil servants for three months, he was 'struck by their professionalism and continuous quest for improvement'.^{cxxi} After the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis, during which Hong Kong was severely tested, the philosophy, or at least the rhetoric of the philosophy to respond to the crisis, can be seen in the titles of the government budget. The English names for the budget in 98-99 and 99-00 are 'Renewing Hong Kong Strength' and 'Onward with new strength' respectively. The Chinese titles, however may be even more explicit, the direct translations are 'ease the people, lessen the difficulties, and keep self-strengthening'^{cxxii} (98-99) and 'strengthen the foundation, economize expenditure, and invent new strengths together'^{cxxiii} (99-00). Both titles function as an expression of hope to achieve what the titles mention. We can see that even if the government before the crisis mistakenly over-praised the foundations of the 'success' of Hong Kong, it did want to show that the government officials had learned a lesson. They want to show people that they would, as a result, be pragmatic, and would focus on something more fundamental, more practical

regarding its governance of the Hong Kong economy. Therefore no more illusion, no more myth, no more bubble. In a famous statement made by the ex-financial secretary Donald Tsang in the radio programme 'Letter to Hong Kong' before delivering the budget 98-99, this 'be practical and no bubble attitude' is presented no more clearly. He said, 'frankly speaking, it is possible to disregard the long term interest of Hong Kong to give Hong Kong people some short term excitement, however, I think, exchanging the tax revenue for a moment of applause is an irresponsible, and even dangerous action of the government.'^{cxxiv}

As a result, for such a practical and even pragmatic government, at least willed by the rhetoric, the theatrical and performative dimension of politics as a valid approach of analysis must be seen as irrelevant, or indeed as something to be avoided and even criticized and combated. Yet, in the rest of this chapter, I am going to argue that instead of accepting this convenient but misleading dichotomy laid down by the government, and merely reverting the emphasis from one extreme to another, what we can see is rather the intermingling of these two dimensions, and the government's non-recognition of the very theatrical and performative dimension. One can indeed hypothesize that the very need to combat and criticize is grounded precisely in the need to obliterate the often less eye-catching dimension and function, while it indeed occupies a no less important proportion of what the government is exactly doing, hence diverting the sight of the people from any other perspective according to which

the governance can be judged and other things can be done. In other words, not only in the emphasis on the practical and pragmatic face of the government is power at work, an even more important trace of power may be found where the emphasis is at the expense of making invisible other dimensions. Power, echoing Foucault's famous analysis in his essay 'The subject and power', is 'an action upon an action, on existing action' or more importantly, 'on those which may arise in the present or the future', power functionally is the guidance of the 'possibility of conduct and putting in order the possible outcome'.^{CXXV}

Foucault's essay explicates how power and the project of modern states deal mainly with the construction of the subject, which is not our concern here. However, his analysis supplements the ideas outlined above in that the supposedly binary opposition between the practical/pragmatic vs. theatrical/performative is off the mark. Whereas the construction of the subject is the purpose, it really then does not matter whether the government is pragmatic or performative, nor does the controversy of whether they indeed epistemologically and ontologically exclude each other. Instead of insisting on either side of the opposition, we have to look into the power relation embedded in various social nexuses, through different kinds of grass-root level institutions such as hospitals, markets, schools, and even ceremonies, although policies about them may seem to be made 'up there' by the government officials 'at' the moment they decide. As a result, the question opened up then will be to locate the theatrical and

performative moments in modern politics, at work in various institutions embedded in the whole social nexus.

Before really going into the analysis of the Governance of Hong Kong, a clarification needs to be made. To investigate the theatrical and performative dimension of governance should not be mistaken for a complete denial of the relevant institutions, policies or actions. For instance, if a mother wants to deter her daughter from her frequent night-life, she might say to her daughter: you know what, the number of girls assaulted at night every single year is surprisingly blah blah blah... We can take this statement as persuasion or even a threat, yet in any case whether the figure here is right or wrong is not relevant. In this context, what is worth investigating is instead how this threat or persuasion is articulated and on what grounds the articulation transits into an effect that might occur on the part of the daughter.

Bird flu

Hong Kong's becoming the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) under the People's Republic of China from a British colony was a difficult transition for both the government and the people. During the second half of 1997, a time when it was still a newborn baby, Asia experienced a tremendous financial crisis, and Hong Kong inevitably was one of the targets in jeopardy. This is not the place to elaborate the political economy involved, but put briefly, in October 1997, Hong Kong dollars were 'short-sold' by some speculators and international hedge-funds, causing intense economic strain on the SAR Government

to maintain the pegged exchange rate between Hong Kong and the U.S. dollar. As a result, interest rates between banks experienced a huge thrust, and consequently credits became very difficult to obtain, prices of the stock and property markets declined steeply.

Whereas the SAR Government takes seriously the degree of economic prosperity as an important constituent of its legitimacy, the financial crisis that struck Hong Kong turned out to erode a considerable portion of the prestige and legitimacy of the SAR Government. Almost simultaneously, the bird flu crisis broke out in the area of public hygiene by the end of November 1997. The bird flu, technically known as H5N1, was by that time unrecognizable even for the international scientific and medical community. Within a month, 13 people were infected (a total of 18 people were infected in the outbreak), and 6 people were killed by the virus in less than 2 months.^{cxxvi} Exactly a month after the outbreak of the virus, on the same day, the government decided to slaughter all the chickens and poultry in the wholesale markets and retail outlets, as a result of the sudden death of chickens in a local poultry wholesale market and the discovery of the H5 virus in a sample taken in a local chicken farm.

This decision launched a lasting series of spectacles which arguably have become part of the shared memory of Hong Kong people -- 1.5 millions chickens^{cxxvii} and other poultry, weighing about 1300 tons,^{cxxviii} altogether were slaughtered in just about 3 day's time. The slaughter of this huge number of chickens and other poultry in almost 200 spots

around Hong Kong, including wholesale markets, chicken and poultry farms, was, however, not the most important part of the spectacle; the most spectacular part was seen in the process of handling the aftermath of the slaughter. In a way represented by the sensation-oriented practice of the local media, the city became the great tomb of the slaughtered animals. Hong Kong people were confronted with images of piles and piles of animal bodies at the locations of slaughter; the heads and feet not wrapped well and scattered around in the three designated dumping areas. Headings such as 'Uncollected sacks of rotting carcasses, picked apart by rats and wild dogs, littered village roads' and 'Renegade chickens were still roaming around rural farms' ^{cxxix} appeared in newspapers at newsstands and were read all over Hong Kong.

One day before the government decision on the slaughter, the government freshly reported on a study jointly done by the Hong Kong Department of Health, the WHO and the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and Prevention in Atlanta, USA. The study shows that the anti-body to the virus is found in poultry workers and those who have direct exposure to the virus, while no such anti-body is found in the control of the experiment. Meanwhile the government tried to keep Hong Kong people's confidence with the message that 'the main mode of transmission of this virus is considered at this stage to be from bird-to-man. The transmission from man-to-man, if occurring, is considered inefficient.' ^{cxxx} If man-to-man indeed does not seem to be the source of infection, the slaughtering of chickens and poultry in

Hong Kong should be considered as a way to actively block the more likely source of infection: bird-to-man. However, this deduction works only if we, and the government, (intentionally or not) ignore the fact that chickens are delivered daily from chicken farms in South China, and the supply from these farms constitutes 80% of the daily consumption of chickens in Hong Kong;^{cxxxix} otherwise, the government would not take their decision of slaughter as 'an attempt to rid the source of influenza A H5N1 virus' .^{cxxxii}

To take this seeming mismatch of problem and solution as a mere mistake, a wrong decision, would, however, probably undermine a chance to investigate the working or the governance of the SAR Government. As put amusingly enough by a critic , apart from the bird flu, the ' malaise' of Hong Kong certainly includes ' a weakened stock market and a slowing economy' ; therefore it takes ' more than a health department order to give Hong Kong a clean bill of health' .^{cxxxiii} This comment juxtaposed the images of hygienic crisis and the economic situation in the context of Hong Kong, which is what occupies the government's mind and what the government keeps constructing. Nevertheless, the comment separates the tasks of the different departments of the government a bit too neatly, as we have always imagined it to be. As shown above, destroying the poultry might have been off the mark, effectively putting to the back stage some arguably more relevant responses and measures, such as securing a virus-free supply of chickens from China in the future, although at the same time, the slaughter paradoxically does more than just halt the

spread of bird flu.

SARS

Another case similar to the outbreak of bird flu is the well-known case of the global outbreak of the Severe and Acute Respiratory syndrome (SARS), which brought about a much larger scale of loss of both human and economic resources than the bird flu. With the source of the virus brought by a medical doctor from mainland China by the end of February 2003, SARS broke out in Hong Kong in early March.^{Cxxxiv} The virus spread tremendously quickly during the subsequent four months in Hong Kong, and culminated at the end of March, with a record of 80 infected cases admitted to the hospital in one single day. Altogether, 1755 people got infected and 299 died.^{Cxxxv} During the SARS outbreak, directly or indirectly affected by the virus, the unemployment rate rose to a historical high of 8.6%, amounting to 300,000 of the Hong Kong population; the World Health Organization, for the first time ever, warned travelers to avoid traveling to Hong Kong and other high risk areas^{Cxxxvi}; the Secretary for Education and Manpower, Arthur Li, was almost 'forced' to announce class suspension officially, as a result of the tremendous public pressure and the land-sliding voluntary class suspension of primary and secondary schools.^{Cxxxvii} The government even issued a 10-day 'isolation order' to the residents in Block E of Amoy Garden, where more than 100 residents had already been infected by that time; and evacuated the building 2 days later, quarantining the residents in a recreation center in Sai-kung. In addition, the severe criticisms of government officials, especially the

senior health department, regarding delayed and ill-informed treatment on the brink of the community-wide spreading of the virus; and the enormous recognition given to the frontline medical workers, janitors, etc., all combined with the conditions described above to yield the unprecedented size and scope of different types of interactions and tensions, highly condensed in this historical four-month period in Hong Kong.

Mechanical explanation of cause and effect, problem and response in this incident, in the sense that goals were first laid down and the policies and measures implemented to fulfill the goals, probably would not take us too far to comprehend the situation in Hong Kong, and the working of the government. When the government considered that they began to contain SARS, Tung subsequently summoned senior officials on a 'cross-bureau, inter-departmental'^{cxxxviii} basis, to form two task forces. The one which deals with public hygiene was led by the Chief Secretary, Donald Tsang; the other, aiming to revitalize the economy, was led by the Financial Secretary, Henry Tang. The common and ultimate task for both teams was to engage the whole of Hong Kong, as soon as the WHO had lifted the above-mentioned travel advisory, in a 'promotion exercise' that conveys the following message: 'SARS is now being contained, Hong Kong is a safe and environmentally friendly and hygienic place and travelers, tourists and investors should feel safe to come to Hong Kong to stay, be tourists or to invest'.^{cxxxix} 'Setting' up task forces 'to involve' the whole of Hong Kong in a promotion exercise certainly falls into the category of power

described by Foucault. To look at the actual practice and policy suggestions made, at what both task forces have really done, with Foucault's notion and Geertz's idea that 'theatre, performative as the domination itself', makes possible not only a better understanding of the power relations here in Hong Kong, but can also avoid off-the-mark judgments and criticisms.

To the government officials, the outbreak of SARS is not a problem of administration of health-related governmental departments (say for instance the communication of information between health units of different places, the implementation of urgent measures regarding a highly contagious virus, etc.). It is also not a problem of the increasing flow of population between Hong Kong and mainland China, and all over the world (however, the issuing of a travel advisory by the WHO; the locations where the carriers of the virus were staying along their journeys; which flight they subsequently took, etc.: the government indeed took all of these seriously, didn't it?)^{cxl}. Instead, they considered it as fundamentally and essentially a matter of hygiene. As explained by Donald Tsang, the chairman of the task force, namely Team Clean: '... to deal with epidemics like SARS ... many fundamental things have to be dealt with. Starting from personal hygiene, followed by household, environmental hygiene, eating habits, and then workplace...' ^{cxli} When Donald Tsang had to make a public presentation on the suggestions recommended by the task force, the relationship between hygiene and SARS was even taken one step further: 'we would not forget its (SARS's) devastating Hong Kong, taking

away the precious lives of almost 200 Hong Kong citizens ... Hong Kong is now a different Hong Kong from 3 months ago, demanding more and more public, personal and household hygiene' .^{cxlii} As a result, hygiene has to be observed not because it is virtuous, not because prevention is a merit, but because we are effectively destroying people's precious lives if we don't.

Echoing the military tone of government officials, a local newspaper understands the hygiene issue as a war, and the task force has to 'win the war of civilization by using rationality' .^{cxliii} After establishing the almost- exclusive relationship between hygiene and responsibility for SARS, readers should not be surprised by the famous notion of a 'zero tolerance' attitude, adopted by the task force, when their '*Report on measures to improve environmental hygiene in Hong Kong*'^{cxliv} expressed an abstractly negative perception of, for instance, fresh markets, which occupy quite a proportion of attention and treatment in the report. According to the report, the fresh market has a perennial condition of wet, dirty and slippery floors. (p.77) Market tenants litter the ground with all kinds of rubbish, such as damaged fruit and vegetables, plastic bags, discarded cartons, tissue papers, cigarette butts, etc.; when they are indeed required to provide rubbish bins for themselves, though some tenants do not even have one. (p.78) Tenants also seldom have the initiative to clean their own stalls. The collected dust produces an untidy look of the market. (p.78) The description particularly given to the poultry stalls is fascinatingly sophisticated and worthy to be reproduced in full length. 'Poultry

feathers block drains while dirty, poultry droppings despoil the environment. Empty transit cages are often stacked in common parts of the market to await collection. Dressing of poultry in the stall, and not in the scalding room, makes the situation even worse^{cxlv} (p.78)

Now let us take a close look at the basic structure of the descriptions, or one may say accusations, in the perception of the task force of the fresh markets and food premises. They commonly consist of highly abstract, non-contextual adjectives (dirty, untidy, bad, despoiled, lack of initiative, and so on) applied to general, unspecified subjects. The report does not show an intention to differentiate among the fresh markets and their tenants, the description provided also practically ignores and even denies any improvement ever in the markets, before the overhaul of the task force. In that case, it would be interesting to know what then comes out of the encounter of the 'zero tolerance' resolution and such a general, non-contextual, yet negative perception of the places and practices to be disciplined.

In the presentation of what has been done so far after the formation of the task force, the following items are mentioned. Regarding the fresh market and food premises, according to the report, the Food and Environmental Hygiene Department (FEHD) alone has inspected all the 18,000 licensed food premises, issuing 3009 verbal warnings, 111 written warnings, 580 summonses, 264 statutory notices to keep the 6-m surroundings clean; and seized 1220 kg of open food. And the FEHD and Housing Department (HD) have joined forces with the police to

organize 153 blitz operations in 15 public housing estates, during which 42 people were arrested and 280 seizures of goods recorded. Focusing on the hygiene problem of the public housing estates, the report explains that 'intensive cleansing[s] of 258 hygiene black spots in 99 public housing estates'^{cxlvi} were carried out. Among them, 239 were 'eradicated'. Controversial punishment mechanisms were also introduced, among them a raise of the fixed penalty for spitting and littering from \$600 to \$1500^{cxlvii}, repeated violations of public housing residents resulting in the termination of tenancy.

The relationship between unhygienic conduct such as spitting/littering and tenancy (and hence the right to do business) can certainly invite considerable reflection on the problem between 'crime' conducted and scale and scope of punishment. Time and space do not allow me to go further into this issue. I will, however, take issue with the compatibility between the hygienic problems as the government sees it and the measures they suggested. And transcending this issue is a more fundamental one: even if they are compatible, to what extent does this compatibility refer to the eradication of SARS? What will be the boundary of reasonable sanctions implied by this compatibility? Critics have already made the point clear, severe punishment for those who litter and spit, for unhygienic food premises, changing the way food markets sell food, eradication of hygiene 'black spots', renovation and restructuring of buildings, all these actions are trying to convince us that the source of SARS is exactly somewhere inside the markets, hawkers and buildings^{cxlviii} – which are in effect also the

exclusive targets of the government's actions. Grounded in the fact that several public housing estates have been major sites of the spread of the virus, public housing, and their residents, immediately become a major object for discipline, but if one does not intentionally ignore the fact, the situation in private housing estates (which always represent an image of modern management) in places like Chai Wan are at least equally severe, not to mention Amoy Garden in Ngau Tau Kok.

What the government has kept doing is, however, borrowing power and legitimacy from primitive binary oppositions of old vs. new and civilized vs. uncivilized.^{cxlix} Team Clean begins the chapters on measures towards community hygiene this way: The number of supermarkets carrying fresh food items has increased significantly in recent years, but public markets remain a *traditional* source of daily food provisions^d (my emphasis). The word 'but' in the middle is significant, it refers to a turn of tone. In fact, focusing on the effort to maintain cleanliness and tidiness should be more fundamental than attaching these two qualities essentially to something else, making them seemingly mutually exclusive. Less than a month after the Team published this report, a fish tank of a major supermarket of Hong Kong, Park n' Shop, was found to have cholera^{cii}, and by the end of 2003, staff of the FEHD found in another major supermarket in Hong Kong, Wellcome, stock of chilled pork and pork of dubious origin, the supermarket was suspected to sell chilled meat as fresh meat.^{ciii} Combining these two cases with the mixed major sites of SARS spread, it would be very important to question where the borderline between

civilized and uncivilized, modern and traditional lies, even if we do not deem these analytical concepts impossible or simply void and discardable.

Raising this issue is not intended to relativize all differences. The problem is, cleaning Hong Kong at the expense of spreading the non-constructive binary opposition does not seem to help Hong Kong's economy, or prevent life-devastating epidemics. As mentioned above, paralleling the formation of Team Clean is the formation of another task force aiming at revitalizing the Hong Kong economy. One of its tasks is to achieve this aim by reintroducing more tourists. The 2 most famous outdoor markets, the Lady Market and Temple Street Market, are precisely areas where abundant street hawkers and other snack shops make their livings. They are certainly among the victims of this official endorsement of the binary opposition^{cliii}, when at the same time Hong Kong has to get its tourism going again, probably by trumpeting them as major tourist attractions.^{cliv} As the historical studies of T. G. McGee of hawkers in Hong Kong argued, hawking has been a constituent part of the Hong Kong economy. It functioned to ease the employment pressures of Hong Kong, at a time when the population of Hong Kong was increasing rapidly, especially in both the 30s and 50s. The way they did business, their location, the price of their goods, all functioned to keep the cost of living down. The government's effort to allocate them to established markets, to issue licenses to them, in fact is a source of creating additional revenue.^{clv} Whether the historical functions of hawkers are still valid as they were a couple of decades

ago is certainly open to discussion; however, the process of emptying their social meanings and stuffing in meanings like dirt-makers and residues of a traditional way of life should not remain invisible in discourse. In other words, it is by almost reinventing the categories of hawker, fresh market tenants, etc., in this way with all those characteristics and features, some of which are true and some are certainly not, that a network of apparently coherent meanings can be established, and that actions can be taken about them. In this case, the way that goals that are supposed to be fulfilled remains distant precisely as a result of the action itself, while other effects, which subsequently emerged, might illustrate Gould's concept of illocutionary suspense/ perlocutionary delay, if we emphasize the operations involved rather than the linguistic origin of these concepts for the moment.

Space mania

Apart from the prolonged economic recession that has been straining Hong Kong almost from the beginning of the HKSAR, and the above-mentioned epidemics that spread both insecurity and discontent towards the government's handling, countless large and small social and political scandals, messes and provocations such as the Equal Opportunities Commission saga, the organization of Harbour Fest, the Article 23 legislation debate and the resulting historical demonstration of 500,000 people on July 1, 2003, etc., are all incidents directing the response of the people in the same direction. ^{clvi} Apparently the only moment when the whole of Hong Kong seemed to

enjoy a moment of togetherness is the period when we saw the space launch of Shenzhou V, and the first Chinese man in space. An understanding of this event against such a context might reveal the operation of power, especially in the way that Geertz understands it with the theatre state.

On the fifteenth of October, 2003, Hong Kong people witnessed the space launch of the Shenzhou V. This space launch is considered significant because it carried the first Chinese astronaut, Yang Liwei, into space. Hong Kong was able to be the first to invite Yang, along with China's first manned space mission to visit Hong Kong – the second stop of the whole delegation, with big cities like Shanghai lining up behind Hong Kong. Yang and the delegation finally came to Hong Kong at the end of October. A very particular space was constructed here in Hong Kong within which three factors were constitutive, according to a pro-Beijing newspaper analyst: attention from the Chief Executive, government officials being responsible, and the engagement of society.^{clvi} However, I will suggest one more contribution, borrowing Piyush Mathur's observation of the Indian nuclear test 1998, which is the surrender of the media. Mathur argued in the Indian case, 'the media very likely fell vulnerable to the sheer force of the event that had been thrust upon it, by the secretive compulsions of the nuclear statehood, to "cover"'.^{clviii} As a result, universal values like science, progress, development thrust were simultaneously appropriated by the media, reproducing hegemonic imaginations. The whole event, driven by protagonists such as the

government and the media, 'through its span of immediate effectiveness, was able to create a people as its legitimate receptionists and representatives'.^{clix} The suffocating wave of the nuclear test, however, has the effect of voicing down discontent from the anti-fundamentalists, the environmentalists and human right activists. And here we can see the double meaning of the choice of word 'cover' –to reveal and conceal at the same time.

In Hong Kong, it is still debatable whether this thrust was rooted in the independently existing 'universals' such as science and development or the thirsty media. Yet, what was achieved by these performances, and the coverage of these performances, should be clear enough. A newspaper description reads, 'in the marches and national anthem by the military parade, Yang Liwei stands up on the stage, salutes the slow-rising national flag. Then he steps down from the stage and walks to the center of the football court, to receive the welcome and blessing from Hong Kong people, to receive the gifts from students and people, then has a brief conversation with 3 student representatives.'^{clx} The leader of the delegation, Hu Shixiang, expressed that they were immersed in the ocean of flowers, national flags and the SAR flag ever since they arrived in Hong Kong. He also mentioned that it is 'only in Hong Kong that we can experience the pride of being a space missionary, that we can experience the importance of prosperity and strength of our mother nation'.^{clxi}

Over the days when Yang and the delegation were in Hong Kong,

Hong Kong people, in the words of Yang in his letter to Hong Kong, 'young and old, no matter days or nights, all keen to watch the exhibition of the first manned space mission. They go to the music hall and gymnasium to dialogue with experts, teachers, and students on the topic of space technology.' The impressive spectacle in which the 40, 000 people in the Hong Kong stadium, waving national and SAR flags, sang the national anthem is also an unforgettable moment to Yang and the delegation.^{clxii}

In the welcome speech of the Chief Executive to the delegation, Tung pointed out that 'since the launch of Shenzhou V, the people of Hong Kong have longed to see and meet Mr. Yang, who epitomises the ambition and courage of the Chinese nation'. He also pointed out that how this wish of the 'Hong Kong people' came true with his own effort, he recalled 'I personally conveyed to President Hu Jintao the Hong Kong people's wish and our invitation to Yang and his colleagues to visit Hong Kong as soon as possible. The Central Government responded quickly and positively ... -- testament to the Central Government's regard for the people of Hong Kong.'^{clxiii}

All these events simply combined to form a theatrical spectacle, resembling almost exactly the 'making of an 'eleven-roof lord' in Bali, as mentioned above: 'it was in the ability to stage productions of an eleven-roof scale, to mobilize the men, the resources, and not least, the expertise, that made one an eleven-roof lord'.^{clxiv} The SAR Government is able to mobilize the 'Hong Kong people', at least those

Hong Kong people captured by all kinds of media in this event, to stage a performance which combines the representation of the aspirations of nationalism, progress of science and technology, social solidarity, festivity, etc. And the most important part of the performance is played by Tung -- as he claims the initiative to ask the leader of the President of the PRC, with the leader giving a quick and positive response.

This event, although almost unanimously appreciated, invited criticism. Some argue that Hong Kong is in a milieu of deep crises, yet Tung still puts all his attentions to inviting Yang and the delegation to come to Hong Kong. This just shows that the crisis of the governance of Hong Kong is just on the brink.^{clxv} Some ironically point out that both the media and the SAR Government engage in idolizing Yang, which provides relief and happiness to Hong Kong – but that is alright, Hong Kong people are bruised all over anyway.^{clxvi} The discursive appropriation and transformation of Yang's and the delegation's, one might argue, is never implicit. In the welcoming ceremony in the Hong Kong Stadium, Donald Tsang reminded Hong Kong young people to take Yang as a role model, to learn from him and face life's challenges.^{clxvii} This remark would not have been significant without the general atmosphere of economic recession, the urge to face the adverse and self-strengthening. As for the implication of nationalism, nothing can be more explicit than Yang's now famous quotations, 'seeing the fellow Hong Kong people, I got a feeling of home-coming'^{clxviii} and 'my heart was beating normal in space, but is

beating faster here in Hong Kong'.^{clxix} In other words, both the government and its critics indeed fully acknowledge the ways this space mania are appropriated. The difference is only that while the critics see the appropriation as something to blame, the government simply appropriate the space mission without feeling the need to disguise.

Both critics seem to have an assumption about politics. They assume that politics has its own essential and independently existing domain, where it is a violation of rules to solve political problems by mobilizing and borrowing from the astronauts, to which the discourses of science and nationalism are attached. However, insisting that politics has its own rules and domain does not logically and empirically mean that those rules and domain are immune from any other thing but politics *per se*. The politics of the first manned space mission visit lies precisely in whether one can articulate it with their own projects, to create and mobilize an audience large enough, and hence support and legitimate it in the process of the creation and mobilization of an audience.

Yet, the creation and mobilization of an audience as a form or a medium in which power operates could not have been a one-off and isolated incidence, and it is only because the creation and mobilization of a similar type previously yielded the effect of power^{clxx} that the space mission's visit can be considered successful and important to Tung's governance. Apart from the size and scale of the

people involved – people which provided the basis and are appropriated for the manifestation of power -- the element of science and technological advance played a due and resourceful role. Tung expressed it in his congratulation: ‘Following the successful launch and return of this manned spacecraft which has been designed and developed by our country, our manned spacecraft technology has entered an important era’. He also said that the space journey of Shenzhou V shows the increasing strength of our nation, represents the most stable, powerful, all-rounded and successful period in the development of contemporary China.’^{clxxi} The media also suggested to take this chance to stimulate more interest and passion of the people in the area of technology.^{clxxii} And all these emphases in technology can indeed be referred to the government, public and business discourses on the issue (which will be investigated in later chapters); they provide the ‘conventions and models’ for the government’s words and actions to be effective in this case.

Conclusion

In both the cases of the epidemics (bird flu and SARS included) and that of the visit of the first manned space mission, we can see the attempt to articulate an internally coherent and consistent picture, which is ultimately quite impossible when we are able to see the heterogeneous elements penetrating through the articulation. Yet the different ways in which these two types of cases attempt to articulate the picture are already revealing enough to clarify the situation in which these articulations could be staged and appropriated. In the

case of the epidemics, the act of attributing hygiene as the ultimate cause is an act through which people are told to re-learn the different features and positions and the appropriate attitude of the different agents in society. At the same time, the social meaning and terrain of hygiene itself is also transformed. And all of them were necessary at a time when the government was actively looking for a 'scapegoat' and wanted to refill the space opened up by the crisis of legitimacy -- precisely caused by these epidemics.

In the other case, the visit of Yang and the whole first manned space mission, while the mechanisms of articulating dissimilar elements into the same discourse are rather similar in these two cases, the major difference is that the launch of Shenzhou V and the subsequent visit did not create a problem/crisis/lack of legitimacy comparable to that in the case of the epidemics. Therefore, the staging of the launch and visit does not in itself refer to any political problem from which they are inevitably derived, and which they specifically constitute. On the contrary, they are themselves contingently mobilized to alleviate/fill the crisis/lack of legitimacy which originated somewhere else. One can almost call this a 'stand-in' quality, except that the specific characters of a stand-in are usually negligible in terms of transforming the role that the stand-in is supposed to play. In the case of the launch and visit, if one is not able to figure out clearly what indeed is a problem of legitimacy, no problem, fetch Yang and the mission to Hong Kong, then the lack of legitimacy will, at least in part, become a lack of national pride due to a low level of scientific advance.

The descriptions above of events in Hong Kong after the Handover should not be mistaken as intending to provide a comprehensive social and political record of post-Handover Hong Kong. The events are analyzed in the light of revealing the observation that the nature and characteristics of the social and political operations indeed cannot do away with a constitutively discursive and performative dimension. As a result, a way to look at these issues is to focus on the basis and operations of these performatives, their intended effect, whether disclosed or not, and their subsequent effects, rather than strictly assessing their chronology, the linear causal relationship both within the different components of the same event and between different events.

Regarded from this direction, the governance of Hong Kong does not have an essential and independent core to which all effects of the cases above are directed from the 'outside'; the governance is also not a long journey heading to a single and fundamental goal, ultimately in a rational manner with different morphologies at different temporal stages. Instead, the loose cluster of the discursive subject 'government' can be viewed as a chance-taker, adopting different strategies at different moments regarding different problems it confronts, without any predetermined route, but only a highly contingent one that we retroactively grant causal relations. This view does not deny the complex relationships between what happened in the time and space within and outside Hong Kong, it is not trying to

claim that 'Hong Kong' is indeed empty, metaphysical or even nihilistic. All the discourses, narrations, actions and policies pursued come with concrete material and institutions. This view, however, requires us to be highly skeptical of Hong Kong as a black box of rational progress.

As Jessop and Sum also argued, Hong Kong can indeed be viewed as an entrepreneurial city, in the sense that the city has its own strategies adapted to changing circumstances, despite its long reputation of *laissezfaire*.^{clxxiii} According to them, one criterion for a city to be entrepreneurial is that, 'the promoters of entrepreneur cities adopt an entrepreneurial discourse, narrate their cities as entrepreneurial and market them as entrepreneurial.'^{clxxiv} I only differ from this interpretation, instead of opposing it, in the sense that I further acknowledge that the notion of 'city', and the validity of city (as a discursive subject) is possible only when we associate the entrepreneurial strategies with the notion itself and hence confer it the status of a valid discursive subject.

Certainly the content of the discourse and narration almost inevitably involves the linearity of progress or economic development; however, what should not be overlooked is that the adoption of these discourses and narrations is strategic and historical. The SAR Government is entrepreneurial in the sense that it produces discourse and narrations of this kind; the government is entrepreneurial also in the sense that these discourses and narrations 'are more or less explicitly formulated, and pursued in an active, entrepreneurial fashion'^{clxxv} – another

criterion, according to Jessop and Sum.

One of the most important discourses and narrations produced, and actively pursued by the SAR Government, especially during the period when Hong Kong had to actively rebuild itself from the Asia financial crisis, is about technology, and IT in particular. The following chapters will explore in detail the 'entrepreneurship' of the government regarding this aspect, and what kind of entrepreneur is nourished by this very kind of entrepreneurship -- taking the building process of the business empire of Richard Li as an example.

What does the ITC mean by technology?

In his second policy address, Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa clearly spelled out his ambition to develop Hong Kong as both a 'leading city in the world for the development and application of information technology, especially in electronic commerce and software engineering' and 'a regional centre for supplying professional and technological talents and services'.^{clxxvi} Setting these goals was a response to the realization of the over-heated, 'bubble' economy of Hong Kong and the economic recession following the Asia financial crisis that strained Hong Kong starting from October 1997.

Recommended by the Chief Executive's Commission on Innovation and Technology, the Innovation and Technology Fund (ITF) was established as a statutory fund on June 30, 1999 under the Public Finance Ordinance, with an allocation of 5 billion Hong Kong dollars. The objective of the fund is to 'increase the added value, productivity and competitiveness of our economic activities.' It also encourages and assists Hong Kong companies 'to upgrade their technological level, and to introduce innovative ideas to their businesses'.^{clxxvii}

Example: Zi acquisition of Telecom Technology center

Much earlier than the establishment of the Innovation and Technology Commission, the Hong Kong Productivity Council (HKPC) was set up in 1967 to 'promote increased productivity and the use of more efficient methods throughout Hong Kong's business sectors'. Ever since at least the mid-90s, the government had already been working under the conception that 'Hong Kong is transforming from a center of low-cost production to a commercial center and a production base of high-value-added products in the Asian-Pacific region.'^{clxxviii}

In order to fulfill its role of channeling creative applied technology, the HKPC 'has invested heavily in both new technologies and in-house training in order to upgrade the performance of its talented workforce.' The services provided by the HKPC cover a wide range of product development, consultancy, training and technology transfer. And the services are provided for both the industrial and commercial sectors, including textile and apparel, innovative enterprises, watches and jewellery, software and information, transport and logistics, to name but a few.^{clxxix}

One of the major responses of the HKPC in the mid-90s to the apparently up-and-coming transformation to a knowledge-based economy was the establishment of the Telecom Technology Center Co. Ltd. (TTC).^{clxxx} TTC was established as a result of a \$83.9-million grant of the Industrial Support Fund (ISF) in 1995. The ISF was in turn set up in 1994 to support initiatives that were considered beneficial to

Hong Kong's industrial or technological development. The Commerce and Industry Bureau (CIB) and the former Industry Department were responsible for the administration of the fund. (I will return to the ISF later). The objective of the TTC is to enhance the competitiveness of Hong Kong-based companies by developing building block solutions for the next generation of telecommunications products. ^{clxxxix} In particular, the major task of the TTC was to develop low-cost, critical, but highly value-added components, 'on which the economical production and competitiveness of the Hong Kong telecommunication industry depends' . ^{clxxxii}

After 5 years of operation, TTC had already accomplished 70 projects for 29 clients, some of them even pioneering among Asia, and examples include ISDN phone and terminal adapters, GSM handsets, and digital VCRs. ' (N)ow is the time for TTC to go to the next level,' said the executive director of the HKPC Thomas Tang. This so-called 'going-to-the-next-level' refers to the acquisition of TTC by Zi. And the comment was indeed made at the acquisition ceremony of TTC by a Nasdaq-listed Zi' Corporation in August 2000. The agreement was reached between Zi and HKPC at a price of \$25 million, in which \$22 million was injected back into the ITF and \$3 million into the HKPC. When asked to account for the financial situation of TTC, the executive director only said that ' the value and function of the center cannot be measured in terms of profit' . The acting commissioner re-stated the position of the government, 'one cannot evaluate the effort the government pays to support Hong Kong industries as a whole in terms of money.' The CIB in a later report also claimed that CIB would

consider handing over the operation of similar government-funded programmes to private organizations according to public interest.^{clxxxiii}

While according to the common sense logic of privatization of public organizations, the so-called 'public interest' involved in the act of privatizing public organizations usually refers to higher profitability and efficiency, etc. regarding government revenues or other public resources, the CIB report claimed that '...privatization would add value to the services of TTC with commercial strengths of the private sector'.^{clxxxiv} In this case of privatization, the notion of 'public interest' is less than obvious. The public gains interest, of course, through the injection of HK\$ 22 million and HK\$ 3 million respectively into the ITF and HKPC, which will continue to provide support and funding for prospective units. However, how is public interest involved in the operation of the ITC itself caused by privatization? In other word, how, by privatizing ITC itself, can the improved efficiency of the ITC count as public interest?

Now let us recall the policy direction of the HKSAR in the '97 policy address. The government wants to develop Hong Kong into the 'leading city in the world for the development and application of information technology', and 'a regional center for supplying professional and technological talents and services'. And indeed, by finishing 70 projects for 29 clients in 5 years, the executive director of HKPC believed that TTC had already reached this goal. Moreover, the government's wishes and efforts are not to be measured in terms of money, as the statements of the government officials quoted above

seem to indicate. So if the government is so keen on developing innovation and technology, and if the TTC was working well in terms of technological advancement according to the standards of the government officials, instead of simply dismissing it as hypocrisy, it would be interesting to find out for what reason the Hong Kong Productivity Council decided to sell the TTC, and what rationale is implied.

As revealed further by a previous Financial Committee document prepared also by the former Trade and Industry Branch in June 94^{clxxxv}, the \$83.9 million grant from the ISF was only intended for the setting-up and operation during the first 3 years. The HKPC expected 'the center to become self-financing in its sixth year of operation', and as a result, it was estimated that, starting from 94-95, the center would require a total amount of \$112.3 million. It was initially stated in the document that before the end of the first 3 years of operation, HKPC would undergo a management review, on which further funding would depend.

Well until the acquisition, the recurrent income of the center was only \$10 million per annum, which only covers half of the recurrent costs. And in addition, at least one local company with a similar business nature began to compete with the TTC after 1999. As a result, the CIB estimated that the center 'would only be self-sufficient by 2004-05 at the earliest'. And since \$83.9 million, the initially capped amount for the first 3 years, has already been disbursed, the CIB deemed it 'highly undesirable' to continue TTC as a public entity by ITF.^{clxxxvi}

While no one ever expects endless subsidies from the ISF, and later ITF, to TTC, it is quite obvious that the privatization of TTC cannot be attributed, in a negative sense, to the insufficiency of its level of technological advancement, at least according to the standard of the government. At the same time, in a positive sense, it also seems that the privatization cannot be attributed to reasons such as a simple drive for improving the performance of TTC for the sake of public interest. Apart from that, on the one hand, the center is increasingly facing competition in the industry, on the other, the recurrent income of the center barely compensates for its recurrent cost. Indeed, according to the report of the CIB, the privatization of the TTC may well be explained by the unwillingness of the ITF to be burdened by the grant to TTC. All these elements tell a story of an unrewarding investment. Therefore in the CIB report, the untold, but major principle guiding the policy implementation is indeed 'expelling the unrewarding investment!'. The government's action of privatizing the TTC simply cannot be understood if we do not take that major principle into consideration, and if we only take into consideration high-sounding principles like 'developing Hong Kong into every center possible' and 'the government is willing to spend money to promote innovation and technology'.

Connecting the truth

We have just seen how the discourse of privatizing TTC appeals to the public common sense advantages of higher profitability and efficiency,

as if these are the unanimous interest of the people as such. On the other hand, the more general development of innovation and technology is also constantly appealed to, and indeed needs to appeal to an ultimate 'truth' for legitimation.

Truth and power are invested in each other. On the one hand, 'true discourse... that prophesying the future, not only foretold what would come to pass, but participated in its coming, bringing to it men's acquiescence and thus weaving itself into the fabric of fate.'^{clxxxvii} In other words, true discourse, instead of just anticipating what would be the future, anticipates it in the right way by paving and shaping the path to a future already prescribed by the discourse. This explains the way in which discourse has the implication of action and the effect of power. 'On the other hand, no power can be exercised without the extraction, appropriation, distribution or retention of knowledge'.^{clxxxviii} Foucault illustrates this the following example: the penal code started out as a theory of right; then, from the time of the nineteenth century onwards, people looked for its validation in sociological, psychological, medical and psychiatric knowledge. It is as though the very words of the law had no authority in our society, except insofar as they are derived from the true discourse.^{clxxxix} Power, to Foucault, is certainly more than mere coercion, he finds it inadequate to define power as repression, as something that 'only weigh(s) on us as a force that says no;' power instead 'traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse'.^{cxc} Therefore power has to produce truth, which in turn acts as its source of sanctioning, the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and

false statements, and to determine the status of those who are in charge of saying what counts as true.

In elaborating the subtle nexus between power and truth, one characteristic of the nexus mentioned by Foucault is that truth is largely 'centered on the form of scientific discourse and the institutions which produced it'.^{CXCI} He asserts that the important problems 'of the status, of the conditions of exercise, functioning and institutionalization of scientific discourses' remain more or less unanswered.^{CXCII} For him, the importance of studying discourse is to see how disciplines came to call themselves sciences, disguised themselves as sciences, for the power inherited in the truth claim. However, what the study of discourse, as a method to investigate this problem, seeks to do is to look at the condition of emergence, insertion and functioning, and how all of them transform the mode of existence of the discourse.^{CXCIII} This intention of dealing with discourse is important and applicable for the exercise here in Hong Kong. The point is not that science and technology did not previously appear in Hong Kong, there was certainly a discourse of science and technology. Yet, by looking at the conditions under which the present discourse emerges, how it is appropriated, to what end, in the name of which kind of truth, we may have a better understanding of the concrete truth/power nexus in this case.

Giving priority to innovation and technology in an era of a knowledge-based economy is usually understood in terms such as awakening or enlightenment. According to Francis Ho, the

commissioner for Innovation and Technology: ' before the reign of the HKSAR Government, Hong Kong had a severely distorted economy. Making money is easy in the bubble economy driven by finance, real estate and stock ... and precisely because making money is such an easy task, people lost the cognition of technology and the interest in pursuing advanced knowledge.'^{CXCIV} Having such a ' distorted' mind, it is not a straightforward process for Hong Kong people to be enlightened and awakened; the implication is that we did not see the truth (i.e. the importance of, and also the present emphasis on, innovation and technology) because the growing economic bubbles are too appealing to Hong Kong people.

In the opening ceremony of the Hong Kong science Park, Tung addresses the few years of experience for Hong Kong people, ' the deep reflection of the community on the state of the economy in the past few years has in fact been a much more positive process than it appears at this moment. Amidst the bewilderment and mixed feelings, one gratifying outcome is that there is a clearer degree of recognition, particularly within the business community, that innovation and technology holds the key to the future of Hong Kong. This awakening and acceptance is important ... the need ... to promote innovation and technology in the unique Hong Kong context has now been undisputedly accepted.'^{CXCV}

The Innovation and Technology Fund is thus considered by the government and the fund's administration itself as a ' major policy tool to drive innovation and technology upgrading in Hong Kong

manufacturing and servicing industries'^{CXCVi}, whose importance can be demonstrated by the fact that this is one of the only two institutional suggestions ^{CXCVii} made by the Commission of Innovation and Technology in their first report. The turn to innovation and technology is in turn one of the major initiatives of the administration of the HKSAR as a whole.

a) **The ambivalence**

This production of truth within discourse is powerful. 'Waking up' to this ahistorical and universal truth of innovation and technology at this very historical moment provides the government with the necessary ground (or excuse, some probably insist) to reduce or even dismiss any differing opinions as immature and inappropriate. People who do not side with the government are 'reasonably' dismissed as immature simply because they are portrayed as not knowing much about innovation and technology, because they do not know what the key to the future is, or because they still dream of a resurrection by another wave of the bubble economy, etc. When posing the question in this way, the government bypasses the debate of whether the government itself should actually participate in promoting innovation and technology. The government also bypasses the debate of whether the way in which the government promotes Innovation and Technology is reasonable and beneficial for Hong Kong, and for which part of the Hong Kong population in particular, if any. Just as Francis Ho confided to readers in a newspaper interview, '... we can see that the role of the government is changing, and the key question now is not whether the

Hong Kong Government should join (in promoting innovation and technology), but under which circumstances the Hong Kong Government should join.’^{cxcviii} The position of criticism here is not against government intervention as such. Freedom defined as government intervention-free economic activity in civil society is paradoxically a product of the government.^{cxcix} When a high government official is so affirmative in his promotion, it seems that problems like that of allocating resources, in other words: which part of the society is targeted by the innovation and technology policy to be the winner, are practically off the agenda.

As a result, a line between right and wrong is drawn, and it is drawn by claiming innovation and technology as the key to the future. Being not supportive can be quickly considered wrong within this regime of truth. The ‘success’ of Hong Kong is subsequently measured and constituted by the extent to which Hong Kong people identify with and practice this awakening and enlightenment, again, under the assumption that other economic options simply do not work and should be eliminated from the very starting point.

Besides, within this regime of truth erected by government discourse, facing it is presented as accepting the inevitable. The sacrifice of other needs is considered as the inevitable bridge to the future. According to the imperative of the truth (emphasis on innovation and technology, and the transition to the era of knowledge-based economy) certain groups of people in society are distantly portrayed as destined to suffer. And it is exactly in their suffering that we see the transition under

way. In his Policy Address in 2001, Tung announces that 'the transformation will be more complicated because the restructuring is the result of several different but inter-related factors ... businesses now require substantially fewer staff because of developments in information technology. The emphasis in the past was on a fine division of labour, whereas today it is on multi-skilling ... if we are to preserve our economic vitality, create greater prosperity, and maintain living standards, economic restructuring is the only way. Our people, our businesses and the SAR Government must have the foresight to see changes coming, to adjust to those changes and to manage them. We must all do our best to move up to higher value-added activities.⁹⁷

If we put this in a broader context, we can see that this 'moving up' is accompanied by budgetary cuts in different areas like tertiary education, social welfare, and housing, to name just a few. Suffering is not exactly the result of personal misfortune (although on the other hand, the Government always urges people to equip themselves, to add value to themselves, as if fortune and misfortune is merely a matter of personal initiative and responsibility). The social condition upon which this suffering is based is never natural and objective, as it might easily be mistaken at first glance. Suffering in this context always appears alongside with active systematic institutional initiatives, though usually in an apparently unrelated manner.

The objectivity of the need to change, the advantages and necessities of quick change are all produced within the discourse of innovation and technology, and the government in turn seems to be compelled

to accommodate. However, if the case of innovation and technology is juxtaposed with other cases in which there is an apparent necessity to accommodate, the meaning of this accommodation is often blurred and difficult to distinguish from its opposite. Take, for instance, the property market: against the peak in 1997, overall property prices have tumbled by over 60%. The volume of transactions also shows a marked decline. The total volume of transactions in February 2003 is the lowest since 1995.^{cc*i*} In this case, the government, urged by the property sector ever since the collapse of 1997, responded by introducing nine measures by the end of 2002 to stabilize the property market, as pronounced by Michael Suen, the Secretary for the Housing, Planning and Lands Bureau.^{cc*ii*}

Another example concerns the population policy. According to the report of the Task Force on Population Policy headed by the Chief Secretary, Donald Tsang, Hong Kong has one of the lowest fertility rates in the world, with every Hong Kong woman on average having only 0.9 children over their lifetime. It is predicted that one quarter of our population will be aged 65 or above by the year 2031. Among them, those older than 85 are expected to triple from the current 67,000 to 209,000. During that period, the total population is forecast to rise 30 per cent from 6.72 million in 2001 to 8.72 million, but the labour force will grow by only 8 per cent, from 3.43 million to 3.7 million. By then, the report estimates that 58% of the 8-million population in Hong Kong (about 5 million of people, including the retired and children) will be economically inactive.^{cc*iii*} It is in this context, especially accompanied by the 'burden' of the increasing population of dependent elderly and

immigration from Mainland China, that Hong Kong seems to be in need of developing a new direction in its population policies. When asked, however, whether the Hong Kong Government would launch any policies to encourage families to have more children, both Donald Tsang and the Executive Director of the Family Planning Association of Hong Kong, Susan Fan, demonstrated a very firm negative attitude. Both of them maintained that in a *liberal* society like Hong Kong, and regarding such personal matters as birth-giving, it is inappropriate for the government to adopt a special policy to encourage people to give birth.^{cciv}

Both the cases of the collapse of the property market and of the critically low fertility rate can be clearly discerned empirically and are thus more visible, at least numerically speaking, than the coming of the knowledge-based economy. The status of Hong Kong's need to accommodate to the knowledge-based economy resembles a wish or self-motivated propensity more than an inevitable compulsion. However the government is far more reluctant (at least in appearance), temporarily in the case of property market and in terms of attitude in the case of fertility, to assume an active role, like the one for information technology. If we understand the responses of the government in these two cases as a kind of accommodation, it would be difficult for us to comprehend the institutional practices and policy directions regarding innovation and technology also as a kind of accommodation, in particular regarding the accommodation to an irreversible, inevitable and clearly definable transition to a knowledge-based economy, especially before the government has

presented a concrete explanation of exactly what is understood as a knowledge-based economy, and what it considers crucial in the expected transition to it.

One can also reasonably consider the actions taken by the government in these cases as active intervention for revitalizing the economy: the nine measures are designed to boost, instead of stabilize, the property market, the population policy is intended to attract capital and specialists. However, the government demonstrates a particularly enthusiastic and high-sounding gesture in the case of innovation and technology against a need that is not particularly pressing. Anyway, the point I would like to make is that the so-called pressing 'need' to accommodate to this transition and to pick up innovation and technology can only make sense within its own discourse and rhetoric, or at least cannot be applied to other areas in the same way. One of the natural consequences, at least, is the constitutive trade-off, as suggested by Tung above, which can make sense also only within this particular discourse.

This production of truth in discourse is also ready to dissolve counter-discourse. As a matter of fact Hong Kong was once a home of manufacturers, especially between the 50s and early 80s. And all through this economic phase in Hong Kong the government kept providing resources to improve productivity, technological advancement and innovation. One important example is The Hong Kong Productivity Council that we mentioned before. Established in 1967, its aim is to 'promote increased productivity and the use of more

efficient methods throughout Hong Kong's business sectors.' And the government indeed considered the HKPC as 'playing the role of the agency of the government, to assist the sector in increasing the productivity and the transition to high value-adding production' .^{ccv}

Besides, different funds and supporting programmes have long been operating before the HKSAR, and probably before the staging of the slogan of the 'era of a knowledge-based economy,' as the government puts it. Take the example of the Industrial Support Fund (ISF), which was set up in 1994 for ' projects which may contribute to the competitiveness or technological development of the local manufacturing industry as a whole or a specific sector within it.' ^{ccvi} Since 1994, and up until 1999, the ISF has supported 373 projects, involving a total financial commitment of over \$1.38 billion.^{ccvii} With the establishment of the Innovation and Technology Fund, the ISF no longer approved any application and had itself transferred to the Innovation and Technology Committee. The projects initially funded by the ISF have also been shifted under the ITC, with the detailed rules and regulations involving the approval of the application remaining largely unchanged.^{ccviii} All is amounts to a story in which the line dividing innovation and technology on one side and pure labour-intensive production on the other does not exist, or at least does not overlap with a line beyond which lies ' the era of knowledge-based economy' , if there is any such thing.

However, to argue against the government's discourse of innovation and technology with historical facts, to contend that innovation has

always occurred and technology has always been progressing to a certain extent, can be unfruitful. The present discourse can easily subsume the argument, as I will show. The present discourse can further affirm itself by saying that people in the past few years have been blinded by the bubble economy. It is even exactly because Hong Kong people were indulging in the bubble economy that they did not see the universal and global importance of innovation and technology, as maintained above by Francis Ho. This logic of universality can clearly be seen in the design of the ITC symbol. Although the Innovation and Technology Committee was only established in 1999, the ITC is symbolized by the Greek letter 'p' for two reasons. Firstly, the character p is a combination of the 3 characters 'I', 'T', 'C'; secondly, the number p has been studied mathematically both in the eastern and western cultures for thousands of years. According to the committee, p symbolizes a scientific and technological orientation. It has been important in the history of man's scientific and technological advancement, from astronomy to probability to the physics of sound and light'; 'the 4,000-year search for the ultimate value of p symbolizes the constant aim of technology to develop improved solutions to problems'.^{ccix}

Even if we do not doubt that advancement is a process that goes on and on for thousands of years, it is too easy to come to the conclusion that this history of advancement can be linked up and appropriated linearly and teleologically according to the present mode of the discourse of innovation and technology. We have to recognize that historical development is not a linear process with definite origins and

progressive stages toward a predetermined destiny.^{ccx} What one has to locate in the development of Hong Kong is then not the point in time when Hong Kong changed from labour-intensive to technology-intensive economic activities, because it supposes two definite stages in a progressive sense, both heading towards a universal Truth called 'The Future.' Rather, the development of innovation and technology on the one hand, and the development of society on the other, are not initially two discreet and independent paths. The path of innovation and technology did not come to merge with the path of development of society naturally, but the two have always been invested in each other. It is too intentional to mute the economic initiatives in the discourse of innovation and technology, and too hasty to incorporate thousands of years of advancement into the present development of a knowledge-based economy, especially when we can obviously see that this awakening in fact means the active subjection of people to suffering by our SAR Government.

b) Innovation and technology as interest?

On different occasions, government senior officials like Tung Chee-hwa and Financial Secretary Antony Leung reinforced the importance of education and human resources as the determining factors in innovation and technology.^{ccxi} As a matter of fact, substantial resources are being put into the promotion of innovation and technology. The General Support Programme under the ITC aims precisely at supporting 'those projects that contribute to fostering an innovation and technology culture in Hong Kong', which include

mainly studies, surveys, conferences, exhibitions, seminars, promotional and training programmes. The expenditure on education has increased from 37.9 billion in the fiscal year 96/97 to 55.3 billion in the fiscal year 01/02. Tung is satisfied with the achievement Hong Kong attained regarding education and human resources, and he gave some examples: 'the best of the world', like Paul Chu at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Tsui Lap-chee at the University of Hong Kong, Simon Wong at the Applied Science and Technology Research Institute, etc., are coming together in Hong Kong, and six outstanding scientists were conferred the prestigious membership of the Chinese Academy of Science in May 2002. (I will return to this conferment of membership later in this chapter)

The government introduces Innovation and Technology as a method to cope with the 'challenges' of the knowledge-based economy. However, in regard to education, the government seems to suggest that innovation and technology are still more a means to develop interest and potential than a vehicle oriented merely towards profit. The second report of the Commission of Innovation and Technology states that 'more students must be attracted to take up courses in the science and technology field ... pursuing graduate research studies with a view of a career in R&D ... We urge the government and non-government institutions to do more to inspire *interest* in science and technology among young people'.^{ccxii} If interest in innovation and technology is not readily reducible to economic interest, or indeed does not equal economic interest yet, then it should be logical to expect innovation and technology on the one hand and economic

interest on the other to be conceptually separated. Although they do not have to be distinct and totally independent, stimulation of interest in innovation and technology through education should not be a mere vehicle of economic interest.

However, if one takes a closer look at the operations of ITC, which are those of institution- and regulation-confined research, one can see what this mode of research and interest in science and technology might really mean. This is where one can find out 'on the ground' if interest in science and technology really keeps an irreducible distance from economic interest.

One year after the establishment of the ITC, Francis Ho, the Commissioner of Innovation and Technology commented in a report to the LegCo panel on trade and industry that 'the quality of the ITC applications in the general categories, namely Innovation and Technology Support programme (ITSP) and General Support Programme (GSP), is declining, which means 'a lack of focus in research programmes' and that the ideas of local researchers are 'drying up'.^{CCXIII} As a result, the ITF started to solicit proposals in the category of ITSP, according to clear project objectives decided on by the ITF, with the hope that this would 'increase the collaboration and competition among research institutions and enable projects initiators to think and plan their projects in a more focused manner.'^{CCXIV} As Francis Ho puts it, 'the operation of the fund has changed from 'bottom-up' to 'top-down', which means that the ITC would decide several major themes and directions and then solicit proposals from the

academies or research institutions’ .^{CCXV} Examples of solicited themes include, ‘Industrial Applications of Micro-Electro - Mechanical Systems’ and ‘Innovative Product Development for Textiles, Clothing and Footwear Industry’ in 2001, and industrial applications of micro-electro-mechanical systems; development and application of biosensor technologies; advanced surface coating technologies and applied genomics in 2002.

The act of solicitation of ITC can of course be viewed as a responsible response to the need for better fund management. My interest here, however, is not to know whether it succeeded in improving the quality and quantity of the applications, but what the government considers to *be* innovation and technology in this problem-solving situation. Let interest in science and technology still be an irreducible factor in all the considerations concerning the operation of the fund, and an interview with Francis Ho reveals how the focus is heavily balanced in favour of economic interest. He recalled that in 1996, when he visited South Korea, companies like Samsung and LG were all but invisible in the fields of plasma TV and CDMA mobile phones, and after 6 years, they have all become bright and shining in the world. He commented that ‘due to its different economic system, it is difficult for Hong Kong to resemble South Korea’ .^{CCXVI} Nevertheless, the Commission of Innovation and technology would become more and more focused, as is the investment made by the ITC. This ‘more-and-more-focused’ approach includes at least the project-solicitation strategy.

Drawing on the difference between South Korea and Hong Kong, the utterance of the commissioner demonstrates a lack of forcefulness. His pledge to make the ITC and ITF 'more and more focused' further demonstrates that his idea of innovation and technology indeed has less to do with an 'interest' in science and technology. Never mind whether the 'different system' noted by Francis Ho is the liberal economy *per se* (when referring to the economic process of South Korea, the state of South Korea is usually recognized as a developmental state, in which the state is considered to be assuming an entrepreneurial role).^{CCXVII} Never mind also whether he is referring to the apparent contrast between the 'liberal economy' in Hong Kong and the developmental state in South Korea. For Francis Ho, the problem and weakness of Hong Kong is that Hong Kong is *not focused enough*, that each company is doing its own research, and 'small companies are facing difficulties in 'growing up', and very often abort before maturation.'^{CCXVIII} After he sighed over this different system, which made Hong Kong less competitive than South Korea, he suggested to tackle this situation by making the research, and investments as well, more focused, to invest money thematically.

Conceptually the tension between an interest in science and technology on the one hand and the return of money invested by the fund on the other, is elided, it becomes just a matter of which aspect to emphasize more, or which to sacrifice more. In the hands of the commission, the space necessary for different levels of innovation and technology in different areas has to give way to a more focused and thematic organization of researches. The task is not to let the success of

innovation and technology, and hence the smooth transition to the knowledge-based economy, be eroded by a diffused and confused scenario, anyway. If this is really the basic position of the government officials, it just effectively demonstrates the second meaning of our common usage of the word – interest is curiosity, and it is also advantage.

Structure and circulation

Just as we do not relate every statement possible to every discourse possible, and just as we understand that the commentaries of *Ulysses*, are produced out of, or in relation to, the work *Ulysses*, but not, say, arguments against the legislation of national security 5 years after the Handover of Hong Kong, 'in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organized and redistributed according to a certain number of procedures'.^{CCXIX} And in the discourse of innovation and technology here in Hong Kong, it is possible for us to recognize certain criteria for elements allowed in the discourse, a structured mode (not necessarily 'logic' *per se*) of inference, as the rules and procedures for the regulated production of the discourse.

When evaluating the ITF, Henry Tang, the Secretary for Commerce, Industry and Technology said that, 'The business community is putting increasing emphasis on the commodification of the product of scientific and technological research and technological transfer, and the collaboration with the universities is also becoming more and more frequent.'^{CCXX} What he meant by this, and under which conditions, is revealed in his following elaboration: 'Say for instance, having

received the subsidy from the ITF, a herbal medicine company is now collaborating with two Universities in Hong Kong. Drawing on the knowledge and resources from the universities, the company is developing new Chinese medicine through advanced pharmaceutical science and clinical tests. The company is now listed in the 'Growth Enterprise Market'. ^{CCXXI}

In this elaboration of what he understands as a successful example of the collaboration between the business community and the universities, he barely includes information on the technological accomplishment that he explicitly recognized. In other words, what exactly, or at least generally, describes of this collaboration, or the herbal medicine remains unsaid. He does not tell the audience what kind of medicine it is, what its function is, what specific advancement this collaboration achieved, etc. All the audience learns is an expression of a *formal structure* in which anonymous parties are collaborating; the *knowledge and resources* of the universities are utilized, and *something* – what, we supposedly need not to know from this expression – is developed out of it. In short, the Secretary of Commerce wants to convey a message of recognition and acknowledgement through putting forward a formal structure, with the object of his discussion left vacant throughout. Above all, and quite abruptly indeed, the company is listed in the 'Growth Enterprise Market', 'a fund raising venue with a strong identity to foster the development of technology industries in Hong Kong and the region'; a market catering to the 'alternative of investing in 'high growth, high risk' businesses'. ^{CCXXII}

It seems that the example quoted here is not even intended to give the audience any specific and substantial information, except that the company is now listed in the Growth Enterprise Market. Nevertheless, it is suggested that certain elements are required for a particular instance to be considered noteworthy or remarkable by a government official, almost like entering name and amount in a legally authorized lease contract, to make it legally binding and effective. As a result, if one is to sort out the criteria the government is using to measure the effectiveness of the ITF, the level of technological advancement would not seem to acquire a plausible position on this list. As in the case mentioned above, whether certain innovative and technological products are considered significant, and how significant the product is, can readily be reduced to the function of the market, and even further to the stock market; evaluating an innovative or technological product in the name of technological advancement is unfortunately 'insufficient'.

Apart from the criterion of being listed in the stock market, we can also recognize other elements by which the government constructs the formulation of their version of the success of Hong Kong. In a speech in a forum, CE Tung said, 'to evaluate the development of innovation and technology, one has to see if the people are actively adopting innovation and technology to improve their living standard, to see if the companies are adopting innovation and technology to improve their productivity, to provide services and products of better quality.'^{CCXXIII}

With these criteria, Tung believed that Hong Kong began to flourish. This is illustrated by

- Hong Kong households' increasing possession of PC from 35% in 1998 to 61% in 2001
- the increasing rate of household penetration of the Internet, from 12% in 1998 to 50% in 2001
- the increasing broadband coverage in Hong Kong, from 50% in 1998 to 95% in 2001.
- the increasing number of electronic currency smart cards from 4.8 million in 1998 to 7.8 million in 2001.

Simply speaking, with all these soaring numbers, people in Hong Kong are 'actively' adopting innovation and technology, and have their living standard improved as well – disregarding the fact that accessibility and living standard is not in a transparent, causal relation.

However, even within other dominant discourses in Hong Kong, like the discourse on youth, sex, and personal relationships etc., immediate access to a PC and the Internet are not unproblematically considered an improvement in life at all. Young people are criticized for spending too much time surfing the web, playing online games etc.^{CCXXIV} People are also supposedly becoming more and more 'alienated' when they are making more virtual than actual friends^{CCXXV}, abusing the web by spreading or reading pornography^{CCXXVI}, etc. Those are all common sense drawbacks of technology. Young people and even adults who are considered to be engaging too heavily in online games and virtual communication are usually accused of being dishonest. They are also

considered unsociable, lacking communication skills, violently emotional, and even vulnerable to nutritional disorder. A social worker even attributed the increase in child sexual abuse to the persistent spreading of net pornography^{CCXXVII}.

Nevertheless, not only the media trumpets the negative impact of the increasing penetration of science and technology, the government even took action to halt people's access to computers, or at least acted as though it knew for certain that increasing access is problematic. LegCo approved The Occupational Safety and Health (Display Screen Equipment) Regulation on 24 April, 2002 to protect the safety and health of employees who use display screen equipment at work for prolonged periods of time. And the Occupational Safety and Health Council issued the newsletter 'Sedentary Workers Safety and Health Bulletin', to advise on the selection and arrangement of computer workstations in offices.^{CCXXVIII}

I am not suggesting here that we need to accept all these 'drawbacks;' but they nevertheless prevail in Hong Kong, and within the government, as significantly negative consequences of the penetration of innovation and technology.

Francis Ho clearly stated in an interview that education, alongside with and ranked first among, a favourable business environment and economic freedom, are the major premises for the success of the development of innovation and technology.^{CCXXIX} On another occasion Tung spoke of the achievements of Hong Kong in the development of innovation and technology, specifically the aspect of

fostering local talents. He mentioned that six scientists from Hong Kong were recently conferred the prestigious membership of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, as evidence for what Hong Kong has achieved.^{CCXXX}

However, what is perhaps ambiguous here is the meaning of 'local talents' and the 'fostering' of local talents. All of them are indeed working now at universities in Hong Kong, and studied in institutions in Hong Kong a long time ago. If one cannot leave out and deny the effect and influence of postgraduate training in the process of 'fostering', among other factors, then it would be noteworthy that all of them received their professional qualifications from overseas institutions, and only one from the University of Hong Kong.^{CCXXXI} It is one thing that it is important for Hong Kong to foster local talents in order to develop innovation and technology, but whether the evidence presented by Tung confirmed the achievements of Hong Kong in this respect is quite another. This is of course not meant to denounce these scientists. The problem is just to what extent their conferment can be attributed to being 'fostered by Hong Kong,' and hence be counted as Hong Kong achievement. The government officials seem to fail to recognize 'fostering' as a timely process, and are hasty to explain all the achievements in terms of their own efforts. In explaining why the Austrian/Czech scientist of genetics, 'Mendel spoke the truth, but he was not within the truth...' in his often quoted inaugural speech, Foucault told us that the objects of Mendel's studies, his methodology, the theoretical perspective in which he situated himself, 'was simply not along the line in which objects and biological concepts were

formed (before Mendel).'^{CCXXXII} Taking this insight into another direction, one could say that our sense of conviction and acceptance exactly does not rest on the substances of the argument, but more on the fact that these substances are situated within commonly accepting frameworks, in which the presence of experts or authoritative figureheads usually plays a prominent role.

Foucault's point is strikingly valid in both Tung's and Henry Tang's arguments and elaborations. Let us put aside first the validity and truth content in their arguments and elaborations (although those are also highly questionable if we look at them in detail, as I have demonstrated above). What I want to highlight is the positioning of these statements as valid arguments and elaborations according to the standard of the government officials and the media who cover them so that we can find out within what kind of 'truth' we are in this case.

Does it matter, to you?

--PCCW and Narratives of technology and the market

locating the focus

This chapter is about the story of Richard Li, Tzar-kai, and his company, Pacific Century CyberWorks -- Hong Kong Telecom. The company witnessed, and was undoubtedly one of the most active protagonists in, the years during which Hong Kong was most enthusiastic about information technology. But before turning to the story of Richard Li and his PCCW empire, let us spend some time on an excellent example given by Daniel Miller in his recent book, *The dialectics of shopping*. He analyses a story of the merger (in Britain) between a discount grocery store, 'Kwik-save', which concentrates on cutting back the costs; and a core high-street supermarket, Somerfield, which represents itself as a 'focal point and active member of the community'.^{CCXXXIII} Both of the retailers have their own market niches, so the merger, or to be more precise, the takeover of Kwik-save by Somerfield, is a seemingly very logical result for both of them, serving the same market, in an atmosphere of growing competition in the retailing industry (which we usually understand as 'the context'). Miller, however, provides another version of the merger, in which the real struggle at the level of the day-to-day operation of the retail business as the reason of merger is far less important; in which the driving force

of the merger lies somewhere else.

According to his version of the merger, the driving force comes, surprisingly, from a Hong Kong-based company, Dairy Farm, which is a retail subdivision of a long-standing Hong Kong group, Jardine Matheson. The history of Jardine is even longer than the colonial history of Hong Kong. It started as an opium trader, and one of their bosses, William Jardine, had entered history for persuading the British Government to declare war on China and seize Hong Kong.^{CCXXXIV} As a group of British capital based in Hong Kong, Dairy Farm started to expand its business on a global scale in response to the impending Handover of Hong Kong from Britain to China. Kwik-Save, initially a company growing in an 'organic and self-funded' manner^{CCXXXV}, is one of the mismanaged items in the global portfolio of Dairy Farm, which took over control of the former company's management in 1987. The shares of Kwik-Save underperformed the whole sector by almost 70 percent between 94 and 98. The merger between Kwik-Save and Somerfield, and the subsequent sale of the shares of the merged company by Dairy Farm, is therefore a decision made 'quite irrespective of its local performance or its relationship to other supermarket competition within the British market'.^{CCXXXVI} In the atmosphere of 'deregulation' in the Thatcher era, the impact resulting from this distance between the consideration from the point of view of finance, capital reproduction and the consideration of day-to-day operations of the retail business is even more significant. While the primary basis of the Thatcherite governance lies in its inability and

unwillingness to intervene in the business sphere, mega-businesses, such as the merged Kwik-Save and Somerfield, by virtue of their enormous market-share, will come to represent consumer interest. As the 'agent' of the consumers at large, the management of merged retailers in fact makes decisions in terms more of financial performance than of consideration of their daily business performance, yet legitimized in the name of the consumers. The content and reality of consumers are exploited in this abstraction process.

Indeed, in his conclusion to *Virtualism: a new political economy* co-edited with James G. Carrier,^{ccxxxvii} Miller juxtaposes several phenomena from different areas under the umbrella notion of 'virtualism'. The phenomena include the obsession with auditing practices in higher education, an argument made initially by Michael Power^{ccxxxviii}. The argument is that academics 'may reduce their actual teaching quality in order to spend more time demonstrating to managers that their teaching quality has improved.'^{ccxxxix} The prevalence of management consultancies and pension funds and their *de facto* domination of contemporary capitalism are also examples of virtualism. Management consultancies, due to their increasing size and scope of responsibility, replace the management of the firms that consult them in the first place. Pension funds, at least in the case of Britain by virtue of their gigantic volume, demand 'a voice in the companies in which they invest – for instance, a veto over board appointments, executive compensations, and critical corporate charter provisions'.^{ccxl} All the interests of 'actual consumers' are no

longer the only stake or even a significant consideration in the operation of businesses and education. Instead, the major scramble for interest has shifted to that between the auditing unit and the academics, the management and the management consultancy, the management of the pension funds and the shareholders of it; in other words, 'virtual consumers' reign.^{ccxii}

In such a situation, what is contestable is no longer the simple and original accumulation of capital and exploitation of workers. The argument that Miller wants to advance is that if consumers still constitute an integral part of capitalism by being impoverished, they are now impoverished by being abstracted, for the benefit of the few. No matter whether the consumers are students who consume the 'education services', firms which pay for management consultancy or people whose pension money the pension fund is investing, they are bypassed and abstracted. People who dominate in contemporary capitalism are not in any sense less greedy than before, but they are now benefiting from what Alain Touraine considers the real danger: 'the unrestricted movement of capital, which can suddenly destroy whole economies on the basis of a purely financial and short-term calculation'.^{ccxiii} However, it goes without saying that this unrestricted movement of capital, though it does not, or is not patient enough to, extract most of its profit from 'actual consumers', has no reason to be benevolent.

A clean and clear version

Here begins the story of Richard Li. The business career of Richard Li is usually dated back to the early 1990s. He first became well-known for his sale of Star TV (which 'never made any money' and was threatened to be shut down by his father^{ccxliii}) to Rupert Murdoch's News Corp with a profit of \$800 million, which is almost 8 times the founding seed money, \$125m, in 1993. ^{ccxliv} The profit was halved between him and his father's Hutchison Whampoa. He then founded the Pacific Century Development, which subsequently bought a Singapore-listed company, and got itself listed in the Singapore stock market under the name of Pacific Century Regional Development. At that stage, its business included insurance, hotels and some real estate.

In 1998 the Pacific Century Group formed a joint venture with Intel called Pacific Convergence Corporation (PCC), which 'intends to provide high speed Internet services'. ^{ccxlv} This is one of the earliest and most well-known IT-related businesses of the group. In the second policy address delivered by Chief Executive Tung Chee-wah during the same year, Tung explicitly announced his intention for the government to participate actively in the promotion of technology, in particular information technology. He said: 'we need now to strengthen our support for technological development, build up a critical mass of fine scientists, engineers, skilled technicians and venture capitalists, and encourage the development of a significant cluster of technology-based businesses'. ^{ccxlv} In 1999, the Hong Kong SAR Government, through a private treaty, granted the Pacific Century

group the exclusive license to develop Cyberport, a combo of residential and information technology infrastructure, in Pokfulam, Hong Kong.

In order to raise money to develop the project, the group bought a company called Tricom, as its listed vehicle in the Hong Kong stock market, and eventually changed its name to Pacific Century CyberWorks (PCCW). About half a year after the name PCCW had replaced Tricom in the stock market, PCCW was already planning another merger, which was seemingly quite impossible for a company which had not yet made any significant profit. The target of the merger this time was the Cable and Wireless Hong Kong Telecom, one of the largest listed companies in Hong Kong. It took about a month for the PCCW and British Cable and Wireless, and also one more competitor, Singapore Telecom (Sing Tel), to complete the negotiations. With the aid of a consortium led by the China Bank group, which provided a total of HK\$100bn, PCCW successfully reached an agreement with the management of British Cable and Wireless about taking over the Cable and Wireless HKT.

The Cable and Wireless HKT was also not PCCW's exclusive target for acquisition and merger, indeed by the time PCCW made the decision to take over HKT, a significant amount of acquisition and investment projects had already taken place. Between August 99 and February 00, PCCW had already accumulated 19 items in its acquisition and investment portfolio, with the total cash invested more than

US\$273m.^{ccxlvii} As a result of all these acquisitions, mergers and investments, the stock price of PCCW rose from about HK\$3 in early August, 1999, to a historical high of HK\$28.5 on Feb 15, 2000, in the midst of the negotiation between PCCW and the British Cable and Wireless.^{ccxlviii} Despite the enormous fluctuation of the stock price of PCCW, by the end of 1999, the HK\$164bn-PCCW had become one of the ten biggest listed companies in Hong Kong, with Richard Li accumulating HK\$50bn for himself.^{ccxlix} By then, the story of Richard Li was widely regarded as a legend in the history of Hong Kong.^{cd}

The standard interpretation of this history in Hong Kong is certainly the discourse of technological innovation and the global trend of liberalization and deregulation of the telecommunication market, which in itself is one facet of the neo-liberal discourse emerging from the latter half of the 1970s. The claims are: enhancing competition, deregulation, 'freedom of choice, the market society, *laissez-faire*, and minimal government'^{cccli}, etc.. From this perspective, the narrative is presented in a straightforward and exclusively positive way: the synergy arising from the collaboration between the SAR Government and the technologically very potent PCCW to develop the project of Cyberport, which is the cradle of a future development of both industry and commerce in Hong Kong; the deregulation of the telecommunication industry resulted in more competition and the take over of the former monopoly Cable and Wireless HKT by PCCW as one of the promising competitors. However, following the steps of Miller, I also would like to suggest other versions of interpreting of this story, in

order to understand more about the underlying impetus and dynamics, in short, what really happened?

Angle obscured 1: scrambling for 'Hong Kong' Telecom

To begin with, regarding Hong Kong, what is strikingly coincidental is the historical context in which Miller's story about the supermarket merger in Britain and the acquisition of HKT by PCCW took place. We mentioned the reason why Kwik-Save changed from developing in a stable and self-funded manner to an over-developing one, and finally merged with Somerfield. When Dairy Farm became the major shareholder of the retailer, it mismanaged it and had to quit by selling all its shares in the end. However, the very reason why Dairy Farm had to go global and acquire Kwik-Save echoes that of the acquisition of HKT by PCCW.

The competition between PCCW and Sing Tel over the control of HKT mattered to the public in Hong Kong because the nature of telecommunication has always had a strategic dimension and is politically highly sensitive.^{ccliii} That is why after Sing Tel announced its intention to acquire HKT, the secretary of Telecommunication and Information Technology of Singapore visited Hong Kong and proclaimed that it was not their intention to control the telecommunication industry through this acquisition. ^{ccliiii} Moreover, Singapore has long been one of the major competitors in Asia in various fields. All of these amount to a widely recognized notion that

the competition was indeed a battle to preserve something belonging to Hong Kong.^{ccliv}

Yet, the irony is that one has to ignore quite a lot of historical details in order to hold on to such a notion, not to mention whether to be grateful for Li's triumph. A very brief history of HKT will suffice to make this point clear. Cable and Wireless Hong Kong Telecom was the company name after the acquisition of Hong Kong Telephone by Hong Kong Cable and Wireless in 1987. The former was founded by British Cable and Wireless, which itself was established back in 1873 in Britain, and started to run the international telecommunication services in Hong Kong in 1936. The latter, owned by the local Li Kwok Po family, had been developing as the exclusive operator of local telecommunication services ever since the post World War II period. And British Cable and Wireless held more than 50 percent of the merged company.^{cclv} This makes it obvious that Cable and Wireless HKT was a company founded and operated by British capital. Even after the acquisition of the Hong-Kong-capital based Hong Kong Telephone, and the subsequent ownership of the shares by the Hong Kong Government after the acquisition, the notion that the company is a valid 'Hong Kong' company can be defined merely by its local operation and very recent involvement of local capital.

In this sense the notion that Richard Li's PCCW was fighting to preserve HKT as belonging to Hong Kong is only valid in a very narrow sense. Moreover, and herein lies the echo to Miller's story, the reason why

PCCW had to compete with Sing Tel has to be attributed more to political elements, rather than economics, much less competition. In the middle of the 1990s, the then recently appointed managing director of Dairy Farm stated, 'it would be a pity if Beijing were to believe the firm is anything less than 100 percent committed to Hong Kong'.^{cclvi} The background of this statement was the going global of the company and its implied retreat from Hong Kong facing the approaching Handover of Hong Kong. If the political dimension is selectively purged out, it would be difficult to comprehend the validity and relevance of the above statement, especially when the topic is the highly calculating and rational business decisions.

This very historical background was undoubtedly intimidating HKT as well, but we can see quite a different response from Hong Kong Cable and Wireless. The late 70s witnessed the beginning of the negotiation over the future status of Hong Kong between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the British Government. In September 1984 both parties signed a draft text of the Joint Declaration, the main agreement being that Hong Kong would be handed over back to the PRC by the British Government. Well before the Handover, Cable and Wireless HKT had already sold 10 million and 20 percent of its shares to the Guangdong Government and a Chinese capital company, Citic Pacific, respectively in the late 80s.^{cclvii} Accordingly, the decision of British Cable and Wireless to merge Hong Kong Cable and Wireless and Hong Kong Telecom, and the following engagement of the Hong Kong Government as a major shareholder of the company, are interpreted

by commentators as an exercise to localize or decolourise the British element in this highly strategic and politically sensitive business^{cclviii}. After all, the decision of British Cable and Wireless can be interpreted at least equally, if not more, reasonably as a gesture to secure its own profit out of its monopoly status in the Hong Kong telecommunication market.

The final decision of British Cable and Wireless to exit the market and sell Cable and Wireless HKT to PCCW can also be explained from the angle of the decision of the colonial government to open the telecommunication market. As a matter of fact, owing to the emerging local pressure to stop the monopoly of HKT in the telecommunication market in the middle and late 1980s, the colonial government had mandated a consultancy firm, Booz Allen and Hamilton, to assess the issue of opening up the telecommunication market. (So it should not be surprising to recognize the relevance and validity of Miller's theory of virtualism – management consultancy is indeed in a position to decide on our behalf). The suggestion of Booz Allen and Hamilton was that the government was to issue 3 more licenses for the operation of the local fixed telecommunication network services (FTNS). Hutchison Global Communication, New World Telecom and Wharf T&T were the 3 winners of the additional operation licenses, effective from July 1, 1995. This was also the day when the exclusive license of Cable and Wireless HKT came to an end. The exclusive license of international telecommunication services was likewise surrendered about 8 years earlier (late March, 1998 instead of

2006), as a result of an agreement of the World Trade Organization (WTO) concerning the opening up of the international telecommunication market back in 1996.^{cclix} Consequently, the telecommunication business of HKT has been declining steadily (and somewhat enormously). For instance, a recent report of the company stated that up until 2003, the performance of FTNS had already dropped by almost 30 percent from its apparently total monopoly.^{cclx}

Figure 1, situation of the operation of fixed telecommunication network services and international telecommunication services after the Booz Allen and Hamilton consultation

Local fixed telecommunication network services	International telecommunication services
July 1, 1995	Late march, 1996
Exclusive license of HK Telecom ends	
3 effective licenses: Hutchison Global Communication New World Telecom Wharf T&T	

In other words, the story of the acquisition of Cable and Wireless HKT by PCCW -- although it constitutes an important part of the 'legendary' business career of Richard Li and his PCCW, and represents an apparently incontestably linear success of Hong Kong in its re-orientation in the direction of innovative and information

technology -- is rather misleading. It can on the contrary be argued that, even if Sing Tel had really successfully acquired Cable and Wireless HKT, the situation was just a transfer of property and capital from the hands of Britain to that of Singapore, especially when the business will nevertheless be run in Hong Kong, and especially after the Handover of Hong Kong from the British Government to the PRC. It is not particularly sound and reasonable to assume that a British-owned company belongs to Hong Kong.

Therefore, the story can be at least equally, if not more reasonably, be interpreted as a story in which an emerging businessman triumphed in taking the opportunity to make huge sums of money through the stock market, and by the hype of its out-competing the Singapore rival, after insatiable British capital no longer sees any profit potential in the telecommunication business and quits. Apart from those who were able enough, in terms of sensitive decisions and capital competence, to make quick money in the stock market, the benefit of PCCW's acquisition to Hong Kong as a whole is not to be unquestionably assumed, and has yet to be convincingly argued. So the uniqueness of the phenomenon of technological hype in Hong Kong is yet to be located in the actual interaction between technological artifacts and the everyday life of people. At least as far as everything said above is concerned, Hong Kong people as consumers and users of technological products are by and large bypassed. Nonetheless, they are abstracted as a rather empty reference upon which articulation of justifications can be imposed. And this is a clear Hong Kong resonance

of Miller's virtualism thesis.

Angle obscured 2: how successful is the 'success'?

The dimension of the whole phenomenon of Richard Li and his PCCW that concerns Hong Kong people is mainly connected to financial performance. Therefore, the third version of the story concerns the actual business and financial activities of the biography of PCCW. As mentioned above in the first version, the first business success of Richard Li, even before his founding of the Pacific Century group, was his sale of Star TV to the Australian media tycoon Rupert Murdoch. The sale was significant because Star TV, despite its regional household subscription of 53 millions, with its enormous operational cost, 'is thought to have lost more than \$600m in less than a decade (both the Li and Murdoch era included) and is still losing money', according to a report from *the Economist* in 2000.^{cclxi} Richard Li himself earned a huge sum and divested himself of a burdensome TV station; Murdoch paid, in effect lost a huge sum, had to take care of a mediocre TV station, and could not make money out of it. This asymmetry constituted the 'legendary' quality of the story.

This particular significance is, however, paradoxical. If an underperforming TV station sold for an unexpectedly high price is worth celebrating, effectively, the merit derived from the practical operation of the TV station and the merit derived from its monetary value materialized in transaction are two matters to be considered separately. In reality, it seems almost customary to separate these 2

realms. However, if the remarkable moment of the whole transaction lies precisely in this imbalance, then in other words, for this story to be 'successful', the two realms should be different, yet not separated: the worse the TV station, the unreasonably higher the price paid, the more wonderful the story. The excitement and noteworthiness generated from other combinations, including bad operation/low price, good operation/low price and good operation/high price, are simply different in kind and far lower in magnitude. However, this conclusion is just drawn from the style in which this transaction is *represented*, meaning that a direct and accurate correspondence between the words and descriptions from these media representations and what these words and descriptions represent is not intended, and simply does not exist. However, it is also this very intended distance between them which constitutes the paradoxon between the discourse of satellite TV as an innovative and information technology (and our celebration of it, of course) and the benefit and enjoyment of the people, or at least of its subscribers. This kind of strange logic in the finance and business activities is nonetheless exceptional.

Another moment of the acquisition of Cable and Wireless HKT by the PCCW that is considered highly significant is usually characterized by the rhetoric of the 'new economy'. It was popular to point out that one of the reasons why Sing Tel was out-competed by PCCW is that a merger between Sing Tel and HKT was still pretty much in the realm of the 'old economy', not much synergy could be expected. Rather, mergers between the traditional telecommunication business and

corporations with the concept of information technology reflect an irresistible global trend.^{cclxii} Read literally from these words, it is difficult to figure out what exactly the notion 'new economy' do means, and what the difference between the old and the new is, except if we simply characterize it tautologically as the acquisition of Cable and Wireless HKT by PCCW itself. In order to understand what comes out of this merger, it is helpful to borrow from the notion of myth according to the classic definition of Roland Barthes.

Myth, to Roland Barthes, is constituted by at least 2 levels of signification. The combination of a primary signifier and a primary signified is called a sign, which in turn further constitutes the secondary signifier of another signified. Through this process of signification, the arbitrariness of the relationship between the signifier and the signified is reified as a natural and essential relationship, the process through which the secondary signifier is constituted by a match up of the pair of primary signifier and signified is also drained out. Myth 'has a task of giving an historical intention a natural justification, and making contingency appear eternal'.^{cclxiii} Accordingly, a successful myth is one that is 'able to naturalize and universalize the interests of the dominant groups as if they were the interests of all members of society.'^{cclxiv} Nevertheless, this naturalization and universalization of myth does not happen under any veil, since 'myth does not deny things, on the contrary, its function is to talk about them; simply, it purifies them, it makes them innocent, ... it gives them a clarity which is not that of an explanation but that of a statement of fact.'^{cclxv}

Referring to the story of PCCW and Richard Li, what is most frequently talked about and has acquired the status of almost a statement of fact, is certainly the fortune made. An interpretation of the profit from the sale of Star TV to Murdoch is already a case in focus; the celebration of the profit made by Richard Li naturalizes and universalizes the virtue of the notion of profit itself, and by doing this, drains off the problems regarding the operation of the TV station and the benefits to its subscribers.

As mentioned in version 1, PCCW borrowed a total of HK\$100bn from a consortium led by the Bank of China. This approach is crucial, as Miller argues, 'the financier's logic is that a company should take on a huge burden of debt', because 'debt is seen as helpful in imposing the kind of discipline upon a company that will force it to take the ruthless decisions that will lead, in turn, to the most efficient use of capital'.^{cclxvi} Unexceptionally, the imperative of growth conditioned by the huge amount of debt is the principal atmosphere of operation of PCCW. The signification of this ultimate signified, this particular condition of growth, can indeed be truly ruthless.

In fact, starting from mid-2001, the company had 3 redundancy exercises within one single year, in July/August 2001, December 2001 and March 2002.^{cclxvii} Back to the date at the end of February 2000, when PCCW and British Cable and Wireless finally came to an agreement about the acquisition, the decision was worrisome enough

for the employees of HKT because of the increasing competition in the telecommunication market and the huge burden of debt taken by the new company. Richard Li came out and publicly proclaimed, 'we never thought of any layoff, we emphasized human assets!' ^{cclxviii}

However, a quick glance over the interim report 2003 of PCCW reveals the following in a section entitled 'management's discussion and analysis', 'the improvement (of group EBITDA margin) was primarily due to greater cost efficiency achieved as a result of various strategic realignment plans and efficiency programs implemented in 2002.' ^{cclxix}

Regardless of the technical meaning of the EBITDA margin, the sentence looks neutral and certainly acceptable, considered from the point of view of growth and repayment of debt. Indeed, in early September, PCCW announced a plan which should be one of the 'strategic realignment plans and efficiency programs'. The plan required that staff in several categories of work (such as customer service and outdoor maintenance work) should start up their own companies, in order to compete for the jobs previously assigned to them in-house. The management did not promise those who failed to join the startups that they would not be laid off. The management promised to secure all the contract jobs to the new startups, but only for the first year, and no promise was made concerning the second, the third or the later years. ^{cclxx}

There are no data available to show whether, in which aspects, and to what extent this realignment arrangement helped to improve the quality of the services, but what we can be sure of is the cut of the

various kinds of allowances, lengthening of working hours, and a 20 percent reduction of salary^{cclxxi}. In other words, the notion of 'improvement' mentioned in the interim report or the notion of 'efficiency' claimed by the name 'efficiency program' has to be understood not in terms of more output by the same input, but the same output by less input – the reduction of the responsibility of the company to its staff, and the more concrete deterioration of the terms of employment. After all, both the 'strategic realignment plan and efficiency programs' only restructure the production process, instead of any *de facto* improvement of sale of the company, especially its business core, the telecommunication process. It is in all of these that we may develop a concrete understanding of the choice of word of 'strategic' – not for the absolute sense of improvement of quality, but an improvement of efficiency in a negative sense.

As a matter of fact, the overall performance of PCCW also recorded a total of two years of consecutive decline of almost HK\$14bn in 2002 and 2003, which is HK\$7.76bn and HK\$6.1bn respectively.^{cclxxii} In particular, the sale and the market share of telecommunication services of PCCW has been suffering a decline for all the four years since its acquisition of HKT.^{cclxxiii} In other words, since the telecommunication services of PCCW is not efficient, competitive and attractive enough to even retain its customers, improved efficiency can again only be understood in terms of the reduction of its responsibility to its staff. As a result, to accept or acknowledge such a kind of improvement as a catalyst of better performance is to accept

or acknowledge a paradoxon on improvement without improving either sales, or the welfare of its staff: a paradoxon that resembles that of the sale of Star TV.

Hong Kong cultural critic Ackbar Abbas argues that the culture of Hong Kong is a culture of disappearance. In a culture of disappearance, according to Abbas, one does *not* see what *is* there, but mis-recognizes it as something else; a thing does not vanish without a trace, it simply dis-appears.^{cclxxiv} Before anything about the advantage of the 'new economy' over the 'old economy' is visible in terms of technological content, we again see only the abstraction, the virtual operation on the part of finance. The operation calls for a mis-recognition of what indeed should be our focus, or at least for an elusion of a comparable consideration of the quality of the services provided, at the expense of the corporate responsibility to its staff at the same time. The examples of Star TV and the discourse of efficiency in the interim report, viewed through Abbas's concept of disappearance, complements Miller's theory with a more concrete status and function of the 'real' in regard of the working of the whole story. The 'real', the benefits to customers, the staff of the company, and the subscribers of satellite TV, has to be mis-recognized as something irrelevant, or simply made invisible, in other words, disappear, in order to render the story of PCCW and Richard Li legendary.

Angle obscured 3: doing businesses by (merely) talking about them

So much for the discursive treatment of the paradoxical relationship between the sale, redundancy and improvement of efficiency. However, all of them are still pretty much within the realm of the old economy – we do not have particularly convincing reasons to attribute these subtle operations to the ‘new economy’, if this notion is to have some positive content. In fact, all of the above concerns only the financial operation of Cable and Wireless HKT; in the merger between the old and the new economy, they are simply considered, and even denounced, as elements of the latter. So how exactly can we characterize the notion of ‘new economy’? I would suggest and argue that the notion of ‘new economy’ is elaborated quite succinctly by a coverage from *The Economist*, ‘These days businessmen are more likely to hit newspaper headlines for thinking of doing a deal than for actually doing one.’^{cclxxv}

We can start with the case of Cyberport, testimony of commencing of the Science Hub project in Hong Kong’s rival Singapore in 1998, and based on the vocal manifestation of emphasis by the HKSAR Government expressed in policy addresses in 1997 and 1998, in which Tung’s administration came up with a range of innovation and technology related policy suggestions in an urgent tone. (See the chapter on the discourse of government innovation and technology policy. In March 99, Mr. Donald Tsang, the then Financial Secretary, in his second budget speech proposed the project of Cyberport, ‘the

essential infrastructure to form a strategic cluster of information services companies'. He further elaborated,

for Hong Kong to meet the challenges of the 21st Century, it must adapt to the new forces of the Information age and respond to the mega trends of technological advances which were introducing new ways of doing business, transforming traditional markets and altering existing competitive advantages... Hong Kong must race against time to have a quick and decisive response in developing its own niche in view of the speed with which the information technology sector was advancing and the emphatic efforts of practically all of its competitors in trying to carve out their own corners of the market.^{cclxxvi}

The whole proposed Cyberport project, located in Pokfulam, aims at providing 100,000 square meters of office space, with facilities of retail, entertainment, education, and a hotel. The tenants already moved into the first phase of the project in mid-2002, and the whole project is planned to be completed by mid-2004.^{cclxxvii} Insisting on the positive non-intervention and free market policy of the government, Donald Tsang points out that 'it is the rightful role of the government to provide an appropriate environment and suitable infrastructure to promote, facilitate and support our manufacturing and service industries.'^{cclxxviii} As a result, the proposed Cyberport is to be built on the basis of a partnership between the government and a private company. Paradoxically, this privileged exclusive license was granted to Richard Li's Pacific Century Development, through a private treaty instead of public auction, a method which in itself manifests to a certain extent the competitiveness of the market. When the Secretary for Information Technology and Broadcasting, K.C. Kwong, was asked about the

rationale behind the decision of dealing with PCD through a private treaty, he listed five reasons. First, the company has to be attractive enough for the best IT companies worldwide to come to Hong Kong; secondly, the company has to bear the development of the project and also the risk of it; thirdly, the readiness of the company not to be out-paced by other regional competitors; fourthly, whether there are other interested developers; and finally, the company has to be capable of managing the whole project.^{cclxxix} It seems confusing enough why all these reasons should not amount to the choice of public auction. This case nevertheless sheds light on our understanding of the notion of market competition and positive non-intervention.

What should not be surprising is that while the popular notion is that Hong Kong is or has been practicing a *Laissez-Faire* governance, the notion is indeed more assumed than critically examined. It is almost conventional among serious academic investigations of the topic that the extent of the *Laissez-Faire* is rather limited and has to be understood in very particular terms.^{cclxxx} Anyway, despite the fact that PCD won the exclusive license through a private treaty, if we are to examine whether Cyberport fulfills the goals laid down by the government, it is necessary, as Doreen Massey, Paul Quintas and David Wield did for the science parks in Britain, to 'examine them in their own terms'.^{cclxxxi} According to their research, two major objectives of the science parks in Britain are: promoting the formation of new firms, and creating job opportunities. The result they found was that science parks practically did not perform well to breed new startups, the 'majority of

them are relocated units and firms', in the milieu of university budget cuts, 'university staff are recommended to start their own companies as an alternative for their position in the university'. Both findings confirm that both objectives laid down by the science parks are more or less under-accomplished.^{cclxxxii} These experiences in Britain are useful for us to decide whether the proposal of Cyberport helps Hong Kong in re-orienting itself in the direction of innovation and technology industry or is, at the opposite extreme, promoting like a loud-speaker the government's emphasis, for the benefit of capital in the stock market.^{cclxxxiii}

Reports from various sources show that a considerable proportion of the tenants of the Cyberport are in fact just relocating firms. Up until early 2004, a total of 28 companies were occupying 64% of all the first two phases of office space in Cyberport; of the 28 companies, 12, which amounts to less than half of the total, are new startups. With the completion of the construction work of the third phase in February 2004, the total occupation percentage will fall to 40 percent.^{cclxxxiv} Among the eight major tenants that PCCW solicited in the very beginning of the project are multinational corporations such as Microsoft, Yahoo!, HP, all of which were renting office space in Hong Kong before the proposal of the Cyberport project. Only 2 companies were exceptional, one is the Pacific Convergence Corporation, which is the joint venture formed between PCCW and Intel, the other is Softbank, a Japan-based group.^{cclxxxv} The lease record of Cyberport can also be assessed indirectly from the fall of leases in other properties which also

specialize in IT-related companies. Taikoo Place, in particular, where the headquarter of PCCW-HKT is located, experienced a loss of tenants as a result of the completion of Cyberport, while major tenants like CSL and Microsoft were all moving out to rent office space in Cyberport.

The effect of a strategic cluster is also not to be assumed, but to be argued. Indeed, Taikoo Place, for instance, was arguably a candidate for the 'strategic cluster' pursued by the government. Taikoo Place once housed multinational tenants such as Cable and Wireless, Microsoft, PCCW, Time-Warner, etc. It has built-in information infrastructure connecting the 11 buildings among themselves and facilities connecting to databases of various multinational corporations.^{cclxxxvi} If IT-related multinational corporations are the ultimate juicy fruit for Hong Kong to alter our 'existing competitive advantages', to 'adapt to the new forces of the information age -- and respond to the mega trend of technological advances'^{cclxxxvii}, then it must be quite annoying for the government to acknowledge that Hong Kong got these juicy fruits long ago, at least well before the establishment of Cyberport. Before the government even tries to account for the difference Cyberport and other similar private experiments make, and the limitation of the latter, contradictions and discrepancies remain unsettled. The spectre of promoting technology by merely announcing it is still haunting.

At this stage, the way in which both the SAR Government and Li's

PCCW 'hit newspaper headlines for thinking of doing a deal rather than for actually doing one' should already be clear enough. Indeed, this irony echoes Sum Ngai-ling and Bob Jessop's definition of Hong Kong as an entrepreneurial city. According to their theorization, 'the promoters of entrepreneurial cities adopt an entrepreneurial discourse, narrate their cities as entrepreneurial and market them as entrepreneurial. This involves the articulation of diverse economic, political and socio-cultural narratives and complementary nonnarrative discourses to contextualise and reinforce calls for entrepreneurial action'^{cclxxxviii}. While the government's promotion of Cyberport by articulating the context in which Cyberport is conceived (see also chapter 3 on the discourse of government innovation and technology policy) is certainly entrepreneurial in the sense of Sum and Jessop, the way in which Richard Li is developing his business from Star to PCD to PCCW and finally to PCCW-HKT was no less entrepreneurial.

As long as stock price does not have any essential relationship with the company it represents, activities of making quick money in the stock market are merely 'trad[ing] on emotion and the perceptions of emotion'.^{cclxxxix} It is even due to this intentional dissociation and abstraction of the perception and emotion from the operation of the business that the stock price of Tricom can rocket 2270 percent, from a mere HK\$0.136 to the highest of HK\$3.225, within one single day in early March, 1999.^{ccxc} And between the time when Tricom was renamed to Pacific Century CyberWorks and mid-February 2000, the time when PCCW announced its intention to acquire HKT, PCCW energetically

invested, acquired and formed joint ventures. Some of its more well-known counterparts included City Telecom, CMGI, Outblaze, StarEastNet, SoftNet^{CCXCI}; a joint venture between PCCW and the Australian Telecom, namely Telstra, was also formed in April. During this period, all these joint ventures, acquisitions and investments practically alluded to technological excellence and hence profit, therefore, 'firms... are working hard to fuel rumours that buyers are about to pounce and unlock the value of their assets, so as to prop up sagging share prices – even though few hard deals materialise' ^{CCXCII}, a commentator satirized. The commentator revealed that Richard Li 'withdrew a mooted offer for Cable and Wireless, but not before newspaper headlines worldwide had brightened his fading image.' ^{CCXCIII} Accordingly, the stock price of PCCW finally reached HK\$25.8 in February 15, 2000, even if, with the exception of particular joint ventures, investments and acquisitions only refer to changes of stake or financial structure, in other words, irrelevant of the sales or operation of the business. This irrelevance was not insignificant, some small public shareholders who have been holding the shares of HKT for its stable dividend suffer from Li's business style: dropping sales figures already imply decreasing dividend, the huge sum of debt incurred by PCCW at the time of acquisition further held the group from paying dividend.

The craze of people over IT-related stocks did not remain without criticism. As noted by a biographer of Li, regarding the enormous rise in stock price of PCCW in December 1999, when people criticized Li for

pushing the price too high, he simply responded, 'am I really competent enough?'^{CCXCIV} This is an interesting response that could connect two incidences. Oei Hong Leong, the original stake holder of Tricom, which was the shell company acquired by Pacific Century group, sold a huge amount of Tricom shares in mid-May, before the even larger amount of shares held by institutional investors were allowed to enter the market. He sold 400m shares for about HK\$500m. The day then witnessed a drop of the share price by 16 percent.^{CCXCV} Another instance was the same thing done by those who suffered from the sale by Oei. Cable and Wireless HK was renamed PCCW-HKT on August 10, 2000; this was also the day when British Cable and Wireless was allowed to sell their 1.1bn of PCCW shares. 1.1bn of share freshly entering into the market naturally and inevitably created pressure for the stock price to fall. Therefore, before August 10, the senior management of PCCW, including Richard Li, collectively took a step ahead of British Cable and Wireless, and sold more than 260m of PCCW shares for almost HK\$40bn. August 8 also witnessed a drop of almost 12 percent.^{CCXCVI}

The subtlety here is that Li thought that the almost irrational rise of the stock price was not his fault, and that he did not distort the stock price single-handedly. By the same token, if he was conscious enough when he asked 'am I really competent enough', the question at the other side of the token should be, 'how can I fail to take this opportunity to make a big fortune?' And if this is the case, then what Oei did should also not be considered as ruining the deal.^{CCXCVII} This view does no more

than confirm the popular conception of the market that the craze and the collapse are merely in sync with the inevitable outside world, say for instance the sudden surge and gradual decline of the Nasdaq in America. However, if the premise that he did nothing to push up the price does not stand, which means that he really anticipated and indeed participated in pushing up the price, then it qualifies just in an indirect way his quality as an entrepreneur, who actively articulates an irresistible and inevitable context, in which his articulation is significantly constitutive. As an entrepreneur who pretentiously denies entrepreneurship, he is able to narrate and perform strategies that are apparently advantageous in themselves, purifying the process through which this irresistible and inevitable context is popularly affirmed, reducing any alternative consideration and subordinating them under unquestionable contexts. It is here that we clearly see the practical 'talking' dimension of the myth of the 'new economy'.

Explaining our supportive attitude

One of the handful of standup comedians in Hong Kong, Wong Chi-wah, demonstrated in one of his shows the mentality of people engaging in the stock market by the time of the Handover and the 'technology bubble' in 99.

A: Chi-wah, let me tell you something reliable: 731

Chi-wah: What? Never heard of it.

A: Certainly. Strictly inside information. I have friends from the north (Beijing)^{CCXCVIII}

In another case

A: Chi-wah, let me tell you something reliable: 005.

Chi-wah: 005 stands for HSBC, doesn't it? Let me tell you something reliable instead: mothers are women^{ccxcix}.

The concern here is not that the extent to which the profitability of buying the stock of HSBC is as self-evident as the notion of 'mothers are women'. The above examples, however, humorously problematize the characteristics of the activities in the stock market. If economics tells us that we make a decision of buying something out of rational calculations, the examples turn this understanding upside down: knowing something well enough is irrelevant for our buying decisions; perfect information is neither the necessary nor the sufficient condition for our decision to buy certain stock. On the other side of the coin, knowing not enough does not hinder our buying decision: inside information refers to information that we recognize or concede as such. Basing upon inside information means giving up our active articulation or understanding of the present situation or the tendency of the stock market, we let the 'inside information' do the articulation or understanding for us.

In Michelangelo Antonioni's *Blow Up*, labeled by Slavoj Žižek the 'last great modernist film', Žižek juxtaposes the way in which the protagonist Thomas investigates the actually non-existing dead body he

discovered in his own photographs, and the way he ends up accepting to play the mimic tennis game without the physical presence of the tennis ball. Žižek regards this juxtaposition as the 'lesson of modernism', in which 'the structure, ... works as well if the Thing is lacking, if the machine revolves around an emptiness'.^{ccc} As a result, what is worthy of investigation or even critique in the case of the stock market is therefore not whether people's decision to become involved in the 'technology bubble' is made out of their perfect knowledge or the lack of it. To cite a Marxian maxim, 'they do not know it, but they are doing it'.^{ccc} It is the mechanism in which this phenomenon is allowed or even encouraged to occur that is of interest.

As mentioned above, mysteriousness is the fundamental quality of 'inside information' on the tendency of the stock market. Indeed, in the example given by Wong, the significant moment is when people simply seem to be betting merely on 'inside information' as a form, following wherever the 'inside information' directs them to go, without even trying to comprehend what content or message is present in the form. The appropriation of this recognition of non-recognition (of what is inside the 'inside information') is indeed the assumed ground or even justification for decision. In another example provided by Žižek to explain the working of ideology, he points out that the ideology of anti-Semitism probably depicts Jews as the incarnation of evil. However, in everyday life, any German might easily encounter Jews which are indeed the opposite of what propaganda teaches them. Yet if this everyday experience is effective enough as resistance to

ideological interpellation, then the ideology is not a successful one. Ideology, according to Žižek, functions by turning this gap itself (between the ideological figure and the actual everyday experience) into the argument for anti-Semitism, and it succeeds 'when even the facts which at first sight contradict it start to function as arguments in its favours'.^{cccii}

Here we can identify a parallel situation. In the case of anti-Semitism, no matter how the anti-Semitic propaganda tries to structure our ways of conceiving Jews, it is by our own irreconcilably confusing interpretation of our normal and even pleasant perception of Jews that we can see that ideology is at work. And in the case of the stock market activities, by the same token, even if people know that they are able to profit stably from the stock of HSBC, one of the top 3 largest groups in the stock market, people tend to invest in something they have not even heard of, by virtue of 'inside information', by virtue of the label of Beijing, and the mysterious working of the label that follows. If these phenomena involve the working of ideology, they work not by completely internalizing our sense of truth as defined by ideology; it works not by convincing us with its own rationality. Quite the opposite, it precisely works by allowing a residual region defined by its traumatic, senseless and contradictory quality. This region 'far from hindering the full submission of the subject to the ideological command, is the very condition of it.'^{ccciii} This is what Žižek calls a 'vicious circle of authority'^{ccciv}, a tautology in which we believe simply because it is the authority, even if nothing beneficial can be gained out of it. Do we

have to be reminded of the couple of collapses of the stock market in 1997 and 2000?

This exercise helps us to distinguish, if we refer again to the maxim: 'they do not know it, but they are doing it', the sphere where investigation and criticism are urgently needed and appropriate. It may be a bit off-target if we focus solely on whether a certain discourse or ideology intends to transform or successfully transforms the mind, the people's 'knowing' part, it would be frustrating if we found that people know already that everything is 'false-consciousness' after all, yet they still decide to act accordingly. On the contrary, it is the 'doing' part that matters. Like the practice of canned laughter in soap operas and chorus in Greek tragedies, what are the mechanisms in which our sensitivity and response are disregarded and trivialized to the story of PCCW and Richard Li? And the phenomenon of the technological hype in general? What is our understanding of these mechanisms that enables the preservation of our traumatic, contradictory and senseless residual region? Such that this region with all our traumas, contradictions of the gain and loss, love and hate, the obvious and the ambivalent will 'start to function as arguments in its favour'?

Conclusion

Following the steps of Miller, this chapter has developed different versions and angles of the story of Richard Li and his PCCW. It focuses on the underlying dynamics, impetus and intentions that are actually in operation, and tries to uncover the significance constitutive of the

whole phenomenon. This exercise is important, as confirming the popular notion of the linear triumph of innovation and technology that is beneficial to the social and economic life of Hong Kong is simply futile, even if we see technological development as in some sense important. Undoubtedly, virtualism in the sense of abstraction appears in different moments of the story. It is clear that unique and particular logics of both discourse and capital are at work, and Touraine's critique of the popular critique of the neo-liberal view of globalization should be an appropriate reminder here: economy, finance and politics (one might perhaps add, society) are not a monolithic bloc.^{ccc} From the above analyses, it is obvious that different relations and forces indeed constitute the story to such an extent that it would be difficult to conceptualize it as a technological issue *per se*. However, we might have unduly granted Richard Li and his PCCW too much if we conceive of all the political, financial and economic forces and relations as intrinsic to the story. By the same token, all of the above might be virtual enough, yet if we still insist that all of them are just undifferentiated operations for making profit, we will not be able to comprehend the problem and will be rendered in many senses inactive.

According to the analyses in this chapter, the operation of these logics is quite indifferent to, does not regard, and sometimes works at the expense of the counterparts that they refer to. These logics seem to dominate the constitution of our sense of what the group is about. All the operations described in this chapter have their own agendas, no

matter whether financial or political, yet the social and the everyday life dimensions are by and large absent and omitted. A commentator talking about the 'burst of the technology bubble' said, 'it is the "investors" who are first exposed to the burst of the bubble, instead of the "consumers"' .^{cccvi} Let us for the moment put aside the problem of how we can meaningfully distinguish these two kinds of people; still this statement is interestingly coherent with Miller. To Miller, investors are of course exposed to the burst before the consumers. However, consumers (at least part of them) and investors do not stand opposite each other. No matter whether the bubble bursts or expands ever after, investors always seems to be the only ones exposed; consumers, on the other hand, simply have never been in the game, or are replaced by their virtual stand-ins.

To counter the interpretation of the supposedly sudden emergence of the social and economic prevalence of information technology that supposedly improves everything in terms of the inevitably linear process of an actualization of rationality, one of the best critiques is to insist on the concrete and contextual. For instance, Paschal Preston points out that, at least in the context of Britain, the mania for information and communication technology (ICT) did not emerge until the late 1970s, as a result of the rise of Thatcherism and with the aim to combat and manage acute social and economic problems. The emergence of ICT discourse at that time, with the help of the popularization of 'books and magazines concerned with (and usually, enthusing over) the ... then relatively new ICTs', had a special emphasis on its job creation

potential.^{cccvii} And in the context of Hong Kong, 'it can be argued that the technocultural imagination has created a post-crisis (Asian financial crisis) euphoria that may be conducive towards the rebuilding of a new form of urban governance'^{cccviii}. Nevertheless, it is one thing to expose the official discourse which requires us to acknowledge that their abstracted and ahistorical logic of technological development is indeed tackling problems other than what they claim they are handling. How we are to conceptualize the situation in which we practically live with or paradoxically do not see the obviously visible discrepancies arising out of this virtualism is quite another. Especially when these discrepancies also have no reason to be benevolent, as we see from the analyses above.

Žižek's skilful analysis critically bridges the gap. Simply exposing the discrepancies, irreconcilables, and senselessness seems inadequate because it does not explain our supportive attitude. After all, if we find people in this apparent confusion, it is simply not necessary that they do not know about the confusion, quite the opposite, it is well probable that the confusion, and hence the getting away of making exclusive judgment, are precisely what they consciously identify with.^{cccix} Through the notions of virtualism and abstraction, Miller seems to endorse the existence of a realm that is 'real' or not yet abstracted, however, the notions are different from Žižek's notion of the traumatic and senseless residual region. Methodologically, Miller builds his notion of abstraction and virtualism upon the realm that is 'real' and not yet abstracted. In other words, he assumes that the level of everyday life is

not ill-represented and there is some method to recover somewhat authentically this region. But for Žižek, the very traumatic and senseless residual quality is the real stake. Without it, it would be impossible to understand the workings of ideology, and it will have to be assumed as an undistorted human subject at risk of being interpellated – precisely the Miller's starting point. If Miller is not to straightforwardly assume a natural and real subject and develop his theory upon this assumption, effort will have to be put into formulating an articulation between the subject and the social and historical context of the subject. But this effort of formulation shall inevitably be political, and is itself a contested domain.

According to Žižek, we believe in, instead of being convinced by, the discrepancies and contradictions in a direction towards the dominant. One more point to add is that explaining the working principle of ideology is far from claiming that a particular ideology can completely dominate the whole society and its people. After all, such a claim would inevitably be empirically inaccurate and theoretically disabling; not only because it is far from potent enough, but also because the very subjects (society and people) that are being referred to are definitely not entirely clear and immediately valid subjects of ideology. Who is to be included? What can be the benchmark of a total interpellation? The list of questions can be expanded further, but the implication is simple: the obstacle on the way to a better understanding of the working of ideology and discourse is only the nostalgic imagination that a society and its history can easily be

conceived of as a unified whole. With this in mind, we can turn now to the final chapter.

Conclusion: rethinking through HK's history

The history of Hong Kong, as many writers have noted, and of course like the history of any place ever written, is contested terrain. This terrain was even full of contestations at the time when Hong Kong had to be handed over back to China from the British after one and a half centuries of colonial rule.^{cccix} In the context of handover politics, one important aspect that the writings and interpretations of Hong Kong tend to focus on is the issue of nationality: to what extent people in Hong Kong are Chinese or Hong Kong people *per se*; what kind of historical events can be mobilized to support that Hong Kong people are anti-colonial or colonial collaborators; what the relationships between colonialism, anti-colonialism, communism, and anti-communism are, etc. Critics argued that this aspect of Hong Kong history is by and large dominated by colonial scholars from Britain and patriotic scholars from the mainland.^{cccxi}

Another important aspect of Hong Kong history (though not completely separable from the former, see later in this section) concerns the impetuses and the meaning of the place's economic development and success. According to the textbook-style narrative of K.Y. Nyaw, Hong Kong started out chronologically as a trading port in 1842. Between 1842 and 1941, Hong Kong was effectively, if not

exclusively, an entrepot and free port. Despite the suspension of economic activities during the Second World War, the industrialization of Hong Kong started in 1947.^{cccxi} Before industrialization, the prominent figures in Hong Kong's economy were apparently the banks and *hongs*, assisted by Chinese compradors^{cccxi}. While Hong Kong has always been considered a free port, practicing the policy of *laissez-faire*, practically all the changes in the economic structure during the history of Hong Kong were due to changes in 'external' circumstances. For instance, the beginnings of the industrialization of Hong Kong were the combined effects of both the embargo placed on China by the United Nations after the former's involvement in the Korean War (which resulted in the loss of the entrepot status of Hong Kong in the early 50s, and a turn to industry), and the establishment of the Communist regime in China in 1949 (which resulted in Hong Kong receiving the fleeing Shanghai capitalists and their capital).^{ccciv}

From this perspective, the significance of the Hong Kong Government is unique. Due to the pressure of factors and influences both from inside and outside Hong Kong, it would simply be futile for the government to attempt in any way to intervene in the operations of the economy and any inevitable structural shift. Paradoxically, it is precisely through the government's very intention and effort to limit its reach that Hong Kong was able to float in the global economic current, accommodating itself to whatever the circumstances required. Therefore, on the one hand, these writers described the early economic development in Hong Kong as a neat and clear path from trade and finance activities

to industrialization, under the non-interventionist colonial administration. On the other hand, even when they could not deny that manufacturing industries were not altogether absent in Hong Kong, Nyaw attributes their taking root in this early phase of colonial development to factors that were quasi-inevitable, and had nothing to do with any active determination on the part of the government whatsoever -- for example, the free port policy (again!), the stimulation by population growth, and the Imperial Preference granted to Hong Kong by the home country.^{CCCXV}

Yet, this explanation of the take-off of the economic development with respect to the development of the manufacturing industries in Hong Kong in particular is not unanimously accepted. For those who considered Hong Kong's pre-War manufacturing industries to be absent or at least insignificant, one of their most standard supporting arguments comes from Edward Szczepanik's *The economic growth in Hong Kong*, published in 1958. Szczepanik reports that among the 1.8 million population in Hong Kong in 1940, only 30,000 workers were working in about 800 factories.^{CCCXVI} Other sources, however, reveal the moment where this mistaken understanding of the industrial development could have occurred. Frank Leeming argued that this might have to do with the way 'industry' was defined. He argues that well before the coming of the 20th century, a considerable proportion of property (around 30% between 1845 and 1847) in the Victoria area was recorded to be in industrial use. These 'industries' engaged in small businesses like bakeries and cabinet making, where factories, shops,

and residence alike were under the same roof in those premises. Leeming goes on to argue that most of these factories, instead of being discrete businesses in their own right, indeed in one way or another were the extension or continuation of the same business started in Guangdong and the Pearl River Delta in particular.^{cccxvii}

David Faure, through uncovering old archive material, also argues that pre-War, and even pre-20th century, industries were by no means insignificant and were already producing a whole range of products for domestic use.^{cccxviii} This very position is also held by Ngo Tak-wing, who argues that 'Hong Kong's modern industries can be traced back to at least the turn of the twentieth century, rather than to a sudden spurt after the Korean War, as is commonly assumed'.^{cccxi} In a document published in the mid-1930s, it is first reported that out of the 850,000 people in Hong Kong, 110,000 engaged in the manufacturing of different everyday life goods. The figure even exceeds that in the sector of commerce and finance, from which the fortune of Hong Kong was commonly believed to come.^{cccxx} The significance of pre-War manufacturing industries can also be inferred from their competitive edge in respect to products from other regions. Faure mentions that according to another document published in the late 1910s, for example, 'the Taikoo sugar works is said to be the largest refinery which is under one roof in the world.'^{cccxxi} The manufacturing sector in Hong Kong was so strong that one commentator asserted in the mid-1930s, 'despite the size of the country, the industrial goods from Shanghai and Hong Kong ranked equal among the exhibits.'^{cccxxii} Ngo

even points out that the rubber shoes produced in Hong Kong led the British official to admit to Hong Kong's 'invasion of the United Kingdom market', and other products such as cosmetics and leatherwear effectively displaced imports in the domestic market by the 1920s and 1930s.^{cccxxiii} And if this evidence apparently implies only the possibility of the illusionary self-pride of Hong Kong industrialists, the reaction of the overseas authority was certainly significant. Ngo reports that Hong Kong's exports even led the British Government and Canadian Government to attempt to impose quotas and raise tariffs to footwear exported from Hong Kong.^{cccxxiv}

While the earliest industrial activities in Hong Kong were not recognized, Faure argues, it may just be due to the fact that 'until the 1920s, little was manufactured for export' ^{cccxxv}. However, as shown in the evidence and interpretation of other writers, when Hong Kong products began to gain a competitive edge over overseas products, the reason for the ignorance and non-recognition may have more to do with more complex colonial projects. On the one hand, Leeming and H.F. Cheung^{cccxxvi} argue that manufacturing industries were mainly businesses run by Chinese. Even if we put aside the prejudice of the colonial officers against Chinese people, it is still undeniable that the evidence advanced by these writers comes mainly from local newspapers and classified directories. On the other hand, up to this point, the argument is still referring to the debate about the periodization of the process of industrialization of Hong Kong. Anyway, even if we really assume that industrialization indeed took off in the

post-war period, the issue of another dimension, namely the role and function of the '*laissez-faire*' government in relation to this process, still remains unresolved.

More precisely, the problem is about our attitude towards the claim that the colonial administration of Hong Kong has always been a fiscally healthy, *laissez-faire* government, and economic success has been the result of the decision and adaptability of the Hong Kong economy and civil society regarding 'external' economic conditions, the positive and intentional outcome of a positive non-interventionist government. Conventional literature on Hong Kong history generally holds a positive attitude to this version. Critics, however, argue that 'while it is true that the government practiced a tight fiscal policy, it is far too simplistic to explain this policy purely in terms of the ideological commitment of the various Financial Secretaries (of Hong Kong's colonial administration) to fiscal conservatism.'^{cccxxvii} From this perspective, we must avoid a presumed position according to which *laissez-faire* and the related fiscal conservatism were unanimously benevolent governance options chosen intentionally to bring benefit to each and every one in the colony, even if the interventions and participation of the colonial administration were in fact low compared to, say, the rest of the three 'little dragons'. Rather, meaningful studies of the economic development in Hong Kong must focus on the dynamics and negotiations underlying the decision to adopt this policy direction.

For instance, studies of the provision of industrial land and the proposal of establishing an industrial bank by Stephen W. K. Chiu nicely depict this dynamic.^{cccxxviii} The provision of concessionary industrial land and a publicly financed industrial bank were both pressing issues in the early 1950s, when the Korean War opened up an enormous opportunity for the Hong Kong economy to go on and develop along the path of industrialization. That historical moment was considered as the very opportunity of formulating something resembling an industrial policy. However, in the case of industrial land, the commercial and financial sectors opposed the proposal because they wanted to avoid any possibility of raising taxes as a result of any prolonged assistance by the government in terms of the provision of cheap land. In the case of the industrial bank, the historical moment was the time when the industrial sector saw the potential for development, and at the same time the bank raised interest rates to compete for deposits. The proposal brought up by the industrialists, while not totally rejected by the government, was again rejected by the finance and banking sectors, for a 2-fold reason. They did not want to take the risk of a tax increase that a prolonged governmental input might bring; the reason was also that the industrial bank would be their direct competitor and effectively reduce their profit.

Alex Choi's discussion contributes one more dimension, the dimension of the relationship between the imperial home country and the colony, and hence uncovers a broader context in which the apparently fiscally healthy *laissez-faire* policy can be conceived and located. He

maintained that the time when Hong Kong saw the opportunity to go for industrialization roughly coincided with the time when Sterling crises were threatening British imperialism. As a result, the formerly restrictive attitude of the British to the industrialization of Hong Kong was more or less relaxed. However, the reason for this relaxation was not that the previously protected British industrial production no longer needed protection, but that during that the waves of Sterling crises, Hong Kong had become a 'money-earning powerhouse', which was a valuable asset to the low currency reserve back in Britain.^{cccxxix} That is to say, the experiment of the industrialization of Hong Kong was then allowed, yet definitely not with the input of government subsidy, but rather with a strict fiscal conservatism.

In the light of these two arguments, it is almost obvious that *laissez-faire* is less an ideological commitment than a mere name to embody different responses of the government regarding the market and its exchange, and hence looks different according to different circumstances. But after all, those are still decisions or actions taken by the 'government', a rather empty notion embodying quite different, sometimes conflicting, directions, principles, or concrete techniques of governing. From this perspective, we are then very close to the notion of governmentality introduced by Foucault. According to Graham Burchell's interpretation, civil society, understood in the sense that it constitutes a space in which economic activities are conducted out of government's reach, is historically an invention of the government.^{cccxxx} That the invention of civil society is one of the techniques of the liberal

government is one of Foucault's arguments in the whole project on the genealogy of governmentality, in his lectures in 1978-79.

Foucault's project of a genealogy of governmentality analyzes -- from pastoral power dating back to Hebraic thought to the 'reason of state' in the classical period -- the notion of police in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, liberalisms since the seventeenth century, and the contemporary, neo-liberal counterpart.^{cccxxxi} In general terms, this analysis is 'an attempt to pose the question of the epistemological and technical conditions of existence of the political, to analyse the historical *a priori* by which we construct politics as a domain of thought and action, and to analyse the instrumentation, vocabulary and forms of reason by which this is done.'^{cccxxii} Whereas every form of governmentality has its own epistemology and problematic in regard to the notion of politics, in general it is a 'permanent instrument of critique'^{cccxxiii} to other and previous forms of governmentality.

The genealogy of governmentality in the lectures of Foucault is too rich in content to be discussed in full here, but insofar as it pertains to this discussion, it is instructive to draw on the comparison between notions of economy in different historical periods. The concept of government before the 18th century, in a sense, referred to the governing of the family (or household) in economic terms^{cccxxiv}. The emergence of the modern state, however, is characterized by the crystallization of this notion of the government of the household economy as a quasi-naturalistic, autonomous level of reality, which started to acquire

the name of political economy^{CCCXXV}. In other words, at the moment when modern government was founded, the idea of the government of the economy is more or less the successor to that of the government of the household. The sphere where individuals can freely conduct economic activities not only has a trace that can be found in the previous economic government of the household, it is also actively and intentionally organized, and placed out of reach, by the state. What is relevant about this analysis for our discussion here is that, as Dean Mitchell precisely summarizes, 'liberalism is an art of government not only because it recognizes that there are limits to the role of the state but because what it determines as falling outside the political sphere is itself necessary to the ends of government'^{CCCXXVI}.

The invention and protection of civil society, in which the *individual* is allowed to conduct rational economic activities, does not therefore refer to a retreat of government, but just to a different form of practicing its governmental techniques. Even in the shift to neo-liberalism, the government does not disappear altogether; especially in the version of neo-liberalism of the German *Ordoliberalen* specifically analysed by Foucault, the state is required to organize a competitive market institutionally and juridically. For these German liberals, market competition no longer takes on a natural character, it is institutional and artificial instead.^{CCCXXVII} Or, in a more general formulation, the role of the state just changes to '*actively creat[ing]* the condition within which entrepreneurial and competitive conduct is possible.'^{CCCXXVIII} (original emphasis).

It is precisely in civil society that we can see how the economy can be mobilized by the state itself as a principle of philosophical critique of 'too much government', and at the same time, as the very manifestation of governmental practice^{cccxxxix}. Should this argument lead one to confuse whether the state is indeed omnipotent or debilitated, Foucault would probably have answered that this very fundamental ambivalence is what should be retained. If we adhere to the way in which Foucault poses the question of governmentality, this ambivalence just once again re-affirms that governmentality is not simply about being for or against something according to some arbitrary principles, but rather about a manner of formulating a domain of knowledge and practice that we call the political.

Therefore, going back to the argument of Chiu and Choi, their studies not only successfully call into question, indeed by relativizing, the stagist approach to economic development, their studies even direct our attention to 'the intellectual and practical techniques and inventions via which civil society is brought into being as both distinct from political intervention and yet potentially alignable with political aspiration'.^{cccxi} This approach is meaningful to avoid the mistake of criticizing historiography while retaining its basic historical periodization; it also prevents us from discussing terms like civil society or government intervention in any a priori, a-historical sense.

Therefore, the picture that emerges from the history of the economic

development of Hong Kong is far from the clear-cut narrative in which industrialization is a distinct step-by-step process; instead, the vitality and significance of different types of industrial activities are invisible only when Hong Kong's history is narrated according to conventional literature. Moreover, the notion of *laissez-faire* should also be the subject of suspicion: it is just far removed from any ideological commitment. Historically it looks like an umbrella notion spanning decisions and policies of huge heterogeneity. It is ironically the outcome of the negotiation of interests between the colonial administration, the imperial authority, finance, trade and banking interests, and the industrialists, which, at different stages in Hong Kong's history, discourages *as well as* embraces the industrialization in Hong Kong.

And it is here that we can draw out a performative dimension of the rhetoric of the *laissez-faire* policy. In the words of Ngo, it is through the selective interpretation that *laissez-faire* is rationalized, *post hoc*, as a 'good policy' that contributed to the prosperity of Hong Kong, and it is through this *post hoc* rationalization that the popular legend of the barren-rock-turned-capitalist-paradise is sanctioned^{cccxi}, that the identity of Hong Kong can be established. The performative dimension here refers, by definition, precisely not to whether this understanding of the history of Hong Kong is accurate or correct, it is by and large irrelevant in many cases. The performative dimension resembles almost something like giving a simple and encompassing name to a historical space in which we, upon closer inspection, will find

incoherence, contradictions and inconsistency, evoking and obliging an inevitable precondition for the future path of Hong Kong, as informed by this very version of the Hong Kong experience.

Teleology complicated: the beginning is the end is the beginning...

Žižek tells a joke about a conversation between a Pole and a Jew, and the joke goes like this: in a train compartment where a Jew and a Pole sit opposite each other, the Pole is shifting nervously and watches the Jew all the time. Finally, he cannot restrain himself any longer and asks how Jews succeed in extracting even the last small coin from other people and accumulate all their wealth. The Jew agrees to tell him the secret, but the Pole has to pay some money to the Jew first. As the secret is being revealed by the Jew, he stops, and when the Pole asks greedily if he can become rich simply by following what the Jew said, the Jew demands more money from the Pole, then he would tell him the answer. The Pole pays, and the Jew goes on to tell the rest of the secret. He stops again and asks the Pole to pay even more before he continues. Finally, the Pole loses his temper and shouts at the Jew, 'You dirty rascal, do you really think I did not notice what you were aiming at? There is no secret at all, you simply want to extract the last small coin from me!' The Jew replies with resignation, 'this is how we do it...' ^{cccxl}

What Žižek tries to exemplify through this joke is that the Other (the Jew's secret) indeed does not exclude the Pole; that the Pole is NOT external to the Jew's secret. The joke of the Jew is successful only by

taking the desire of the Pole into consideration, that is to say, how to manipulate the 'secret', so that it causes our desire and at the same time is posed retroactively by this desire. As a result, at the end of the story, the Jew did deceive the Pole; he gets the money, and at the same time keeps his words. In other words, for the secret to be effective, the desire of the audience has to be taken into consideration. The audience, necessarily, has to fail to know the truth in the process of the unfolding of the secret. Therefore, it is wrong to situate the Jew's narrative of the secret as a path to the final revelation of the 'secret', which is assumed to be external to the narrative itself; instead, the narrative structure designates the Pole's impossible relation to the secret^{cccxlvi}, and that is where the secret lies, and that may be what the Pole has to acknowledge if he is to traverse the secret, *know* the secret.

From this perspective, the lesson is that it is not particularly helpful, if not misleading, to consider any story as a path to the final revelation of a secret, to consider the story from the final point the story reaches, as the final arbitrator, the final reference -- which sometimes leads us to a void. It would help to recall a story often told to people in their childhood. Once upon a time, a King went out of his luxury palace to come to the countryside to breathe some fresh air. When he approached the foot of a hill, he stopped and wanted to have some fun. He then told his followers confidently that if anyone could make him reach the peak of the hill, that person would be awarded anything the person would like to have. A guy nearby came up and said to the

King: I do not know how to make you reach the peak, but I do know how to make you go down once you have reached the top. The King did not believe him and went up with the guy. When they all arrived at the peak, the guy said to the King, with little regret: welcome to the peak, my honourable King.

If Žižek's joke functions to complicate the straightforward teleology that every story seems to imply, this childhood story calls into question the relevance of the power of the people with respect to the teleological structure, it even broadens the possible referent of 'secret' itself. In the Pole and Jew joke, it is still the nervous and defensive Pole who triggers the story by asking of a supposedly deceitful and omniscient Jew (in the view of the Pole, who is curious about the Jew) their way to make money. And the question the Pole asks is 'what the secret is'. The Jew, who knows it, dominates the unfolding of the narrative structure from this point. And in the case of the childhood story, it is the self-confident King who triggers the story, by asking a question that he thinks no one is able to answer, a question to which he thinks there is no ultimate answer yet. However, it is the follower who dominates the unfolding of the narrative. For the King, the question he asks is 'whether there is an answer'. So in this case, while in both cases the one who knows dominates the unfolding of the narrative structure, using the terminology of Žižek, even the King, who asks the question in the first place, can assume himself in a position excluded by the secret and external to the Other, not to mention the people who are the only possible candidates to answer the question, when indeed all of them

are from the very beginning part of and included in the same game. One can also see that the desire to know can accommodate both a conscious sense to seek the secret and a more primary and open-ended question that does not necessarily have an answer, even though both are ultimately unattainable. The trick here is that the sense of both having and, paradoxically, lacking an ultimate and exclusive answer can work equally well to trigger an inter-subjective network that we retroactively and straightforwardly name as teleology.

The above discussion is crucial to supplement the story of Richard Li in chapter 4. The openness of the working of desire works well with both Richard Li, who is the one manipulating the proceeding of the story, and other people, who are trying to make sense of the story, even if they do not consciously know if there is an answer at all. As long as we keep seeing the final revelation as the answer, rather than attend to how our desire to know the unattainable secret (which is whether Richard Li and the discourse of technology is the saviour of Hong Kong) guides us along the 'wrong way', (when the desire is the answer itself) we may still be far from approaching the contingent nature of this particular discourse, and we will fail to see for this particular discourse how our failure and desire are taken into consideration in advance^{cccxliv}. In this case, we will simply see the story and judge the story as a one-way teleological unfolding of the secret.

One question is justified to be brought up regarding Richard Li's story: his empire of PCCW and he himself both eventually failed -- his

company has shrunk back to what it is supposed to be worth, maybe even less; he himself has now become no more than the object of a joke^{cccxiv}. Moreover, time and again, even during his heyday, he was being criticized on account of his secret deals with the government, intentions of creating a monopoly and so on. While all of those are true and valid, they miss the point of the exercise in this thesis. In fact, those questions seem to mix up two aspects of inquiries, which are largely inseparable, but definitely not identical. To raise the question to what extent the discourse of technology successfully constructs its subjects is different from seeking to unravel the ways in which this discourse functions to construct its subjects. The analysis undertaken in this thesis, at the level of textual analysis, is clearly more of the latter kind. For the first kind of inquiry, a different methodology has to be employed, and is out of scope of the exercise in which we engaged here.

Regarding the way the discourse functions, as we have discussed above, the teleological relation inherent in any story should not be simply seen as a case in which the secret lies only in the final revelation, after a whole narrative process external to the secret is gone through. The secret as merely the point of final revelation should not be taken as the absolute arbitrator, and is indeed far from being the most revealing. By the same token, the audience is also never neutral, listening indifferently to a story that reveals the answer in the last minute. Therefore, while it is true that Richard Li and his empire have fallen now, this alone is not adequately meaningful to be taken as the final answer of the whole problem, assigning meanings to all elements in the

discourse. On the contrary, all those questions justifiably raised could actually function as attempts to put up seemingly external scapegoats to mask the very fundamental contradictory quality and impossibility of the discourse, even at its peak moment, or from the opposite direction, against which 'a pathos or nostalgia for a lost wholeness'^{cccxli} can be constructed. In this light, judging him from the perspective of the final situation in which he turns out to be in, only defers, if not suspends, the exposure of the mask covering the impossible unity of the discourse of technology, and hence fails to see the impossibility of any primary narrative or discursively constructed social space in which all these discrepant elements and moments, in the sense defined by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in *Hegemony and socialist strategy*^{cccxlii}, can be coherently articulated. Therefore, although those questions are fully valid and could point to different directions of research, this validity stands only insofar as they do not presuppose a primary narrative or discursively constructed social space in which the discourse of technology and other elements and overflows can be properly and coherently accommodated.

Why does the government always come up with solutions?

Referring to the discussion of the previous section, early industrialization and the story of Richard Li, it might be interesting to postulate both the *laissez-faire* and the high-technology function as the unattainable secret in Žižek's joke about the Pole and the Jew. Or in other words, it is the *objet a*, which is 'nothing but the rendering positive of a negative,

of making an object out of what does not exist'.^{cccxlvi} It is the object-cause of our desire, when the *objet a* itself is the very embodiment of the lack, and hence retroactively the desire.^{cccxli} Through this perspective, the issue with the discourse of technology is not whether it is 'for real', in terms of bringing economic success to Hong Kong, or whether it has unanimously been internalized in the minds of the people. We must, instead, pay attention to how this desire of *laissez-faire* and hi-tech as the '(unattainable) secret' to the economies since the early 1950s, and at the end of 20th century respectively, retroactively, or borrowing the words of Ngo, *post hoc*, constitute fantasy spaces, where the spaces themselves must by definition be deemed failures. Elements constituting the fantasy space can be various and include such as the post-handover Southeast Asia economic crisis, the lack of technological sophistication and diversification for long periods of time, too much indulgence in futureless labour-intensive and cutthroat industrial activities, threats of globalization, etc. It is precisely against these fantasy spaces that *laissez-faire* and hi-tech can be constructed effectively as the object of desire, the magic and inevitable pills for economic development or the revival of Hong Kong.

In order to further exemplify this mechanism, it might be instructive to recall Žižek's rejection of Stalinism in his postface to Lukacs' *A defense of history and class consciousness*. According to Žižek, for Stalinism, it is impossible to have any *act* proper. Stalin asserts that the revolutionary potential is written into the very 'inner nature' of the working class, yet it

does not arise spontaneously, and needs 'neutral intellectuals' to force the potential out of the workers. This very compulsion is 'the Party's exertion of dictatorial pressure over the "empirical", actually existing workers and their confused, opportunistic self-awareness, in the name of (the Party's correct insight into) what their true inner potentials and/or their "true long-term interests" in fact are' .^{ccc}

Here we have the same structure in the case of Žižek's analysis of Stalinism and the case of the narration of Hong Kong history. In the case of the analysis of Stalinism, the moment of fantasy occurs when the nature of the working class is determined as revolutionary, but only in the form of 'potential', and along with this potential, they have their own interest, conflicts, etc., among themselves. And it is against this fantasy that (with their exclusive insight into the development of history) the Party's coercion becomes justifiable and even inevitable. In the case of the early account of the industrialization of Hong Kong by finance and trade capitalists, *hongs*, Hong Kong as a fantasy space was posed in which trade is 'objectively' and 'empirically' more profitable, the geographical conditions and raw materials and so on were all supposed to be unsuitable for developing industries. It is against this scenario that the desire to create the colony exclusively as an entrepot is posed, in the name of the 'stability and prosperity' of Hong Kong. The more Hong Kong is considered unsuitable for the development of industries, the more the development of the entrepot business is apposite and urgent. The moment of retroactivity here is that, by steering Hong Kong in the direction of entrepot trade, even

the 'objective environment' according to which we judge the validity of the fantasy changes in a direction favourable to the business of trade and finance, and hence makes the desire of the trade-benefiting *laissez-faire* naturally more palatable.

The discourse of technology is the contemporary counterpart that can be juxtaposed to those we have just looked into. Stanley Aronowitz provides one formulation in his book, *Jobless future: 'American's weakened competitive position had to be improved through efficiency programmes such as technological change that reduced the size of the factory labour force; mergers and acquisitions that eliminated redundancy... and applying hatchet to "overhead" costs such as clerical workers and middle management'*.^{cccl} The economic recovery brought about in these ways is called 'jobless recovery', and in such a situation, 'everything, including jobs, had to be sacrificed to make workers more productive'.^{cccll} Is this not the basic model of what we have seen in the case of Richard Li's PCCW? The basic elements are still employees, whose characteristics are: inefficient and redundant, whose status is again posed as the fantasy against which trimming and restructuring are conceived as 'authentic' solutions to the indeed unanswerable problem framed in terms of employees. This play of the 2 categories is significant, since fantasy and desire are in a relation in which fantasy creates desire which retroactively creates fantasy. They are therefore not two independent variables for us to measure the innocent distance between them. Our perception of any one end of the tension necessarily involves, or indeed is constituted by,

our change in perception from the other end. Yet, in the example of Richard Li, this game of restructuring is played out without much technological content, not to mention technological improvement, even if this discussion is situated precisely in the rhetoric of the 'new economy', which is highly associated with technological innovation. Yet the closed circuit that draws us in is still that the more Hong Kong's industries are under-developed in terms of technologies, the more hi-tech Hong Kong is obliged to become.

In effect, echoing Žižek's assertion that a letter will always arrive at its destination, we can have a glimpse at why the government always comes up with solutions in different economic situations. The letter always arrives at its destination because once the letter enters into the symbolic circuit, the sender is subsequently disburdened of his responsibility for the letter.^{cccliii} The sense of teleology here is not the ultimately unshakable, and objectively existing direct channel through which a letter arrives at its destination, quite the contrary, teleology here is merely presented as a *post hoc* rendering positive of the inter-subjective network that the letter passes through. So the fact that the government always comes up with a solution -- no matter whether it is entrepot trade in the pre-war period, industries in the post-war, or hi-tech by the end of the 20th century, with the *laissez-faire* policy a constant -- has less to do with the government's ability to identify and make sense of the problem at the very beginning, and its subsequent ability to formulate strictly corresponding solutions. Quite on the contrary, the teleological and causal relations involved have more to

do with retroactive creations of 'problems' to be solved and the retroactive fixing of dissimilar elements (i.e. the problems created and the solutions taken *post hoc*) into meaningful sequences in the field of discourse. As far as our desire is concerned, teleology is not a path out there in an *a priori* form, the government always comes up with solutions because we want 'to know', the solutions are only articulations that occupy our lack of the answer, and the problem as well, which is produced out of our desire 'to know', and are meant for us only.

What exactly is 'hi-tech', then?

We have now reached a position very close to the one of Laclau and Mouffe. In their *Hegemony and socialist strategy*, they revisit the interpretation of the history of the Russian Revolution and provide an alternative reading of the significance of that history. In orthodox Marxist doctrine, class is an abstract category defined in terms of its position in the process of production, and the historical development proceeds sequentially from the revolution of the bourgeois over the feudal lord to the revolution of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie. But the situation of Russia at the beginning of the 20th century is peculiar, there was 'weakness of the bourgeoisie, and urban civilization; disproportionate growth of the State as a military-bureaucratic apparatus becoming autonomous from classes; insertion of advanced form of capitalism resulting from "privilege of backwardness"; freshness of the Russian proletariat, due to the absence of tradition tying it to a complex civil society'^{cccliv}. Due to the immaturity of the bourgeoisie,

they argue, the question of hegemony regarding the historical development is designated by a space 'dominated by the tension between two very different relations: a) that of the hegemonized task and its "natural" class agent; and b) that of the hegemonized task and the class hegemonizing it'.^{ccclv}

In other words, the question of the Russian Revolution is: how can we grasp, as Žižek asks in a similar tone, 'the tremendous emancipatory potential of the Event of October'^{ccclvi}, without falling back to strictly observing some ambiguous law of general historical development. In effect, this is the question of how we are to understand the Russian proletariat's bypassing the bourgeoisie to overthrow the Tsar: are we to still cling to the 'narrative of exceptionalities' or to open up the 'conceptualization of specificities'?^{ccclvii} Despite their complex argument, their answer is simple: what is important is the contingent, historical and hegemonic articulation of dissimilar elements, and our analysis of them, instead of their fixation back into the chain of abstract historical necessity. That is why they assert that, '(h)istory, therefore, is regarded not as an ascendant *continuum* of democratic reforms, but as a discontinuous series of hegemonic articulation or historical blocs'.^{ccclviii}

According to this assertion, it is meaningful to borrow this insight of Laclau and Mouffe from the reconsideration of the problem of history to the analysis of the discourse of technology in Hong Kong, and this has been attempted in this thesis: For both the government and the

business sector, the issue of hi-tech is posed as a 'logically necessary' or at least transparent implication against an 'objectively pressing' situation in the post-handover year. In the first chapter, an attempt was made to draw a rough picture in which different ways of approaching the problems of technology are sketched out. The discussions and debates vary hugely according to the times when they emerge, the theoretical frameworks to which they refer, the meanings of the very term 'technology' they evoke, etc., but all of them amount to drawing the picture of a dispersion or proliferation of the discourse of technology, in the sense of Foucault, as we can actually see there is hardly anything unifying in the term 'technology' itself: notions (except the very one of 'technology') such as author, style, period of time, idea, etc. all fail to unite this huge diversity of discussions and debates

The chapter on the governance of Hong Kong further destabilizes the idea that Hong Kong is 'a black box of rational progress'. Through the ways in which the vicious circle consisting of epidemics, bird flu and SARS, and public hygiene is articulated, the strength of changing our perspective regarding the analysis of social and political events should have become adequately clear. In the chapter, the concept of the performative is repeatedly discussed, and the reason should be obvious enough now. The idea that no matter when we speak or perform, we necessarily have objectively, externally existing referents from which we can judge the truth or falsity of what we said, is called into question. Instead, when we speak or perform, we constantly re-articulate, modify, or reinvent the referents concerned. Is this not

precisely the philosophical assumption of the theoretical discussion above? Concepts like historical development, field of discourse should not be assumed to have any essential, a priori core, such that other unarticulated elements are deemed as essentially external elements, and denied any fundamental potential for change. Thus we can see, from a greater distance, as shown in chapter 1, the degree of inconsistency or even conflict and chaos regarding the meaning of the 'master signifier' (and the meaning assigned from it to others). And it is in chapter 2 that we can see how every particular discourse in the field tries to set in place and fix, albeit temporarily, a certain network of meaning around the impossible master signifier; or in other words, how meaning is only possible when it is fixed temporarily in a particular discourse.

Upon the groundwork laid down in chapter 1 and 2, the 2 subsequent chapters go on to depict the discourse (regarding both the government and business sector -- Richard Li and his PCCW in particular) constructed around the notion of hi-tech, as the ultimate and constitutive inadequacy. The chapters seek to show the mechanism of the hegemonic *attempts* of the SAR Government and Richard Li's PCCW to articulate dissimilar elements and temporarily fix their meanings, so as to render possible a harmonious, unified discourse of hi-tech, namely a natural teleological path for Hong Kong. At the same time, by providing a broader global association and uncovering the unarticulated and subversive elements which penetrate the government and business discourse, the chapter argues for, instead of

a straightforward value judgment, the necessary impossibility of such attempts.

The argument described above may better be explained with an imaginary example. For a very fatal disease, a whole range of treatments, medicines, and arrangements are inspired to combat it, but the mere presence of all of them will just give the disease a deadlier quality: if a certain simple treatment is able to cure it, that whole range of responses is unconceivable and unnecessary. Therefore, all of those responses, instead of successfully recognizing or capturing the disease, only paradoxically determine the quality of the disease as fatal. And if this example, though imaginary in nature, sounds easily understandable, it may be due to our recent association of something similar to it: SARS. SARS is not eliminated because medical professions invented an accurate and proper treatment, all arrangements regarding public hygiene look more like political gestures than direct responses to the disease, its gradual disappearance is also out of our grasp. All of them indeed confer the utter unattainability of the disease, yet the drive derived from this unattainability simply articulates dissimilar elements together, which further makes the disease mysterious. In the light of the discussion in chapter 2, rather than just proving the necessity of an analysis in terms of articulation, what the case of SARS shows us in this present context is obviously the complexity of causal relations in terms of the working of desire.

Referring back to our present discussion, suffice it to juxtapose the notion of 'hi-tech' with the notion of 'society' in Laclau and Mouffe. According to their famous discussion of the 'impossibility of society' as a 'sutured and self-defined totality', the assertion precisely points out that 'there is no single underlying principle fixing – and hence constituting – the whole field of [social] difference'.^{ccclix} Our sense of society as 'a valid object of discourse' is only an ideological nodal point, which 'consists precisely in those discursive forms that seek to construct society and social agency as decidable discursive forms within a totalizing horizon that projects on to a particular discursive form an impossible fullness and transparency'.^{ccclx} Or from another angle, Laclau's nodal point is also Žižek's 'quilt', both society and 'hi-tech' can be conceived of as words 'to which "things" themselves refer to recognize themselves in their unity'.^{ccclxi} What this understanding implies is that, although the words are the points to which all moments within the discourse refer, the words do not consequently contain the richest meaning, or are not the master signifier assigning meaning to everything within the unity. Rather, the very words have to be utterly empty to embody the possible relations, and hence the meanings, that the words retroactively establish with the 'things', the dissimilar elements, waiting to be articulated. So if society exists only as a perpetual effort to construct its impossible self, 'hi-tech' as the nodal point, or quilt, works in a similar way. Whereas by definition a discourse embodies the attempt to fix, at least temporarily, the meaning of the moments within, all the references within the same discourse will definitely make the meaning of the nodal point

self-conflicting and senseless, hence rendering it impossible for the nodal point to have any stable, self-defining meaning.

Conclusion

By now it should be clear that we do not criticize ideology because we consciously have a very defined and clear-cut picture of how a certain ideology misleads people, how ideology distorts the reality and so on. Any reality is not to be grasped in its fullness, but is constantly in the remaking discursively, whose master-signifier, or the nodal point, is the ultimate inadequacy or unreachable, or in another formulation, the real goal of any ideology 'is (just) the consistency, is the ideological attitude itself'.^{ccclxii} Therefore, it is rather fruitless or incomplete simply to point out all the cracks between actions and thoughts, between the revealed intentions and the implicit intentions, between the reality formulated in any specific discourse and the reality 'as it is'; in short, the symptoms. However, to say that it is fruitless obviously does not imply that there is no crack or there is nothing to blame: it is only the first step, rather than a complete process. The joke of the local stand-up comedian already shows us that the emptiness of any crack can paradoxically act as the ultimate support of people's justification of their actions or decisions. Instead, the notion of fruitlessness implies that valid and effective criticisms do not stop where symptoms are pointed out, or, as Žižek said, 'the unmasking of the secret is not sufficient'.^{ccclxiii}

What we have to attend to, therefore, is the *form* of ideology that drags people in – replacing the content without traversing the form

can not take us too far; the history of Hong Kong's economic development narrated by a liberal or a socialist necessarily have differences, but not necessarily in terms of being ideological or not. If critics would like to wake people up from the neo-liberal fantasy (unless they in fact want to convert people to become total nihilists), what they have to do will be to conceive of a hegemonic articulation that does not presume any *a priori* master-signifier, such as *laissez-faire* or a new economy based on I.T., which fixes historical meanings once and for all. Recognizing the opening of any articulation; not trying to cover up points where incoherence can be found; keeping openness a topic of dialogue and debate; allowing change of articulation as the result of the dialogue or debate – all these may be possible ways to live with the necessity of fixing temporal meaning discursively.^{ccclxiv}

Introduction

ⁱ For details of the Digital 21 IT Strategy, see the official website. http://www.info.gov.hk/digital21/chi/strategy2004/strategy_main.html

ⁱⁱ *Sun*, June 12, 2004.

ⁱⁱⁱ *Oriental News*, April 14, 2004.

^{iv} *Sun*, January 28, 2004.

^v *Sun*, December 12, 2003.

^{vi} *Mingpao*, November 21, 2003.

^{vii} *Ta Kung Pao*, December 11, 2003.

^{viii} *South China Morning Post*, December 19, 2003

^{ix} *Sun*, December 19, 2003

^x Hau, Luen-kwai, *Appledaily*, May 9, 2004

In terms of nothing technological as such

^{xi} Heidegger, Martin. *The question concerning technology and other essays*. New York: Harper and Roy, 1977. P.4.

^{xii} Adorno, Theodore and Max Horkheimer. *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. London: Verso, 1999 [1944]. P.85

^{xiii} Foucault, Michel. 'Space, knowledge, and power'. In Faubion, James, D. ed. *Power*. London: Penguin, 1994. p.348

^{xiv} *Ibid.*, p.349

^{xv} Williams, Raymond. *Keywords: a vocabulary of culture and society*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. p.315

^{xvi} *Ibid.*, p.41

^{xvii} *Ibid.*, pp276-80.

^{xviii} *Ibid.*, pp.41-2

^{xix} *Ibid.*, p.42

^{xx} This separation can indeed find more material support or even mobilization from the development of the term 'industry'. 'Industry', originally associated with the meaning of diligence or quality of sustained effort. The word became emphasized in the sense of institution or sets of institution of production and trade, only after the rise of two derivatives: industrial revolution and industrialism. The rise of these two terms was subsequently the result of the technical change in production and the new order of society based on organized mechanical production, all in the late 18th and 19th century. See Williams, p.165-7

^{xxi} Heidegger, Martin. *The question concerning technology and other essays*. New York: Harper and Roy, 1977. p.21-4

^{xxii} *Ibid.*, p.4

^{xxiii} Translator's note 16, in *The question concerning technology*, p.17

^{xxiv} Zimmerman, Michael E. *Heidegger's confrontation with modernity: Technology, Politics, Art*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990. P.29

^{xxv} *Ibid.*, P.223

^{xxvi} the four causes include 1) the *causa materialis*, which refers to the material, the mater out of which something is made; 2) the *causa formalis*, which refers to the form, the shape into which the material enters; 3) the *causa finalis*, which refers to the end in relation to the object required is determined as to its form and matter; 4) the *causa efficiens*, which, or who, brings about the effects. Whereas

Heidegger does not invent the four types of causes himself, they are just something 'for centuries what philosophy has taught', he uses the four causes to explore what technology as pure instrumentality may disclose. See Heidegger, Martin. *The question concerning technology and other essays*. New York: Harper and Roy, 1977. p.6

^{xxvii} While the notions of 'genuine' and 'original' may seem suspicious and dubious enough (insofar as the impossibility of any original and genuine nationality, in the strict sense of the words), Zimmerman points out that it was Heidegger's propensity to 'overcome isolation, alienation, and meaninglessness', Zimmerman further argues that this propensity explains Heidegger's close proximity to the major themes of *völkisch* authors. See Zimmerman, Michael E. *Heidegger's confrontation with modernity: Technology, Politics, Art*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990. Pp.23-4

^{xxviii} Ibid., p.24

^{xxix} Heidegger, Martin. *The question concerning technology and other essays*. New York: Harper and Roy, 1977. p.29

^{xxx} Some critics argued that Heidegger's allegiance to Hitler's regime is exactly the result of his break from modern technological society, no matter left or right. The reason is that Heidegger believed that this great leader 'would restore Germany to its authentic origins, thereby making possible a new relationship to work on the part of the German *volk*.' See Zimmerman, Michael E. *Heidegger's confrontation with modernity: Technology, Politics, Art*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990. For the discussion of the relationship of science, technology and politics, see also Rorty, Richard, 'another possible world'. Stierle, Karlheinz, 'An eye too few: earth and world in Heidegger, Hölderlin, and Rousseau' and McCarthy, Thomas, 'Heidegger and critical theory: the first encounter', all in Harris, Karsten and Christoph Jamme eds. *Martin Heidegger: politics, arts, and technology*. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1994.

^{xxxi} Heidegger, Martin. *The question concerning technology and other essays*. New York: Harper and Roy, 1977. p.25

^{xxxii} Žižek, Slavoj. 'Bring me my Philips mental jacket' in *London Review of Books*. vol. 25, no. 10.

^{xxxiii} Ibid.

^{xxxiv} Ibid.

^{xxxv} Adorno, Theodore and Max Horkheimer. *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. London: Verso, 1999 [1972]. P.xi.

^{xxxvi} Ibid., p.81

^{xxxvii} Ibid., p.43

^{xxxviii} Ibid., pp.47-8. Another example of the Enlightenment element before the period of Enlightenment mentioned in the *Dialectic* is the logic of equivalence. The ability of abstraction involved in the consideration of equivalence, no matter whether in gift exchange or choice of substitute for sacrifice. See 'the Concept of Enlightenment' and 'Excursus I: Odyssey or myth and Enlightenment' in *Dialectic*.

^{xxxix} Alway, Joan. *Critical theory and political possibilities*. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1995. P.34.

^{xl} Adorno, Theodore and Max Horkheimer. *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. London: Verso, 1999 [1972]. pp.81-4

^{xli} Alway, Joan. *Critical theory and political possibilities*. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1995. P.35.

^{xlii} Adorno, Theodore and Max Horkheimer. *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. London: Verso, 1999 [1972]. pp.85-6

^{xliii} Ibid., p.154

^{xliv} Huyssen, Andreas. *After the great divide: modernism, mass culture,*

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- postmodernism*. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1986. P.23
- ^{xlv} Ibid., P.20
- ^{xlvi} Heidegger, quoted in Zimmerman, Michael E. *Heidegger's confrontation with modernity: Technology, Politics, Art*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990. P.22-3
- ^{xlvii} Adorno, Theodore and Max Horkheimer. *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. London: Verso, 1999 [1972]. P.148
- ^{xlviii} Huyssen, Andreas. *After the great divide: modernism, mass culture, postmodernism*. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1986. Pp.22-3
- ^{xlix} Adorno, Theodore and Max Horkheimer. *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. London: Verso, 1999 [1972]. P.16
- ⁱ Huyssen, Andreas. *After the great divide: modernism, mass culture, postmodernism*. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1986. P.23
- ⁱⁱ Basalla, quoted in Kumar, Deepak. *Science and the raj 1857-1905*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000. p.3-4
- ⁱⁱⁱ Arnold, David. *Science, technology and medicine in colonial India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. P.8. However, a few pages later, Arnold concedes that Basalla remained widely cited and discussed, because of 'the absence of a more satisfactory model'. See *ibid.* p.11
- ^{liii} Adas, Michael, quoted in *ibid.* P.12
- ^{liv} *Ibid.*, p.9-15
- ^{lv} Chatterjee, Partha. *Nationalist thought and the colonial world: a derivative discourse?* London: Zed Books, 1996. p.30.
- ^{lvi} Prakesh, Gyan, 'Science between the line', in Amin, Shahid and Dipesh Chakrabarty eds. *Subaltern Studies IX*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996. P.60.
- ^{lvii} Kumar, Deepak. *Science and the raj 1857-1905*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000. p.181-2
- ^{lviii} See the the cases of B.N. Bose, P.N. Bose, P.N. Datta and more in *ibid.* p.216-22
- ^{lix} *Ibid.*, p.198
- ^{lx} Prakesh, Gyan, 'Science between the line', in Amin, Shahid and Dipesh Chakrabarty eds. *Subaltern Studies IX*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996. P.79-80
- ^{lxi} Arnold, David. *Science, technology and medicine in colonial India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. P.15
- ^{lxii} Nandy, Ashis, 'Introduction: science as a reason of state', in Nandy, Ashis ed. *Science, Hegemony and violence: a requiem for modernity*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990. P.1-21
- ^{lxiii} *Ibid.*, P.9
- ^{lxiv} Mathu, Piyush. 'Nuclearism: The contours of a political ecology', in *Social Text*. 19.1, 2001. Pp.1-18
- ^{lxv} *Ibid.*
- ^{lxvi} *Ibid.*
- ^{lxvii} Shiva, Vandana. 'Reductionist science as epistemological violence', in Nandy, Ashis ed. *Science, Hegemony and violence: a requiem for modernity*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990. P.242-4
- ^{lxviii} *Ibid.*, p238
- ^{lxix} Harding, Sandra. *Is science multicultural? Postcolonialism, feminism and epistemologies*. Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1998. Pp.23-38
- ^{lxx} *Ibid.*, p.23
- ^{lxxi} Hessen, quoted in *ibid.*, p.30
- ^{lxxii} *Ibid.*, pp.32-3
- ^{lxxiii} *Ibid.*, pp.29-35

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- lxxiv Hacking, Ian, 'the disunities of sciences' quoted in *ibid.* p.2
- lxxv *Ibid.*, p.75-6
- lxxvi Harding, Sandra, quoted in Wajcman, Judy. *Feminism confronts technology*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991. P.10
- lxxvii Harding, Sandra. *Is science multicultural? Postcolonialism, feminism and epistemologies*. Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1998.P.77
- lxxviii Wajcman, Judy. *Feminism confronts technology*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991. P.11
- lxxix Longino, Helen. 'Subjects, power, and knowledge: description and prescription in feminist philosophies of science' in Bartsch, Ingrid and Muriel Lederman eds. *The gender and science reader*. London and New York: Routledge, 2001.
- lxxx Longino also sets down rules for the effective of the community: the community must conduct their discussion in a publicly recognized forum, with the rules and criteria for evaluating the contents of discussion subject to constant revision by the participating public. No political and economic coercion can be allowed in the proceeding of the discussion. In *ibid.*
- lxxxi Wajcman, Judy. *Feminism confronts technology*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991. Pp.18-9
- lxxxii Foucault, Michel. 'Truth and power', in Faubion, James, D. ed. *Power*, London: Penguin, 1994. pp.116-25.
- lxxxiii See Marx, Leo and Merritt Roe Smith 'Introduction', in Marx, Leo and Merritt Roe Smith eds. *Does technology drive history?*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994. Pp. xii-xiii. For different positions in this technological determinism debate, see also other articles in the same volume.
- lxxxiv Castells, Manuel. *The rise of the network society*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000. Pp.5-13
- lxxxv *Ibid.*, P8
- lxxxvi Pacey, Arnold. *The Culture of Technology*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983. P.14
- lxxxvii Braverman, Harry. *Labour and monopoly of capital*. New York: Monthly Review, 1974. Pp.169-83
- lxxxviii see the table of the fall inpercentage manufacturing worker from 1820-1970, in *ibid.*,P.283
- lxxxix Douglas, Susan J., 'Amateur operators and American Broadcasting: shaping the future of radio', in Corn, Joseph J. ed. *Imagining tomorrow: history, technology and the American future*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1986. Pp.35-57
- xc Silverstone, Roger and Robin Mansell. 'The politics of information and communication technologies'. In Silversone, Roger and Robin Mansell eds *Communication by design*. London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Pp.213-27
- xcI *Ibid.*, p.215
- xcII *Ibid.*, p.217
- xcIII Morley, David. *Home Territories*. London and New York: Routledge, 2000. Pp.105-27.
- xcIV *Ibid.*, p.7.
- xcV Ross, Kristin. *Fast car, Clean Body: decolonization and the reordering of French culture*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1999.
- xcVI *Ibid.*, p.169
- xcVII Castells, Manuel. *The informational city*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1989. p.348
- xcVIII Sussman, Gerald. 'Urban congregations of capital and communications: redesigning social and spatial boundaries', in *Social Text*. 17.3, 1999. Pp.35-51.
- xcIX *Ibid.*, p350
- c Sassen, Saskia ed. *Global networks, linked cities*. London and New York:

Routledge, 2002. Pp.1 -29

^{ci} Ibid., p.13 Sussman also asks a similar question, but in the opposite direction: 'given such a degree of economic and informational concentration and integration, does place still matter?' in Sussman, Gerald. 'Urban congregations of capital and communications: redesigning social and spatial boundaries', in *Social Text*. 17.3, 1999. pp.35-51

^{cii} She gives 2 reasons for that. The first one is the 'agglomeration effect' of the city that allows various kinds of experts to interact, to establish what Sassen calls the social connectivity. The second is the 'social infrastructure' for that social or even global connectivity. See Sassen, Saskia. 'An interview with Saskia Sassen'. in *Cities and Design*, no.13/14, March 2003

^{ciii} Ibid., p.21

^{civ} Downey, John. 'XS 4 all? "Information society" policy and practice'. In Downey, John and Jim McGuigan eds. *Technocities*. London: Sage Publications, 1999. Pp.121-39

^{cv} Sussman, Gerald. 'Urban congregations of capital and communications: redesigning social and spatial boundaries', in *Social Text*. 17.3, 1999. pp.35-51

^{cvi} Massey, Doreen; Paul Quintas and David Wield. *High-tech fantasies: science parks in society, science, and space*. London; New York: Routledge, 1992. Pp. 72-85

^{cvi} Ibid., Pp.36-7

HK as a blackbox of 'rational progress' ?

^{cviii} Geertz, Clifford. *Negara: the theatre state in the nineteen -century Bali*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980. P.120.

^{cix} Ibid., p.104

^{cx} Ibid., p.121

^{cx} Gould, Timothy. 'The unhaPpy performative', in Parker, Andrew and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick eds. *Performativity and Performance*. New York and London: Routledge, 1995. P.20.

^{cxii} Ibid., Pp.24-31

^{cxiii} Ibid., P.30

^{cxiv} Miller, J. Hillis, quoted in *ibid.*, p.25

^{cxv} Butler, Judith, 'Burning acts: injurious speech' in *ibid.*, pp197-227.

^{cxvi} Ibid., p.205

^{cxvii} Ibid.

^{cxviii} Geertz, Clifford. *Negara: the theatre state in the nineteen -century Bali*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980. P.120.

^{cxix} Butler, Judith, 'Burning acts: injurious speech' in Parker, Andrew and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick eds. *Performativity and performance*. New York and London: Routledge, 1995. P.197

^{cxx} Tung Chee Hwa, speech at the sixth World Economic Development Congress, September, 17,1997

^{xxi} Hong Kong SAR Government, Policy Address 1997.

^{xxii} My translation, Chinese version: '利民紓困 自強不息'

^{xxiii} My translation, Chinese version: '強本節用 共創新猷'

^{xxiv} My translation, Chinese version: '坦白說，要給市民一些短暫的喜悅，而撇開香港長遠利益，是能夠辦到的，但我認為，將納稅人的血汗錢拿來換取一時的掌聲，是一個非常不負責任政府的所為，更是危險的動作'。 Tsang, Donald, speech at the radio programme, 'Letter to Hong Kong', RTHK. January 24, 1998.

^{xxv} Foucault, Michel. 'The subject and power', in David Ingram and Simon-Julia

Ingram eds. *Critical theory: the essential readings*. Minnesota: Paragon House, 1991. Pp.303-19

^{cxxvi} *Mingpao*, October 21, 2000; *Singtao Daily*, April 24, 2003.

^{cxxvii} Team Clean, Hong Kong SAR Government, Report on measures to improve environmental hygiene in Hong Kong, August 9, 2003. p.98

^{cxxviii} Hong Kong SAR Government, Press release, 'Joint effort to dispose of chicken carcasses', January 2, 1998.

^{cxxix} Newsweek, 'The sky is falling', *Newsweek*, Vol. 131 Issue 2, January 12, 1998, p.38.

^{xxx} Hong Kong SAR Government, press release, 'Screening of travelers not necessary', January 5, 1998; see also, Hong Kong SAR Government, press release, 'Preventive measure for avian flu implemented', December 23, 1997; Hong Kong SAR Government, press release, 'Chicken slaughter exercise go off in full swing', December 30, 1997.

^{xxxi} Business Week, 'Now for the side effect', *Business Week*, Issue 3560, January 12, 1998, p. 48; Newsweek, 'The sky is falling', *Newsweek*, Vol. 131 Issue 2, January 12, 1998, p.38.

^{xxxii} Hong Kong SAR Government, press release, 'Government announces slaughter of chicken', December 28, 1997.

^{xxxiii} Business Week, 'Now for the side effect', *Business Week*, Issue 3560, January 12, 1998, p. 48.

^{xxxiv} *Mingpao*, January 11, 2004.

^{xxxv} *Appledaily*, December 31, 2003

^{xxxvi} When asked about the action of WHO, Mr. Tung's response was that tourists are declining in numbers anyway, and what WHO has done is merely a confirmation of what has been happening'. The action of the WHO immediately sent the government officials of the SAR in an embarrassing position to respond, on the one hand; the press had exposed that the government had tried to 'dissuade the organization for taking such a step', on the other hand. See *South China Morning Post*, April 3, 2003; and also Hong Kong SAR Government, press release, 'CE's transcript', April 2, 2003.

^{xxxvii} The words of Mr. Li to the public already revealed that his decision to suspend classes was involuntary, or at least not practical regarding the halting of spread. The official government statement maintains that the suspension was a measure to 'prevent the spread of atypical pneumonia on school premises.' (See Hong Kong SAR Government, press release, 'Suspension of classes for the prevention of atypical pneumonia', March 27, 2003). However, the further elaboration of the decision by Mr. Li showed his obstinacy on the 'uselessness' of the decision. On the one hand, when asked ironically: does this 'postponed' decision result in increased infection of school kids? the answer he provided was, 'not even one'. On the other hand, he also argued that suspension of classes would not relieve the danger of infection, he said, 'school premises are still safe, and all students were infected in places other than school.' See *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, March 28, 2003; *Appledaily*, March 28, 2003.

^{xxxviii} Hong Kong SAR Government, press release, 'CE's transcript', May 5, 2003.

^{xxxix} Ibid.

^{cxl} Indeed, the source and spread of SARS in Hong Kong is recognized now in a Chinese medical doctor. He brought the virus from mainland China, and during his brief stay in a local hotel, the virus was transmitted to a couple of other travelers who stayed at the same floor of the same hotel as the doctor. When later the doctor got a temperature and went into a local hospital with the then unknown virus, the infected travelers had already flown the virus to Singapore and Toronto. See *Mingpao*, April 24, 2003. This is indeed the best footnote to the government's

almost one-dimensional emphasis on hygiene.

^{cxli} My translation, original version, '告訴我們知道應付大疫症，好像 SARS，一定要從根拔起，很多事情要從根本處理。要從個人衛生著手，以至家居衛生、飲食習慣、環境衛生、工作地方的衛生'。Hong Kong SAR Government, Press release, 'CS's transcript', May 13, 2003.

^{cxlii} My translation, original version, '我們不會忘記它摧毀香港，另外亦奪去我們近三百名香港市民的寶貴生命，... 現在香港跟三個月前的香港已很不同，對於公共生、私人衛生及家居衛生的要求已更上一層樓。' Hong Kong SAR Government, press release, 'CS's transcript', May 28, 2003.

^{cxliii} My translation, original version: 理性打贏文明戰爭。 *Oriental Daily*, August 10, 2003. The choice of the description with 'military tone' shall not be too far away from what was intended by the government. Donald Tsang pointed out in his presentation that the police force has already been provided for other law-enforcing departments with the necessary training to combat scenarios involving resistance and violence. See Hong Kong SAR Government, press release, 'CS's transcript', August 9, 2003.

^{cxliv} Team Clean, Hong Kong SAR Government, Report on measures to improve environmental hygiene in Hong Kong, August 9, 2003.

^{cxlv} Exclusively in the Chinese version, there is a reason for the tenants to do the dressing of poultry in the stall instead of the scalding room, which is: 'for the sake of convenience', '貪圖方便'. See *ibid.*, p.70

^{cxlvi} Team Clean, Hong Kong SAR Government, Report on measures to improve environmental hygiene in Hong Kong, August 9, 2003. p.18. It is interesting to note that while the report did not elaborate clearly what it means by a hygiene black spot as much as the 'eradication' of it, it provides photo illustrations to contrast the differences made by intensive cleaning. A quick glance at the photos can only tell that if there is really a great difference between images before and after cleaning, one important difference will probably be 'lighting'. Images after the cleaning were usually taken under intense light, while those before seem underexposed.

^{cxlvii} This raise of the amount of the fixed penalty caught public attention because the policy of a fixed penalty was only effective since June 2002, which is about a year before the Team Clean's decision to raise the amount.

^{cxlviii} *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, August 14, 2003

^{cxlix} One major orientation of the Team Clean is to 'crush the old and establish the new' 破舊立新 in Chinese. Hong Kong SAR Government, press release, 'CS's statement in the Legco', May 28, 2003.

^{cl} Team Clean, Hong Kong SAR Government, Report on measures to improve environmental hygiene in Hong Kong, August 9, 2003. p.77

^{cli} *Mingpao*, September 3, 2003; *Mingpao*, September 5, 2003.

^{clii} *South China Morning Post*, December 23, 2003.

^{cliii} Chan, Siu-sin, *South China Morning Post*, June 6, 2003. The author does not pay much sympathy to those businesses, but he depicts the situation of people running these businesses, and what a FEHD raid is like, in detail.

^{cliv} For a similar viewpoint, see Li, Mon, *Appledaily*, June 16, 2003; and Tang, Yik-ying, *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, August 14, 2003.

^{clv} McGee, T.G. *Hawkers in Hong Kong*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1973. Pp.31-52

^{clvi} At the end of June, the signing of the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) and the mainland authority's decision to allow citizens of Guangdong to apply for visiting Hong Kong in their individual capacity instead of as members of a tour group may be the candidates for exceptional cases. As far as the performance of the retail sector and unemployment rate are concerned, positive changes were seen in the second half of 2003. However, empirically speaking, perceptions

towards them are highly mixed, from accepting them unreservedly, to accepting the cash of mainlanders but not their physical presence, to disdaining both their cash and their physical presence, etc. Besides, these two arrangements are fundamentally about flow, which according to my discussion above, may be the potential danger, especially if we conceive of the cleaning of Hong Kong as an independently sufficient project.

^{clvii} Lee, Tung-hoi, *Wen Wei Po*, November 5, 2003.

^{clviii} Mathu, Piyush. 'Nuclearism: The contours of a political ecology', in *Social Text*. 19.1, 2001. p.1-18

^{clix} Ibid.

^{clx} *Oriental Daily*, November 2, 2003.

^{clxi} *Hong Kong Daily News*, November 2, 2003.

^{clxii} <http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200311/20/1120095.htm>

^{clxiii} Hong Kong SAR Government, press release, 'CE welcomes delegation of China's first manned space mission', October 31, 2003.

^{clxiv} See note 11.

^{clxv} Cheung, B.L., *Economic Journal*, November 5, 2003.

^{clxvi} Yeung, Tzi. *Appledaily*, November 6, 2003.

^{clxvii} *Hong Kong Daily News*, November 2, 2003.

^{clxviii} My translation, Chinese version: '看見香港同胞，讓我有回家的感覺'，see *Appledaily*, November 2, 2003.

^{clxix} My translation, Chinese version: '在太空我心跳正常，來到香港後我的心跳卻加速了'，*Ta Kung Pao*, November 2, 2003.

^{clxx} Examples can be found in events that the government gained and lost alike. The friendly matches of the football clubs Liverpool and Real Madrid in Hong Kong were initiated by the task force led by the Financial secretary. A new report on the day after the match of Real Madrid reads, 'People are cheered up, no matter whether they pay (for the match) or not, even so are those who do not watch the match. Some Hong Kong people said they long missed this feeling. This is the first time since SARS and the July 1 demonstration that the whole city is feeling joyful, every place is crowded with people, like during festivals.' See *Mingpao*, August 9, 2003. In the opposite direction, the indispensable example is the July 1 demonstration. No matter how the government and the pro-Beijing political parties were keen on the legislation of Article 23 of the Basic Law, no matter how the media kept covering strong and even outrageous opinions and argument against the legislation, the 500,000 people demonstration necessarily forced the government to retreat from its legislation proposal.

^{clxxi} Hong Kong SAR government, press release, 'CE congratulates motherland on successful Shenzhou V space mission', October 16, 2003.

^{clxxii} Editorial, *Mingpao*, October 25, 2003; *Ta Kung Pao*, October 16, 2003.

^{clxxiii} Jessop, Bob and Ngai-Ling Sum, 'An entrepreneurial city in action: Hong Kong's emerging strategies in and for the (inter)urban competition', *Urban Text*, Vol. 37, No. 12, 2000.

^{clxxiv} Ibid.

^{clxxv} Ibid.

What does the ITC mean by Technology?

^{clxxvi} Hong Kong SAR Government, Policy Address 1998, Para 23.

^{clxxvii} See Innovation and Technology Fund, Annual Report 2001. p.1

^{clxxviii} the quotes from this paragraph are from 'Commerce and Industry', in *Hong Kong 1995*, Hong Kong: Information Services department, HKSAR Government;

Hong Kong 1996, Hong Kong: Information Services department, HKSAR Government.

clxxix the quotes from this paragraph are from the website of the Hong Kong Productivity Council: <http://www.hkpc.org/hkpc/html/>

clxxx An interesting fact is that with the setting up of the ITF, the establishment of the TTC was changed from by a grant of ISF, as stated in the yearbook 98/99, to by a grant from ITC, as stated in the yearbook 99/00. It literally reflects how substantially the ITF 'means' ISF, at least to HKPC.

clxxxii See Hong Kong Productivity Council, Annual Report 98/99. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Productivity Council. P.115

clxxxiii Ibid.

clxxxiv Financial Committee, Legislative Council, FCRI (2000-01)17

clxxxv Ibid

clxxxvi FCR(94-95)25, quoted in *ibid*.

clxxxvii Financial Committee, Legislative Council, FCRI (2000-01)17

clxxxviii Foucault, Michel, quoted in Sheridan, Alan. *Michel Foucault: the will to truth*. London and New York: Tarvistock Publication, 1980. P.123

clxxxix Ibid. p.131

clxxxix Foucault, Michel. 'The order of discourse', in Young, Robert ed. *Untying the text: a post-structuralist reader*. London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981. P.55

cxc Foucault, Michel. *Power/knowledge: selected interviews and other writings, 1972-1977*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1980. P.119

cxi Ibid., Pp.132-2

cxcii Foucault, Michel. 'Politics and the studies of discourse', in Bruchell, Graham, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller eds. *The Foucault effect : studies in governmentality : with two lectures by and an interview with Michel Foucault*. Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1991. P.65

cxciii Ibid. p67

cxciv My translation, the original text is '在特區政府成立之前，香港經濟出現嚴重的扭曲。在金融、地產、股票帶動的泡沫經濟下，賺錢變得很容易。...。正因為金錢易得，很多人都失去了對科技的認知，以及追求新知識的興趣'，see *Ta Kung Pao*, February 1, 2002.

cxcv Speech by the Chief Executive, Tung Chee Hwa, at the opening ceremony of the Hong Kong Science Park, 27/6/02

cxcvi See Innovation and Technology Fund, Annual Report 2001.

cxcvii The other one is Applied Science and Technology Research Institute. See Chief Executive's Commission of Innovation and Technology, The first report, September, 1998

cxcviii My translation. Original text, '都可以看到政府的角色確是在轉變... 目前關鍵的問題不是政府是否參與，而是在什麼樣的情況之下參與。' *Ta Kung Pao*, February 1, 2002.

cxcix Bruchell, Graham 'Liberal government and techniques of the self', in Barry, Andrew, Thomas Osborns and Nikolas Rose eds. *Foucault and political reason*. London: UCL Press, 1996. Pp.19-36

cc Hong Kong SAR Government, Policy Address 2001. Para 10-14

cci *Wen Wei Pao*, March 3, 2003.

ccii see for examples *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, November 14, 2002; *Appledaily*, November 13, 2002; *Singtao Daily*, November 14, 2002

cciii See Report of the Task Force on population policy, February 26, 2003. Chapter 2.

cciv Though as a matter of fact, in order to equalize the child tax allowance for the first two children, the government does double the child tax allowance for the third to the ninth child. The rationale of this is that the 'two-tier' arrangement of a tax allowance for children is considered by the Task Force to be not 'appropriate in the

light of our very low fertility rate. The Task Force considered it as a removal of discouraging factors, rather than as adding a favourable factor in the consideration of birth giving. See *Mingpao*, February 28, 2003.

^{ccv} See *Hong Kong 1994*. Hong Kong: Information Services department, HKSAR Government. Chapter 7

^{ccvi} Trade and Industry Bureau, 'Information Paper presented to the LegCo Panel on Trade and Industry', Jan, 1998

^{ccvii} Commerce and Industry Bureau, 'Information Paper for LegCo Panel on Commerce and Industry', Jan, 1999.

^{ccviii} This assertion is made in the sense that by the emphasis the Government put on the importance of innovation and technology, one would expect the ITC to have a larger autonomy and capacity in terms of finance. However, if the ITC is to fund any item for more than \$15 million, approval is still required from the LegCo Financial Committee, the same as the ISF.

^{ccix} See the explanation by ITC on its website:
http://www.info.gov.hk/itc/eng/about/why_purple_pi.shtml

^{ccx} One of the most famous elaborations of this position is Foucault, Michel. 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History' in Bouchard, Donald F. ed. *Language, counter-memory, practice: selected essays and interviews by Michel Foucault*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1977. Pp.139-64

^{ccxi} see for example the speeches they delivered: Tung, 8/11/2001, 5/11/2001; Leung, 13/10/2002

^{ccxii} Chief Executive's Commission of Innovation and Technology, The second report, June 1999

^{ccxiii} LegCo, ITF report, CB(1) 151/00-01(02), November 13, 2000.

^{ccxiv} Ibid.

^{ccxv} ^{ccxv} My translation. Original text, '基金已由從前的「由下而上」模式改變至現時採用的「由上而下」模式，即由政府先出主題及定出具體方向，再由大學及科研機構提供項目... 'see *Hong Kong Economic Times*, January 5, 2002

^{ccxvi} My translation. Original text, '由於經濟制度的關係，很難仿效南韓的做法 ' See *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, June 6, 2002.

^{ccxvii} Castells, Manuel. *End of millennium*. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers. 1998. Pp.249-53

^{ccxviii} My translation. Original text, '這些公司在成長壯大的過程，往往舉步維艱，夭折的情況也屢見不鮮。 ' See *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, June 6, 2002

^{ccxix} Foucault, Michel. 'The order of discourse', in Young, Robert ed. *Untying the text: a post-structuralist reader*. London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981.

^{ccxx} My translation. Original text, '產業界近年對科研成果商品化及科技轉移更為重視，而他們與大學的合作也更趨緊密。 ' Speech by Henry Tang, 4/11/2002

^{ccxxi} My translation. Original text, 例如一家中草藥業公司，接受了創新及科技基金的資助，與香港兩所大學合作，利用大學的知識及資源，透過先進的藥物學科技及臨床前測試，開發新的中藥產品。該公司已在創業板上市。 ' Ibid.

^{ccxxii} see the introduction of the Growth Enterprise Market,
http://www.hkgem.com/root/e_default.asp

^{ccxxiii} see a speech delivered by Tung in a forum held on 5/11/2001.

^{ccxxiv} See for example *Singtao Daily*, January 17, 2003; *Hong Kong Economic Times*, January 27, 2003; *Hong Kong Economic Times*, May 14, 2001.

^{ccxxv} See for example *Sing Pao*, February 20, 2000; *Mingpao*, December 16, 2002; *Mingpao*, February 5, 2003.

^{ccxxvi} See for example *Mingpao*, February 14, 2002; *Sun*, November 25, 2000; *Sun*, December 26, 2001; *Hong Kong Daily News*, November 10, 2001.

^{ccxxvii} see *Hong Kong Daily News*, November 10, 2001.

^{ccxxviii} Occupational Safety and Health Council, *Sedentary Workers Safety and*

Health Bulletin, Issue 16, January 2002.

^{ccxxix} *Ta Kung Pao*, February 1, 2002

^{ccxxx} Speech by Tung, 2002/6/27

^{ccxxxi} The exceptional one is Prof. V.W.W. Yam, Ph.D. H.K.; other conferred scientists are , J.C.Y. Leong, FRCS Eng & Edin; Prof David S Y Tong, Ph.D. California-Irvine; Prof. Albert S.C., Ph.D. Chicago; Prof. Nancy Y. Ip, Ph.D. Harvard, Prof. Thomas C.W. MAK, Ph.D. Brit.Col

^{ccxxxii} Foucault, Michel. 'The order of discourse', in Young, Robert ed. *Untying the text: a post-structuralist reader*. London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981. Pp.60-1

4. Does it matter to you?

^{ccxxxiii} Daniel Miller. *The dialectics of shopping*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2001. P. 153-6

^{ccxxxiv} See *ibid.* p. 159 and Lau Wai-sun. 'the island of unequal opportunity: the socio-economic significance of big corporations in Hong Kong' in Kao and Chan eds. *Hong Kong: continuity or rupture of civilization?* Teipai: Luen Ging, 1997. pp. 149-51. In Chinese: 劉維新, 不平等的機會之島 – 香港大型企業的社會經濟意義, 高承恕, 陳介玄編, 《香港, 文明的延續與斷裂?》, 台北, 聯經, 一九九七。頁一四九至一五一。

^{ccxxxv} Daniel Miller. *The dialectics of shopping*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001. P. 153

^{ccxxxvi} *Ibid.*, p.161

^{ccxxxvii} Daniel Miller. 'Conclusion: a theory of virtualism', in James G. Carrier and Daniel Miller eds. *Virtualism: a new political economy*, Oxford and New York: Berg, 1998.

^{ccxxxviii} Michael Power. *Audit Society*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997

^{ccxxxix} *Ibid.* see also Daniel Miller. 'the unintended political economy', in du Gay, Paul and M. Pryke, eds. *Cultural Economy: cultural analysis and commercial life*. London: SAGE, 2002. P. 175.

^{ccxl} Drucker, quoted in *ibid.*, p.167.

^{ccxli} Daniel Miller. 'Conclusion: a theory of virtualism', in James G. Carrier and Daniel Miller eds. *Virtualism: a new political economy*. Oxford and New York: Berg, 1998.

^{ccxlii} Alain Touraine. *Beyond Neo-liberalism*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001. pp.14 -5

^{ccxliii} *Fortune*, 'Can Asia's cyber kid rise again?', *Fortune*, vol. 143, March 19, 2001, pp. 164-7

^{ccxliv} *Forbes*, 'The high-tech son', *Forbes*, vol.164, July 5, 1999, pp. 156-8

^{ccxlv} Tricom's day of reckoning', in www.webb-site.com, August 3, 1999.

^{ccxlv} Hong Kong SAR Government, Policy Address 1998.

^{ccxlvii} The PCCW portfolio', www.webb-site.com, January 18, 2000.

^{ccxlviii} Fung Bon-yin *PCCW merging HKT*. Hong Kong: Mingpao, 2000. pp 53-155. In Chinese, 馮邦彥, 《盈動兼併香港電訊》, 香港: 明報, 二零零零。頁五十三至一五五。

^{ccxlix} *Ibid.*, p.61

^{cc} Wong Ton. *Digital Superman*. Hong Kong: Ming Lau, 2000. p. 196; Chung Ching. *The legend of Li Tzar-kai*. Hong Kong: Mingpao, 2000. pp.93-4.; Hui Chek Wai. *Li Tzar-ka: embracing future*. Hong Kong: Subculture, 2000. pp. 61, 151. In Chinese: 王彤, 《數碼超人》, 香港: 名流, 二零零零。頁一九六; 松青, 《李澤傳奇》, 香港: 明報, 二零零零。頁九十三至四; 許澤惠, 《李澤楷前傳: 擁抱未來》, 香港: 次文化堂, 二零零零。頁六十一, 一五一。

^{ccdi} Henk Overbeek. *Restructuring hegemony in the global political economy: the rise of transnational neo-liberalism in the 1980s*. London; New York: Routledge, 1993. p. 15

- ^{ccli} Wong Ton. *Digital Superman*. Hong Kong: Ming Lau, 2000. p.121. In Chinese 王彤,《數碼超人》,香港:名流,二零零零。頁一九六。The strategic dimension and political sensitivity of telecommunication can also be seen in the fact that the ancestor of the internet is indeed military equipment, to avoid the vulnerability of centralized command. Another example is that, even when the parent company of HKT, the British Cable and Wireless, got listed in London back in 1981, it is provided that the CEO should be a British citizen, in order to secure the control of the company by the British government. see Fung Bon -yin. *PCCW merging HKT*. Hong Kong: Mingpao, 2000. p. 67. In Chinese, 馮邦彥,《盈動兼併香港電訊》,香港:明報,二零零零。頁六十七。
- ^{ccliii} Ibid., p.114
- ^{ccliv} see Lau Shan. *Behind the legend: Li Tzar-kai*. Hong Kong: Mingpao, 2003. p.33. In Chinese, 劉山,《神話背後:李澤楷》,香港:明報,二零零三年。頁三十三
- ^{cclv} Fung Bon-yin. *PCCW merging HKT*. Hong Kong: Mingpao, 2000. pp. 69-73. In Chinese, 馮邦彥,《盈動兼併香港電訊》,香港:明報,二零零零。頁六十九至七十三。
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- ^{ccxi} *The Economist*, 'The Messiah of cyberasia', January 1, 2000.
- ^{ccxii} See for example, Editorial, *Mingpao*, March 1, 2000, and *The Hong Kong Economic Journal*, quoted in Fung Bon-yin. *PCCW merging HKT*. Hong Kong: Mingpao, 2000. pp. 164-5. In Chinese, 馮邦彥,《盈動兼併香港電訊》,香港:明報,二零零零。頁一六四至五
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- ^{ccxiv} Storey, John. *Cultural consumption and everyday life*. London, Sydney, Auckland: Arnold, 1999. p.28.
- ^{ccxv} Barthes, Roland. 'Myth today', *Mythologies*. London: Vintage, 1993 [1972]. p.143
- ^{ccxvi} Daniel Miller. *The dialectics of shopping* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001. P. 170
- ^{ccxvii} *Appledaily*, March 26, 2002.
- ^{ccxviii} My translation, original Chinese:「我們從未想過裁員,找們很著重 human asset。」 see Fung Bon-yin. *PCCW merging HKT*. Hong Kong: Mingpao, 2000. p. 146. In Chinese, 馮邦彥,《盈動兼併香港電訊》,香港:明報,二零零零。頁一四六。
- ^{cclix} PCCW interim report 2003. p.10
- ^{ccxx} See for example, *Mingpao*, March 9, 2002.
- ^{ccxxi} See for example, *Mingpao*, September 26, 2000.
- ^{ccxxii} *Hong Kong Commercial Daily*, March 6, 2004.
- ^{ccxxiii} The figure of market share of household telecom services of PCCW since 2000 are, 2000:97.5%; 2001: 93%; 2002: 82% and 2003: 72%. Sources from local newspapers.
- ^{ccxxiv} Abbas, Ackbas. *Hong Kong: Culture and the politics of disappearance*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1997. P.6, p.65
- ^{ccxxv} *The Economist*, 'Virtual bid', February 22, 2003.

- cclxxvi Hong Kong SAR government, press release, 'Cyberport' proposed in Telegraph Bay', March 3, 1999.
- cclxxvii <http://www.cyberport.com.hk>
- cclxxviii Tsang, Donald. Budge Speech 1999. HKSAR government, March 3, 1999
- cclxxix Fung Bon-yin. PCCW merging HKT'. Hong Kong: Mingpao, 2000. p. 45. In Chinese, 馮邦彥,《盈動兼併香港電訊》, 香港: 明報, 二零零零。頁四十五
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- cclxxxii Ibid.
- cclxxxiii The practice of 'examining them in their own terms' in fact is not the minority interest of critical scholars, Hong Kong practitioners also voiced out their opinion against the amplifier-oriented approach of the SAR government in dealing with the innovative and information technology issue. See Hau, Luen-kwai, 'Digital 21 should be realistic' in *Appledaily*, March 22, 2004.
- cclxxxiv *Mingpao*, March 13, 2004.
- cclxxxv Fung Bon-yin, *PCCW merging HKT'*, Hong Kong: Mingpao, 2000, p. 43. In Chinese, 馮邦彥,《盈動兼併香港電訊》, 香港: 明報, 二零零零, 頁四十三。
- ccxxxvi *Tai Kung Pao*, April 5, 2000.
- ccxxxvii See note 43 and 44
- ccxxxviii Jessop, Bob and Sum Ngai ling. 'An entrepreneurial city in action: Hong Kong's emerging strategies in and for (inter)urban competition. *Urban Studies*, Nov2000, Vol. 37.
- ccxxxix Henwood, Doug. *Wall Street*. London, New York: Verso, 1998. p.4.
- ccxc Fung Bon-yin. PCCW merging HKT'. Hong Kong: Mingpao, 2000. p. 49. In Chinese, 馮邦彥,《盈動兼併香港電訊》, 香港: 明報, 二零零零, 頁四十九。
- ccxci 'The PCCW portfolio', www.webb-site.com, February 18, 2000.
- ccxcii 'The Economist', 'Virtual bid', February 22, 2003. p.56
- ccxciii Ibid.
- ccxciv Lau Shan. *Behind the legend: Li Tzar-kai*. Hong Kong: Mingpao. 2003. p.30. In Chinese, 劉山,《神話背後: 李澤楷》, 香港: 明報, 二零零三年, 頁三十。
- ccxcv Wong Ton. *Digital Superman*. Hong Kong: Ming Lau, 2000. pp. 105-6. In Chinese: 王彤,《數碼超人》, 香港: 名流, 二零零零。頁一零五至六
- ccxcvi *Next Magazine*. September 28, 2000
- ccxcvii ruining is the literal translation from the Chinese '拆台', see Fung Bon-yin, *PCCW merging HKT'*, Hong Kong: Mingpao, 2000, p. 52; Wong Ton. *Digital Superman*. Hong Kong: Ming Lau, 2000. p. 105. In Chinese: 王彤,《數碼超人》, 香港: 名流, 二零零零, 頁一零五; 馮邦彥,《盈動兼併香港電訊》, 香港: 明報, 二零零零, 頁五十二。
- ccxcviii My translation, original Chinese version:
a: 喂阿子華, 比隻堅料你: 731
子華: 乜話? 呢個霖把未聽過
a: 梗係啦, 內幕。我上面識人。
- ccxcix My translation, original Chinese version:

a : 阿子華 , 比隻堅料你 : 005

子華 : 005 , 咪即係匯豐 ? 比隻堅料你 : 阿媽係女人。

^{ccc} Žižek, Slavoj. *Looking awry: an introduction to Jacques Lacan through popular culture*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991. p.145

^{ccci} Marx, Karl quoted in Žižek, Slavoj. *The sublime object of ideology*. London and New York: Verso, 1994. p.28

^{ccci} Žižek, Slavoj. *The sublime object of ideology*. London and New York: Verso, 1994. p.49

^{ccci} Ibid., p.43

^{ccci} Ibid., p.37

^{cccv} Touraine, Alain. *Beyond Neo-liberalism*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001, p.15

^{cccv} *Singtao Daily*, June 8, 2003.

^{cccv} Preston, Paschal. *Reshaping communication: technology, information and social change*. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: SAGE, 2001, pp. 24-5.

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^{cccx} Žižek provides an example of this type in *Sublime*. In the 1986 presidential campaign in Austria, while the left criticized their opponent, Waldheim, as not having the courage to face the history of his own and Austria. Nevertheless, Waldheim won support from centrist voters – the voters knew it well that he was hiding from his past, but so did the voters. See Žižek, Slavoj. *The sublime object of ideology*. London and New York: Verso, 1989. Pp.105 -7

5. Conclusion

^{cccx} Wong, Wang Chi. *The Burden of History: A Hong Kong perspective of the Mainland discourse of Hong Kong history*. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. 35-40. In Chinese 王宏志 2000 《歷史的沉重：從香港看中國大陸的香港史論述》香港：牛津大學出版社。頁三十五至四十。

^{cccx} Tsai, Jung-fang. *The Hong Kong people's History of Hong Kong*. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2001; Wong, Wang Chi. *The Burden of History: A Hong Kong perspective of the Mainland discourse of Hong Kong history*. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2000. In Chinese 蔡榮芳 2001 《香港人之香港史》香港：牛津大學出版社；王宏志 2000 《歷史的沉重：從香港看中國大陸的香港史論述》香港：牛津大學出版社。

^{cccx} Nyam, K.Y. 'The historical trajectory of the Hong Kong industrial development' in Wang, Gungwu ed. *Hong Kong history: new perspectives*. Hong Kong: Joint Publication, 1997. Pp.371-416. In Chinese, 饒美蛟 香港工業發展的歷史軌跡 《香港史新編》王廣武編 1997 香港：三聯。頁三七一至四十六。

^{cccx} Berger, Suzanne and Richard K. Lester. *Made by Hong Kong*. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1997. P.15

^{cccx} Nyam, K.Y. 'The historical trajectory of the Hong Kong industrial development' in Wang, Gungwu ed. *Hong Kong history: new perspectives*. Hong Kong: Joint Publication, 1997. Pp.371-416. In Chinese, 饒美蛟 香港工業發展的歷史軌跡 《香港史新編》王廣武編 1997 香港：三聯。頁三七一至四十六。

^{cccx} Ibid., p.374

^{cccx} Szczepanik, Edward. *The economic growth of Hong Kong*. London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1958. P.135 and p.152

^{cccx} Leeming, Frank, 1975 'The early industrialization of Hong Kong' (extract), in Law Kam-yee and Lee, Kim-ming eds. *The Economy of Hong Kong in non-economic perspective*. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2004. Pp. 41 -5

- ^{cccxviii} In details, a report provided by the Commission on the Causes and Effects of the 1930s Depression provided the breakdown for industrial operation in the 1930s: Knitting and weaving, medicines and perfumes, printing and stationary, cakes and sweets, rubber and canvas shoes, preserves and canning altogether accounted for 40 percent of overall Chinese industrial investment'. See Faure, David. *A documentary history of Hong Kong: economy*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University press, 2004. P.3
- ^{cccxi} Ngo, Tak-wing, 'Industrial History and the Artifice of *Laissez-faire colonialism*', in Faure, David ed. *Hong Kong: a reader in social history*. Hong Kong Oxford University Press, 2003. P.549
- ^{cccxx} While it is true that the number of people employed under the category of manufacturing does not automatically prove the extent of industrialization, Ngo further solidifies his point by showing the size of the factories in Hong Kong and its *de facto* displacement of handicraft industries as the result of the degree to which the factories were mechanized. Ibid., pp.550-2
- ^{cccxxi} Faure, David. *A documentary history of Hong Kong: economy*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University press, 2004. P.61
- ^{cccxxii} Ibid., p.73
- ^{cccxxiii} Ngo, Tak-wing, 'Industrial History and the Artifice of *Laissez-faire colonialism*', in Faure, David ed. *Hong Kong: a reader in social history*. Hong Kong Oxford University Press, 2003. P.551
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- ^{cccxxvi} Cheung, H.F. 'Modern Chinese-capital industries in Hong Kong' (in Chinese, 張曉輝 近代香港的華資工業) in Law, Kam-ye and Lee, Kim-ming eds. *The Economy of Hong Kong in non-economic perspective*. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2004. Pp. 46-55
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- ^{cccxxviii} Chiu, Stephen W.K. 1996 'Unravelling Hong Kong's exceptionalism: the politics of *laissez-faire* in the industrial take-off', *Political power and social theory*, Vol. 10, 1996, pp.229-56
- ^{cccxxix} Choi, Alex. H. 'State-business relations and industrial restructuring' in Ngo, Tak-wing ed. *Hong Kong's history: state and society under colonial rule*. London and New York: Routledge, 1999. Pp.146-50
- ^{cccxxx} Bruchell, Graham. 'Liberal government and techniques of the self, in Barry, Andrew, Thomas Osborns and Nikolas Rose eds. *Foucault and political reason*. London: UCL Press, 1996. Pp.19-36
- ^{cccxxxi} For a brief description of the elements in this genealogy, see Dean, Mitchell. *Critical and effective history: Foucault's methods and historical sociology*. London and New York: Routledge, 1994. Chapter 9.
- ^{cccxxxii} Dean, Mitchell. *Governmentality: power and rule in modern society*. London, Thousand Oaks and New Dalhi: Sage publication, 1999. p.47
- ^{cccxxxiii} Foucault, Michel, quoted in *ibid.*, p.49.
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- ^{cccxxxv} Dean, Mitchell. *Critical and effective history: Foucault's methods and historical sociology*. London and New York: Routledge, 1994. p.189
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- ccxli *Ibid.*, p.9
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- ccxliii Žižek, Slavoj. *The sublime object of ideology*. London and New York: Verso, 1989. Pp.64-5
- ccxliv See also Žižek, Slavoj. *Looking awry: an introduction to Jacques Lacan through popular culture*. Cambridge, Massachusetts London: The MIT Press, 1992. Pp.6-8
- ccxlv Žižek, Slavoj. *The sublime object of ideology*. London and New York: Verso, 1989. Pp. 65-6
- ccxlv One example in popular culture is in the film, *Golden Chicken*, directed by Chao Leung-jun in 2002. The film is basically about the life story of a sex worker in relation of the trajectory of the development of Hong Kong. In one stage of her life, she has bought the shares of the recently merged PCCW-HKT just like so many small investors, and ends up in huge loss just like so many small investors. The film wittingly puts up a documentary footage of Richard Li in a press conference, what the audience can see, however, is just a stuttering Richard Li. The stutter is of course a derision of the (in)ability of Richard Li on the one hand, but on the other hand, has it not accidentally revealed the very stake in the whole story of Richard Li? Even if we do appreciate his success in business of merely talking about them, we should, at least, be aware of the fundamental style with which he delivers his talks. I thank Dr. Li Siu-leung for the example.
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- ccxlviii Kay, Sarah. *Žižek: a critical introduction*. Cambridge, 2003: Polity. Pp.56
- ccxlix Žižek, Slavoj. *Looking awry: an introduction to Jacques Lacan through popular culture*. Cambridge, Massachusetts London: The MIT Press, 1992. P.12
- cccl Žižek, Slavoj. 'Postface', in Lukacs, Georg 2000 *A defense of history and class consciousness: tailism and the dialectics*. London and New York: Verso. Pp.164-5
- cccli Aronowitz, Stanley. *Jobless future, sci-tech and the dogma of work*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994. P.4
- ccclii *Ibid.*
- cccliii Žižek, Slavoj. *Enjoy your symptom! Jacques Lacan in Hollywood and out*. London and New York: Routledge, 1992. Pp.9-23
- cccliv Laclau, Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe. *Hegemony and socialist strategy: toward a radical democratic politics*. London and New York: Verso, 1985. P.52
- ccclv *Ibid.*, P. 50
- ccclvi Žižek, Slavoj. 'Postface', in Lukacs, Georg. *A defense of history and class consciousness: tailism and the dialectics*. London and New York: Verso, 2000. P156
- ccclvii Laclau, Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe. *Hegemony and socialist strategy: toward a radical democratic politics*. London and New York: Verso, 1985. P.63
- ccclviii *Ibid.*, p.71
- ccclix Laclau, Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe. *Hegemony and socialist strategy: toward*

a radical democratic politics. London and New York: Verso, 1985. P.111

^{ccclx} Torfing, Jacob. *New theories of discourse: Laclau, Mouffe and Žižek*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1998. P.114

^{ccclxi} Žižek, Slavoj. *The sublime object of ideology*. London and New York: Verso, 1989. Pp.95-6

^{ccclxii} *Ibid.*, p.84

^{ccclxiii} *Ibid.*, p.15

^{ccclxiv} see for example Worsham, Lynn and Gary A. Olson 'Hegemony and the future of democracy: Ernesto Laclau's political philosophy', in Worsham, Lynn and Gary A. Olson eds. *Race, rhetoric, and the postcolonial*. Albany: State of University of New York Press, 1999. Pp.129-164

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