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REMADE IN HONG KONG
HOW HONG KONG PEOPLE USE HONG KONG DISNEYLAND

CHOI WING YEE KIMBURLEY

PHD

LINGNAN UNIVERSITY

2007

REMADE IN HONG KONG
HOW HONG KONG PEOPLE USE HONG KONG DISNEYLAND

by
CHOI Wing Yee Kimburley

A thesis
submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Arts
(Cultural Studies)

Lingnan University

2007

ABSTRACT

Remade in Hong Kong How Hong Kong People Use Hong Kong Disneyland

by

CHOI Wing Yee Kimburley

Doctor of Philosophy

Recent studies of globalization provide contrasting views of the cultural and sociopolitical effects of such major corporations as Disney as they invest transnationally and circulate their offerings around the world. While some scholars emphasize the ubiquity of Disney's products and its promotion of consumerism on a global scale, accompanied by cultural homogenization, faltering democracy, and diminishing state sovereignty, others highlight signs of contestation and resistance, questioning the various state-capitalist alliances presumed to hold in the encounter between a global company, a local state, and the people.

The settlement process and the cultural import of Hong Kong Disneyland in Hong Kong complicate these studies because of the evolving post-colonial situation that Disney encounters in Hong Kong. While Disney specializes in "imagineering" dreams, Hong Kong itself is messily imagining what "Hong Kong" is and should be, and how it should deal with others, including transnational companies and Mainlanders. In this thesis, I appropriate Doreen Massey's ideas of space-time in order to examine Hong Kong Disneyland not as a self-enclosed park but as itself a multiplicity of spaces where dynamic social relations intersect in the wider context of post-colonial Hong Kong. I illuminate the shifting relationship between Disney, Mainlanders, and the locals as this relationship develops in its discursive, institutional, and everyday-life aspects. Through interviews and ethnographic research, I study how my respondents have established and interpreted the meanings of Hong Kong Disneyland, and how they have made use of the park to support their own constructions of place, of politics, and of identity.

DECLARATION

I declare that this is an original work based primarily on my own research, and I warrant that all citations of previous research, published or unpublished, have been duly acknowledged.

CHOI Wing Yee Kimburley
13 June 2007

CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL OF THESIS

REMADE IN HONG KONG
HOW HONG KONG PEOPLE USE HONG KONG DISNEYLAND

by
CHOI Wing Yee Kimburley

Doctor of Philosophy

Panel of Examiners:

(Prof. John Nguyet ERNI) (Chairman)

(Prof. LUI Tai Lok) (External Member)

(Prof. Meaghan MORRIS) (Internal Member)

(Prof. CHAN Ching Kiu Stephen) (Internal Member)

Chief Supervisor:
Prof. Meaghan MORRIS

Co-supervisor:
Dr. Markus REISENLEITNER

Approved for the Senate:

(Prof. Mee-kau NYAW)
Chairman, Research and Postgraduate Studies Committee

Date

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CONTENTS

Acknowledgements	ii
Chapter	
One. HKDL: A Construction Site for Place, Identity, and Politics	1
Two. Disney Power, Cultural Globalization, and Local Contexts	60
Three. The HKSAR Government's "World City" Imaginary	111
Four. Do Dreams Come True?	158
Five. Pragmatist Cosmopolitanism: Parents' Use of Disney Merchandise ...	205
Six. Disney Management: Fairy Tales of Cultural Globalization	259
Seven. Work and Consumption: Pixie Tricks of Cultural Globalization	315
Eight. Remade in Hong Kong: Our Place, Our Park	382
Appendix	
1. Letter to HKDL Director, Media Relations	423
2. Letter to The Salvation Army (Education Services)	425
References	427

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I like eating dessert a lot. I especially like it after I finish eating the appetizer and the main course. Certainly my fondness for dessert has much to do with this last course's sweetness. And dessert is also the final part, a closure, of the meal (I always have my dessert and coffee together). In this same sense, I write the acknowledgments here as I would enjoy a dessert. These few comments represent the end of a long undertaking, and writing them helps me remember sweet experiences and bitter experiences that I have had throughout this project's almost six years.

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Early version of chapter Five appears as “Consumption: Why Does It Matter in Cultural Research?” *Cultural Studies Review* 13, issue 1 (2006).

Chapter One

HKDL: A Construction Site for Place, Identity, and Politics

On 3 November 1999, many Hong Kong newspapers featured in their headlines the success of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) government in signing up contracts with the Walt Disney Company in the establishment of Hong Kong Disneyland (HKDL).¹ To celebrate the joint-venture, the popular press used headlines like that of *Apple Daily*, which read “Millennium Dream Comes True!”² This millennium dream was not only about Hong Kong’s having one more theme park, “Hong Kong Disneyland,” but also about Hong Kong’s following in the footsteps of other global cities like Tokyo and Paris, which have imported the mega-brand Disneyland from the United States. On 12 September 2005, Hong Kong Disneyland officially opened on the reclaimed land of Penny’s Bay in Lantau, an outlying island in Hong Kong. Unexpectedly, however, Hong Kong Disneyland drew negative portrayals from local media through their circulation of the uncomplimentary views of visitors and workers. By reporting the Chinese New Year chaos³ that occurred on February 2006 and that resulted from HKDL’s ticketing system, local media replaced the “millennium dream” with the “Hong Kong shame”⁴ to describe HKDL. HKDL’s attendance rocketed shortly after the park’s establishment, but its first year attendance figures fell short of its target of 5.6 million.⁵

What events and themes have contributed to the drastic changes of meaning that have characterized “Disneyland” in Hong Kong? Are words like “millennium dream” and “Hong Kong shame” adequate in describing Hong Kong people’s views of HKDL? Who made the dream? Whom does the dream work for? What are

the sociopolitical effects of this particular dream? How should we reconsider this particular *local* dream under the *globalization* process?

Recent globalization studies provide contrasting views of the cultural and sociopolitical effects of global corporations such as Disney as they invest transnationally and circulate their offerings around the world. In the case of Disney, some scholars emphasize the ubiquity of Disney's products and its promotion of consumerism on a global scale, along with cultural homogenization,⁶ declining citizenship rights and faltering democracy,⁷ and diminishing state sovereignty.⁸ However, other scholars highlight signs of contestation⁹ and resistance,¹⁰ questioning the absolute alliance that is presumed to hold between the state and capitalists¹¹ in the encounter between a global corporation, a local state, and the people.

Because of different local sociopolitical and cultural situations, scholars need to study how globalization processes manifest themselves in different local contexts. The settlement of Disneyland in Hong Kong has become an important source that scholars can use to examine globalization processes and cultural transformation, with the focus on the interaction between, on the one hand, a US-based company with a global operating span and, on the other hand, local actors including the government, media practitioners, and local people as workers or consumers. In the case of HKDL, it was the HKSAR government that invited Disney to build HKDL, and in 1999, the HKSAR government and the Walt Disney Company forged an alliance that promotes a particular "world city" dream¹² for Hong Kong people to imagine. In the early period of the park's operation, however, the HKSAR government characterized certain requests made by the park as

“unacceptable”¹³ and “requested” the park “to make improvements.”¹⁴ How should we evaluate state sovereignty in this situation?

Before the transnational joint-venture was forged between the HKSAR government and the Walt Disney Company in 1999, Hong Kong people recognized Mickey Mouse, knew Disney as a famous entertainment brand with its international presence, and consumed merchandise featuring Mickey Mouse and related movies. How should we examine Hong Kong culture and identity in relation to Hong Kong people’s consumption of Disney offerings? Have Hong Kong people changed their consumption activities since the park arrived? Since September 2005, the relationship between Disney and Hong Kong people has been more than a relationship between an entertainment provider and consumers—it has centered on a big business organization’s provision of job opportunities to Hong Kong workers. With HKDL’s emphasis on professional service quality and standards,¹⁵ have local workers at HKDL been transformed into apt Disney workers? Facing certain Disney management practices, how do media practitioners react to the circulation of the Disney image?

The study of Hong Kong Disneyland is particularly challenging because other Disney studies generally emphasize the problem of conceptualizing local-global relations, and the term “local” in these studies is usually construed as synonymous in the first instance with the “national.” However, Hong Kong is not a nation-state but a city, and Hong Kong’s city status was undergoing enormous change during the very period of the establishment of HKDL: as HKDL took shape, Hong Kong people themselves were experiencing—and continue to experience—the transformation of their own civic status from that of being British colonial subjects to one of becoming Chinese subjects. Having been a colonial city for more

than one hundred and fifty years, Hong Kong became China's "Special Administrative Region" starting on 1 July 1997. Scholars argue that, since the 1960s, rapid urbanization, industrialization, increased education opportunity, the development of local popular culture, changing local immigration laws, and the implementation of the Beijing government's closed-door policy have helped develop the local consciousness of the *Heung Gong Yan* (Hong Kong People)¹⁶. And it is in this unstable context that HKDL has become a site expressing and constituting not only the power dynamics of the local Disney project but also the "Hong Kong people"- "Mainlanders" relationship. Although Hong Kong people may see themselves as ethnic Chinese, many see themselves as different from or even superior to mainland Chinese and see Hong Kong city as different from or, again, superior to cities in China, culturally, economically, and politically. Gordon Mathews terms such local consciousness as "Chineseness plus,"¹⁷ which encompasses themes ranging from cultural taste, wealth, and rule of law to democratization.

The Handover brought changes to Hong Kong society both internally and to its relationship with China, and in this regard, Mathews' "Chineseness plus" may benefit from a reformulation. According to Alvin So, because of the Handover, the Hong Kong colonial government started to launch limited democratization in the 1980s, but the emergence of the "strong Beijing-businesspeople-London alliance"¹⁸ in the late 1980s resulted in the endorsement of Basic Law in 1990 and hampered Hong Kong's democratization process. Despite political reforms undertaken by the last governor, Chris Patten, who reinterpreted Basic Law in the 1990s after the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, the pro-Beijing provisional Legislative Council replaced the existing elected Legislative Council on 1 July 1997 and the HKSAR

Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa was indirectly elected by a 400-member Selection Committee. Hong Kong, since the Handover, seems to be a dependent polity controlled by Beijing authorities. Culturally and economically, the HKSAR government has faced challenging tasks in re-imagining, reformulating, and re-imagining Hong Kong as a city-state and a “special administrative region” of China. On the one hand the HKSAR government acting as a dependent “special administrative region” instead of an autonomous city-state government, knew well that Hong Kong should experience decolonization and the re-nationalization process after China’s resumption of Hong Kong sovereignty. On the other hand, the strong local consciousness in Hong Kong suggests that any coercive attempt to renationalize Hong Kong people would be undesirable, especially when the HKSAR government would like to enhance its own political legitimacy and to position Hong Kong as a city that has its own particularities notably different from other Chinese cities; indeed, such a position might attract foreign investment, which countries and cities throughout Asia sought after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and which was a possible remedy to local economic stagnation and to increasing competition from other Chinese cities after the Handover. To differentiate Hong Kong from other Chinese cities, the HKSAR government networked with Western symbols, such as Disney, to demonstrate its “international” semblance without endangering Beijing authorities’ endorsement of the model of “restricted democracy,”¹⁹ which has characterized Hong Kong’s democratization since 1997.

The economic rise of Chinese cities and the potential tourist impact of increasing numbers of affluent and worldly Mainlanders prompted the government to lure Disneyland to HK. In this way, the HKSAR government hoped to confront and to overcome competition from major Chinese cities such as Shanghai, and also

in this way, the government no doubted hoped to help legitimate its regime. As for Hong Kong people, many were forming at this time (as my research in subsequent chapters will show) a desire to become more “cosmopolitan” and, thereby, to retain their self-perceived competitiveness. HKDL, therefore, is not only significant as an economic revitalization project, or as an occasion to debate issues of cultural Americanization, but rather requires us to ask how different Hong Kong people have *used* HKDL to develop their personal sense of identity.

While Disney specializes in imagineering²⁰ dreams, Hong Kong itself is messily imagining what “Hong Kong” is and should be and how the Hong Kong people should deal with others, including global companies and Mainlanders. The HKDL project was announced in November 1999, around two years after Hong Kong’s Handover in July 1997. The project has been one of the biggest investments of the HKSAR government in the first post-Handover decade. As a small-sized and self-enclosed park, HKDL creates many opportunities in which Hong Kong people can experience intimate encounters with other Hong Kong people and with tourists from other places around the world, including the Mainland. The park has become a place for constituting multiple social relationships, and these encounters sometimes reinforce beliefs and sometimes encourage Hong Kong people to reflect upon or even to change their concepts of the self and of the other, including their concepts of Mainlanders. As a site that links up the Disney Company with the city of Hong Kong, HKDL brings up issues of city identity and of Hong Kong people’s cultural identity in relation to those global companies whose presence is rendered so desirable by the inter-urban competition driving the globalization processes. For example (as I will show in a chapter Six and Seven), Disney’s corporate practice in the local environment was perceived as “Americanism” by some Hong Kong media

figures, and the dynamic relationship between HKDL management and local media encouraged Hong Kong people to rethink their relationship with the “Western” corporate other as represented by the Disney Company.

Certainly, these identity questions are not merely cultural: they stem from and can have sociopolitical effects on existing social structure and local governance. Our perception of the self and of the other affects both how we treat people of different cultures and what we want our city to become. How should the Hong Kong people open themselves so that they embrace different cultures? Should the Hong Kong people open themselves to all kinds of cultures, including corporate global culture, which might diminish state sovereignty and citizenship, or should they dare to say “no” to certain cultures? What kind of city do the Hong Kong people want their city to become? Do Hong Kong people want Hong Kong to be a city for affluent residents and tourists instead of for various populations if the city continues to develop as a tourism-based one? What kind of city is the HKSAR government promoting and constructing? Do Hong Kong people have enough institutional access to monitor the government’s urban planning? If part of the effect of globalization is to challenge citizenship, what particular kinds of domestication should local actors (including the government, media practitioners, and ordinary people) adopt to face global companies such as Disney?

The study of HKDL as a case provides me an opportunity to analyze Hong Kong’s changing worldly situation after Handover. As a case study, my study is specific to place (the intersecting Hong Kong-Mainland and local-global spatial relationships) and time (the post-Handover Hong Kong facing globalization and regional competition). Certainly, this case study is particular in the sense that I studied particular individuals (HKDL workers, middle class parent consumers,

media practitioners) and groups (Disney Hunter and HKDL Cast Member Union); these views are limited in the sense that the opinions and acts expressed by these particular individuals cannot be generalized as a study of the whole population of Hong Kong society. However, it does not mean that my HKDL study does not involve some sense of generality. Unlike many cultural studies research whose focus is on a particular group of marginal people or government policy making, many of my respondents are common people. By forging links between Hong Kong's dreams and Hong Kong's disappointment with HKDL, I argue that the rigorous study of Hong Kong people's views and uses of HKDL provides a substantial ground for understanding the identity formation of Hong Kong as the latter encounters the sociopolitical effects of a transnational private company-public government joint-venture in the post-colonial context of Hong Kong. At the same time, theoretically the study of HKDL as a global corporate import to the local soil gives me chance to refine theories concerning cultural globalization: as we shall see, there is no necessary correlation between globalization forces (such as Disney's global economic and cultural power) and homogenization of local culture, between localization and political empowerment, and between cosmopolitanism and the development of pluralistic culture.

To examine the same globalization story in three aspects (the discursive, the institutional, and the everyday aspects), in the following section I appropriate Doreen Massey's concepts of space-time and of the connection (and the disconnection) of social networks in the formation of city identity. Using these concepts, I study how Hong Kong people use their connection with Disney, through the HKDL joint-venture, to reconstitute Hong Kong's city image, politics, and cultural identities.

Space-time, place, identity, and HKDL

Doreen Massey's distinctive concept of space-time introduces a cultural perspective into the idea of space, which is traditionally seen as a passive and apolitical "setting for objects and their interaction"²¹ in a timeless context. Rather than conceptualize spatial relations as social relations taking a particular geographical form, Massey conceptualizes space and social relations as mutually constructed. And if space and the spatial configurations of social relations produce social effects, space and the spatial are implicated in the production of history (p. 254); space, therefore, cannot be seen as the realm of stasis. In Massey's words, "Space is not static, nor time spaceless...neither [spatiality or temporality] can be conceptualized as the absence of the other" (p. 264). Because space is conceived in terms of social relations, and because social relations are dynamic and multiple, and because individuals hold not only different positions but consequently different experiences and interpretations of spatial social relations, space does not imply fixity or stasis but "a simultaneous multiplicity of spaces" in the "lived world" (p. 3). That is, space should be conceived in relation to social relations, power, symbols, and representations.

Massey's concept of space-time challenges the dualistic concept that frames time as becoming and space as being. Massey's concept challenges, as well, the dualism that frames place as the local and "everywhere" as the global—a distinction that pits the concrete against the abstract, the particular against the universal. In "A Global Sense of Place," she argues that the idea of place problematizes the distinction between global and local because the specificity of a place lies neither within the place's identifiable borders nor within the place's

proper history. In truth, a place is a site where wider cultures meet, networks take root, and social relationships evolve:

What gives a place its specificity is not some long internalized history but the fact that it is constructed out of a particular constellation of social relations, meeting and weaving together at a particular locus. If one moves in from the satellite towards the globe, holding all those networks of social relations and movements and communications in one's head, then each "place" can be seen as a particular, unique, point of their intersection. It is, indeed, a *meeting* place. (p. 154)

If a place is not constructed by an internally produced and essential past, the place's identity is not singular, fixed, and unproblematic. If places are "open and porous networks of social relations" (p. 121), places not only develop mixtures through history but also bring differences together in space. It follows that places constructed out of "juxtaposition, the intersection, the articulation, of multiple social relations" are of course internally contradictory and contested, and that while places are necessarily shared, there will simultaneously be clashes between various and competing interests over what the area is, and what it ought to *become* (p. 137). To extract advantages from a set of social relations, the particular claimant groups lay claim to some particular position in time-space (whether through the establishment of heritage centers and the promotion of nationalism), so that the groups can establish an identity of a place, although "the past was not more static than is the present" (p. 169):

When black-robed patriarchs organize ceremonies to celebrate a true national identity they are laying claim to the freezing of that identity at a particular moment and in a particular form—a moment and a form where they had a power which they can thereby justify themselves in retaking. All of which means, of course, that the identity of any place, including that place called home, is in one sense for ever open to contestation. (p. 169)

Besides challenging the static identity of a place, Massey challenges the necessity of an essentialist connection between place and cultural identities, and the idea that place alone is the source of a stable and coherent identity. If a place does not contain an “internally produced, essential past” (p. 170), the contested identity of place cannot be the source of a single, stable, and coherent identity; the geography of social relations enables individuals to recognize their interconnectedness and contested personal and cultural identities. Situated in different locations in relation to the overall complexity of social relations, various social groups read those relations differently and these different social relations also make the personal and cultural identity of these social groups distinct (p. 121). In other words, although identities may be constructed out of place, class, gender, and race, identities cannot be aligned with a place only (p. 137), because localities are about “the intersection of social activities and social relations and, crucially, activities and relations which are necessarily, by definition, dynamic, changing” (p. 136).

Massey’s concept of space-time, her concept of place as a meeting site for wider cultures, her assertion that conflicts over what a place is and should be are inevitable, and her argument that personal identity and cultural identity are multiple and dynamic help me examine HKDL as not a self-enclosed park in Lantau but a multiplicity of spaces with dynamic social relations in the wider context of post-colonial Hong Kong. To examine these complex social relations and multiple spaces, I used interviews and ethnographic research. In this way, I studied, in particular, how my respondents establish and interpret the meanings of Hong Kong Disneyland and how they make use of the park to reconstitute their own “constructions of place, of politics, and of identity”²² in Keith and Pile’s words. These local views and constructions of both the city identity of Hong Kong and the

cultural identity of the Hong Kong people are neither stable nor unified but multiple and contested. Individuals, whether they are media practitioners, HKDL workers, or HKDL consumers, have different positions in their relationship with HKDL and use their own positions diversely. Indeed, their views on the same project are internally divergent. As we shall see, the connection between Disney culture and HKDL networks has transformed social relations, cultural identities, and self-other relations.

I examine the sometimes dominant, sometimes negotiated relationships among Disney, “Mainlanders,” and the locals as these relationships develop in discursive, institutional, and everyday life aspects. In the discursive aspect, Hong Kong people were—long before the establishment of HKDL—well familiar with the Mouse, the Disney brand, and its offerings. The success of the joint-venture with public endorsement starts from the appealing representation of Disney. The HKSAR government allied itself with Disney and has made use of Disney’s famous brand name and huge symbolic value not only to revitalize Hong Kong’s economy but also to sell the Hong Kong people the “world city” dream. The import of HKDL also functions to extend Hong Kong’s existing symbolic connections to both “the East” (so that Mainland Chinese can consume the spectacular Western Disney park) and “the West” (so that business will increase its investment in Hong Kong). Some Hong Kong people found the HKDL project attractive insofar as they could use Disney as a cultural marker to distinguish Hong Kong from other Chinese cities or to distinguish themselves from Mainlanders; some other Hong Kong people use Disney as a way to achieve their cosmopolitan dream, to acquire cosmopolitan sensitivity and cultural capital. However, these uses do not imply that Hong Kong

people wholly embrace all Disney offerings, as I suggest when pointing out middle class parents' selective consumption of Disney merchandise.

In the institutional aspect, I discuss the problems and conflicts between the HKSAR government and the Disney alliance. Although transnational companies propagate their assertion that they glocalize their offerings for local uses, certain major company management philosophies and practices seem difficult to either glocalize or, for that matter, localize. These practices might also raise conflicts between the state and the company and between the company and the local actors.

In the everyday life aspect, I examine how HKDL workers perform in response to the Disney manual and to the HKDL work environment and how their interaction with visitors, both locals and Mainlanders, affects their existing conceptualization of the Hong Kong people and of Mainlanders. I also discuss grass-roots populations' organized resistance against both the Disney Company and HKDL. In this regard, I further examine how local consumption has localized, negotiated, and remade the meaning of the contextless Disney theme park, "the happiest place in the world."

Before delving into chapter details and research methodology, I would like to mobilize Massey's concepts of space-time, of place as a meeting site for networks and wider cultures, and of dynamic identity to reread local studies on the emergence, in the 1960s, of the ambiguous Hong Kong identity, *Heung Gong Yan*. It is important that we first develop a rigorous understanding of the emergence of local identities in the colonial period if we hope to understand, with similar rigor, the cultural significance of HKDL inside Hong Kong society in the post-colonial period, a topic that I discuss in later chapters.

“*Heung Gong Yan*”: ambiguous local consciousness, changing space-time

Hong Kong is geographically and historically linked to Mainland China, but in the 1970s, Hong Kong’s colonial governance and modernization process, together with China’s closed-door policy, fostered the emergence of a sense of a Hong Kong identity. This identity, different from identities applicable to people in China, was labeled *Heung Gong Yan* (Hong Kong People) and arose out of economic development and colonial policy targeting housing, education, immigration, and media. In considering Hong Kong’s cultural distinctiveness in relation to space, we should not consider the identity difference to be a natural consequence of the separation of Hong Kong from the Mainland. These have not been “‘naturally’ discontinuous spaces” in Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson’s words but rather result from a “division of space” that stems from government’s efforts:

Representations of space in the social sciences are remarkably dependent on images of break, rupture, and disjunction. The distinctiveness of societies, nations, and cultures is predicated on a seemingly unproblematic division of space, on the fact that they occupy “naturally” discontinuous spaces. The premise of discontinuity forms the starting point from which to theorize contact, conflict, and contradiction between cultures and societies.... Space itself becomes a kind of neutral grid on which cultural difference, historical memory, and societal organization is inscribed.... This assumed isomorphism of space, place, and culture results in some significant problems.²³

Rather than treat cultural differences as a natural and unproblematic consequence of geographically discontinuous space, Gupta and Ferguson argue that in the production of imagined place-based communities, colonial states have significantly affected the “division of space”: “Colonialism...represents the displacement of one form of interconnection by another.”²⁴ This point is accurate, but colonial governance also actively *represents* the discontinuous space as a matter of “natural”

cultural differences and emphasizes a naturalized link between place, people, and culture.

We may partially apply Gupta and Ferguson's argument on colonial-governance displacement to the case of Hong Kong. Between 1843 and 1997, Hong Kong was a British colony. It was not the colonial government's initial idea to disconnect Hong Kong from China spatially or culturally. Because the British used Hong Kong as an *entrêpot* to open the China market and to extract economic benefits therefrom, the colonial government ruled the people in Hong Kong on the basis of Chinese law and Chinese customs.²⁵ Between 1946 and 1949, however, the Mainland experienced civil war between the Communist Party of China (CCP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). To prevent Hong Kong's devolution into another battlefield that would harm British traders' businesses,²⁶ the colonial government restricted human flows between Hong Kong and China. In 1949, the year in which the CCP set up the People's Republic of China, the colonial government issued identity cards and set up population controls and, in response to these actions, the Beijing government adopted its closed-door policy. After 1951, Chinese living in Hong Kong and Macau had to apply for a "China Entry Permit"²⁷ to enter the Mainland, and their activities in the Mainland were under inspection. Zheng and Wong²⁸ argue that the Mainland's entry system and inspections made it difficult for Hong Kong people to conceive of China as a "homeland," for they were treated as "foreigners" there.

Meanwhile, Hong Kong's restriction of human flows from the Mainland was tightening through the years.²⁹ In April 1974, Hong Kong's immigration control measures fell in line with the so-called "Reached Base Policy,"³⁰ meaning that only those Mainland people who had been received by Hong Kong relatives or

friends at the China-Hong Kong border could stay in Hong Kong. Although the Beijing government headed by Deng Xiaoping set up, in 1976, a China Re-entry Visa system³¹ to loosen control over Hong Kong people's return to the Mainland, the colonial government implemented full immigration controls in October 1980. People from the Mainland crossing the Hong Kong border became illegal immigrants and faced immediate repatriation in the Mainland.

To disconnect Hong Kong's cultural and political networks from China's, the colonial government set up new laws. In October 1948, the colonial government set up a Public Ordinance to restrict activities that were associated with the spread of communist ideas and of nationalism in Hong Kong. In the same year, the government re-amended the "Education (Clause 2) Amendment Ordinance,"³² through which the Governor and the Executive Council could close a school or sack a teacher in the public interest; in February 1949, one school supporting Communism was closed.³³ According to Wong Wang Chi, particular chapters in Chinese history such as the Opium War of 1839-1842 and the Boxer Uprising (1899-1901) were de-emphasized³⁴ because the former highlighted the role of the British in selling opium and the latter raised public's nationalist sentiments.

In 1953, the "Report of the Chinese Studies Committee" issued by the Education Department created the concept of "modern Chinese" for Hong Kong people.³⁵ As *modern Chinese*, Hong Kong students must know both Chinese and Western thoughts and languages. Noticing that the successive governments of China had been trying since 1927³⁶ to popularize *Putonghua* as *Kuoyu*, the "national language," the colonial government started its seven-year primary-school expansion program in October 1954³⁷ and specified Cantonese³⁸ as the medium of instruction and English as a second language. As for secondary education, the

Anglo-Chinese grammar schools used English as a medium of instruction and Chinese was taught as a second language, while the instruction of Chinese middle schools was in Chinese and English was taught as a second language. The medium of educational instruction starting from the 1950s constructed the cultural differences between people in Hong Kong and those in the Mainland, for the former population's cultural and language connection was with the "West."³⁹ The above immigration and education policies can be seen as separatist in nature because they limited human flows between the Mainland and Hong Kong and because they developed Hong Kong people's cultural identity as "modern" Chinese, in contrast to "traditional" Chinese identity.

As shown in the education reforms, colonial governance also created the Hong Kong identity in temporal terms. Because the Hong Kong population was dominated by ethnic Chinese, the colonial government shaped the identity of the Hong Kong people on the grounds of neither China-based cultural traditions nor an extended historical lineage but a distinctive *way of life in the present*.⁴⁰ Such a perception of identity was developed through education media, collective experiences on specific social crisis (in particular, the 1966-67 riots) and related social issues,⁴¹ and the rise of an urbanized way of life.

The official station Radio Hong Kong,⁴² for example, produced popular TV programs such as *Family in Hong Kong* and *Below the Lion Rock*⁴³ from 1972 onwards to be aired on commercial TV stations; these programs portrayed Hong Kong common people's everyday life in concrete social situations. As the two titles suggest, the two programs encouraged a largely immigrant audience to treat Hong Kong as home. In the early 1970s, *Below the Lion Rock* was a series of five-minute to fifteen-minute "slots" featuring a family's everyday life practices through which

the program commented on various social problems in housing, public transport, education, and the like. From 1976, *Lion Rock* turned into a half-hour program depicting life stories of different social strata.⁴⁴ These programs played a role in the popular politics of place making by inviting Hong Kong people to deal with existing problems and not by promoting nostalgia over China's past.

The concept of *mor dun* (modern) was grounded in present-day ways of life and not in traditions and extended historical lineage. The colonial government promoted *mor dun* through "school textbooks and trade promotions, public information campaigns and tourist publicity."⁴⁵ It articulated *mor dun* on the basis of contested local daily practices. On the whole, *mor dun* constituted the Hong Kong people's first distinctive sense of Hong Kong identity, and this process took place in the late 1960s. The concept of "modern" can be interpreted in many ways,⁴⁶ two of which (in their Hong Kong usage) are particularly pertinent here. First, "modern" stands for identity based on work, that industrialization and economic hardship gave rise to "working daughters"⁴⁷ who went out to work diligently for family survival even though they had completed only their primary school education. In this regard, to promote exports, the government agencies also portrayed female secretaries as smart, diligent, and efficient, and this image became working class women's imaginary for social advancement.⁴⁸

Second, the concept *mor dun* suggests styles that appealed to youths and that were reflected in consumption and fashion patterns in the 1960s. For example, working hard to earn money, working daughters became not only breadwinners of the family but also consumers in the market. Evidence of this trend was observable in the annual Chinese Manufacturers' Exhibition of Hong Kong Products.⁴⁹ One of Hong Kong's largest festivals, it was held for several weeks before Christmas

during the 1960s. With songs and dance, fashion shows, opera, and beauty pageants, the trade show promoted collective consumption as entertainment for the diligent working populations. Young working populations, different from their seniors, were concerned about fashion and *mor dun* and consumed these modern images through movies, TV, stars' appearances, government promotion, among other media venues. Hong Kong youths have chased related images and identities since the late 1960s.

However, the separatist and disconnected cultural and immigration policies and the definition of cultural identity based on present-day and modern ways of life, instead of on traditions, was in connection and contestation with human and cultural flows from the Mainland to Hong Kong and with Hong Kong people's everyday practice of Chinese customs. In Massey's words, the lived world of a simultaneous multiplicity of spaces implies "cross-cutting, intersecting, aligning with one another, or existing in relations of paradox or antagonism."⁵⁰ The emergence of working daughters in the late 1960s and the 1970s, for example, should not be seen as the mere product of industrialism; rather, it should be seen as the articulation between the market regime of increasing demands of workers during industrialization and the traditional Chinese family regime in neglecting daughters' wishes (to stay in school to study, in this case) and pressing them to "sacrifice" for family.⁵¹ During the same period, a modern domestic ideal developed in the West emphasizing nuclear patterns and suggesting home-based careers (namely, homemaking) as the ideal female role, and this ideal also started to emerge in Hong Kong, but the ideal of a full-time wife, as argued by Ng Chun Hung,⁵² was unrealizable in the hostile economic climate of 1970s Hong Kong. As Lui Tai Lok argues, although ambiguous local consciousness emerged in Hong

Kong starting from the mid 1960s, it was not until the 1970s—with changing family structure, the rise of living standards, the dominance of localized popular culture, the intensification of urbanized consumption- and entertainment-based ways of living, and changing government-public relations⁵³—that a quasi-autonomous local consciousness formed in Hong Kong.⁵⁴ Underneath the concept of *Heung Gong Yan* was an ostensible clash of contesting cultural elements from contradictory daily lived experiences, and the resulting ambiguous local consciousness marked the ostensible difference between the Hong Kong people and Mainland Chinese.

The Hong Kong people's inability to articulate a coherent identity for themselves intensified from the mid-1980s onwards. Economically and politically, Hong Kong people realized the impossibility of the existence of an autonomous Hong Kong identity. With China's economic reforms, with the increase of Hong Kong-China trade, and with the British-Chinese 1984 decision⁵⁵ to hand over Hong Kong's sovereignty to China in 1997,⁵⁶ Hong Kong's spatial connection with China has seemed to intensify rather than diminish. It is not surprising then to see that, from August 1997 onwards, successive university surveys on Hong Kong people's cultural identity identify four types of cultural identity in which Hong Kong people describe their ambiguous cultural identity—the Hong Kong citizen, the Chinese Hong Kong citizen, the Hong Kong Chinese citizen, and the Chinese citizen.⁵⁷ These four types of identity illustrate the tensions that afflict Hong Kong identity, which is the site of an often painful balancing act between ethnicity-based identity, tradition-based identity, culture-based identity, and geography-based identity.

Post-colonial HK identity: re-nationalization and cultural distinctions

Since the Handover, and as the implementation of the HKSAR government's re-nationalization project has proceeded,⁵⁸ more and more Hong Kong people have ethnically or nationally identified themselves as Chinese. The 1997 survey conducted by the University of Hong Kong indicates that almost 60% of respondents considered themselves to be *Heung Gong Yan* in a broad sense⁵⁹ and that 38% considered themselves to be Chinese in a broad sense.⁶⁰ Another survey conducted by the same institution in 2004, however, showed a 10% decrease in the number of Hong Kong people considering themselves to be *Heung Gong Yan*⁶¹ and a 14% increase in the number considering themselves to be Chinese.⁶²

The political Handover, the increase of Hong Kong-China networks, and the implementation of the re-nationalization project have prompted more Hong Kong people to identify themselves as Chinese instead of as *Heung Gong Yan*, but this trend does not mean that Hong Kong people believe that they are the same "Chinese" as the Mainland Chinese. The Hok Yau Club's 2004 survey of 4,595 secondary school students' cultural identity⁶³ showed that although there was a percentage increase in respondents who were identifying themselves as Chinese, the respondents considered the characteristics of Hong Kong people to be more positive than the characteristics of Mainland Chinese. Hong Kong people were rated as open-minded, courteous, and knowledgeable⁶⁴; Chinese were seen as traditional and self-centered.⁶⁵ In terms of politics, more than 90% of the respondents stated that Hong Kong people were pursuing democracy, liberty, equality, and a system of fairness; whereas less than half of the respondents stated that the Chinese were pursuing these civic values.⁶⁶ The appendix of the survey divided respondents into two groups: students who were born in the Mainland and students who were born in Hong Kong⁶⁷; the former's rating of the characteristics

of Chinese was more positive than the latter's rating of those characteristics. In other words, positive ratings of the characteristics of Chinese are even lower if we consider only the responses of Hong Kong-born students. In sum, although more and more Hong Kong young people identify themselves as Chinese since the Handover, these same young people believe that (1) the personalities of Hong Kong people are better than the personalities of Mainlanders, (2) Hong Kong people are more modern than (less traditional than) Mainlanders, (3) Hong Kong people are more open-minded to foreign culture (and thus more knowledgeable) than Mainlanders, (4) and Hong Kong people are more civilized in both a cultural sense and a political sense than Mainlanders. Since the Handover, two frameworks have pervaded the minds of Hong Kong's youth: the colonial spatial definition of Hong Kong identity, based on foreign—especially Western—cultural connections, and the temporal definition of *Heung Gong Yan*, based on modernity and not on tradition.

Gordon Mathews argues that “Chineseness plus”⁶⁸ is the discourse that many Hong Kong people deploy in recognizing sameness and difference in relation to the Other, the Mainland Chinese. In general, Hong Kong people are affirmed as representing “Chineseness plus internationalness” (p. 144) or “Chineseness plus Westernness” (p. 144). In terms of politics, Hong Kong people are “Chineseness plus freedom/democracy/human rights/the rule of law” (p. 150); in terms of culture, Hong Kong people are “Chineseness plus aesthetic freedom/cosmopolitan taste/manners/knowledge” (pp. 145-9); and in terms of economics, Hong Kong people are “Chineseness plus wealth” (p. 159). These “plus” elements are largely elements acquired from spatial and cultural connections with the capitalist Western bloc.

Certainly, “Chineseness plus” is only an aspect of Hong Kong local consciousness. Although, in this thesis, I borrow from Mathews’ concept of “Chineseness plus” in order to understand Hong Kong people’s cultural prejudice against Mainlanders, I do not mean to claim that Hong Kong local consciousness rests only on “Chineseness.” In my perspective, Hong Kong people’s local consciousness derives chiefly from a sense of “Hong Kongism,” not from “Chineseness.” As I have suggested, the spatial and temporal disconnection of Hong Kong from China in colonial times helped Hong Kong people define Hong Kong identity in their own terms (in particular through modernity and connection with the West). In fact, Hong Kong people may exercise “Chineseness plus” consciousness when they are actively considering themselves to be “Chinese,” but they would also like to distinguish themselves from “Chineseness.” There are still many Hong Kong people who think of themselves as *Heung Gong Yan* instead of as Chinese. In the 2004 University of Hong Kong survey, 49% of respondents still considered themselves to be *Heung Gong Yan* in a broad sense.⁶⁹ When expressing and legitimizing supremacist thoughts, Hong Kong people also interpret “Chineseness” as Other to themselves. Politically, economically, and even culturally, “Chineseness” is not the most prominent cultural bearing among Hong Kong people: Hong Kong’s experience of almost thirty years of “prosperity and stability” between 1967 and 1997 stands in stark contrast to the Mainland’s political and social turbulence; Hong Kong’s self-proclaimed “non-interventionist” capitalist economy is the opposite of the Beijing government’s interventionist socialist economy; Hong Kong people may practice Chinese customs, but Hong Kong people’s enjoyment of a relatively high degree of freedom of speech is hard to attain on the Mainland.

As Chan Koon Chung argues, Hong Kong people's local consciousness is, to a large extent, based on Hong Kong people's experiences in Hong Kong, particularly on Hong Kong's rapid economic development after the late 1960s. Because the Hong Kong government has had a relatively efficient system, rule by law, and public housing, and because Hong Kong made an early entry into the world economy by functioning as an entrepôt and as an exporter, the Hong Kong economy developed rapidly, and Hong Kong people came to believe themselves to be brilliant, flexible, efficient, and business savvy.⁷⁰ I would prefer to call this identity "Hong Kong supremacist," one which proudly allows that these characteristics surfaced under a colonial governance that turned Hong Kong from a fishing port into an international financial center. "Chineseness plus" consciousness can be seen as one type of "Hong Kong supremacist" consciousness, but Hong Kong identity is not chiefly based on "Chineseness," as Mathews' concept of "Chineseness plus" implies.

As Hong Kong fell back under Mainland China's sovereignty in 1997, and as Hong Kong people experienced economic doldrums between 1997 and 2003, Hong Kong people started to question the superior aspect of "Hong Kong" identity. Hong Kong people's status as British colonial subjects disappeared forever with the 1997 Handover, which effectively ended the people's "Chineseness plus." In terms of politics, Hong Kong as a quasi-city state has no say in defense or foreign affairs; the Hong Kong people's legal pursuit of democracy and universal suffrage must receive Beijing authorities' approval, and the Beijing authorities have sovereign power over the common law courts of Hong Kong.⁷¹ In terms of economics, it is true that Hong Kong's economy has recovered, at least somewhat, from the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, the dot-com collapse of 2000, the September 11

attacks of 2001, and the spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) of 2003; nevertheless, the Mainland's economy is the fastest growing region in Asia.⁷² Indeed, Hong Kong's economic rebound, after all these traumatic events, received most of its support from the Beijing government's policies.⁷³

There can be little doubt, then, that the development of Hong Kong's economic future depends significantly on the development of strong economic relations between Hong Kong and Mainland China. And as I mention above, in terms of culture, many Hong Kong young people characterize Hong Kong people as open-minded, courteous, and knowledgeable and characterize Chinese people as traditional and self-centered; however, we should bear in mind that Hong Kong people who frequently work on the Mainland or who live in a Mainland cabin or retreat during weekends may have a more complicated picture of Mainlanders. Between 2001 and 2003, Eric Ma conducted an ethnographic study in Dongguan, Shenzhen, and Guangzhou. Ma argues that, on the basis of their class, Mainlanders differ among one another in their view of Hong Kong culture: working class Mainlanders embrace the popular culture of Hong Kong and that of Taiwan, whereas the Mainland's cultural elites and the Mainland's rising middle class take great pride in traditional Chinese culture and have considerable disdain for Hong Kong culture.⁷⁴ Inside a private housing estate, it is always the Mainlanders who occupy the most luxurious house at the center of the estate, and Hong Kong people may know that they "may not be superior to these Mainland Chinese in fashion, style of speech, and consumption acts."⁷⁵ The fragile and ambiguous differentiation marker that Hong Kong people may still maintain rests perhaps on the Hong Kong people's hybrid culture, which derives from Hong Kong's long-term connection with Western culture. As James Watson argues:

Hong Kong in the late 1990s constitutes one of the world's most heterogeneous cultural environments. Younger people, in particular, are fully conversant in transnational idioms, which include language, music, sports, clothing, satellite television, cybercommunications, global travel, and...cuisine. It is no longer possible to distinguish what is local from what is not. In Hong Kong ... the transnational *is* the local.⁷⁶

Starting in the 1960s, Hong Kong people's hybrid consumption activities have influenced not only their cultural taste but also local production. Many of Hong Kong's productions of television programs, movies, and songs reflect not merely local sources but also popular genres that prevail elsewhere and that the Hong Kong people have appropriated. Stephen Teo argues, for example, that "Contemporary Hong Kong cinema is a hybrid, a child of the two major streams, the Mandarin and Cantonese cinemas of the 50s, as well as Western influences."⁷⁷ Hong Kong action movies in the 1960s were already a display of different martial arts and opera traditions, and increasingly borrowed from Hollywood⁷⁸; Jackie Chan's changing onscreen persona is often a play between Chinese nationalistic culture that borrows heavily from martial arts traditions and a revisionist version of *kungfu* comedies that draws on urban pragmatic and cynical values; as Steve Fore argues, Jackie Chan's early screen persona was "a balancing act between dual manifestations of tradition and modernity in Hong Kong."⁷⁹ As for popular songs, Cantonese songs are a hybrid of different elements.⁸⁰ In Cantonese opera, for example, both Chinese instruments and Western instruments accompany the music,⁸¹ and the way of playing these Western instruments is "Cantonized."⁸² In terms of stylized manufactures, Hong Kong people obtain, re-make, and merchandize the manufactures that originate from global consumer culture. These remade products attract Mainland Chinese to Hong Kong for shopping excursions.

In 2004, 12.24 million Mainland Chinese visited Hong Kong, where they spent HK\$23 million dollars on shopping, and this constituted 68% of their total expenditure in Hong Kong.⁸³ Mainlanders come to Hong Kong and buy Hong Kong goods because of Hong Kong products' hybrid nature, and Hong Kong's hybrid culture comes from adapting cultural goods not only from West but also from other Asian cultures, particularly the Japanese.

Scholars find that Hong Kong youth identify especially with Japanese popular culture. Watching television in the late 1960s and the 1970s was the most popular entertainment activity for the Hong Kong public,⁸⁴ and Japanese TV programs such as *Visour Sign* (1970),⁸⁵ *Sugata Sanshiro* (1970),⁸⁶ *G Men '75* (1975),⁸⁷ and *Oretachi no Tabi* (1976)⁸⁸ were popular with Hong Kong viewers.⁸⁹ Nowadays, Hong Kong people, especially youth, consume Japanese publications, comics, movies, video games, fashion, cultural icons, models, popular music, on-line Japanese content, and non-cultural offerings such as electronic appliances, as well as Japanese television programming. Wilkins⁹⁰ conducted a content analysis of the Cantonese spoken Jade channel of the Television Broadcasts Limited (TVB) that airs in Hong Kong. Wilkins found that, in 1993, of all the programs the Jade channel aired, 80% were its own production; 11% were imported from Japan; 5% from Western sources; and 4% from other Asian sources. In 2001, Delwiche conducted a qualitative study of twenty-four respondents who were between the ages of sixteen and twenty-three, and Delwiche found that "nearly every respondent expressed strong affection for some aspect of Japanese culture."⁹¹ Delwiche argued that owing to the similarities between Hong Kong people's body types and Japanese body types, between Hong Kong's family structure and Japanese family structure, and between Hong Kong's academic system and Japan's academic

system, his respondents “were far more oriented toward the fashions and aspirations of Japanese teens than toward the fashions and aspirations of young people anywhere else in the world” (p. 88). Comparing Japanese teenagers with Hong Kong youth Delwiche’s respondents suggested that “Hong Kong people [are] always trailing one step behind” (p. 82). In research conducted by Jenifer Tam on Hong Kong youth’s consumption of cuteness-themed Japanese products and Japanese fashion magazines, she concludes that her respondents identified Japan “as a world of consumerist pleasure, cuteness, and youthfulness.”⁹²

Among various Japanese cultural offerings, the *kawaii* (cute) style is one popular phenomenon in Hong Kong. The word *kawaii* stands for affectionate feelings toward animals and children who are too weak to support themselves, and as Sharon Kinsella argues, it turns out to be a style celebrating “sweet, adorable, innocent, pure, simple, genuine, gentle, vulnerable, weak, and inexperienced social behavior and physical appearances” and has dominated Japanese popular culture since the 1980s.⁹³ In relating Disney to *kawaii*, Shunya Yoshimi argues that Japanese women remake the Disneyfied European folktale: While Disneyfication is the transformation of a death-rebirth folktale into Disney’s *Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs*, a fantasy about a young girl who, surrounded by cute pets, yearns for a prince, Japanese women’s *kawaii* culture “produced a discourse to colonize strangers” through cutification—to take in things *kawaii* and to deny things that are not into their “imagined community of fantasy.”⁹⁴

Based on Yoshimi’s argument, I would further argue that while Japanese females use *kawaii* culture in order to place themselves in a warm atmosphere to shut out everyday problems,⁹⁵ and to resist adulthood and work,⁹⁶ Hong Kong youth use *kawaii* culture in order to link themselves to others, to maintain peer-

group ties, and to maintain close family ties. According to Jenifer Tam's study⁹⁷ of nineteen Hong Kong youths' consumption of Japanese cultural offerings, "More than half of the informants agreed that they came into contact with either Japanese cute products or fashion magazines from their family members, especially in the case of cute products, as their parents or siblings bought them cute stuff when they were little kids."

Hong Kong people not only domesticate Japanese consumption patterns relative to cute products but remake cute products, as well. Kinsella argues that the early prototype of Japanese cute products derives from the cute style in Japanese manga animation and from young people's handwriting styles.⁹⁸ This version of a cute product "is small, pastel, round, soft, loveable...dreamy, frilly and fluffy."⁹⁹ Hong Kong people appropriate the Japanese cute style in remaking Disney characters and appeal to both local and Mainland customers. This can be shown through the increase of Hong Kong-designed Disney characters in contrast to the decrease of Disney Stores in Hong Kong.

Although Disney characters were popular in Hong Kong, Mickey Mouse, the major icon of "Disney," is seen as outdated and boring in the eyes of many Hong Kong children and, in 2003, was listed as the eighth most "not cool" cartoon character¹⁰⁰; even Disney animators agreed that Mickey's characteristics were indistinguishable from the characteristics of other cartoon characters.¹⁰¹ Hong Kong's first Disney Store opened in 1994, and the number of stores grew to nine in the following years¹⁰² but only three were left by 2004; the only remaining downtown store closed its doors on 4 September 2005, a week before the official opening of HKDL.¹⁰³ The Hong Kong airport has two Disney stores, which target tourists instead of locals.¹⁰⁴ On the other hand, in 1997, Hong Kong celebrated the

opening of Trendyland, a local retail shop designing and selling fancy gadgets decorated with cartoon characters such as Mickey Mouse. By 2006, the number of Trendyland stores in Hong Kong had grown to fourteen. Every year, Trendyland designs more than three thousand products, including home appliances, kitchenware, furniture, stationery, accessories, and plush dolls.¹⁰⁵ Trendyland is also one of the retail stores in Hong Kong designing and modifying Disney characters' appearances, which consequently acquire rounded faces, infantile body shapes (big heads and small bodies), pastel colors, and soft textures. Because of the popularity of Trendyland's translated image, these designs influence the products sold inside HKDL. Like Trendyland, HKDL sells Hong Kong's cutified Mouse and Duck. Trendyland thus exerts its influence on Disney in Hong Kong. This influence extends, as well, to the Mainland. In 2006, Trendyland had eight stores in China in total, with two stores in Shanghai, and one store apiece in Guangzhou, Chengdu, Shaoxing, Beijing, Ningbo, and Hainan.

Fig. 1: Trendyland Character Design¹⁰⁶

Fig. 2: HKDL Grand Opening Pins

In that sense, Hong Kong's cultural offerings are not only hybrids, but also consumption goods that Hong Kong people remake from versions provided by Disney and Japanese designers. In addition, these Hong Kong remade goods exercise cultural influence on the Mainland, although Hong Kong has never exercised political or military influence there.¹⁰⁷ With the establishment of HKDL under the post-colonial context, how should we understand Hong Kong-Disney and Hong Kong-Chinese dynamics? How do Hong Kong people use and remake HKDL for their own sake? What kinds of domestication consequently surface in HKDL? Theoretically, how should we understand globalization and domestication in relation to cultural citizenship and democracy? These are the issues to be explored in the following chapters.

Chapter outline

As discussed in an earlier section of this chapter, I see the site of HKDL as “a simultaneous multiplicity of spaces,”¹⁰⁸ and, therefore, I attempt to illuminate the HKDL globalization story in three of its different aspects: the discursive, the institutional, and the everyday. To narrate the HKDL story in relation to global-local dynamics, I examine in a bottom-up approach how Hong Kong people have responded to and used the established meanings of Disney both before and after HKDL settled in Hong Kong, and how Hong Kong people have used HKDL to develop their own notions of place and identity.

Of course, Disney is a well-known global entertainment brand about which many Hong Kong people have pre-conceived notions, but we should note that Hong Kong people do not simply and passively receive these notions. Rather, Hong Kong

people use and re-use the Disney symbol in their everyday situations. The meaning of “use” in this thesis is threefold. First, based on the ideas of de Certeau, “use” concerns consumption. We can use bread by eating it and use paper by writing on it. The word “use” does not imply that “we have only a secondary relationship to goods.”¹⁰⁹ Rather, “use” implies that the act, itself, changes the state of the consumed good. For example, when we use vegetables to make soup, we change those vegetables. Furthermore, just as there are “procedures of ‘consumption’,” so there are “ways of using.”¹¹⁰ It follows that, second, Hong Kong people both make use of the existing established cultural meanings of Disney and reappropriate these meanings in everyday practices to fulfill individuals’ particular goals. As we shall see, some respondents in my study used Disney merchandise daily as baby-sitting tools; some appropriated the international “aura” of Disney to achieve their own aims of being cosmopolitan. Third, the act of making sense is itself a kind of use. For example, the HKSAR government makes sense of the HKSAR-Disney joint-venture as though it were proof of Hong Kong approaching “world city” status simply by working with a world class entertainment company. As HKDL opened its doors and presented itself to Hong Kong, the city’s residents may reconstruct their own meanings of Disney on the basis of established codes and lived experiences. While HKDL prompts Hong Kong people to complicate their interpretations of Disney, the meanings of local identities may change, as well.

An important qualification is necessary here. Although I emphasize the ways in which Hong Kong people “use” Disney and HKDL in the senses defined above, and although I use a bottom-up approach to examine the globalization process, I do not argue in this thesis that local actors have all kinds of powers to tame and control a global corporation. Following de Certeau’s argument, I argue

that Hong Kong people can pursue their own goals precisely by *using* the established images and the established meanings of Disney, that Hong Kong people can subconsciously or even consciously struggle against the assimilationist effects of global corporations such as Disney, but that users maintain no specific base of operations, as Disney does.¹¹¹ That is, even though users have complicated and changed the local meanings of Disney since HKDL's opening, Hong Kong citizens have had few ways to monitor or to control Disney actions owing chiefly to the non-transparent contracts signed between the HKSAR government and Disney in 1999, and to Hong Kong's current business law. With these premisses in mind, we should examine users' acts as somewhat "contingent or lateral" manifestations of "power and resistance"¹¹² in Paula Saukko's words. In this way, we can promote successful rigorous examinations of the specific effects of local-global negotiations in culture.

The thesis is divided into eight chapters. In chapter Two, I will review the extensive literature on Disney, focusing on those strands of argument which emphasize, respectively, materialist, symbolic, and everyday-life approaches to the subject. In particular, I will discuss the views of scholars who stress the social, political, and cultural influence that Disney corporations have, and the landscape changes that ensue; the utopian appeal that Disney gains in relation to its media monopoly, its merchandising ubiquity, and its theme park design as an antidote to urban problems; and the various meanings and uses that people invoked in relation to the Disneyland park.

Chapters Three, Four, and Five focus on events that happened before the opening of HKDL in 2005. As I stated earlier, I consider the HKDL project to be a site where various social relations intersect. In this regard, I examine the various

ways in which the HKSAR government and ordinary people used the established cultural representations of Disney before the park's opening. In chapter Three, I argue that far from being a diminishing state under the global economy, the HKSAR government allied with the Walt Disney Company and constructed a "world city" dream for Hong Kong people to imagine. On a discursive level, the "world city" dream not only promises Hong Kong people economic revitalization and employment, but also functions as an identity marker distinguishing Hong Kong from other Chinese cities. Certainly, the import of HKDL is for economic revitalization, but we should not ignore HKDL's political effects: some Hong Kong people support the undemocratic and non-transparent HKDL project for a vague cultural and economic dream.

In chapter Four, I shift my focus to how respondents' views on the established global Disney affect their various views and uses of the HKDL project. Drawing on my arguments in chapter Three, I further challenge the assumption that culture is economized under a neo-liberal economy. Many of my respondents embrace the HKDL project but do not see it as an economic project. Rather, they see Disney as a famous global brand that helps Hong Kong prove its cosmopolitan city status and distinguishes Hong Kong from China. The cultural distinctions that reflect "Chineseness plus" and "Hong Kong supremacy" that derive from the colonial period are evident in the statements of some respondents. At the same time, some other respondents, in particular the university graduates, voiced a bigger and yet more individualized dream—the dream of becoming cosmopolitans. They used Disney as a global corporation to achieve their own cosmopolitan dream. In some cases, lived experiences of working in Orlando sometimes changed respondents' established views on self and others.

The dream of being cosmopolitan is characteristic of middle class parents, as well as of university graduates. In chapter Five, I carefully study several parents' selective uses of Disney offerings, the Disney English learning and other educational kits, and argue against the alleged necessary connection between the use of Disney merchandise and the acceptance of certain Disney values. These parents appropriate Disney merchandise for their own uses: locally, parents attempt to solidify their own children's middle class status; seeing that Hong Kong workers need to be highly competitive in the increasingly regionalized and even globalized economy, parents train themselves and their children to be an apt international workforce.

Chapters Six and Seven feature stories about respondents' experiences of both HKDL's opening and HKDL's post-opening operations. These two chapters deal with multiple spaces of HKDL, namely the social relations (1) between Disney management and the HKSAR government, (2) between Disney public relations officers and local media practitioners, (3) between HKDL workers and HKDL management, (4) between HKDL workers and visitors, and (5) among visitors. These various social relations and competing social spaces construct and reshape the local-global and Hong Kong-Mainland dynamics.

In chapter Six, I focus on the institutional and everyday aspect. I argue that Hong Kong imports not only Disney's theme park technology and service philosophy but Disney's management practices, as well. However, these supposedly glocalised Disneyland management practices sometimes were in conflict with local expectations. Conflicts then arose between Disney's public affairs officers and Hong Kong reporters and between Disney management and the HKSAR government, in particular when HKDL securities, by maintaining Disney

magic, challenged health inspectors to “dress down” to enter the park. Currently, institutional constraints significantly limit legislators’ power to monitor the park, although it receives significant investments from the HKSAR government.

Focusing on the institutional aspect themselves, media practitioners resignify the meaning of ‘Disney’ as “Americanism” and circulate the new meaning through media, thereby reshaping the global-local relationship.

In chapter Seven, I further examine how people’s everyday dialogue about the park and how visitors and workers’ actual behavior inside the park have injected local flavor into the established meaning of Disneyland. Disappointed with certain Disney-management acts, workers “localized” their services rather than join labor unions; and facing various critical comments circulated in the media, local consumers disrupted Disneyland’s routine without boycotting the site. Furthermore, Hong Kong visitors used HKDL as a stage on which they gave body to their discriminatory attitudes toward Mainlanders; in contrast, some HKDL workers changed their pre-conceived notions of “Hong Kong people” and of “Mainlanders” after having everyday encounters with Mainlanders.

In short, the globalization story in the case of HKDL is not simply about global homogenization of local culture or about diminishing state sovereignty or, for that matter, about locals who wield and exercise all kinds of power to control a global company. The globalization process is a long winding road, with unforeseen local uptakes, appropriation, and resistance in relation to globalized corporate offerings, and these local acts result in shifting local-global dynamics and contestations in various spaces of social relations. In the concluding chapter, I connect my empirical studies of usage with Hong Kong culture and identify the important roles that local laws and citizenship rights play in local communities’

efforts to deal with a transnational company's management practices. Then, I raise the issue of cultural citizenship to discuss Hong Kong culture's effects on the development of a democracy-based culture of openness and inclusiveness.

Research methodology

Following Massey's idea that social groups' locations in social relations differ from one group to the next, and that social groups' reading of these relations differ from one group to the next, I argue that localities' uses of HKDL in relation to Disney differ from one locality to the next. To understand these various "spaces of interactions," as Massey puts it,¹¹³ I adopt a multi-sited research methodology to study how respondents with different socio-cultural positions use the park and construct their own notions of place, identity, and politics under post-colonial governance, whether that governance derives from local administration or business concerns. Except in chapter Three, where I undertake textual criticism of how the HKSAR government has mobilized various discourses in promoting the HKDL project, I use methods based on ethnographic research and attempt to tease out the lived experiences and the complicated and sometimes changing meanings of Disney among my study's thirty-nine respondents.

Among them, there were ten HKDL workers (one of whom was a seasonal part-timer); two Hong Kong-based Disney production workers; seventeen consumers (three as individual consumers, eight as parents who consume Disney offerings in a family setting, and six as children); four media practitioners (two journalists, one daily-news program director, one music video producer); two Disney merchandise licensees; one kindergarten principal; one labor union worker; and two social-movement activists.¹¹⁴ In addition, I conducted two focus-group

interviews with ten kindergarten students aged four to five. I engaged in numerous casual talks with HKDL visitors, my neighbors, and students on the topic of Disney and HKDL. Basically, I used semi-structured interviews¹¹⁵ to start my research with my respondents and followed some interviews with field study and participant observation (discussed below) recorded in the form of field notes. To protect confidentiality, I use pseudonyms in the thesis. To study various Disneyland parks in the world, I visited all Disney parks without financial support from the Walt Disney Company.

As Paula Saukko argues, research is always political.¹¹⁶ It asks us, in Haraway's words, to be aware of "what kinds of realities and beings we are creating, out of whom, and for whom."¹¹⁷ To understand how individuals view and make use of Disney merchandise and the HKDL project, chapters Four and Five focus on individuals' lived experiences, individuals' behavior contributing to their lived world, and individuals' interpretation of their lived world. Following Saukko,¹¹⁸ I connect these lived experiences to the larger social, economic, and political environment *not* by first researching their lived worlds and by then contrasting them with "real" structures or politics as envisioned by my own political agenda, but by practicing "dialogic research strategies" to escape from ventriloquism.¹¹⁹ Believing that respondents are always aware, to different degrees, of the discourses in which they are embedded, I questioned respondents in order to render explicit their ideas and acts. Following Eric Arnould's advice,¹²⁰ I then practiced participant observation to observe and to identify respondents' behavior in resonance or in conflict with their own ideas. Then I tracked the respondents by conducting follow-up interviews and fieldwork that took the form of casual encounters (such as babysitting and casual talks through phone calls, e-mails, and home visits). I have

tried not to interpret respondents' thoughts without discussing my interpretations with them. Shared interpretations turn into dialogues, during which complicated and contradictory selves often reveal themselves. Through conversations, I acknowledge people's concrete concerns and experiences and also uncover my own political agenda. That is, as a Hong Kong person, I am concerned about Hong Kong's democratization, including the development of accountable and transparent governance, citizen-based participatory government, and a place-based culture that both treasures its own values and ways of life and that develops openness toward other cultures besides that of global consumerism. As a cultural studies student, I use dialogic research method to put my belief in pluralistic culture and participatory democracy into research practice. I attempt to do justice to the researched, including their perspectives and their lived experiences, and I try not to homogenize respondents' views and acts but examine them from different angles. Hopefully, by employing dialogic and self-reflexive ethnography, the people being studied, as well as the readers, gain access to my motivations and concerns.

Dialogic research method requires that, between the researcher and the researched, there exist long-time contact, strong trust, and openness. The goal, therein, is to have the two parties recognize each other's complicated and contradictory thoughts. For example, when I practiced dialogic research in my study of five middle class families (see chapter Five), I tried to study parents' approaches to the process of parenting, particularly in relation to family consumption of Disney products (including movies, merchandise, and theme parks). Therefore, during 2002 and 2006, I conducted an ethnographic study on these five families by undertaking at least three rounds of semi-structured interviews, home visits, babysitting of their children, and casual talks through phone and e-mails. I

knew three of the five families before I began this research. Because of this knowledge and because of the long-term nature of the contact, I was able to find that parents' house-rules and parenting methods have significant effects over children's consumption behavior, and I also found that these middle class parents' particular ways of using Disney offerings can be traced back to their childhood memory of watching Disney movies and using Disney merchandise, their life history of climbing up the social ladder through education, and their way of associating career difficulties with a "lack" of world exposure.

With the Disney or HKDL staff respondents, I conducted semi-structured interviews with two Disney production and ten HKDL employees, five of whom had been cultural representatives of HKDL and had worked in Orlando Disney parks for six months. Among the twelve Disney staff respondents, four of them engaged in more than three individual interviews with me. Because I knew only one HKDL staff respondent in 2004 (I became acquainted with all the others in 2006), I conducted many of the interviews comparatively late in the research process. And because Disney prohibits HKDL employees from talking about HKDL to researchers and journalists, I found it quite difficult to develop trust between me and the staff respondents. They worried that, by sharing information with me, they would reveal their identities to their employers. To lessen their worry, I promised them before the interviews that no local newspaper (whether in Chinese or in English) would publish any interview information; to protect confidentiality, I not only use pseudonyms in the thesis (as I mentioned earlier) but also blend different voices into one story and break one voice into several stories.

I encountered other methodology problems. In the course of my research, I found, for example, that my attempt to apply dialogic research method to my

interactions with Disney-staff respondents was more difficult than my attempt to do so with the parents. First, with two exceptions, I had no personal relationship with my staff respondents prior to the start of the research project. I became acquainted with the latter through friends or through other Disney staff respondents. To lessen any tension during the interview process, I would sometimes invite my friends to join the interview. Second, the duration of our relationships was rather short, a fact that made it difficult to develop a solid and trusting relationship. Third, because I did not know these respondents personally and invited them to be my interviewees through their friends, some respondents accepted my invitation on the basis chiefly of their friends' request. Knowing that they should not disclose HKDL information to outsiders, some of the respondents declined to be interviewed on more than one occasion, and one respondent preferred to do the interview through phone. Without a long-term relationship, dialogic research method becomes impossible to execute insofar as the methods emphasize the importance of self-reflexive conversation.

The last type of difficulty that I encountered while conducting my ethnographic study on HKDL employees concerned their high turnover rate. Among the ten HKDL staff-respondents, four of them quit their HKDL job within the first year, one with a permanent position was planning to quit the job, one planned not to renew his contract, and one worked only as a seasonal part-time worker. Only three had worked inside the company for more than a year. Both the short duration of their HKDL work experiences and the short duration of our contact have imposed difficulties on my efforts to tease out the workers' complicated and maybe changing thoughts toward HKDL. As a result, although I practiced dialogic research method toward my four Disney staff respondents, I believe that one case partially failed. From this experience, I concluded that I

should learn to execute dialogic research method in a more cautious way, and therefore note some details here.

In 2004, I met my first HKDL staff respondent, Olivia, who signed a contract to become an HKDL cultural representative in Orlando's Walt Disney World for six months and to return to HKDL to work for another six months. She agreed to be one of my respondents and, through several interviews, to tell me about her Disneyland work experiences. To help me understand her life in Orlando, she gave me access to her blog,¹²¹ where she frequently wrote about her daily life and feelings. When she was in Orlando, we communicated with each other by e-mail. After her Orlando trip, we had two long face-to-face chats and many long phone chats, all of which centered on her work experiences in Orlando and in Hong Kong. I also phoned her several times to ask her some concrete questions such as whether or not an ambulance could drive inside HKDL, and on all these occasions, Olivia was helpful. Olivia had been a social worker, and given her past academic training at a university and her two years of social-work experience, I thought that by practicing dialogic ethnography, I could and I should reveal some of my anti-Disney values (such as my opposition to Disney's corporate practices) and discuss with her how she viewed these anti-Disney values and practices. But I was wrong. In our third and last interview, Olivia was in my home and I asked her to read a newspaper article reporting accusations made by Disney Hunter, an anti-Disney group to which I belonged. In fact, I had mentioned my affiliation herewith to Olivia. She made no comments on the accusations, and I was unsure whether or not her silence stemmed from her knowledge that I was a member of the group. I then told her about scholars' criticisms of Disney's control over workers—the scripted manners, the service with a smile, and other forms of emotional subjugation (indeed,

she had once mentioned in her blog that her Disney job was not always suitable for her because it required employees to smile and she sometimes just could not do it). Immediately responding to my comments, she twice stated, “I think I am always a good girl. I don’t find it problematic.” Her refusal to engage in discussion reflected my insensitivity to her reluctance to exchange genuine but different views with me on this particular topic. After our interview, I recalled that Olivia had once stated in her blog that she would not say “in public” that Disney was bad in any sense because to say so would constitute proof, in her mind, that her decision to be a Disney employee amounted to a mistake. A couple of months later, I phoned her several times but she did not return my calls. Because I wanted to send her a Christmas present rather than conduct another interview with her, I asked one of our common friends to help me send her the present. She then phoned me back, and we made a date for dinner. On that day, she phoned me and said that, because of some sudden change of plans, she was not free for dinner. She promised to phone me back, but I received no reply from her. The present that I intend to send her is still in my home. Her blog, after her return Hong Kong and after successive negative entries on HKDL management, carried less and less information about her work, and one day, she deleted all her past written entries (maybe she put these written entries in a private section). I am not suggesting that my discussion with her during our interview caused her to delete this information or to block her friends from reading her online diary, but this experience has enabled me to sense the dangers of practicing dialogic research method. Practice of these methods in some circumstances can block, rather than foster, dialogue.

After this experience, I become more cautious in practicing dialogic research. I intentionally and repeatedly told my respondents that I would like to

have a balanced view of my Disney research and that, to this end, I would like to hear about both their contentment and their discontent regarding HKDL. I did not hide my own participation in some anti-Disney activities, but I did not tell respondents about these activities right away. Critical dialogue works better with some people than with others. Those respondents who were willing to disclose their different attitudes toward Disney were able to engage me in conversations that yielded many critical dialogues. Josephine, for example, was the most enthusiastic HKDL staff member whom I met in the course of my research, and indeed, her colleagues commented to me on her unusually pronounced enthusiasm for HKDL. However, at our first meeting, she told me about both her enthusiasm for HKDL and her disappointment with HKDL. Moreover, she said that she would like to learn more different perspectives on Disney. We had two long talks in person and many long phone conversations, during all of which we exchanged views on various HKDL work and management practices. In our first meeting, Josephine mentioned that she had bad feelings about the union. After several talks, I told her over the phone that I had met the HKDL labor-union representative and that, according to this source, the labor union's activities went beyond the activities reported in the news media. Then, rather than again voice her own distrust of the union, she started to pepper me with questions about the union. Her way of responding to my comments got me to thinking about the effects that activists' characteristic mentalities may have on people's involvement in social movements. For example, activists often paint a picture of the opposition that is neither vague nor ambiguous; in this way, the activists have a clear-cut object that they can resist. This tendency to discount vagueness and ambiguity may hinder people's involvement in social movement, an issue that I will discuss in chapter Seven.

Throughout the research process, I learned that one core difficulty in practicing the dialogic research method actually follows from the way in which it asks the researcher to encourage informants to express, using their own voice, their own worldviews. In this way, the researcher should try to understand the informants through their eyes. Yet on the other hand, the dialogic research method asks the researcher to tease out multi-layered and sometimes contradictory meaning-making processes that pertain to the researched, to talk to the respondents about the findings, and to ask respondents to make their embedded discourse explicit. The method asks not only that the researched genuinely express their views but also that both the researched and the researcher have the courage to be self-reflexive. In short, only through on-going dialogue, mutual trust, and openness to differences can we create critical and self-reflexive ethnography.

Other respondents in my research are local media practitioners (including journalists, a daily news producer, and a music-video producer), consumers (including Disney fans, Disneyland fans, and a kindergarten principal) and Disney merchandise licensees. I conducted semi-structured interviews with these respondents by asking them about their HKDL experiences, their views on the park, and their consumption practices inside the park. I also interviewed two members of the anti-Disney group Disney Hunter to identify both the reasons for their decision to join the group and their evaluations of the campaign. Because I am myself a group member of Disney Hunter, I used participant observation to strengthen my discussion about Disney Hunter's influence on Hong Kong people's views of Disney. I used participant observation, as well, to study visitors' consumption practices inside HKDL.

Although I attempt to identify many diverse meanings and many diverse uses attributable to Disney in Hong Kong, my research findings are far from exhaustive. In its treatment of HKDL as a workplace, my study fails to collect information from high-ranking employees who would have a comprehensive understanding of the HKDL management policy. In reviewing HKDL public-relations policy and HKDL media-relations policy, the study lacks views and responses from HKDL from high-ranking or policy-specific staff members, whose insights would have made my study more pluralistic. I sent out a formal call-for-interviews letter to the media-relations department of HKDL but received no reply. Two journalists helped me ask an HKDL public-relations officer in person to accept my request for an interview, but she refused it. To counteract the unbalanced points of views from reporters or freelance producers, I interviewed three HKDL employees who were working in customer services and who were familiar with certain HKDL practices touching on both public affairs and media relations. I hope that these interviews remedied the aforementioned deficiency to a certain extent.

In this thesis, I emphasize multi-sited, polyvocal research because it can help express the multifaceted realities of Disney. This emphasis can help researchers, participants, and readers alike go beyond our common conception of Disney as “just family entertainment” and situate Disney in a complicated framework of local-global dynamics, local governance, landscape changes, cultural identity and distinctions, and consumer politics. By interacting across these socio-cultural and political themes, we can better recognize that a participatory civic society is necessary condition for the development of participatory democracy. In the following chapter, I will review literature on Disney in relation to these issues.

NOTES

¹ “\$27b seals Disney dream,” 3 November 1999, *Hong Kong Standard*, A01; “世紀夢成真迪士尼藍圖初展 神奇王國 (Magic Kingdom) 初步構思,” 3 November 1999, *Apple Daily*, A01; “迪士尼旅遊事務主席談選擇原因 港具備國際大都會條件不排除內地建新迪士尼,” 3 November 1999, *Ta Kung Pao*, A01; “迪士尼香港最抵玩,” 3 November 1999, *Hong Kong Commercial Daily*, A01; “香港迪士尼乃港人寶貴資產,” 3 November 1999, *Hong Kong Commercial Daily*, A02, headline; “迪士尼 40 年回報千五億 特區政府佔股權五成七首年遊客料可逾五百萬人次,” 3 November 1999, *Wen Wei Po*, headline; “建迪士尼每港人付三千元,” 3 November 1999, *Hong Kong Daily News*, A02, headline; “港府 224 億建迪士尼 首 12 年無分紅進賬,” 3 November 1999, *Ming Pao Daily News*, A01; “未來 40 年帶來 1480 億 為投資額 8 倍 建迪士尼 港府料 18 年始分紅,” 3 November 1999, *Hong Kong Economic Times*, A02, headline; “‘禮金’ 224 億 ‘迎娶’ 迪士尼 12 年回本落成翌年售股份,” 3 November 1999, *Tin Tin Daily News*, A01.

² 世紀夢成真迪士尼藍圖初展 神奇王國 (Magic Kingdom) 初步構思,” 3 November 1999, *Apple Daily*, A01.

³ Because of overbooking, on 1 and 2 February 2006, HKDL barred from the park more than two thousand people who were holding valid tickets. HKDL neither possessed immediate measures to control human flows nor issued a formal apology; therefore, the government intervened and the chaos became headline news in local papers and even raised international concerns. The details of the chaos are discussed in chapter Six.

⁴ 李兆富, “蘋論：國企主題公園令香港蒙羞,” *Apple Daily*, 3 February 2006, A06, editorial; “落閘開閘混亂 樂園令港蒙羞,” 3 February 2006, *Sing Pao*, A04, editorial.

⁵ Wendy Leung, “Disney set to miss mark on visitors,” 5 September 2006, *The Standard*, M03; Linda Choy and Dennis Eng, “5 million visit Disney park, short of target,” 5 September 2006, *South China Morning Post*, EDT1, headline; “迪士尼 500 萬客量少預期一成,” 5 September 2006, *Ming Pao Daily News*, A08; “首年遊客 500 萬暑假逾半內地客 迪士尼入場人次未達標,” 5 September 2006, *Apple Daily*, A08; “迪士尼 500 萬客未達標,” 5 September 2006, *Oriental Daily News*, A04; “香港迪士尼全年客量難達標,” 5 September 2006, *Hong Kong Economic Journal*.

⁶ Janet Wasko, Mark Phillips, and Eileen R. Meehan, eds., *Dazzled by Disney? The Global Disney Audiences Project* (London, New York: Leicester University Press, 2001).

⁷ Henry A. Giroux, *The Mouse That Roared: Disney and the End of Innocence* (Lanham, Boulder, NY, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999), pp. 87-9.

⁸ Sharon Zukin, *Landscapes of Power: From Detroit to Disney World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), p. 230.

⁹ Aviad E. Raz, *Riding the Black Ship: Japan and Tokyo Disneyland* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard, 1999); Brannen, "'Bwana Mickey': Constructing Cultural Consumption at Tokyo Disneyland," in *Re-Made in Japan*, edited by Tobin (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 216-34; Shunya Yoshimi, "Japan: America in Japan/Japan in Disneyfication: The Disney Image and the Transformation of 'America' in Contemporary Japan," in *Dazzled by Disney? The Global Disney Audiences Project*, edited by Wasko and others (London, NY: Leicester University Press, 2001), pp. 160-81; Mitsuhiro Yoshimoto, "Images of Empire: Tokyo Disneyland and Japanese Cultural Imperialism," in *Disney Discourse: Producing the Magic Kingdom*, edited by Smoodin (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 181-203.

¹⁰ Stacy Warren, "Cultural Contestation at Disneyland Paris," in *Leisure / Tourism Geographies: Practices and Geographical Knowledge*, edited by Crouch (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 109-25.

¹¹ Richard Foglesong, *Married to the Mouse: Walt Disney World and Orlando* (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1999); Stacy Warren, "Disneyfication of the Metropolis: Popular Resistance in Seattle," *Journal of Urban Affairs* 16, issue 2 (1994), pp. 89-107.

¹² Government Information Centre (HKSAR government), "1999 Policy Address," <http://www.policyaddress.gov.hk/pa99/english/part1.htm> (accessed 6 January 2007), clause 1.

¹³ In September 2005, the assistant director of Food and Environmental Hygiene Department Rhonda Lo confirmed that two health inspectors were required by HKDL security to "dress down" before entering the park and that the park's request was "unacceptable." See Patsy Moy, May Chan, and Dennis Eng, "Disney under fire for asking inspectors to dress down," 10 September 2005, *South China Morning Post*, EDT1.

¹⁴ Government Information Centre (HKSAR government), "Government concerned about operation of the Hong Kong Disneyland during the Chinese New Year Golden Week," press release on 2 February 2006, <http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200602/02/P200602020226.htm> (accessed 7 October 2006).

¹⁵ Aviad E. Raz, *Riding the Black Ship: Japan and Tokyo Disneyland* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard, 1999), pp. 109-10. The service manual is an important tool with which Disney maintains its staff members' service standards.

¹⁶ Matthew Turner, "60's / 90's: Dissolving the People," in *Hong Kong Sixties: Designing Identity*, edited by Turner and Ngan (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Arts Centre, 1995), pp. 13-34; 吳俊雄, "尋找香港本土意識," in *Reading Hong Kong Popular Culture 1970-2000 / 閱讀香港普及文化 1970-2000*, edited by 吳俊雄 and 張志偉 (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press (China), 2001), pp. 86-102; 鄭宏泰、黃紹倫, *香港身份證透視* (香港: 三聯書店 (香港), 2004); 黃家英、尹寶珊, "對中國的「重新想像」: 回歸後身分認同的延續與變化," in *香港社會*

政治的延續與變遷, edited by 劉兆佳、黃家英、尹寶珊 (香港: 香港中文大學香港亞太研究所, 2004), pp. 213-41.

¹⁷ Gordon Mathews, *Global Culture / Individual Identity: Searching for Home in the Cultural Supermarket* (London, NY: Routledge, 2000), p. 144.

¹⁸ Alvin Y. So, "Hong Kong's Problematic Democratic Transition: Power Dependency or Business Hegemony?" *Journal of Asian Studies* 59, issue 2 (2000), p. 371.

¹⁹ So, "Hong Kong's Problematic Democratic Transition," p. 360.

²⁰ The word "Imagineering" is a word created by Disney. "Imagineering" combines two words, "imagination" and "engineering." Walt Disney Imagineering is a research and development team for designing and developing attractions of various Disney theme parks. Imagineers also create shows, parades, and firework displays at the theme parks. Many Imagineers work at the Disney headquarters in California.

²¹ Doreen Massey, *Space, Place and Gender* (Cambridge, Oxford: Polity Press, 1994), p. 261. Further references are in parentheses in the text.

²² Michael Keith and Steve Pile, "Introduction Part 2: The Place of Politics," in *Place and the Politics of Identity*, edited by Keith and Pile (London, New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 28.

²³ Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson, "Beyond 'Culture': Space, Identity, and the Politics of Difference," in *The Anthropology of Globalization: A Reader*, edited by J. X. Inda and R. Rosaldo (Malden, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), pp. 65-6.

²⁴ Gupta and Ferguson, "Beyond 'Culture'," p. 67.

²⁵ 王宏志, *歷史的沉重: 從香港看中國大陸的香港史論述* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press (China), 2000), p. 82.

²⁶ Sir Alexander Grantham, the Governor of Hong Kong from 1947 to 1952 stated clearly in his speech to the Legislative Council on 8 March 1950:

We cannot permit Hong Kong to be the battleground for contending political parties or ideologies. We are just simple traders who want to get on with our daily round and common task. This may not be very noble, but at any rate it does not disturb others.

Hong Kong Hansard (Hong Kong: Government printer, 1950), p. 41. Quoted from Lau Siu Kai, *Society and Politics in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1982), p. 36.

²⁷ "China entry permit" is an English translation of 港澳同胞通行證.

²⁸ 鄭宏泰、黃紹倫, *香港身份證透視* (香港: 三聯書店 (香港), 2004), pp. 179-81.

²⁹ Another separatist policy was implemented on 23 August 1971. The colonial government introduced two types of identity card—the black seal and the green seal. The former was issued to people who were born in Hong Kong or who had already lived in Hong Kong for over seven years; the green seal was issued to those who had lived in Hong Kong less than seven years. Zheng and Wong argued that

different identity cards visually separated “Hong Kong People” and Mainlander from each other and that this separatist immigration policy helped Hong Kong people dissociate themselves from Mainlanders. See 鄭宏泰、黃紹倫, *香港身份證透視*, p. 99-102.

³⁰ The Chinese title of “Reached Base Policy” is “抵壘政策.”

³¹ The Chinese translation of “China Re-entry Visa” is 回鄉証.

³² The Chinese name of “Education (Clause 2) Amendment Ordinance” is “教育(第2號)修正條例.

³³ 鄭宏泰、黃紹倫, *香港身份證透視*, p. 41.

³⁴ 王宏志, *歷史的沉重：從香港看中國大陸的香港史論述* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press (China), 2000), p. 17. The Boxers are also named “The Righteous and Harmonious Fists.” It was a religious society that had originally rebelled against the imperial government in Shandong. The Boxers believed that the expulsion of foreign devils would magically renew Chinese society and begin a new golden age. The Boxer Uprising lasted from November 1899 to September 1901 and was finally quashed by an international force. The Western countries then forced the imperial government to sign the Boxer Protocol of 1901. Under the Boxer Protocol, European powers maintained military forces in the capital and thus placed the imperial government more or less under arrest. The protocol suspended the civil service examination, required that the Qing government pay a huge indemnity to European powers for the losses they had suffered, and prohibited the Qing government from importing arms into the country.

³⁵ 王宏志, *歷史的沉重*, p. 16, quoting the Education Department, “Report of the Chinese Studies Committee,” (HK: Hong Kong Government, 1953), p. 19.

³⁶ Hong Kong Government, *Hong Kong: Report for the Year 1961*, p. 10.

³⁷ The seven year primary school expansion began in October 1954 and officially ended in 1961.

³⁸ The 1961 census reveals that the population was 3.13 million and that 79% of all persons aged five and over identified Cantonese as their usual language, and an additional 16% indicated their ability to speak Cantonese. Therefore, 95% of the whole population aged five and over used Cantonese habitually or occasionally. See Hong Kong Government, *Hong Kong: Report for the Year 1961* (HK: Hong Kong Government, 1962), p. 33 and p. 10.

³⁹ Placing a high priority on English speaking in the government service and higher education, parents after the 1950s chose Anglo-Chinese grammar schools for their children for pragmatic reasons. In 1961, there were 107 Anglo-Chinese grammar schools accommodating nearly 53,000 pupils and 98 Chinese middle schools accommodating nearly 31,000 pupils; in 1963, there were 148 Anglo-Chinese grammar schools accommodating 94,625 pupils and 105 Chinese middle schools accommodating 44,349 pupils. There was a 38% increase in Anglo-Chinese grammar schools and only a 7% increase in Chinese middle schools; the increase of students in Anglo-Chinese grammar school was 78.5% while the corresponding increase was 43% in Chinese middle schools. English, instead of *Putonghua*,

gradually became the second language of Hong Kong people. In the 1950s, around 30 to 50% of people had the chance to get a secondary education and these secondary school graduates became Hong Kong's first generation middle class and were well versed in both Cantonese and English instead of *Putonghua* under the colonial rule. For the change in the number of Anglo-Chinese grammar schools and Chinese middle schools between 1961 and 1963, see Hong Kong Government, *Hong Kong: Report for the Year 1961*, p. 114; Hong Kong Government, *Hong Kong 1964* (HK: Hong Kong Government, 1965), p. 82; for the language spoken by Hong Kong's first generation middle class, see 陳啓祥, "香港本土文化的建立和電視的角色," in *Culture and Society in Hong Kong*, edited by Elizabeth Sinn (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 1995), p. 82.

⁴⁰ Many scholars mentioned the emergence of Hong Kong identity starting from the 1960s, but Turner emphasizes the *ambiguity* of such identity based on ways of life instead of political citizenship. I hereby borrow his idea on Hong Kong identity. For details, see Matthew Turner, "60's / 90's: Dissolving the People," in *Hong Kong Sixties: Designing Identity*, edited by Turner and Ngan (HK: Hong Kong Arts Centre, 1995), pp. 20, 22-3.

⁴¹ The 1966-67 riots, for example, were seen as involving important social issues that Hong Kong people faced collectively. Many scholars argued that the riots should be seen as the crucial historical juncture for people in Hong Kong who were treating Hong Kong as their home and the colonial government as their legitimate government. During this period, the Cultural Revolution had just started and riots in Hong Kong were supported by the radical Left. Many people fled from China and stayed in Hong Kong because they feared communist rule, and they did not accept riots in Hong Kong that were backed by the left. As a result, people did not agree with these pro-Chinese nationalist riots and supported the colonial government's suppression of the riots. The riots as the "traumatic kernel," argued by Hung Ho Fung (孔皓峰), became the pillar of defense both for Hong Kong's capitalist ways of life and against the Mainland's communist rule. Elizabeth Sinn, "六十年代—歷史概覽" in *Hong Kong Sixties: Designing Identities*, edited by Turner and Ngan (HK: Hong Kong Arts Centre, 1995), pp. 80-3; 王宏志, *歷史的沉重：從香港看中國大陸的香港史論述* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press (China), 2000); 孔皓峰, "論說 67: 恐左意識底下的香港本土主義、中國民族主義與左翼思潮," in *誰的城市? 戰後香港的公民文化與政治論述*, edited by 羅永生 (香港: 牛津大學, 1997), pp. 98-9.

⁴² The colonial government took over radio broadcasting and launched its first broadcasts in June 1928 under the call-sign GOW. In 1929, the call-sign changed to ZBW. In 1934, the station started to broadcast news bulletins and a Chinese channel under the call-sign ZEK was established. In August 1948, both of the call-signs were abandoned and Radio Hong Kong (RHK) became the official name. In 1970, RHK established the Public Affairs Television Unit to produce public affairs programs to be aired on licensed commercial TV stations, and in 1976, the name RHK was changed to Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK) to reflect the increasing number of television productions. See "RTHK history," <http://59.188.18.227/b5i/www.rthk.org.hk/classicschannel/history.htm> (accessed 11 September 2006).

⁴³ Lion Rock is a famous hill in Kowloon, and the title *Below the Lion Rock* suggests Chinese people living in Hong Kong.

⁴⁴ *Below the Lion Rock* is a long-lasting popular TV program produced by RTHK and it has been successively broadcast since 1972. The newest series was broadcast in the summer of 2006. Because *Lion Rock* encourages Hong Kong people to face severe present conditions and an unsettling future in a courageous way, some episodes of *Lion Rock* were broadcast after the financial crisis in 1997, and the recent *Lion Rock* series deals with Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), problems faced by new immigrants, a shrinking employment market, and the like. 吳昊, *香港電視史話 I* (香港: 次文化有限公司, 2003), p. 10-3; Zhang Tao, "RTHK: Its Rise and Decline," in *Changes in Hong Kong Society through Cinema*, edited by Li (Hong Kong: Urban Council, 1988), p. 56-8; "獅子山下," RTHK, <http://www.rthk.org.hk/special/belowthelionrock/> (accessed 13 September 2006).

⁴⁵ Matthew Turner, "Introduction," in *Hong Kong Sixties: Designing Identity*, edited by Turner and Ngan (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Arts Centre, 1995), p. xvi.

⁴⁶ According to Meaghan Morris and Naoki Sakai, the word 'modern' has been associated with the notion of "progress" and "development" since the eighteenth century, but it can also be viewed as "a standard against which other customs or ways of life are judged pre-modern. A modernization project then prescribes a 'reform' or a 'revolutionary change' in accordance with that standard." Derived from Latin, 'modern' means "just now" with "no special reference to the 'West'"; associated with the industrial revolution and imperialism, "the modern" then stood in opposition to the traditional and the backward, instead of in comparison with the classical and the ancient. See Morris and Sakai, "Modern," in *New Keywords: A Revised Vocabulary of Culture and Society*, edited by Bennett, Grossberg, and Morris (Malden, Oxford, Carlton: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), pp. 219-24.

⁴⁷ Janet W. Salaff, *Working Daughters of Hong Kong: Filial Piety or Power in the Family?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

⁴⁸ Colonial policies may not have purposefully built up local consciousness. Rather, the construction of the sense and the image of "modern" Chinese among Hong Kong people could foster the industrialization process and international trade development.

⁴⁹ The annual Chinese Manufacturers' Exhibition of Hong Kong Products started in 1934 and became an important entertainment event every year.

⁵⁰ Doreen Massey, *Space, Place and Gender* (Cambridge: Polity, 1994), p. 3.

⁵¹ As Choi Po King illustrates, modern and traditional values bombarded these working daughters. They held diverse and contesting ideas about early entry into the work domain. Some respondents admitted that their conception of the gender hierarchy was identical to their parents' corresponding conception; they believed that girls did not need to study too much, and therefore, they felt that it was quite "natural" for girls to quit schools and to start working when they were very young. Some respondents, however, found the family's request to quit school and to begin work extremely unfair, and so the families, in effect, forced the girls to quit school. Owing to different reasons such as studying for interest or for social advancement, some of these working daughters continued to study during the nighttime. Starting

in 1978, the colonial government instigated 9-year compulsory education and youth needed to complete at least their junior secondary schooling before they could go out to work. 蔡寶瓊, “多少夜讀的寒暑,” in *晚晚6點半: 七十年代上夜校的女工*, edited by 蔡寶瓊 (香港: 進一步, 1998), pp. 16-46.

⁵² Ng Chun Hung, “New Directions in Cultural Studies,” in *Culture and Society in Hong Kong*, edited by Sinn (HK: Centre of Asian Studies, 1995), pp. 1-22.

⁵³ 呂大樂, “無關痛癢的1974,” in *香港·文化·研究*, edited by 吳俊雄, 馬傑偉, and 呂大樂 (香港: 香港大學出版社, 2006), p. 37.

⁵⁴ Many scholars argue that Hong Kong’s 1966-7 riots caused the colonial government to offer limited social reforms to tackle people’s discontent. For example, the colonial government amended labor legislation, offered 6-year free primary education in 1971, offered 9-year mandatory free education in 1978, established the ICAC in 1974 to wipe out corruption, and provided public health services and public housing. However, as Lui argued, before the mid-1970s, Hong Kong’s economic and living conditions were still poor, the chance for upward mobility was negligible, and around 80% of respondents did not find Hong Kong to be a fair society. Therefore, local consciousness might have emerged in the late sixties and the early seventies, but it did not flourish until the late 1970s. See 呂大樂, “無關痛癢的 1974,” pp. 22-7.

⁵⁵ The People’s Republic of China and the United Kingdom signed the Sino-British Joint Declaration on 19 December 1984 in Beijing. On 27 May 1985, the two governments exchanged instruments of ratification and registered the instruments of ratification at the United Nations on 12 June 1985: the PRC government resumed the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong from 1 July 1997.

⁵⁶ Starting in 1982, the Chinese government and the British government began negotiating with each other about the future of Hong Kong. The British government stated clearly that it would not extend its administration over Hong Kong beyond the end of the lease in 1997. Hong Kong, however, did not turn out to be a city-state. Its sovereignty transferred from the Crown to the Beijing authority.

⁵⁷ HKU POP, “Categorical ethnic identity—half-yearly average (22/6/2006), from August 1997 to June 2006,” People’s ethnic identity, HKU Public Opinion Programme (POP). <http://hkupop.hku.hk/> (accessed 28 September 2006).

⁵⁸ Re-nationalization in Hong Kong includes the performing of nationalist rituals (such as flag raising, national-anthem broadcasting), changing or establishing nationalist landscapes (such as the establishment of Golden Bauhinia Square for the Handover), and changing school curriculum.

⁵⁹ The 1997 survey indicates that 35.9% of Hong Kong residents considered themselves to be Hong Kong citizens and that 23.6% considered themselves to be Chinese Hong Kong citizens, meaning that 60% considered themselves to be *Heung Gong Yan* in a broad sense. “Categorical ethnic identity—half-yearly average (22/6/2006), from August 1997 to June 2006,” HKU POP; “逾半被訪者自認香港人 67 % 反台獨 有信心統一,” 8 January 2003, *Apple Daily*, A06.

⁶⁰ The survey shows that 19.9% and 18% identified themselves as Hong Kong

Chinese and Chinese respectively; that is, 38% identified themselves as Chinese in a broad sense. “Categorical ethnic identity—half-yearly average (22/6/2006), from August 1997 to June 2006,” HKU POP; “逾半被訪者自認香港人 67 % 反台獨 有信心統一,” 8 January 2003, *Apple Daily*, A06.

⁶¹ The 2004 survey shows that 26% of respondents considered themselves to be *Heung Gong Yan* and 23% considered themselves to be *Heung Gong Yan* in China; in total, 49% considered themselves to be *Heung Gong Yan* in a broad sense. “Categorical ethnic identity—half-yearly average (22/6/2006), from August 1997 to June 2006,” HKU POP; “34%被訪者對施政報告沒期望,” 22 December 2004, *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, P07.

⁶² The 2004 survey shows that 16% of respondents considered themselves to be Hong Kong Chinese and 32% considered themselves to be Chinese; therefore, in total, 48% considered themselves to be Chinese in a broad sense. “Categorical ethnic identity—half-yearly average (22/6/2006), from August 1997 to June 2006,” HKU POP; “34%被訪者對施政報告沒期望,” 22 December 2004, *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, P07.

⁶³ Hok Yau Club, 2004, “中學生國民身份認同調查報告,” Hok Yau Club, <http://www.hyc.org.hk/files/survey/NISreport04.pdf> (accessed 1 June 2005).

⁶⁴ 89% of respondents thought Hong Kong people open-minded, 77% courteous, and 88.9% knowledgeable; only 36.4% thought Chinese open-minded, 35.9% courteous, and 49.9% knowledgeable. Hok Yau Club, 2004, “中學生國民身份認同調查報告.”

⁶⁵ 93.6% of respondents saw Chinese as traditional but only 53.1% thought Hong Kong people traditional; 87.3% saw Chinese as self-centered and only 60.5% saw Hong Kong people in this light. Hok Yau Club, 2004, “中學生國民身份認同調查報告.”

⁶⁶ A majority of student respondents saw Hong Kong people pursuing democracy (92%), liberty (94.5%), equality (93.3%), and a system of fairness (94.5%); whereas more than a half of respondents rated Chinese poorly in these aspects: (39.3%) for pursuing democracy, (50.5%) for liberty, (53.4%) for equality, and (27.7%) for a system of fairness. Hok Yau Club, 2004, “中學生國民身份認同調查報告.”

⁶⁷ Among respondents, 22.4% were born in the Mainland and 75.6% in Hong Kong. Hok Yau Club, 2004, “中學生國民身份認同調查報告.”

⁶⁸ Gordon Mathews, *Global Culture / Individual Identity: Searching for Home in the Cultural Supermarket* (London, NY: Routledge, 2000), p. 144. Further references are in parentheses in the text.

⁶⁹ “34%被訪者對施政報告沒期望,” 22 December 2004, *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, P07.

⁷⁰ 陳冠中, *我這一代香港人* (香港: Oxford University Press, 2006), second edition, p. 7.

⁷¹ The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress has successively

interpreted the constitution in ways that challenge Hong Kong's juridical autonomy. The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress issued its first constitutional interpretation in 1997. When hundreds of Mainland-born children claimed their right of abode with guarantee from the Basic Law, the HKSAR government curtailed their right by legal amendment and asked the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for a constitutional interpretation. The second interpretation was when the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress scrapped the Bill of Rights passed by the colonial government in 1992, and the third interpretation was when the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress's dealt with the new Chief Executive after Tung quit his post in 2005. These all undermined judiciary independence and the autonomy of the HKSAR government.

⁷² China had one of the highest economic growth rates in the Asia Pacific region in the 1990s. From 1993 to 1999, China achieved the highest annual real gross domestic product (GDP) growth among the major countries in the region, ranging from 7 to 13%. See Zhang Qui Hanqin, Carson L. Jenkins, Qu Hailin, "Mainland Chinese Outbound Travel to Hong Kong and Its Implications," in *Tourism in China*, edited by Lew and others (NY, London, Oxford: Haworth Hospitality Press, 2003), p. 278.

⁷³ For example, the Chinese government abolished the quota system for the Hong Kong Group Tour Scheme and implemented the Individual Visit Scheme in 2001, allowing Mainlanders to visit Hong Kong without having to join tour groups, and this change has greatly increased the number of Mainlanders traveling, the frequency at which they travel, and the amount of money they spend during their travels. In 1997, owing to the Asian economic crisis, expenditure by Chinese visitors continued to increase while all other Asian visitor markets declined. See Zhang, Jenkins, and Qu, "Mainland Chinese Outbound Travel to Hong Kong and Its Implications," pp. 282-3.

⁷⁴ 馬傑偉, "市井國族主義: 重劃大陸與香港的文化版圖," in *香港·文化·研究*, edited by 吳俊雄, 馬傑偉 and 呂大樂 (香港: 香港大學出版社, 2006), p. 271.

⁷⁵ 馬傑偉, "市井國族主義: 重劃大陸與香港的文化版圖," p. 269.

⁷⁶ James L. Watson, "Introduction: Transnationalism, Localization, and Fast Foods in East Asia" in *Golden Arches East: McDonald's in East Asia*, edited by Watson (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1997), p. 80, emphasis in original.

⁷⁷ Stephen Teo, *Hong Kong Cinema: The Extra Dimensions* (London: British Film Institute, 1997), p. 60.

⁷⁸ Meaghan Morris, "Transnational Imagination in Action Cinema: Hong Kong and the Making of a Global Popular Culture," *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 5, issue 2 (2004), pp. 183-5.

⁷⁹ Steve Fore, "Life Imitates Entertainment: Home and Dislocation in the Films of Jackie Chan," in *At Full Speed: Hong Kong Cinema in a Borderless World*, edited by Yau (Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota, 2001), p. 130. Steve Fore argued that Jackie Chan became a big star after starring in two *kung fu* comedies by Yuen Wo Ping, *Snake in the Eagle's Shadow* and *Drunken Master*, in which Jackie

portrayed a “mildly rebellious, immature” but “not subversive” kid who implicitly commented on traditional belief systems. Such an onscreen persona helped Chan become a major star in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan and much of Southeast Asia. When he started his Hollywood adventure, however, cultural difference became another marketing tool, and his onscreen persona has become “modernity’s Kwan Tak-hing” (p. 136) with an essentialist view of cultural China and a denial of his Hong Kong identity.

⁸⁰ The style of Cantonese songs varies greatly—some use the format of Chinese traditional music, some adopt Cantonese opera, and some use English songs; in terms of lyrics, some are in literate Chinese but some are in spoken Cantonese; in terms of accompaniment, many musicians have hailed from the Philippines and brought electronic Western music to the forefront. See 黃霑, “流行曲與香港文化,” in *Culture and Society in Hong Kong*, edited by Sinn (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 1995), p. 160-8.

⁸¹ Cantonese opera uses both Chinese instruments and Western instruments such as the violin, saxophone, trumpet, banjo, and slide guitar for accompaniment. See 陳守仁, “神功粵劇與香港地方文化,” in *Culture and Society in Hong Kong*, edited by Sinn (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 1995), p. 259.

⁸² 陳守仁, “神功粵劇與香港地方文化,” p. 259.

⁸³ Visitors’ spending on shopping is nearly half of visitors’ total spending during the visit, and in 2002, spending on shopping exceeded half of the total (HK\$ 34,184.75 million of HK\$ 61,142.28 million dollars). The main reason for the increased spending in shopping centers was the increase in Mainland tourists after the abolition of the quota system for the Hong Kong Group Tour Scheme in 2001, under which Mainland visitors could visit Hong Kong only in groups instead of on an individual basis. In 2004, 21.81 million people visited Hong Kong, an increase of 40.4% over the year 2003. Of the 21.81 million visitors, 56%, that is 12.24 million, were from the Mainland, and their spending constituted more than 55.5% of the total visitor spending, HK\$ 33,941.01 million dollars. Since 1 January 2005, Mainland visitors can carry a maximum of \$20,000 past the border, and the HKSAR government expects that the retail sales of Hong Kong can increase by HK \$5.7 billion. See Hong Kong Tourism Board (HKSAR government), *Tourism Expenditure Associated to Inbound Tourism: Jan-Dec 2004* (Hong Kong: Tourism Research Hong Kong Tourism Board, 2005), p. 6.

⁸⁴ On 19 November 1967, Hong Kong Television Broadcasts Limited (HK-TVB), the first wireless free-to-air Cantonese-medium broadcasting TV station, was opened. Because TVB was free, TV audiences rose rapidly. It was estimated that there were about 70,000 wireless receivers in use by June 1968, and this number increased to 120,000 receivers by the end of the year. The percentage of households owning a TV set rose from 27% in the late 1960s, to 60% in 1970, 86.2% in 1974, and 90% in 1976.⁸⁴ For the information on the increase in wireless receivers between June and the end of 1968, see Hong Kong Government, *Hong Kong 1968* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Government, 1969), p. 213. For the information on the rise of households owning a TV set, see Joseph W.C. Wong and Joseph W. Yu, *Television News and Television Industry in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Centre for

Communication Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1978), p. 3; 吳昊, *香港電視史話 I* (香港: 次文化有限公司, 2003), p. 7.

⁸⁵ *Visour Sign* has another Japanese title, *Sain wa V*, meaning “The Sign of V”; the Chinese title of the program is 《青春火花》.

⁸⁶ *Sugata Sanshiro*’s English title is *Judo Story*, and its Chinese title is 《柔道龍虎榜》.

⁸⁷ *G Men '75*’s Chinese title is 《猛龍特警隊》.

⁸⁸ *Oretachi no Tabi* means “Our Journey,” and its Chinese title is 《前程錦繡》.

⁸⁹ Another reason for the large number of American TV programs shown on TVB in the early years may be due to TVB’s ownership. National Broadcasting Company (NBC) was one of the shareholders of TVB. See 吳昊, *香港電視史話 I*, p. 6.

⁹⁰ Karin Wilkins, “Hong Kong Television at the End of the British Empire,” in *Mass Media in the Asian Pacific*, edited by McIntyre (Clevedon, Philadelphia, Pa.: Multilingual Matters, 1998), p. 20.

⁹¹ Aaron Alan Delwiche, *Frog under the Well: The Relationship of Global Media Use and Cosmopolitan Orientation among Hong Kong Youth* (PhD Thesis, School of Communication, University of Washington, Seattle, 2001), p. 42. Further references are in parentheses in the text.

⁹² Jenifer Tam Pui Yim, *Japanese Popular Culture in Hong Kong: Case Studies of Youth Consumption of Cute Products and Fashion Magazines* (MPhil Thesis, Department of Sociology, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, 2002), p. 269.

⁹³ Sharon Kinsella, “Cuties in Japan,” in *Women, Media, and Consumption in Japan*, edited by Skov and Moeran (Surrey: Curzon Press, 1995), p. 220.

⁹⁴ Shunya Yoshimi, “Japan: America in Japan/Japan in Disneyfication: The Disney Image and the Transformation of ‘America’ in Contemporary Japan,” in *Dazzled by Disney? The Global Disney Audiences Project*, edited by Wasko, Phillips, and Meehan (London, NY: Leicester University Press, 2001), p. 176.

⁹⁵ Brian J. McVeig, *Wearing Ideology: State, Schooling, and Self-presentation in Japan* (Oxford, New York: Berg, 2000), p. 144.

⁹⁶ Kinsella, “Cuties in Japan,” pp. 250-2.

⁹⁷ Tam, *Japanese Popular Culture in Hong Kong*, p. 213.

⁹⁸ Kinsella, “Cuties in Japan,” p. 225.

⁹⁹ Kinsella, “Cuties in Japan,” p. 226.

¹⁰⁰ “兒童網站調查顯示 小童眼中麥當勞「最型」冇型行爲：吸煙拍拖做義工, 11 September 2003, *Apple Daily*, A12.

¹⁰¹ “75 歲誕辰 復出拒再悶蛋 米奇玩個性,” 18 November 2003, *Apple Daily*, A27; “米奇老鼠改形象 圖挽童心,” 17 November 2003, *Hong Kong Economic Times*, A20.

¹⁰² There were nine shops in Hong Kong: Tsim Sha Tsui, Shatin, Festival Walk, Tai

Koo Shing, Whampo, Diamond Hill, Causeway Bay, and two in the airport. The first Disney store was opened in Shatin New Town Plaza with four thousand square meters. All except the Tsim Sha Tsui shop were closed by 2004, but a new airport store was opened in 2004.

¹⁰³ “Lack of business forces Disney closures,” 5 September 2004, *South China Morning Post*, EDT1; “迪士尼專門店年減逾半,” 6 September 2004, *Ming Pao Daily News*, A18; “港迪士尼專門店僅餘三間,” 6 September 2004, *Apple Daily*, A22.

¹⁰⁴ 羅羽庭, “迪士尼店結業 半價清貨,” 2 September 2005, *Hong Kong Economic Times*, A16.

¹⁰⁵ “About Us,” Trendyland official website, http://203.194.142.183/trendyland/trendyland_main.html (accessed 20 March 2007).

¹⁰⁶ “Products,” Trendyland official website, http://203.194.142.183/trendyland/trendyland_main.html (accessed 20 March 2007).

¹⁰⁷ Ulf Hannerz, “Notes on the Global Ecumene,” in *The Anthropology of Globalization: A Reader*, edited by Inda and Rosaldo (Malden, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), pp. 37-45. Hannerz argues that countries exercise influence on different levels and on different spheres.

¹⁰⁸ Doreen Massey, *Space, Place and Gender* (Cambridge, Oxford: Polity Press, 1994), p. 3.

¹⁰⁹ Daniel Miller, “Consumption as the Vanguard of History: a Polemic by Way of an Introduction,” in *Acknowledging Consumption: A Review of New Studies*, edited by Miller (London, NY: Routledge, 1995), p. 17.

¹¹⁰ Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life* (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984), p. xiii.

¹¹¹ De Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, p. 30.

¹¹² Paula Saukko, *Doing Research in Cultural Studies: An Introduction to Classical and New Methodological Approaches* (London, Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2003), p. 50.

¹¹³ Massey, *Space, Place and Gender*, p. 138.

¹¹⁴ I have also interviewed six children and did two group interviews with ten kindergarten students in a kindergarten setting. Because I do not report these research findings in this thesis, I do not count them as my respondents here.

¹¹⁵ For all except the child respondents in my study, at the first interview, I would show them my interview script, including general questions such as their encounters and comments on Disney offerings (merchandise, movies, theme parks), and I would let them understand the general framework of the interview. For those who worked inside the Disney company, I would add questions such as why respondents joined the company. These questions are fairly open and general to be a starting point for interactions and conversations. Sometimes after respondents provided answers that sounded like common sense to them, I would attempt to follow up on their answers by posing new questions: my goal was to have the respondents make their common sense explicit and make them reveal the ways they

think about particular questions. Consequently, these interviews may have had similar research questions, but the interviews, themselves, turned out to be different from each other.

¹¹⁶ Saukko, *Doing Research in Cultural Studies*, p. 29.

¹¹⁷ Donna J. Haraway, *Modest_Witness@Second_Millennium.Femaleman_Meets_Oncomouse: Feminism and Technoscience* (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 58.

¹¹⁸ Saukko, *Doing Research in Cultural Studies*, chapter Four.

¹¹⁹ Morris has argued that some so-called “ethnography” in cultural studies (by John Fiske in particular) has operated under the assumption that scholars know the “true” better than the researched people and that respondents became ventriloquists for scholars’ political agendas. See Meaghan Morris, “Banality in Cultural Studies,” in *Logics of Television: Essays in Cultural Criticism*, edited by Mellencamp (Bloomington, London: Indiana University Press, 1990), pp. 14-43.

¹²⁰ Eric Arnould, “Daring Consumer-oriented Ethnography,” in *Representing Consumers: Voices, Views, and Visions*, edited by Stern (London, NY: Routledge, 1998), pp. 87-8.

¹²¹ To protect respondents’ real identities, I cannot write down Olivia’s blog address in my thesis.

Chapter Two

Disney Power, Cultural Globalization, and Local Contexts

In 1928, Disney began as a small frail animated-cartoon studio that distributed Mickey Mouse shorts. In the eighty years since then, Disney has become one of the most popular brands in the world.¹ As a giant global company, the Walt Disney Company divides itself into four major business segments: studio entertainment (theatrical films, home video, television, theatrical productions), parks and resorts (Disneyland parks, Disney Vacation Club resorts, Disney Cruise Line), media networks (television channels including ABC television, Touchstone television, cable television including ESPN and the Disney Channel), and consumer products (children's and teenagers' fashion and apparel, toys, home décor, educational kits, food and beverages, electronics, fine art and collectibles).² With internet and direct marketing, Disney's net income soared (in US dollars) from 0.5 million dollars in 1952, to 3.4 million in 1959, 11 million in 1965, 26.7 million in 1971, 93.2 million in 1983, 173.5 million in 1985, 703.3 million in 1987, 824 million in 1990,³ 1,267 million in 2003, and 2,533 million in 2005.⁴

Well aware of Disney's popularity and power, scholars of different disciplines including architecture, art, anthropology, business, cultural studies, political economy, and urban planning pay close attention to the Disney enterprise.⁵ Drawing on Disney animated cartoons, scholars from the academic left explicate "Disney ideology,"⁶ analyses of which result in books entitled *From Mouse to Mermaid: The Politics of Film, Gender, and Culture*, edited by Elizabeth Bell, Lynda Haas, and Laura Sells, and *The Mouse that Roared: Disney and the End of Innocence* by Henry Giroux.⁷ Starting in the 1990s, Disney expanded its market

from a chiefly Anglo-American setup to a global one by representing cultural others in *Aladdin* (1992), *Pocahontas* (1995), and *Mulan* (1998). In view of this shift, while some scholars such as Lee Artz⁸ argue that Disney's change demonstrates only that Disney recognizes the enormous potential for profit in the multicultural market, not that Disney has a multicultural agenda; other scholars such as Janet Palmer⁹ argue that the changing Disney representations reflect pressures that Disney has faced from social movements.

Disneyland, as is the case with Disney animation, cannot escape from scholars' scrutiny regarding Disney's influences on global cultural landscapes. Stacey Warren refers to Disneyland as "theoryland"¹⁰ because scholars always study Disneyland in relation to their theoretical concerns: for example, Real's use of gratification theory to study respondents' views of a Disney park in 1977,¹¹ Eco's semiotic study of Anaheim Disneyland in relation to social control in 1986,¹² Baudrillard's postmodernist study of Anaheim Disneyland and Los Angeles as simulacra in 1988,¹³ Zukin's cultural geographic analysis of the correlation between Disney parks and landscapes of power in 1991,¹⁴ and Fjellman's ethnographic and contextual study of Orlando's Walt Disney World in relation to contemporary American society in 1992.¹⁵ Scholars argue that the attractiveness, the ugliness, or simply the character of a specific Disney park that they study are themes that, if properly understood, can help us understand a city such as Los Angeles or a contemporary civilization like that of the United States.

Because of Disney's long-developed global reach,¹⁶ scholars outside the United States also examine cultural Americanization in relation to Disney offerings. Within the context of an affirmative Third World, Ariel Dorfman and Armand Mattelart published *Para leer al Pato Donald* in Chile in 1971.¹⁷ This was the first

book critically examining Disney comics as American cultural products that, transplanted to peripheral countries, disguise cultural power as entertainment to promote American cultural imperialism. In 1975, the book appeared in the United States as *How to Read Donald Duck* with a new subtitle, “Imperialist Ideology in the Disney Comic.”

In 2000, twenty five years after the publication of *How to Read Donald Duck*, scholars gathered at an international conference and discussed “how extensively and intensively Disney products are marketed, and also how local audiences interpret these products” in eighteen countries.¹⁸ In 2001, the book *Dazzled by Disney* was published. Wasko and Meehan, in the concluding chapter of the book, warn that consumers’ early contact with Disney offerings, and consumers’ subsequent association of Disney with childhood innocence, nostalgia, and family gatherings, make it difficult for audiences to question the assumptions behind the consumers’ Disney-related cultural experiences. In terms of cultural globalization, Wasko and Meehan also argue that children’s early contact with Disney may lead to cultural hegemony instead of cultural hybridity¹⁹; “Disney’s pervasiveness and symbolic ubiquity” result in the near impossibility that nations can “maintain identities adjacent to the identities provided in global commercial media.”²⁰

Given Disney’s increasing influence and the increasing importance of globalization studies in the 1990s, scholars vow to study Disney insofar as it is the “greatest media empire” around the globe and an “entertainment empire”²¹ second to none. Given its global ubiquity and the extension of company projects from movies to theme parks to urban planning,²² scholars such as Richard Foglesong,²³ Andrew Ross,²⁴ Jane Kuenz,²⁵ John van Maanen,²⁶ Henry Giroux,²⁷ and others²⁸

unveil Disney's undemocratic and non-transparent private governance over public domains, its application of controlling mechanisms to theme-park workers, and its promotion of consumerism. These scholars also warn readers that Disney's profit-driven, non-transparent corporate practices and largely conservative offerings devour democracy, social justice, and civil society. Scholars such as Michael Sorkin, Chris Rojek, Andrew Ross, Stacey Warren, and Alan Bryman have presented different terms for these practices: "Disneyzone,"²⁹ "Disneyfication,"³⁰ and "Disneyization,"³¹ to point out Disney's near-universality and its overwhelming influence over cultural and social landscapes. These terms do not merely point to Disney's influence over its own projects but also suggest the devastating influence that Disney's principles have on urban planning. Indeed, to achieve business success, other developers and companies emulate Disney-inspired business strategies and practices. In other words, our lived but fantasy world is going to be increasingly Disneyized and Disneyfied without Disney's direct involvement.

To rethink the above problems raised by scholars in relation to Disney, I must say that some speculative worries raised by scholars have already become hard and fast reality. However, scholars disagree with one another as to the reasons that underlie governments' and the public's support of a Disneyized landscape, and scholars disagree with one another as to the conclusions that are to be drawn from these findings: some scholars are chiefly pessimistic, seeing Disneyized landscapes as an inevitable postmodern phenomenon, whereas other scholars emphasize the negotiations and the resistance that greet Disneyized landscapes. I categorize these different Disney literatures into three types: the materialist, the symbolic, and the everyday. The materialist approach focuses on economic structuring and the development of a consumerist landscape; the symbolic approach emphasizes

Disney's media-based and corporate-based cultural power to address and to shape the public's dreams; the everyday approach highlights various spaces where various local actors—namely government officials, journalists, home-owners, environmentalists, and consumers—differ from one another in their application of local politics and local culture to remaking or to resisting a Disneyfied landscape. Because of their different approaches, the three literatures identify different implications and draw different conclusions regarding the relationships among transnational capitalism, local governance, identity politics, democratization, and civil-society development. One point to note is that although I discuss these three approaches in the order of materialist, symbolic, and everyday, I do not mean that these three approaches, in their manifest reality, surface one after the next; indeed, the approaches are not entirely distinct from one another. For example, overlap has occurred between the materialist approach and the symbolic approach insofar as some materialist scholars (such as Hannigan) who address the effects of a Disneyfied landscape do so on the basis of Sharon Zukin's idea of "landscape of power," which I categorize as a symbolic approach. Readers of this study, therefore, will note similarities between the materialist and the symbolic, especially in relation to Disney effects.

The macro-materialist dimension: political economy and Disneyization

In identifying the relationship between large-scale social changes and postmodern consumer society, scholars interested in political economy use a macro and materialist approach to examine Disney's effects on societies. According to these scholars, contemporary urban redevelopment, because of government retrenchment and deregulation, aims to re-energize a city center through public-private

partnerships that draw the affluent middle class consumers back to the city center. Urban renewal, then, is synonymous with the construction of not only office towers but also convention centers, professional sports complexes, museums, and urban theme parks—all to accommodate the post-industrial service economy. With the great economic success of Disney theme parks, urban-development projects have turned to Disney-inspired principles to redevelop space.

John Hannigan³² argues that this form of public-private partnership began to emerge in the 1970s with the renovation of Faneuil Hall Marketplace in Boston: at the partnership's core was the premise that shopping and dining were the engines driving the commercial regeneration of downtown areas. Famously able to attract crowds to Disney parks by selling spectacular leisure experiences, the Walt Disney Company set up the Disney Development Company in 1984 and began incorporating theme-park experiences into urban entertainment centers. Major multinational entertainment companies also followed Disney's move and established development teams to evaluate, plan, and initiate urban entertainment destinations in joint business with public redevelopment agencies (pp. 125-6).³³ Because many government officials and public agencies believe that entertainment destinations have almost magical powers to create employment and to raise government revenues, many municipalities provide entertainment companies with infrastructure upgrades, tax benefits, and regulatory relief.

Hannigan argues that the shift from an industrial economy to a post-industrial economy led to the rise of public-private partnerships and to urban entertainment districts. In making this argument, Hannigan shifts his own focus from America to the Asia-Pacific region, stating that “the leading edge of the

American themed commercial culture coming ashore in Asia” (p. 179) is due to the region’s expanding economy and the rise of the region’s middle class:

To a considerable extent, the Asia-Pacific region in the 1990s can be compared to that of the affluent years of America in the 1950s. In both instances, you have an expanding economy, an increase in leisure time and a ballooning middle class with rising discretionary income.... With rising incomes, the new middle class is primed to spend.... Many of the developing leisure products and services are foreign-supplied or inspired. (p. 177)

For Hannigan, the global development of urban entertainment districts has created social harm instead of social good. To secure profits from these entertainment destinations, planners incorporate theme-park experiences into renewed urban spaces, such as shopertainment, eatertainment, and edutainment enclaves. These fantasy cities sell themes and technology, branded merchandise and spectacles. This development reinforces pre-existing consumer tastes and diminishes variety and choice. Isolated from its neighboring surroundings, the Disney-inspired renewal of urban space creates a space that is discriminatory for it ignores the reality of homelessness, unemployment, social injustice, and crime; its high-rent lifestyle discourages the mixing of different classes and races of people (p. 6).

Voicing similar worries to Hannigan, Alan Bryman coined the term “Disneyization”³⁴ to describe “the process by which the *principles* of the Disney theme parks are coming to dominate more and more sectors of American society as well as the rest of the world” (p.1, author’s emphasis). Bryman declares that Disneyization as a process is about “the spread of the principles that its theme parks exemplify” (p. 11). These principles consist of theming (p. 15),³⁵ hybrid

consumption (p. 57),³⁶ merchandising,³⁷ and emotional labor.³⁸ The goal of these principles is to increase consumption:

Theming provides the consumer with a narrative that acts as a draw by providing an experience that lessens the sense of an economic transaction and increases the likelihood of purchasing merchandise. Hybrid consumption is meant to give the consumer as many opportunities as possible to make purchases and therefore to keep them as long as possible in the theme park, mall, or whatever. Emotional labor is the oil of the whole process in many ways: in differentiating otherwise identical goods and services, as an enactment of theming, and as a means for increasing the inclination to purchase merchandise. (p. 167)

The single aim of increasing consumption, however, leads to large-scale changes throughout the landscape, the social structure, and the culture (particularly the working culture and the consumption culture). The success of Disney theme parks has prompted companies, architects, and governments to follow Disney's principles to transform streets, shopping arcades, restaurants, and airports into a vast "entertainment-consumption" complex. The negative effects of this outcome include distortion of history and place; destruction of natural habitats; emotional and physical manipulation of children, consumers, and workers; and creation of "limited citizens" in that the consumption levels of the poor fall far below the consumption levels that consumer society deems appropriate and honorable.

Similar to Hannigan, Bryman urges us to treat Disneyization as chiefly a global spread of a system and of principles, and to avoid prioritizing the worth of particular commodities such as Disney films, merchandise, and theme parks. He realizes that Disney theme parks around the globe have made many adaptations to local contexts and sensibilities, but for Bryman, as a systemscape, Disneyized "*principles* [that have] to do with the production and delivery of goods and

services” still proliferate (p. 165). For example, theming as a principle can rather easily be imported to local places and adapted to the places’ own local themes, but theming as a principle remains non-negotiable. As a system, Disneyization encourages variety and differentiation (p. 168), instead of standardization and homogenization (p. 167).³⁹

Bryman’s concept of Disneyization is significant because his emphasis on a system and its four main principles clarifies how Disney practices become a model that is supremely adaptable to various other parts of the world. However, his emphasis on system and principles also assumes that these automatically spread over the globe, that states just adapt the Disneyized system to their gentrification and tourism projects such as Sydney’s The Rocks (p. 37) and Finland’s Lapland as “Santa Claus Land” (p. 45), and that local cultures respond to Disneyization by adapting to it. However, theming, for example, is not necessarily successful, as Bryman notices in regard to the plight of themed restaurants (p. 53). Bryman states, also, that “emotional labor has been a particularly prominent site for resistance” (p. 165). In fact, Bryman sees Disneyization as a process wherein “agents of capitalism” (p. 160) promote consumption that exhibits a “growing interpenetration of the economic and the cultural” (p. 173), but he provides no explanation as to why or how these interpenetrations happen except to say that Disneyization has “affinities” with “a post-Fordist world of variety and consumer choice” (p. 13). Elsewhere, Bryman humbly admits that he uses Disneyization “to *identify* large-scale changes that are discernible in economy and culture that can be found in, and are symbolized by, the Disney parks”⁴⁰; however, it is not correct to treat Disneyization as a concept that, in and of itself, explains consumerist global societies’ convergence with characteristics of Disney theme parks.

Whereas Bryman assumes that Disneyization is a process spreading throughout “a post-Fordist *world*” (p. 13, emphasis added), Hannigan assumes that international capitalism’s free flow of capital accounts for transnational companies’ growing power and states’ diminishing sovereignty. Both analyses have determinist economic assumptions wherein structural economic change shapes cultural change, and transnational capitalism affects local governance. Besides, both Hannigan’s and Bryman’s realist analyses ignore the fact that Disneyized landscapes are produced by agencies, institutions, and actors that hold various views and interests in their locales. Rather than focus on a model, a system, or a set of principles, Richard Foglesong’s realist and political analyses of the Disney-Orlando government relationship “emphasize the role of human beings rather than abstract forces in ... shaping events.”⁴¹ Of chief concern to him is the *process* that characterizes Disney power in Orlando. His *Married to the Mouse* traces the spatial control inside the Walt Disney World park and then proceeds to examine the long and rocky relationship between the Walt Disney Company and the Orlando government.

In the early 1960s, because of its economic power, Disney bought 27,500 acres of land in Orange and Osceola counties in Orlando through private land brokers and without public involvement. Having limited financial resources, the Florida State Legislature designated Disney’s acres as the “Reedy Creek Improvement District” in 1967, with Disney promising to fund its own roads, sewage systems, and fire protection services, and what is most important, to build a model city that would bring a potential economic boom to the Greater Orlando area. The designation granted Disney every right to manage its land, including control over zoning and building codes and power to tax and issue tax-free municipal bonds, but Disney—unlike other developers—would bear no responsibility for

addressing off-site impact fees. In other words, the designation made Disney into an independent local-government unit that would serve its own private interests by both asking for public funding as a local government would and resisting public scrutiny as a private company would.⁴²

Foglesong's telling account of Walt Disney World's history reveals the untoward effects that privatization and deregulation can have on local governance. Whereas Hannigan highlights intercity rivalry that has left little room in which local political leaders can reject scarce private investment—investment that would create wages, profits, jobs, and tax revenues—Foglesong argues (against an economic-determinist model) that Orlando's dependence on Disney is due more to political, institutional, and cultural factors than to economic factors. In terms of institutions, the designation of the Reedy Creek Improvement District led the Florida legislature, in effect, to let Disney be its own private government, and as a government, Disney needs to face only its own regulations: in terms of politics, Disney has built an alliance with Orange County's pro-growth and pro-business government officials, and the long-established cooperation makes it difficult for policymakers to act against Disney; in terms of culture, the popularity of Disney makes it difficult for dissenters to badmouth Disney and to offer alternative paths for economic development.

"To put the people back in the story" (p.xii), Foglesong shows how local officials exercise definite power over the company. The designated Reedy Creek Improvement District and the many legal exemptions that Disney enjoys are built on a false premise: a city with citizens instead of a theme park with tourists. For this reason, Disney made its first concessions in 1989 regarding fees for off-site impact, concessions that came after three years of government-to-government

negotiations. In return, Orange County agreed not to challenge the constitutionality of the Reedy Creek charter for seven years. In early 1989, the Property Appraiser Bob Day decided to deny Disney's agricultural classification on their 11,000 vacant acres in Osceola County. After negotiations, the county government successfully taxed a certain amount of the land at the commercial rate, and Disney now needs to release a certain amount of land from agricultural classification each year. As for the Celebration project, Disney was subject to a development-of-regional-impact review because the property had been de-annexed from Reedy Creek. These developments show that local government does not always adhere to a global company's demands, even though Disney's capital can be mobile. However, although Foglesong stresses human agency instead of abstract economic forces in his narrative of the Orlando-Disney relationship, "people" in his narrative are limited to big men, political leaders, local officials, and financial investors: ordinary people, Orlando citizens and consumers, are outside the circle of agency. "Local officials," not common people, "had the power to tarnish their [Disney's] public image" (p. 120). The "mundane" version of the Orlando-Disney story has not yet been narrated in Foglesong's "people" story.

If we examine inter-city rivalry, economic structuring, and thus the development of public-private ventures and of Disneyized landscapes from another perspective, we may find that the above-mentioned phenomenon are concrete events happening in different parts of the world but scholars narrativize these material facts in a cause-effect sequential order which interprets them in a reductive way. Alexander Reichl's examination of the success of Disney's renewal of Times Square differs from Hannigan's and Bryman's respective examinations insofar as Reichl demonstrates that the Times Square renewal has been driven not by

economic forces alone but also by a confluence of political arrangements, media representations, and business interests.⁴³ Reichl places great importance on urban politics and popular discourse because decisions require support of the public, and political and public discourse help shape redevelopment in the public debate, political coalitions, and public support.

According to Reichl, in the 1920s, Times Square was at its peak regarding its fame as a fashionable entertainment district. By the 1950s, Times Square was reflecting national trends involving the migration of populations, of jobs, and of investment dollars. And, in the 1960s, a loss of tax revenues compounded the problems. In the late 1970s, the reduction of federal aid made it impossible for many cities to address problems of poverty and unaffordable housing. The general view was that crime- and drug-ridden areas whose populations consisted increasingly of ethnic and racial minorities were driving the middle class populations from the city centers. From the 1960s through the 1980s, Times Squares epitomized this form of urban decline. Reichl argues that Mayor Ed Koch (p. 117) and the respectable newspaper *The New York Times* (p. 44) popularized the above discourse and that Disney's renewal project for Times Square received popular support because it addressed a collective dream (that Times Square would return to its peak as in the 1920s through historic preservation packed with high culture) and tapped into racial anxiety.

Reichl argues that under the name of historic preservation, the pro-growth coalition centered on a trio of interests: the business community, public officials, and urban arts and culture organizations and enterprises, with support from social service organizations (for providing jobs) and religious leaders (for sanitizing the area) (p. 119). The renewal project also received popular support. In 1984, the

redevelopment project got unanimous approval from the Board of Estimates; in 1993, Disney's presence on 42nd Street sanitized the district and worsened social segregation. Reichl's study of Times Square shows that we cannot treat privatization, state deregulation, and the loss of public space as automatic globalized trends affecting social and cultural landscapes around the globe. I would further argue that scholars' over-emphasis on economic changes leading to social and cultural changes is rooted in Karl Marx's analysis of mobile capital, that Marx foresaw the rise of a world market and the fall of state regulations in *Grundrisse*:

The tendency to create the *world market* is directly given in the concept of capital itself. Every limit appears as a barrier to be overcome.⁴⁴

Under international capitalism's free flow of capital, governments try to preserve domestic business, attract foreign investment, and thereby secure revenue by reducing regulatory intervention in markets, by providing tax incentives to business, and by adjusting related policy. In this scheme, it is necessary to retrench the public economy both to ease the tax burden and to strengthen the nation's competitiveness relative to international markets and to other governments' economic policies. It follows that national governments have no choice but to deregulate and to surrender sovereignty to maintain economic performance, achieve high employment, income growth, and thus political legitimacy. This is a common and compelling global economic theory, but it also results in a "universal history" of humankind.⁴⁵

The state may not be a neutral place for different parties with different economic and social interests to fight over, but we cannot then assume that the state must always immediately adhere to capitalists' interests without considering other factors and demands. Anthony Giddens argues that although capitalists have power

over the state because capitalists control “allocative resources,” capital and wage-labor are economically mutually dependent: neither one can survive without the other. Workers’ organized and collective demands are an important drawing card that enable workers to negotiate with capitalist interests and that functions as an impetus for change and maintenance in state policies. Because “the ruling class does not rule” but does business, a chasm opens up between state policies and the interests of the capitalist class: the state may resist specific business interests. The dialectic of control between capitalists and workers cannot guarantee the state’s absolute approval of capitalists’ demands.⁴⁶

Duane Swank’s econometric analysis of 1964-1993 data from sixteen nations illuminates the above argument.⁴⁷ Swank argues that the dramatic post-1960s increases in international capital mobility have few direct effects on the size of the public economy and that “configurations of democratic institutions fundamentally shape the domestic policy impacts of capital mobility” (p. 133). He divides the studied nations into three types: social corporatism (that possesses an organized and centralized labor movement) defending welfare state policies (Sweden and Norway); inclusive electoral institutions with broad-based forms of representation through the electoral and party systems (Denmark and Finland); and dispersion of policy-making authority with socially heterogeneous forces (Australia, Canada, Switzerland, and the United States).⁴⁸ He finds that the increases in international capital mobility “vary systematically across national institutional contexts” (p. 154). The states of social corporatism and of inclusive electoral institutions can develop and defend large public economies directly or indirectly, whereas the heterogeneous forces in dispersed authorities tend to distrust state-

generated policy intervention, and national policies also enhance market flexibility and low-wage production.

The symbolic dimension: Disney's utopian appeal

A realist account of Disney power as the power of a global company may explain why Disney and other global entertainment companies acquire more and more power to shape contemporary social landscapes under international capitalism and pro-growth politics; however, a realist account does not explain whether or not Disney's power is similar to the power exercised by other global companies. On this subject, Reichl asks, "Is Disney's power advantage atypical?"⁴⁹ The second group of analyses that I discuss concerns scholars' understanding of atypical Disney power around the globe. There are two groups of analyses, the first concentrating on media analysis and the second on the utopian appeal of Disneyland park. More specifically, the first group is concerned with Disney's media dominance and ubiquity in creating the "Disney universe" wherein audiences in different parts of the world tend to agree with the core concepts promoted by the company, while the second group focuses on how Disney, through its economic and cultural power, addresses and molds contemporary urban problems and desires, leading to the great success of its theme-park business and other urban projects. Because of the incorporation of Disney's offerings into cultural rituals⁵⁰ and because of the connection between Disney and childhood,⁵¹ Disney enjoys "relative immunity ... from criticism"⁵²; and because Disney stories are always based on widely accepted folk tales and cultural myths, Disney fantasies and narratives "are shielded from external critiques."⁵³ Disneyland's success in addressing, resonating with, and shaping social desires enables Disney to win the public's support easily in

the theme-park business and in urban-planning projects. Scholars' recognition of Disney's symbolic and cultural power as a kind of globalness plus happiness, plus fantasy, plus innocence, and plus utopia helps wins Disney considerable public support. Because the focus of my dissertation is on the establishment and the operation of Hong Kong Disneyland, I will only briefly discuss scholars' views on Disney's media imperialism and will concentrate primarily on the second group of analyses.

As previously mentioned, in 2001, Janet Wasko, Mark Phillips, and Eileen Meehan published the book *Dazzled by Disney? The Global Disney Audiences Project*,⁵⁴ which collects scholars' research on how Disney offerings are marketed and consumed in eighteen countries. The project was called "The Global Disney Audience project." According to the project's findings, respondents underestimated their contact with Disney because of a discrepancy between the number of products they reported using in unprompted conditions (4.24 products per person) and the corresponding number in prompted conditions (11.6 products per person).⁵⁵ Respondents also tended to agree with the core concepts promoted by the company. When asked to use one term to describe Disney, the most frequent mentioned word was "fun," followed in descending order by "happiness," "fantasy," "imagination," and "family" (p. 42). Respondents enjoyed Disney animation and termed it "cute, cozy, warm, clean, safe, friendly, heart-warming, carefree, enchanting, wonderful, perky, innocent, mystical, moral" (p. 49). They believed that Disney movies were "harmless fun," and they described Disney as a rite of passage because they watched Disney movies when they were young. The reservations that respondents expressed about Disney concerned its business side: "unending product promotions, tie-ins, and advertising" (p. 49).

Although respondents expressed different reasons for enjoying Disney⁵⁶ and although respondents expressed different degrees of attachment, including ambivalent feelings, toward Disney,⁵⁷ Wasko and Meehan argue that Disney's pervasiveness and symbolic ubiquity may none the less lead to a capitalist, global, commodified culture. First, in terms of cultural industries, "Disney's dominance of children's entertainment in many parts of the world has affected indigenous media and cultural production by setting Disney products as the standard by which local and regional productions are judged," (p. 336) and Disney's dominance also drains local economies of resources. Second, Disney's promotion of consumer culture through its aggressive advertising and extensive merchandising inserts global consumerism into local rituals and interpersonal practices. Third, Disney offerings redefine local standards in media productions and contribute to cultural standardization. In all, Wasko and Meehan argue: "If the future holds a global system of distribution where production remains oligopolized and formulae remain rooted in the model of US commercial culture, then one has to wonder if and how localities, regions, and nations will maintain identities adjacent to the identities provided in global commercial media" (p. 339).

Holding similar views about Disney's dominant cultural power, Sharon Zukin's focus on "landscape"⁵⁸ enables her to move between the materialist and the symbolic approach to examine Disney's power in shaping its own "landscape of power." Similar to the materialist approach (which has in fact been influenced by her), Zukin suggests that capitalism has transformed the American landscape from a production economy to a "symbolic economy" that emphasizes (visual) consumption. Different from the purely materialist approach, Zukin argues that, starting in the early twentieth century, Hollywood films and later broadcast

television domesticated audiences' fantasies, whose precise forms have derived from a few media conglomerates including the Walt Disney Company. More important, Walt Disney shapes people's desires through not only television or movies, but also a real fantasy land based on the *real* and collective desires of the powerless:

While Walt Disney won fame as a founder of Hollywood's animation industry, his real genius was to transform an old form of collective entertainment—the amusement park—into a landscape of power. All his life Disney wanted to create his own amusement park. But to construct this playground, he wanted no mere thrill rides or country fair: he wanted to project the vernacular of the American small town as an image of social harmony.⁵⁹

To Zukin, Disney is atypical. Because of its media power, Disney can easily impose its fantasy visions on audiences; and because Disneyland does not promote itself as an explicitly educational medium, it can selectively use and reproduce the American landscape and American history for entertainment and can project the collective desires of the powerless: namely, the desires for safety, cleanliness, mobility, and domesticity. Zukin's warnings about the Disneyfied "landscape of power" have been taken up by Hannigan, a topic that I discussed in an earlier section; therefore, I will note only briefly here that Disney's cultural vision-based power resonates with social desires⁶⁰ but promotes privatized and centralized urban development, restructures landscapes around the globe, and undermines democracy.

Many scholars studying Disney's power to address and to shape the public's utopian dream follow Zukin's emphasis. Michael Sorkin argues that Disneyland addresses modern urban problems such as the undisciplined complexities of the city⁶¹; Mark Gottdiener explains that Disneyland experiences are desirable because

Disneyland “provides people with the illusion of escaping from the demands of their own economy: the need to work, to budget, to save”⁶²; emphasizing historical specificity, John Findlay argues that Anaheim Disneyland in the 1950s “offered a California-based critique” of the urban sense of unfriendliness, disorientation, and confusion.⁶³ Whereas both Sorkin and Gottdiener argue that theme parks’ spatial control results in the commodification of public space and that Disneyland exemplifies the development of “homogenized, underdimensioned citizenship,”⁶⁴ Findlay emphasizes history and process in his study of Disneyland and its nearby area. He argues that the success of the park turned the agricultural-oriented Orange County into a tourism-based center that featured a stadium, a convention center, and shopping malls; Disneyland also brought urban problems (such as traffic congestion and an influx of prostitutes), from which Disneyland ironically offers people escape. As a result, the outside world intruded into Disneyland while the theme park Disneyized the outside world.

As we shall see, Zukin, Sorkin, Gottdiener, and Findlay all argue that Disneyland experiences provide visitors a desirable or even a utopian substitute for urban malaise. In contrast, Stephen Fjellman argues that Walt Disney World is “the major middle-class pilgrimage center in the United States” because Disney World uses various marketing strategies to symbolize the idealized essence of childhood and because Disney World’s “utopian aspects appeal strongly to *real* peoples’ *real* needs in *late capitalist society*.”⁶⁵ That is, the rides inside Disney World are densely packed with symbols that articulate wide-ranging ideological messages; the parks sells fantasy, US history, science and technology, nature, and world travel, and the park appeals to all the five senses as visitors play ride, eat, wait, and walk. Visitors of different backgrounds and ages have different dreams, but the parks fulfill most

of them because of the utopian experiences that Disney parks offer. Park visitors in general turn out to be tourists experiencing the illusion of being somewhere else (p. 223); for example, they might engage in a ten-minute simulated safari trip “without mosquitoes, monsoons or misadventures” (p. 226); child visitors can indulge in some rides without either strife or adults (p. 276); parents (especially mothers) can leave their children in day-care centers and pets in kennels; the disabled find extensive provisions for them (p. 403). These utopian appeals are not limited to urban conditions but extend to the specific needs that specific persons have in relation to their specific location in social relations. Although Foglesong argues that Disney theme parks fulfill various utopian visions that visitors have, he warns that people can realize these visions only through consumption. To Fjellman, however, this is the American culture of consumerism: “we must be taught that it is good, reasonable, just, and natural that the means necessary for life are available only through the market” (p. 402). Besides, the park’s world of commodities “leaves minimal space in our lives for coherent critical thought about what we are doing” (p. 15). He draws a conclusion similar to that of Wasko and Meehan: Disney promotes consumerism around the globe and manipulates consumers’ thinking.

Cultural domination, consumerism, and citizenship

Scholars’ worries about Disney’s consumerism-based standardization of tastes are epitomized by Henry Giroux’s *The Mouse that Roared*.⁶⁶ With the subtitle “Disney and the End of Innocence,” the book rigorously alerts readers to Disney’s universality and to its annihilation of public culture. Giroux argues that Disney is a global company “spreading the conservative and commercial values that erode civil society” (p. 91). According to Giroux, Disney’s media domination and involvement

in public and private education control information and structure children's everyday life with its own ideologies. Disney movies are conservative in nature (p. 85) and promote consumerism as human choice and freedom. Disney's economic and institutional power in land use also diminishes the public sphere available for participatory citizenship (pp. 87-9). In short, by forcefully presenting itself as innocence and moral virtue (p. 86), by involving itself in entertainment and education (p. 79), by regulating public land use, by blurring the line between public and private, and by promoting values such as consumerism, the Disney Kingdom diminishes civic society, participatory citizenship, and democratic culture:

As market culture permeates the social order, it threatens to cancel out the tension between market values and those values representative of civil society that cannot be measured in commercial terms but that are critical to democracy, values such as justice, freedom, equality, health, respect, and the rights of citizens as equal and free human beings. (p. 162)

Scholars such as Wasko, Meehan, Fjellman, and Giroux, consumerism is a symptom of an apolitical age because consumerism does not strengthen people's political power and because consumerism provides people with a false alternative between choice and freedom. In short, people are free to choose consumption goods, and the desire that people invest in this freedom displaces their desire for political participation. International capitalism commodifies the globe. Consequently, people replace their citizenship rights with commodity desires. The above argument draws upon the familiar series of oppositions between production and consumption, capital and commodity, active and passive, use value and exchange value, authenticity and homogenization, reality and ideology.⁶⁷

However, the very relationship between these “opposites” is not necessarily oppositional but contingent. Anthony Giddens’ life-politics provides us with another perspective on the role that politics plays in the context of “high-modernity.” For Giddens, although consumption and democracy are not equivalent to each other, the relationship between the two may not be as polarized as critics have imagined. From the modern era onwards, politics has been “emancipatory”—its function has been “to release under-privileged groups from their unhappy condition, or to eliminate the relative differences between them”⁶⁸; once individuals have achieved a certain level of autonomy of action in high modernity, life politics, “a politics of lifestyle,”⁶⁹ prevails. Others agree with Giddens that in the post-modern consumerist society, citizens do not struggle against the market by merely challenging state policies; their political involvement manifests itself in the consumption that citizens integrate into politics.⁷⁰ Green politics and consumption acts⁷¹ against sweatshops are two domains in which consumers connect their consumption acts with citizenship rights, and these local everyday mundane consumption acts produce globalizing effects. Consumer behavior need not stand in contrast to active citizenship; rather, the former can be an extension of the latter. The relationship between active altruistic citizenship and passive selfish consumership need not be polarized.

Of course, consumer behavior does not always pair up with active citizenship; life politics, as Giddens argues, is only for people with secure incomes. In other parts of the world, people in developing countries also desire consumption but their desires draw them to develop another kind of politics—that of the right to consume. As Karl Marx wrote:

The ultimate reason for all real crises always remains the poverty and restricted consumption of the masses...⁷²

Marx wrote the above comment during the mid-nineteenth century; similar urges for the right to consume both public goods and private goods are common today in Southeast Asian cities, but the effects vary from one context to the next. John Clammer⁷³ argues that there is no necessary link between demands for fair allocation of public goods and democratization. In Bangkok and Jakarta, there are large numbers of NGOs and citizens' movements (p. 411); in Manila and other large Philippine cities, however, members of the middle class who used to demand political rights are now more likely to demand public goods (p. 411); and in Singapore, there are no NGOs except those controlled by the state (p. 410).

Clammer's study implies that the relationship between demands for the right to consume and democratization vary across national institutional contexts. Likewise, Bhaskar Mukhopadhyay's ethnographic study of rural Bengal villagers in India,⁷⁴ by demonstrating a link between villagers' desire for imported Chinese bicycles and the villagers' desire for democracy, argues that any rigorous examination of the intricate relationship between consumption and democratization must account for particular political and institutional contexts. The Bengal villagers came from a remote village to Calcutta to buy Chinese bicycles, which were much less expensive than the Indian ones and which the villagers referred to as *gifts* of globalization. However, the villagers failed in their objective because the government officials allowed the rich to purchase the bicycles before everyone else, and these villagers left Calcutta feeling only bitterness (p. 42). Villagers then kept on telling Mukhopadhyay about stories of corruption and about their dissatisfaction with the communist ruling state that they had voted into power in the previous

election. Mukhopadhyay discovered that, because the political left had transformed the villagers into political subjects and because the villagers considered this new political identity to be a gift from the communists, the villagers paid the left back by voting for its candidates. However, the left conferred onto the villagers the entitlements of citizenship, and the villagers subsequently denounced their ruling government and its corrupt administration. Mukhopadhyay argues that the Chinese bicycles should be seen as “a substitute-object for their [the villagers’] deep and repeatedly frustrated desire to participate in the political process as dignified right-bearing citizens, as subjects of a welfare-state entitled to enjoy the benefits of state-subsidized goods as a matter of right, to participate in the global marketplace as consumers free from the restrictions imposed by a paternalist state” (p. 52). More important, Mukhopadhyay avoids a simple theory linking democratization with people’s desire for commodities. He argues that villagers’ desire for democracy resulted from both the leftist pedagogy concerning the rights and entitlements of citizenship and villagers’ exposure to foreign goods including Chinese bicycles and media-disseminated US and European lifestyles. Political and institutional conditions, media flows, local culture, and everyday practices are all captured in Mukhopadhyay’s analysis.

The everyday dimension: politics, culture, and everyday agency

In studying Disney power, scholars practicing the everyday approach emphasize that, in addition to macro-economic trends, Disney’s media domination, and cultural power, it is important to study how people *view* these specific situations, *appropriate* or *challenge* them, and *live* through them. Rather than a narrow examination of people’s everyday acts, the everyday approach accounts for how

macro-economic trends, specific local political and institutional contexts, firms' strong symbolic and cultural power, and locals' everyday practices intersect each other and produce various effects. Second, because the Disney landscape surfaces in different places whose contexts are unique, Disney power is necessarily various in relation to each unique context. Third, the everyday approach emphasizes the multi-dimensional—as opposed to the uni-dimensional—relations that arise between a single locality and Disney. I argue that the everyday approach can function as a research methodology that underscores Massey's idea of “a simultaneous multiplicity of spaces” in reference to diverse local actors' varying views on Disneyfication, globalization, and the local world.

Stacey Warren⁷⁵ examines various Disney-local power contestations at various Disney sites. In her earlier article on popular resistance toward Disneyfication in Seattle, Warren argues against the postmodern critique, which posits that “not only are individual people powerless to transform the parameters of their existence, but structural realities of the postmodern world ensure that true participatory democracy shall never be achieved.”⁷⁶ Rather, by “tracking the activities of actual people in actual landscapes,” Warren sees Disney-Seattle power relations as a kind of “hegemonic give and take” (p. 85) embodying both consent and resistance in relation to people's practices, understandings, and expectations; resistance to powerful corporations such as Disney is possible.

The Seattle Center project was Disney's first extensive urban planning project on non-Disney property. In the early 1980s, City Hall and Seattle Center management decided to ask Disney to be the urban planning consultant because Disney was “probably the best in the world” (p. 99); Disney was ultimately dismissed in 1989 after three years' negotiation and friction. Soon after the

Imagineers arrived in Seattle, Disney declared that it would not pursue the project if the city insisted on an open bid; the Seattle government required that Disney solicit input from a local watchdog advisory board, which subsequently reported that even the arranging of meetings with Disney was difficult; at Disney's public meetings, Disney talked and the public listened. Seattle people then circulated petitions that requested the dismissal of Disney, and City Hall received letters and complaints calling for more public involvement. Disney's three alternative blueprint plans, entitled Plan A, Plan B, and Plan C, fueled a new dimension of criticism that stemmed from the media, citizens' groups, and council chambers: the general criticism was that Disney's designs "did little to evoke Seattle's own culture or history" (p. 102). Council members favored Plan B and insisted that Disney modify the plan by integrating into it more local citizen input; Disney modified the plan. Nevertheless, Seattle residents characterized the plan as "superficial," the work of "cartoonists," and a "mini-Disneyland" (p. 102). More important, implementation of the Disney plan would require an admission fee. Upon encouragement and requests from the official advisory group, informal coalitions, and many citizens, the council then asked a local architectural firm to develop three new alternative plans, and several additional firms submitted plans, unsolicited and at their own expense. In 1989, the council chose five plans and the Disney plan was not among them. Disney's involvement in the Seattle Civic Center came to an end. To Warren, the Seattle story is "a lively hegemonic dynamic" in which "the model of urban organization that Disney proposed engaged city residents, sometimes captivating their imaginations and sometimes angering them, but it never dictated a predetermined reality to them. Rather, the process opened up space for debate, participation, and resistance" (p. 104).

Warren's article "Saying No to Disney" is an extension of her previous discussion on the power dynamics among Disney, city governance, and local people. This time, she discusses four contested Disney developments: the Seattle Civic Center, Long Beach, Anaheim, and Haymarket, Virginia. Warren argues that these Disney projects seemed to be guaranteed success but that they failed because of Disney's "almost complete disconnection with more recent planning tropes, strategies, or even etiquette."⁷⁷ According to Warren, in the 1980s, there was a change in city governments' attitude toward their public's financial support of private development, a shift in planning roles of developers from plan makers to negotiators, and a shift in planning theory toward emphasizing both stimulation of the development environment and protection of citizens' interests; Disney as a private developer, however, still sees its power as absolute and does not adapt to changing attitudes and situations, even in the face of resistance. In confronting public outcry, either the government or Disney, as the case may be, eventually dropped each of these four projects. In the case of the Seattle Civic Center, as discussed above, Disney ignored residents' disappointment and tried to convince the council to waive the required Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). Since Disney did not fulfill the EIS process, the council then called for three alternative plans to be reviewed (p. 242).

In 1989, Disney acquired new properties in Anaheim and Long Beach. In Long Beach, Disney wanted to build a "Port Disney" including a theme park, five resort hotels, and shops (p. 243), while the Anaheim project was about building a "new themed urban resort" called WESTCOT (p. 244). In 1990, Disney issued a public statement that "the Walt Disney Company can only build one of these parks in the 1990s." Disney then pitted the two potential locations against each other so

that the resulting competition would bring Disney concession packages. However, Disney finally dropped its plans in both of the cities because of organized local grassroots resistance.

For the Long Beach project, because over half of the proposed acreage was underwater and needed to be filled in, the project required zoning and environmental approvals at both the local level and the state level. Besides, the California Coastal Commission required that a portion of all waterfront development must be accessible to the nonpaying tourist. Although the officials in Long Beach offered Disney US \$880 million for infrastructure improvement and pledged to support Disney to gain waivers from environmental and rezoning regulations, environmental groups protested across the state. Eventually, the California Coastal Commission refused to allow the coastline zoning variance, and Disney could not build its “classic walled Disney compound” (p. 244). Disney promptly dropped its plan.

For the Anaheim project WESTCOT, Disney planned to build a theme park with hotel and retail shops adjacent to existing Disneyland property. To ensure Disney’s approval of the development project, local officials offered Disney one billion US dollars to improve public facilities. However, home owners organized “pep rallies complete with marching bands, cheerleaders, and extensive coverage” (p. 245). In public hearings on the matter, Disney turned debate into a showcase for Disney, itself, just as it had in the Seattle case. Moreover, Disney dismissed serious planning questions concerning, for example, the provision of adequate schools for the families of the projected 17,500 new employees; and in response, one group of families sued Disney over its unwillingness to contribute to the educational infrastructure that would be needed if WESTCOT should be built. Although

officials were ready to accept Disney's redevelopment project, Anaheim residents refused such a private-owned public-sphere project. Eventually, the plan was dramatically scaled back into a theme park called Disney's California Adventure adjacent to a Disneyland park.

The fourth failed Disney project that Warren discusses is a theme park based on American history, "Disney's America," located in Haymarket, Virginia, outside of Washington D.C. and less than five miles from Manassas National Battlefield Park, a Civil War site. Popular resistance elevated from local to national levels, and Disney finally dropped the plan. Much as Walt Disney had bought land in Orlando anonymously in the early 1960s, Disney in 1993 anonymously purchased an option to buy three thousand acres owned by Exxon in Haymarket. Because Exxon had already won zoning approval for large mixed-use development, Disney could proceed with its plans secretly. However, rumors leaked and Disney officially announced that it would build a new theme park called Disney's America. According to Warren, officials and business leaders at the state, regional, and local levels initially supported Disney's theme park. Despite Disney's refusal to participate in routine meetings about the rezoning application, the Prince William County Planning Commission voted to authorize Disney to proceed the project. However, the well-established and well-funded environmental preservation group The Piedmont Environmental Council raised concerns about the loss of natural beauty and local histories; the newly formed Protect Historic America group comprising nationally known historians and media personalities argued against the Disneyfication of American historical narratives. To raise the debate to a national level, the group's members disseminated advertisements and editorials nationally and threatened to launch legal action. Disney's theme park project then came before

the US Senate's Energy and Natural Resources Sub-committee on Public Lands, National Parks, and Forests. Facing a deadline for the land purchase, Michael Eisner, the Chief Executive Officer of the Walt Disney Company from 1984 to 2005,⁷⁸ announced that Disney would not pursue the Virginia historical theme park project.

By illuminating four failed Disney projects on urban planning, Warren concludes that although the free flow of capital made communities feel a desperate need to attract private developers that might help the communities remain competitive, a number of other factors (culture, local conditions, and democratic traditions and actions) played crucial roles in negotiating and resisting privatization development. In Warren's words, "privatization is not a monolithic cultural and economic expression" (p. 254); instead, these privately developed spaces need to emerge "within the same existing democratic structures" (p. 252).

When Disneyland transplanted itself to France and Japan, Jean Baudrillard⁷⁹ and Fredric Jameson⁸⁰ argued that Disneyfication was stifling local identity. Jameson argued that, in relation to Singapore and Japan, Disneyfication was a symbolic domination by the West of the non-West, ranging over themes from architecture, cultural industry, and spatial behavior to the very idea of utopia. In Jameson's words, the changes resulted in:

... various things, from a new urbanism to a new kind of shopping, a new kind of globalization, a new kind of entertainment industry, even a new kind of Utopia itself—that Walt invented.⁸¹

Some scholars, however, argue that the seemingly cultureless Disney parks⁸² rest upon definite historical (time) and geographical (space) contexts, including local

contexts. These scholars argue that diversity—rather than uniformity—marks Disneylands, Disneyfied work cultures, and Disneyfied consumption cultures. The “same” park, when it transplants itself to different contexts, faces different social relations that intersect each other and that produce different effects. This process does not prevent Disney from gaining power inside and outside its parks but it does *contest* Disney’s power.

In 1985, Disney announced its decision to build a European Disney theme park in Marne-la-Vallée, France. Given that the French government provided Disney with financing deals, tax breaks, transportation networks, and below-market land prices in the Euro Disneyland deal,⁸³ Stacy Warren argues that “the Walt Disney Company deserves honorary colonial status.”⁸⁴ According to Warren, Disneyland Paris⁸⁵ is “Disney’s most ambitious recolonization project” (p. 110). Disney expresses its colonial voices by celebrating fabricated difference and by speaking for others; it expresses “colonial control of local ‘othered’ populations”; and it economically exploits the locals (pp. 112-3). Warren explores (1) the power dynamics between Disney and local governance, (2) the “concession” that Disney management made to workers regarding work conditions, and (3) visitors’ everyday reception of the park; on the basis of this three-pronged examination, Warren argues that Disney “colonization” is in fact a process of “hegemonic destabilization” (p. 113):

If Disneyland is about the colonization of the world, Disneyland Paris is something else again: it is about the playful recolonization of images of itself, embedded within a quietly sinister recolonization of economic, political, and cultural relationships between corporation, nation-state, and locality. A close examination of Disneyland Paris’ history and everyday life reveals what Disney’s postmodern critics have thus far missed: the theme park actually is a site of twisted postcolonial cultural debate. The cultural

conflicts that occur within the park echo, within their safely manufactured confines, the conditions of postcolonial struggle in the so-called real world. In ways that the American parks or even Tokyo Disneyland will never approach, the intrusion of Disney into France has forced Disney employees, guests, and the general public to confront questions of “us” and “them,” “self” and “other,” “intelligentsia” and “subaltern,” and other tropes of postcolonial discourse. (p. 112)

Again, we can see that employees, visitors, government, and the public not only participate in “hegemonic destabilization” but also sometimes can successfully challenge the supremacy of corporate culture. In this case, the first hegemonic concession occurred in relation to onstage Disneyland events,⁸⁶ when patrons of the site insisted that Disney lift its ban on alcohol. At the workplace where the Disney workers called the “backstage,” staff members protested Disney’s famous smile culture and compelled Disney to relax this requirement at Disneyland Paris: instructors of new employees advised the class, “If you don’t feel like smiling, don’t” (p. 119-20). Owing to the media’s ridicule, to labor unions’ protests, and to a government labor inspector’s formal complaint against Disney, Disney relaxed its strict dress codes so that female workers won the right to wear red lipstick and black pantyhose.

In fact, the dress-code conflict was not simply over style of dress but also over the power that Disney as a private American-based global company could wield in France. Rather than write the dress code into the employee contract, Disney management presented the dress code as an attachment to the employee contract, and it was then exempt from standard approval through government channels. The government labor inspector who lodged the aforementioned formal complaint against Disney declared that Disney’s dress code was a disciplinary code applicable to all Disney employees and that, under French labor law, these codes should be directly written into the employee contract and subject to the

government's approval. The dress-code conflict entered the legal realm, and a few months before opening day, police started investigating the dress-code charges.⁸⁷ Disney finally backed down and voluntarily adhered to the regulations. On this matter, Warren quoted a Disneyland Paris employee: "I was not required to wear my hat, scarf, or belt, tuck in my shirt, even wear black shoes. We were asked to, but many did not and could not be punished for it" (p. 121). These changes suggest a "complex hegemonic interplay between Disney management and employees, colonizer and colonized, that was carried out over a period of time by various actors" (p. 120). These changes suggest, as well, that local government does not always ally with Disney and that local opposition sometimes curtails Disney's control.

The negotiations that took place over offstage Disneyland events paralleled protests that resulted in Disneyland Paris' modifications of onstage spectacles. Officially Disneyland Paris recognizes six languages: French, German, Italian, English, Spanish, and Dutch; but some prominent attractions such as Phantom Manor were recorded in both English and French and, for this reason, received criticism as a cultural affront to the dominant language: French. Within five months, Disney replaced the recording with a French-only one (p. 121). Second, because most folklore that Disney uses originated from Europe, children from different European countries find that familiar stories undergo significant modification at Disneyland Paris; in these cases, parents link the Disney version to the stories that the parents' young children learned back home. Only in this way can the children comprehend and fully enjoy the show. In other words, visitors' different cultural contexts end up negotiating with and re-narrativizing Disneyfied European stories (p. 122).

Just as Europeans do not let Disney gain a stranglehold over European life, nor do the Japanese in Tokyo Disneyland. Scholars such as Mary Brannen,⁸⁸ Aviad Raz,⁸⁹ Shunya Yoshimi,⁹⁰ and Mitsuhiro Yoshimoto⁹¹ argue that Tokyo Disneyland exhibits not the unilateral structure of Western hegemony but the multilateral negotiations between two dominant first world countries, that the Japanese people import American Disneyland and edit and consume it in a unique way. These scholars, on the one hand, discuss Japan's cultural Americanization in history and, on the other hand, argue that if the export of Disneyland from the United States is seen as US global influence on consumer culture dating back to the 1920s, the culture has—since the 1970s—undergone a translation that projects an “ethnocentric Japanese worldview.”⁹² The changing meaning of America parallels the changing Japanese responses and uses of American offerings, including Disney.

From a historical perspective, Shunya Yoshimi in his article “Japan: America in Japan/Japan in Disneyfication” (subtitled “The Disney Image and the Transformation of ‘America’ in Contemporary Japan”)⁹³ demonstrates how the meanings of “America” and “Disney” have changed in relation to Japan's economic development and how Japanese youth have used Disney images to create their own lived world. In analyzing cultural Americanization in Japan, Yoshimi argues that “Although ‘America’ was so often said to have swept over Japanese popular culture, the latter was not reduced to dependency on American mass-cultural products, but strove instead to naturalize and reinvent them” (p. 166). As an American symbol, the word ‘Disney’ might have meant “richness” and “newness” (p. 168) from the late 1940s to the 1960s. Starting in the 1970s, because of rapid economic growth from 1955 to 1973, the word ‘America’, as it was colored by Tokyo Disneyland, no longer symbolize either wealth or innovation but a “system of consumption, which

constructs self-identity as consumerable, or as something to be colonized” (p. 172). While Disney Disneyfies folk tales such as *Snow White* by transforming a tale about death and rebirth into a fantasy about a young girl surrounded by lovable but strange dwarfs and saved by a prince, Japanese girls cutify Disney characters through their *kawaii* culture by taking in everything *kawaii* and shutting out things that are not *kawaii*. Determinants of the *kawaii* culture include, in addition to cultural Americanism or Disneyfication, “a system of broad colonization [that] exists in contemporary Japan” whereby Japanese young people “sterilize” the external within themselves to colonize strangers in their everyday practices (p. 176-7).

The changes in Tokyo Disneyland’s onstage attractions can be seen as Japanese domestication of the outside world, including of America, through “cutification” of commodities. Yoshimoto notes that Tokyo Disneyland changes its spectacle Main Street U.S.A. into a new spectacle: Global Bazaar. According to Yoshimoto, Japanese turned the world (otherwise referred to as the “World Bazaar”), not just America, into a commodity that they could consume inside Tokyo Disneyland, now a Japanese-styled mall. For Brannen and Raz, onstage changes in Tokyo Disneyland omitted American-specific histories or translated them to accommodate Japanese culture and to project a Japanese national identity for consumption. The renaming of Frontierland as Westernland and Main Street U.S.A. as the World Bazaar functioned to omit an American nostalgia that was meaningless to Japanese; the park’s expansion of shopping space served the gift-giving needs of the Japanese; the change of Sleeping Beauty’s castle into Cinderella’s castle complements the Japanese “rags to riches” experiences. Raz points out that only Tokyo Disneyland has the attraction named “Meet the World.”

Located on the outskirts of Tomorrowland, it is a “show on history with a look to the future.”⁹⁴ Raz argues that the thirty-minute film “ignores Japan’s Paleolithic ancestors, in favor of the traditional Japanese myth of origin, which regards the founding ancestors as the offspring of the gods, who created the islands and came down to inhabit them” (p. 53). It reenacts Japanese exceptionalism and cultural uniqueness by suggesting that the beginning of Japanese civilization is the beginning of the world and that Japan later opened itself to progress and interacted with the rest of the world as an equal. This expression receives further voice in the Tokyo Disneyland guidebook, which introduces “Meet the World” as a ride on which visitors can “revolve on a carousel through time and relive Japan’s fascinating encounters with other cultures” (p. 51). Many Japanese consider these stories about Japan’s interactions with Chinese and Western cultures as a sign of Japan’s successful incorporation of other cultures. For Raz, Tokyo Disneyland is “not an agent of Americanization but a simulated ‘America,’ showcased by and for the Japanese” (p. 200).

Rather than produce a monolithic global culture, Tokyo Disneyland enables Japanese visitors to enjoy the park in their own ways and in relation to their own lived world. Raz argues that scholars’ warning of commodification and of corporate solutions to problems is partial: his research shows that (1) Japanese visitors are rational consumers “from the *aficionado* to the critical, from anti-establishment to traditional” (p. 189); (2) that some female visitors’ infantile behavior and fascination over Disneyland is rebellion against adulthood; (3) that some repeat visitors come in groups to Tokyo Disneyland where they play the role of “screamers” out of a desire for disorder; and (4) that some people, such as members

from the International Play Association-Japan, are highly critical of Tokyo Disneyland for its emphasis on scripted play instead of on social play or free play.

Analyzing backstage themes and events at Tokyo Disneyland, Raz finds that Disney's strict grooming standards and strong service culture are "ordinary" in Japanese terms because Tokyo Disneyland part-timers are accustomed to working during holidays and to adhering to strict grooming standards (p. 84). Japanese also are less concerned than people from many other cultures about "being phony" (p. 126) because many Japanese consider politeness a part of Japanese social life in general. However, workers resist Tokyo Disneyland manuals, which are translated versions of original English-language Disneyland manuals. Many part-timers do not read them because their supervisors do not ask them questions; and the section managers and trainers despise the numerous manuals for their symbolism of the "infantile" younger generation, the part-timers (p. 110).

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have studied three approaches in Disney literature: the materialist, the symbolic, and the everyday. Herein, I argue that Disney power disperses itself in various power dimensions. In a postmodern consumerist landscape, Disney operates as a resourceful global company that possesses a strong image representing not only fun and family but urban redevelopment and economic success, as well. For these reasons, Disney has gained certain advantages in negotiations with city governments: for example, Disney has received state subsidies and has escaped from certain local regulations and policing. However, the overemphasis on abstract economic forces runs the risk of reductionism. There is no guarantee that capitalism and democracy must have certain unchangeable

relations. Foglesong's study of the long, changing, sometimes cooperative and sometimes difficult relationship between Orlando and Disney, and Warren's study of four failed Disney urban projects show that a state-Disney alliance is not guaranteed.

Culturally, Disney's long-running media domination around the globe may result in audiences' perception of Disney as innocent and fun; Disney's ubiquity over the course of generations makes it easy for consumers to insert the world of Disney into their childhood memories and their sense of family. Nevertheless, Disney does not homogenize systems of meaning throughout the globe. The symbolic approach, unlike the materialist approach, enables researchers to understand Disney power as a "globalness plus," a utopian appeal. However, the symbolic approach ignores the fact that local dreams concern more than the untoward effects that industrialization and modernization have on safety and cleanliness; local dreams can be various because of cities' various political and institutional structures, economies, histories, and cultures.

Although all these scholars have different theoretical concerns (whether in cultural geography, political economy, or media studies), they draw similarly pessimistic conclusions about Disney effects—the diminution of state sovereignty and of citizenship rights. Disney's influence on physical space and Disney's promotion of privatization and of centralized planning diminishes the power of city governments and the public; Disney's promotion of a consumerist lifestyle replaces local identities and participatory citizenship by controlling landscape and media. In short, by promoting consumerism and the false alternative of choice and freedom, Disney creates for itself economic and cultural power, homogenizes culture, and weakens democracy and society. I argue that there is neither a necessary correlation

nor a necessary opposition between international capitalism and democratization. Both capitalism and democracy can be expressed in different forms, as demonstrated by J. K. Gibson-Graham in their account of economic diversity⁹⁵ and by Swank in his analysis of different forms of democratic government structure. By citing Gidden's idea of "life politics" and the empirical studies of Clammer and Mukhopadhyay, I argue that the relationship between consumption and citizenship development needs to be examined under special national context.

Rather than study Disney power as an abstract economic and symbolic force, researchers should highlight the role that local politics, culture, history, democratic traditions, and actors play in global-local power dynamics. As Lawrence Grossberg argues, the changing context ("geographical and historical, political, institutional and intellectual conditions"⁹⁶) requires scholars to reject reductionism at all levels. His advocacy of the concept of "articulation" is a call to examine different forms of realities that have material effects on people's real-life conditions and to study how people's cultural practices appropriate and work upon circumstances through interpretation and action.

Regarding the relationship between Disney's global ubiquity and cultural globalization, scholars such as Warren, Brannen, Foglesong, Raz, Yoshimoto, and Yoshimi emphasize local uptake, negotiation, and resistance. Although Disney power is paramount in both economic terms and cultural terms, these scholars remind us that we need to examine Disney power in *process*—asking how different forces of power intersect in different contexts and periods of time. Using this approach, Foglesong demonstrates the changing Orlando government-Disney relationship, and Warren illuminates the changing city-planning discourse in conflict with the Disney's static and absolutist urban-planning discourse. Also

using this approach, scholars examine whether the meaning of Disney changes among locals (take, for example, Yoshimi's study of the changing meaning of "America" among Japanese) and how people use their own preferences to remake Disney offerings (take, for example, Japanese cutified Disney characters).

In reviewing scholars' studies of various local responses (Orlando, Seattle, New York, Anaheim, Virginia, Long Beach, Paris, Tokyo) to Disney power, I have argued that local acts significantly contribute to the power dynamics of various local Disney projects. Moreover, "locals," as demonstrated by Warren's studies of four American projects and Disneyland Paris, do not fall into one single category. Local government, officers, journalists, Disney employees, consumers, environmentalists, and home owners occupy different positions in relation to Disney and can hold views that clash with Disney's agenda. In other words, as I discussed in chapter One, we need to study these various spaces of social relations to understand the multiple power dynamics of local Disney projects.

In my study of the establishment, the operation, and the consumption of Hong Kong Disneyland, I dare not say that I bear no predefined sets of political beliefs and concerns. Hong Kong, although affluent, has no democratic elections for its Chief Executive; and although significant in terms of its cultural exports in Asia since the sixties, Hong Kong can never characterize itself as a dominant cultural power comparable to France, Japan or America. Hong Kong is not even a nation, but a Special Administrative Region under China's sovereignty. In addition to cultural globalization, then, I am also concerned about Hong Kong's democratization and about Hong Kong's transformation of public space in relation to HKDL.

In terms of politics and institutional matters, I acknowledge that Disney has pitted Hong Kong and Shanghai against each other to compel the HKSAR government both to fund Disney and to waive certain local regulations that would otherwise pertain to HKDL. However, I doubt the assertion that there is an absolute alliance between the HKSAR government and the Disney Company. Certainly, there is cultural Americanization in Hong Kong through Hong Kong's import of Hollywood movies, hamburgers, and shopping-mall consumption system, but the general influence of American cultures is counterbalanced by Hong Kong people's everyday practice of Chinese customs (as I discuss in chapter One), and by the overall development of regional cultures within global cultures.⁹⁷ I also doubt that Disney or other transnational corporations exercise total control over every aspect of Hong Kong people's lives: there is no absolute homogenization of meaning systems, nor is there an absolute substitution of consumerism for citizenship. However, I cannot deny that Hong Kong is a consumerist city; lacking democracy, many Hong Kong people exercise their sovereignty through consumption rather than through elections; living in a small city, Hong Kong people more often than not actively accommodate global trends rather than resist them, and do so for survival.

It was, in the first place, Hong Kong legislators and media that pressed the HKSAR government to compel Disney to settle Disneyland in Hong Kong. On the surface, it seems clear that Hong Kong government officials, legislators, media, and even ordinary Hong Kong people, as shown by surveys,⁹⁸ have submitted themselves to Disney owing chiefly to its economic, media, and cultural domination around the globe. As development progresses, conflicts arise and different groups, including laborers, environmental groups, student activists,

journalists, local popular stars, and even business partners and HKSAR government officials, criticize Disney actions. This criticism circulates through popular press and can affect the bottom line: for instance, visitors' park attendance rocketed then dropped drastically, perhaps because of the circulating criticism. It comes as a surprise to some onlookers that the Disney "magic" failed in the consumerist Hong Kong cityscape. To study Hong Kong people's Disney dream and the failed Disney magic, researchers can uncover a wealth of information by focusing on actors instead of on automatic forces, by focusing on articulation instead of on convergence.

In the next chapter, following Reichl, I study how government officials in 1999 persuaded the Hong Kong public to embrace the HKDL project, even though the deal was undemocratic, non-transparent, and unfair, suggesting that the HKDL project functioned to preserve Hong Kong's cultural identity, as well as to strengthen Hong Kong's post-1997 economic revitalization—articulating Hong Kong people's desires for both economic rebound and cultural distinction after the Handover.

NOTES

¹ Janet Wasko, "Is It a Small World, After All?" in *Dazzled by Disney? The Global Disney Audiences Project*, edited by Wasko, Phillips, and Meehan (London, NY: Leicester University Press, 2001), p. 3. Wasko argues that since the 1930s, some Disney characters and products have played important roles in the popular culture of many countries and that Disney's "1999 revenues from international sources (including US exports) reached \$5 billion or 20% of the total company revenues."

² "Company Overview," from official Disney website, http://corporate.disney.go.com/corporate/overview.html#studio_entertainment

(accessed on 27 March 2007).

³ Alan Bryman, *Disney and His Worlds* (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 36, 48.

⁴ The Walt Disney Company, *The Walt Disney Company 2005 Annual Report* (2006), p. 57. http://adisney.go.com/adownload/investorrelations/ar_2005.pdf (accessed on 12 February 2007).

⁵ As Smoodin argues, Disney is important because it is connected to projects in urban planning, ecological politics, product merchandising, domestic formation, regional formation, global policy formation, technological innovation, and construction of local consciousness. See Eric Smoodin, "Introduction: How to Read Walt Disney," in *Disney Discourse: Producing the Magic Kingdom*, edited by Smoodin (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 5.

⁶ Elizabeth Bell, Lynda Haas, and Laura Sells, "Introduction: Walt's in the Movies," in *From Mouse to Mermaid: The Politics of Film, Gender, and Culture*, edited by Bell, Haas, and Sells (Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 2.

⁷ Henry Giroux, *The Mouse that Roared: Disney and the End of Innocence* (Lanham, Boulder, NY, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999). Giroux describes Disney as a conservative promoter of consumerism and of sanitized notions of identity, difference, and history.

⁸ Lee Artz, "Monarchs, Monsters, and Multiculturalism: Disney's Menu for Global Hierarchy," in *Rethinking Disney: Private Control, Public Dimensions*, edited by Budd and Kirsch (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 2005), p. 95. Artz argues that lurking beneath the egalitarian and pluralistic surface, Disney animations naturalize hierarchy.

⁹ Janet P. Palmer, *Animating Cultural Politics: Disney, Race, and Social Movements in the 1990s* (PhD Thesis, Sociology Department, University of Michigan, Michigan, 2000).

¹⁰ Stacy Warren, "Cultural Contestation at Disneyland Paris," in *Leisure / Tourism Geographies: Practices and Geographical Knowledge*, edited by Crouch (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 111.

¹¹ Michael R. Real, *Mass-mediated Culture* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977).

¹² Umberto Eco, *Travels in Hyper Reality: Essays* (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986).

¹³ Jean Baudrillard, "Simulacra and Simulations," in *Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings*, edited by Poster (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 166-184.

¹⁴ Sharon Zukin, *Landscapes of Power: From Detroit to Disney World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).

¹⁵ Stephen Fjellman, M., *Vinyl Leaves: Walt Disney World and America* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1992).

¹⁶ The first Disney feature-length movie *Snow White* was shown in Shanghai in the 1930s. As deCordova argues, from the late 1920s to the middle 1930s, films

increasingly functioned as advertisement for consumer goods. See Richard deCordova, "The Mickey in Macy's Window: Childhood, Consumerism, and Disney Animation," in *Disney Discourse: Producing the Magic Kingdom*, edited by Smoodin (NY, London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 203-13.

¹⁷ Ariel Dorfman and Armand Mattelart, *How to Read Donald Duck: Imperialist Ideology in the Disney Comic* (New York: International General Additions, 1975).

¹⁸ Janet Wasko, "Is It a Small World, After All?" in *Dazzled by Disney? The Global Disney Audiences Project*, edited by Wasko, Phillips, and Meehan (London and NY: Leicester University Press, 2001), p. 6.

¹⁹ Janet Wasko and Eileen R. Meehan, "Dazzled by Disney? Ambiguity in Ubiquity," in *Dazzled by Disney? The Global Disney Audiences Project*, edited by Wasko, Phillips, and Meehan (London, NY: Leicester University Press, 2001), p. 339.

²⁰ Wasko and Meehan, "Dazzled by Disney? Ambiguity in Ubiquity," p. 339.

²¹ I take these terms from Ron Grover's books entitled *The Disney Touch: Disney, ABC, & the Quest for the World's Greatest Media Empire* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1997) and *The Disney Touch: How a Daring Management Team Revived an Entertainment Empire* (Homewood, Illinois: Irwin, 1991).

²² Established in 1984, the Disney Development Company increased its business involvement in design consultancy and real-estate development in US cities both on and off Disney property.

²³ Richard Foglesong, *Married to the Mouse: Walt Disney World and Orlando* (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1999); Richard Foglesong, "Walt Disney World and Orlando Deregulation as a Strategy for Tourism," in *The Tourist City*, edited by Judd and Fainstein (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1999), pp. 89-106.

²⁴ Andrew Ross, *The Celebration Chronicles: Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Property Value in Disney's New Town* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1999).

²⁵ Jane Kuenz, "Working at the Rat," in *Inside the Mouse: Work and Play at Disney World*, edited by The Project on Disney (Durham, London: Duke University Press, 1995), pp. 110-62.

²⁶ John Van Maanen, "The Smile Factory: Work at Disneyland," in *Reframing Organizational Culture*, edited by Frost and others (Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications, 1991), pp. 55-76.

²⁷ Henry Giroux, *The Mouse that Roared: Disney and the End of Innocence* (Lanham, Boulder, NY, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999).

²⁸ Alan Bryman, *The Disneyization of Society* (London: Sage, 2004); Maurya Wickstrom, "The Lion King, Mimesis, and Disney's Magical Capitalism," in *Rethinking Disney: Private Control, Public Dimensions*, edited by Budd and Kirsch (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 2005), pp. 99-121.

²⁹ Michael Sorkin, "See You in Disneyland," in *The New American City and the End of Public Space* (NY: Hill and Wang, 1992).

³⁰ Several scholars have used the term “Disneyfication” but they associate it with different meanings. Rojek criticizes Disney parks for encouraging people to become consumers instead of citizens; Ross describes “Disneyfication” as “a process of sanitizing culture or history”; and Warren warns that Disneyfication reflects powerful economic organizations that control social order. See Chris Rojek, “Disney Culture,” *Leisure Studies* 12 (1993), pp. 121-35; Stacy Warren, “Disneyfication of the Metropolis: Popular Resistance in Seattle,” *Journal of Urban Affairs* 16, issue 2 (1994), pp. 89-107; Andrew Ross, *The Celebration Chronicles: Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Property Value in Disney’s New Town* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1999), p. 134.

³¹ Alan Bryman, “The Disneyization of Society,” *Sociological Review* 47, issue 1 (1999), pp. 25-47.

³² John Hannigan, *Fantasy City: Pleasure and Profit in the Postmodern Metropolis* (London, NY: Routledge, 1998). Further references are in parentheses in the text.

³³ According to Hannigan, there is a mechanism that strongly links government officials, planners, and corporations to one another because there are frequent flows of creative and management personnel across existing industry boundaries and because people of different organizations may serve on corporate boards of directors.

³⁴ Alan Bryman, *The Disneyization of Society* (London, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publishers, 2004), p. 5. Further references are in parentheses in the text. To escape from the negative connotation of “Disneyfication,” which has often been associated with the process of transforming cultural products in a superficial and simplistic ways, Bryman coins another term, “Disneyization.” The concept of Disneyization derives from Ritzer’s McDonaldization. See George Ritzer, *The McDonaldization of Society* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 1993); *The McDonaldization Thesis: Explorations and Extensions* (London: Sage, 1998); and George Ritzer and Allan Liska, “‘McDisneyization’ and ‘Post-tourism’: Complementary Perspectives on Contemporary Tourism,” in *Touring Cultures: Transformations of Travel and Theory* (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 96-109.

³⁵ “Theming” is the application of a narrative to institutions or locations. More and more areas of economic life are becoming themed: themed restaurants, pubs, cruise ships, shopping malls, and airports, to such a great extent that Gottdiener writes, “the theming of America.” Mark Gottdiener, *The Theming of America: Dreams, Visions, and Commercial Spaces* (Colorado, Oxford: Westview, 1997).

³⁶ In his earlier work, Bryan uses the phrase “dedifferentiation of consumption,” but the meaning has not been changed. It refers to institution-related forms of consumption that become interlocked with each other and increasingly difficult to distinguish from each other. Different forms of consumption such as “shopping, visiting a theme park, eating in a restaurant, staying at a hotel, visiting a museum, going to the cinema, play and/or watching sports, and gambling in a casino” are brought together. Every attraction in Disney parks has a nearby shop that sells commodities related to the attraction. Examples of this trend can be found outside Disney parks: for example, in some big shopping malls with theme parks and with other leisure activities. Las Vegas effectively illustrates dedifferentiation: it blurs the boundaries between casinos, hotels, restaurants, shopping, and theme parks.

³⁷ Disney promotes goods bearing copyright images and logos. The goods include products made under license. Disney movies are often in line with Disney merchandising, and Disney parks are both entertainment venues and big shopping malls with a whole range of different Disney merchandise. Critics often refer to this setup as the commodification of culture. Outside Disney, related examples could be found in Rainforest Café, Hard Rock Café, Planet Hollywood restaurants, Manchester United Football Club, and the like.

³⁸ Disney University trains students in the subject of emotional labor. Disney seminars spread this management approach to other organizations, and various management texts emphasize Disney's success in management.

³⁹ Here, Bryman makes a distinction between Disneyization and McDonaldization. Whereas McDonaldization highlights standardization, Disneyization is a system spreading choice and variety.

⁴⁰ Alan Bryman, "The Disneyization of Society," *Sociological Review* 47, issue 1 (1999), p. 29, emphasis added.

⁴¹ Richard Foglesong, *Married to the Mouse: Walt Disney World and Orlando* (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1999), p. xii. Further references are in parentheses in the text.

⁴² Foglesong recounts an example (pp. 107-111): By 1984, Disney was in great debt because of the Epcot establishment; consequently, Disney started a hotel business. Once Disney became a major hotelier, it opposed any mass-transit schemes that might take their patrons off their property and to other shopping locations. Even though Orlando has a regional transportation problem, Disney as the local government would not solve it if the proposal might hinder Disney's pursuit of profits.

⁴³ Alexander J. Reichl, *Reconstructing Times Square: Politics and Culture in Urban Development* (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 1997), p. 19. Further references are in parentheses in the text.

⁴⁴ Karl Marx, *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft)* (Harmondsworth: Penguin in association with New Left Review, 1973), p. 408, author's emphasis.

⁴⁵ Here I borrow the term from Giddens. Anthony Giddens, *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Press, 1995), p. 20.

⁴⁶ Giddens, *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism*, chapter 9.

⁴⁷ Duane Swank, "Mobile Capital, Democratic Institutions, and the Public Economy in Advanced Industrial Societies," *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice* 3 (2001), pp. 133-62. Further references are in parentheses in the text.

⁴⁸ Swank does not specify which nation-states belong to which type of democratic institutions, but each country he studied has an average score of the three types of democratic institutions.

⁴⁹ Alexander J. Reichl, "When the Mouse Runs the House: Disney Urbanism,"

Urban Affairs Review 37, issue 6 (2002), p. 860.

⁵⁰ Janet Wasko and Eileen R. Meehan, "Dazzled by Disney? Ambiguity in Ubiquity," in *Dazzled by Disney? The Global Disney Audiences Project*, edited by Wasko, Phillips, and Meehan (London, NY: Leicester University Press, 2001), p. 330.

⁵¹ Wasko and Meehan, "Dazzled by Disney? Ambiguity in Ubiquity," p. 331.

⁵² Mike Budd, "Introduction: Private Disney, Public Disney," in *Rethinking Disney: Private Control, Public Dimensions*, edited by Budd and Kirsch (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 2005), p. 2.

⁵³ Lee Artz, "Monarchs, Monsters, and Multiculturalism: Disney's Menu for Global Hierarchy," in *Rethinking Disney: Private Control, Public Dimensions*, edited by Budd and Kirsch (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 2005), p. 78.

⁵⁴ Janet Wasko, Mark Phillips, and Eileen R. Meehan, eds., *Dazzled by Disney? The Global Disney Audiences Project* (London, New York: Leicester University Press, 2001).

⁵⁵ Mark Phillips, "The Global Disney Audiences Project: Disney across Cultures," in *Dazzled by Disney? The Global Disney Audiences Project*, edited by Wasko, Phillips, and Meehan (London, NY: Leicester University Press, 2001), p. 42. Further references are in parentheses in the text.

⁵⁶ Wasko and Meehan, "Dazzled by Disney? Ambiguity in Ubiquity," pp. 329-43. There are different reasons for respondents' enjoyment of Disney: first, respondents pleasantly associate Disney with family members and friends (Australia, Brazil, Denmark, Mexico, Norway, UK, US); second, respondents' experiences of Disney both contrast with respondents' experiences of everyday life and mirror holidays, celebration, and gifts (Norway, Denmark); third, respondents associate Disney with local rituals (Mexico's Sunday meal and Norway's Disney animated cartoon as Christmas icon); and fourth, Disney provides an escape from age-related problems and social problems (Mexico). Further references are in parentheses in the text.

⁵⁷ Respondents also had different degrees of attachment to Disney. Because Disney's ubiquity affects family rituals, respondents' readings of Disney become complicated. Some respondents (US and Japan) placed Disney in a "special, almost sacred, category" (p. 332), but some others (Brazil, Denmark, Greece, South Korea, UK) had mixed feelings about Disney. Respondents from these countries tended to compartmentalize their views: respondents in Brazil and Denmark liked Disney as animation but had reservations about Disney as a business; respondents in Greece and South Korea considered Disney good entertainment and educational but also recognized its negative cultural or industrial influences; some South Korean respondents felt guilty when they consumed Disney products; and respondents in the UK considered the Disney dream an illusion but attractive and necessary for children.

⁵⁸ Sharon Zukin, *Landscapes of Power: From Detroit to Disney World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).

⁵⁹ Zukin, *Landscapes of Power: From Detroit to Disney World*, pp. 221-2.

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- ⁶⁰ Zukin, *The Cultures of Cities* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1995), p. 76.
- ⁶¹ Michael Sorkin, "See You in Disneyland," in *Variations on a Theme Park: The New American City and the End of Public Space*, edited by Sorkin (NY: Hill and Wang, 1992), p. 208.
- ⁶² Mark Gottdiener, *The Theming of America* (Oxford: Westview, 1997), p. 113.
- ⁶³ John Findlay, *Magic Lands: Western Cityscapes and American Culture after 1940* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p. 66. In the book, Findlay studies four environments including Disneyland, the Seattle World's Fair of 1962, Sun City in Arizona, and the Stanford Industrial Park. Findlay argues that the four planned sites built in the mid-1950s and the early 1960s provide antidotes to chaotic eastern urban life.
- ⁶⁴ Sorkin, "See You in Disneyland," p. 231. Sorkin and Gottdiener argue that "Disneyzone" and the increase in themed environments transform public space into profit-seeking commodities which "never really innovate" (Sorkin, p. 226); the increase in theme parks also suggests the decline in public space where visitors can develop their own ways of creatively interacting with one another and with the space itself (Mark Gottdiener, *The Theming of America* (Oxford: Westview, 1997), p. 158).
- ⁶⁵ Stephen M. Fjellman, *Vinyl Leaves: Walt Disney World and America* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1992), p. 10, emphasis added. Further references are in parentheses in the text.
- ⁶⁶ Henry A. Giroux, *The Mouse that Roared: Disney and the End of Innocence* (Lanham, Boulder, NY, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999). Further references from here on are in parentheses in the text.
- ⁶⁷ Some binary oppositions invoked here are inspired by Hugh Mackay. See Hugh Mackay, "Introduction," in *Consumption and Everyday Life*, edited by Mackay (London, Thousand Oaks: Sage in association with the Open University, 1997), pp. 2-3.
- ⁶⁸ Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self-identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 211.
- ⁶⁹ Giddens, *Modernity and Self-identity*, p. 214.
- ⁷⁰ Miriam Hansen, "Unstable Mixtures, Dilated Spheres: Negt and Kluge's the Public Sphere and Experience," *Public Culture* 5, issue 2 (1993), p. 201; Bruce Robbins, *Feeling Global: Internationalism in Distress* (New York: New York University Press, 1999), p. 56. Here, I borrow Bruce Robbins' re-reading of Miriam Hansen's delineation of Oscar Negt and Alexander Kluge's argument on the relationship between culture and market.
- ⁷¹ Naomi Klein, *No Logo* (New York: Picador, 1999).
- ⁷² Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy* (Moscow: Foreign Languages, 1959, vol. 3), p. 472.
- ⁷³ John Clammer, "Globalisation, Class, Consumption and Civil Society in South-East Asian Cities," *Urban Studies* 40, issue 2 (2003), pp. 403-19. Further references are in parentheses in the text.

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- ⁷⁴ Bhaskar Mukhopadhyay, "The Rumor of Globalization: Globalism, Counterworks, and the Location of Commodity," *Dialectical Anthropology* 29, Springer (2005), pp. 35-60. Further references are in parentheses in the text.
- ⁷⁵ Stacy Warren, "Disneyfication of the Metropolis: Popular Resistance in Seattle," *Journal of Urban Affairs* 16, issue 2 (1994), pp. 89-107; Stacy Warren, "Cultural Contestation at Disneyland Paris," in *Leisure / Tourism Geographies: Practices and Geographical Knowledge*, edited by Crouch (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 109-25; Stacy Warren, "Saying No to Disney: Disney's Demise in Four American Cities," in *Rethinking Disney: Private Control, Public Dimensions*, edited by Budd and Kirsch (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 2005), pp. 231-60.
- ⁷⁶ Stacy Warren, "Disneyfication of the Metropolis: Popular Resistance in Seattle," *Journal of Urban Affairs* 16, issue 2 (1994), p. 92. Further references are in parentheses in the text.
- ⁷⁷ Stacy Warren, "Saying No to Disney: Disney's Demise in Four American Cities," in *Rethinking Disney: Private Control, Public Dimensions*, edited by Budd and Kirsch (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 2005), p. 238. Further references are in parentheses in the text.
- ⁷⁸ "Board of Directors," from Disney official website, http://corporate.disney.go.com/corporate/bios/michael_d_eisner.html (accessed 25 April 2007).
- ⁷⁹ Jean Baudrillard, "Simulacra and Simulations," in *Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings*, edited by Poster (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981), pp. 166-84.
- ⁸⁰ Fredric Jameson, *Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991).
- ⁸¹ Fredric Jameson, "Future City," *New Left Review* May-June (2003), p. 71.
- ⁸² The term "cultureless" is borrowed from Brannen. Brannen, "'Bwana Mickey': Constructing Cultural Consumption at Tokyo Disneyland," in *Re-made in Japan*, edited by Tobin (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1992), p. 218.
- ⁸³ Because both the French government and the Spanish government would like to attract tourist dollars and employment by acquiring for their respective nation a Disney theme park, the two governments offered Disney financing deals, tax breaks, transportation networks, and even free land. See Andrew Lainsbury, *Once Upon an American Dream: the Story of Euro Disneyland* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2000), p. 21.
- ⁸⁴ Stacy Warren, "Cultural Contestation at Disneyland Paris," in *Leisure/Tourism Geographies: Practices and Geographical Knowledge*, edited by Crouch (London, NY: Routledge, 1999), p. 112. Further references are in parentheses in the text.
- ⁸⁵ The whole complex Euro Disney Resort was opened on 12 April 1992 and the name of the park was Euro Disneyland. The park's name was changed to Euro Disneyland Paris in 1994, to Disneyland Paris in 1995, and Disneyland Park or Parc Disneyland in 2002.
- ⁸⁶ Disney theme-park culture divides the park into two parts: onstage events and

backstage events. Onstage events take place in the areas to which visitors have access. All attractions and shows belong onstage. Once park workers are onstage, they are cast members who act and who provide a “good show.” “Backstage” in Disney culture refers to the place to which only Disney Park workers have immediate access, and scholars refer to the “backstage” as Disney’s work culture, management, and labor relations. Aviad Raz adds one more dimension, the “offstage” area, the larger Japanese “popular/consumerist” cultural context, where specific groups of Disney “fans” consume Tokyo Disneyland variously in relation to their everyday life. See Aviad Raz, *Riding the Black Ship: Japan and Tokyo Disneyland* (Cambridge, London: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999), p. 13.

⁸⁷ David Koenig, *Mouse Tales: A Behind-the-ears Look at Disneyland* (Irvine: Bonaventure Press, 1994), p. 219.

⁸⁸ Mary Yoko Brannen, “‘Bwana Mickey’: Constructing Cultural Consumption at Tokyo Disneyland,” in *Re-Made in Japan*, edited by Tobin (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 216-34.

⁸⁹ Aviad E. Raz, *Riding the Black Ship: Japan and Tokyo Disneyland* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard, 1999).

⁹⁰ Shunya Yoshimi, “Japan: America in Japan/Japan in Disneyfication: The Disney Image and the Transformation of ‘America’ in Contemporary Japan,” in *Dazzled by Disney? The Global Disney Audiences Project*, edited by Wasko, Phillips, and Meehan (London, NY: Leicester University Press, 2001), pp. 160-81.

⁹¹ Mitsuhiro Yoshimoto, “Images of Empire: Tokyo Disneyland and Japanese Cultural Imperialism,” in *Disney Discourse: Producing the Magic Kingdom*, edited by Smoodin (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 181-203.

⁹² Aviad E. Raz, *Riding the Black Ship: Japan and Tokyo Disneyland* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard, 1999), p. 16.

⁹³ Yoshimi, “Japan: America in Japan/Japan in Disneyfication,” pp. 160-81. Further references are in parentheses in the text.

⁹⁴ Raz, *Riding the Black Ship: Japan and Tokyo Disneyland*, p. 51. Further references are in parentheses in the text.

⁹⁵ J. K. Gibson-Graham, *The End of Capitalism (as We Knew It): A Feminist Critique of Political Economy* (Cambridge, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996).

⁹⁶ Lawrence Grossberg, *Bringing It All Back Home: Essays on Cultural Studies* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1997), p. 246.

⁹⁷ Diana Crane, “Culture and Globalization: Theoretical Models and Emerging Trends,” in *Global Culture: Media, Arts, Policy, and Globalization*, edited by Crane, Kawashima and Kawasaki (NY, London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 7-9.

⁹⁸ John Ap, “Hong Kong Disneyland: Community Reactions and Its Implications on Tourism in the Pearl River Delta Region,” paper read at Leisure and Entertainment Asia Conference 2000 (Hong Kong SAR, 2000); John Ap, “Residents’ Opinions of Hong Kong Disneyland” (HK, press embargo: 2002), 20 December 2002.

Chapter Three

The HKSAR Government's "World City" Imaginary

Whenever Disney plans to expand and build a new Disney theme park in the hub of a region, governments bidding for the role of host often desperately try to obtain it by offering Disney generous setup subsidies, cheap land, low-interest-rate loans, transportation networks, setup infrastructure, and tax breaks. These deals are not just about financial support; instead, the successful government surrenders its management control over Disney,¹ and sometimes the local Disneyland does not need to abide by the law² and enjoys special consideration from the government for future changes in legislation.³ Surprisingly, even though the media widely publicize these deals, Disneyland supporters outnumber opponents in France and Hong Kong.

Certainly, the dream or utopia appeal that Disneyland offered the French and the HKSAR governments was not simply an antidote to urban malaises as it was in the case of Anaheim Disneyland, according to Zukin, Sorkin, Gottdiener, and Findlay (see chapter One). In the post-industrial global economy, both the French government and the HKSAR government believed that the Disneyland projects could provide tens of thousands of jobs, lower the unemployment rate, increase foreign exchange and tourist revenues, and establish new leisure and tourism developments.⁴

However, cultural critics denounced France's Disneyland as the "Euro Dismal" project, while the phrase "cultural Chernobyl" circulated in the mainstream press.⁵ Yet public opinion polls on the Île-de-France indicated 86% approval for the Paris Disney park,⁶ and two journalists—Turner and Bumbel—described it as "an extraordinary triumph of commerce over ideology."⁷ Hong Kong's experiences with

Disneyland were similar to France's. As in France, Hong Kong had detractors of the HKDL project. An elected legislator in the city argued that the HKDL deal was an "Unequal Treaty"⁸ because the HKSAR government had invested HK\$22.95 billion compared to The Walt Disney Company's HK\$2.45 billion. However, the HKSAR government receives 57% of the shares of the government-Disney joint venture company Hong Kong International Theme Park Ltd (HKITP) whereas Disney owns 43%. Also in Hong Kong, local scholars and some journalists⁹ raised other reservations about the HKDL project; in particular, they criticized the deal's lack of transparency¹⁰ and the deal's ecological destruction of Lantau Island,¹¹ the backyard of Hong Kong. Despite these reservations, Hong Kong people largely supported the HKDL project,¹² and the popular press even termed the completed deal a "millennium dream come true." Local scholar Joseph Chan¹³ drew a conclusion similar to that of Turner and Bumbel: according to Chan, the favorable reception that Hong Kong extended to the Mouse is evidence of the prevalence of Hong Kong's economic logic, paves the way for cultural globalization, and weakens resistance voices.

I would like to argue that, in the case of HKDL, lurking behind the prevalent economic logic is the HKSAR government's use of the HKDL project to sell Hong Kong people another utopia—the world-city utopia. In other words, the HKDL project was attractive to the HKSAR government not only in economic terms but also in cultural and political terms. First, the HKSAR government used the strong sign value of Disney—that namely, "Disney" is a famous and valuable global brand—to brand Hong Kong itself as a "world city" and, consequently, to differentiate Hong Kong from other Chinese cities. Second, the HKDL-based world city ideal helps to divert Hong Kong people's imagination away from

conceptualizing a “better” society based on a democratization process, and toward a Western-based reformulation of Hong Kong’s imagined “Chineseness plus” elements. Moreover, the “Western” influence in this instance reflects Western *commercial* culture instead of Western *democratic* culture. The HKSAR government has effectively used HKDL to re-image Hong Kong from a colonial city based on a symbolic “East-meets-West” economics to a post-colonial city based on a symbolic “East-meets-Disney” economics. This repackaging of Hong Kong city’s self-image has the potential to satisfy both Hong Kong people’s desires for cultural distinction and the Beijing government’s decolonization project (including the “decolonization” of the late-colonial government’s democratization project). Third, the popular appeal of the undemocratic and non-transparent HKSAR-Disney HKDL negotiations and subsequent deal has helped to consolidate the HKSAR government’s wider undemocratic regime and non-transparent institutional structure. In short, my argument about the HKSAR government’s construction of the world-city utopia confirms Massey’s argument that although we should conceptualize our lived world as a simultaneous multiplicity of spaces, “the world has seen the recrudescence of exclusivist claims to places—nationalist, regionalist and localist” since the late 1980s. These attempts aim to “fix the meaning of particular spaces, to enclose them, endow them with fixed identities and to claim them for one’s own” and for the justification of one’s power.¹⁴

I would argue that to sell the non-transparent HKDL project to the public, the HKSAR government developed two existing colonial discourses on development and cosmopolitan identity, thereby evolving a “competition-development” discourse and a “disappearing-world-city” discourse for its own use. By using these two discourses, HKSAR government hoped to persuade the public

that it should approve of the unequal Hong Kong-Disney deal. In this chapter, I first narrate how the HKDL project received support from the Legislative Council even though the government asked the Council to approve the funding in the absence of a completed environmental-impact assessment. In the second and third sections, I discuss the concept of the imaginary and how the government developed the economic-oriented “world-city” imaginary by appropriating two pairs of discourses—a “competition-development” discourse and a “disappearing-world city” discourse. I examine how newspaper reports have circulated and have reinforced these two pairs of political discourses in wider popular discourse. In the last section, by examining the HKSAR government’s tourism policy, I further discuss how the process of touristification functions simultaneously to accomplish decolonization tasks and re-nationalization tasks, and to reshape Hong Kong as a spectacular tourist magnet instead of a citizen-based participatory community.

The unequal deal and legislators’ *fait accompli* assent

In late 1998, news had it that Disney might build another park in Asia. Legislators demanded that the HKSAR government demonstrate sincerity and determination to settle Disneyland in Hong Kong in its negotiation with The Walt Disney Company. The legislators hoped that, in this way, Disney would choose to build Disneyland in Hong Kong. To facilitate these efforts, the legislators suggested that the establishment of Disneyland in Hong Kong should mirror the financial arrangement of Ocean Park, the only theme park in Hong Kong at that time. In other words, the HKSAR government should provide cheap land to the Walt Disney Company so that, at its own expense, the company could proceed with the construction of the theme park.¹⁵ Although press and legislators were excited about the negotiations,

the government kept related details under wraps.¹⁶ Having no chance to examine the deal, legislators were dissatisfied with the government's non-transparent negotiations, for the government notified the public only about the outcome. These critical legislators warned the government that the Legislative Council could block funding for the Disneyland project.¹⁷

On 2 November 1999, the HKSAR government and the Walt Disney Company officially announced that the HKDL deal had reached a successful conclusion. As I mention in an abbreviated form above, elected Legislator Man Kwong Cheung¹⁸ denounced the deal as an “Unequal Treaty” by paralleling it with the 1842 treaty that transformed Hong Kong into a colony and that ceded it to the British. Because secrecy characterized the deal-making process, the Hong Kong people had no chance to discuss its details in public. Indeed, a public release of the details came only after both of the parties had officially announced the deal's completion. At this time, the Commissioner for Tourism presented the details:¹⁹

- A total of HK\$13.6 billion would be spent on the reclamation and development of Penny's Bay (the then Sunny Bay), the infrastructure, and the transportation links to HKDL.
- A total of HK\$14.1 billion would be required to pay for the park—HK\$6.6 billion for the theme park itself and HK\$7.5 billion for the hotels and all the infrastructure supporting it. The division of HK\$14.1 billion was projected as follows:
 - ✦ Of the equity, the government would invest HK\$3.25 billion into a joint-venture company with Disney, while Disney would invest HK\$2.45 billion therein. The name of the venture would be Hong Kong International Theme Park Ltd (HKITP);

- ✦ HK\$6.1 billion in government loans including capitalized interest (prime minus 1.75% from drawdown to the eighth anniversary of the park's opening; prime minus 0.875% for the next eight years; and prime for the next nine years) for 25 years;
- ✦ The entire project would also be financed by a commercial loan of HK\$2.3 billion including capitalized interest.

The government needed to invest HK\$22.95 billion in the joint venture in three ways: investment in infrastructure and transportation, direct injection of cash, and government loans to raise 57% of the Hong Kong International Theme Park Ltd (HKITP) shares; The Walt Disney Company invested only HK\$2.45 billion to get its 43% of the shares. The government may recover its direct investment of HK\$3.25 billion because the agreement allows for the complete privatization of the joint venture, but Disney must maintain \$1.9 billion in the joint venture. Besides, the Walt Disney Company would receive the following royalties once the park began operations: 10% admission, 10% participant, 5% merchandise, 5% food and beverage sales, 5% hotel revenue. The base management fee was 2% and variable management fee ranged from 2% to 8%.²⁰ What the Hong Kong public did not know about the deal was whether or not the Hong Kong people would need to bear the HKDL-related maintenance costs for all infrastructure; nor was the Hong Kong public informed about the financial arrangement in case HKDL ran a deficit.

In mid-November 1999, after the official announcement of the completed deal between the government and the Walt Disney Company, the government needed approval from the Legislative Council for the funding of HK\$13.569 billion to complete the official contract with the Walt Disney Company. Legislators had

three main concerns: the ability of the park to ensure a balanced budget, the shared responsibility of the government and Disney if HKDL ran a deficit, and the government's fast-track action in asking the Legislative Council to approve the funding without completing the environmental-impact assessment. The government responded that it had conducted a sensitivity analysis by scaling down the projected revenue by 20%, finding that the HKDL would still be financially viable; refused to disclose the exact financial arrangement but said that both sides would pour money into the park if HKDL ran a deficit; and warned that the finance of the project would suffer and that the government would have to redo the whole financial arrangement and assessment if the Legislative Council postponed its approval of the funding until the release of the report of the environmental-impact assessment.²¹

Elected legislators belonging to the Democratic Party²² initially criticized the government for its lack of aggressiveness relative to negotiations with the Walt Disney Company; then, the legislators denounced the deal as unequal and criticized the government for violation of the spirit of the law insofar as the government sought fast-track Legislative Council approval of the funding even though no environmental-impact assessment had been completed. Nevertheless, the legislators in question abstained from voting on the Finance Committee; in effect, the legislators abdicated their voting rights despite having criticized the government. Furthermore, these legislators voted *for* the project in the Public Works Subcommittee. Facing a *fait accompli* and fervent public approval of the HKDL project (as shown from different public opinion polls),²³ the Legislative Council approved the HK\$22.45 billion funding for the HKDL project. In the Finance Committee, only three legislators, Emily Lau, Cyd Ho, and Christine Loh, opposed the approval of the government-Disney joint-venture funding. On 10 December

1999, the government and the Walt Disney Company signed five official agreements—on shareholders, loan, license, management, and the master project itself.

Concepts of the “imaginary”

Scholars provide various understandings of the concept of the “imaginary.” Jacques Lacan conceives of the imaginary as a basis of a misrecognized selfhood; Benedict Anderson couches the imaginary in political terms; Charles Taylor and Claudia Strauss argue that social imaginaries are a “cultural model”, that is, the common understandings through which people imagine their surroundings. For Lacan,²⁴ the imaginary is associated with ideal, illusion, and misrecognition. According to Lacan, the self is a split self; the imaginary is an internalized image of an ideal whole self that young people, during their preverbal stages, derive from an unfragmented image that they have of their own selves. When an infant looks at a mirror and sees his or her image wholly present, the wholeness of the image establishes itself in the infant’s mind, where the image constitutes the infant’s ego, the concept of identity. In other words, this mirror image is an image of wholeness—of completeness and coherence—and reflects, for the infant, a complete and coherent internal self. Lacan argues that this line of reasoning in the infant’s mind leads to a profound misrecognition of what it means to be human.²⁵ However, the mirror stage, which ends with a sense of the self as complete, has an important social function: by creating the subject (the self), the mirror stage enables the subject to recognize and to interact with objects (the external world). Media scholars, for example, use Lacan’s theory to explain how the subject identifies with screen images to fulfill his or her desire to achieve oneness, to replace our permanent lack with completeness.

Anderson interprets the meaning of the imaginary by associating it with the concept of “nation.” He argues that the development of print capitalism in the eighteenth century standardized and disseminated vernacular print languages and social concerns. The common language was “fixed” as the “national” language, through which people communicated and exchanged ideas. The common concerns raised by the print media also constructed an imagination of a community, the nation, in which people share common concerns at the same time. To Anderson, the community is “imagined” because nationalism encourages members of the community to imagine that they share not only the same language but also the same concerns, although “the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them.”²⁶ Anderson further explains:

It is imagined as a *community*, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately, it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings.²⁷

Anderson argues that media play a critical role in the construction of these imagined communities because the widespread nature of communication processes help construct national identity and other forms of community.

In contrast to Anderson, Charles Taylor argues that the social imaginary is not an idealized understanding of things but rather a matter of complex understandings in which both facts and norms play important roles. The social imaginary affects people’s perceptions of how things are (facts) and people’s perceptions of how things should be (norms):²⁸

I want to speak of social imaginary here, rather than social theory, because there are important—and multiple—differences between the two. I speak of *imaginary* because I'm talking about the way ordinary people 'imagine' their social surroundings, and this is often not expressed in theoretical terms; it is carried in images, stories, and legends. But it is also the case that theory is usually the possession of a small minority, whereas what is interesting in the social imaginary is that it is shared by large groups of people, if not the whole society. Which leads to a third difference: the social imaginary is that common understanding that makes possible common practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy. In addition, we should note that what start off as theories held by a few people may come to infiltrate the social imaginary, first that of elites, perhaps, and then of society as a whole. The social imaginary is that common understanding that makes possible common practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy.²⁹

Building on this theory, Claudia Strauss argues that Taylor's social imaginary "fits cognitive anthropologists' conception of cultural models"³⁰ because cultural models are also widely shared and they are implicit schemas for people to interpret the world and their behavior. Cultural-model theorists further argue that there is more than one cultural model and that cultural models affect people's behavior to different extents and in different ways.

Although it seems that Lacan, Anderson, Taylor, and Strauss hold conceptions of the "imaginary" that differ from one another, and although the theorists' use of the same word ranges from the self, to community, nation, and culture, there are certain similarities among these distinct conceptions. The first two theorists differ from one another in terms of their focus on the self and the community respectively, but they both argue that the imaginary is a misrecognition: a mind that inaccurately recognizes a complete himself or a complete herself—a complete self; people that inaccurately recognize a community—a cohesive group. Whereas Lacan treats the imaginary as a universal aspect of the human condition, Anderson, Taylor, and Strauss suggest that the imaginary of a community, a nation,

or a social surrounding, is reproduced on a regular and mundane basis. Different from the first two, Taylor's and Strauss' social-imaginary model implies a dialogic relationship between the elite minority and the "ordinary" majority—that social theory can integrate itself into the social imaginary and, also, that the social imaginary can derive its form and content from "below."

Having examined various HKSAR government officials' public speeches and the news reports regarding the HKDL project, I argue that the HKSAR government attempted to sell the HKDL project to the public in two ways: first, the HKSAR government appropriated certain social imaginaries (in particular, the "Chineseness plus" model of cultural identity) that appealed to the majority of Hong Kong people and that encouraged them to imagine Hong Kong's acquisition of Disneyland as the key to Hong Kong's transformation into a "world city"; second, the HKDL consolidated for the Hong Kong public the imaginary according to which a city's status as a "world city"³¹ depends on the city's ability to successfully compete in the era of globalization. To highlight the assertion that Hong Kong's importation of Disneyland would enable Hong Kong to *become* a world city in the twenty-first century, the HKSAR government developed two already available discourses—the competition-development discourse and the disappearing-world-city discourse. The first discourse reproduces the necessity for development politics in the midst of global competition; the second discourse plays on Hong Kong's fears that Hong Kong, itself, was disappearing from the world economy and it catered to Hong Kong's dream of being a twenty-first-century world city.

In late colonial times, Hong Kong had often been seen as a cosmopolitan "East-meets-West" city and an emphasis on urban development was common

because of the colonial government's heavy reliance on property tax³² and on the "success" and the wealth that Hong Kong people had attained³³ under industrialization that started in the 1960s. Under the post-Handover context, the HKSAR government appropriated the colonial "East-meets-West" cosmopolitan image of Hong Kong and the colonial politics of development to interpret the economic doldrums that Hong Kong was facing in 1999. Hong Kong was seen as disappearing³⁴ in both economic terms and political terms because of urban development in China, severe regional competition in the Asia Pacific region, and ironically, the "successful" Handover; Hong Kong would soon disappear if the Hong Kong people did not face competition positively—only with "development" could Hong Kong turn "from adversity to opportunity,"³⁵ from a disappearing city to a world city. Hong Kong should grasp the opportunity to establish Disneyland, for the brand "Disney" with its huge sign value, would help Hong Kong achieve the world-city status.

Certainly, the HKSAR government's "world city" imaginary is not necessarily the cultural model embraced by the "people." Following Claudia Strauss in studying "the imaginaries of real people, not the imaginaries of imagined people,"³⁶ here I study imaginaries on two levels. In this chapter, I study the HKSAR government's attempt to characterize Disneyland as a significant import that would help Hong Kong achieve the "world city" imaginary; in the next chapter, I examine my respondents' various social imaginations in relation to the HKDL project. Although the HKSAR government followed the British colonial government in prioritizing economic development and in offering Hong Kong citizens limited rights,³⁷ and although the HKSAR government consciously and unconsciously constructed the ideal citizen-subject as economistic and

individualistic through education reform³⁸ and welfare policies,³⁹ various respondents' uses of HKDL indicate that Hong Kong citizen-subjects are multiple and not merely economistic.

The HKSAR government's economic "world city" imagination

As discussed in chapter One, after the late 1960s and during British rule, a local consciousness took shape among Hong Kong people. This local consciousness projected China as Other. In the early 1980s, Hong Kong people's fears of the change of sovereignty from the capitalist British to the socialist Chinese regime became a critical negotiation chip for the British government in the related Sino-British negotiations.⁴⁰ The negotiations resulted in the "one country, two systems" policies, and the Sino-British Agreement of 1984 guaranteed that "the economic, legal and social system in Hong Kong and its citizens' way of life will remain in force for fifty years after 1997."⁴¹ In the mid 1980s, the colonial government, facing democratization demands from professionals and "pressure groups," also initiated limited democratic reforms. In 1985, the Hong Kong government increased the number of indirectly elected Legislative Council seats from twelve to twenty-four. According to Alvin So,⁴² in late 1985, Beijing made known its disapproval of any further democratic reforms carried out by the Hong Kong government before the installation of the Basic Law, which was drafted in the Mainland instead of Hong Kong and determined Hong Kong's future political structure. Because of the Tiananmen incident in 1989, London asked for faster democratization in Hong Kong and in 1992, Chris Patten became the last Governor of Hong Kong. Since the Basic Law was already promulgated, Patten announced the Legislative Reform Bill in 1993 and reinterpreted the Basic Law's definition of

“functional constituencies” (occupational group) so that the election base rose from 110,000 to virtually 2.7 million adult workers, meaning virtually every adult worker could vote for the 1995 Legislative Council election.

In 1997, however, the public experienced a backlash against democratization. Arguing that Patten’s political reforms violated the Basic Law, on 30 June 1997, the Beijing Authorities dissolved the Legislative Council, which had been elected in 1995 and would have served beyond 1997 for institutional continuity. The Provisional Legislative Council also repealed and amended some laws passed by the colonial Legislative Council and passed some new laws such as the Public Order Ordinance, which required police permission for demonstrations involving over 30 people. Furthermore, the Basic Law authorized by the Beijing authorities stipulated that the Chief Executive of the HKSAR government in 1997 was to be elected by a 400-member electoral commission instead of by popular election.⁴³ In short, in late colonial times, Patten tried to articulate democracy with Hong Kong’s “way of life”;⁴⁴ in post-colonial times, the Beijing authorities slowed down Hong Kong’s democratization process.⁴⁵

To earn public approval, then, the new HKSAR government sought to direct Hong Kong people’s desires away from democratization and toward economic concerns. Right after the Handover, however, Hong Kong, as was the case with other Asian countries such as Thailand, South Korea, Indonesia, and Malaysia, experienced the Asian financial crisis, which resulted in a steep decline in property and stock markets, in asset values, in inbound tourism, and in the local economy. To attain political legitimacy, the new regime has concentrated on strengthening Hong Kong’s economic competitiveness and on resolving Hong Kong’s socio-economic problems such as a bubble economy, de-industrialization, and the widening gap

between the rich and the poor.⁴⁶

To revitalize the economy, starting in 1998, the HKSAR government attempted to appropriate part of the Hong Kong people's existing social imaginary—Hong Kong people's desire for cultural distinction from other cities. The government used this appropriation to transform post-colonial Hong Kong into a “world city” and, thus, to avoid the possibility that Hong Kong would become just another Chinese city after the Handover. To re-negotiate its world position, therefore, Hong Kong needed to strengthen ties with not only the Mainland but also with global companies such as Disney.⁴⁷

In 1997, when Tung Chee Hwa, the Chief Executive of the HKSAR government, delivered his first policy address (also the HKSAR government's first policy address under the People's Republic of China), he said in his introduction that the Hong Kong people needed to face two aspects of “the new era”⁴⁸: the Handover and the world economy. In view of China's remarkable economic growth since the 1978 reforms, Tung stated that the Handover brought Hong Kong only benefits: “Our country has bright prospects from which Hong Kong is sure to benefit” (clause 3). However, he also warned the Hong Kong people that under the global economy, Hong Kong faced “open, free and borderless competition” (clause 4) and that the city needed long-term planning to “set new courses for development” (clause 4). However, Tung was optimistic about global competition because Hong Kong was a cosmopolitan city with hybrid cultures that enabled the Hong Kong people to face challenges under global competition:

Ours is a cosmopolitan city. Our ability to embrace the cultures of East and West is one of the secrets of our success, shaping a unique social culture of our own. (clause 111)

Experiencing the ailing local economy after the Asian financial turmoil, Tung in his 1998 policy address argued that Hong Kong needed to acquire more economic connections and to re-position itself to *become* a cosmopolitan city. And the way to become a cosmopolitan city was to strengthen networks with China, to become the gateway to China, and also to become a “bridge” to the “international community”:

As China passes through the different phases of modernization, Hong Kong will have different roles to play and new functions to perform.... We must now consider how to reinforce our role as the bridge between China and the international community.... We must ... expand further our business links and economic co-operation with the Mainland⁴⁹ We have studied the roles of New York and London, which are not only the most cosmopolitan cities in America and Europe respectively, but are also international financial centers, tourist destinations, homes for the headquarters of multi-national corporations and international communication and transportation centers. I believe that Hong Kong too has the potential to become, not only a major city within one country, but also the most cosmopolitan city in Asia.⁵⁰

Tung did not elaborate on the meaning of “cosmopolitan city” in his policy address, but he cited New York and London as exemplars of his ideal cosmopolitan city. By simply equating cosmopolitan cities to “international financial centers, tourist destinations, homes for the headquarters of multi-national corporations and international communication and transportation centers,” Tung restricted the meaning of “cosmopolitan city” to strictly economic terms and ignored the democratic and pluralistic cultural values held by these vibrant cities. Although “cosmopolitan city” became the HKSAR government’s objective for Hong Kong, China as a country and the neighboring Chinese cities were seen as support for—instead of a hindrance to—Hong Kong’s objective.

In the 1999 policy address, a month before the completion of the HKSAR

government-Disney deal, Tung re-stated the government's determination to transform "Hong Kong into a prosperous, attractive and knowledge-based, world-class city"⁵¹ on a par with New York City and London, but the urgency underlying this transformation concerned a fear of disappearance under fierce competition with other cities, especially the Chinese ones:

Two decades of rapid economic growth on the Mainland have continued to narrow the gap between Hong Kong and the key cities there.... Unless we consciously improve, our lead will disappear.⁵²

A comparison of the three policy addresses reveals that, from 1997 to 1999, the government was modifying the idea of Hong Kong's position in relation to the world. In 1997, Hong Kong was a cosmopolitan city; in 1998, Hong Kong was no longer a cosmopolitan city but struggling to be one. In 1997, China was an important supporter of Hong Kong's future development⁵³; in 1999, China cities were Hong Kong's official competitors under the globalized economy and Hong Kong's leading position was disappearing because of these competitors' rapid development.

According to the government, the fear that Hong Kong was a city disappearing from the global scene stemmed from the Handover, as well as from global and regional competition. At the media briefing session of the official announcement of the HKSAR government-Disney deal, Mike Rowse, the Tourism Commissioner, stated directly that "Hong Kong was disappearing":

We kind of faded from the spotlight a little bit since 1997 when I know many people just wrote us off—that was the end of Hong Kong, Hong Kong was disappearing and would gently decline from thereon.⁵⁴

According to this rhetoric, a “disappearing” Hong Kong would be a logical outcome not simply of economic trends but also of politics. Right after the completion of the HKSAR-Disney deal, Mike Rowse warned again that Hong Kong people had lost, in addition to money during the financial crisis, their peculiar identity after the Handover:

Then came 1997 when we suffered a double blow; the Asian economic crisis reduced the level of regional travel; and the political transition meant we lost our allure as the last major historical anomaly.⁵⁵

By connecting with the mega-transnational brand Disney, the government suggested that the joint-venture between the HKSAR government and the Walt Disney Company endowed Hong Kong with huge transnational sign value and helped Hong Kong achieve both a Chinese image and a world-city image within a Western-dominated global system. Disney’s investment in Hong Kong reaffirmed the hope that Hong Kong was still “alive,” according to Mike Rowse:

... what this [the Walt Disney Company] project tells the world is that Hong Kong is still alive and kicking and we are aiming high. We are not going to decline. We are going to grow from where we were and develop, and we are aiming to be among the world’s top cities.⁵⁶

The name “Disney” may elsewhere signal the sanitization process of Forty-second Street in New York under gentrification⁵⁷ or the affluent Japanese people’s ability to own and manage an American Disneyland according to Japanese cultural precepts.⁵⁸ In the case of HKDL, however, Disney’s utopian appeal for the HKSAR government was the possibility that Disney could help Hong Kong attain or maintain world-city status, an antidote to the possibility that Hong Kong was a

disappearing city under a globalized economy. When, on behalf of his government, Secretary for Economic Services Stephen Ip signed the Master Project Agreement with the Walt Disney Company, he said that the joint-venture represented “a happy marriage between a world class tourist attraction and a world class tourist destination.”⁵⁹

Media portrayal: HKSAR city status and pro-development politics

Having examined most Hong Kong newspapers (both in Chinese and English) that appeared between October 1998 (when rumors started to spread that Disney might build a new park in Asia) and November 1999 (when the joint-venture contract was signed by the government and Disney), I can attest that a majority of Hong Kong popular newspapers and TV channels⁶⁰ expressed approval of the HKSAR government-Disney joint-venture HKDL project, although these media simultaneously voiced reservations. Because the deal evolved largely in secrecy, most related media discussions lacked comprehensiveness and substance. The major reason for the media’s explicit approval of the HKDL project hinged on the media’s general support for urban development, especially after the Asian financial crisis in 1997; in their view, HKDL would bring Hong Kong people not only income, through park operations, but also fame, which in turn would bring Hong Kong society greater foreign investment and greater economic returns. In what follows, I discuss how news reports highlighted competition between Hong Kong and other Chinese cities, especially Shanghai, and how these media reports echoed the HKSAR government’s pair of discourses, the competition-development discourse and the disappearing-world-city discourse. I will show, as well, that the media reports couch the world-city utopia only in economic terms, without

considering the reinforcing effect that the HKSAR government-Disney alliance would have on local non-transparent and non-democratic governance.

The HKDL project became a prominent topic in Hong Kong news reports after October 1998, a year before the official announcement of the project. As soon as there emerged the rumor that a Disneyland park might be built in Asia and that Disney was considering Hong Kong for the role of host, news reports highlighted competition between Hong Kong and other cities. In mid-October 1998, *Tin Tin Daily*, *Ta Kung Pao*, *Wen Wei Po*, *Sing Tao Daily*, *The Standard*, and *Ming Pao Daily News* reported that a Disneyland park would be built in Mainland China, possibly in Hong Kong or Zhuhai.⁶¹ In reporting the news, the press highlighted the keen competition that Hong Kong was facing for the opportunity to host the park: Zhuhai officials actively held talks with Disney officials in Los Angeles about the theme-park plan,⁶² but the HKSAR government declined to comment and local politicians clamored over the government's lethargic attitude. A few months later, after news had spread that Zhuhai had withdrawn its bid, the press reported that Shanghai was in fact Hong Kong's major rival. In early March 1999, Hong Kong people were reading almost daily news reports about a Hong Kong-Shanghai rivalry over the right to host Disneyland park; moreover, these reports were appearing in the newspapers' main section. For example, all major newspapers including *Apple Daily*, *Ming Pao Daily News*, the finance-oriented *Economic Times*, and the pro-Beijing publication *Ta Kung Pao* reported on 6 March 1999 that, according to Shanghai Mayor Xu Guangdi, Shanghai and Disney had signed a letter of intent to conduct a feasibility study.⁶³ After his remarks, major features reported that Mr. Xu had openly noted Shanghai's comparative advantages over Hong Kong; that HKSAR Economic Services Secretary Stephen Ip had sent an affirmative reply

to the media regarding Hong Kong's advantages in hosting Disneyland⁶⁴; that, according to financial analysts and column writers, Hong Kong and Shanghai had various advantages over one another in hosting a Disney park⁶⁵; and that each city could have a Disney park.⁶⁶

Competition among cities or countries is prominent in the Disneyland history, and Disney has expertly pit potential locations against each other to attain better deals and to escape from certain government regulations. Orlando finally won the right to host the Disney Kingdom over thirteen other venues in the eastern United States in the 1960s; while Disney originally identified 1,200 possible sites for the establishment of Euro Disneyland, and France, Spain, Portugal, Germany, Italy, and Great Britain were all competitors. France's Paris competed severely with Spain's Barcelona. Spain's minister of tourism and transport once expressed personal determination to host Disneyland, "We want to obtain Disneyland at any price!"⁶⁷ Finally, Disney opted for Paris. The Orlando case shows that cities compete with one another within a country, and the France-Spain contest illustrates competition between countries. Unlike Orlando and France, however, Hong Kong competed with both other countries and domestic cities; that is, with *foreign* Asian cities such as Singapore, Taipei, and Bangkok, and with *domestic* cities in the Mainland such as Hengqin Island in Zhuhai, Guilin, Shanghai, and Guangzhou.⁶⁸ Describing the resulting bidding as "tussle," "war," and "rivalry,"⁶⁹ press outlets such as *The HK Economic Times*, *The Hong Kong Standard*, and *Ming Pao Daily News* successively analyzed the competitive advantages that Hong Kong possessed over other cities, especially the Chinese ones, in hosting the Disney park.⁷⁰ The emphasis on competition between Hong Kong and other cities produced a fear among Hong Kong people that many neighboring cities such as Singapore or

Shanghai would soon surpass Hong Kong. In evaluating Asian cities' own advantages with regard to hosting a Disney theme park, local press highlighted the assertion that, in 1999, Singapore had replaced Hong Kong by receiving the highest score of the annual *Index of Economic Freedom* published by the Heritage Foundation,⁷¹ and the Chairman of the Bank of East Asia David Li Kwok Po said that Shanghai would bypass Hong Kong in the future.⁷²

These reports and analyses heightened Hong Kong people's fear that their home, Hong Kong, was plunging into decline:

Shanghai and Hong Kong compete to build Disneyland, and the competition reminds Hong Kong people again that this Mainland industrial and commercial mega-city is a more threatening competitor than Singapore ... if Hong Kong is complacent and does not seek to make progress, it will be surpassed by Shanghai sooner or later.... Mainland achieved success in finance reform and Shanghai can be the international finance center. Once China opens its currency, transnational companies will certainly be attracted to move headquarters to Shanghai, and such acts will strengthen Shanghai and weaken Hong Kong, and therefore Hong Kong must prepare...⁷³

The competition between Hong Kong and other cities concerns not only the issues of Disneyland but also the city's status as an international finance center, an international tourism destination, and a shopping and horse-racing paradise. On this topic, one columnist wrote:

Recently, Hong Kong people felt the clutch of fear in viewing competition around us: Singapore competes with us for the securities market, Shenzhen for consumer market, Shanghai for Disneyland, Macau for horse-racing, etc. The world seems to be increasingly constricted, and people increasingly not upholding justice.⁷⁴

By constantly emphasizing the severe regional and international competition that Hong Kong was facing, these reports and analyses in the news media tended to

support the secret HKSAR government-Disney deal, which promised to extract Hong Kong from the economic doldrums that followed the Asian financial crisis. News-media argued that the park would be good for Hong Kong tourism development, for Hong Kong's retail industry, and for Hong Kong's employment situation.⁷⁵ Few local news-media outlets except *Hong Kong Economic Times*⁷⁶ questioned the alleged economic revitalization that Disneyland would bring to the Hong Kong economy. Although the press voiced reservations about the project's cost-and-returns,⁷⁷ about the secrecy of the deal,⁷⁸ and about the ecological damage to Lantau Island,⁷⁹ among other topics,⁸⁰ these reservations were of secondary importance in comparison to HKDL, which so many people and institutions positioned as a project that could resurrect Hong Kong's long-lost "cosmopolitan" status (i.e. "East-meets-West" was the clichéd phrase). The day after the official announcement of the HKSAR government-Disney deal on the HKDL project, *Apple Daily* devoted four full pages—entitled "Millennium Dream Comes True"—to cover stories that declared the paper's full support of the project⁸¹; *Ming Pao Daily News* welcomed the deal because HKDL could reinforce the image of Hong Kong as an international tourist center and thus could stimulate other industries⁸²; pro-Mainland and pro-HKSAR government press such as *Wen Wei Po* repeated Mike Rowse's views: many people thought that Hong Kong was disappearing from the international scene, but the HKDL project announced to the world that Hong Kong was on its way to being one of the most important cities in the world.⁸³ Other reports affirmed that HKDL could boost Hong Kong's international image, attract foreign investment, raise Hong Kong's service quality, develop Hong Kong as an important tourist site in Asia, and change Hong Kong's future development trajectory.⁸⁴

Local news reports and comments tended to create a prevailing narrative according to which Hong Kong needed to accept pro-development and pro-business politics to reverse its ailing economy and to overcome regional competition. The existence of this prevailing narrative does not lead me to conclude that news actors colluded with government officials; rather, as Fred Chiu argues in his re-narrativization of the Hong Kong “Handover” issue, Hong Kong media failed to document complicated issues and succeeded in representing them in a binary form.⁸⁵ Chiu argues that, regarding the Handover, media neglected the many different groups and local social-movement agents and concentrated on only two groups, the official representatives of Britain and the PRC for their oppositional stance. Because of the binary nature of the media reports, the alternative voices of dissenters were lost in the framework of “prosperity” and “stability.” This simplistic coverage extended to and affected the Handover itself.

In the same way, Hong Kong’s news media has used binary logic to narrativize problems that Hong Kong society has faced since both the Handover and the Asian financial crisis; consequently, the news media’s reports and comments on the HKDL project reflected chiefly the government’s competition-development discourse and the government’s disappearing-world-city discourse. The binary nature of these two discourses (that under severe city-city competition in a world economy, only pro-development politics could transform Hong Kong from a “disappearing” city into a world city) creates a simple framework in which media can easily analyze the HKDL issue. Underneath the pro-growth rhetoric, both the government and local press suggested that there is only one world system: competing cities in a global economy⁸⁶; there is also only one criterion by which we can evaluate cities—economic power. Alliances between cities that are competing

against one another have only one purpose: to overcome even greater competition from another city or from another alliance of cities; hence, the extended metropolitan region of the Pearl River Delta comprising Hong Kong, Macau, and Zhuhai counters another of the Mainland's extended metropolitan regions, the Yangtze River Delta of Shanghai, southern Jiangsu Province, and northern Zhejiang Province. By successfully connecting with powerful transnational corporations such as Disney, Hong Kong could clear its international image from shrouds of gloom, could better compete against other cities, and could attract more foreign investment.⁸⁷

“Chinese or not Chinese, that is the question”: HKSAR tourism policy

A significant cultural issue for the newly established HKSAR government after the Handover was the Hong Kong people's unwillingness to identify as Chinese and their preference for an identity based on *Heung Gong Yan* (Hong Kong people). A 1997 survey conducted by the University of Hong Kong found that almost 60% of the respondents considered themselves Hongkongese and only 38% Chinese, and this ethnic identification did not change in 1999.⁸⁸ Decolonization and re-nationalization become one of the major tasks of the HKSAR government after the Handover. Re-nationalization has been difficult to accomplish because the HKSAR government, on the one hand, would like to promote the idea of nation and to integrate the Hong Kong people into the wider populations of Mainland Chinese, and because, on the other hand, the HKSAR government must not harm Hong Kong's international status.⁸⁹ This tension of re-nationalization manifests itself in the government's oscillation between nationalist integration and globalist economic networking—an oscillation that has resulted in the emergence of a cosmopolitan

business-oriented nationalism. Crystallizing this trend is the government's civic-education advertising campaign that began in 2004 and whose principal slogan is, "The heart is tied to the home country; ambition looks out on the world."⁹⁰

Parallel to this oscillation between nationalist integration and globalized economic networking is the HKSAR government's tourism policy. In tourism, the "identity" of the host society depends on the presence and the gaze of the tourists. Scholarship on the formation of self and identity generally often posits that the affirmation of the self depends on the gaze of the Other. Giddens, for example, argues that the self is conditioned through its ongoing interactions with others; identity is what the self conceives of itself. For the specific conditions of tourism, Lanfant argues that host societies often "construct an imaginary place for an Other, and an image of self which seduces both self and Other."⁹¹ Accordingly, Edward Bruner coins the term "touristic borderzone"⁹² to describe an actual place where tourists and local performers meet and where the two perform their parts. The formation of identity in these accounts is not as autonomous as we imagine; however, this does not mean that only exogenous force contributes to the re/formulation of local identity and the presentation of self. In tourism, the host society always experiences the process of constructing its own image, and it is the host society that decides its own image, and by communicating with tourists, the host society guarantees the circulation of that image.⁹³

Pang and Sum⁹⁴ argue respectively that the ambiguous HKSAR "East-meets-West" tourism policy circulates two contrasting tourist discourses for two types of tourists. For Western tourists, there is a discourse that stages an exotic Oriental past and religious activities; for Chinese tourists, there is a discourse that represents contemporary Hong Kong life as a vast array of transnational consumer

products epitomizing modern, capitalist, and Western ways of life. Both discourses ignore colonial history and colonial culture, and both induce visitors to feel safe as they consume their imaginary Other. Pang further argues that although they seem to differ from each other, the two discourses emphasize simply fantasy—not heterogeneity, which is Hong Kong’s reality.⁹⁵

Contributing to these two tourism discourses is the Hong Kong Tourism Board, a government body whose job is “to market and promote Hong Kong as a destination worldwide.” Part of the board’s promotion efforts is the Discover Hong Kong website. The “Heritage” section of this website contains multiple references to Hong Kong’s colonial past, chiefly in connection with monuments’ architectural styles. For example, the building that houses the Legislative Council chambers suggests both the influence that Western colonialism has had on Hong Kong and the autonomy of Hong Kong’s government. Of course, this two-fold suggestion is implicit. The website stresses, quite explicitly, the building’s “neo-classical style.” Other descriptions include the “bandaged” brickwork of the Western market, “Baroque-Rococo look” of Helena May, the “Greek revival style” of the Former Central Magistracy. As du Cros⁹⁶ argues, although the Hong Kong Tourism Board’s tourism-marketing strategy introduces colonial and Western heritage assets, it does not deal with these heritage assets’ role in colonial history. For example, The Peak was an example of racial prejudice up until the Second World War, because it was a European enclave where Chinese were forbidden to build. However, little of this history is noted in Hong Kong Tourism Board brochures.

In promoting cultural tourism, the Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa in 1998 declared, “We need also to look at ways of better presenting to the world our distinctive heritage.”⁹⁷ However, the Tourism Board’s Discover Hong Kong website

either presents the old colonial buildings in reference merely to their architectural style or it characterizes long-standing Chinese customs such as *feng shui*, *tai chi*, and *kung fu* as Hong Kong's traditions.⁹⁸ As Chan, Ip, and Leung argue,

The so-called “unique flavor” of Hong Kong is simply understood as “East-meets-West culture,” a very broad term that is never clearly defined in terms of its essential socio-political content.... To explain how these two forms of culture might have met would involve a deeper understanding of colonial history. But this historical “meeting” would never be articulated in the form of the “cultural tourism” that the government intended to develop.⁹⁹

Chinese tourists' spending has been the biggest contributor to total tourist spending in Hong Kong since 1997.¹⁰⁰ Hong Kong is exotic and extraordinary to Mainlander Chinese because it was, until recently, an essentially Chinese population under British colonial rule. Now that Hong Kong has divorced itself from this colonial rule, Hong Kong must—in order to maintain its distinctiveness, its exoticism and extraordinariness—devise another powerful symbol to create an unusual, attractive touring experience. In this context, I would suggest that HKDL has become a good replacement for the colonial narrative insofar as HKDL, as a timeless and placeless spectacle, enables the HKSAR government to re-narrativize Hong Kong's “East-meets-West” clichés without damaging the government's re-nationalization project. As a tourist product, HKDL, by replacing the colonial landscape and by conjuring up images of a glittering consumerist dreamscape, suppresses the legacy of late-colonial democratization and reformulates the image of Hong Kong as a business-oriented cosmopolitan world city. The consumerist cosmopolitan world-city image is also offered as a self image for Hong Kong people. HKDL solidifies Hong Kong's reputation as a “shopping paradise” for tourists, and the narrative once again positions Hong Kong people as both enterprising and consumerist individuals

who are outwardly looking and upwardly aspiring: that is to say, as perfect apolitical cosmopolitan subjects.¹⁰¹ Consumption-based “ways of life” seemingly become the only right that Hong Kong people demand. The “West,” as represented by Disney in Hong Kong, entails no democracy—no one-head-one-vote election—but, rather, non-threatening popular-cultural industries that allow and encourage government’s fast-track planning-and-development practices.

HKDL boosts more than local economic development; it boosts the government’s political legitimacy, as well. The HKSAR government assumed office on 1 July 1997 and had been functioning for only two years when the HKDL negotiations got underway. In the immediate aftermath of colonialism, many post-colonial populations greet their new governments with enthusiasm. In contrast to this trend, the Hong Kong people registered a lukewarm response to the HKSAR government and even questioned and challenged the government because of its undemocratic election procedure. Public support for the new regime initially showed signs of promise but gradually dropped from July 1997 to January 1999.¹⁰² The Disneyland project did, in fact, raise the Hong Kong people’s confidence in their government. Research shows that the HKSAR government’s successful efforts to host Disneyland in Hong Kong increased the government’s popularity among the Hong Kong people: a survey conducted by Hong Kong Policy Research Institute Ltd. found that 37% of 967 respondents had more confidence in the HKSAR government after the success of the Disneyland deal in 1999 than they had had before the deal.¹⁰³

The strengthening effects that HKDL has had on the HKSAR government are evident internationally, as well as locally. On 23 November 1999, the HKSAR government launched the tourism-promotion event “Millennium Hong Kong—The

Dragon's Spirit" at the Customs House in Sydney.¹⁰⁴ At the event, Anson Chan, the ex-Chief Secretary, said that the HKDL project demonstrated the determined leadership role that the HKSAR government had played in directing Hong Kong's recovery from the Asian financial crisis. The government aimed to turn Hong Kong away from its over-reliance on property and develop a more knowledge-based society through the establishment of HKDL. Through implementing the HKDL project, then, the HKSAR government strengthens its political legitimacy inwardly and outwardly.

Conclusion

In analyzing the HKSAR government's tourism policy, Pang argues that Hong Kong is sold as "the city of sight"¹⁰⁵ offering surface and spectacle "at the expense of any historical relevance,"¹⁰⁶ whereas Sum describes Hong Kong as "a site of play"¹⁰⁷ for selling "simulacrum-East and colonial-West identity"¹⁰⁸ during the colonial period and then simulacrum-Eastern heritage and customs to the Westerners and *simulacrum*-Western ways of consumption to the Mainlanders after the Handover. These two writers emphasize that the commodity on sale in Hong Kong is a fantasy instead of a reality.

Instead of conceiving of the simulacrum as depthless, cultureless, and homogeneous as Baudrillard¹⁰⁹ and Jameson¹¹⁰ do, I would like to employ Gilles Deleuze's account of simulacrum to highlight differences among simulacra—differences that stem from different processes of production and "conditions of their reproduction."¹¹¹ In his reading of the theory of Platonic Ideas and the distinctions between copies and simulacra, Deleuze argues that the Platonic view defined copies as "well-grounded claimants" (p. 47) possessing the internal essence of the

foundation, a resemblance to the Idea, and that this resemblance “must not be understood as an external correspondence” (p. 48). The Platonic explanation of the simulacrum, however, is as a “groundless claim,” that is, one having a resemblance to the original but with the greatest degree of discernible difference from it (p. 48). Although a simulacrum is still recognizable as a derivation from a model, it is not actually a “degraded copy” or a poor copy of the original because, unlike the copy, the simulacrum possesses inner dynamics different from those of the original. Deleuze then uses the example of human beings in Christian theology to elaborate his argument: “God made man in His own image and to resemble Him, but through sin, man has lost the resemblance while retaining the image. Having lost a moral existence in order to enter into an aesthetic one, we have become simulacra” (p. 48).

According to Deleuze, by inquiring into the direction of the simulacrum, Plato discovers that “the simulacrum is not a false copy, but that it calls into question the very notions of the copy ... and of the model” (p. 47). Meaghan Morris further argues that, in this account, simulacra “throw into question the validity of the model/copy distinction—and thus the theory of Ideas.”¹¹² It is because simulacra are copies that “have successfully broken out of the copy mold”¹¹³ by changing their own nature and by consequently becoming originals:

... the multiplied, stylized images take on a life of their own. The thrust of the process is not to become an equivalent of the “model” but to turn against it and its world in order to open a new space for the simulacrum’s own mad proliferation. The simulacrum affirms its own difference. It is not an implosion, but a differentiation; it is an index not of absolute proximity, but of galactic distances.¹¹⁴

Hence, as Deleuze argues, the simulacrum contains subversive power, “a positive power which negates *both original and copy, both model and reproduction.*”¹¹⁵

Massumi also suggests that the danger of a simulacrum lies in its “masked difference”; instead of in its “manifest resemblance,” because the external resemblance is only an illusion that masks the simulacrum’s own life force. A simulacrum is not empty in its cultural meaning but a product of a particular context; the way to evaluate the simulacrum should focus on differences instead of sameness.¹¹⁶

Disneylands, in that sense, though often characterized as timeless and placeless, are simulacra produced in a particular time-space, which has its own social significance. John Findlay argues that the first Disneyland’s success as a cultural landscape in Anaheim is attributable to the Disneyland’s celebration of southern California: that is, to the Disneyland’s role as a vehicle in which visitors could escape from the surrounding and confusing metropolitan area.¹¹⁷ In Orlando, Tokyo, Paris, and Hong Kong, each area’s Disneyland discarded this original meaning (the escape from American urban life) because of the different *cultural processes of production*. Hong Kong owns the fifth “original” Disneyland park, which is neither the antithesis of the congested dirty urban landscape of Los Angeles in the 1950s nor the remake of the American consumption system to be found in Tokyo,¹¹⁸ but rather the deployment of both a “superficial” consumerist popular culture and the “Disney” brand of “world-city” imagination.

To conclude this chapter, I would like to review its chief points. Under the globalized economy, state power is far from diminishing. In the case of HKDL, the HKSAR government made use of the global brand Disney (in the form of the HKSAR-Disney joint-venture HKDL project) to realize four objectives. First, through the establishment of the HKDL project, the government successfully established its own legitimacy. Second, the HKSAR government used HKDL’s

Western identity to rewrite the “East-meets-West” mythology and distinguish Hong Kong from other Chinese cities on the basis not of political aspirations but of cultural, cosmopolitan, and consumption-based ways of life. This redefinition of Hong Kong identity does not challenge either Beijing authorities or its own undemocratic rule. Third, the HKSAR government used HKDL and its related tourism policy to reformulate the city’s utopian future as a business-oriented prosperous world city. Fourth, HKDL encourages Hong Kong people to aspire to be cosmopolitan entrepreneurs and consumerists who neither sacrifice their nationalist sentiments nor demand democratization.

The disappearing-world-city discourse and the competition-development discourse regulate the public’s “frame of reference” in three ways. First, the two discourses encourage Hong Kong people, collectively and as a city, to seek economic power in a global-local framework. Second, the two discourses together see the extent of a city’s relative economic power as the most important criterion for evaluating a city’s worth. Third, the two discourses articulate Hong Kong people’s desires for both economic rebound and cultural distinctions. According to several public opinion polls, Hong Kong people fervently embraced the project, suggesting that the HKSAR government has, at least to some extent, successfully reconstituted its subjects’ frame of reference regarding local and global issues and has, with equal success, channeled potentially democratizing energies into the an apolitical cosmopolitan subjectivity. In the following chapter, I will identify and examine the particular dreams that Disney brought to Hong Kong people in relation to their fears and desires, personally and nationally.

NOTES

¹ For example, The Walt Disney Company retained 100% management control of Disneyland Resort Paris. Andrew Lainsbury, *Once Upon an American Dream: The Story of Euro Disneyland* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2000), p. 30.

² One of the famous discrimination cases concerning Disneyland was filed by a male couple in Magic Kingdom in 1980. They went to the center of the dance floor and the security asked them to find female partners. Exler, one of the plaintiffs of the suit, asked why, and an officer replied that it was Disneyland policy. Finally two officers marched Exler off the floor because the guard said that “This is a family park. There’s no room for alternative lifestyles. Two men can’t dance together, that’s our policy,” and another officer added, “We make our own rules. This is a private park.” The two men filed suit. Disneyland countered that its long-standing policy called for ejection of “individuals or groups who may by their actions, dress or attitudes interfere with or jeopardize the enjoyment Disneyland gives to others.” The Superior Court judge ruled that the guards’ actions were allowable and reasonable to protect the interests of other patrons. Within days, the two men appealed the decision because the judge “made a ruling based on his own belief that Disneyland did not have to go by the law.” In 1984, they were in court. Since Disneyland was considered a clean, wholesome, family-type attraction, the same-sex rule still held against individuals. See David Koenig, *Mouse Tales: A Behind-the-Ears Look at Disneyland* (Irvine: Bonaventure Press, 1994), pp. 209-11.

³ For example, to allay fears that Disneyland’s fireworks might be banned under future legislation, a Legislative Council brief recommended that the government would extend to the theme park special consideration for future changes in environmental legislation. The Executive Council approved the recommendation. See Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Economic Services (HKSAR government), Background Brief on Hong Kong Disneyland, LC Paper No. CB(1)117/03-04, <http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/es/papers/es1103cb1-117-e.pdf> (accessed 22 October 2003).

⁴ Andrew Lainsbury, *Once Upon an American Dream: The Story of Euro Disneyland* (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2000), p. 33; Tourism Commission and Economic Services Bureau (HKSAR Government), “Hong Kong Disneyland: Briefing Paper,” <http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr99-00/english/hc/papers/brief.pdf> (accessed 6 December 2006), pp. 2-3.

⁵ Stacy Warren, “Cultural Contestation at Disneyland Paris,” in *Leisure/Tourism Geographies: Practices and Geographical Knowledge*, edited by Crouch (London and NY: Routledge, 1999), p. 110.

⁶ Andrew Lainsbury, *Once Upon an American Dream: The Story of Euro Disneyland* (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2000), pp. 34-8.

⁷ Lainsbury, *Once Upon an American Dream*, p. 43, quoting Turner and Bumbel, “Major Attraction: As Euro Disney Braces for Its Grand Opening, the French Go Goofy,” *Wall Street Journal*, 10 April 1992, sec. A, p. 1.

⁸ “土地平整迪士尼僅佔小半 官方否認條款不平等,” 4 November 1999, *Tin Tin Daily News*, A11.

⁹ 葉蔭聰 and 施鵬翔, eds., *迪士尼不是樂園* (香港: 進一步多媒體有限公司, 1999): “但願迪士尼帶來雙贏,” 3 November 1999, *Sing Pao*, A04, Chinese news, editorial; “分析員: 港府風險大收益低,” 3 November 1999, *Ming Pao Daily News*, A02; “專家指政府投資大風險增 三年止蝕賺錢要等,” 3 November 1999, *Tin Tin Daily News*, A12.

¹⁰ “Chasing the Disney Dream,” 6 March 1999, *Hong Kong Standard*, I01; 黃偉豪 “千萬別重蹈新機場覆轍,” 4 November 1999, *Ming Pao Daily News*, C07.

¹¹ “建迪士尼主題公園有違環保,” 4 November 1999, *Hong Kong Daily News*, A07.

¹² Different surveys show that a majority of Hong Kong people supported the establishment of HKDL. These surveys are discussed in the next chapter.

¹³ Joseph Chan Man, “Economizing Culture: The Discourse on HK Disneyland,” a seminar held at Y7544, City University of Hong Kong on 29 March 2004. Reviewing opinion columns, editorials, and letter sections of several newspapers (*Ming Pao Daily News*, *Economic Daily*, *South China Morning Post*, *Apple Daily*, and *Oriental Daily*) and magazines (*Next Magazine* and *East Weekly*) during 1-30 November 1999, Chan argues that there is an absence of concern over cultural imperialism and resistance. The next chapter will further discuss this subject in connection with respondents’ different responses toward the HKDL project.

¹⁴ Doreen Massey, *Space, Place and Gender* (Cambridge: Polity, 1994), p. 5.

¹⁵ “The World of Disney Expands,” 18 October 1998, *Hong Kong Standard*, A04, Main Section.

¹⁶ Secretary for Economic Services Stephen Ip described the negotiation as a “boy chases girl” relationship and refused to disclose any details of the project, including the future location; Donald Tsang (the former Financial Secretary) addressed the topic in his budget speech in March 1999 and he identified Penny’s Bay as a potential site for HKDL.

¹⁷ “Legislators threaten to scupper Disney,” 23 June 1999, *Hong Kong Standard*, A02.

¹⁸ “自由黨不關心迪士尼?” 4 November 1999, *Ming Pao Daily News*, A13.

¹⁹ Government Information Centre (HKSAR Government), “Commissioner for Tourism Explains Disney Theme Park Project,” press release on 2 November 1999, <http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/199911/02/1102218.htm> (accessed 1 June 1 2005).

²⁰ Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Economic Services, “Hong Kong Disneyland Comparison between Hong Kong and Paris,” paper presented by the HKSAR administration on 11 November 1999, <http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr99-00/english/panels/es/papers/a342e01.pdf> (accessed 7 November 2006).

²¹ Tourism Commission and Economic Services Bureau (HKSAR government), Panel on Economic Services: Minutes of Special Meeting on 15 November 1999.

LC Paper No. CB(1)595/99-00, <http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr99-00/english/panels/es/minutes/es151199.pdf>, (accessed 31 July 2006).

²² The Democratic Party was founded in 1994. According to the party's official website, the party's conviction is to spread "democracy, liberty and justice" throughout society. In 1993, because Chris Patten had reinterpreted "functional constituency" so that the changed meaning allowed almost every adult worker to vote in the last Legislative Council election before the Handover (1995), two groups, namely the political party United Democrats of Hong Kong and the pressure group Meeting Point, merged to form the Democratic Party in October 1994 for the 1995 election. Because the Democratic Party placed a high priority on Hong Kong's democracy development and because the 1995 election was a direct election, the party became the biggest party inside the Legislative Council from 1995 to 1997. After Handover, the Beijing authorities reverted to the meaning of "functional constituency." Consequently, in the 1998 election, the party gained 43% of votes from direct election but received only thirteen seats, meaning 22% of the total seats inside the Legislative Council. For the conviction of the party, see the Democratic Party's website: http://www.dphk.org/e_site/index_e.htm (accessed 5 January 2007).

²³ "九成市民贊成建迪士尼 多屬意選址啓德 北大嶼山僅次選," 1 March 1999, *Apple Daily*, A04; "首選地點舊啓德 建迪士尼九成被訪者贊成," 1 March 1999, *Ming Pao Daily News*, A14; "建迪士尼樂園 民意 90%支持 選址舊機場最理想 吐露港最不受歡迎," 1 March 1999, *Hong Kong Economic Times*, A19; John Ap, "Hong Kong Disneyland—Community Reactions and Its Implications on Tourism in the Pearl River Delta Region," paper read at Leisure and Entertainment Asia Conference 2000 (Hong Kong SAR, 2000); John Ap, "Residents' Opinions of Hong Kong Disneyland," (HK, press embargo: 2002) 20 December 2002. I will further discuss the opinion poll in chapter Four.

²⁴ Jacques Lacan, "The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience," in *The Blackwell Reader in Contemporary Social Theory*, edited by Elliott (Malden, Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 61-6.

²⁵ The misrecognition of a fragmented self as a whole self provokes anxiety.

²⁶ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983), p. 15.

²⁷ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 16.

²⁸ Charles Taylor, "Modern Social Imaginaries," *Public Culture* 14, issue 1 (2002), p. 106.

²⁹ Taylor, "Modern Social Imaginaries," p. 106.

³⁰ Claudia Strauss, "The Imaginary," *Anthropological Theory* 6, issue 3 (2006), p. 323, 329.

³¹ Saskia Sassen, *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 4; Peter J. Taylor and others, "A New Mapping of the World for the New Millennium," *The Geographical Journal* 167,

issue 3 (2001), pp. 213, 216-7; Doreen Massey, "Cities in the World," in *City Worlds*, edited by Massey, Allen, and Pile (London, New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 117. There are diverse understandings of the term "world city." If we equate "world city" with "global city," Saskia Sassen defines the concept of the global city in relation to a city's power to affect both international economic activity and the urban social and economic order: "Cities concentrate control over vast resources, while finance and specialized service industries have restructured the urban social and economic order." For Sassen, New York, London, and Tokyo are leading examples of global cities. Another attempt to define "world city" was made by the Globalization and World Cities (GaWC) Study Group and Network in 1999. The group ranked cities into three levels: Alpha world cities, beta world cities, and gamma world cities on the basis of each city's ability to be "global service centers" in setting up "service connections between cities." In 2001, the group identified ten alpha world cities, five of which were identified as leading world cities: London, New York, Paris, Tokyo, and Hong Kong; ten beta world cities such as Sydney, Madrid, Zurich, and Brussels, and thirty-five gamma world cities such as Amsterdam, Melbourne, Jakarta, and Taipei. Doreen Massey, however, argues that these classification systems ignore other forms of power around the globe and that the systems are hierarchical.

³² Leo F. Goodstadt, *Uneasy Partners: The Conflict between Public Interest and Private Profit in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), p. 128; Hilary du Cros, "Postcolonial Conflict Inherent in the Involvement of Cultural Tourism in Creating New National Myths in Hong Kong," in *Tourism and Postcolonialism: Contested Discourses, Identities, and Representations*, edited by Hall and Tucker (London, NY: Routledge, 2004), p. 155.

³³ Hong Kong maintained a positive annual GDP growth rate from 1962 to 2000, except in 1968 owing to the 1967 riots, in the 1974-5 period owing to the oil crisis, in 1985 owing to political upheaval, and in 1998 owing to the 1997 Asian financial crisis.

³⁴ Ackbar Abbas, *Hong Kong: Culture and The Politics of Disappearance* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1997). The association between "disappearance" and Hong Kong culture was first examined by Ackbar Abbas. Linking up colonialism and globalism, Ackbar Abbas terms Hong Kong culture "a space of disappearance" (p. 1). First, Hong Kong has often been viewed as a "cultural desert" and Abbas describes this kind of *misrecognition* as a "reverse hallucination," of "*not* seeing what *is* there" (p. 6, his emphasis). Second, the floating identity emphasized by the establishment of airport with travelers was replaced by a search for a more definite identity after the Sino-British Joint Agreement in 1984 and Tiananmen Massacre in 1989. However, the search, the profound concern, and the explosion of many representations such as the frequent use of binaries like East-West "differences" make Hong Kong culture and images disappear in clichés. This paradox of explosion and the culture of disappearance were furthered by Hong Kong's situation: a colonized but also globalized state, a state with subordinate political power but not a subaltern state in terms of education, technology, and access to international networks.

³⁵ “From adversity to opportunity” is a tagline from the TV advertisement for the 1998 policy address. The whole script emphasizes that Hong Kong people need to learn new technology, create new industry, and strengthen the financial sector.

In these unsettling times, we face continuous challenges. To meet these challenges, we must chart a new course for the future. We must be versatile and creative, use technology to broaden our economic base. Develop electronic commerce and create new industries. We must strengthen our position as the leading financial center. And we vitalize our industries. Together, we will achieve new height for Hong Kong. From adversity to opportunity.

Government Information Centre (HKSAR Government), “From Adversity to Opportunity,” <http://www.info.gov.hk/isd/tvapi/pa98e/index.htm> (accessed 4 August 2003).

³⁶ Claudia Strauss, “The Imaginary,” *Anthropological Theory* 6, issue 3 (2006), p. 339.

³⁷ Ku and Pun, “Introduction: Remaking Citizenship in Hong Kong,” in *Remaking Citizenship in Hong Kong: Community, Nation, and the Global City*, edited by Ku and Pun (London, New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), p. 7; Ip Iam Chong, “Welfare Good or Colonial Citizenship? A Case Study of Early Resettlement Housing,” in *Remaking Citizenship in Hong Kong: Community, Nation, and the Global City*, edited by Ku and Pun (London, New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), pp. 37-53; Denny Ho Kwok Leung, “Citizenship as a Form of Governance: A Historical Overview,” in *Remaking Citizenship in Hong Kong: Community, Nation and the Global City*, edited by Ku and Pun (London, New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), pp. 19-36. Except in the late colonial times, colonial governance prioritized economic development and introduced limited political reforms and offered limited rights. Its provision of welfare was a way to gain legitimacy and to quell social upheaval after the 1967 riots. Ip Iam Chong argues that the provision of public housing stems not from the idea of social citizenship but from the idea of public health. As argued by Ku and Pun, “If European societies have experienced a shift from the welfare state to neo-liberalism, the development in Hong Kong has shown a great deal of continuity between the civic, urban, economic, and self-reliant subject under colonial citizenship and the enterprising individual under the recent ideology of neo-liberalism” (p. 7).

³⁸ Anita Chan Kit Wa, “The Making of the “Ideal Citizen” in Schooling Processes: Gender, Differences, and Inequalities,” in *Remaking Citizenship in Hong Kong: Community, Nation, and the Global City*, edited by Ku and Pun (London, New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), pp. 74-94.

³⁹ Pun Ngai and Wu Ka Ming, “Lived Citizenship and Lower-class Chinese Migrant Women,” in *Remaking Citizenship in Hong Kong: Community, Nation, and the Global City*, edited by Ku and Pun (London, New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), pp. 139-54.

⁴⁰ 吳俊雄, “尋找香港本土意識,” in *閱讀香港普及文化 1970-2000*, edited by 吳俊雄 and 張志偉 (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press (China), 2001), p. 93.

⁴¹ Gordon Mathews, *Global Culture/Individual Identity: Searching for Home in the Cultural Supermarket* (London, NY: Routledge, 2000), p. 128.

⁴² Alvin So, "Hong Kong's Problematic Democratic Transition: Power Dependency or Business Hegemony?" *The Journal of Asian Studies* 59, issue 2 (May 2000), pp. 359-81.

⁴³ Despite public dissatisfaction, Tung was re-elected for a second term in 2002 because he alone received 713 signatures of support in the 800-member Electoral Committee responsible for electing the Chief Executive, and no other candidate received more than 100 signatures for nomination purposes.

⁴⁴ Fred Chiu, "Combating the Double Processes of Decolonisation/Recolonisation in Hong Kong, or 'Postcoloniality' as a Double-Pronged Politics," in *Cultural Studies Review* 8, issue 2 (2002), p. 50.

⁴⁵ Starting in 2002, the HKSAR government tried to enact anti-subversion laws concerning criminal acts against the state (acts such as treason, sedition, subversion, and secession) in accordance with Hong Kong Basic Law Article 23. The act prompted half a million people to take to the streets in the largest peaceful mass demonstration aimed at the government in 2003. The authorities feared that accelerated democratization would threaten both the undemocratic regime of the HKSAR government and Beijing's one-party government; therefore, the Beijing authority intervened by slowing down the pace of Hong Kong democratization. Although Basic Law's Article 45 stipulated that Hong Kong should have universal suffrage as the eventual goal, the Beijing Authorities postponed the dates of universal suffrage. On 6 April 2004, the National People's Congress Standing Committee stated that, under Basic Law, amendments affecting the electoral system needed the support of the National People's Congress. On 26 April 2004, the National People's Congress Standing Committee ruled out the possibility of universal suffrage in 2007 for the chief executive and in 2008 for the Legislature Council. As noted by Leo Goodstadt, "Beijing was defining the limits of autonomy and leaving little room for informal devolution in political affairs." See Leo F. Goodstadt, *Uneasy Partners: The Conflict between Public Interest and Private Profit in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), p. 94.

⁴⁶ Lau Siu Kai and Kuan Hsin Chi, "Partial Democratization, 'Foundation Moment', and Political Parties in Hong Kong," in *Hong Kong Government and Politics*, edited by Sing Ming (HK: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 254.

⁴⁷ Government Information Centre (HKSAR government), *1999 Policy Address*, <http://www.policyaddress.gov.hk/pa99/english/part3.htm> (accessed 6 January 2007), clauses 50 and 51.

⁴⁸ Government Information Centre (HKSAR government), *1997 Policy Address*, <http://www.policyaddress.gov.hk/pa97/english/patext.htm>, (accessed 6 January 2007) clause 6. Further references are in parentheses in the text.

⁴⁹ Government Information Centre (HKSAR government), *1998 Policy Address*, <http://www.policyaddress.gov.hk/pa98/english/intro.htm> (accessed 14 May 2005), clauses 12-15.

⁵⁰ Government Information Centre (HKSAR government), *1998 Policy Address*, clause 17.

⁵¹ Government Information Centre (HKSAR government), *1999 Policy Address*, HKSARG, <http://www.policyaddress.gov.hk/pa99/english/part1.htm> (accessed 6 January 2007), clause 1. Chee Hwa Tung presented the 1999 policy address to the Legislative Council on 6 October 1999 in the Legislative Council Chamber.

⁵² Government Information Centre (HKSAR government), *1999 Policy Address*, HKSARG, <http://www.policyaddress.gov.hk/pa99/english/part3.htm> (accessed 6 January 2007), clause 40.

⁵³ In *1997 Policy Address*, Tung states that “Hong Kong is indeed fortunate.... Our future economy will also be strongly supported by the rapid development in China.” See Tung, “1997 Policy Address,” clause 5.

⁵⁴ Government Information Centre (HKSAR government), “Commissioner for Tourism Explains Disney Theme Park Project HKSARG,” press release on 2 November 1999, <http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/199911/02/1102218.htm> (accessed 6 January 2007).

⁵⁵ Government Information Centre (HKSAR government), “Speech by Commissioner for Tourism: The Economic Values of Heritage Tourism in Hong Kong Today,” press release on 15 December 1999, <http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/199912/15/1215203.htm> (accessed 6 January 2007).

⁵⁶ Government Information Centre (HKSAR government), “Commissioner for Tourism Explains Disney Theme Park Project HKSARG.”

⁵⁷ Alexander J. Reichl, *Reconstructing Times Square: Politics and Culture in Urban Development* (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 1997).

⁵⁸ Mitsuhiro Yoshimoto, “Images of Empire: Tokyo Disneyland and Japanese Cultural Imperialism,” in *Disney Discourse: Producing the Magic Kingdom*, edited by Smoodin (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 181-203.

⁵⁹ Government Information Centre (HKSAR government), “Hong Kong Disneyland Final Agreement Signed,” press release on 10 December 1999, <http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/199912/10/1210286.htm> (accessed 5 August 2006).

⁶⁰ These newspapers include *Ming Pao Daily News*, *Apple Daily*, *Oriental Daily*, *Sun Daily*, *Tin Tin Daily*, *HK Economic Times*, *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, *Sing Tao Daily*, *HK Commercial Daily*, *Ta Kung Pao*, and *Wen Wei Po* (in Chinese) and *South China Morning Post* and *Hong Kong Standard* (in English). I examined TV news programs on major TV channels, such as TVB Jade, ATV, RTHK (in Cantonese), and TVB Pearl, ATV World, and RTHK (in English). The above-mentioned newspapers fall into one of four categories: (1) Mass-circulation tabloids such as *Oriental Daily*, *Apple Daily*, and *Sun Daily*, of which these three newspapers comprise 70% of readership in total; (2) hard-news publications such as *Ming Pao Daily News*, *Hong Kong Standard*, and *South China Morning Post*; (3) economic and financial newspapers such as *HK Economic Times* and *Hong Kong Economic Journal*; and (4) newspapers financed by the Communist Party of the

Peoples Republic of China such as *Ta Kung Pao*, *Wen Wei Po*, *Hong Kong Commercial Daily*, and *Tin Tin Daily*, whose news is always in line with the official discourse.

⁶¹ “迪士尼或來港安家,” 12 October 1998, *Ta Kung Pao*, A01; “迪士尼：香港珠海選其一,” 12 October 1998, *Wen Wei Po*; “將在大嶼山或珠海開設 亞洲第二個迪士尼公園,” 12 October 1998, *Tin Tin Daily News*, A06; “香港珠海二擇其一 迪士尼建亞洲第二公園,” 13 October 1998, *Ming Pao Daily News*, A04; “葉澍堃聲言爭取建樂園 開設旅遊專員旨在制定政策,” 14 October 1998, *Sing Tao Daily*, A13; “港府已與迪士尼接觸,” 15 October 1998, *Ming Pao Daily News*, A12.

⁶² “比港早提建迪士尼樂園 珠海環境有利已佔先機,” 15 October 1998, *Hong Kong Commercial Daily*, B01; “珠海派員赴美力爭 允迪士尼免費供地,” 17 October 1998, *Sing Pao*, A13, local news; “迪士尼 無意在日以外建園 欲令亞洲談判城市著急” 23 October 1998, *Ming Pao Daily News*, A07, local news; “Zhuhai Brushes off Disney Dampener,” 24 October 1998, *Hong Kong Standard*, A05, Main Section.

⁶³ “港建迪士尼 上海插一腳 上海市長透露或簽意向書,” 6 March 1999, *Apple Daily*, A11, local news; “Shanghai Challenges Hong Kong for Disney,” 6 March 1999, *Hong Kong Standard*, A01, Main Section; “腳踏兩船問津上海 徐匡迪接迪士尼總裁查詢,” 6 March 1999, *Hong Kong Daily News*, A12, important news; “議論迪士尼 曾蔭權喊停 表示談論太多將會影響政府談判籌碼,” 6 March 1999, *Ta Kung Pao*, A11, local news; “半路殺出個程咬金 上海與港爭建迪士尼,” 6 March 1999, *Sing Tao Daily*, A14, local news; “上海迪士尼朱鎔基十年夢想,” 7 March 1999, *Ming Pao Daily News*, A03; “Shanghai Challenges Hong Kong for Disney,” 6 March 1999, *Hong Kong Standard*, A01, Main Section.

⁶⁴ “上海高調爭建迪士尼 市長指香港地小山多交通不便,” 9 March 1999, *Hong Kong Daily News*, A03, 港聞; “擁一億人口土地資源豐富 徐匡迪：滬較港具優勢,” 9 March 1999, *Ming Pao Daily News*, A04, local news; “葉澍堃：基建環境佔先; 徐匡迪：人多地大 港滬數優勢爭建迪士尼,” 9 March 1999, *Tin Tin Daily News*, A11, local news; “建迪士尼鬧四胞 曾考慮選址桂林 葉澍堃：港具優勢不怕爭,” 9 March 1999, *Apple Daily*, A13, 本港新聞; “香港建園非不惜代價 葉澍堃相信條件勝上海珠海,” 9 March 1999, *Hong Kong Daily News*, A03, 港聞; “Battle for Disney a ‘Team Game’,” 9 March 1999, *Hong Kong Standard*, A01.

⁶⁵ “迪士尼選址上海佔優勢,” 10 March 1999, *Sing Tao Daily*, A22, property; “香港建迪士尼機會較大,” 10 March 1999, *Hong Kong Economic Times*, B03, investment; “搶貴貨,” 10 March 1999, *Hong Kong Economic Times*, C10; “港滬競爭,” 11 March 1999, *Hong Kong Economic Times*, C11.

⁶⁶ “迪士尼建兩樂園 上海大香港小?” 9 March 1999, *Hong Kong Economic Times*, A26; “浦東撥地投資十億美元 估計造價較香港便宜 徐匡迪：中國可容兩個迪士尼,” 11 March 1999, *Hong Kong Commercial Daily*, B01; “徐匡迪：上海造價低 10 多億美元就夠 浦東千頃地 備建迪士尼,” 11 March 1999, *Hong Kong Economic Times*, A12; “Shanghai Ups Ante in Disney Bid,” 11 March 1999, *Hong Kong Standard*, A02.

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- ⁶⁷ Andrew Lainsbury, *Once Upon an American Dream: The Story of Euro Disneyland* (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2000), p. 20.
- ⁶⁸ “香港建迪士尼樂園的優勢,” 7 March 1999, *Ming Pao Daily News*, A02; “徐匡迪: 三年追上香港 上海備十億美元建迪士尼,” 11 March 1999, *Hong Kong Daily News*, A04.
- ⁶⁹ Michael Wong, “Theme Park Rivals ‘Need Real-world Sense,’” 14 March 1999, *Hong Kong Standard*, A04.
- ⁷⁰ “Shanghai Challenges Hong Kong for Disney,” 6 March 1999, *Hong Kong Standard*, A01; “Chasing the Disney Dream,” 6 March 1999, *Hong Kong Standard*, I01; “香港建迪士尼樂園的優勢,” 7 March 1999, *Ming Pao Daily News*, A02, editorial; “香港建迪士尼機會較大,” 10 March 1999, *Hong Kong Economic Times*, B03.
- ⁷¹ “香港可重奪自由經濟冠軍,” 30 March 1999, *Hong Kong Economic Times*, A25.
- ⁷² “上海終有一天超越香港,” 22 March 1999, *Ming Pao Daily News*, B02.
- ⁷³ “港滬互爭長短既競爭亦合作,” 7 March 1999, *Sing Tao Daily*, A02, editorial.
- ⁷⁴ 李漸, “超乎競爭之上,” 11 March 1999, *Ta Kung Pao*, A09.
- ⁷⁵ “歡迎迪士尼樂園來安家,” 13 October 1998, *Ta Kung Pao*, A07; 朱幼麟, “香港需要主題公園,” 27 October 1998, *Hong Kong Commercial Daily*, B04; “迪士尼是賺錢樂園?,” 29 October 1998, *Hong Kong Economic Times*, C11; “建主題公園刺激港經濟,” 9 November 1998, *Hong Kong Commercial Daily*, A01; “迪士尼興建可振興旅業 為港提供十萬就業機會,” 4 March 1999, *Ta Kung Pao*, A01; “建迪士尼 年招遊客 500 萬 擴建海洋公園 旅業可增收 11 億,” 4 March 1999, *Hong Kong Economic Times*, A14, local news; “締造九萬五職位 建築期經濟年增長貢獻 0.3%,” 4 March 1999, *Hong Kong Commercial Daily*, A03.
- ⁷⁶ After the deal’s official announcement, *Hong Kong Economic Times* was one of the few newspapers to disapprove of the deal. It held a critical and pessimistic view of the project because of the unequal deal. It highlighted the fact that the Walt Disney Company’s earnings, based on royalties and management fees, were greater than Hong Kong society’s earnings and the fact that the government could earn profits only after 13 years. The Asian edition of *Time International* also criticized Hong Kong’s projected returns on the HKDL project. See Nisid Hajari, “Disney Save Us!” *Time International* (Asia ed.), 15 March 1999, vol. 153, no. 10, p. 38-39.
- ⁷⁷ “建迪士尼園利大於弊,” 3 November 1999, *Ming Pao Daily News*, A02, editorial; “但願迪士尼帶來雙贏,” 3 November 1999, *Sing Pao*, A04, Chinese news, editorial; “分析員: 港府風險大收益低,” 3 November 1999, *Ming Pao Daily News*, A02; “專家指政府投資大風險增 三年止蝕賺錢要等,” 3 November 1999, *Tin Tin Daily News*, A12.
- ⁷⁸ Neither public announcements nor public consultation characterized the HKDL deal. Christine Loh was an early critic of the government’s non-transparency in this regard. She asked the government to spell out long- and short-term possible costs and benefits of building the Disney park and to identify alternative investments that

might yield for Hong Kong even greater benefits, yet she received little media exposure. See “Chasing the Disney Dream,” 6 March 1999, *Hong Kong Standard*, I01; 黃偉豪 “千萬別重蹈新機場覆轍,” 4 November 1999, *Ming Pao Daily News*, C07.

⁷⁹ ATV World’s *Inside Story* (News and Public Affairs Production, HK: ATV World, 5 April 1999) spent the whole program, 22 minutes, criticizing the negative ecological effect that Disneyland would have on Hong Kong society. In its first section, *Inside Story* reported legislators’ reservations about HKDL’s economic benefits for Hong Kong and ended with reporter Chris Dobson standing at a construction site with sand and mud and lorries, saying “With the government and Disney locked in secret negotiation, the only certainty is Penny’s Bay will be filled in [with mud and sand].... But questions remain about the impact that the theme park will have on Lantau’s fragile and diminishing environment.” The second section began by juxtaposing the quiet greenery of Penny’s Bay with the song-and-dance pep of Disney park visuals. It then interviewed different environmentalist spokespersons, including Mei Ng (member of Friends of the Earth), Lindsay Porter (Dolphin Research Group), and Alan Abrahams (Green Lantau Association), criticizing how HKDL and reclamation affected coastal line and damaged natural habitat. Friends of Earth also wrote criticisms in the press, such as “建迪士尼主題公園有違環保,” 4 November 1999, *Hong Kong Daily News*, A07.

⁸⁰ The press raised concerns that the deal did not guarantee for Hong Kong an exclusive right to host Disneyland. See “迪士尼：不排除內地另建樂園,” 3 November 1999, *Ming Pao Daily News*, A02. NGOs criticized the government for its decision to spend money not on unemployment subsidies but on the Disneyland project. Friends of the Earth and the Coalition against Unemployment and Poverty spoke in a live-TV public forum, Radio Television Hong Kong, *City Forum* (Hong Kong: RTHK, 1999) 7 November, 1999. After the official announcement of the HKDL project, Friends of the Earth started the internet sign-up protest against Disneyland investments for they not only damaged the environment but also killed off more than 1,000 social services. These NGOs also wrote newspaper pieces, such as “建迪士尼主題公園有違環保,” 4 November 1999, *Hong Kong Daily News*, A07, forum.

⁸¹ “世紀夢成真迪士尼藍圖初展 神奇王國 (Magic Kingdom) 初步構思,” 3 November 1999, *Apple Daily*, Disney feature, main news; “迪士尼樂園是物有所值的,” 3 November 1999, *Apple Daily*, A06, important news 2, editorial.

⁸² “建迪士尼園利大於弊,” 3 November 1999, *Ming Pao Daily News*, A02, editorial; Allen Perki, “迪士尼可望帶來乘數效應,” 6 November 1999, *Ming Pao Daily News*, B05.

⁸³ “香港國際形象將更佳,” 3 November 1999, *Wen Wei Po*, important news.

⁸⁴ “提升香港形象 注入發展動力,” 3 November 1999, *Wen Wei Po*, editorial; “帶動管理文化 改善國際形象,” 4 November 1999, *Hong Kong Economic Times*, A28. In addition to editorials, many news pieces praised HKDL. Press emphasized that HKDL must achieve definite success because HKDL must not follow the failure of Disneyland Paris (“迪士尼拒出錢港府不讓步,” 3 November 1999, *Ming Pao*

Daily News, A02; “香港迪士尼——重新溝通歐美世界,” 3 November 1999, *Tin Tin Daily News*, A11, editorial). Culturally, *Apple Daily* opposed using “Americanization” to criticize the setup of HKDL (“米老鼠可栽培孫悟空,” *Apple Daily*, 4 November 1999, F01, forum) and reported Stephen Ip’s argument that the effect of watching *Snow White* was far better than watching *Young and Dangerous*, a series of Hong Kong movies (“葉澍堃反駁美式文化入侵 「寧要白雪公主 不要蠱惑仔」,” 6 November 1999, *Apple Daily*, A18). Various press pieces stated that Disney University would improve the standards of Hong Kong services (“迪士尼好客文化 激勵港服務業 建「大學」培訓人員 米奇可由港人扮演,” 3 November 1999, *Hong Kong Economic Times*, A04; “培訓員工待客 視工作為享受 港迪士尼大學設樂園內,” 3 November 1999, *Apple Daily*, A23, Disney feature; “修讀米奇老鼠碩士學位 理大生：迪大課程生活化,” 4 November 1999, *Sing Tao Daily*, A06). The Walt Disney Company involved itself in many social services (“注重服務關懷社會 迪士尼精神植根香港,” 3 November 1999, *Sing Tao Daily*, A10). Ecologically, fireworks and laser performances in HKDL would be under noise-pollution controls (“煙花不影響航機升降 噪音不超越環保標準,” 4 November 1999, *Sing Pao*, A12). In all, the press praised the Disney Company.

⁸⁵ Fred Chiu, “Combating the Double Processes of Decolonisation/Recolonisation in Hong Kong, or ‘Postcoloniality’ as a Double-Pronged Politics,” in *Cultural Studies Review* 8, issue 2 (2002), pp. 33-61.

⁸⁶ Here, I borrow Doreen Massey’s idea from “Cities in the World,” in Doreen Massey, John Allen, and Steve Pile (eds.) *City Worlds* (London: Routledge in association with the Open University, 1999), pp. 122-3.

⁸⁷ “競爭力猶在,” 10 March 1999, *Tin Tin Daily News*, C06; “Chasing the Disney dream,” 6 March 1999, *Hong Kong Standard*, I01, Life Section; “香港迪士尼之夢 振興經濟的 得樂園 還是 失樂園?” 17 December 1998, *Apple Daily*, A22.

⁸⁸ The survey was conducted by the Public Opinion Programme (POP), University of Hong Kong. POP has collected public opinion on ethnic identity since 1997. The 1997 survey indicated that 35.9% of HK residents considered themselves Hongkongese, 23.6% Hongkongese in China, 19.9 percent Chinese in Hong Kong, and 18% Chinese. In other words, almost 60% of respondents considered themselves as Hongkongese, whereas only 38% as Chinese. By 2000, fewer Hong Kong people considered themselves Hongkongese (more than 50%) and more considered themselves Chinese (around 40 to 50 per cent). See the comparative chart done by POP in the section “People’s Ethnic Identity” under POP Polls, <http://hkupop.hku.hk/> (accessed 7 August 2006). The percentage details of the 1997 survey are from newspaper reportage: “逾半被訪者自認香港人 67% 反台獨 有信心統一,” 8 January 2003, *Apple Daily*, A06.

⁸⁹ Thomas Tse Kwan Choi, “Civic Education and the Making of Deformed Citizenry: From British Colony to Chinese SAR,” in *Remaking Citizenship in Hong Kong: Community, Nation, and the Global City*, edited by Ku and Pun (London, New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), pp. 64-5.

⁹⁰ The quote is a literal translation from Chinese, “心繫家國, 志在四方.”

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- ⁹¹ Marie-Françoise Lanfant, "International Tourism, Internationalization and the Challenge to Identity," in *International Tourism: Identity and Change*, edited by Lanfant, Allcock and Bruner (London: Sage, 1995), p. 35.
- ⁹² Edward M. Bruner, *Culture on Tour: Ethnographies of Travel* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2005), p. 17.
- ⁹³ Picard's research on Bali cultural tourism shows that although cultural tourism was not so much an initiative but a response to a *fait accompli*, the Balinese devised the sort of tourism they thought they could live with and could hope to turn to their advantage. It is the end product of skillful negotiations and adaptations among different actors. See Michel Picard, *Bali: Cultural Tourism and Touristic Culture* (Singapore: Archipelago, 1996), Michel Picard, "Cultural Heritage and Tourist Capital: Cultural Tourism in Bali," in *International Tourism: Identity and Change*, edited by Lanfant, Allcock and Bruner (London: Sage, 1995), pp. 44-66.
- ⁹⁴ Sum Ngai Ling, "Paradox of a Tourist Centre: Hong Kong as a Site of Play and a Place of Fear," paper read at 5th Annual Meeting of the Hong Kong Sociological Association (Lingnan University, 2003); Pang Lai Kwan, "Sightseeing an (Inter)National City: Hong Kong's Tourism and the Society of Spectacle," http://www.isop.ucla.edu/cira/pang_paper.htm (accessed 12 August 2006).
- ⁹⁵ Pang, "Sightseeing an (Inter)National City," p. 12.
- ⁹⁶ Hilary du Cros, "Postcolonial Conflict Inherent in the Involvement of Cultural Tourism in Creating New National Myths in Hong Kong," in *Tourism and Postcolonialism: Contested Discourses, Identities and Representations*, edited by Hall and Tucker (London, NY: Routledge, 2004), p. 162.
- ⁹⁷ Government Information Centre (HKSAR government), *1998 Policy Address*, <http://www.policyaddress.gov.hk/pa98/english/econ2.htm> (accessed 6 January 2007), clause 47.
- ⁹⁸ Tourism Board holds different interest classes on subjects such as *feng shui*, *tai chi*, *kung fu*, Chinese medicine, Chinese antique, Chinese tea, Chinese cake, and traditional art forms. "Discover Hong Kong," <http://www.discoverhongkong.com/eng/heritage/ck/index.jhtml> (accessed 4 February 2007).
- ⁹⁹ Chan Shun Hing, Ip Yam Chong, and Lisa Leung, "Negotiating Culture, Economics and Community Politics," *Cultural Studies Review* 12, issue 2 (2006), p. 112.
- ¹⁰⁰ Zhang Qiu Hanqin, Carson L. Jenkins, and Qu Hailin, "Mainland Chinese Outbound Travel to Hong Kong and Its Implications," in *Tourism in China*, edited by Lew and others (NY, London, Oxford: Haworth Hospitality Press, 2003), pp. 282-3.
- ¹⁰¹ Alvin Y. So, "One Country, Three Systems? State, Nation, and Civil Society in the Making of Citizenship in the Chinese Triangle of Mainland—Taiwan—Hong Kong," in *Remaking Citizenship in Hong Kong: Community, Nation and the Global City*, edited by Ku and Pun (London, New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), pp. 241-2. So argues that the HKSAR government has used a "global" vision to formulate

Hong Kong into a high-tech and informational global city whose citizens are more enterprising and thus more competitive.

¹⁰² Lau Siu Kai, "The Rise and Decline of Political Support for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government," in *Hong Kong Government and Politics*, edited by Sing Ming (HK: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 401-2. In a poll commissioned by the *Apple Daily* and undertaken by the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Tung Chee Hwa received a performance score of 63.7 in July 1997 and it climbed to 68 in September 1997, but Tung then received a lower score around 56.5 to 63.3 during January 1998 and January 1999: 59.1 in January 1998, 63.3 in February 1998, 60.1 in April 1998, 60.9 in June 1998, 56.5 in July 1998, 55.1 in September 1998, 60.6 in November 1998, and 58.6 in January 1999.

¹⁰³ "建迪士尼可改善失業 近六成市民信心增強," 5 November 1999, *Hong Kong Commercial Daily*, A12.

¹⁰⁴ Government Information Centre (HKSAR Government), "CS [Chief Secretary] Shows Sydney the Dragon's Spirit," press release on 23 November 1999, <http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/199911/21/1121166.htm> (accessed 18 May 2003).

¹⁰⁵ Pang Lai Kwan, "Sightseeing an (Inter)National City: Hong Kong's Tourism and the Society of Spectacle," http://www.isop.ucla.edu/cira/pang_paper.htm (accessed 12 August 2006), p. 14.

¹⁰⁶ Pang, "Sightseeing an (Inter)National City," p. 18.

¹⁰⁷ Sum Ngai Ling, "Paradox of a Tourist Centre: Hong Kong as a Site of Play and a Place of Fear," paper read at 5th Annual Meeting of the Hong Kong Sociological Association (Lingnan University, 2003), p. 2.

¹⁰⁸ Sum, "Paradox of a Tourist Centre," p. 5.

¹⁰⁹ Jean Baudrillard, "Simulacra and Simulations," in *Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings*, edited by Poster (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981), pp. 166-84.

¹¹⁰ Fredric Jameson, *Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991); Fredric Jameson, "Future City," *New Left Review* May-June (2003), p. 71.

¹¹¹ Gilles Deleuze, "Plato and the Simulacrum," *October* winter (1983), p. 52. Further references are in parentheses in the text.

¹¹² Meaghan Morris, *Too Soon Too Late* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), p. 149.

¹¹³ Brian Massumi, "Realer than Real: The Simulacrum According to Deleuze and Guattari," from the website of Australian National University, http://www.anu.edu.au/HRC/first_and_last/works/realer.htm (accessed 6 February 2007).

¹¹⁴ Brian Massumi, "Realer than Real: The Simulacrum According to Deleuze and Guattari."

¹¹⁵ Gilles Deleuze, "Plato and the Simulacrum," *October* winter (1983), p. 53.

¹¹⁶ Appadurai provides us another vivid example of the different cultural processes of the simulacrum. He realized that Filipinos could sing American songs more perfectly than the Americans, but “the rest of their lives is not in complete synchrony with the referential world that first gave birth to these songs.” See Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), p. 29.

¹¹⁷ John M. Findlay, *Magic Lands: Western Cityscapes and American Culture after 1940* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p. 54.

¹¹⁸ Mary Yoko Brannen, “‘Bwana Mickey’: Constructing Cultural Consumption at Tokyo Disneyland,” in *Re-made in Japan*, edited by Tobin (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 216-34; Mitsuhiro Yoshimoto, “Images of Empire: Tokyo Disneyland and Japanese Cultural Imperialism,” in *Disney Discourse: Producing the Magic Kingdom*, edited by Smoodin (London: Routledge, 1994). Brannen argues that Tokyo Disneyland Resort (TDR) has more commercial space for shopping. Yoshimoto also argues that TDR can be interpreted as a signifier of the subaltern mentality of the Japanese consumer, who could consume some and not all of “America.”

Chapter Four

Do Dreams Come True?

In the last chapter, I argued that Hong Kong's city-state power is far from diminishing in the globalization process. Facing Hong Kong's change of sovereignty and the rise of Chinese cities, the HKSAR government established connections with the Walt Disney Company and imported the seemingly "contextless" and entertainment-based Disneyland into Hong Kong. The HKSAR government has used this import to paint Hong Kong's postcolonial landscape—that is, to renew Hong Kong's image as a world city of Asia whose status is based not on democratization but on economic prowess. To win public approval of the government-Disney joint venture, the HKSAR government mobilized two discourses—the competition-development discourse and the disappearing-world-city discourse—to highlight the assertion that HKDL would transform Hong Kong into a twenty-first-century world city.

The previous chapter identifies three institutional sources of power: HKSAR government officials, the tourism board, and media. I have discussed how the HKSAR government appropriated three powerful aspects of Hong Kong culture: Chineseness plus elements, fear of disappearance, and pursuit of a world-city imaginary. We have also seen how the government narrowly defined globalization as world economy and measured a city's worth on the basis merely of economic terms. Under the globalized economy, Hong Kong is developing its symbolic economy: a consumerist landscape that attracts tourists. And in this process, powerful cultural forces encourage Hong Kong people to become competitive,

enterprising cosmopolitans and, thereby, to successfully face mutating global and regional forces.

Through affect¹ and knowledge, the government governs us. Power, however, circulates around us in everyday life. In this chapter, I want to explore the various and selective ways in which Hong Kong people use their culture either to defend existing lifestyles or to create new lifestyles. Following Massey, I argue that the contested “identity” of a place cannot be a single and stable source for individuals’ personal and cultural identities. I explore this topic by examining, in particular, the relationship between individual Hong Kong people’s interpretations of the HKDL project and these people’s sense of self, their sense of place, and their sense of social processes (namely, globalization and the changing Hong Kong-China dynamics). I argue that despite the strong rhetoric according to which the Hong Kong people are chiefly economic animals, my research on people’s HKDL-related views reveals that respondents welcomed the HKDL project for cultural reasons—whether as a source of cultural distinction from Mainlanders or as a way to experience foreign culture. Certainly, some respondents’ cosmopolitan aspirations may be shaped by real or imaginary institutional and economic forces or by attendant changes, but it does not follow that their cosmopolitan aspirations should be viewed as in themselves necessarily *instrumental* for capital accumulation. Further, the intersection between instrumentalist intention for economic advancement and everyday cultural interaction may encourage people to reflect on their common-sense economic being. The effects that this reflection has on cultural politics may be unexpected.

This chapter is divided into three parts. In the first section, I argue that several opinion polls about the HKDL project suggest that Hong Kong people’s

support of the project was *not* simply based on projected economic benefits. In the next two sections, I use this study's interviews and ethnography to identify both my respondents' interpretations of the HKDL project and the project's effect on my respondents' sense of self.

Embracing HKDL: the economic irrationality of Hong Kong people

Numerous studies show that tourism development is not always a result of financial cost-and-benefit calculations but sometimes a product of a complex web of economic, political, and cultural factors.² Let's review the economic side of the HKDL project: the HKSAR government presented the HKDL project as an economic project that would diversify and revive the Hong Kong economy; media presented the project as a solution to Hong Kong's unemployment problem, to Hong Kong's allegedly fading sign value, and to difficult-to-attract foreign investment. Various opinion polls, however, reveal that Hong Kong people did not conceive of the HKDL project in narrow economic terms.

In February 1999, nine months before the official announcement of the deal, the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB) conducted a telephone survey³ of 878 residents and found that respondents at that time did not quite believe that HKDL could strengthen the Hong Kong economy; indeed, they worried that the establishment of HKDL would lead to the importation of Mainland workers and would, thus, worsen Hong Kong's unemployment situation. Despite their worries, only 4.3% of respondents opposed the HKDL project and 90% of respondents supported it. Another survey, this one conducted by the Liberal Party⁴ in July 1999, also indicated the public's inconsistent attitudes toward the deal. Of one thousand Hong Kong respondents, 40% disagreed with the government's

financial concession to the Disney company and about 55% criticized the HKDL deal's lack of transparency, but over 80% of respondents supported the HKDL project.

John Ap's important surveys show us similar seemingly irrational attitudes attributable to the Hong Kong public. Ap persistently conducted surveys monitoring Hong Kong residents' attitudes to the establishment of HKDL. In 2000, Ap conducted two surveys in March and April respectively.⁵ The survey in March was a non-random survey of 250 residents from Lantau and Peng Chau Islands, and the survey in April was a random telephone survey of 582 residents. The surveys demonstrated that respondents were not optimistic about the under-construction HKDL's ability to create future benefits: 38-39% of respondents commented that the deal was unfair (p. 6), just over a third commented that it was acceptable (p. 5), 24% could not decide whether HKDL benefits would outweigh HKDL costs (p. 5), and more than 50% of respondents stated that they "somewhat dislike" or "dislike" the project's ecological effect on Lantau Island (p. 6). However, three quarters (76%) of them supported the development of HKDL and only 8% opposed the deal (p. 5). Another one of Ap's surveys, which took place between 27 and 29 November and 2 and 4 December 2002, showed similar dissonant results: 43% of respondents thought that it was not fair for the government to provide the land formation and infrastructure works to Disney but 85% supported the deal and only 8% opposed the deal.⁶ Although more and more people found the HKSAR government-Disney deal unfair (from 39% in March and April 2000 to 43% in December 2002), more and more people supported the deal (from 76% in 2000 to 85% in 2002). There was a 4 to 5% increase of respondents criticizing the deal as unfair, but there was also a 9% increase in people's support of the deal!

Respondents' support of the HKDL project shows that Hong Kong people are not simply economic animals whose behavior and judgments are purely economy-oriented. They supported the project even though they had reservations regarding HKDL's possible negative economic effects on Hong Kong: the Hong Kong people were sure neither about whether the park's returns could outweigh its costs nor about whether the park could strengthen the Hong Kong economy; they also realized that HKDL would have harmful environmental effects on Hong Kong's natural landscape. I will argue that some respondents in my study used the HKDL project to distinguish Hong Kong from other cities, especially Chinese ones. Hong Kong's historical specificity—its colonial governance, its protracted separation from China, its assumed superiority over Mainlanders, and its absorption of Western capitalism and of Western modernity—made the entry of HKDL into Hong Kong a cultural event, as well as an economic one.⁷

Cultural distinctions and cities in counter-position

According to the various surveys that I discussed in the first section of this chapter, Hong Kong people embraced the HKDL project but did not clearly understand the characteristics that made the HKDL project so attractive. But one thing is more certain, the above surveys show that Hong Kong people's support of the project was not merely economic. I conducted interviews⁸ with people who were both from different walks of life and connected to Disney in various domains: the respondents included a news producer, Disney-product merchandisers and distributors, a public-relations officer, a kindergarten headmaster, a film distributor, parents as consumers, and Disney staff members. According to my interviews, most of the respondents supported the project but had different degrees of enthusiasm, expectation, and

worry regarding HKDL, then under construction. Moreover, the expectations and the worries always corresponded to identity issues. Although almost all respondents stated that “economic revitalization” was the chief reason for their support of the HKDL project, I suspect that the respondents’ prioritization of this reason was a reflexive response to media’s agenda-setting emphasis on the project’s possible revitalization of the economy. Media helps shape the parameters of our experiences but also clashes with our experiences.⁹ Although most respondents answered my question “Why do you support the HKDL project?” by initially identifying an “economic” reason, the respondents would immediately qualify their previous statement by declaring, for instance, “I don’t know,” “maybe,” or “Actually, I know little about the economy.” Then, the respondents would identify various reasons. More important, many respondents often made vivid facial expressions while offering responses, some about Hong Kong and some more personal. It is my contention that the word ‘Disney’ strikes many respondents in various ways and that emotion, in addition to economic rationality, drives them to support the project.¹⁰

In this section, I first discuss how my respondents’ support of HKDL related to their previous experiences of Disney theme parks.¹¹ In general, when my respondents recounted their Disney park experiences, they always smiled and told me about their happy memories of a park.¹² Surprisingly, there is no necessary connection between respondents’ excitement and their support of the HKDL project. Many respondents in my study supported the HKDL project but were not excited about it; instead, their support of the park rested on an unsteady foundation of worries and reservations.

Among my respondents, Cathy,¹³ an experienced administrator for film companies and film organizations, and Betty,¹⁴ a high school teacher, had greatly enjoyed their Disneyland trips. Cathy had visited Anaheim Disneyland and Disneyland Paris; Betty had visited Disneyland Paris and Tokyo Disneyland. Every time I asked them to recount their Disneyland trips, they could not help showing their big and cheerful smile. When I asked her what she thought about Disneyland, Cathy replied:

Disneyland is superb! I like the parades, I like the buildings, and I like the place. It's full of color! The first time I visited Anaheim Disneyland was in 1991, and this was the first time I had a long trip in America. You know, the second day after I arrived in L.A., I immediately visited Disneyland. People just smiled there! And you just forget all your business when you are inside the park. I visited Disneyland and then Universal Studio the next day. I was so happy because it was my first time going to two theme parks on two successive days.

Cathy and her husband and son, Fred and Adrian, visited Disneyland Paris twice in 2001 and 2006. In Cathy's 2001 visit, although she found the park, especially the attraction Peter Pan's Flight and the Sleeping Beauty castle, to be a bit worn out, she enjoyed the atmosphere inside the park and she visited the park again in 2006. As for Betty, she had visited Disneyland Paris in 1998 with her friends. This was her first visit to Europe; although she did not base her decision to visit Paris on Disneyland Paris, Betty said that, during the entire trip to Disneyland, she had worn the biggest smile:

The experience of spending a day, playing and laughing crazily [in Disneyland Paris] like kids is unforgettable. I remember queuing up for hours for the rides.... I like the Small World a lot, for the lovely displays and decorations; squeezing in for a place to view the parades was absolutely amazing. I wonder why we could stand the heat and the noise for that long

on such a hot afternoon. The most exciting part was staying in the hotel, which was actually a lovely little Mickey Mouse house, a very well furnished and equipped one, where you can see the Disney cartoon characters everywhere and Disney Cartoons were non-stop-showing on TV too. You would never want to unwrap the little piece of soap in the shape of Mickey's head because you'd want to take it home to show your friends.... I like every place I visited in Europe, but I wore the biggest smile in every photo of me at Disneyland Paris.

With their good memories of their Disneyland trips, it is surprising that both Cathy and Betty were not excited about the HKDL project. In explaining their reservations, the two women explained that if Hong Kong had Disneyland, the meaning of 'Disneyland' would have to change from that of a faraway fantasyland to that of just another local theme park. All the efforts that, in the absence of HKDL, go into a trip to Disneyland in Europe or the United States (a good education, a good job, substantial savings, detailed planning) would, in the presence of HKDL, become easily achievable, perhaps rendering the local Disneyland experience mundane.

Different from Cathy and Betty, David,¹⁵ a TV daily-news program director, had visited Tokyo Disneyland, Anaheim Disneyland, and Orlando Disney parks in 1988, 1995, and 2005 respectively. Of all the respondents, David was the one who embraced the HKDL project whole-heartedly. Besides, he had designed a presentation of the HKDL project that had appeared on one TV station's news broadcast. On 2 November 1999, the HKSAR government officially announced the HKSAR government-Disney joint venture concerning HKDL; and for the announcement, David designed an animated trailer in which a castle symbolizing Disneyland raised from the Hong Kong map; once the castle settled, fireworks glittered over the whole of Hong Kong. He was very satisfied with his visual

representation of the deal. I asked how the idea came to him, but he immediately responded with a question of his own:

Shouldn't we celebrate after two years of dark ages? We've had no good news since the Handover. None. I notice that not all people embrace the project, but I don't quite understand why they don't support it. HKDL is the first good news we've had about Hong Kong in these two years. We finally got some good news from the government. It at least brings us hope for a brighter future. [My design shows that] fading Hong Kong can gleam again. I think the design is good and it resonates with Hong Kong people and [reflects] their happiness with the project.

To David, HKDL saved “fading Hong Kong” from the “dark ages” and offered it a “brighter future.” The “two years of dark ages” is the period between the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the November 1999 HKDL deal between the HKSAR government and Disney. After the Asian financial crisis, the HKDL project provided Hong Kong people with a dream—a dream of a “brighter future,” a dream of a city of excellence, and a dream of cultural distinctions. Even though David mentioned the economic benefits that HKDL might bring to Hong Kong, his main concern was about the sign value that Disneyland brought to Hong Kong:

Disney's choice of Hong Kong demonstrates that Hong Kong is still ahead of other Asian cities including Singapore and Shanghai; we are just behind Japan in Asia. We are good enough and professional enough to meet the Disney standard. We should be proud of ourselves.

David, as a news-program director, did not reap immediate benefits (such as more job opportunities) from the HKDL project. He was delighted about the joint-venture project because he, as a Hong Kong resident, felt proud of the city status of Hong Kong. To him, the sign value that HKDL brought to Hong Kong was not future economic benefits but cultural distinctions. That is, in cultural terms, Hong Kong

people could make use of HKDL as a cultural marker to reaffirm their own cultural validity and their own cultural distinctions. According to David, the Hong Kong people have had many strengths: an efficient administrative system, professional managerial ability, adherence to a code of conduct, bilingual and tri-dialect abilities, and knowledge of transnational idioms. These strengths, as well as others, earned Hong Kong the right to host the famous brand, Disneyland park. These strengths have stood in contrast to other big Asian and especially Chinese cities, which—from this point of view—come across as inferior to Hong Kong in these matters.

Not all Hong Kong people have been as enthusiastic and optimistic as David. When rumors spread that another Disneyland might be built in Shanghai right after the official announcement of the establishment of HKDL in 1999, Hong Kong people's sense of cultural superiority immediately diminished; the millennium dream turned into a wishful daydream. As Cathy commented:

If Hong Kong has HKDL, I beg Mr Tung (i.e., the ex-Chief Executive of the HKSAR government) not to be so generous that he'd let Shanghai have their own. It is good that Hong Kong has HKDL, but why is it also good for Shanghai to have one? Please go eat a banana! [*meaning* "Please go to hell"].... Lee Kwan Yew said that, even after 50 years, there is no difference between Hong Kong and Guangzhou. I hope not. I hope that we are, in some way, superior to the Mainlanders.

Although Cathy stated that HKDL should be good for Hong Kong's economy, she voiced concern about the park's future operations. Rather than treat the HKDL project as a dream mechanism by which Hong Kong can reassert its cultural distinctiveness and superiority, Cathy in the 2003 interview stated that the inept HKSAR government, in addition to exposing Hong Kong people to the lower cultural level of Mainlander and Macaunese visitors, would turn HKDL into

international shame. As a case in point, consider the following exchange between Cathy and me (Kim):

Cathy: I am afraid either that HKDL will be like Paris Disneyland, which has attracted unimpressive numbers of people, or that the HKSAR government can't manage it well and the park will quickly close its doors. It's shameful. A shame.... It's really shameful that HK people can't manage well.... Besides, who will come to HKDL? Most visitors would probably be from South East Asia, but they may choose to go to Tokyo Disneyland. Then people visiting HKDL would be chiefly from Macau or the Mainland, and that means the park will get run down quickly. They will make the bathrooms very dirty. This summer I went to *Changzhou*, where the first dinosaur fossils were found. We went to a dinosaur theme park there. It should be very beautiful, and the models are to scale. But once you go to bathrooms, it is just appalling. There are too many people in the Mainland, and the quality of people varies. The more people who come, the more likely it'll be that [HKDL] gets run down.

Kim: So you are not optimistic about HKDL's future?

Cathy: No, I'm not, because the quality of Mainlanders' culture is a lot lower than that of people in other countries. Who goes to the US park? Americans. Who goes to the Paris park? Europeans. You know, China, though developing rapidly, is still a developing country. In 20 years maybe, I mean, Mainlanders' cultural quality may be up to a certain standard after 20 years, but there are too many people. [It is] difficult to say.

Although David and Cathy differed from each other regarding their views on HKDL's future, their concerns over the park in relation to Hong Kong were similar. Each respondent stressed both the image of Hong Kong as a city and the superiority of Hong Kong people's culture to Mainlanders' culture. And the respondents discussed these issues in relation not to local economic development but to global city competition. The Hong Kong cultural identity that rests on cultural distinctions originated from colonial governance and, more recently, from intensifying global city competition. Competition, not interaction, is the keyword for both David and Cathy. Since they both believe in the idea of "winner-takes-all," this cultural idea affects the way they conceive neighboring cities in China as competitors of Hong

Kong in the globalized world. Not that these respondents detest Mainland China, but their concern over Hong Kong's future is greater than their concern over other Chinese cities' future, particularly under globalized city competition.

This last point merits some emphasis. Hong Kong people's depiction of Mainlanders as the Other is neither entirely denigrating nor entirely alienating; rather, Hong Kong people's views on Mainlanders and on their "Chineseness" are entwined but contradictory. David's self-identification as *Heung Gong Yan* or Chinese was shifting and situational; his job provided him an opportunity to communicate with Mainland professionals, and he enjoyed working with them. Cathy and Betty were proud to be Chinese; they fully agreed with the Handover and espoused Confucianism.¹⁶ Cathy had persuaded her son Adrian to enjoy the story of *Sun Wukong*, the Monkey King, in *Journey to the West* instead of Japanese animated cartoons because she espoused Confucianism and abhorred Japanese militarism and the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong¹⁷; she enjoyed helping Mainland tourists and speaking in *Putonghua* in daily life. However, Cathy's self-identification as Chinese did not allay her suspicion that Mainlanders' "Chineseness" remained far less modern than Hong Kong's "Chineseness plus."

If we interpret respondents' perspectives on Mainland Chinese in spatial and temporal terms, the respondents' preferred subjectivity—the modernized subject who attaches importance to hygiene, public order, professionalism, and cosmopolitanism—is not simply a product of modern city life but a technology of discipline promoted by the colonial governance¹⁸ and by Western enterprises such as McDonald's.¹⁹ Although respondents may identify as Chinese and embrace an aspect of Chinese culture, their association of development with human progress and self-discipline reflects a Eurocentric "modern" standard and becomes the chief

standard by which Hong Kong people evaluate themselves and the Other, the Mainlander, whom many Hong Kong people view as uncivilized or gauche.

The entwined but contradictory social relationships between Hong Kong people and Mainlanders affect Hong Kong people's spatial practices; in turn, these spatial practices generate new effects on social relationships. The HKSAR government and Disney projected that 33% of HKDL's visitors would be Mainlanders. In other words, the expectation has been that HKDL will become a node where the unsettling Hongkongers-Mainlanders relationship will evolve and will articulate itself. Perhaps this expectation underlay Cathy's ambivalent attitude toward the HKDL project. Some Hong Kong people are more explicit in their exclusionary attitude and practices toward Mainlanders. Lisa,²⁰ a university public relations officer who worked as a journalist in the past, characterized her own reception of the HDKL project as "passive," and she felt neither excitement nor hatred toward the HKDL project. Lisa had never visited any overseas Disneyland because, for her, visiting a theme park was a waste of time when she could stay in the host country only briefly. She said that if she would visit HKDL in the future, she would choose a weekend full of Hong Kong visitors instead of a Mainland holiday: in this way, she could escape from the flocking Mainland visitors. To visit or not to visit, and if the former, when to visit—these are emotional issues manifested as practical issues, but their latent content remains cultural. Consider Lisa's specific remarks:

When everything is settled, when everybody tries out all the rides and they are in order, and when the Mainland tourists do not flock to HKDL, we will then go. Let's say Ocean Park. We went there during a holiday that is special in Hong Kong but not even celebrated in the Mainland. It's not the Mainland's Golden Week holiday.

These exclusionary practices are common among Hong Kong visitors to HKDL, and I further discuss these practices in chapter Seven, about practices inside HKDL. From Lisa's comments, however, we can already see that spatial division results from not only institutional measures such as the regulation of immigration from the Mainland but also people's everyday spatial practices. Many Hong Kong people cross the Hong Kong-Mainland boundary everyday,²¹ and Hong Kong people have many connections with China, for some of their relatives live there, but Pun and Wang's study²² on both cross-boundary managers from Hong Kong and cross-boundary blue-collar workers from Hong Kong states that most respondents resisted integrating into Mainland city life. In my interview with Sandy,²³ a Hong Kong female boss of several Mainland factories producing Disney's plush dolls, she made statements that were consistent with Pun and Wang's study. Sandy lived in the Mainland most of the time and stayed in Hong Kong only during the Lunar New Year; she also planned to live in the Mainland after retirement. However, when I asked about her perception of her Mainland workers, she immediately threw the words out, "We Hong Kong people can never understand them." Sandy employed several Mainland-born but Hong Kong-raised employees to help her manage the huge Mainland workforce. Living in Dongguan for more than ten years, Sandy's good friends are all from Hong Kong. This example is just one of many in which spatial division results from everyday practices: rather than strive for integration, many Hong Kong people elevate themselves over the Other: the Mainlander.

The Other and the international: the cosmopolitan dream

While treating Mainlanders and China as the Other, many of my respondents voiced little concern about the American-rooted but transnational Disney company. Before 2005, when HKDL became the target of a surge of negative news reports, five of my study's thirty-nine respondents voiced displeasure with the HKDL project; and of these five, one respondent raised concerns about American cultural imperialism. It should be noted that, of the five respondents, two were from an anti-Disney group Disney Hunter,²⁴ another two were a couple,²⁵ and the remaining respondent was a journalist.²⁶ As for the thirty-four respondents who voiced no displeasure with the HKDL project, some (such as David) felt good about the project, others (such as Cathy and Betty) supported the deal but with various reservations, and, yet again, others (such as Lisa) voiced neutrality toward the project. Ap's 2002 survey²⁷ shows that 39% of respondents liked the "influence of American culture on HK society" and 40% were neutral.²⁸ Hong Kong people did not pay particular attention to Disney or to American influence because American popular culture and Japanese popular culture had been prominent since the late 1960s; today, the idea of American cultural imperialism is bizarre to many Hong Kong people. Besides, to my respondents, Disney is just one of the many cultural enterprises that market animated cartoons and merchandise. "Disney," to some, was an import, a readymade product that Hong Kong people could use to demonstrate their ability to host a branded park: "Disney" was not a threatening imperialist forcing Hong Kong to open its market. To some others, Disneyland's attraction lay in its otherness and foreignness. Many respondents who had visited a Disney park had enjoyed consuming the Disneyland fantasy. However, the fantasy extended beyond the sum of exotic Disney attractions and into the very geographical distance between the theme park and Hong Kong. Let us recall that Betty expressed no

particular enthusiasm for the HKDL project because a Disneyland trip, according to her, should be a means to consume an exotic and *foreign* fantasy; HKDL loses the allure of foreignness when the park is just next door. To live out their fantasies of foreign exoticism, some university graduates quit their jobs and worked as low-rank Disneyland cast members in Orlando, a strategy that applies pragmatic steps to the realization of the fantasy.

In late 2004, about five hundred Hong Kong people (mostly university graduates in their early- or mid-twenties) became the first group of HKDL staff members and underwent six months of on-job training in Disney parks in Orlando. The new employees' job title in Orlando was "cultural representative," and they all needed to perform front-line operations instead of managerial work. I talked to ten HKDL workers, and five of them had worked as HKDL cultural representatives in Orlando before HKDL's opening.²⁹ All five HKDL cultural representatives had felt little interest in a job at Disneyland, had found the pay disappointing,³⁰ and, for the most part, had never been Disney fans. Their reasons for working at Disney were quite similar: the global aspect of Disney. The respondents who had worked as cultural representatives in Orlando had treasured the chance to live in America for six months. While in high school, Olivia³¹ had visited Tokyo Disneyland with her family but had not found her park experiences particularly enchanting; indeed, her favorite cartoon character had long been Hello Kitty, a Japanese cartoon character created in 1974, and no Disney character. In light of these facts, I asked her why she had quit her relatively high-paying social work job to be a manual low-paid worker. She replied:

I hadn't had experiences living and working in a foreign place and that's why I took the job.... I had never been in any exchange program during my three-year university career, and thus, I found that I lacked something. I wanted to live with foreigners.... I didn't like the job description, but I treated it as an exchange program. It was only about six months.... And I had graduated from the university only two year earlier, so I was still young, so why not go for it? ... I also wanted to improve my spoken English. Mine is absolutely terrible.

For HKDL-employee respondents who had had no chance to be cultural representatives, the global brand of Disney still exhibited a high sign value.

Winnie³² was a graduate with a master's degree. She had received several job offers, including one for a research-assistant position at a university, but she had opted for Disney. Winnie was enthusiastic about neither Disney nor America but expressed interest in working for a global company:

If I were a fresh graduate, I think I would be happier. I am a grown up, and I do not have a good impression of the US, and therefore, I hesitated as to whether I should enter Disney, an American corporation. But since it is an MNC [multinational company], I took the job; and since I had studied media, Disney should be good.

Another reason for these university graduates' decision to work for Disney rested on their hope that their Disneyland work experience might give them a chance to change their career path. Some respondents, before working at the Disney company, had worked in other fields, including social work, computer sales, accounting, education, and tourism. Some respondents had many times applied for a job in the business field but had received not even an interview because of their academic background; some respondents had wanted to work for a famous marketing or advertising firm but their English-language abilities did not meet standards; some respondents stated that they felt bad about their previous job and that they wanted a

total change. Many of the respondents thought that the name recognition of “Disney” and that the American work experience significantly strengthened their curriculum vitae and significantly enhanced their cultural capital, which could facilitate their job-seeking prospects even further. Although they knew that their Disneyland job had nothing to do with managerial, marketing, or advertising work, some respondents hoped that they could get a transfer inside Disneyland if they stayed on there. These respondents’ reasons for accepting a Disneyland job can be seen as pragmatic, and the respondents’ cosmopolitan aspirations can be seen as pragmatic, too. In fact, Marx argues that cosmopolitanism is a logical move for bourgeoisie and a natural development in capitalism:

The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a *cosmopolitan* character to production and consumption in every country.³³

Aihwa Ong studied the “flexible citizenship”³⁴ of the transnational middle-class Chinese and noted that this form of citizenship has been a response to the neoliberal globalized economy. It can be seen, also, as exemplifying Marx’s argument that the cultural logics of capitalist accumulation, travel, and displacement induce subjects to respond fluidly and opportunistically to changing political-economic conditions (p. 6). To combine the study of everyday life and abstract political-economic forces together, Ong draws on Foucault’s “regime” analysis and argues two points: on the one hand, individuals and the state retool culture in conjunction with changing social and economic circumstances; on the other hand, people’s daily action is shaped by regulatory effects of cultural institutions, including family and state apparatuses, and these social conditions facilitate transnational practices. According to Ong, in critical studies of globalization, the most common conceptualization is

that they treat globalization as a totalizing abstract force that imposes itself on locals and constitutes cultural, social, and political changes. Ong problematizes this conceptualization by arguing that Chinese diasporas are the transnational agents who constitute the increased capital circulation in the globe. She refutes the now extensive literature predicating a triumphant Chinese capitalism grounded on essential cultural differences; rather, she emphasizes how global capital induces individuals to retool and reconceptualize their cultural logic to make their economic-based practices “thinkable, practicable, and desirable, which are embedded in processes of capital accumulation” (p. 5).

Ong argues that overseas-Chinese communities have retooled both Confucian ideology and Chinese culture in several ways. First, the importance of Confucian social ethics has been replaced with the family-centered notion of Confucianism (p. 115); to raise the family’s class position based on capital accumulation, individuals (especially men) should study hard and abroad, shuttle around different places to gain financial prosperity without carrying emotional ties, allegiance, identification or commitment with any nationality defined by any states. Second, Ong’s rich Chinese-American respondents participated in high Western culture to build up cultural capital that might generate economic capital and legitimize their current “elite” status inside the American business hierarchy. Third, the elite transnational Chinese make use of Confucian ethics and *guanxi* (the prioritization of networking) to extend business opportunity (p. 116). Fourth, transnational Chinese selectively engage in “self-orientalism” (p. 81) to highlight essential Chinese values such as diligence and family-oriented values to express both “Confucian cultural triumphalism” (p. 135) and the “new Asian hegemony” in contrast to the decadent West (p. 82). Fifth, Ong’s respondents strategically use

states' immigration policy to become a "nomadic subject" (p. 3) to maximize capital accumulation and to acquire citizenship. The changing family-based and economic-based instrumental Chinese culture, raised by the family regime, articulates (1) the market regime that encourages nomadic transnational practices and flexible accumulation and (2) the flexible state regime that redefines meaning of national citizenship in terms not of cultural homogeneity but of economic status to "compete more effectively in the global economy" (p. 130), all of which contribute to transnational capitalist formations.

Ong attempts to problematize the essential cultural differences between Western and Chinese culture by placing importance on individual agency and everyday life practices in the globalization process. However, Southeast Asia's changing state policies and transnational Chinese communities' changing cultural practices ("flexible citizenship") are a response to changing global capitalism. In other words, capital accumulation is still the most important goal for both individuals and states in Ong's analysis. Ong assumes either market force is irresistible,³⁵ or she essentializes culture as capital-driven. Both arguments identify capital accumulation as the primary and ultimate aim and the source of social transformations, and both run the risk of economic reductionism, of viewing cultural specificities and subjectivities as a subordinate instead of as an autonomous domain subsumed into economic circumstances, in this case, the globalized economy.

Certainly, my HKDL cultural representative respondents who yearned to go abroad are significantly different from Ong's rich Chinese diasporics. However, the participation and active involvement of both groups in Western culture seems to be based in economic practices: where Ong's respondents used Western high culture

to legitimize their privileged economic position, my respondents were attempting to develop Western cultural sensitivity to enhance their competitiveness in the job market. In my study of university graduates' decisions to work in Disney, their decisions appear to be pragmatic and for strategic ends (to change a career path or to acquire cultural capital such as cosmopolitan sensitivity and English proficiency); however, it is too far fetched to interpret their self-conscious acts as aiming only at capital accumulation.

When I asked Winnie why she was obsessed with working for multinational companies, she told me that, most of her life, she had yearned to study abroad but that her family could not support her financially. In the past, Winnie had worked at Nike for a summer and had enjoyed working there because she wanted to acquire cosmopolitan attributes, as she herself noted:

I think Hong Kong is a very small place where my views and my exposure are very limited. Perhaps what I can do in foreign places is insignificant, but at least I can see more. I want to be a cosmopolitan person. I want to see more and experience more; then, maybe I would settle down in a small place. When I was young, I would have killed to study overseas, but I had no money. So, working at an MNC has been my goal, and Disney is an MNC.

Surprisingly, Winnie quit the HKDL job and became a volunteer student helper at a famous annual graphic-design conference held by ACM SIGGRAPH, the Association for Computing Machinery's Special Interest Group on Graphics and Interactive Techniques, in California. Her decision to leave Disney and to accept the new position hinged on her strong belief that she could meet more interesting people at the SIGGRAPH conference than at the Disney park. After the conference, Winnie came back to Hong Kong for a while, but then she found another job which

required her to work in Holland for a research project on Hong Kong. Like Ong's respondents, Winnie actively and opportunistically searched for chances to accumulate Western cultural capital, and Winnie similarly prioritized the importance of networking to achieve her dream to become a cosmopolitan. Unlike Ong's respondents, however, Winnie's pragmatic acts were not aimed at extending a business or developing a career opportunity but rather at broadening her views and experiences.

Annie,³⁶ another HKDL cultural representative in Orlando, studied finance at a university and took up the job of HKDL cultural representative after graduation. She provided answers similar to those of Winnie insofar as both Annie and Winnie stated that they found Hong Kong small and Hong Kong people short-sighted. Annie wanted to know and to experience what the world is. Annie participated in a university exchange program that enabled her to live in Hungary for a half year, and she applied for a position in the HKDL cultural-representative program because she did not like living in Hong Kong. The following exchange between Annie and me sheds light on her perspective:

Annie: My Hungary experience is very special. I don't like Hong Kong. I'd like to leave Hong Kong because it's very small. Paris, Italy—I hope I can go to these places. I also find Hong Kong's pace too fast for me. In Hungary, I lived with seven Taiwanese, and my *Putonghua* became so good. I was very happy when I was in Hungary. I was very excited to decorate the whole room. I learnt to be independent, to take care of myself, and to be confident. [When I left] I cried madly in the plane. I just didn't want to come back. They [my friends] said I always smile after I came back.

Kim: Why?

Annie: Because I become more confident than before. And I have also found that I know more about what's happening in the world. There's distance between me and my classmates. When I was in Hungary, students talked about the effects that the establishment of the European Union had on the Italian lire, whereas Hong Kong students talk only about idols. After I

came back from Hungary, I found the Disney program, so I applied for it. I didn't want a serious job at that time. I applied for the HKDL job because I didn't know what to do after my return to HK. The life was so good there [in Orlando], we just earned money to go on a trip: St. Augustine, New York, Boston, Chicago, LA, San Diego, Las Vegas. I was very free in the US and the places I visited were beautiful, a hundred times more beautiful than HK. I've never thought that Orlando or the US is desolate. And Budapest is so convenient: subway, tram, bus, or walking. I love Europe more than the US...

I conducted my interview with Annie in September 2006. A few days after our interview, Annie left Hong Kong in pursuit of her "world" dream again. She found a job in Canada and wanted to stay there at least for a couple of years. Annie participated in the Hungary exchange program and the HKDL cultural-representative program not for capital accumulation but for self-development—she sought confidence, living skills, and a wider vision of her surroundings.

Josephine,³⁷ a committed HKDL staff member, had been a finance accountant for a year before she became a cultural representative in Orlando Disney parks. During her undergraduate years, she had joined a half-year exchange program to Canada. After a year of being an accountant, she grew depressed, as she found herself constantly in the office. She wanted to find a job working outside the office, meeting people of various backgrounds and facing unexpected events. She took up the Disney job in Orlando, for she thought that it would not create any adverse effect on her accountant career; which is to say, she took the Disney job as a short-term break from her long-term accountant career. However, after six months of operations work in Orlando, Josephine firmly believed that her previous career choice of being an accountant was the worst decision she had ever made in her life. I asked her what she treasured most from her work experiences in the Orlando park: her answer centered on neither career stability nor career advancement but the

opportunity to meet different people everyday. Further, Josephine's cosmopolitan aspiration was not limited to Western first-world countries. Because Josephine enjoyed working in HKDL, I asked her whether she would work there for a long time. She immediately shook her head back and forth and said bluntly, "no." She then expanded on her one-word answer:

I am the kind of person who likes going out to see the wider world. Working at the same company for a long time will limit my view of the world, even though the company may be very big. However, I will stay on if I will be sent to Shanghai to help open the park, because that would give me a chance to work with Mainlanders and learn how they do things.

Here I would like to argue that cosmopolitan aspirations need neither derive from an instrumentalist mindset nor constitute a pursuit of capital accumulation; even if the respondent held an instrumentalist mindset in which the HKDL job was a means to capital accumulation (including cultural capital such as the acquisition of fluent spoken English), the concrete living experiences in Orlando might produce unexpected effects.

Olivia, as I mentioned in the beginning of this section, had been a social worker for almost two years before working as a Disney cultural representative in Orlando in 2004. She had wanted to live in a foreign country but had had no chance to do so during her undergraduate years. Moreover, Olivia had thought that the brand "Disney" had a certain market value; bearing her Disney and American work experience, her curriculum vitae would grow significantly stronger as an asset that would help her develop a business career; if she stayed on at HKDL for several years, she might receive a promotion to the junior managerial level.³⁸ English proficiency is another type of cultural capital that she wanted to acquire: "I also

want to polish my spoken English. Mine is absolutely terrible.” Compared with Josephine and Winnie, Olivia was highly pragmatic, highly strategic, and eager to acquire wealth in both economic terms and cultural terms. Just consider this conversation between Olivia and me:

Kim: Where did you find the job?

Olivia: *The Career Times*. And I applied. When I read the job details, I was not interested in the job, frankly speaking.

Kim: What’s it about?

Olivia: All operations are front line. It has different sections. It’s like primary school allocation...

Kim: (laughs)

Olivia: ...and you fill in your priorities, ranging from 1 to 8: merchandising, restaurant. It describes clearly what you do, such as cashier work, cooking, fastfood, and so on. One is really bad, and I gave it a number 8, custody, and it tells you to do the cleaning.

...

Olivia: One of your questions is whether I will work in Hong Kong Disneyland after coming back. It highly depends on what benefits it gives me and the nature of the job. What I demand is stability. I need my boss to treat me well.... I would like to develop my career in the business field, but my background is not that relevant, and that’s why I would like to see what I can get from working in Disneyland. I would also like to know what management is. If you ask me to work as a frontline worker for three years, of course I won’t do it. If it treats me very well, I don’t rule out that I may work at this job for the rest of my life. Therefore, it depends on Disney’s offer.

As I have just noted, an employee’s pragmatic strategizing in their American Disney job can undergo unexpected cultural effects, including self reflection and personal transformation produced during everyday cultural interaction. In fact, these effects can encourage the employee to question even the initial aim of capital accumulation. Consider, for example, the discrepancies between the conversations that Olivia and I had before her Orlando experiences and the conversations that we

had afterward. Although Olivia treated the US trip as an exchange program, she placed greater emphasis on her efforts to improve her English and to change her job from social work to business, especially business management. After her return to Hong Kong, I conducted another interview with her, this time in August 2005. When I asked her to evaluate the US trip, she stated that the aim of the trip had changed:

Kim: How do you evaluate your US Disney trip?

Olivia: How do I evaluate it?...hmm...I haven't lost anything. No loss. My purpose was very clear and I got what I wanted. Some people felt bad about joining this program because Disney doesn't treat you well and Disney didn't offer what they promised before the trip, such as rewarding your work experience and offering you a promotion. People are angry about it. That's not my style. Instead, I appreciate the chance to play around and to live in the US and to get to know US lifestyles. My purpose was to try something I hadn't tried before.

Kim: You mean, you made foreign friends, and you could experience living in the US?

Olivia: And I also had my US trip, I went to many US cities: L.A., St. Augustine, Key West, New York, and so on. I treated the Disney trip as an exchange, I exchanged my work for my journey, and I got what I wanted.

In the above dialogue, Olivia did not mention polishing her spoken English or changing her career. Before going to Orlando, Olivia mentioned that she wanted to work in business management. After the Orlando trip, Olivia preferred working on a part-time basis so that she would have more time for everyday-life reflection. She increasingly realized that she might not be suitable for work in the business field:

Kim: So, overall, you're positive about your US trip?

Olivia: Yes, positive. I didn't come out of it with less than I'd had at the start. Even in terms of salary, I didn't lose much.

Kim: How much exactly did you earn each month in the US?

Olivia: Depends on if you worked hard. I generally could work only about 30 hours. But I also worked about 50 hours on occasion. I could cover only the rent. Ha, ha ... In Hong Kong, of course, my salary is lower than before, but the pressure of my previous job was a lot greater. Now, the job is task-based. You know, tomorrow is another day. If you asked me to choose, I'd prefer staying in Orlando. I had more space for myself, more time for self-reflection. I don't know whether or not I am a very business-oriented or target-oriented person. My friends and teachers think that I am aggressive and am suitable for work in the business field, but I now feel that I am not suitable to be a strong business woman.

Kim: Or you don't *like* being a business woman?

Olivia: Yes, you are right. I can *do* business: I can manage people, I can plan ahead, and I can be aggressive and competitive. But I don't *want* to do these things now. In fact, I want to be a secretary. I just do what you tell me to do. I will do best what you tell me to do, but please don't ask me to think what to do.

Olivia realized that she was not the person that she had thought she was: a target-oriented, career-oriented, and aggressive person working in the business field. The above conversation echoes what she wrote on her blog³⁹ when she was in Orlando:

Life is short
Humans always chase something abstract and think it is important
[I must] enjoy life
[I've] decided after several years
to leave the work place
to have a long vacation
to feel life
to feel tranquility and the time to talk to myself
I will remember the words I said to myself
I don't like the hardworking person I am in Hong Kong
Love staying here
This kind of life lets me have time to reflect on life
Part-time work allows me to have more space to broaden my personal space
No competition
I just want stability and life
I once believed that ambition was important to one's life
but I don't like competition anymore
I'd love to have good relationship with colleagues
I don't think that my change is out of laziness

Olivia's changing self-awareness can be traced back to the cultural conflicts and, indeed, the culture shock that she experienced everyday in Orlando. It was Olivia's curiosity regarding the practices of the Orlando Disney parks' visitors that first triggered changes in her self-awareness, which was both critical and reflective of cultural discourses. She had visited Tokyo Disneyland in the past; and on that trip, she and her friends would first plan an itinerary so that they could participate in as many attractions as possible. Consequently, the trip had been hasty. However, in the United States, she found that the most American guests did not plan an itinerary and that they sometimes only strolled around. In her blog, she wrote,

They [US guests] take everything in stride ... they pay so much to visit the park, but they don't make any plan before the visit. They just feel free. Compared with them, we are so calculating that we must play as many rides as possible. I should learn from them, learn to relax, like people all around here. Sometimes I thought that, once I paid for a park visit, I would have to play hard. But they [US guests] can really give the feeling of being on a vacation because of their relaxed attitude. It [consuming the park in a leisurely way] is worth the cost of admission.

By meeting and working with people of different personalities and by experiencing cultural differences and conflicts, Olivia also gradually changed her own personality in regard to interpersonal conflict: whereas in the past, she would be critical of others, she would now reflect on the roles that both her own personality and her own cultural values played in creating these conflicts. During the first few weeks of her work, Olivia had found it difficult to communicate with some black colleagues because of their different English accent and because of their bad tempers; she once cried in front of her white colleagues after being scorned by two black colleagues. A few weeks later, she asked her black colleague to make two breakfasts for guests; finding him unresponsive to her request and feeling anxious

about the task at hand, Olivia said, “I’ll do it myself.” Her colleague then replied, “Calm down.” Olivia then understood that her value and practices of “efficiency” caused her trouble. She recounted the event and her response to it in her blog:

He said he was getting ready to do it ... he asked me to calm down
That got me thinking
Actually ... I always use my own standards to judge others
I demand of myself that I work fast and well
To a certain extent, I demand that my colleagues approximate my work standards
I have to learn not to use my own standards to judge others

During her stay, Olivia also discovered that her ideas about Mainland Chinese were one-sided. Before her American trip, she sometimes went to Shenzhen to relax and shop; yet she rarely communicated with local people. She noticed an official notice that was posted in a Shenzhen subway and that read, “Please wait politely.” At that time, she commented to herself that Mainlanders should review their queuing behavior. Later, in Orlando, she met cultural representatives from Beijing University and Tsing Hua University and found these students to be brilliant and cultured:

We then went to the home of a Hunan colleague, Emily
Wow it’s ... such ... a ... big... house
...
The dinner opened my eyes
They talked about buying the house, applying for the visa, how to use gas to produce electricity, Chinese history, the GRE, TOEFL, etc.
Although I could understand only 60% of their *Putonghua*
I found I learned a lot
Well Beijing University or Tsing Hua University students are not simple
HK’s university students ... couldn’t keep up with them
This dinner has made me reflect on my views of Mainlanders

Olivia also changed her attitudes toward some places. Initially, Olivia did not plan to go on many trips while working in Orlando, but she followed others and visited many cities including St. Augustine, San Diego, Los Angeles, New York, and Washington D.C., as I mentioned earlier. Her trips changed her attitude toward Los Angeles, for example:

I don't quite like LA.... In the past, I thought LA is a prosperous metropolis
but indeed it's quite rough and backward
There are many old buildings where nobody lives
It's like no one lives in the whole city
San Diego feels more prosperous
We even equate LA with some Mainland cities: LA is fading

Her imaginary of the first-world United States underwent changes during and because of her short-stay in the country—the United States was not as prosperous, technologically advanced, safe, and health-conscious as she had once thought. On one occasion, she wondered whether or not the strawberries she was eating in a restaurant were fake!

In summary, the experiences that Olivia underwent during her six-month stay in Orlando fall into one of three categories: people of different ethnicity, places, and herself. Olivia liked to plan everything and control the results (she took the Disney job to improve her English, to enhance her transnational capital, and finally to strengthen her prospects of finding a good business job); she had liked to compete with colleagues, had received attention from superiors, and had earned promotions—but she wanted to transform herself because she found that being competitive is not the only path that one must follow in a career. Her experiences in

Orlando critically changed her wants and her values. In place of career advancement (or, in Ong's term, capital accumulation), Olivia now wanted to relax, to experience life, and to learn to face cultural differences. Her everyday experiences in Orlando—culture shock and thus self-reflection and self-transformation—apparently clashed with her earlier instrumental intentions of career advancement and capital accumulation. Olivia had wanted to stay in the United States, and during her stay, an American colleague who knew of her desire to staying there offered to marry her, but she stated in her blog that she refused to marry the man for a green card. Perhaps, Olivia's American colleague saw Chinese culture as hardworking and family-oriented, a view that conforms to Ong's argument about the essentialization of Chinese culture in terms of triumphant Chinese capitalism. And perhaps, he also essentialized Chinese people as having an obsession to acquire capital, such as US residence. Is it true that, by and large, Chinese or transnational Chinese obsessively strive to acquire capital, and if so, why? In her related analysis, Ong does not give us an answer. What we are left with, then, is the understanding that, under capitalist economy, the cultural logic of transnational Chinese culture might rest on capital accumulation. And the obsession with capital acquisition, as Ong proposes, is like another prevalent discourse about Chinese in American society.

Although culture is changing to adapt to changing social, political, and economic circumstances, culture is also sufficiently powerful to induce subjects to use it to formulate and to examine their lives under particular contexts. Exemplifying this process is the case of Olivia. She changed some of her conceptions of place, other people, and self. Here I do not mean that Olivia abandoned pragmatism and whole-heartedly embraced free-spiritedness. In our

conversation after her return from Orlando to Hong Kong, I asked her to evaluate her American-Disney experience, and Olivia's first reply was, "I haven't lost anything" (p. 183), and she added, "I exchanged my work for my journey, and I got what I wanted" (p. 183). When I asked her again if she evaluated her American trip as positive, Olivia gave me a similar answer: "I didn't come out of it with less than I'd had at the start" (p. 183). Pragmatism still shaped Olivia's evaluation of her American trip; this pragmatic mindset functioned in contestation with discourses emphasizing freedom, positive interpersonal relationships, and self-reflection. The critical point not only in Olivia's case but indeed throughout this thesis is that a person's particular action reflects the contestation of different perspectives, which takes place in a particular context. Whereas Ong treats diasporic Chinese transnational culture as an instrumental tool transformed and conditioned by global economic forces, I treat respondents' pragmatic move to work both for Disney and in America as a produced desire and even a regulated response to the various and intersecting institutional practices and structure: Hong Kong as a city is too small to accommodate youths' adventurous spirit; state propaganda encourages citizens to be cosmopolitan, nationalist, enterprising subjects⁴⁰; recent university policy encourages students to participate in foreign exchange during their three- to four-year undergraduate studies; and big companies prefer to employ university students who have foreign-living experience.

Conclusion

In analyzing Hong Kong people's cultural identity, scholars such as Lau Siu Kai with his concept of "utilitarian familism"⁴¹ and Ong with her "flexible citizenship" reinforce the assertion that Hong Kong people are "economic animals" who are

interested only in costs, returns, and efficiency for family advancement. Other scholars who are critical of HKSAR governance, on the other hand, argue that the HKSAR government actively *promotes* this assertion by constructing Hong Kong people as “enterprising individuals” who are “always on the lookout for resources and new opportunities to enhance their income, power, life chances and quality of life in order to take advantage of the rapid changes of economy and society.”⁴² In the case of the HKDL project, Joseph Man Chan⁴³ researched the media’s circulation of related public discourse. To this end, he examined the opinion columns, editorials, and letter sections of several different types of newspapers and magazines: namely *Ming Pao*, *Hong Kong Economic Daily*, *South China Morning Post*, *Apple Daily*, *Oriental Daily*, *Next Magazine*, and *East Weekly* as they appeared between 1 November 1999 and 30 November 1999. According to his examination, the public discourse in these publications substantively addresses neither cultural imperialism nor resistance to this imperialism’s destructive effects. The dominant patterns of the public discourse concern accounting, costs and benefits, feasibility and fairness, and employment. Chan coins the term “economization of culture” in reference to the public discourse. Except for *Ming Pao*, the newspapers neglected the resistant voices of scholars and activists. Chan concludes that Disneyland is a symbol of cultural globalization, that this economic logic prevails in the midst of Hong Kong, and that the economic logic strengthens cultural globalization and weakens resistance voices. In short, the globalized economy so fiercely economizes Hong Kong culture that Hong Kong people, first, evaluate culture according to its economic value and, second, preserve only economically viable cultural elements.

In his re-narrativization of the issue of Hong Kong's Handover, Fred Chiu argues that by Orientalizing and domesticating China as "the master Other," academic discourse creates little room in which the one-country-two-systems idea can operate imaginatively. Chiu argues that journalists, as well, tend to represent the Handover in a binary way by concentrating on official British arguments and official PRC arguments. Together, these two arguments, or narratives, "formed the master narrative hegemonizing the populace, literally mastering the entire imagery of 'Hong Kong' as a fate, a destiny. No variation or any [sic] improvisation could be allowed to deviate from the tune of 'Hong Kong's way of life!' or 'Tomorrow will be better'!"⁴⁴ In examining Hong Kong Disneyland in relation to Hong Kong people's cultural identity, scholars may look for more possibilities and more imaginative and novel ways to discuss the relationships among culture, governance, and global economy. In other words, scholars may distance themselves from such grand theories as economization of culture, which itself subsumes culture under economic reductionist logic.

The above study of people's different views (expectations and worries) and uses of the HKDL project argues that, first, meanings of cultural material such as the meanings of HKDL should be seen as plural. Respondents appropriate these meanings in ways that continuously change the meanings, and these changes reflect adaptations to varied lives. Second, Hong Kong culture should be seen as plural and contesting. The HKSAR government's characterization of Hong Kong people as enterprising, nationalistic, transnational subjects is one among many characterizations on the drawing board. On the symbolic level, some respondents such as David used HKDL as a cultural marker, a unifying power to reaffirm Hong Kong as a particular city-state apart from Mainland China. For David, HKDL was

not chiefly an important instrument for economic revitalization. Other respondents such as the young upwardly mobile university graduates appropriated the HKDL project according to their concrete everyday practices. These respondents sought to make their cosmopolitan dreams come true, and these cosmopolitan dreams were far more complex than the academic discourse prioritizing the economy-driven and opportunistic characteristics of Hong Kong people.

Hong Kong culture has been embracing both China-based cultural learning (especially the learning of *Putonghua*) and internationalization. To a certain extent, economic forces may account for this embrace. However, we cannot then say that culture as a whole changes to adapt to economic forces. My study above shows that some Hong Kong people, though they call themselves Chinese, embrace Chinese culture, and speak *Putonghua* fluently, distinguish themselves from Mainland Chinese by identifying themselves as superior to Mainland Chinese. In ironic contrast, respondents who had faced the non-transparent HKSAR government-Disney HKDL deal objected hardly at all to the role that Disney had been playing on the local-global stage. Most respondents stated that Western countries—not Chinese cities—were places for cultural enlightenment. Legislator Mandy Tam commissioned a research company to conduct a survey in April 2007 and found that, of 375 respondents, 62% were unwilling to work in the Mainland and only 12% were positively willing to work in the Mainland.⁴⁵ This hierarchical cultural global order has stemmed not solely from economic forces but also from available discourses that constrain the possibility that people will consider China an enlightening place. Colonial education, immigration laws, and economic development in the past helped Hong Kong people use lifestyle culture to place

themselves in categories different from—and superior to—the categories in which Hong Kong people placed Mainlanders.

I argue that culture as a way of life should be seen as incoherent and be analyzed in various levels. If we adopt this approach, we can rigorously explain both Hong Kong people's self-differentiation from Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong people's increasing interest in China's cultural capital. In examining Hong Kong local consciousness, Ng Chun Hung⁴⁶ divides Hong Kong culture into four levels. The first level is tone and timbre and helps describe Hong Kong people's daily expressions and practices, such as speaking loudly. The second level is common sense and helps explain Hong Kong people's prioritization of studies and networking (*guanxi*). These types of common sense often accumulate over the course of many years of experience. The third level is ideological elements. For example, one type of ideology is any systematic body of knowledge that governs the arrangement of space. Thus, Chinese *feng shui* and Western interior design are two concrete ideologies. Moreover, ideologies can overlap with one another. For example, Hong Kong people can furnish their home according to *feng shui* and to a Western style at the same time. The fourth level is "systematic discourse." Systematic discourse encourages and inclines subjects both to review history and to move ahead. Ng argues that three types of systematic discourse about Hong Kong local consciousness were circulating in the 1990s. The first type attributes Hong Kong's economic success to Hong Kong's big market and small government practices; the second type emphasizes the connection between Hong Kong and China, asking Hong Kong people to accept political and economic reality, and to embrace their Chinese national identity; the third type criticizes Hong Kong's heavy reliance on a market economy reproducing social injustice.

Experiencing both their culture's prioritization of cosmopolitanism and the growing China-Hong Kong economic integration, Hong Kong people who seek career advancement or career survival equip themselves with new cultural tools, such as fluency in *Putonghua*, sensitivity to Mainland cultures, and cosmopolitan attributes: all in all, a basic life strategy that has undergone recent changes in emphasis. However, changes in basic life strategy do not mean that individuals must change their life tone, their common sense, their ideology, or their systematic discourse. The acquisition of a Mainland dialect and of cosmopolitan sensitivity functions in line with Hong Kong people's common-sense adaptability to changing social circumstances. However, Hong Kong people's ideology-based privileging of Hong Kong culture over "Chineseness" can stay the same or change, depending on individuals' self-reflection and actions.

In addition to analyzing culture through a multi-level analysis, we should examine people's various ways of using culture and how these ways affect individuals' course of action and their self-perception. In my study, some respondents use culture in a defensive way: they use an existing cultural resource to direct their action. Even though social circumstances may undergo change and even though the changed social circumstances may change behavior, the content of cultural resources may undergo little change. David and Sandy had many chances to work with Mainlanders and had good relationships with them, but did not problematize their conception of homogeneous Mainlanders. On the other hand, some individuals such as Olivia use culture in a reflexive manner such that the use changes the ideological elements of her perception of the Other (the Chinese and the blacks) and even of her own self.⁴⁷ Therefore, it would be a rush to judgment and an overgeneralization to say that global economic forces or structural changes

(such as the Handover in the case of Hong Kong) determine cultural changes in general; we need to exhume, identify, and examine the cultural elements that adapt to changes, the cultural elements that resist changes, and the political effects that result from this adaptation and this resistance.

As I argued in chapter Three, the HKSAR government used HKDL as an icon to disarticulate the process of democratization during late colonial times, to disarticulate “Hong Kong way of life,”⁴⁸ and to re-articulate the linkage between the “Western” consumption lifestyle supported by “Disney” and the Hong Kong way of life. The HKSAR government also used HKDL to distinguish Hong Kong from other Chinese cities. My study finds that the government’s discourse resonated with some respondents, who used the HKDL project as a cultural marker to distinguish themselves from Mainlanders. Besides, only five of thirty-nine respondents (and three are social activists) indicated their displeasures with the HKDL project and two criticized, in particular, the non-transparent, undemocratic practices that the HKSAR government applied to the public project. I must admit that citizens can use “cultural distinctions” in both a progressive way and a reactionary way: Hong Kong citizens can use their demands for transparent governance as a way to distinguish Hong Kong from China, but they may also use a consumption-based undemocratic HKDL to make the distinctions. Both of the ways may also indicate the Hong Kong people’s attachment to Hong Kong but have different effects on the people’s acts (to embrace the project or to resist it) and on local governance (to continue administration-led government or to pursue transparent democratic governance).

In the following chapter, I will concentrate on parents’ pragmatic use of Disney merchandise as a way for the parents to achieve their cosmopolitan

aspirations for their children. Following the current chapter's argument, I will argue that parents' persistent use of Disney merchandise is not equivalent to their acceptance of Disney's conception of family, child development, or morality. We have to consider respondents' behavior from various perspectives to understand the behavior. I also argue that parents' selective use of Disney and their parenting methods reinforce local hierarchical parent-child relationships, local class disparity, and the imbalance in power and status between globalizing Disney media and local popular culture.

NOTES

¹ Lawrence Grossberg, *We Gotta Get Out of This Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture* (NY, London: Routledge, 1992). In *We Gotta Get Out of This Place*, Lawrence Grossberg argues that we should reduce neither culture to texts nor human reality to the plane of meaning. When the analysis of culture reduces to "the interpretation of cognitive, semantic or narrative content which lies hidden within the text," social and material realities will "disappear into the plane of meaning. Meaning becomes the totality of human existence" (p. 43). However, this mode of cultural analysis cannot explain sufficiently people's different "investments and intensities" relative to cultural texts and practices (p. 45). To understand popular culture, Grossberg argues that analysis should focus on "the plane of affect" (p. 79). Popular culture, by working with an affective sensibility, offers potential means for people to organize their affect, "their emotional and narrative life and identity" (p. 84), and the recognition of the pleasurable relation with popular culture through emotion investment can be (not necessarily) empowering because of the "generation of energy and passion, the construction of possibility" (p. 85). However, people's attention, volition, mood, and passion can also be "organized, disciplined, mobilized and ultimately put into the service of specific political agendas" (p. 255). Popular depoliticization, for example, is expressed in the form of "affective epidemics," and "'addiction' becomes a powerful, negatively charged activity which can authoritatively explain a broad range of events and reconfigure people's everyday lives" (p. 261). The new conservatism, in the case of the US, embodies "not a political rebellion but a rebellion against politics" (p. 278).

² Linda K. Richter, *The Politics of Tourism in Asia* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989); Colin Michael Hall, *Tourism and Politics: Policy, Power and Place*

(Chichester, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1994); Colin Michael Hall and John M. Jenkins, *Tourism and Public Policy* (London, New York: Routledge, 1995); Michel Picard, *Bali: Cultural Tourism and Touristic Culture* (Singapore: Archipelago, 1996).

³ “Why magic of Disney may be short-lived,” 1 March 1999, *Hong Kong Standard*, A10, Main Section; “建迪士尼全城叫好 有人則擔心海港污染外勞搶飯碗,” 1 March 1999, *Sing Pao*, A15; “九成市民贊成建迪士尼 多屬意選址啓德 北大嶼山僅次選,” 1 March 1999, *Apple Daily*, A04; “首選地點舊啓德 建迪士尼九成被訪者贊成,” 1 March 1999, *Ming Pao Daily News*, A14; “建迪士尼樂園 民意 90% 支持 選址舊機場最理想 吐露港最不受歡迎,” 1 March 1999, *Hong Kong Economic Times*, A19.

⁴ “自由黨對興建迪士尼樂園的立場,” press release on 1 July 1999, <http://www.liberal.org.hk/contents/> (accessed 7 September 2006); “旅協冀盡量爭取利益,” 2 July 1999, *Hong Kong Commercial Daily*, B01; “增強建園籌碼享受公平利益 旅遊界贊成延長談判期,” 2 July 1999, *Tin Tin Daily News*, A12.

⁵ John Ap, “Hong Kong Disneyland: Community Reactions and Its Implications on Tourism in the Pearl River Delta Region,” paper read at Leisure and Entertainment Asia Conference 2000 (Hong Kong SAR, 2000). Further references are in parentheses in the text.

⁶ John Ap, “Residents’ Opinions of Hong Kong Disneyland” (HK, press embargo: 2002), 20 December 2002, p. 2.

⁷ Gordon Mathews, *Global Culture / Individual Identity: Searching for Home in the Cultural Supermarket* (London, NY: Routledge, 2000), p. 144. As discussed in the introductory chapter, Hong Kong people’s local consciousness, the sense of *Heung Gong Yan* (Hong Kong People), instead of a natural place-bound internal development, has been, since the late 1940s, a social construct under specific spatial connections and disconnections within the wider geography under colonial governance. The local consciousness, however, becomes quite an exclusive cultural marker that Hong Kong people can use to distinguish themselves from Mainlanders. Gordon Mathews coins “Chineseness plus” to describe Hong Kong people’s entwining relationship with Chinese: Hong Kong people are ethnically Chinese but our cultural identity is more than Chinese. Hong Kong people are Chineseness plus Westernness, democracy, human rights, freedom, cosmopolitan consumer taste and knowledge, and wealth.

⁸ In my study, I conducted interviews with thirty-nine people, including six children. Whenever I mention a respondent, I will introduce him or her individually in an endnote.

⁹ The idea is from Laura Desfor Edles, although my emphasis is different from hers. I emphasize more on articulation and intersection and less “a complex blend,” as used by Edles. See Laura Desfor Edles, *Cultural Sociology in Practice* (Massachusetts: Blackwell, 2002), p. 69.

¹⁰ This chapter will explore respondents’ views on the HKDL project. These interviews were conducted before the opening of the park, and therefore,

respondents had not been adversely affected by all the later negative reports on HKDL.

¹¹ Not all respondents in my study had gone to Disney parks. Among the thirty-nine respondents, sixteen had gone to Tokyo Disneyland, Disneyland Paris, Anaheim Disneyland, or Orlando's Walt Disney World. Among these sixteen respondents, four were children who, at the time of my first interviews, were between the ages of four and eight. I did not ask the children questions about whether they supported the HKDL project.

¹² These good memories include (1) the fun that respondents had had because of the attractions of the park, (2) the memories concerning friends or their children, and (3) the available Disney merchandise. Of twelve respondents (David, Cathy, Fred, Betty, Agnes, Katie, Ada, Judy, Ms Leung, Susanna, Olivia, and Winnie, not counting children) who had visited a Disney theme park, six respondents (David, Cathy, Fred, Betty, Agnes, and Katie) had visited more than one Disney park. Among these twelve respondents, six (David, Cathy, Betty, Agnes, Katie, and Susanna) expressed to me the excitement that they had felt during their first park visit, two (Fred and Ada) said that they had not chosen to visit Disneyland themselves but that they had visited for their wife (Cathy) and daughter (Angel) respectively. They had enjoyed their experiences in the park because their wife or daughter had enjoyed the park experiences. And the other four respondents (Judy, Winnie, Olivia, and Ms Leung) had not found Disney park particularly exciting, although they all said that the design and the color of the park had made them comfortable. Of twelve respondents, Judy was the only one visiting Tokyo Disneyland for business; she had worked as a reporter of a children's magazine and had gone to Tokyo Disneyland to write a report on the park.

¹³ In 2002, I began conducting an ethnographic study of five middle class families with the aim of studying two topics: first, the parents' approaches to the process of parenting, particularly in relation to family consumption of Disney products (including movies, merchandise, and theme parks), and second, their views on the HKDL project. I invited Cathy to be my respondent in 2003, because both she and her husband Fred worked in the film industry and because I thought that they might evaluate Disney movies differently from other parent respondents. Between 2003 and 2006, I conducted four formal interviews and several phone talks about Disney with Cathy, Fred, and their son Adrian, who was age six in 2003. The first interview that I conducted in 2003 took place in a McDonald's restaurant near her apartment. I asked Cathy, Fred, and Adrian for their views on Disney movies and characters. I held the second interview in Cathy's home, and she showed me Disney merchandise that her family owns. I also witnessed what methods Cathy used to persuade Adrian not to watch television. In the second interview, Cathy told me about her ambivalent views on the HKDL project. I conducted a third interview with Cathy in a Chinese restaurant in 2004, about her parenting methods and what movies and television programs she allowed or did not allow her son to watch. In 2006, I conducted a fourth interview with her in a restaurant near her office. This time, I asked her opinions of Hong Kong Disneyland after its first year in operation.

¹⁴ I conducted three interviews with Betty between 2005 and 2006. The first interview took place in May 2005. I had not known Betty before the interview. A common friend had introduced Betty to me. I invited Betty to be my respondent

because I realized that the middle class parents whom I interviewed were all first-generation middle class members, that they all came from a relatively humble background. Because I wanted to examine whether there were differences between parents' views on Disney because of their class background, I intentionally searched for second generation middle class parents who would be my respondents. However, the search was difficult because my acquaintances who were second-generation middle class members had not raised children; those parents whom I knew and who had children between the ages of five and ten were first-generation middle class. Betty's father had come to Hong Kong from Shanghai in the 1950s and had worked as an accountant in Hong Kong. She had lived in Happy Valley, a place for affluent Hong Kong people, before she had married; at the time of the interview, she lived in Shatin. Betty was a high school teacher teaching English in a famous girls school on Hong Kong Island. She therefore was concerned with her son Henry's English. I will discuss this issue in chapter Five, which concerns family consumption of Disney offerings.

¹⁵ In 1994, I worked as a daily-news production assistant at a local TV station, and David was a senior program director there who was responsible for operating live newscast, preparing news presentations, and working with the graphic department in designing visuals presented in the newscast. Before starting my PhD thesis, in 1999, we had casual chats on the HKDL project, and I remember the excitement on his face as he described his design for a story about the completion of the HKSAR government-Disney joint venture. After I started my PhD study in October 2001, I invited David to be one of my respondents, and he kindly accepted my offer. Between 2001 and 2006, I held three formal interviews with him: one in his apartment, one in a restaurant, and one in my apartment in December 2002, December 2005, and December 2006 respectively. In the first interview, I focused on his exposure to Disney offerings and his views on the joint venture; the second interview was about his four Disneyland trips and his views on the negative news coverage of HKDL during the early period of the park's operation; the third interview focused on his views on Hong Kong Disneyland after the park had been open for a year and on his comparison of various Disneyland parks—the Magic Kingdom in Orlando, Tokyo Disneyland, and Hong Kong Disneyland.

¹⁶ Cathy espoused Confucianism because it asks people not to be too radical but to take a middle-of-the-road stance, whereas Betty embraced Confucianism for its emphasis on propriety, righteousness, trustworthiness, and benevolence.

¹⁷ The period of Japanese occupation has often been represented as the dark ages of Hong Kong history. The Hong Kong Museum of History has eight permanent galleries narrating "The Hong Kong Story"; gallery 7 is about Japanese occupation. See Hong Kong Museum of History, unknown, "'The Hong Kong Story' Exhibition Materials," Hong Kong Museum of History, http://www.lcsd.gov.hk/CE/Museum/History/download/the_hk_story_exhibition_materials_e.pdf (accessed 17 September 2006), p. 71.

¹⁸ Starting in 1948, the colonial government launched the campaign "Keep Hong Kong Clean." In the beginning, the campaign was a two-week clean-up operation carried out across the territory each year. In the 1970s, the campaign extended its strategies from the distributing of poster and leaflets to the broadcasting of programs on television and radio, the use of mega posters on public transportation

and on the exterior of buildings, and the use of popular stars and artists such as Sam Hui, Josephine Siao, and Lydia Shum Din Ha for promotion. See Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, "Clean Hong Kong History," Food and Environmental Hygiene Department, http://www.fehd.gov.hk/pleasant_environment/chk/index.html (accessed 16 May 2005).

¹⁹ James Watson argues that McDonald's socializes people of different parts of the world to develop consumer discipline. In Hong Kong, queuing for services was not a common practice until the mid seventies and McDonald's has the distinction of introducing the queue to Hong Kong customers. In Moscow, McDonald's employees distributed information sheets to teach customers the process of ordering food, including the custom of standing in line. See James Watson, "Introduction: Transnationalism, localization, and fast foods in East Asia," in *Golden Arches East: McDonald's in East Asia*, edited by Watson (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1997), pp. 27-9.

²⁰ Lisa worked as an English-language journalist and later changed careers to be a communication officer at a university. I conducted formal interviews with Lisa four times between 2005 and 2006. The first interview took place in a restaurant near Lisa's office. I interviewed her about her exposure to Disney offerings in the past and about her views on the HKDL project. I conducted the second interview in Lisa's home. I interviewed her views on Disney and Disney merchandise and her parenting methods. I also talked to her two daughters, Dorothy and Stephanie, about their likes and dislikes of Disney characters. Because Stephanie was only three years old in 2005, I talked more to Dorothy. In the first interview, because Lisa did not want her daughters disrupting our interview, she showed them *The Lion King* and I had a chance to observe how the two young girls watched *The Lion King* together. During the second interview, Lisa also demonstrated how she used *Disney's World of English* every night, which will be discussed in chapter Five. I conducted the other two interviews in a restaurant near Lisa's office. The third interview took place in early 2006 because she had visited HKDL in Christmas 2005 and had enjoyed the park experience. After one year's operation of HKDL, I interviewed Lisa again about her views on the negative portrayal of HKDL in the press.

²¹ According to the Planning Department survey "Cross-boundary Travel Survey 2001," Cross-boundary passenger trips have risen sharply from 36.9 million in 1990 to 116.6 million in 2001; on average, there are some 333,000 daily trips (whether departures or arrivals). See Planning Department (HKSAR), 2001, "Cross-boundary Travel Survey 2001," Planning Department (HKSAR), http://www.pland.gov.hk/p_study/comp_s/travel01/xbts_e.htm (accessed 19 September 2006), 1. introduction and 2.1 daily flows.

²² 潘毅 and 黃洪, "跨境空間：在中國大陸工作的香港人的階級政治和身份認同," in *香港·文化·研究*, edited by 吳俊雄, 馬傑偉, and 呂大樂 (香港: 香港大學出版社, 2006), pp. 233-55.

²³ I did not know Sandy personally before my interview with her. Sandy was introduced to me by my friend who told me that Sandy owned a factory producing Disney character plush dolls. I conducted an interview with her in February 2006.

At that time, HKDL had already been open for five months, and I asked her for her views on HKDL and on her working relationship with the Disney company. Sandy had not visited any Disney parks, including HKDL. In the interview, I asked Sandy whether or not she had supported the HKDL project in 1999, and she replied that she certainly had supported the project and that, in 1999, she had believed that HKDL could bring her more business. However, she found her assessment was wrong because after HKDL opened in 2005, Disney characters in Hong Kong did not become more popular and her licensee did not request that her company produce more products.

²⁴ I interviewed Susanna and Billy in February 2006 individually. Before joining the local anti-Disney group Disney Hunter established in June 2005, Susanna was the executive member of Hong Kong Federation of Catholic Students in the past and an active member in a university labor concern group. Billy was a chairperson of the Hong Kong Federation of Students Resources Committee and university student union representative in 2006. I interviewed Susanna and Billy because both love Disney characters; Susanna likes Belle in *Beauty and the Beast* and Winnie the Pooh, and Billy has been loving Mickey since he was about five. With permission, I use their real names instead of pseudonyms in the thesis. I will further discuss their views on Disney in chapter Seven.

²⁵ This couple is Judy and Jacob. In the interview in 2002, it was Jacob raising the issue of American cultural imperialism. They have a boy Leo who was seven years old in 2002. I met Judy in 22 March 1994 in a protest fighting for the amendment of the New Territories Ordinance, which restricted women having inheritance right. Judy is a freelance writer. She has published a book about everyday practices of a nurse (her husband) in an emergency room in public hospital. She now writes for in-flight magazine in a regular basis and works as a part-time research assistant in university. I had my first interview with Judy, Jacob, and Leo respectively in their home in 2002 and I asked their views on Disney movies, merchandise, and their views on the HKDL project. After the first interview, I conducted two formal interviews, one with Judy, and another with Judy and Jacob about their parenting methods in 2004, and the last formal interview was held in 2006 about Judy's views on HKDL after it opened in September 2005. I also did baby-sitting for Judy so that I had several chances to watch movies with Leo, to talk to him in a shopping mall and in his school, seeing how he interacts with his classmates.

²⁶ I did not know Sammie personally before I interviewed her. After reading a news reportage by Sammie, I asked my journalist friend to invite Sammie to be my respondent and she kindly accepted my invitation. I interviewed Sammie in October 2006 and with several follow-up phone talks. In the interview, I asked her questions, most of which concerned one of four main issues: (1) how she had developed the news story, (2) how her encounter with Disney staff members had affected the story's content, (3) her perception of Disney and HKDL, and (4) whether or not the relationship between reporters and HKDL public relations was improving. On another occasion, this time in April 2007, I asked Edith to share her Orlando experiences with my students; she again kindly accepted my invitation. Sammie told me that while she was studying journalism in university, she also took a few courses concerning the power of global companies. Although she did not particularly abhor the Walt Disney Company, she was concerned about Disney's

power in the globe. Because Sammie's company prohibited unauthorized interviews with staff members, the name 'Sammie' is a pseudonym. To protect confidentiality, I also withhold the name of the media company for which Sammie worked.

²⁷ John Ap, "Residents' Opinions of Hong Kong Disneyland" (HK, press embargo: 2002), 20 December 2002, p. 2.

²⁸ Interestingly, in my study, two respondents' first experience of a Disney park was Japan's instead of America's because they had visited only Tokyo Disneyland.

²⁹ These five cultural representatives are Josephine, Olivia, Richard, Pat, and Annie. These people, before becoming HKDL cultural representatives, worked in diverse fields or had just finished their university or college studies. Olivia had been a social worker for two years; Josephine had worked as a finance accountant for a year; Richard had been a computer salesperson; Pat had been a tourist guide; and Annie was a fresh graduate from a university's finance-studies program.

³⁰ The minimum working hours for a cultural representative is thirty hours per week and the hourly pay is US\$6.70. Cultural representatives can work ten additional hours to get overtime pay, which is 1.5 times the normal hourly pay. They live in same-sex dormitories where strict rules govern behavior. For example, visitors of the opposite sex can visit only during a certain period of time and the dormitory closes at midnight.

³¹ I had known Olivia since December 2004; that is, before she went to Orlando to become an HKDL cultural representative. Before working at HKDL, Olivia had been a social worker for two years. I conducted three formal interviews with Olivia, the first one took place in a restaurant in January 2005 and concerned her exposure to Disney offerings and her role as an HKDL cultural representative in Orlando. Before HKDL officially opened in September 2005, I conducted the second formal interview at my home and asked her about her experiences in Orlando. Because there was dissatisfaction among cultural representatives and some cultural representatives had written criticisms on on-line forums, I asked Olivia to evaluate these criticisms. The third interview took place again in my home in December 2005. I asked her to compare the similarities and the differences between working at Disneyland in Orlando and working at Disneyland in Hong Kong, and I also asked her to evaluate critical comments made by scholars and activities held by an anti-Disney group, Disney Hunter.

³² I conducted one interview with Winnie in May 2005. At the time, she had already quit her HKDL job and was waiting to go to a San Francisco conference, at which she would work as a student helper. In the interview, I asked her about her interest in the HKDL job, about her training, and about her decision to quit the job.

³³ Karl Marx, *Manifesto of the Communist Party, the Revolutions of 1848: Political Writings, Vol. 1* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), p. 71, emphasis added.

³⁴ Aihwa Ong, *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999). Further references are in parentheses in the text.

³⁵ In Ong's words, "Despite the claims of some American scholars and policy makers that the emergence of the Pacific Rim powers heralds an irreducible cultural division between East and West, these parallel narratives, I argue, disguise common civilizational references in a world where the market is absolutely transcendental." Ong, *Flexible Citizenship*, p. 7.

³⁶ Annie is another cultural representative whom I met in September 2006. I made her acquaintance about six months after Annie had quit the HKDL job. The snowballing method enabled me to make Annie's acquaintance; that is, another HKDL employee introduced Annie to me for an interview. After the interview, Annie left Hong Kong, and we wrote each other through e-mail to keep in touch.

³⁷ I conducted my first formal interview with Josephine in June 2006 at a restaurant. In the first interview, Josephine shared with me her reasons for taking the job of cultural representative, her work experiences in both Orlando and Hong Kong, and HKDL's changing media policy. After that, I conducted three interviews with her over the phone in October and December 2006 and in February 2007 respectively. The second interview concerned the management culture and the relationships among workers inside HKDL; the third interview concerned the details of the work environment (such as the size of the break room) in HKDL; the fourth interview concerned her recent HKDL work experiences. In August 2006, I visited the park, where I observed how she worked.

³⁸ This was a promise that Olivia got from HKDL management at the opening reception. Here, 'managerial level' means supervisory role.

³⁹ As I mentioned in the introduction chapter, Olivia had a habit of writing in a blog to express her feelings toward daily life. She gave me her blog address so that I could gain some insight into her thoughts about her life in Orlando. In her blog, Olivia usually did not write in paragraph form and seldom used punctuation marks, except ellipses. If the ellipsis is used within a paragraph, it is used by Olivia and it does not mean that I have abridged her writing. If I abridge her writing, I open a new paragraph and use the ellipsis to indicate that I cut some parts of the content from her blog.

⁴⁰ As I mentioned in chapter Three, starting from 2004, the government launched a series of civic-education advertising campaigns that appeared throughout Hong Kong and that bore the title "The heart is tied to the home country; ambition looks out on the world." The quote is an embellished translation from Chinese, "心繫家國, 志在四方."

⁴¹ Lau Siu Kai, *Society and Politics in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1982), pp. 72-4.

⁴² Agnes S. Ku and Pun Ngai, "Introduction: Remaking Citizenship in Hong Kong," in *Remaking Citizenship in Hong Kong: Community, Nation and the Global City*, edited by Ku and Pun (London, NY: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), p. 1.

⁴³ Joseph Chan Man, "Economizing Culture: the discourse on HK Disneyland," a seminar held at Y7544, City University of Hong Kong on 29 March 2004.

⁴⁴ Fred Chiu, "Combating the Double Processes of Decolonisation/Recolonisation in Hong Kong, or 'Postcoloniality' as a Double-pronged Politics," in *Cultural Studies Review* 8, issue 2, p. 50.

⁴⁵ Legislator Mandy Tam commissioned a research company to survey Hong Kong people's work conditions in the Mainland. Of 373 respondents, 40% needed to work in the Mainland, and 12% needed to work in the Mainland for more than 20 days. Of the 373 respondents, 62% indicated that they were unwilling to work in the Mainland. Of those who worked in the Mainland, 40% said they worked in the Mainland because of the growing China-Hong Kong economic integration, and 24% said their Mainland working experiences were good for their career advancement. See "六成港人不願北上工作," 23 April 2007, *Apple Daily*, A06; "北上工作者憂治安醫療," 23 April 2007, *Hong Kong Daily News*, A04.

⁴⁶ 吳俊雄, "尋找香港本土意識," in *閱讀香港普及文化 1970-2000*, edited by 吳俊雄 and 張志偉 (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press (China), 2001), pp. 87-9.

⁴⁷ People can be open in one way but can resist an unfamiliar idea in another way. As I mentioned in chapter One, my practice of dialogic ethnography led to a defensive response from Olivia. Her insistence on confirming the wisdom of her decision to work at HKDL pushed her to argue against negative criticism of HKDL, including criticism from her fellow cultural representatives. Some cultural representatives were disappointed because before going to Orlando, an HKDL cultural-representative senior staff member told all five hundred cultural representatives that they would be promoted after working in Orlando. However, the promise did not come true, thus triggering the anger. Rather than think that HKDL management was problematic because it had broken its own promise, Olivia commented that her colleagues were unintelligent because the promise had been only verbal, not written as a valid contract.

⁴⁸ Fred Chiu, "Combating the Double Processes of Decolonisation/Recolonisation in Hong Kong, or 'Postcoloniality' as a Double-pronged Politics," in *Cultural Studies Review* 8, issue 2, p. 49. Fred Chiu argues that colonial governor Chris Patten channeled the Post-June-4 Hong Kong mood and articulated the linkage between the democratization processes and "Hong Kong ways of life." The Democrats' landslide victory in 1991 was an achievement of this articulation.

Chapter Five

Pragmatist Cosmopolitanism: Parents' Use of Disney Merchandise

In the previous chapter, I argue that the attractiveness of the HKDL project is not merely economic but also cultural. The “world city” or “cosmopolitan city” image offered by Disneyland promises my respondents various dreams. First, it makes available a “dream” in which they can re-enact their presumed “Chineseness plus” cultural identity (an identity through which some “Hong Kong people” may distinguish themselves from other Chinese).¹ Second, it offers a way to reconfirm some of their “Hong Kong supremacist” belief that Hong Kong is a city of excellence surpassing other Asian cities, and that Hong Kong people are competent and “professional” (up to world standard) enough to host a world-class entertainment complex. Third, the American-based global Disney company significantly provides some people (most of whom are recent local-university graduates) with opportunities to live and work in the United States, to strengthen their curriculum vitae, to change career paths, to encounter cultural differences, and to broaden their own cultural orientation. Because Disney is a household name with which Hong Kong has long been in contact, in this chapter, I focus on the middle class family consumption of Disney offerings, including movies and merchandise. I ask how Disney texts connect to Hong Kong families’ lived experiences and to the families’ larger social, economic, and political environment; in particular, I examine how Hong Kong middle class parents appropriate Disney products for their own uses while simultaneously being subjected to various discourses that shape the parents’ lived sense of themselves and their child-rearing practices. In this chapter, I also discuss middle class struggles and the micropolitics that the middle class

exercises to maintain its privileged position.

It is evident that Disney, through its various merchandise and through its gigantic photogenic sets in malls, manages to insert itself into different Hong Kong families. In 2002, I began conducting an ethnographic study of five middle class families. My aim was to study parents' approaches to parenting, particularly in relation to family consumption of Disney products (comprising chiefly movies, merchandise, and theme parks). All these five families had various Disney merchandise, including DVDs, clothes, and household appliances. Although Disney merchandise is ubiquitous both in Hong Kong generally and, at least at the time of my study, in my respondents' homes, my respondents as parents felt ambivalent toward the Mouse.

I conducted an ethnographic study of several families only, and I chose to concentrate on middle class families.² There are two reasons for the choice. First, Disneyland has been recognized as a site that is accessible to the middle class, that suggests the desire of the American middle class to safely and predictably consume "exotic" landscapes,³ and that promotes American middle class values such as individualism.⁴ Second, scholars differ about role played by the middle class in political transformation.⁵ In the context of this chapter's concerns, I discuss whether middle class parents' consumption behavior, in general, and Disney merchandise, in particular, materializes the middle class "self-help" culture and local family power dynamics within both the market and the existing global order as it affects Hong Kong. I also ask whether this consumption behavior fits the authoritarian, administration-led management practices of the HKSAR government.

All eight parents in my study were between the ages of thirty-five and fifty. During their childhood, they all had had contact with Disney offerings; one parent

had joined the Hong Kong Disney Club as a child, and another parent had delighted in classic Disney animated cartoons. Of the eight parents, however, six were reserved in their opinion of Disney animated-cartoon values and consciously resisted the consumerist culture that Disney had promoted. Nevertheless, Disney merchandise surrounded the children's rooms and the families' TV cabinets. In these parent-respondents' eyes, Disney was no longer just about entertainment but about their children's formal, effective, and entertaining education. My middle class family respondents all had two or more Disney learning products such as bilingual Disney picture-story books or English-language-instruction VCDs, in addition to the respondents' Disney plush dolls, action figures, computer games, costumes, tee-shirts, and DVDs. It is the parents who selected Disney merchandise, produced certain Disney meanings, and thus helped mold their children into certain types of cultural beings.

This chapter's respondents—middle class parents—were more pragmatic than the previous chapter's respondents, who were (for my study's purposes) university-graduated HKDL workers. The middle class parents emphasized formal education, and their pragmatic use of Disney merchandise as edutainment can be linked with two important factors: first, their own lived experiences of upward class mobility (due to their attainment of education qualifications); and second, their recent declining career-advancement opportunities (due to, in their view, their lack of cosmopolitan cultural capital). Living through the Britain-to-China shift of power, riding the property-price wave from crest to trough, facing the Asian financial crisis, and coping with—among other things—severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), economic restructuring, and a shrinking employment market, both my middle class respondents and I, being a Hong Kong resident myself, have

considered ourselves the “crippled” privileged: we have reflected on our “lack” instead of on our “gains” in the global economy. At the same time, respondents’ use and interpretation of Disney can also be attached to other more general discourses, such as the culture of market individualism, which rewards individual material success and condemns personal failure.

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section examines Disney’s synergistic marketing strategy, whereby Disney has inserted itself into Hong Kong families’ everyday life through ubiquitous products and family-oriented celebrations. The second section and the third section discuss these parents’ perception patterns and consumption patterns relative to Disney movies and merchandise. Parents in my study perceived Disney-based moral values, and some parents, as I just noted, were reserved toward, or even resistant toward, some of these perceived values. This latter group of parents were willing to act as cultural gatekeepers to scan out values that they did not want their children to inhabit, in particular, values concerning violence and consumerism. In the fourth section, I examine families’ consumption of Disney educational kits, especially the English-language learning kits. I discuss how parents’ behavior connected with their own lived experiences and discourses and how their acts (1) sustained their middle class privileges, (2) reinforced the local hierarchical parent-child relationship, (3) reproduced local pragmatist and flexible economic-based cultural practices, (4) reproduced the cultural ideal of American “success,” (5) affirmed the importance for their children of the emerging China-based regional economy, and (6) decreased their children’s encounters in the domestic sphere with local popular culture, thereby reducing the potential means for them to relate their pop cultural affect with a local identity and a place-based sense of community. In fact, the complexity of

these parents' consumption behaviors in relation to their lived world demonstrates the value of Massey's argument against making an essentialist connection between place and culture.

Hong Kong: city of Disney consumption⁶

Hong Kong is famous as a big shopping mall; *the International Herald Tribune* calls the Central District the "Fifth Avenue of the Far East."⁷ In "revitalizing Hong Kong's economy and strengthening community cohesiveness following the SARS outbreak" in 2003, different trade organizations of the tourism, retail and catering industries launched a three-month "community self-help" campaign, "We Love HK," to "call upon the Hong Kong public to 'go out and spend' and help the ailing economy."⁸ In contrast to many South Koreans,⁹ for example, Hong Kong people reportedly feel little guilt over their consumption of American or Japanese imports.¹⁰ Living in a big mall landscape, Hong Kong people's shopping culture is incorporated into their daily spatial practices. Whether Hong Kong residents live in public housing or on a private estate, there are malls nearby that the residents can walk past, peer into, and buy from. In 2005, over one third of the housing estates managed by the Hong Kong Housing Authority had shopping malls.¹¹ A ride to any district center will reveal another mega-mall. The most successful district mall is the New Town Plaza in Shatin (one of Hong Kong's eighteen districts).¹² With 200,000 square meters comprising three internal mega-malls, New Town Plaza is one of the largest shopping centers in Hong Kong.¹³

In November 1999, the HKSAR government officially announced that the government and the Disney Company would initiate HKDL, and ever since then, Disney has undertaken a "synergistic"¹⁴ marketing strategy to boost its local and

civic image in Hong Kong. This strategy has included extensive promotion of Disney movies, the refurbishment of local Disney Stores¹⁵ in 2001, frequent public-library retellings of Disney stories, and regular Disney-related activities held for children and high school students.¹⁶ Disney's largest marketing functions took place during the 2001 and 2002 Christmas seasons.

The 2001 Disney Christmas function “Snow White’s Magical Christmas” was held in the center of New Town Plaza on 24 November 2001 and 1 January 2002 (figure 1). The site was decorated as a mini-Disney park, at the center of which stood a castle. Surrounded by tall trees, the outside environment was blocked and the site maintained a self-enclosed narrative. Inside this medieval edifice, visitors walked through a dark corridor featuring a Walt Disney biography and a production history of *Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs* (1937); played with an interactive magic mirror in which the Queen would appear when visitors stepped on a particular part of the floor; visited the Seven Dwarfs’ house; watched a *Snow White* promo; played computer games; and bought Disney merchandise. The flow of visitors to “Snow White’s Magical Christmas” was controlled so that visitors could walk only in one direction: visitors needed to pass through the written introductions about both Walt Disney’s Disney-authorized biography and the *Snow White* production history; after making it through this “rite of passage” (the corridor), visitors could engage in various types of physical entertainment and, in particular, consumption activities.

Fig. 1: “Snow White’s Magical Christmas” in 2001

The visitors were well under Disney's control. The site structured visitors' spatial practices in an enclosed space. However, we should not then conclude that the Disneyfied Snow White Christmas site exercised total control over visitors' behavior. During my visit, most visitors would stay at the site for ten to fifteen minutes. They carried a camera (i.e., not a cellular phone but a digital camera, which means the visitors knew well beforehand that they would like to take pictures there) and immediately took pictures of the site. With their "functional" goal achieved, very few of the visitors bothered to read either the authorized biography of Walt Disney or the *Snow White* production notes, although the information was located at the entrance of the castle through which visitors had to pass. I stayed at the entrance for half an hour and found out only two out of fifty people that I observed bothered to read the history. These two people were in their twenties. Whereas the other visitors quickly filed through, the two visitors in question stayed at the entrance for several minutes and only thereafter did they proceed into the site to take photos. In general, adult visitors busily snapped photos, and no parents tried to explain the *Snow White* story to their children, who seemed oblivious to the written information. To see the Queen appear, older children kept on stepping on the part of the floor that activated the magic mirror. Visitors clearly subordinated the *Snow White* story and Walt Disney biography to their snap-taking and play. As a result, the "Snow White" function may have successfully promoted neither Walt Disney's biography nor the Snow White name; however, the function successfully became a platform for family gathering, aroused certain pleasant and felicitous experiences, and encouraged families to associate Disney with local family festival celebrations.

To create in people’s minds a link between Disney and Hong Kong family rituals, the Walt Disney Company (Asia Pacific) Limited and the Hong Kong Housing Authority (HKHA) co-produced “Disney’s Magical Moments” in 2002 (figure 2). Running from 21 December 2002 to 5 January 2003, this event remains the largest function ever held by the HKHA.¹⁷ Networking 131 of the HKHA’s shopping centers, the event issued souvenirs to those customers who purchased over HK\$200 worth of Disney products. Four shopping malls, Stanley Plaza, Tsz Wan Shan Shopping Centre, Lok Fu Shopping Centre, and Lei Yue Mun Plaza,

were lavishly decorated with gigantic sets and models that served as stages for Cinderella, Belle, Snow White, and the Little Mermaid. Disney merchandise occupied every corner of these malls and their department stores. Disney perhaps had learned from “Snow White’s Magical Christmas” that families privilege picture-taking over reading in the Disney landscape, and Disney made onstage adaptations to local needs. Different from “Snow White’s Magical Christmas” in 2001, “Disney’s Magical Moments” did not ask visitors to familiarize themselves with Walt’s biography or with Disney movies’ production histories but rather to memorize the huge, exotic Disney caricatures by taking a snapshot of their happy Disney moment. These Disney caricatures and visitors’ photos with Disney icons signified both the omni-presence of Disney characters and the particular types of pleasant experiences that stem from a visit to the Disney landscape. Not long after this grandiose event, Disney icons appeared in all major local festival celebrations: the Mickey Mouse Garden featured in the 2003 Hong Kong Flower Show, the big lantern of Sleeping Beauty Castle took part in the 2003 mid-Autumn festival in Victoria Park (figure 3), and since 2001, the Hong Kong Disneyland float has graced the Chinese New Year parade.

Fig. 3: 2003 HK mid-Autumn Festival, Victoria Park

The opening of Hong Kong Disneyland gave rise to a Mickey Mouse craze, elevating the cartoon rodent from modest to high fashion, emblazoning the icon on everything from tee-shirts to jewellery, and generating a market even for counterfeit Mickey Mouse-themed goods; indeed, *the International Herald Tribune* describes the ubiquitous appearance of the Mickey icon in Hong Kong as “a Disney mania.”¹⁸ Disney merchandising also includes character-themed candies and grooming products in pharmacies and in beauty chains such as Mannings and in local supermarkets like Park N’ Shop; Disney-related toys, computer games, and books in Toys ‘R’ Us; similar household products, soft toys, and gifts in thirteen Trendyland chain stores¹⁹; inexpensive youth fashion in ‘It’s Mickey’ chain stores and eighty-six Giordano fashion shops²⁰; uptown high-fashion in Moisselle chain stores; jewellery in forty-five Chow Sang Sang shops; and Disney merchandise in over two hundred McDonald’s restaurants in Hong Kong. Other merchandise featuring Disney characters that Hong Kong has imported from Japan can also be found in trendy youth shops inside MTR stations, Japanese department stores, and small shopping malls in every corner of the metropolis. Counterfeit Disney merchandise can be found in small stationery stores in every public-housing estate, in the famous Ladies Market in Mong Kok, and in markets in Causeway Bay, Wan Chai, North Point, Sham Shui Po, and so on.

Disney’s commercial success is due largely to its synergistic approach, whereby the company first produces movies treated as merchandise advertisements; then it makes TV series, comics, soundtracks, and musicals and sells a range of movie-character merchandise in Disney Stores, theme parks, and local stores. Throughout the process, Disney operates an extensive and penetrating series of

marketing and promotional activities. As the biggest licensor in the world, Disney exercises control over a host of instantly recognizable characters, each of which corresponds to hundreds of kinds of products; therefore, it is no surprise that cross-media marketing helps Disney turn great profits. Mickey Mouse's face sells US\$4.5 billion worth of merchandise every year²¹; *The Lion King* grossed US\$756 million at the box office worldwide, but its soundtrack, live stage shows, cartoons on the Disney Channel, a Toontown attraction at Disneyland, a vast array of merchandise, and home video and DVD sales raked in more than US\$1 billion²²; the production cost of *Toy Story* (1995) was about US\$75-100 million,²³ and the film grossed US\$356.8 million at the worldwide box office²⁴ and, subsequently, grossed over US\$3 billion²⁵ during ten years of further profits, including ancillary earnings.

It is evident that Disney—because of its differentiated merchandise, its shifting aesthetic sense, and its adaptive application of contradictory popular discourses to local needs and desires—has managed to successfully insert itself into different Hong Kong families' lives. On the one hand, the American-based firm links up the brand “Disney” with Hong Kong's local festivals and family rituals and, on the other hand, the firm advertises its characters by presenting them in various promotional activities, movie screenings, and product sales in every corner of Hong Kong. The commercial operation is massive. However, if the core aim of Disneyization²⁶ is to sell successfully and to ask consumers to consume happily and thoughtlessly, then a Disneyized culture is hard to find in Hong Kong; instead, Disney merchandise becomes a vehicle by which parents can mold their children into a certain type of cultural being. Moreover, as we shall see, parents' uses of Disney products reproduce the existing power order, including local class differences and a cultural ideal of American superiority at success.

Hong Kong parents: the cultural gatekeepers

Hong Kong people generally regard family as the most important component of human life²⁷; in particular, both having children and child-centeredness in a family setting are norms in Hong Kong culture.²⁸ Children's status in Hong Kong society, as Ng Chun Hung argues, has changed over time, "from a beginning of neglect, then to alarm and protection, and, since the 1970s to a view of children as the pillar of the future society and hence an asset to be invested in."²⁹ Such shifts as the one from child-neglect to child-centeredness have become possible both under the changing state policies³⁰ and amidst the proliferation of TV programs, games and toys, clothing, and other products—a proliferation that treats children as consumers who have their own tastes and wants.

Living inside this "Shopping Paradise," Hong Kong parents may refrain from shopping for themselves so that they can save for their children's future.³¹ Also, parents frequently disagree with and reject the consumerist attitude promoted by children's TV programs and the mega-mall landscape of Hong Kong, although they allow their children to have their own tastes to different degrees; as I will show later, the parents encourage their children to consume particular edutainment products, and even provide an "environment" for them to do so. Thinking of children as passive, vulnerable, and dependent, parents also frequently state the importance of "environment" in children's development. In discussing their child-rearing methods, parents presume that they should provide their children with an environment conducive to a "healthy" childhood and should protect their children against environments that affect the innocence of children "negatively." Commonly listed among these environments are Hong Kong shopping malls and especially

Disney's consumerist landscape, viewed as containing mainly "low cultural capital" commodities.

Cathy³² and Lisa³³ are two mothers who consciously act against malling behavior; that is, these mothers oppose parent-child visits to and wanderings through shops inside malls, visits that can last for hours and result in a bevy of purchases. Because of the economic doldrums that seized Hong Kong after the Handover, Cathy consciously changed her consumption practices into a pragmatist approach.³⁴ For example, to save money her family dropped the Sunday family ritual of having *dim sum* in a Chinese restaurant; she also consciously refrained from shopping for "unnecessary" goods (such as clothes) or services (having beauty treatments or joining a gym). As full-time working mothers, both Cathy and Lisa expressed concern over their lack of child-centered time. To develop parent-child intimacy, the two mothers planned activities such as outings and storybook readings, as well as casual activities such as sandwich making, and the two considered these activities to be more valuable than malling. As Cathy, for example, stated:

I'm not in the habit of taking him [her son] shopping because he can't quite control himself.... It's a waste of time, since we don't have much time to be together ... I have to go to work on alternate Saturdays. On Sunday, we wake up at about ten and eleven. After lunch, he has to study, since we just do it once a week. After studying, it's about three. What can we do? At most, we go to the park or to the public library. After a while, it's time to have dinner. It is a waste of time if we also go shopping at the mall and play stupid things in Jumpin Gym U.S.A.³⁵.... Now I know some of his classmates' parents, and we go to the park together. Those parents also think like me. Going out to the park is better than spending time in the mall.

Given her intention to spend less money in everyday life, it is easy to understand why Cathy rarely goes to the Disney Store to shop for her son Adrian. In 2003, I

visited Cathy's home, where she showed me her Disney merchandise and commented that Disney merchandise is not worth the expense:

You see the Buzz notebook. Once, his classmate's mother brought me to the Disney Store. It was on sale and I bought it. But actually not everything is cheap. Only some stuff. And Disney clothes are still more expensive than clothes at the market. The one he [Adrian] wears now costs only twelve dollars in Po Ling Street. He doesn't have to dress up at home, right? A tee-shirt around forty dollars is good enough for going out, and you can't buy Disney clothes for about forty dollars, right?

In my casual talks with Cathy, we seldom talked about consumption activities. In contrast, my talks with my single, childless girlfriends often concern consumption-related topics. Important to Cathy were Adrian and her work life, which she mentioned during every one of our talks. Family and work occupied Cathy's life, and consumption became a rare and marginal daily-life practice. Adrian has some Disney clothes, but many are gifts³⁶ from relatives and friends. Cathy had bought some Disney movies in the VCD medium, such as *Toy Story*, *Snow White*, *Peter Pan*, and *The Lion King*. Cathy carefully chose these VCDs: she would buy them only if she had concluded that the movie would be good enough to re-play many times. And even though Cathy, her husband Fred, and Adrian visited Disneyland Paris in 2001 and 2006, the family did not change into big spenders. In 2001, for example, they bought only a balloon. That is, they successfully resisted the park's design, which encourages visitors to play happily and to shop "naturally" and extravagantly.

Seeing children as innocents who need to be constrained with discipline, parents discipline their own lifestyle. Fighting against ideas of consumerism and materialism, Lisa and her husband Tom seldom went to a mega-mall. When they

did go shopping, they tried their best to go alone, that is, to avoid bringing their daughters along; this strategy reflected the parents' effort to prevent their children from developing the desire to shop. Since the birth of their first daughter, Dorothy, the family would eat dinner at home except during festivals. As did Cathy, Lisa refused to treat shopping in malls on weekends as a family ritual. Lisa and Tom told me separately and together on three separate occasions that "we never buy products based on characters." In Lisa's words, "We absolutely do not buy products because of the characters. They [the children] know the rule and therefore they don't whine to buy things with a character." All products that Lisa and Tom purchase are based on the products' usefulness, instead of on appearance.

Consequently, Dorothy and Stephanie, the two daughters of Lisa and Tom, seldom went to a mall, even though their residence in Shatin is less than a ten-minute drive from New Town Plaza. Dorothy was a bit different from the other children discussed in the study and from ten kindergarteners whom I talked to in a nursery school,³⁷ for she recognized Disney characters but had no special preference for any particular character. She exhibited no strong desire to own a product with a character image. There were Winnie the Pooh plastic plates in Lisa's home, but these were gifts from friends.

Judy and Jacob,³⁸ another couple, enjoyed dining out with their son, Leo, and three of them frequently visited malls. Aside from the members of the anti-Disney group, Judy and Jacob were the two interviewees who most worried about the HKDL project's contribution to American cultural imperialism. Compared with Cathy and Lisa, Judy and Jacob were more liberal in the sense that they allowed their child to visit malls and his favorite shops, but at the same time they were more explicit in criticizing Disney's promotion of child-centered consumerist behavior.

Characterizing Disney as an institution that is “dredging money from children by tantalizing them,” they practiced the “no buy” policy. Consider the following conversation that we had:

Kim: You bring Leo to the Disney Store. Does he ask you to buy him things?

Judy: Yes, he does. We just say, “We won’t buy it. No buy.” (Judy smiles.)

Jacob: He is not fond of those things.

Judy (smiling): Sometimes he is. After seeing the movie, he wanted to have a toy, such as Buzz Lightyear.... Every time he goes there [Disney Store], he touches them. We keep on saying, “We won’t buy it because it is expensive and we don’t need it. You can come but only to look at them.”

Leo accepts his parents’ teachings and puts them into practice. After watching *Lilo & Stitch* (2002), Leo and I visited a Disney Store. When he saw the Stitch plush dolls, he ran to that counter and played with the dolls. His fondness for Stitch instilled in him a powerful desire to own a Stitch plush doll, but he decided not to buy it finally because “mother likes it least.” Again on this topic, I conversed with Leo:

Kim: Do you like Stitch?

Leo: Yes.

Kim: Why?

Leo: Because it is cute.

Kim: Do you want to have a Stitch soft toy?

Leo: Yes, but mother said we have soft toys at home. We don’t need to have more soft toys. But the fact is, my home doesn’t have a Stitch soft toy.

Kim: If you had money, would you buy a Stitch soft toy?

Leo: No, because mother likes it least of all.

Leo displayed the “look but don’t buy” behavior again when we stepped outside the

Disney Store and back into the mall, where a temporary counter was selling Bossini casual wear featuring images of Stitch and Lilo. Leo asked me to accompany him to the counter to have a look. When we arrived, he said, “Actually, I don’t really like short-sleeved shirts. I have a lot at home. I don’t need any more.” His desire to own the tee-shirt was suppressed by his rational evaluation of needs.

With regard to Disney offerings, Betty³⁹ was less ambivalent and more positive than other mothers. To Betty, Disney movies are good for both parents and children: “After watching *Finding Nemo*, parents should learn that we shouldn’t be too strict to children and children should also know that they should listen to parents’ advice.” As the only second-generation middle class parent in my study, Betty had joined Hong Kong’s Mickey Mouse Club when she was a child and she was the only respondent in my study to voice the belief that “It [Disney] belongs to my generation”—although her fondness for Japanese cartoon characters was greater than her fondness for Disney ones.⁴⁰ Perhaps because of her relatively affluent background, Betty was also the only parent who did not insist on training her son, Henry, to refrain from consumption activities. When I first visited Betty and Henry, I was stunned by the huge number of Disney videos in their home: above the TV set, there were many Disney DVDs, including *The Lion King* and its sequels, *Lilo & Stitch* and its sequel, *Dumbo*, *Toy Story I and II*, *A Bug’s Life*, *Finding Nemo*, *The Incredibles*, some sing-along English learning videotapes, and some “It’s Mickey” short animated cartoon videotapes; on the left, there were two big boxes with the big words “Disney’s World of English” and many Disney storybooks. Besides, there were three Pixar/Disney action figures (Buzz Lightyear, Emperor Zurg, and Mr. Incredible), a Buzz toothbrush, and a Shrek sofa. Betty explained that Henry liked watching the same movies repeatedly and that the cost

of going to the movie theater was more than the cost of buying a DVD; deciding to forego the movie-theater experience, she opted to wait for the release of a film on DVD. As an English teacher at a famous girls' school, Betty was lenient toward Henry's Disney-watching practices because she found that Henry improved his English by imitating simple dialogue in the movies.

Hard-working workshop: stickers collection

Though attractive, Disney's countless pieces of merchandise are not many parents' objects of desire; in fact, some parent-respondents in my study tried their best to guard their children against the desire both to shop and to own these vast arrays of goods. Although it may not be easy for them, children still can get what they want by requesting a particular product as their birthday gift or by behaving well in return for a reward. To instill in children the understanding that "there is no free lunch in the world," mothers Ada⁴¹ and Cathy presented their children with an alternative way to get rewards: sticker collecting. If their kids collected a certain number of stickers, they got a reward.

Fig.4: Ada's home

Like many parents, Ada was concerned with Angel's academic standing. Angel sometimes received physical punishment because she would not concentrate on doing assignments or because she was careless in her test-taking (figure 4). To ensure Angel's academic standing, Ada spent most of her time in line with Angel's tightly crammed school schedule and bought books and educational kits for Angel. Ada noted that she gave Angel ten dollars of pocket money each week and that Angel could spend her money according to her wants. If she did not want to use her allowance, Angel could behave well to get star stickers. After collecting a certain number of star stickers, Angel would earn a gift such as stationery. If her conduct fell below expectations, stars would be deducted and she would have to behave better to earn the stickers back.

Ada used sticker collecting to encourage Angel to be docile and to do well in school, whereas Cathy saw it as a practice-based reflection of the "winner-take-all" world in which we live. Cathy and I spoke about the matter:

Kim: What kinds of gifts do you give him [Adrian] on his birthday?

Cathy: They vary from year to year. Last year, it was a plant. I wanted to train him to have patience. Sometimes I give him a gift that he longs to have, such as computer games. Kids are never satisfied. They are accustomed to receiving lots of gifts, but they still feel that they don't have enough. Recently, I've intentionally bought him fewer things. Lots of these [Disney products] were bought by others.... Adrian has to collect 100 stickers for a Digimon game.⁴² He tries his best to be the best. He has to be the best in school. And if he doesn't behave well that day, he will ask, "How many stickers can I get today?" He is aggressive in this respect. He has to win. If he loses, he will cry. But it's OK, since everybody experiences failure while growing up.

Kim: You want to train Adrian to be aggressive?

Cathy: I want him to know that there is no free lunch in the world, that you have to work hard for your dreams.

In the consumerist world, children are seen as full-fledged consumers who have their own tastes and who deserve some freedom of choice. The Hong Kong parents whom I interviewed for this study strove to protect their children from such a consumerist attitude by limiting their exposure to shopping-mall environments and, therefore, to the ubiquitous Disney products. Although nine Disney Stores were located in major Hong Kong shopping malls by 2004, these parents seldom shopped there, for they found that Disney merchandise did not live up to its billing.⁴³ According to the sum of their views, children who desire something need to act well, a dictum that runs parallel to the “work hard, play hard, spend hard” mentality of these Hong Kong parent respondents.

No killings, no disobedience, no laziness: failed Disney movies and stories

Shopping and watching TV are two interrelated daily behaviors—the more exposure children have to TV, the more consumer power children will demand.⁴⁴ Parents whom I interviewed try their best not only to obstruct children’s introduction to the consumerist world but to keep them away from the television set, as well. Many Hong Kong parents consider television viewing a negative influence on children’s development: it takes away from children’s homework time, promotes consumption, and broadcasts explicit depictions of sex and violence.⁴⁵

In the family, it is the mothers who perform “the mediating role of ‘gatekeepers’ in creating a reception context”⁴⁶ and who thus rule over children’s media use. Choi and Lee argue that women—both at-home workers and marketplace workers—are more responsible than men in Hong Kong for childrearing and for domestic work.⁴⁷ In one of my own studies,⁴⁸ I further argue that mothers control what children can and cannot watch; mothers talk to the

children about what they should or should not learn from television and movie characters; and mothers even change their own watching habits to cater to their children's development.⁴⁹ The increase of families' VCR ownership,⁵⁰ the rise of home-rental markets for videos in the 1980s, and the subsequent rise of VCD and DVD markets have greatly helped parents select particular programs for children to watch. As the world's largest provider of child-oriented content, Disney releases movies that, most recently in the VCD and the DVD mediums, have impressed both parents and children in Hong Kong, especially when these parents consider local movies and TV soaps to be mind-numbingly pointless but consider Disney movies, presenting little sex or horror, to be safer for children.⁵¹ For example, Cathy liked *Snow White* and *Peter Pan* a lot, and therefore, Adrian had watched these two Disney classics many times. As a film buff and film-company administrator, Cathy liked the elegant depiction and cinematic style of *Snow White*. She cited the death scene as an example:

When he [Adrian] was two or three years old, we watched *Snow White* [the movie] many times, and I saw every detail. *Snow White* does not show Snow eating the apple, and you just see the apple dropping from her hand. It is very elegant. It is different from today's movies, where you see a knife lodged inside the corpse. The film is worth many viewings. There is a little turtle in the movie. At one point, Snow raises her hand and the turtle crawls down. It is funny, and the song is so beautiful. You cannot find another film better than this film.

As I mentioned, Judy and Jacob had bad impressions of Disney animation because they feared American cultural imperialism. Judy argued, also, that Disney animated cartoons emphasize a binary way of reading goodness and badness, heroism and cowardice, all of which simplify children's views of the world. However, compared with other characters such as Bionicle,⁵² whom Leo liked, Disney's characters

sometimes held a greater appeal for Judy and Jacob. For example, Judy and Jacob recounted an incident in which one of Leo's classmates had hit him twice: the first time, hitting Leo in his stomach and testicles in the classroom; the second time, hitting Leo in the testicles in the restroom. During one of our conversations, both Jacob and Judy linked this incident to their concern over media's promotion of violence:

Jacob: The main problem is why the child was being so violent. Because things around us are so violent. Media images are so problematic. Media just keep on showing fighting and fighting, and children just copy, just imitate. They may know it is wrong, but they still imitate.

Kim: Then how do you face the fact that Leo likes watching Buzz Lightyear and Bionicle, characters that have the right to conquer?

Judy: We tell him directly our attitude toward these characters. But he can love these characters. I told him "your Bionicle looks very ugly. It is about biological warfare. If humans have to face this situation, it will be very bad.

Jacob: Disney basically is very American. Even Buzz Lightyear is an idol, a so-called hero to protect and to save human beings. In *Toy Story*, Buzz is there to save other toys. *But* it's better than Bionicle. There is also another side to *Toy Story*, it also talks about the relationship between him [Buzz] and Woody. *But* I still think that it is a very big corporation making these animations. *But* it is not totally bad... [emphasis mine]

Although Jacob did not quite like the character Buzz Lightyear because it legitimises violence based on self-defense, Jacob found that other productions, such as Bionicle, can be worse. By frequently using the disjunction 'but' to describe his views on *Toy Story*, the above dialogue reveals Jacob's disjointed, ambivalent attitude toward Disney movies. Both Judy and Jacob emphasized liberal parenting and open discussion instead of traditional parenting and rule-giving; consequently, Leo, unlike other children in this study, had chances to watch his favorite television programs, which Judy and Jacob perhaps frowned upon personally as "bad."⁵³

It should be noted, however, that while establishing a family-entertainment market in which the whole family can enjoy a movie together, Disney movies fail to deal with local family agendas in detail; the Hong Kong parents in this study expressed concern that Disney's feature-length animated cartoons are too long for children's healthy viewing and that the movies' romance and revenge themes and some of the characterizations work against Hong Kong parents' idea of children's entertainment. To protect children from the harm that might arise from their exposure to fear, confusion, anger, and disgust, parents establish household rules about screen-media use. For instance, although Lisa enjoyed songs from *The Lion King* and although her daughters liked the film, Lisa had reservations about this big Disney hit. She declared that it contains "too many killings":

... in *The Lion King*, the two brothers kill each other. I watch the film with the children and I have to explain why this or that happens; but I can't explain why the two brothers need to kill each other ...

Except for Judy and Jacob, other parents in this study carried with them a sense of Chinese traditionalism.⁵⁴ To them, parents are superior to children and should teach their children the difference between right and wrong; children are innocent and should receive an education and an upbringing based on talks, controls, rewards, and punishment, which can be physical. Because of this traditionalism, children's entertainment in parents' eyes should teach children to be polite, docile, honest, gentle, cultivated, and hardworking, instead of naughty, wild, deceitful, violent, uncouth, and lazy. Some Disney characters such as Tinker Bell are famous and popular for their mischief,⁵⁵ and Hong Kong parents do not view such characters as positively as do parents in a Western context, which might be more likely to exhibit

relatively liberal child-rearing practices. Cathy, the administrator of a local movie company and a fan of *Snow White*, disliked *Pinocchio* (1940) because “Pinocchio is not a good kid and I don’t like a bad kid,” and she abhorred *Lilo & Stitch* for Stitch’s disruptive behavior:

I really don’t like the film. It’s unacceptable. The first whole hour is about how that thing [Stitch] destroys things. Children should not watch the film. This cartoon animation is made for children. However, he [Stitch] is so naughty. Is it that you [Disney] want the children to be as naughty as Stitch? I really wanted to leave the theater. I will be picky in choosing Disney movies in the future.

Afraid that her child would imitate inappropriate behavior, Cathy argued that Disney had failed in recent years to produce “good-children” movies and that she had become suspicious of Disney productions altogether. Judy and Betty, as did some other parents, raised concerns about Stitch’s naughtiness, but did not prohibit their boys, Leo and Henry, from watching the movie; instead, these mothers talked to the children and directed them to interpret the movie. As I mention above, Leo followed Judy and Jacob’s “no buy” policy because he knew that his mother did not like Stitch. In fact, *Lilo & Stitch* was not well received at the Hong Kong box office.

Before the release of *Lilo & Stitch*, Disney launched an aggressive advertising campaign to promote this film: TV advertisements on both Cantonese channels and English channels,⁵⁶ continual reports in popular lifestyle magazines such as *East Touch*⁵⁷ and *Milk*,⁵⁸ family-oriented magazines such as *TVB Weekly*,⁵⁹ and children’s magazines such as *Ming Po Children Weekly*⁶⁰ and *X-kids Express Weekly*.⁶¹ Disney also had tie-in toys and tie-in activities available through McDonald’s restaurants, Kjeldsens cookies, and local popular fashion brand Bossini.⁶² In conjunction, shopping malls and Disney held promotional activities⁶³

wherein shoppers who spent a certain amount of money on purchases would receive Stitch merchandise. Outside trendy movie theaters in Causeway Bay, passers-by would see a giant-sized Stitch plush doll. Disney also invited one popular Taiwan group, F4, to sing one song for the movie. Despite an avalanche of promotional activities and the golden movie-release time of the summer holidays, *Lilo & Stitch* reached a disappointing 29th place at the local box office in 2002, grossing a mere HK\$8.64 million. That same year, the second-highest-grossing film was *Harry Potter and the Chamber of Secrets* (HK\$38.26 million), and rounding out the top-five highest-grossing films was *Monsters, Inc.* (HK\$25.77 million).⁶⁴

The merchandise of *Lilo & Stitch* was not well received either. *Lilo & Stitch* was in Hong Kong theaters from 11 July to 21 August 2002. In June and July 2002, I conducted my fieldwork on all nine local Disney Stores⁶⁵ (Tsim Sha Tsui, Shatin, Festival Walk, Tai Koo Shing, Whampoa, Diamond Hill, Causeway Bay, Tsuen Wan, and one in an airport). I made a total of twenty-four separate visits to these stores during the two-month period. In each visit, I spent about one hour to see whether or not different populations came to Disney stores at different times and behaved differently. During this period of intensive fieldwork, *Lilo & Stitch* merchandise was on prominent display in the stores: Stitch plush toys, bean dolls, interactive dolls, music dolls, figure sets, computer games, glass globes, stationery, school bags, card holders, drawing kits, candies, clothes, dress-up costumes, canteens, tumblers, plastic cups, and activity kits. My observations strongly suggested that customers either did not recognize the two characters, Lilo and Stitch, or were not very keen on Stitch:

A teenage girl about twelve years old talked to her mother, commenting that

Stitch was “cute” and that “it only costs \$145.” Her mom replied, “What is it? It isn’t a koala, nor is it a monster.” The mother walked away while continuing with her comments, and the girl followed. (Shatin, 23 June 2002, Sunday)

Two teenage girls looked at the *Lilo & Stitch* glass globe, one asked the other, “Oh, this one, this is the new one, what is it called?” The queried girl replied, “What? New? I don’t know. It’s so ugly!” (Kowloon Tong, 29 June 2002, Saturday)

After the film appeared on the big screen, more customers recognized the characters Lilo and Stitch. However, few customers stayed at the Stitch corner of the stores for more than 10 seconds; instead, they looked for clothing on sale⁶⁶; many customers clustered around the Pooh corner, where some newly arrived Winnie the Pooh soft toys could be found.⁶⁷ Few people actually purchased the *Lilo & Stitch* merchandise. During my visits, there were only three purchases of Stitch merchandise and no purchases of Lilo merchandise. Aggressive promotion activities might strengthen the recognisability of new Disney characters, but ensure neither positive public reception of the characters nor desirable sales of related merchandise. From my observations, the advertising did little to offset the decidedly mixed perceptions of Stitch’s cuteness factor:

A girl about ten commented that Stitch was “cute” as she was holding the plush doll, and she kept on saying “It’s very soft” while touching it. Her mother commented, “It’s so ugly!” They, then walked away. (Kowloon Tong, 10 July 2002, Wednesday)

With his sharp teeth, pronounced nostrils, fins, and four weapon-like hands, Stitch is a cross between an adorable koala and a terrifying alien: the concept of “cute” encounters the concept of “ugly,” good and evil. One parent who had also worked in a film marketing organization commented that the unpopularity of the film was

due largely to parents' disapproval of the characterization of Stitch, a mischievous alien. The film had a sequel but skipped a theatrical release and went straight to DVD.

Stitch and other Disney characters display a good deal of violence and mischief, to which my respondent Lisa objected. As a mother who worked outside the home and as a firm believer in meritocracy, Lisa objected, as well, to Disney's princess stories because, she argued, they teach girls to think about only romantic affairs and marriage. In a conversation with me, Lisa argued that girls who daydream of romance and marriage are naughty and lazy:

Kim: What do you like or dislike about Disney stories?

Lisa: Too many love stories and too many killings. For example, in *The Lion King*, the two brothers kill each other ... You asked me if Disney is American. Well, these nonsense love stories are very American. And this thick book on Disney classics—the stories just ask girls to get married. What is the point of these stories? Isn't it sick to ask small girls to daydream about getting married as soon as possible? I don't know how to tell them the stories when I find that I can't educate them through these stories. Therefore, I don't use them anymore.... We try to find stories that are more educational, and we are afraid of popularizing certain ideas, you know, materialism and violence.... That's why I stopped telling them these stories.

Disney's princess stories ran counter to Lisa's "work hard" mentality and the ideal that she projected onto her two daughters—an ideal that substitutes a marketable career woman for a non-marketable married wife. As a result, traditionalism (which emphasizes hierarchical parent-child relationships based on children's obedience) and a middle class mentality (which emphasizes self-made success based on hard work) encourage parents to restrict their children's exposure to some Disney movies because these movies purportedly have negative effects (disobedience, laziness) on children.

Parents are aware of and feel uneasy with some Disney values and the consumerist discourse in general. Surrounded by this threat, the parents resist it by negotiating with it: the families watch and buy some—but not any—Disney movies and products. Underlying this strategy, however, is not only an actively local negotiation with global discourses but also the abrasion of local cultural formation by transnationally circulating values—in this case, either parental authority in Hong Kong’s “traditional” family practices relative to a more recently adopted child-centeredness and the emphasis on egalitarian family relationships based on the “modern” domestic ideal, or frugality and hard work as family virtues relative to market-based consumption as a child’s right. In the next section, I will demonstrate that parents’ active consumption shapes their own middle class ideas on parenting and, at the same time, reproduces the privileged status of those ideas by instituting a “good environment” (or, as in Bourdieu’s terms, a good habitus⁶⁸) for their children.

Hong Kong parents: the “good English-learning environment” providers

It is quite common for affluent families to have Disney movies at home. It is also a widespread practice for parents in Western countries to set rules limiting children’s media use.⁶⁹ However, what distinguishes Disney merchandising in Asia from Disney merchandising elsewhere is the greater market presence (relative to English-speaking countries) of Disney educational products in Asia.⁷⁰ This presence earns Disney a privileged status for many Hong Kong families.

Coming from the intermediate and the lower classes, most present-day Hong Kong parents have attained an education, worked hard, and climbed the social ladder. It is these parents who dominate the first generation of Hong Kong’s

current middle class: administrators, managers, and professionals in related fields. Without inherited economic capital, these parents are deeply concerned over their children's social identity and make a concerted effort to maintain their children's middle class status by acquiring capital of both the economic kind and the cultural kind: the core of their sense of attainment centers on their children's language skills, and an important supplement to this core concerns the nurturing of their children's competence in high culture. Parents in my study believe that if they provide a good learning environment for their children, their children will have a greater chance of developing the competence and cultural capital needed for their future careers.⁷¹

Parents attach great importance to their children's adeptness in oral and written English because it signifies that these children can enter a better school and, later in life, find a better job. Furthermore, since the Handover in 1997, many Hong Kong parents see *Putonghua* as increasingly important, particularly given the emergence of China as a power to reckon with in the global economy. Not far behind language on the importance scale is "cultivation" in high culture, which children are expected to possess if they are to gain entrance to prestigious schools. As a result, all five families that I worked with were paying for piano lessons for their children, and four for private English lessons, and three of the five had enrolled their children, starting at the age of five, in *Putonghua* classes. The extreme case was Angel, Ada's daughter. When she was in Primary one (which is a grade for students who are about six years old), Angel not only spent a full day at school but also managed to take nine additional classes every week: piano on Monday, English on Tuesday and Wednesday, ballet on Thursday, mathematics and English on Friday, and *Putonghua*, English pronunciation, and ballet on Saturday. Of the nine private lessons, four involved English, and one was in *Putonghua*.

Because Angel's family was Catholic, Angel attended church and did not need to have additional classes on Sunday, but normally she swam with her father for an hour to strengthen her body.

Because these parents were pragmatic consumers, they consumed products that could heighten their children's learning initiative and abilities. Hong Kong parents will not use a Disney movie as a babysitter, but they do treat Disney *educational kits* as babysitters. All the families in my study had Disney educational products: Judy had bought *Leo Winnie the Pooh 123's* and *Winnie the Pooh ABC's* so that her son could learn counting and letter recognition when he was three years old; Cathy had bought bilingual Disney storybooks and Disney's *Read Along* CD-and-storybook series to help Adrian learn both English and written Chinese; and Ada had bought Disney's *Sing Along Songs* and several of Disney's English-language storybooks for Angel to learn English.⁷² Parents bought Disney edutainment kits because, even before the purchase, both the parents and their children were familiar with the characters. People's familiarity with Disney characters because of long-time encounters and because of the omni-presence of the Disney image, as discussed in a previous section, encourages parents to purchase the Disney brand instead of other edutainment products. Betty discussed this very topic:

It [Disney] belongs to my generation.... These characters are attractive to *us*. We watched Disney when *we* were growing up. The BBC also has a set of teaching-English materials. Its main character is an owl and it's cheaper, I should say a lot cheaper. But as a mother, I think what attracts me can attract my son. Perhaps this is the wrong idea. Perhaps the owl also attracts him. But who buys the set? The mother, not the son. They [Disney characters] are attractive to me, and therefore, I bought this set.

Disney's World of English is my focus here because the first set, which is for children aged three to six, recommends daily use over the course of three years. Consisting of twelve English learning books and many vocabulary cards, the set costs HK\$14,000, which is slightly below Hong Kong's average household monthly income of HK\$15,500⁷³ and which is about ten times the cost of another brand's English learning VCD set. Among the five families I have studied, Lisa and Betty used the first set and Betty had paid the full price for it.

Disney's World of English is not developed by the Walt Disney Company itself but by a licensee, World Family Ltd. The English kit emphasizes children's ability to learn American English as their mother tongue through "listening, absorbing and copying." The kit asserts that its approach to learning is not complex; the claim is that children aged three to six who play it everyday for three years can learn to speak English as their mother tongue and can do so easily because the kit successfully creates an English-language learning environment. It was first introduced in 1980 in Japan and has served over 100,000 families across Japan and Taiwan.⁷⁴ Introduced to Hong Kong in the late 1990s, it soon became popular with middle class families.

Attracted to the concept of an English learning environment, both Betty and Lisa bought *Disney's World of English*. Each had a Filipina maid who took care of their children and who communicated with them in English, but Betty and Lisa remained unsure of the maid's English-language teaching skills and, therefore, bought the Disney set and asked the maid to play the disc and sing the songs with the children in the morning. At night, the mothers read to them from the same books. Betty commented on the topic and responded to one of my follow-up questions:

Betty: This is the pack for learning English. We can sing all songs taught by the kit. We use them rarely now, but we played them every morning when Henry was young. He did not have much to do at home and we needed to go to work. The maid did not know what to do with him, but with this [*Disney's World of English*], the maid played the disc and sang with him. Grace [Betty's ex-maid] can sing all the wake-up songs and bedtime songs.

Kim: How long can it be used?

Betty: It can be used until [the child is] six years old. There are vocabulary cards and these words keep repeating in all the songs and stories. The whole idea of the learning set is to recycle these words continuously so that children can learn all these words. I know this method works. For example, children don't know what 'acrobat' means. But there's a book called the circus show. And it contains acrobat songs. The child watches it and then knows who the acrobat is and what a circus is. The words they teach can be used in daily life. We had already taken him to a circus.

The parents were suspicious of the content of Disney movies but were not suspicious of the content of the Disney English-language learning kit. Mickey, Minnie, Donald, Goofy, and Pluto become an important entry point through which two-year-old and three-year-old children begin their English-language learning. In my study, the parents allowed their children to watch the same disc, day after day and week after week, until the children memorized all the linguistic details of each speaker. Lisa tried out book Eight in front of me (the following dialogue was in English unless indicated):

Lisa: The second section is about acrobats. "... can we do that?"

Dorothy: Of course I can. I am an acrobat.

Lisa: I can hang by one knee.

Dorothy: I can stand on one hand.

Lisa: I can swing and ...

Dorothy and Stephanie: ... and so can she.

Lisa: I can fly in the sky, and ...

Dorothy: ... and so can I.

Lisa and Dorothy: We are the acrobats.

Lisa: Can you lift a hundred pounds?

Stephanie (lowering her voice to imitate a man's voice): Of course I can.

Lisa: I am a ...

Stephanie (lowers her voice): ... a strong man.

Lisa: I can lift ...

Dorothy and Stephanie: ... a hundred pounds.

(Then Dorothy and Stephanie speak themselves.)

Dorothy: Can you lift two hundred pounds?

Stephanie (lowers her voice): Of course I can. I am a strong man.

Dorothy: Can you lift three hundred pounds?

Stephanie lowers her voice: Of course I can. I am a strong man.

Dorothy: Can you lift four hundred pounds?

Stephanie (lowers her voice): Of course I can. I am a strong man.

Lisa (to Kim, in Cantonese): Every night is like that. I want to finish it as soon as possible and then I can go to sleep.

Lisa: five hundred, six hundred ...

Dorothy (in Cantonese): No, only the last three are like that, not now!

(Lisa then follows the book and talks.)

Dorothy (in Cantonese): No, it's not like that. You should ask a question, not just talk to yourself.

(Stephanie sings an English song after awhile.)

Lisa (in Cantonese): She is singing a song from another book.

Dorothy (in Cantonese): It's in book Six.

Lisa (in Cantonese): And she learns the word *hippopotamus*.

From Lisa's perspective, the "pure entertainment" of Disney movies contains gender stereotypes that would encourage her daughters to think only of marriage; the Disney English-language kits, in contrast, are educational and the cultural concerns are of secondary importance. On this point, Lisa fielded several of my questions:

Kim: When I played back the Disney kit's tape that you tried in front of me, I was a bit scared because the children learn not only the pronunciation but also what it means to be a man—you know, "I am a strong man." Have you thought about it?

Lisa: You mean gender stereotypes? No, I have not thought about this before.

Kim: Have you ever worried about this?

Lisa: For pronunciation, they also watch other English-language learning programs, and I hope that they won't just believe in one system of phonetics. As for stereotypes, I always tell them about alternative ways of thinking. For example, regarding men, I told them that they just need to find a good man to marry and that daddy is a good man. Being a good man means so many things: a rich man, a handsome man, or a strong man does not necessarily make a good man.

Language acquisition is more important here than cultural issues. While cultural critics have criticized the post-Handover use of *Putonghua* as the medium of instruction in Hong Kong schools and have attributed this use to the Mainland's cultural imperialism, Lisa accepted such changes because she considered them pragmatic: "What's the problem? They speak Cantonese at home. Their English and *Putonghua* must be better than ours so that they can earn a living." We should note here that neither were Lisa's actions the direct result of unconscious acts nor was she thoughtlessly adopting other parents' behaviors. Rather, she understood clearly the "lack" that characterized her and her husband; because of their lack of "world exposure," and because of their sub-standard English (the two factors were closely related in her eyes), the career choices available to Lisa and her husband were not as broad as those choices available to "better" counterparts in society. We spoke about this issue:

Lisa: The most ideal case for me is that ... they can get a scholarship to study overseas. In the globalized world, they should have world exposure. Their parents do not have it, and we feel bad about this.

...

Kim: How about *Putonghua*?

Lisa: She has not started learning *Putonghua*, but we found one school for her ... We accept the idea that *Putonghua* is the medium of instruction in school. What's the problem? They speak Cantonese at home. Their English and their *Putonghua* must be better than ours so that they can earn a living.

Kim: Do you think that you can't earn a living?

Lisa: Of course I don't.

Kim (expressing astonishment at the answer): What do you mean by having the ability to "earn a living" then? After all, you know that speaking good English and good *Putonghua* can't guarantee you a good job.

Lisa: I don't know. Let's say, if my oral *Putonghua* is as good as a native speaker's, then I can work for Phoenix TV,⁷⁵ and I won't need to work for TVB Jade, ATV, or Cable. I get more chances. If my English is very good, I get more opportunities.... You know, HK's media. Of eleven Chinese newspapers and two English newspapers, only one English newspaper is ok, but how come I can't be one of those top reporters? English is the barrier. I am in grade C but they are in grade A. I mean, only grade-A people can work at Reuters: I can't ... Actually, if I tell you I'm not a pushy parent, it's a lie. I would very much like them to do something I can't do.

Kim: Such as acquiring better English than you and I have?

Lisa: Yes, because *we* both know so clearly the limitations of people living in Hong Kong. You must have professional skills to survive in this globalized world.... For me, children need to leave Hong Kong because, you know, [the job market of] Hong Kong will get saturated after twenty years. If they don't have the ability to go outside Hong Kong, their development will be more limited than ours.

Kim: But where does one go?

Lisa: At least a condition for leaving Hong Kong is language, right? Other skills should also be acquired, but the most important thing should be language.

The parents in my study attributed their successful ascent on the social ladder to academic achievement, but they qualified this success as "partial" and were conscious of their "lack," which hindered their further success in, for example, the job market. They also knew that the globalized economy does not empower all people; the process empowers a few but disempowers many, depending on whether the subjects can be flexible enough to adapt to the globalized environment; for

example, flexible enough to speak foreign languages fluently. In our conversations, Lisa lamented several times her “sub-standard” English. Lisa had graduated from her university thirteen years earlier and had never stopped studying since. After earning her bachelor’s degree in history, she completed her law degree and a master’s degree in journalism. The former degree reflected Lisa’s interest in the field, whereas the latter degree reflected her pragmatic efforts to tune up her English.

Lisa worked as a reporter for two local English newspapers, *The Standard* and *The South China Morning Post*. After several years, when opportunities for promotion at the newspapers grew rare, she changed jobs and became a public relations officer. It was in this job that Lisa was working while I was conducting my fieldwork on her. Lisa saw herself sometimes as a successful market player and sometimes as a failed market player. Whatever the case, it was through her work experiences that she continually reinforced her self-reliance ethic, which was the key to class advancement or just to “survival.” She had grown to believe that Western education, especially English-language acquisition, was a necessary condition for “earning a living.”⁷⁶ Lisa’s workplace experiences had become a significant part of the cultural schemas from which she framed her sense of the global and the local and from which, therefore, she selected her “strategies of action”⁷⁷ toward her two little daughters. Lisa’s comments on her own lack shed light on her intention to build a material and social environment that would shape her children’s habits and (language) skills in a way that would successfully prepare them for careers in the increasingly competitive labor markets of the transnational economy.

From Lisa's perspective, being local is an impediment. For instance, a Hong Kong person whose native dialect is Cantonese and who refuses to master English or *Putonghua* will lack the cultural capital necessary for economic viability. Bombarded by talk of a dominant global arena and of struggling local arenas, Lisa made every effort to shape her two little children into "cosmopolitans" who, rather than remain in the "saturated" locale of Hong Kong, could go to and stay in the English-speaking world or the *Putonghua*-speaking world. If being local cannot strengthen one's career options, then such cultural identity loses its importance. Convinced that local pop culture is mind-numbing and that Cantonese has no economic value, many Hong Kong parents rid their domestic spheres of local pop culture and urge children to learn foreign languages (English and *Putonghua*) diligently.

Conclusion

According to Baudrillard, consumption is based on lack. This may be questionable as a general model, and theories of desire as a positive force have much to offer.⁷⁸ However, living in a small city, facing an ailing economy, and acknowledging the growth in regional and international competition, the parents in my study strongly sensed a lack that continues to induce Hong Kong's high consumption of economically valuable cultural goods, including language kits like Disney's. The consumption patterns of middle class families indicate that consumption is not just about leisure and lifestyle in symbolic and material terms but also about fulfilling the changing and adaptive *local* cultural imaginary, which accords preference to the cosmopolitan figure who uses global cultural capital to navigate the world.

It is evident that these parents do not accept Disney values as a total cultural

package and that they are partially successful in negotiating and resisting certain cultural meanings offered by Disney. In the “cultural supermarket,”⁷⁹ it seems that parents can select their favorite cultural products for their child-rearing practices. However, consumer power is not absolute. Because a few transnational conglomerates dominate the media market and because parents cannot access with equal ease the offerings of all cultures, parents will find it much easier to “choose” which particular Disney merchandise to consume than not to consume any Disney products at all; because parents’ consumption of a particular culture is determined largely by the culture’s market value, they have greater agency to decide to use or not to use Disney learning kits than they do to choose not to teach children English or *Putonghua*. Consumer agency, in this sense, is constrained by both the media and cultural domination of Disney and the global order. At the same time, parents’ consumption behavior reinforces cultural hegemony in a specific way. As the economic viability of local identity (being *Heung Gong Yan*) decreases, Hong Kong’s middle class parents actively and reflexively purchase those glocalized products that address their cosmopolitan desires, that amplify their economic and social needs, and that forge meaningful and distinguishable social identities and relations. As a way for these parents to maintain their privileged but insecure local class positioning, such local actions not only maintain local class disparity but reproduce a relatively low level of local cultural and media consumption in relation to the intensive use of global commercial media products.

In this sense, the relations between the local and the global are more dynamic and more complicated than we might expect. In order to understand these parents’ consumption practices in terms of cultural globalization, we need to consider them from four perspectives. First, there is always the consumerist, fun-

seeking element in Disney—no cultural imperialism writ large, but part of a range of such diversionary practices churned out by global culture today. The parents in my study occasionally purchased expensive, globally sourced diversions, and in this, the parents' behavior was not resistant.

Second, I suspect that the Disneyfied consumerist landscapes such as shopping malls, merchandising, and Disney animation are a contested site for a more mundane moral project of passing on moral guidelines and of teaching and learning how to be a human being. Here, parents' resistance to Disney's promotion of consumerist behavior and their locally inspired family standards regarding screen violence, mischief, and morals might offer some resistance to globalized consumption on the one hand, and a reassertion of local mundane morality on the other.

Third, the parents in my study used cultural goods self-consciously to achieve class distinction; their aspiration to become modern and cosmopolitan was, like the process itself, laden with the *local* class context and the parents' lived sense of their experiences of upward mobility. Parents' use of Disney (and other) products is a way in which parents solidify their distinctive position in a newly proclaimed global order. Uptake is not equal to resistance.⁸⁰ When a local university graduate cannot get a job in a prestigious local hotel because of his or her lack of non-local experiences and non-local ideas, then the local culture and the local identity must—precisely in order to be successful—give way to a particular kind of “cosmopolitan” under the real and perceived imperatives of a globalized economy.⁸¹ At this point, some members of the local community actively and consciously begin to acquire globalizing cultural capital (such as proficiency in certain languages) and these “local” actions develop a distinctively pragmatist

cosmopolitanism devoted to the accumulation of *economically viable* cultural capital.

Fourth, this cultural consumption is also a local identity project involving two facets; the government's re-deployment of cultural symbols and ordinary people's own local use of these. The parents in my study fit the HKSAR government's imagineering project in that they try their best to become the modern, competitive, cosmopolitan beings promoted by the government after the Handover.

Parents are turning their children into cosmopolitans who can "earn a living" in the world's near-future workforce. In this sense, the conscious acquisition of "foreign" languages through consuming Disney and other education kits reconstitutes the deterritorialized hybridity of local Hong Kong culture and heightens Hong Kong's "cosmopolitan" ways of life. Unfortunately, such ways of life are not the ways of life that many scholars attribute to cosmopolitanism, if by this we mean that people consider themselves world citizens, concern themselves with all humanity, and respect cultural pluralism based on democracy.⁸² Language is the core of a culture, but one's knowledge of a language does not transform one into a proud bearer of the language's corresponding culture; language acquisition does not equal cultural competence. Parents who ask their children to excel in English do not want their children to excel in individualism and democracy; instead, these parents' child-rearing methods emphasize hierarchical parent-child relations in which the child embodies obedience.

I suspect that the hierarchical parenting method works in tandem with government's authoritarian regime, and parents' currency-based evaluation of local culture also coincides with the government's city planning of Hong Kong, whereby Hong Kong should develop as a world city based on consumption instead of civil

citizenship. As Ku argues, the postcolonial HKSAR government reinterprets Hong Kong history as an economic success story.⁸³ To maintain this economic miracle, the HKSAR government strives to develop Hong Kong into a world-class city comparable to London and New York, and such a city must provide “soft and hard infrastructure” and an improved business environment⁸⁴ for “multinational companies and Mainland enterprises.”⁸⁵ Therefore, the task at hand for Hong Kong is to establish rule of law, efficient administration, political stability, and language proficiency in English and *Putonghua*. The interests of transnational corporations are protected by low tax rates, minimal government control, minimal disclosure requirements on businesses, and discouragement of union membership. Hong Kong will be an optimal space in which transnational corporations can do business. Nothing serious is said, however, about the desirability of a local community whose values stray outside the laws of supply and demand.

HKDL was built under such circumstances. Putting the deal together in secrecy, the government, without public consultation, withdrew HK\$22.95 billion from the public coffers to sign the deal with the Walt Disney Company, financing 10% in return for a 43% stake. After the Asian financial crisis, the HKSAR government admitted that Hong Kong’s bubble economy had burst. Trying to recoup from the downturn, the government promised (1) to restructure Hong Kong’s economy, on the basis of consumerism, from a reliance on the property market to tourism development and (2) to commodify the city into a dreamscape for “touristic voyeurism.”⁸⁶ Through the Disneyland project, the government successfully but temporarily builds its own legitimacy and redefines Hong Kong’s distinction from China in terms based not on political aspirations but on cultural, cosmopolitan and consumption-based ways of life.

Agency in regulating Hong Kong's cultural consumption does not equate to democracy; self-assertion in commodity culture is not the same as human rights. Consumption of certain Disney products in a certain way is an acceptance, a resistance, or an uptake, depending on which perspective we emphasize, but it cannot be equated to political resistance. Many consumption studies have deployed the concept of agency, but as I have tried to suggest, it is not a useful concept when it is predicated on a continuum that lacks built-in *gradations* and *conditions*. The consumption of Disney goods, like that of any good, can be a site of both liberation and domination, depending on what aspects of power the researcher addresses. Hong Kong families' consumption of Disney goods does not necessarily reflect a love for Disney's conception of family, child development, and morality; but Hong Kong parents' consumption of certain Disney products does forge a link to their aspiration to realize a particular type of "good life" with cultural and political effects.

Parents hope to mold their children into the type of pragmatist cosmopolitan who has little contact with local popular culture (the relatively low-cultural-capital world of cheap commodities targeted at child consumers) but who can access the relatively high-cultural-capital world of expensive commodities (piano lessons, fluency in English and in *Putonghua*) that all but determine where one lives, what one eats, what one listens to, and so on. I must admit that this pragmatist cosmopolitanism has little to do with not only citizenship rights, but also belonging, commitment, and the passion of a community. As Turner asks,

What is HK 'life-style'? A taste for fashion, gossip magazines and karaoke? A paradise for consumers and polluters? Or does life-style suggest something deeper, perhaps the subjective texture of identity? Is life-style

like citizenship, the rights of association and forms of representation that underlie civil society, and make it possible for citizens to shape policies of common concern? Or is life-style like fashion, changing from moment to moment?⁸⁷

When a community believes in authoritarian parenting, and has relatively little agency, commitment, and passion to protest against corporatism, against “expert system”⁸⁸ solutions, and against dictatorial planning for tourism development,⁸⁹ it is hard to imagine how parents’ ambivalent attitudes and consumption practices toward Disney products (sometimes acceptance, sometimes resistance, and sometimes appropriation) might target the corporate transformation of the community into a dreamscape. We have the right to choose neither which companies and which experts plan our city, nor which type of government and which representatives decide our community’s present and future. Our right to choose is limited to consumer products. In democracy’s cities, citizens may fall into the habit of thinking that consumers should make choices on the basis of professional advice, rather than be active producers of knowledge.⁹⁰ In Hong Kong, the public does not have the right to choose between political parties, and no cultural supermarket can provide products that compensate for a lack of both formal democratic citizenship rights and passion for community.

NOTES

¹ Gordon Mathews, *Global Culture / Individual Identity: Searching for Home in the Cultural Supermarket* (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 144.

² Scholars differ over who belongs to the middle class and over middle class characteristics. According to Lui Tai Lok and Jimmy Wong Chi Tsing, although

scholars use different theoretical frameworks when defining the middle class (some subscribe chiefly to Marxism whereas others prefer Weber's theories), their research subjects are similar: namely, the "new class" members emerging in contemporary capitalist society—in particular, people working in administrative, managerial, or other professional capacities. Lui and Wong argue that middle class members are not the classical bourgeoisie, whom we would now call "capitalists," those who played an important role in the transitional period from feudal society to capitalist society; nor are "middle class" members now the petite bourgeoisie, the self-employed who exist in both traditional and modern society. They list three characteristics of the members of the middle class: first, they do not own capital or the means of production, nor do they control the whole work process; second, nowadays, many of the middle class rely on their own academic or professional qualifications, or on their accumulated work experiences, to achieve better employment conditions (such as the opportunity to participate in company decision-making, a relatively high level of autonomy in their work, a high salary, better welfare, and more job security); third, the so-called "middle" position of the middle class derives from its middling status between capitalists and employees in general, such that their employment conditions and living standards are better than those of employees in general. In this thesis, I adopt Lui and Wong's framework to select my middle class respondents. See 呂大樂, 王志錚, *香港中產階級處境觀察* (香港: 三聯書店 (香港) 有限公司, 2003), pp. 3-5.

³ John Hannigan, *Fantasy City: Pleasure and Profit in the Postmodern Metropolis* (London, NY: Routledge, 1998), p. 185, 190.

⁴ Michael Eisner, "Planetized Entertainment," *New Perspectives Quarterly* 12, issue 4 (1995), p. 8, quoted from Henry A. Giroux, *The Mouse That Roared: Disney and the End of Innocence* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), p. 29; Ma Sheng-mei, *The Deathly Embrace: Orientalism and Asian American Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), p. 133. Disney icon Mickey Mouse and Disney animated movies provide ample examples of the company's support of individualism. Michael Eisner, the ex-Chief Executive Officer of the Walt Disney Company said Mickey Mouse imparts a "diversity of individual opportunity, individual choice and individual expression, [and that] for viewers around the world, America is the place where the individual has a chance to make a better life and to have political and economic freedom." Ma Sheng-mei argues that many Disney animated-cartoon heroines in the 1990s, including Belle, Little Mermaid, Jasmine, Pocahontas, and Mulan, are from different racial backgrounds but that they all desire autonomy and contribute no substantive cultural differences to the corresponding film.

⁵ Richard Robison and David S. G. Goodman, "The New Rich in Asia: Economic Development, Social Status and Political Consciousness," in *The New Rich in Asia: Mobile Phones, McDonald's and Middle-Class Revolution*, edited by Robison and Goodman (London, NY: Routledge, 1996), pp. 1-18; 呂大樂, 王志錚, *香港中產階級處境觀察* (香港: 三聯書店 (香港) 有限公司, 2003); 陳昭偉 and others, *七一的中產論述* (香港: 基層大學, 2003); SynergyNet website, http://www.synergynet.org.hk/en_main.htm (accessed 16 February 2007). Richard Robison and David S. G. Goodman argue that the Asian middle class plays a

decisive role in political transformation. Local scholars have different views on the role that middle class members play in political transformation. Lui Tai Lok and Ng Chun Hung argue that Hong Kong's democratic movement is doomed to failure if it relies on middle class populations, whether conservative or otherwise; whereas Anthony Cheung views the reliance as a positive strategy. He established SynergyNet and argues for "better governance reforms."

⁶ The Trade Development Council, starting in 2003, has aimed to transform Hong Kong into the "Consumption City of China." Here I appropriate the term while adding the word 'Disney'. "Hong Kong: China's Consumption City," 1 October 2003, from Economic Forum, Hong Kong Trade Development Council website: <http://www.tdctrade.com/econforum/bea/bea031001.htm> (accessed 16 February 2007).

⁷ Government Information Centre (HKSAR government), "HK a Magnet for Luxury Retailers," press release on 1 December 2004, <http://news.gov.hk/en/category/ontherecord/041201/html/041201en11001.htm> (accessed 16 February 2007).

⁸ "'We Love HK' Campaign Ends with a Great Success," 2003, <http://www.welovehongkong.com/success.asp?lang=EN> (accessed 16 February 2007); "We Love HK," 6 May 2003, <http://www.bar.org.hk/news.htm> (accessed 5 July 2005).

⁹ Sangmee Bak, "McDonald's in Seoul: Food Choices, Identity, and Nationalism," in *Golden Arches East: McDonald's in East Asia*, edited by Watson (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), pp. 150-151.

¹⁰ Chua Beng-Huat, "Consuming Asians: Ideas and Issues," in *Consumption in Asia: Lifestyles and Identities*, edited by Chua (London, NY: Routledge, 2000), pp. 11-3.

¹¹ In 2005, there were 133 shopping malls managed by the Hong Kong Housing Authority among 177 public housing estates and 192 subsidized housing estates. Hong Kong Housing Department, "Residential Properties," <http://www.housingauthority.gov.hk/en/residential> (accessed 19 September 2005).

¹² Shatin's population increased from 30,000 residents in the 1970s to about 640,000 according to the 2001 census.

¹³ In 2005, New Town Plaza contained sixty restaurants, one hundred and twenty-four fashion stores, forty-four beauty parlors and pharmacy stores, twenty-six gift shops and bookshops, four department stores, fifteen electrical appliance stores, thirty-one jewelry shops, twenty-nine home furnishings, thirteen travel agencies, and twenty-three banks and mobile service shops. Because of its sheer size, the mall is able to hold exhibitions, performances, and even car shows inside its walls.

¹⁴ *Synergy* can be understood as a combined action among individual units. It is Disney's key strategy. The Disney brand derives from Disney's movies and merchandise. In 1955, Disney established Disneyland and based the park's attractions on Disney's own created characters and brands. The introduction of Disneyland on American Broadcasting Company (ABC) further promoted the Disney brand.

¹⁵ The first Disney Store opened in Glendale Galleria in Glendale, California in

1987. About 535 Disney Stores have opened in eleven countries. See Judy Chung Chuihua, "Disney Space," in *Harvard Design School Guide to Shopping*, edited by Chung and others (TASCHEN: Koln, 2001), p. 292.

¹⁶ Activities include cooperation with the Agricultural and Fisheries Department in holding a survival camp for children and various competitions for primary and high school students. Disney "volunteer" activities can be found on its website, <http://corporate.hongkongdisneyland.com/discover/community.html> (accessed 18 July 2005).

¹⁷ This was the first time that the Housing Authority (HKHA) organized a function for 131 malls. Mr. K. F. Cheung, General Manager of Commercial Properties, HKHA, said in *Financial Report* (22 December 2002, TVB Jade, Hong Kong) that the Christmas functions cost over HK\$1 million. The HKHA would like more people to visit their malls and to increase shop sales. Cheung said that the HKHA held similar functions at fifty malls during Easter 2002 and that these activities, together, resulted in a 50% to 70% rise in the number of participants. Some areas even increased by about 100%. Cheung predicted in *Financial Report* (22 December 2002, TVB Jade, Hong Kong) that the people flows would increase by one hundred percent on the next occasion because it would be the largest such event to date.

¹⁸ Alexandra A. Seno, "A Craze for Disney Chic Sweeps Hong Kong," 15 September 2005, *International Herald Tribune*, http://www.ihf.com/bin/print_ipub.php?file=/articles/2005/09/14/opinion/rdisney.php (accessed 16 February 2007).

¹⁹ Intellectual Property Department (HKSAR government), http://www.ipd.gov.hk/eng/promotion_edu/no_fakes/nfretailer/Toys&Gifts.pdf (accessed 7 July 2005).

²⁰ Giordano has more than 1,500 shops operating in thirty-one territories worldwide, <http://www.giordano.com.hk/web/HK/ourCompany.html> (accessed 15 April 2006).

²¹ Mike Schneider, "Disney Icon Mickey Mouse Turns 75," 18 November 2003, *AP Entertainment*, <http://www.newsday.com/entertainment/news/wire/sns-ap-mickey-at-75,0,116499.story?coll=sns-ap-entertainment-headlines> (accessed 17 February 2007).

²² Jonathan Weber, "The Ever-expanding, Profit-maximizing, Cultural-imperialist, Wonder World of Disney: the Serious Business of Selling All-American Fun," *Wired*, issue 10.02 (February 2002), p. 75.

²³ "With Digital Technology, There Is Room for Small Players Too," 19 November 1998, *Economist.com*, http://www.economist.com/surveys/displayStory.cfm?Story_id=176659 (accessed 14 July 2005). Steve Jobs, the Chairman and the CEO of Pixar Animation Studios, claimed that Pixar's computer-animated techniques reduced the movie's production costs greatly. With traditional techniques, the film would have cost between US\$100m and US\$125m, but with Pixar techniques, the cost was between US\$75m and US\$100m.

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- ²⁴ Box Office Mojo website:
<http://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=toystory.htm> (accessed 17 February 2007).
- ²⁵ C. W. Nevius, "Pixar Tells Story Behind *Toy Story*," 23 August 2005, *San Francisco Chronicle*, <http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2005/08/23/BAGDKEBPAB1.DTL> (accessed 7 February 2007).
- ²⁶ Alan Bryman, *The Disneyization of Society* (London, Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2004), p. 157.
- ²⁷ According to Mitchell's findings, 80% of respondents in the 1960s identified their spouse as their major source of emotional support; and Chan and Lee confirmed Mitchell's argument in the mid 1990s; Lui's survey in 1992 found that around 60% of respondents viewed "family" as the most important area in life. See Robert E. Mitchell, *Family Life in Urban Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Survey Research Centre, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1969); Chan Hoi Man and Rance P.L. Lee, "Hong Kong Families: At the Crossroads of Modernism and Traditionalism," *Journal of Comparative Family Studies* 26, issue 1 (1995), pp. 83-99; Lui Tai Lok, "Work and Work Values," in *Indicators of Social Development: Hong Kong 1990*, edited by Lau and others (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1992), p. 112.
- ²⁸ Lee Ming Kwan found that although fewer Hong Kong people feel the need and the obligation to have children than in the past, and that although people widely shared doubts about having children and sacrificing for them, most still endorse the belief that "marriage without children is not fully complete." Lee Ming Kwan, "The Family Way," in *Indicators of Social Development: Hong Kong 1993*, edited by Lau and others (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1995), p. 4.
- ²⁹ Ng Chun Hung, "New Directions in Cultural Studies," in *Culture and Society in Hong Kong*, edited by Sinn (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, 1995), p. 15.
- ³⁰ State policies reflect an increasing concern for the shielding of children from abuse in the workplace and at home: for instance, the instigation of six-year free and compulsory primary education in 1971, the nine-year compulsory education in 1980, and the establishment of the Charter for Youth in 1993. See Ng Chun Hung, "New Directions in Cultural Studies," p. 15.
- ³¹ Ng found that regardless of class differences, 77.6% of respondents agreed with the idea that "parents should plan for children's futures and should be frugal in their own entertainment and consumption." See Ng Chun Hung, "Consumption and Hong Kong Way of Life," in *Indicators of Social Development: Hong Kong 1993*, edited by Lau and others (Hong Kong: HK Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1995), p. 349.
- ³² As mentioned in Chapter Four's endnote, I invited Cathy to be my interviewee in 2003, and between 2003 and 2006, I conducted four formal interviews with her. In these interviews, I asked her opinion on Hong Kong Disneyland, Disney movies and merchandise, parenting methods, and house rules. For details, see endnote 13 in chapter Four.

³³ As I mentioned in chapter Four, between 2005 and 2006, I conducted four formal interviews with Lisa. In the interviews, I asked her about her views on Disney, Hong Kong Disneyland, Disney merchandise, *Disney's World of English*, and her parenting methods. For details, see endnote 20 in chapter Four.

³⁴ Annie Chan Hau Nung, "Middle-class Formation and Consumption in Hong Kong," in *Consumption in Asia: Lifestyles and Identities*, edited by Chua (London, NY: Routledge, 2000), pp. 98-134. The term *pragmatist* refers to people who hold a more practical attitude toward consumption. It is borrowed from Chan, p. 108.

³⁵ Jumpin Gym U.S.A. first launched their "family entertainment center" (FEC) in June 1994. It is the largest operator of an FEC business in Hong Kong. There are more than fifty shops in Hong Kong, and the firm plans to other countries. Because Jumpin Gym U.S.A. provides games for adults and children, and because the better you play, the more stamps you can collect to exchange for products, Jumpin Gym U.S.A. is popular among families. However, parents in my study do not like bringing their children to Jumpin Gym U.S.A. because they find the costs prohibitive and the environment too noisy for children's well being. See "Company Profile," http://www.jumpingym.com/eng/index_cp.htm (accessed 2 June 2007).

³⁶ See Annamma Joy, "Gift Giving in Hong Kong and the Continuum of Social Ties," *Journal of Consumer Research* 28, issue 2 (2001) pp. 239-56; Joseph Bosco, "The McDonald's Snoopy Craze in Hong Kong," in *Consuming Hong Kong*, edited by Mathews and Lui (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2001), pp. 263-86. Hong Kong people practice a gift-giving custom, and gift giving in Hong Kong typically involves parents and adults who give gifts not to each other but to children (Joy 2001). It is common that if my friend or relative has a child, I would buy gifts for the child instead of for the adult, because children do not have money to spend on their favorite products. In my study, it was also found that many Disney products are purchased not by parents themselves but by their friends or relatives.

³⁷ To enrich my study's conclusiveness, I conducted two group interviews with nursery students, aged four to five, in a nursery school in June 2005. These students were from various class backgrounds: half of these students lived in private or home-ownership housing estates and half received, directly or indirectly, financial subsidies from the government. Among the mothers of children taking subsidies, some were not permanent Hong Kong citizens and carried a double-permit entry to enter Hong Kong to take care of their children. I found that all ten children with whom I talked recognized and had their favorite Disney characters, such as Mickey, Minnie, Winnie the Pooh, Cinderella, Sleeping Beauty, Snow White, and Little Mermaid. Most of them also noticed the upcoming opening of Hong Kong Disneyland in September 2005. They even could identify rides inside the park because their teachers, who reviewed with the students important local news once a week, had once told them about HKDL's opening and about the park's facilities. In two focus-group interviews, I made a particularly interesting finding: when I asked these children why they loved certain Disney characters, many did not answer my question but told me immediately what merchandise they had.

³⁸ As I mentioned in an endnote of chapter Four, Judy was a feminist freelance writer. Born in the early 1960s and coming from a humble background, Judy had few chances to go to movies when she was small. Disney characters such as

Mickey and Donald Duck were not her favorites. As social activists, Judy and Jacob expressed to me their anger over the wide gap between rich and poor and their abhorrence of big companies' profit-making practices. For details, see endnote 25 in chapter Four.

³⁹ As I mentioned in an endnote of chapter Four, I conducted three interviews with Betty between 2005 and 2006. In the interviews, I asked her about her opinion on Disney movies, *Disney's World of English*, and HKDL. For details, see endnote 14 in chapter Four.

⁴⁰ When I visited Betty's home the first time, what surprised me upon my first glimpse of her apartment was not the vast array of Disney merchandise placed in the living room, but the many Hello Kitty and Little Twin Stars ornaments placed inside a big cupboard at the very entrance. Betty said she loved Japanese cartoon characters more than Disney characters.

⁴¹ Born in the early 1960s, Ada was also from a humble background. She seldom watched Disney cartoons; however, when a small child, she was an ardent fan of TV's *Popeye the Sailor*. After high school graduation, Ada studied social welfare at the polytechnic and worked as a social welfare worker and as an inbound and outbound tourist guide before getting married. After getting married, Ada worked as a homemaker. Her husband Andy worked as a senior-ranking engineer in a Japan-based transnational consumer-products company in Hong Kong. Quite demanding, his work sometimes required that he fly to Japan. Ada then bore the sole responsibility of the everyday child-rearing practices. Between 2002 and 2006, I had three formal interviews with Ada. In late 2002, I first interviewed Ada and her daughter Angel in a McDonald's restaurant. At that time, Angel was seven years old and was studying in Primary two. In late 2003, I visited Ada, Angel, and Andy in their home and looked at lots of Angel's photos, some of which were of Tokyo Disneyland in 2000. The third interview took place in a restaurant nearby Angel's school in early 2006, and Ada and Angel shared with me their HKDL experiences.

⁴² *Digimon* is a Japanese TV animated cartoon series. Adrian liked *Digimon*, whereas Catherine disapproved of Adrian's exposure to the series because of its Japanese militarist mentality. There are four TV series of *Digimon 01*, namely *Digimon* (2001), *Digimon Zero Two* (2002), *Digimon Tamers* (2003), and *Digimon Frontier* (2004).

⁴³ Many Disney Stores were closed, and the last one, the flagship store located in Tsim Sha Tsui, finally closed its doors on 4 September 2005. See 羅羽庭, "迪士尼店結業 半價清貨," 2 September 2005, *Hong Kong Economic Times*, A16.

⁴⁴ Stephen Kline, *Out of the Garden: Toys, TV, and Children's Culture in the Age of Marketing* (London: Verso, 1993).

⁴⁵ Over half of the local respondents in a 1990 survey agreed that the government should exercise tighter control over the content of television. See Joseph Chan Man and Paul S.N. Lee, "Mass Communication: Consumption and Evaluation," in *Indicators of Social Development: Hong Kong 1990*, edited by Lau and others (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1992), pp. 91-2.

⁴⁶ Stuart Cunningham and Elizabeth Jacka, "Neighbourly Relations? Cross-cultural Reception Analysis and Australian Soaps in Britain," in *Media in Global Context: A Reader*, edited by Sreberny-Mohammadi and others (London, NY: Arnold, 1997), p. 308.

⁴⁷ Choi Po King and Lee Ching Kwan, "The Hidden Abode of Domestic Labour: The Case of Hong Kong," in *Engendering Hong Kong Society: A Gender Perspective of Women's Status*, edited by Cheung (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1997), pp. 157-99.

⁴⁸ 蔡穎儀, "看與不看—媽媽為何不再與我看恐怖片?" in *差異與平等: 香港婦女運動的新挑戰*, edited by 陳錦華, 黃結梅, 梁麗清, 李偉儀, 何芝君 (香港: 新婦女協進會, 香港理工大學應用社會科學系社會政策研究中心, 2001), pp. 211-6.

⁴⁹ 甘翠萍, 馮幸玲, "從廣告看母親角色與婦女自主、解放的衝突" in *差異與平等: 香港婦女運動的新挑戰*, edited by 陳錦華, 黃結梅, 梁麗清, 李偉儀, 何芝君 (香港: 新婦女協進會, 香港理工大學應用社會科學系社會政策研究中心, 2001), p. 206. Gan and Xing found that women respondents always suppressed their individual preferences to their mothering roles. When they were asked what they thought about the media's portrayal of women, they immediately declared that some images are obscene and have a bad influence on children. Even though they found some advertisements attractive, they would worry about the susceptibility of their children's subconscious to negative influences therein. As a result, the women acted as gatekeepers and suppressed their own sexual desires.

⁵⁰ Joseph Chan Man and Paul S.N. Lee, "Mass Communication: Consumption and Evaluation," in *Indicators of Social Development: Hong Kong 1990*, edited by Lau and others (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1992), p. 96. Chan and Lee found that over 70% of Hong Kong households possessed a VCR in the eighties.

⁵¹ There are exceptions: *The Lion King* (1994) and *The Little Mermaid* (1989) were accused of presenting gratuitously sexual images.

⁵² *Bionicle* is an adventure story created by Lego. A place called Mata Nui was once a paradise but then becomes a place of darkness and fear. The six heroes need to gather Masks of Power to challenge Makuta, the ruler. As does Disney, *Bionicle* contains movies, toys, books, and comics. For details, please see <http://www.lego.com/eng/bionicle/default.asp> (accessed 12 July 2005).

⁵³ Besides Disney movies, Jacob encouraged Leo to watch Miyazaki's Japanese animated movies, such as *Spirited Away* (2001), *Nausicaä of the Valley of Wind* (1984), and *Castle in the Sky* (1986), and the local production *McMug*. Once we three brought Leo and another child to watch an African animated cartoon shown at the Hong Kong International Film Festival.

⁵⁴ I borrow the term "Chinese traditionalism" from Chan Hoi Man and Rance P. L. Lee. They argue that although Hong Kong people can no longer abide by Confucianism, its ethical tenets have become part of the social norms in everyday life in Hong Kong society. See Chan Hoi Man and Rance P. L. Lee, "Hong Kong Families: At the Crossroads of Modernism and Traditionalism," *Journal of Comparative Family Studies* 26, issue 1 (1995), p. 83.

⁵⁵ As described by the official Disney website, “Disney Insider,” Tinker Bell has become a Disney icon second only to Mickey Mouse himself, <http://disney.go.com/inside/issues/stories/v050920.html> (accessed 17 February 2007).

⁵⁶ For example, on 12 July 2002, there was a TV promo about *Lilo & Stitch* on TVB-Pearl at night. The promo focused on five attractive qualities of the film *Lilo & Stitch*: first its realistic portrayal of “foreign culture tradition” such as Hawaii’s spiritual culture, dance style, surfing, and energy; second the Disney values of “love prevails” in our world; third the rhythmic voice and music; fourth the refreshing and nostalgic drawing style that, harkening back to early Disney, has no straight lines and a water-color background; fifth the 100% original Disney character creation.

⁵⁷ *East Touch* magazine: vol. 362 (9 May, 2002); vol. 371 (11 July 2002); vol. 372 (18 July 2002).

⁵⁸ *Milk* magazine: vol. 49 (27 June 2002); vol. 50 (4 July 2002); vol. 51 (11 July 2002).

⁵⁹ *TVB Weekly*: vol. 266 (25 June 2002); vol. 267 (2 July 2002).

⁶⁰ *Ming Po Children Weekly*: vol. 614 (28 June 2002).

⁶¹ *X-kids Express Weekly*: vol. 378 (28 June 2002).

⁶² There were over twenty one designs of the *Lilo & Stitch* tee-shirt in the Times Square Bossini shop in June and July 2002.

⁶³ During 20 June and 14 July 2002, in the mall Silvercord in Tsim Sha Tsui, a purchase of over HK\$300 dollars was awarded a Stitch cushion; a purchase of over HK\$500 dollars was awarded a Stitch cushion and one movie ticket.

⁶⁴ Motion Picture Industry Association website: <http://www.mpia.org.hk/mpia/indexc.htm> (accessed 15 July 2006).

⁶⁵ There were nine Disney Stores in 2002 but one after another closed its doors. One new Disney Store opened in the Chep Lap Kok airport and only three (Tsim Sha Tsui and two in an airport) remained open by 2004. The store underwent a name change, from “Disney Store” to “The Magic of Hong Kong Disneyland.”

⁶⁶ This fieldwork took place at the Times Square Disney Store, Causeway Bay, during lunchtime on 14 July 2002.

⁶⁷ This fieldwork took place at Hollywood Plaza Disney Store, Diamond Hill, about 6 p.m. on 15 July 2002.

⁶⁸ Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1977). According to Bourdieu, habitus is a set of “durable dispositions” (p. 85) which generates “schemes of perception, conception, and action common to all members of the same group” (p. 86), and thus “produces individual and collective practices, and hence history” (p. 82). Since habitus is acquired through family, school experiences (p. 87), and interpersonal relations (p. 81), it is a class-oriented and collective phenomenon. In my study of the five middle class families, all eight parents emphasize the importance of providing a

good “environment” for their children. The good environment includes: good family relationship; healthy food provision (all five families usually have their dinner at home, and in the extreme case of Lisa’s family they only go out for dining during festivals); good manners (all the families practice a “no rough language” policy at home); good schooling (all the children go to good schools and four study in traditional famous schools); and a regular wake-up, study, and sleeping schedule. However, there are also internal differences among these five families. As feminists, Judy and Jacob emphasize egalitarian parent-child relationships whereas the other four families emphasize hierarchical parent-child relationship. In this chapter, I have space only to focus on the parents’ provision of a good English-learning environment.

⁶⁹ University of Western Sydney and Australian Broadcasting Authority, *Children’s Views about Media Harm. Monograph 10* (New South Wales: Australian Broadcasting Authority, 2000).

⁷⁰ This edutainment merchandise includes numerous Disney videos that teach counting and letters to infants (*Winnie the Pooh 123’s: Discovering Numbers and Counting* and *Winnie the Pooh ABC’s: Discovering Letters and Words*), interactive learning kit in a CD-ROM format (*Disney Learning Kindergarten*), activity books for small children (*Tarzan Multi-activity Book* and *The Prince of Egypt Sticker Adventure Book*), storybooks with DVDs (*Disney’s Sing Along Songs* series with different characters such as Pooh, the Lion King, princesses, Mickey, Brother Bear, and Peter Pan), the CD *Read Along* with bilingual storybooks (*Monsters, Inc.*, *Toy Story*, *Beauty and the Beast*, etc.), and the widely advertised, expensive, and popular *Disney’s World of English* set, which contains storybook sets, CDs, DVDs, a scanner for word-card scanning, and games.

⁷¹ Oliver Chan Wing Sang, *Intra-Familial Resources Allocation and Leisure Pursuits among Married Couples in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Polytechnic University, 1999). Chan’s qualitative research on the views of leisure among the twenty-five married individuals across different classes and family life-cycle stages found that the families with children would save money for their children’s living environment and education, and that the low income couples with dependent children were reluctant to spend money on themselves but willing to spend money on children’s unnecessary items such as music.

⁷² Ada chose to use not *Disney’s World of English* but Longman’s English learning kit because Disney’s set is far more expensive than Longman’s: the former costs around HK\$40,000 whereas the latter less than HK\$2,000. Because Angel likes reading, her room is full of books, some in English and some in Chinese, and from different publishers including Disney.

⁷³ In 2003, the median monthly household income in Hong Kong was HK\$15,500. Census and Statistics Department, *Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics 2004* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 2004), p. 40.

⁷⁴ World Family Shopping website, <http://shopping.worldfamily.com.tw/wfshop/about.asp> (accessed 8 July 2005).

⁷⁵ In Hong Kong, there are four free TV channels: TVB-Jade (in Cantonese), ATV (in Cantonese), TVB-Pearl (in English), and ATV-World (in English). Starting in

the 1990s, different pay-TV channels became available, such as Star TV and Phoenix TV: the former is an English channel whereas the latter, a *Putonghua* channel.

⁷⁶ See Aihwa Ong, *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999), p. 95; Johanna Waters, "Flexible Citizens? Transnationalism and Citizenship amongst Economic Immigrants in Vancouver," *The Canadian Geographer* 47, issue 3 (2003), p. 227. Both Ong's study and Waters' study argue that Chinese immigrants consider the command of English to be crucial capital in the quest for "cosmopolitan" being.

⁷⁷ Ann Swidler, *Talk of Love: How Culture Matters* (Chicago, London: University of Chicago, 2001), p. 82. I borrow the term "strategies of action" from Ann Swidler. The meaning of "strategies of action" concerns the patterns of behavior that emerge when "actors routinely go about attaining their goals."

⁷⁸ Elizabeth Grosz, *Space, Time, and Perversion: Essays on the Politics of Bodies* (New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 179. Elizabeth Grosz argues that desire has often been considered a lack, from Plato to Freud and Lacan; in contrast, some philosophers since Spinoza have considered desire a production. In her words, "Desire is the force of positive production, the action that creates things, makes alliances, and forges interactions."

⁷⁹ The term "cultural supermarket" is from Gordon Mathews, "Cultural Identity and Consumption in Post-colonial Hong Kong," in *Consuming Hong Kong*, edited by Mathews and Lui (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2001), pp. 287-318.

⁸⁰ On the concept of uptake, see Anne Freedman, "Anyone for Tennis?" in *Genre and the New Rhetoric*, edited by Freedman and Medway (London, Bristol: Taylor & Francis, 1994), pp. 43-66; "Uptake," in *The Rhetoric and Ideology of Genre: Strategies for Stability and Change*, edited by Coe, Lingard, and Teslenko (Cresskill, New Jersey: Hampton Press, 2002), pp. 39-53.

⁸¹ According to William Mackay, Regional Vice President and General Manager of Four Seasons Hotel Hong Kong, 90% of the hotel's 850 employees are Hong Kong residents who share a similar background; these employees have studied or lived in foreign countries in the past and can both speak the local dialect (Cantonese) and draw on their exposure to foreign cultures. See 喬菁華, "國際化學生," 24 August 2005, *Ming Pao Daily News*, D07.

⁸² On whether cosmopolitanism can help develop democracy and "moral economy" if cosmopolitanism means a lack of social solidarity, commitment, and belonging, see Craig Calhoun, "Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism," in *Nationalism and Its Future*, edited by Özkirimli (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 93-126.

⁸³ Agnes Ku Shuk Mei, "Postcolonial Cultural Trends in Hong Kong: Imagining the Local, the National, and the Global," in *Crisis and Transformation in China's Hong Kong*, edited by Chang and So (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), pp. 343-62.

⁸⁴ Government Information Centre (HKSAR government), *Policy Address 2001*, phrase 31, <http://www.policyaddress.gov.hk/pa01/e29.htm> (accessed 16 February 2007).

⁸⁵ Government Information Centre (HKSAR government), *Policy Address 2001*, phrase 82, <http://www.policyaddress.gov.hk/pa01/e82.htm> (accessed 16 February 2007).

⁸⁶ Sharon Zukin, *Landscapes of Power: From Detroit to Disney World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), p. 51.

⁸⁷ Matthew Turner, “60’s / 90’s: Dissolving the People,” in *Hong Kong Sixties: Designing Identity*, edited by Turner and Ngan (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Arts Centre, 1995), p. 39.

⁸⁸ Giddens argues that money and the expert system are two disembedding mechanisms in the development of modern social institutions and that these two mechanisms depend on “trust” in “abstract capacities.” Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity, 1990).

⁸⁹ Colin Michael Hall, *Tourism and Politics: Policy, Power, and Place* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1994).

⁹⁰ Engin F. Isin, “Global City-regions and Citizenship,” in *Local Places in the Age of the Global City*, edited by Keil, Wekerle, and Bell (Montreal, NY: Black Rose Books, 1996), pp. 21-36.

Chapter Six

Disney Management: Fairy Tales of Cultural Globalization

In chapters Four and Five, I argued that respondents consume the HKDL project and Disney offerings in various ways: some appropriate the HKDL project as symbolic cultural marker, whereas others make use of HKDL or Disney merchandise to help construct cosmopolitan selves for themselves or their children. However, since the official opening of HKDL on 12 September 2005, it has proved far from successful in fulfilling Hong Kong people's dreams of cultural distinctions through cosmopolitan realization and economic revitalization. For the first few months after HKDL's Rehearsal Days,¹ the commentary from various press sources (ranging from scholars² and local stars³ to common people⁴) characterized the park as too small,⁵ the park operations as chaotic,⁶ the management as highhanded,⁷ as disrespectful of local legislation,⁸ and even as Americanism.⁹ Some press sources stated that HKDL was turning from Hong Kong's "millennium dream"¹⁰ into a "Hong Kong shame."¹¹

Hong Kong did not, in fact, undergo Disneyfication. Rather, a variety of local actors actively resisted various Disney corporate practices. These local actors ranged from the press, popular celebrities, and pop-culture producers to anti-Disney groups and to ordinary HKDL workers and consumers. In the following two chapters, I discuss these acts in detail. The unfolding dialectical relationship between Disney and various local actors narrated in these two chapters also confirms Massey's argument against the dualistic conception that "place" is local while "everywhere" is global. Rather, place is where various cultures meet and multiple social relations articulate and intersect. In this chapter, I focus on HKDL

media practices and local media actors' reactions to a particular Disney "philosophy"—"Disney Realism"—and to Disney's accompanying management practices of scientific management. HKDL management's hierarchical and bureaucratic system effectively renders a strategy of localization difficult to implement in HKDL. I further show how Disney values and practices were caught up in conflicts with local production values and practices, and how local critics interpreted HKDL's various acts as Americanism. Among these critics were members of the local press, local scholars, local celebrities, and even local Disney production staff. Their chief complaint concerned HKDL's adherence to Disney's management practices. Then in chapter Seven, I go on to discuss how both HKDL staff and HKDL visitors practice various uptakes inside HKDL, and I examine Disney management's difficulties in "Disneyfying" local staff and local patrons.

Because chapter Six and chapter Seven work as a pair, the chapter titles are similar: I use "fairy tales" and "pixie tricks" to describe cultural globalization in the case of HKDL. "Fairy tales" can be read in two ways: first, it suggests a magical and extremely happy story; second, it can be interpreted as an imaginary story for children only. As I discuss in chapters Three and Four, the joint venture between the HKSAR government and the Walt Disney Company was seen by the government as "a happy marriage between a world class tourist attraction and a world class tourist destination"¹² and was seen by Hong Kong people as a cultural marker by which they could both distinguish themselves from Mainlanders and attain cosmopolitanism. The opening of the park in 2005, however, has turned the fairy tale into a comedy of errors. Furthermore, Hong Kong people interpret Disney management practices as Americanism and resist certain Disney acts. "Pixie tricks" refers to mischievous fairies who deceive people. Here, I reverse the dynamics that

usually characterize the relationship between Disney and Hong Kong people. For me, HKDL workers and consumers are fairies who play tricks on Disney's scientific management practices.

In these two chapters, I argue against scholars' emphasis on Disney's alleged overarching influence over local cultural landscapes. Then, I narrate many local stories that my interviewees provided to me or that I experienced by myself to identify the dialectical local-global relationship that has been unfolding in various social spaces. On the one hand, these stories tell us that Disney brings Hong Kong not only a physical park but also its non-transparent values and scientific management practices. And under current local laws, it is difficult, if not impossible, to demand that HKDL disclose some of its company information that locals may consider important to Hong Kong's monitoring of tax-based expenditures. On the other hand, these same stories demonstrate that local people, including media actors and government officials, are not simply "receivers" who read Disney values and practices in preferred, negotiated, or oppositional ways.¹³ Rather, these actors produce and circulate the changed local meanings of "Disney" as "arrogant" and "highhanded," and contribute to the ongoing remaking of local identities and culture; meanwhile, some other actors, such as HKDL workers and visitors, work and consume the park in a mischievously "local" way that Disneyland management finds difficult to control.

This chapter is divided into three main sections. In the first section, I discuss Disney's management philosophy, Disney Realism. To maintain Disneyland's status as a dreamland, HKDL management exercises different skills to control publicly circulating information. I argue that under current Hong Kong law, the Hong Kong people have no right to monitor the HKDL financial situation although

the HKSAR government is the biggest shareholder of the park. I then focus on how local journalists and local pop stars viewed and resisted Disney Realism, Disney's character-centered production values, and its administration practices. In the second section, I discuss the contribution that HKDL's bureaucratic work system made to the slow media response to HKDL's problems. I discuss, also, local media's semantic transformation of "Disney" from a "millennium dream" (which dominated the semantic field during the project's planning stage) into a "Hong Kong shame" (which dominated the semantic field during the project's operational stage). In the third section, I interview Disney production staff and HKDL staff and reveal that although Disney has tried to "glocalize" its products, to make them pertinent to "local" concerns, Disney's bureaucratic work practice, transnational work-force, and division and subdivision of labor make localization difficult. Disney's weak adaptation to the local environment then created chaos and turned off visitors (both Hong Kong people and Mainlanders), journalists, and government officials. I also argue that the HKSAR government, compared with the Oriental Land Company, which owns Tokyo Disneyland, has little institutional power in either the master-planning or the operating of HKDL and, thus, has little power either to cater to local flavors or to change unpopular HKDL management practices.

Joint-venture HKDL: from Disney Realism to HKDL "kingdom"

"What we create is a 'Disney Realism', sort of Utopian in nature, where we carefully program out all the negative, unwanted elements and program in the positive elements,"
said Disney designer and artist John Hench.¹⁴

There are various kinds of "realism" advocated by film scholars and critics, including Siegfried Kracauer's cinematic realism, André Bazin's photographic

realism, and Georg Lukács's critical realism. Kracauer argues that an aesthetic medium must build from its basic "properties."¹⁵ The basic property of film is its capacity for "recording" (p. 41) and "revealing" (p. 46) physical reality. However, reality and human experiences are fragmented. Therefore, cinema should represent the indeterminate nature of reality; that is, cinema should represent the natural world as "unstaged reality," "chance," "the fortuitous," "the indeterminate," the "flow of life," and "endlessness" (pp. 60-74). Similar to Kracauer, André Bazin's photographic realism argues that cinema's essence is in recording and revealing "the ambiguity of reality."¹⁶ Bazin argued that the development of long-take and deep-focus photography from 1940 to 1950 highlighted the spatiotemporal continuity and integrity of perceptual experience and that this photography marked "a decisive step forward of the language of the film" (p. 38) because filmmakers can be explorers and observers who integrate "ambiguity into the structure of the image" (p. 36). Bazin expects that viewers of realist films, by using their own freedom of thought and of action, can link a film's complex structure with the film's dense content and that the viewers, thus, can achieve a degree of self realization (p. 36). Different from Kracauer and Bazin, Lukács argues that realism must represent a historically specific, multi-layered, and concrete social reality. By employing exemplary situations and typical characters, the dialectic in Lukács' critical realism pits the person as individual against the person as social being.¹⁷ By making a connection between particular events (for example, an individual person's action or thought) and general contexts (namely, a historically rooted society), realist films encourage readers to be aware of their own place within a complex, interactive web of society-based relationships. Despite their different emphases, Kracauer, Bazin, and Lukács are similar in their view that reality is complex

(empirical richness, undetermined nature, and complex relations between individual events and social structure) and that realism in film should represent reality's complex nature and unpredictability.

Film scholars and filmmakers know well that, even with the mechanical reproduction of photography, “truth” and “reality” in films are constructs because frame composition, mise-en-scène, and editing—among other factors—manipulate any authentic mirror of the world around us, if indeed any such mirror is possible. Some documentary filmmakers choose to practice *cinéma vérité* to reveal the process of filmmaking (how the director shoots the film and what to do with what was filmed) and to highlight the authorship of the director. These directors reveal that the presented reality is not a pure and objective reality but a particular truth socially constructed by—or perhaps through—the filmmaker. Classic Hollywood cinema, however, preferred coherent characters, controlled the mise-en-scène, practiced the 180-degree rule in cinematography, practiced eyeline matching, and edited for continuity. The resulting narrative would present reality as causality that unfolds in a continuous temporal-spatial, albeit fictional, world. Film scholars such as Stephen Heath¹⁸ and Bill Nichols¹⁹ argue that the self-containment of the narrative and the manipulative style of classic cinema obscure the constructedness of cinema and represent cinema as transparent. Classic cinema's self-contained narrative also explains away real contradictions. Rather than refer to classical cinema as “realism,” early-cinema scholar Tom Gunning refers to it as “realistic *illusions* of the cinema.”²⁰

“Disney Realism,” to a certain extent, is a phrase that invokes many of the meanings attributable to realism in classic cinema, but Walt Disney pushed “illusionism” to an extreme in the establishment of Disneyland. According to

Disney's official publication *Imagineering*, Walt Disney's idea of Disneyland stemmed from his desire to build a park where visitors could feel that they were in a magical world:

Driven by the desire to take his passion for storytelling far beyond the confines of two-dimensions, he [Walt Disney] landed on the idea that visitors who stepped into this new park should feel as though they stepped into a movie. Every inch of the place should be part of a story, as in a movie or television show.²¹

To persuade visitors that they are like Alice stepping through the Looking Glass and entering another world, the design of Disneyland employs such cinematic techniques as powerful images from movies, familiar movie plots, cinematographic techniques, scale manipulation, and forced perspectives, all of which are built into the environment and all of which integrate visitors into a "seamless, apparently logical, whole."²² However, this magic world must look realistic, or so declared Walt Disney: "what we're selling is a belief in fantasy and storytelling, and if the background [i]sn't believable, people wouldn't buy it."²³ To construct its "reality effects,"²⁴ Disneyland features concrete details that secure its authenticity. As is the case with classic realist films, Disneyland effaces all traces of the work to naturalize the fantasy world. It is worth noting again that the park is divided into an onstage area and a backstage area and that patrons can visit only the onstage area; in other words, Disney prohibits the visitors from visiting the backstage area, where magic is produced. Rather than reveal reality's richness and its contradictory and complex nature, Disney Realism is a style that conforms to Disney's own standard of "utopia": Disneyland as "a magical escape" where "families everywhere, regardless of boundaries or culture" can experience "a world of fantasy and

imagination,”²⁵ and where “the guest walks through an atmosphere of order and cleanliness and comes away feeling that things must be all right, after all.”²⁶

Therefore, Disney Realism is a style that helps produce the image of Disneyland as utopia. It is thus not surprising that applications of Disney Realism “program in” positive elements (i.e. elements favorable to the Disney image as “fantasyland” and “the happiest place in the world”) and “program out” negative elements (which have adverse effects on the Disney image). Furthermore, the “embellishment” and the “modification” of “reality” include manipulating and sanitizing history or, in Michael Wallace’s words, “to vacuum clean the past.”²⁷ The park area “Main Street USA” exemplifies “sanitized, good-spirited and inaccurate nostalgia” regarding the nineteenth-century American small town.²⁸

To construct the brand “Disney” according to the idea of “fantasy,” Disney Realism affects not only park design but also the company’s everyday management practices. Reviewing the history of the Walt Disney World in Orlando, Foglesong²⁹ warns readers that based on Disney Realism, Disney shows only a positive surface—that Disney obstructs the public’s view of negative elements (as Hench freely admits in the quotation above). Disney has considerable power to impose “Disney Realism”: Disney is tantamount to a private government controlling the autonomous political district of Orlando’s Reedy Creek Improvement District, and Orlando’s citizens have limited ways to monitor Disney. Foglesong, in *Married to the Mouse*,³⁰ warned the readers that Disney, to uphold both its favorite image and the widespread belief that Disneyland is a safe dreamland, may try to prohibit the dissemination of negative information pertaining to Disney. According to Foglesong, on 10 July 1985, *The Orlando Sentinel* published an editorial entitled “Magic Kingdom of Aloof” both criticizing Disney executives’ requirement that

visitors stay inside Disney hotels and urging the executives to be more involved in county boards and commissions. On the morning the editorial appeared, a Disney employee removed *Sentinel* newsracks from Disney property and a *Sentinel* delivery truck was refused entrance onto Disney property (p. 111). Disney also improperly used its private security guards, the “cast members,” to perform police functions involving serious crimes such as burglary, rape, and robbery without reporting the findings to any government law-enforcement agency because Disney has had no inherent obligation to release such records (pp. 141-4).

Unlike Orlando, HKDL is not an autonomous political district and should be subjected to Hong Kong laws. Nevertheless, at least eight local newspapers denounced “Disney highhandedness” on 10 September 2005,³¹ two days before the official opening of HKDL. This unified criticism occurred when Rhonda Lo, assistant director of the Food and Environmental Hygiene Department (FEHD), confirmed on a radio program³² on 9 September 2005 that, on 30 August 2005, HKDL security had forced two FEHD health inspectors to “dress down” (to take off their caps and epaulettes) before they could enter the park to investigate reports of food poisoning. Disney’s efforts to preserve the park’s magic and to program out negative elements were, in this case, seen as manipulative and drew fire from government officials, legislators, and scholars: Lo said that the park’s request was “unacceptable”;³³ Secretary for Security Ambrose Lee said, “Disneyland does not stand above the law of Hong Kong”;³⁴ Legislator Fred Li was astonished³⁵ by HKDL’s “out of line”³⁶ behavior, while scholars commented that Disney’s American management practices treated Disney as an “independent kingdom” and had certainly violated citizens’ rights.³⁷ When I asked my reporter respondents³⁸ why, in their news stories, they had highlighted HKDL’s violation of Hong Kong

law instead of HKDL's apologies to the FEHD, one reporter admitted that she had been astonished and enraged by the news, whereas the other reporter said that the interview process of questioning "relevant" and "legitimate" interviewees (government officials, legislators, scholars, and HKDL) created an imbalance that favored critics of HKDL, who outnumbered spokespersons for HKDL management. He denied that media had painstakingly produced the idea of Disney highhandedness; reporters had just reported and circulated criticism about HKDL actions.

The nature of HKDL and the nature of the HKSAR government-Disney joint venture made it difficult for Disney to implement Disney Realism in Hong Kong without facing criticism. Hong Kong Disneyland is the only Disney park to enlist a government as a shareholder.³⁹ Because of the HKSAR government's huge investment in the park, many legislators and members of the press have viewed HKDL as a quasi-public business, which, in their view, means that the public has the right and the responsibility to monitor the government's tax-based investment in HKDL. The public's right-to-know demands contradict Disney Realism's emphasis on non-transparent management practices. Keith,⁴⁰ a local news reporter, said,

If HKDL received all its investment from the Disney company, HKDL would be a private investment and its returns, whether good or bad, would be none of our business. However, because the park received a huge investment from the HKSAR government, media—though this may sound hackneyed—has the responsibility to monitor the government's investment, to confirm that it isn't wasting public money. This is why we're worried about, not merely interested in, the park's attendance figures, its image, and its returns.

By 1999, the park had consumed HK\$22.95 billion of tax-payer money; however, ownership of HKDL has been the responsibility of a private company named Hong

Kong International Theme Park Ltd (HKITP), in which the HKSAR government is the largest shareholder. Because it is a private company, under Hong Kong company law, it has no obligation to disclose things that it views as sensitive information, including those facts that the public views as necessary information: attendance figures and the park's revenue. In December 2005, for example, when Margaret Ng, a member of the Legislative Council, asked whether or not HKITP would publish all the directors' reports and audited financial statements of HKITP, the Secretary for Economic Development and Labour, Mr Stephen Ip, clearly spelled out the impossibility of such a request:

HKITP is a private company, there is no requirement under the Companies Ordinance for a private company to publish its directors' reports and audited financial accounts. Although TWDC [the Walt Disney Company] invests jointly with the Government in HKITP, the Government has to respect the company's interests, and its operation under commercial principles will not be compromised due to the disclosure of commercially sensitive information. As an international financial and business centre, we have to respect the right of a private company to protect its commercially sensitive information.⁴¹

In 1999, while persuading the public of the benefits of a future HKDL, the HKSAR government claimed that HKDL would attract millions of tourists to the park and get HK\$148 billion in "net economic benefit," a 25% net economic return, and a benefit-cost ratio of 8:1 over forty years of operation.⁴² However, without the audited financial accounts, the public has had no way to verify whether or not the economic promise has come to fruition.⁴³ While HKDL enjoys the right of protecting its "commercially sensitive information," it also enjoys right to use public funds for expansion of a government-Disney joint venture.

In addition to tension between the Hong Kong public's right to know and the Disney Realism strategy of revealing only information that is beneficial to the company, tension between Disney and journalists has accumulated through journalists' everyday mundane reportage practices. When the idea of Disney Realism is translated into everyday management practice, the realism becomes a series of manipulative acts controlling what can and cannot be seen or narrated, an approach that has triggered enormous criticism from the park's communication "partners," the reporters—especially from those upholding the idea of freedom of the press. As would occur with "a landowner of a kingdom" (in the words of Keith), HKDL initially required that reporters receive permission before they cover events inside HKDL. If reporters wanted to interview HKDL staff, Disney would select particular staff members to conduct the interviews while other staff members were prohibited from answering any reporters' questions. Throughout the whole interview process, a public relations officer had to accompany and monitor the reporter. A prominent example was HKDL's three-day celebratory opening activities during 10 and 12 September 2005, during which one thousand and two hundred reporters from around the world came to HKDL, and HKDL appointed to each news agency three Disney "media hosts" to arrange activities for journalists. If these media hosts did not see the journalist around, they would phone the journalist and ask where she or he was.⁴⁴

The journalist Sammie⁴⁵ recounted a vivid story about her efforts to cover HKDL before its opening in September 2005. In April 2005, HKDL invited several media companies to report on HKDL cultural representatives who had been working in Orlando since late 2004 and who would come back to work in HKDL for at least six months. Sammie's company accepted the offer. Before the trip,

Sammie had had meetings with Edith, a representative of HKDL public affairs.⁴⁶ They discussed the arrangements of the trip. In the meeting, Sammie and Edith agreed, without written confirmation, that Sammie would interview one or two individual cultural representatives as a way to explore their lives in Orlando in depth.

According to Sammie, tension between Sammie and Edith arose with the first interview in Orlando. Sammie interviewed a female HKDL cultural representative in her room. On Sammie's account, she asked the interviewee to sit on her bed so that they could have a casual interview, but Edith requested the interviewee to sit on the sofa and adopt a formal pose. Again according to Sammie, Edith's numerous interruptions and prohibitions marred the three-day interview period. On one occasion, Sammie says, she asked the Magic Kingdom manager his views on the small size of HKDL relative to the Magic Kingdom. When the manager started to answer, Edith allegedly stopped the camera filming and requested that the manager not answer any question involving comparisons between Disney parks.⁴⁷ Another situation occurred at Disney University. During recess, a male cultural representative, after learning that Sammie was a reporter from Hong Kong, commented (according to Sammie): "We cannot say anything here. It's horrible." Sammie recalled that while the man was talking to her, Edith was talking to another reporter and, for that reason, could not hear the man's remark. However, once Edith noticed that the young man was talking to Sammie, Edith immediately came over to them and asked the man to return to the classroom. According to Sammie, Disney even prohibits normal conversations between staff and reporters who have no recording devices in hand. On this occasion, Sammie then wrote her phone number on a piece of paper and told Edith that she needed to return to the

classroom herself because she had left a camera there. To ensure the success of her plan, she asked the other reporter to divert Edith's attention by talking to her. Upon entering the classroom, Sammie quickly gave her phone number to this young man.

Disney controls not only particular questions or dialogues but also the structure of the news story. Although Sammie wanted to base an in-depth story on the working lives of one or two Disney park cultural representatives, Edith (says Sammie) was not willing to allow "deep" interviewing to take place. Edith and Sammie argued over the latter, and Edith reduced the next day's number of interviewees from three to two. Sammie described the first young man she met as a "robot" (in fact, when describing this man to Edith, Sammie rather daringly used the same words). The young man stated matter-of-factly, "Hello. I have had great fun and am happy everyday here. Thank you." Sammie refused to conduct an interview with this man and asked Edith to arrange for her (Sammie) to interview another male cultural representative, James, whom Sammie had met in the park. According to Sammie, Edith's first reply to the request was, "James is not on my checklist." At the end of that day, Edith claimed that James had taken a sick leave and was, in fact, too sick to participate in an interview. On the third day, refusing to interview "robots," Sammie told Edith that, as matters stood, she (Sammie) could not develop a successful story, would leave Orlando one day early, and would write no news story about HKDL cultural representatives. After Sammie's veiled threat, Edith arranged for James to come. However, James' statements were not unlike those of the "robot," and Sammie suspected that James' responses had been scripted.

Efforts to record these kinds of interviews create obstacles that are no more problematic than the obstacles that arise when outsiders try to film Disney parks

themselves. Inside the park, to protect “character integrity,”⁴⁸ Orlando staff told Sammie that she could neither photograph nor film Disney characters. She could not even film a music band’s performance because Disney, as a media company, wanted to ensure that all of Disney’s publicly displayed images were in conformity with the Disney Realism image, that is, an image that contributes to the conception of Disneyland as a “fantasyland.” In the Orlando park, Sammie and her colleagues found surrounding them not only Edith and her assistant, but also a public relations representative from Orlando Walt Disney World, a manager from Orlando Magic Kingdom, a staff member of the Disney International Program, and a local crew filming the behavior of Sammie and her colleagues. Furthermore, they found that their behavior was under the surveillance of the park’s security service in civilian dress. On another occasion, Sammie was watching a BBC television documentary on North Korea, and in the documentary, a BBC reporter stated that it was terribly difficult to interview and to film inside North Korea. Drawing a surprising parallel between the BBC reporters’ efforts and her own recent efforts, Sammie commented that her experience of Orlando Disney parks’ controls was similar to the BBC reporters’ experience of controls in the militarized dictatorship of North Korea.

Standardization is a pervasive Disney practice. In Hong Kong, Disney’s production standards are published as manuals, and any action that strays from the checklist is prohibited. In every Disneyland park, every cast member has to meet a Disney-appearance standard, which is published in a handbook entitled *The Disney Look*; guest service has guidelines and cast members need to follow seven steps governing the members’ interaction with guests; operation guidelines and a corresponding detailed checklist govern every ride inside a Disney park. None of these facts seem unusual or even objectionable. After all, standardization can

strengthen efficiency, effectiveness, and safety. But surface appearances can be deceptive. Standardization can over-indulge itself and can, in this way, have harmful consequences. Take, for example, the way in which Disney not only controls its workers and standardizes Disney characters' movements but it also obligates its staff (including Disney show producers, entertainment operations staff, public relations personnel, and even marketing and sales staff) to "uphold" the Disney standard against other parties' "misrepresentation" of Disney Realism. These Disney workers control the way directors film Disney characters and the way journalists introduce Disney characters. In her story about Disney, Sammie mentioned that the public relations management had an exclusive interviewee checklist and that names outside the checklist were normally unavailable for interview. In Sammie's story, Edith prefers the "robot" staff and prevents James from being interviewed by Sammie. Such acts could potentially discriminate against people on the basis of some manager's personal bias. Besides, Disney's control and manipulation of Disney Realism extends beyond its Kingdom to other domains such as news media, presumed to highlight objectivity and the presentation of truth. In upholding Disney Realism, Disney not only controls news media in representing Disney, but masks a more complicated reality, potentially censoring the contested truth.

It seems that the tighter the control that Disney exerted over journalists' behavior, the greater the resistance that journalists exhibited. To strike a balance between the Disney approvers and the Disney disapprovers, my reporter respondents conducted either undercover interviews with visitors and workers who were inside HKDL or open interviews with opponents of Disney. Sammie initially centered her news story only on cultural representatives' experiences, but because

of her experience in Orlando and the problematic responses of the HKDL public relations officers, Sammie packaged the news story in two parts. She first discussed HKDL cultural representatives' lives in Orlando and then discussed her interview with local scholar Iam Chong Ip, who had edited a Chinese book, *Disney Is Not a Happy Park*,⁴⁹ and members of a local anti-Disney group, Disney Hunter.⁵⁰ In this way, Sammie hoped to portray the different faces of Disney.

HKDL has faced criticisms not only from reporters but from local celebrities, as well. The relation between Disney and celebrities should be reciprocally beneficial so that, while the celebrities bolster their fame, Disney can use this fame to promote HKDL. However, a month before the park opened, local film actor Daniel Wu wrote, in his blog, an entry advocating that people “Boycott Disneyland!” He issued the statement because his band, Alive, had helped to celebrate HKDL’s opening but had received no payment—only a “rude and impolite” reception from “Disney staff specifically the ones from America.”⁵¹

Another local and Mainland China superstar, Kelly Chan, followed Wu’s example and, in a radio program, disparaged HKDL’s disrespect of local stars.⁵² According to her, HKDL had invited her to make a music video inside the park but several of Disney’s higher-ranking officers from America were rude to her when they oversaw her music-video shoot. They reproved their local co-workers for having let Chan and her crewmembers use—without official permission—a hotel room; the officers also argued that Chan had broadcast her song too loudly although there were no guests in the park. Kelly Chan found her Disney dream shattered, and she pledged that she would never again promote the American Disney company.

After facing resistance from journalists who described HKDL as “highhanded” and “Americanism,”⁵³ HKDL management attempted to improve its

relations with local media by implementing Disney Realism in a more lenient way. As I mentioned above, when HKDL first opened in September 2005, journalists had to get permission from HKDL before entering the park to do an interview, and a HKDL worker had to accompany a journalist during his or her trip. Both my journalist respondent and an HKDL staff respondent told me that HKDL had changed some media policies around ten months after HKDL's opening in September 2005.⁵⁴ Henceforward, if HKDL holds a press conference inside the park, reporters after the conference can stay in the park to go on rides without being followed by an HKDL worker, and reporters can interview HKDL guests if these guests are willing to be interviewed. On normal days, if an HKDL staff member finds a reporter conducting interviews unauthorized by HKDL, the staff member should simply note a few facts about the reporter and report these facts to the manager or public relations staff rather than immediately stop the reporter's interview. If the interview that the reporter is conducting is simple and if guests are willing to be interviewed, HKDL staff should not obstruct the interview. Staff may provide the reporter with a room for the interview to minimize disturbance to other guests. HKDL also hired experienced local journalists such as Lee Chan Wing to teach staff ways to deal with journalists. Now, when HKDL holds a press conference, it is held in a restaurant with air-conditioning instead of in a temporary tent without air-conditioning, as was the case during the opening of the park in 2005.

It is true that HKDL's hospitality has improved: HKDL has a more comfortable center for news media, sends premiums⁵⁵ and videos to reporters, and attempts to be generally more open toward reporters. Nevertheless, Disney Realism as a work philosophy easily fosters resistance on the part of journalists because of

its manipulative practices. Some reporters have voiced their grievances in public. In her newspaper column, one female anchor criticized HKDL public relations for treating reporters as advertising agents.⁵⁶ She wrote in September 2006 that HKDL had once invited reporters to cover HKDL backstage stories (about HKDL's new developments) but that, on accepting the invitation, the reporters had gained access only to a few Disney staff members' scripted introductions to cartoon characters in the backstage area. As soon as a reporter had begun to film the cartoon characters, an HKDL public relations officer had stopped the shoot, requesting that the reporter use the expression "Disney friends" rather than the expression "cartoon character" to describe the cartoon characters. The officer had then emphasized the assertion that these Disney "friends" are not in costume but actually born as they appear. In her newspaper column, the anchor summarized the event thus:

It is acceptable to ask reporters to introduce Disney cartoon characters as "Disney friends," but it is truly intolerable to demand reporters to distort facts and to instill ideas that cartoon characters are real creatures. As a result, that reporter gave up reporting and the park lost a chance for promotion.... If public relations people demand an unreasonable request or restriction, it is an interference with freedom of the press.⁵⁷

Facing HKDL's "bad show,"⁵⁸ reporters sometimes boycott interviews or actively report HKDL's inconsiderate acts as experienced by the reporters. On 11 September 2005, a day before HKDL's official opening, a foreign security guard behaved rudely and stated that only journalists with huge, professional cameras and video cameras might conduct interviews about the opening ceremony. Journalists boycotted the interview, and the guard was compelled to apologize; nevertheless, newspapers reported the whole event.⁵⁹ On 12 September 2006, a year after the opening of HKDL, the HKDL management insisted on holding a press conference

outdoors, and reporters and their recording equipment were drenched in the pouring rain; the recording equipment stopped working and twenty reporters from ten organizations boycotted the interview session for an hour. Following this boycott, HKDL moved the press-conference venue indoors; HKDL indemnified reporters' losses and issued a press statement in apology. However, these actions did not stop journalists from writing about HKDL's inconsiderate media arrangement, the reporters' losses, and the boycott.⁶⁰

Besides direct confrontations, journalists can construct a relatively negative image of HKDL by playing with rhetoric. News media commonly compare the management of HKDL with that of another popular Hong Kong theme park, Ocean Park.⁶¹ The former came to be known as "highhanded park" whereas the latter began to figure as the "people's park."⁶² Press frequently compare the two parks in terms of their provision of facilities for disabled visitors,⁶³ their pricing,⁶⁴ the quality and the number of their attractions,⁶⁵ and their attendance figures.⁶⁶ Attendance figures constitute one of journalists' major concerns because of the HKSAR government-Disney HKDL joint venture. When reporting HKDL's annual attendance figures on 5 September 2006, fourteen out of the eighteen local newspapers stated that HKDL fell short of the first-year target of 5.6 million and only four press outlets said that HKDL had received over five million visitors or that the HKDL attendance figures were close to meeting the visitor target in the first year of operation.⁶⁷ HKDL's failure to meet its target has encouraged journalists to search for and report on the limited benefits that HKDL has had for Hong Kong's transport industry, hotel industry, and economy in general.⁶⁸

HKDL tension and chaos: Disney bureaucratic and scientific management

“The management of the modern office is based on written documents (‘the files’), which are preserved in their original or draught form.” Max Weber⁶⁹

I once asked Andrew,⁷⁰ a staff member working in the Hong Kong Disney production office,⁷¹ to identify the most important lesson that he had learned during his four years of work at Disney. He replied without hesitation: writing e-mails. His boss had spent two months teaching him about effective e-mail composition because the first rule of working or surviving successfully in Disney is to manage everything in written form; the boss had also prohibited the deletion of any business e-mails concerning Andrew because they might serve as evidence in case of some related dispute years down the road. Because Disney production practices division and sub-division of labor, a local low-ranking staff member can receive more than two hundred e-mails in three days, even if she or he is not directly involved in any of the projects. Andrew said that he needed to spend every morning replying to and writing e-mails. He knew that the e-mail-writing practice was a way to protect himself from troubles, but he also found it time-consuming and to a certain degree useless, because it is not a local customary practice to invite—by e-mail—celebrities to help Disney promote itself. To simplify the process and to accomplish the task, he normally sent e-mails to agents when the topic involved negotiations and decisions.

Disney treats written documents seriously, because written documents can always be used as evidence against chicanery. Thus, my journalist respondent, Sammie, failed to secure an official letter confirming that HKDL had invited her to interview Disney’s cultural representatives in Orlando. In contrast, to protect its own rights, Disney asks its partners to sign many legal documents, and this

bureaucratic management practice annoys many local celebrities and producers. Andrew told me that a Mainland superstar wanted to visit HKDL and stay in the HKDL hotel for a night, a series of events that supposedly would be excellent publicity for HKDL. This Mainland star agreed to greet the media inside the park, but then the park management asked the star to sign many contracts. As a result, the star refused to sign the contracts and to visit the park.

Disney's e-mail-writing protocol applies to HKDL. Julia,⁷² a HKDL customer-services staff member, said that her supervisor would type all phone inquiries and complaints that were not immediately executable and would e-mail them to the public relations department or to other departments. Afterward, the concerned department would respond to the supervisor via e-mails. At HKDL, phone conversations are strongly discouraged. When I asked her what "Disney magic" is, she said that she had neither created nor tasted Disney magic (the Disneyland service philosophy of bringing unexpected happiness to guests) because she did not think that HKDL workers wholeheartedly tried to help guests solve their problems. She related to me a pertinent story: on several occasions, public relations officers had criticized an employee for telephoning them in search of an answer to some guests' inquiries. To Julia, "Disney magic" expressed her puzzlement at the disappearance of administrators, whom she found extremely difficult to find when she needed an answer to inquiries from customers. In other words, unless inquiries or requests are easily executable (such as an enquiry regarding the time of the HKDL firework display), HKDL's replies are not quick. For serious matters, HKDL public relations will ask for advice from its consultancy firm and even from the US Disney headquarters, and these protracted communications further slow down the response time. My reporter respondent Keith mentioned that the slow

response attributable to Disney's bureaucracy has a secondary effect: the slow responses to handling and managing crises creates a pool of disgruntled visitors and staffers where reporters can go trolling for grievances⁷³ and can dig out a cover story.

The HKDL management marked 4 September 2005 as a trial-run day to test the capacity and the operation of the theme park. All revenues from the day's events were to go to charity, and a thronging mass of about 30,000 people—a number that the management insisted HKDL's efficiency and capacity could handle—swamped the park for a hot humid intermittently rainy and sunny rehearsal day.⁷⁴ Queues were everywhere—at MTR station,⁷⁵ at the entrance,⁷⁶ at rides,⁷⁷ in front of restaurants,⁷⁸ and outside restrooms.⁷⁹ Without adequate measures to manage crowds and visitors' complaints efficiently, disgruntled guests complained about HKDL in front of the press and voiced grievances on radio programs. Visitors resented the discomfort because they had paid full price but were treated merely as herded cattle in Disney's rehearsal "stress test."⁸⁰ They compared queuing inside the park unfavorably to the famously stressful queuing for "peaceful rice"⁸¹ (an annual free public hand-out gift of lucky rice), which had, only a few days earlier, resulted in the accidental crushing of an old woman. Promotions that had hailed a fantastic park experience ceded place to visitors' complaints. However, because Disney's bureaucratic practices encourage neither formal apologies nor written documents such as apologetic press releases, HKDL president Don Robinson neither apologized for the situation nor explained it in public. It was rather the HKSAR government, in the person of Financial Secretary Henry Tang, that explained the chaos in public,⁸² the day after the Charity Day chaos. Moreover, it was also the HKSAR government that issued a press release, stating that the

HKSAR Financial Secretary was having “an extensive discussion” with HKDL management that afternoon about improvements of and adjustments to “the theme park capacity, entry arrangements, queue management, food and beverage facilities, seating area, car parking arrangements, etc.”⁸³

The slow and reluctant HKDL response and HKDL’s lack of crisis-management measures also encouraged people to raise sensitive cultural issues such as Americanism. HKDL’s 2006 Lunar New Year chaos is a prominent example of this process. To increase ticketing flexibility and to boost visitor numbers, HKDL was the first Disney theme park to offer two-tier pricing, which distinguishes normal calendar days (with flexible tickets that could be used any time within six months after, on this occasion, 1-3 February 2006⁸⁴) from holidays and peak days (marked by date-specific tickets) such as Hong Kong public holidays, the Christmas holidays, and the Mainland Golden Week (1-7 May and 1-7 October every year).⁸⁵ Flexible tickets allow but do not *guarantee* entry on any particular day; only date-specific tickets guarantee entry on that specified date. On the basis of “the October 2005 Golden Week experience,”⁸⁶ Hong Kong International Theme Park Company⁸⁷ designated as special days only the period ranging from 28 to 31 January 2006 (i.e., the eve and the first, second, and third days of the Lunar New Year, these four days being Hong Kong public holidays). In contrast, HKDL designated as regular days the period ranging from 1 to 3 February 2006—even though these three extra days are still Golden New Year holidays for Mainlanders (but not in Hong Kong).

Because HKDL did not designate the dates 1 and 2 February as Special Days, guests using Regular Day tickets could gain admission to the park on those days. HKDL overbooked visitors, chiefly because of the many Mainlanders still

holidaying in Hong Kong; in consequence, HKDL refused entry to more than (in total) two thousand people holding valid entry tickets for these two consecutive days. Gates were locked at 11:30 a.m. on 1 February 2006 and again at 10:30 a.m. on 2 February 2006,⁸⁸ and the temporary closure of the park elicited angry outbursts from the disappointed crowd. Most of the local press reported the HKDL chaos in detail on 2 February 2006: some disgruntled visitors refused to leave and clamored outside the park while others rocked the main gates, climbed over the iron gates, and helped children to get over. And police officers were called in for help to maintain order. However, at this stage, only several press outlets presented the story as headline news.⁸⁹ But HKDL management did not apologize; indeed, a Disney spokesperson said only that HKDL's policy was in line with the policy of other Disney parks around the world and that visitors to HKDL should arrive early if they want to visit the park.⁹⁰ Nor did HKDL provide appropriate measures to prevent the chaos. So, when similar chaos occurred a second time on the following day, an increasing number of papers made headlines out of the HKDL chaos.⁹¹ Reports harshly criticized HKDL-management practices on 3 and 4 February for causing a "Hong Kong shame,"⁹² and these reports also raised international concern about the chaos at HKDL.⁹³

HKDL was slow to issue a formal apology. The executive vice-president and the managing director of the theme park Bill Ernest's formal press statement expressing apologies released only on 3 February 2006,⁹⁴ two days after the chaos had begun. In contrast, the HKSAR government intervened in HKDL's difficulties in a quick and high-profile manner. The government sent out a press release on 2 February 2006,⁹⁵ in which the government expressed concerns about the chaos, admitted that the sales arrangement had "caused a lot of inconvenience to guests,"

and “requested them (i.e. the senior management of HKDL) to make improvements.” Press reports discussed Financial Secretary Henry Tang’s deep dissatisfaction with the reluctance of HKDL’s senior management to listen to advice inside the Board of Hong Kong International Theme Park Ltd (HKITP).⁹⁶ These reports, in addition to HKDL’s widely reported slow response to the whole affair, prompted the press to begin reporting overtly that the HKDL chaos was the result of the HKDL senior management’s ignorance,⁹⁷ highhandedness,⁹⁸ reluctance to admit faults,⁹⁹ and even Americanism.¹⁰⁰

To equate both HKDL’s inefficiency in tackling problems and a two-day crowd crisis with Americanism seems to be an exaggeration. Disney as a US-rooted company practices organizational hierarchy and bureaucratic management whereas another US mega-brand, Hewlett-Packard, practices “networked teams” organization, which makes decision-making and communication efficient.¹⁰¹ However, the New Year ticketing chaos, to a certain extent, reveals that the HKDL senior management was concerned more with data and statistics than with local and cultural knowledge when making important decisions. As revealed by the Economic Development and Labour Bureau in the Legislative Council Panel on Economic Services on 27 February 2006, HKDL’s sales arrangement of designating 1 to 3 February 2006 not as date-specific tickets but as regular tickets was “based on the October 2005 Golden Week experience at HKD [Hong Kong Disneyland].”¹⁰² The senior management had full knowledge that these three days were Mainlanders’ Golden New Year holiday, but the management chose to calculate the sales arrangement on the basis of previous HKDL-visitor figures and to ignore both government warnings and their own local cultural knowledge in this regard. However, HKDL’s scientific data had not made explicit the difference

between October Golden Week and Lunar New Year Golden Week, for the latter one is the only Mainland golden week holiday that occurs at the same time as Mainland students' public holiday. As a famous family entertainment provider, HKDL was highly likely to operate at capacity in these circumstances.¹⁰³ The HKDL management's reliance on contextless quantitative data instead of on local knowledge caused the overbooking chaos; it seems that it is not that Disney management was culturally ignorant but that Disney's "scientific" management practices culturally blinded the management when there was a conflict between HKDL's quantitative models and local cultural knowledge.

A transnational system's destabilization of onstage localization

After offending the French by refusing to sell wine at Euro Disney when it first opened, Disney Imagineers claimed that, at HKDL, they worked hard to tweak the park design, including food and facilities, on the basis of local food and local usage. Localization is the park's highlight: the shape of the Mickey and whale fountain outside the entrance is like bauhinia, a flower representing Hong Kong; one Chinese restaurant in the Disney hotel was designed according to the concept of the five elements (of metal, wood, water, fire, and earth) used in ancient Chinese cosmology; only after consulting with masters of *feng shui* did HKDL set the park design in general and the opening date and time of the park. Hong Kong is rainy, humid, and hot. This weather pattern differs from most weather patterns at Disney parks in the United States and in other places; therefore, concrete—rather than stone—was the preferred building material for the classic village inside Fantasyland.¹⁰⁴ Because HKDL's target demographic is Hong Kong people, Mainlanders, and guests from South East Asia, the ride *Jungle River Cruise* is

performed in three languages: Cantonese, *Putonghua*, and English; English performances of *The Lion King* are translated into Chinese and broadcast with Chinese subtitles. To accommodate Mainland tourists' personal hygiene habits, HKDL even built a certain number of squat toilets inside the park. As for cuisine, the park has three restaurants and five fast-food diners providing more than three hundred cuisines, the widest variety of food at any of the company's parks.¹⁰⁵ Besides hamburgers, most dishes that HKDL provides are Asian and include Cantonese noodles, Shanghaiese dumplings, Sichuanese dan dan noodles, Japanese sushi, and Indian Kashmiri chicken curry. HKDL also provides Hong Kong-style egg custard tarts and invented some Hong Kong-Western snacks and fast foods such as *char siu* pork-burger with rice in Tomorrowland's Starliner Diner. Because Hong Kong people and Mainlanders like eating Chinese-style roast meat, congee, noodles, and rice, the park's upscale Victorian-style building Plaza Inn serves classic Cantonese cuisine. Disney Imagineers even studied street hawkers in Mong Kok and, accordingly, dressed cast members up as these vendors and instructed them to sell sanitized local snacks, such as fish balls, from carts—all within HKDL.

Onstage localization is significant to Disney's transnational business, but its US-based transnational workforce, the Disney Imagineers and producers, may not be adept at accommodating local environments and needs so quickly when they design and produce attractions at HKDL, especially when HKDL is operated and managed by the Disney Company, instead of by locals (as is the case with Tokyo Disneyland Park).¹⁰⁶ Let us note, again, that HKDL has specialized and divided its management and has refused to entrust power to local senior management and production officials. These actions have made it difficult for HKDL to identify,

consider, and implement local suggestions. In this section, I discuss two new attractions, *Stitch Encounter* and *Autopia*, built inside HKDL and available since 13 July 2006, to illustrate how HKDL attractions, after almost one year's operation, still encounter problems of localization because of HKDL's management system and power hierarchy, both of which reflect trends at the US headquarters. I then compare two Winnie the Pooh attractions—one at HKDL and the other at Tokyo Disneyland—in order to argue that the localization problems that HKDL is facing are due largely to the HKSAR government's lack of institutional power—a rather startling admission insofar as the HKSAR government is the park's largest shareholder of the park.

Stitch Encounter is an indoor interactive cartoon show, where the on-screen character Stitch from Disney's animated cartoon *Lilo & Stitch* (2002) appears on a large rear-projection video screen and, for the twelve-minute show, converses with the audience in real-time. A cast member, hidden backstage, performs Stitch's voice; the action of the on-screen Stitch derives from a computer that tracks the backstage performer's movements on a real-time basis. For these two reasons, the show enables the character Stitch to perform differently in every show: Stitch's dialogues are not totally scripted and Stitch's actions differ from one show to the next. The show is offered in English, Cantonese, and *Putonghua*, and audiences need to check for the show time that is in their preferred language. Although the Magic Kingdom in Orlando offers an attraction with the same name *Stitch Encounter*, the two shows are quite different in that Orlando's Stitch is an audio-animatronic one and the Orlando show is not interactive.¹⁰⁷

Stitch Encounter has encountered problems of localization. Although *Stitch Encounter* has been offered in three languages, the show's three most important

contributors—the transnational-Disney-show producer, the Walt Disney Imagineering (WDI) director-scriptwriter, and the WDI technical director—could not understand Cantonese or *Putonghua*. According to my Disney production-staff respondent Rebecca,¹⁰⁸ the show’s producer asked the local Hong Kong Disney production office to suggest possible script translators, but finally did not employ people from the list provided; rather, she used two film directors and scriptwriters, Alfred Cheung and Wong Chun Chun, to translate the English script into Cantonese and into *Putonghua* respectively. According to Rebecca, the latter’s *Putonghua* was not fluid enough for the task of writing an adequate *Putonghua* script. Whether true or not in detail, that this story could circulate at all suggests that despite HKDL’s onstage localization, the process is only partly successful at best.¹⁰⁹

The localization problem that plagued *Stitch Encounter* has plagued the efforts of many local Disney production staff to domesticate Disney movies for release in Hong Kong. Local staff can give suggestions relative to these matters but cannot, in the end, determine whose voice will speak which Cantonese lines of dialogue; as stated by Andrew and Rebecca, two staffers working for Disney movies in Hong Kong, it is senior officers at Disney’s US headquarters—not staff members in the Hong Kong regional office—who make these critical decisions. Andrew’s and Rebecca’s experiences¹¹⁰ led them to apply “Americanism” to Disney’s hierarchical organizational culture and to Disney’s production process. *Stitch Encounter* and Disney movies may be localized for local consumers, but the hierarchy and the production process are not always regionalized, much less localized. Atop the hierarchy and governing the process is the American headquarters.

HKDL's *Autopia* faces a similar localization problem. Although *Autopia* "is based on the original *Autopia* ride that opened at California Disney in 1955,"¹¹¹ Disney Imagineers, according to my HKDL worker-respondents, differentiated HKDL's *Autopia* from other *Autopia* rides, for it is the first *Autopia* powered by electricity instead of gasoline. By using electricity, each car then needs to re-charge its store of electricity for one minute at the boarding area of the racetrack although the ride lasts only about four minutes. Local Disney production staff objected to the suggested use of electricity because Hong Kong's hot and wet weather is not suitable for electricity-powered racing cars. Nevertheless, the US-based Disney Imagineers insisted on the new *Autopia*. Successful tests of *Autopia* were to take place in June, but the cars experienced severe recharging problems. Consequently, *Autopia* could not begin operations on HKDL's scheduled opening date, which was moved forward from 1 July to 13 July 2006. To compound the problem, HKDL failed to notify the HKSAR Tourism Board, whose booklet *Hong Kong Shopping Festival Activities Guide* announced that *three* attractions would open on 1 July 2006, information that proved to be wrong because of the aforementioned delay.¹¹² It is understandable that this kind of scenario would play out: Disney Imagineering creates groundbreaking designs; therefore, Disney perhaps does not prioritize pragmatic operational considerations. And yet, it is as obvious as it is understandable that, because of the *Autopia* cars' need for lengthy recharging at the boarding area, very long queues would inevitably result, especially insofar as HKDL has the fewest rides of all Disneyland parks in the world.¹¹³

If Disneyland aims to provide patrons an escape from the existing world, HKDL's small size may illustrate that the California-based Disney Imagineers have failed to grasp locals' need for a larger park in which they might effectively escape

Hong Kong's usual crowded spatial experiences. HKDL was modeled primarily on Walt Disney's original plan for a Disney park. As I learned from my HKDL staff respondents who manage characters' parades, the footprint of HKDL (visitors' walking path inside HKDL) follows that of Anaheim's Disneyland Park. Supporters of the Anaheim park have praised its lesson-teaching potential: cities might "be saved by a mouse"¹¹⁴ because the park's walkable streets and pleasing public spaces aim to enhance people's communication and nurture people's better angels, as it were. Findley¹¹⁵ argued that the Anaheim park had been constructed as a Southern California-based suburban enclave, an antidote to the eastern metropolises of American civilization. However, when HKDL has imitated Anaheim Disneyland, problems have occurred. The approximately fifteen hectares of HKDL¹¹⁶ can hardly be imagined as an antidote to or a substitute for the high-density, hot and humid Hong Kong urban space. In contrast to Tokyo Disneyland, which changed "Main Street" to "World Bazaar" and protected it from rain under a glass canopy,¹¹⁷ the uncovered pedestrian-used areas of HKDL make it difficult for locals to believe that HKDL is an escape from the hot rainy Hong Kong summers, let alone a plethora of fantasy worlds.¹¹⁸ In place of visitors' better angels, HKDL's cramped and chaotic space lends strength to visitors' unpleasant natures, triggering daily quarrels inside HKDL. This turn of events constitutes an infamous irony in that Disney parks have won fame for their order, hygiene, and safety.

I do not mean to suggest that localization never happens successfully in HKDL. At the operational level, HKDL has adapted to local culture and to visitors' behavior. For example, local visitors like taking photos and, to take them, would sometimes disrupt the rides by disembarking from their individual carriages; in response, the park installed additional scenic spots for snapping photos; and a

stationary “cup” was placed in the *Mad Hatter Tea Cups* ride so that passengers could take photos before going for a spin.¹¹⁹ Another factor that contributes to HKDL’s local adaptability is the HKDL operation manual. According to my HKDL worker-respondents, every three months, this confidential and important asset to HKDL’s success updates adaptations to local needs. Each attraction has one operation manual; if the update is immediate, a notice will be published to override a particular point in the manual. For example, the theater entrance door of *Mickey’s PhilharMagic*, a 3-D animated cartoon attraction, was initially automatic. Because local patrons do not leave the theater immediately and because some want to stay to watch the show once again, the automatic entrance created chaos by automatically opening itself for a new group of incoming guests when some previous guests still had not exited the theater. After noting the chaos and identifying its source, HKDL changed the theater door from an automatic one to a manual one. These kinds of changes can be made by more than one or two people. HKDL staff, including cast-member trainers,¹²⁰ Lead (a supervisor and a peer coach of hosts),¹²¹ and guest service managers can, with the approval of the operation-development staff, change the operation manual. However, the decision to make any onstage change that creates an adaptation to local circumstances is, to a large extent, limited to operations personnel.

Although the Walt Disney creative-development vice president Tom Morris said that HKDL “benefits a lot from its new technology,”¹²² my HKDL staff respondents, especially those who worked in park operations, understood and *experienced* the so-called “cheap” construction that characterizes HKDL’s onstage attractions. A particular twist to the theming accounts for this construction. In 2001, the Hong Kong Tourist Association held a two-day conference entitled “Preparing

for Disneyland,” and Paul Pressler, chairman of Walt Disney Parks and Resorts, said that research in Hong Kong and the mainland showed a strong desire there for classic Disney characters and themes.¹²³ To build HKDL with the “original” American flavor, the Walt Disney Imagineers tried to recreate the “original” version of Walt Disney’s Disneyland in HKDL. Many onstage details of the attractions derive from technologies in use in 1955, although the technology at work behind these attractions may be contemporary. *The Many Adventures of Winnie the Pooh* at HKDL, for example, is most similar to the first version of the *Pooh* attraction in Orlando’s Magic Kingdom in June 1999. To build a 1955 park at the turn of the millennium, however, the Disney Imagineers built a mechanical turnstile for HKDL’s *Pooh* attraction. Because the turnstile was mechanical, staff, themselves, had to collect attendance figures every hour, whereas other *Pooh* attractions and all turnstiles elsewhere have been computerized so that the computer can generate an hourly or daily attendance report.

Of all the Pooh attractions, Tokyo Disneyland’s (TDL) *Pooh’s Hunny Hunt*¹²⁴ is seen as the epitome of the “new generation” of dark rides. The name of the Pooh attraction in Tokyo Disneyland differs from the names of other Disney parks’ Pooh attractions; the technology used in TDL’s *Pooh’s Hunny Hunt*, which premiered in September 2000, also differs from—and is, indeed, far more advanced and sophisticated than—other *Pooh* attractions, including HKDL’s *The Many Adventures of Winnie the Pooh*, which premiered in September 2005. Disneylands’ other indoor dark rides are built on tracks and move at a constant speed; in contrast, TDL’s *Pooh’s Hunny Hunt* has no rail track or bus line, and the audience has no way to know or even to guess whether the “free ranging” honey-pot-ride vehicle will move, move or pause, move straight and then swerve or spin, simply go

forward, or bounce. Because of the different speeds of the movement and the sudden pauses, *Pooh's Hunny Hunt* tells the Pooh adventure story with rhythm and generates unexpected spellbinding excitement. At the boarding area, three honey-pot cars move together, but then, each one moves on its own. This is possible because all of the attraction's grounds correspond to an electric map, and thereby, a positioning system detects each vehicle's movement and location. The *Pooh* rides in HKDL, Anaheim Disneyland, Orlando Magic Kingdom, and Paris Disneyland are the same traditional ride: vehicles with tracks. Many visitors would argue that none can compete with the interest and the excitement that TDL's *Pooh's Hunny Hunt* generates.

However, although Walt Disney Imagineering designed and produced both *Pooh's Hunny Hunt* and *The Many Adventures of Winnie the Pooh*, the Oriental Land Company (OLC) has total operational control of Tokyo Disneyland and enjoys rights to master-plan the park and to develop attractions with the Imagineering staff. *Pooh's Hunny Hunt* is an outcome of both requests by OLC¹²⁵ and concepts by Imagineering. OLC, with its master-planning right, was eager to invest more money into the development of new attractions and to renew existing Disneyland attractions, the goal being to attract audiences; at the same time, HKSAR government's negotiating power regarding such issues as park development, management, and operations is far more restricted than that enjoyed by OLC. This state of affairs remains the case even though the funding for HKDL's attractions comes from HKITP, in which the HKSAR government has a 57% share. Imagineers knew as early as December 2002 that HKDL's attractions would consist "mostly of what Imagineers call 'direct lifts'—copies of attractions built for other Disney parks."¹²⁶ As a result, although the cost of Tokyo Disneyland's *Pooh's*

Hunny Hunt was nine times more expensive than HKDL's *The Many Adventures of Winnie the Pooh*,¹²⁷ the former has been the most popular attraction in Tokyo Disneyland, whereas Disneyland Paris's *The Many Adventures of Winnie the Pooh* disappeared from that park in 2006.¹²⁸ In short, OLC has a greater degree of decision-making power than the HKSAR government in designing, budgeting, and producing rides to meet local needs and standards. Even when local HKDL operation staff commented that their own *Pooh* attraction was "cheap" and that the HKSAR government should be willing to pay for an expensive attraction when it was willing to invest HK\$22.95 billion for the reclamation and the building of HKDL, the irreducible fact was that the HKSAR government as the biggest shareholder of HKDL has had a definite say in neither the development nor the operation of their park.

Conclusion

Scholars emphasize Disney's global reach: Disney's ability to dominate global media, to homogenize global culture¹²⁹ (e.g., the organization of meanings of difference),¹³⁰ to constitute popular discourses in favor of its own image and business¹³¹ (e.g., commodification promotion),¹³² and to transform public spaces into privately controlled entertainment and consumption spaces.¹³³ The operation of HKDL demonstrates that Hong Kong imports not only Disney images and technologies but also Disney corporate culture, Disney Realism, and Disney management practices. Hong Kong Company Law does not require Disney to disclose any financial statements at the Companies Registry, and so HKDL can continue its non-transparent corporate-management practices. Although the

HKSAR government is the biggest shareholder of HKDL, bounded by the contractual terms, the former has no definite say in HKDL's design, development, and operation. In this chapter, I have also discussed how Disney's hierarchical corporate culture inhibits localization despite its transnational workforce; it limits localization of transnational cultural forms—in this case, HKDL onstage attractions—to the operational level.

Owning vast transnational power and arrays of global media networks, Disney possesses power that is not absolute; there is interplay among sites of power. Significant interplay takes place between Disney and local media actors, as they struggle with each other for the power to interpret, organize, and circulate the meaning of "Disney." I have shown in this chapter that local media actors have worked to change HKDL's transnational corporate image by interpreting Hong Kong's import of Disneyland not as a "millennium dream" but as "Americanism" and as a "Hong Kong shame." This interpretation illustrates that Disney's control over the organization of both the meaning of "Disney" and the meaning of "Disneyland" is far from total. The "local" remains crucial in shaping both local cultural meanings and the image of the global corporate giant. The Hong Kong press has criticized HKDL as cramped, parsimonious, and unresponsive to Hong Kong people's needs and dreams for a spectacular and extravagant HKDL. Also, the press has pointed out that HKDL's response to crises has been slow, highhanded, and reminiscent of Americanism. The press treatment of HKDL can be seen, in this light, as local resistance to Disney Realism, to Disney's manipulation of media, and to Disney's failure to satisfy Hong Kong people's desire to distinguish themselves from other cities and from non-Hong Kong people, as I discussed in chapter Three.

By criticizing certain Disney management practices as manipulative corporate practices and as Americanism, local media actors not only have problematized and demythicized Disney innocence but also have contributed to a continuous reshaping of local culture and identity. Alongside the press has been the HKSAR government, which has criticized the HKDL chaos. Government officials characterized HKDL security's actions as "unacceptable" after the 2005 dress-down incident,¹³⁴ and following the Lunar New Year chaos of February 2006, the government issued a statement of concern and then made an official "request" to HKDL regarding the need for improvements.¹³⁵ The HKSAR government's actions have helped reconstitute Hong Kong identity as one capable of rejecting a totally subsumed role in preference to a role that creates criticism of Disneyized management culture. A case in point concerns comments that the host of a popular local radio program made in her newspaper column. In reference to HKDL's first anniversary in September 2006, she wrote,

Last year Disney experienced a magical year, in that it received a barrage of negative comments but still earned two to three hundred million dollars, whereas the HKSAR government has run up deficits. However, the Hong Kong people should not feel stupid: we should thank Disney. Disney reinforces the Hong Kong people's international image. Now, the whole world knows that Americanism does not work in Hong Kong; Hong Kong people do not blindly adore American culture. We have independent thoughts and are astute consumers.... Each of us spends three thousand dollars [to build HKDL], and we can defeat an international brand.... [the expenditure] exceeds our billings!¹³⁶

Certainly the above remarks exaggerate the setbacks that Disney had faced in handling the Hong Kong people's views of HKDL management practices and of the international position and image of Hong Kong, but the remarks reconstitute Hong Kong's imagined communities and identities: they are not inferior and subsumed to

global or transnational corporate forces, in particular Disney regulations. It is local actors, including government, journalists, scholars, stars, and local production staff, who have requested that Disney management adapt its corporate culture to the Hong Kong context, especially insofar as HKDL is a joint-venture company and insofar as defects, chaos, and lower-than-expected attendance figures have characterized the park since its first year of operation.

I do not think that our reaction to local actors' resistance should be joyous. In the wake of HKDL's opening, media have widely circulated comment about a side of Disney with which many media consumers were unfamiliar; and since the opening, Hong Kong people have developed a more complicated reading of what "Disney" is. Nevertheless, media's and even local scholars' comments on Disney, as I have shown, complicate the meanings of Disney but rarely rise to a higher, more penetrating level, one that would promote important discussions about local laws' ineffectual monitoring of companies' acts. Hong Kong has yet to demand, in a unified voice, that HKDL practice greater transparency, that the HKSAR government better monitor HKDL management practices, and that, in place of over-generalized anti-Americanism rhetoric, there be open and thoughtful discussions. Let us discuss—as a community—the relationship between non-transparent local governance and HKDL's privatized practices, and let us discuss—as a community—the effect that this relationship has on Hong Kong people's citizenship rights.

In the following chapter, I continue to examine local work culture and local consumption practices inside HKDL. "Labor exploitation" was one of the popular HKDL topics publicized in news media,¹³⁷ but few HKDL workers have joined the HKDL labor union. Dissatisfied with the job owing to various reasons, HKDL

workers have developed their own practices, some with resistance potential. On the whole, these worker-developed practices enable the workers to remain in HKDL's employ but to fall short of Disney's service standards, quite a feat given Disney's all-encompassing work checklists. Consumers, on the other hand, constitute the other, less-recognized party performing on the Disneyland stage. Cultural tensions between Hong Kong people and Mainlanders are pronounced in HKDL, and the two demographic groups' different cultural scripts make it difficult for HKDL to become the "happiest place in the world." Enthusiastic consumers may disrupt the orderly and safe atmosphere of Disneyland unexpectedly, while sophisticated consumers may find HKDL inferior to other Disneyland parks around the world and may, as a result, seldom or never visit the park.

NOTES

¹ The official opening of Hong Kong Disneyland was on 12 September 2005. To smooth the operation, the park opened about a month earlier—and then just a few days before the opening—for “Rehearsal Days” (16 August and 8 September 2005). On these two occasions, HKDL management designated guests visited the park.

² “學者：經濟效益遜預期,” 12 September 2005, *Ta Kung Pao*, B01; “學者指政府誇大 入場人數難達標 迪士尼經濟效益或被高估,” 15 September 2005, *Ta Kung Pao*, A22; 呂大樂, “迪士尼欠缺本土元素,” 7 September 2005, *Sing Tao Daily*, A18; “斥政府計錯數 學者指樂園效益被誇大,” 15 September 2005, *Sing Tao Daily*, A10.

³ “迪士尼致歉 吳彥祖為香港爭啖氣,” 12 September 2005, *Oriental Daily*, C04.

⁴ 黃勁文, “「玩遊戲排 4 小時 慘過輪米」 入場上限 3 萬人 遊人議員促減半,” 5 September 2005, *Hong Kong Economic Times*, A03.

⁵ “學者揭破政府急補鑊迪士尼最多容僅五千人,” 16 September 2005, *Sing Tao Daily*, A28; 聞峰, “迪士尼面積 確細過維園,” 16 September 2005, *Hong Kong Daily News*, A09; “學者：迪士尼細過維園 當局三緘其口 議員要求交代,” 15 September 2005, *Hong Kong Daily News*, A04.

⁶ “迪士尼：入場高峰有 40 日 昨綵排 遊戲出故障餐廳排長龍,” 7 September 2005, *Ta Kung Pao*, A08; “遊戲常有蝦碌員工未熟操作,” 7 September 2005, *Apple Daily*, A24.

⁷ “西方新娘「這麼小那麼霸道」,” 12 September 2005, *Ming Pao Daily News*, A10; “迪士尼霸道損遊興 港府是大股東應盡監管責任,” 15 September 2005, *The Sun*, A30.

⁸ “米老鼠唐老鴨都要守港法,” 12 September 2005, *Hong Kong Commercial Daily*, A04; “葉澍堃：米奇唐老鴨都要守法,” 12 September 2005, *Sing Pao*, A08; “米奇要遵守香港法律,” 12 September 2005, *Apple Daily*, A10.

⁹ “大美國主義忽視中國節慶,” 9 February 2006, *Oriental Daily*, A12; 黃偉豪, “迪士尼王國 挑戰國家主權,” 15 September 2005, *Ming Pao Daily News*, B12. The phrase “Americanism” is used not only by Hong Kong people but also by Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese. On Chinese websites and forums, for example, some Hollywood movies such as *Independence Day* and *U-571* have come under criticism for their reinforcement of “Americanism” because these movies either expose Americans’ arrogant self-perception as world police or suppress other countries’ contribution to the maintenance of world peace. In the case of HKDL, the phrase “Americanism” suggested that during the early period of HKDL’s operations, the Disney company demonstrated American highhandedness and arrogance by neither abiding by Hong Kong laws nor considering the HKSAR government’s advice. These American practices led to crises at HKDL and to Hong Kong people’s dissatisfaction with HKDL. For examples of Chinese websites and forums about “Americanism,” please read “珍珠港的大美國主義,” http://www1.iwant-radio.com/a-b0023/?sn=a-b0023_20010612_01; “大美國主義軍事動作爛片數落篇...,” <http://www.student.tw/db/archive/index.php?t-43677.html>; “美國大電影 六部美國主義電影舉例,” sina e-news, <http://news.sina.com.cn/w/2005-05-18/16526679874.shtml> (all accessed 6 March 2007).

¹⁰ “世紀夢成真迪士尼藍圖初展 神奇王國 (Magic Kingdom) 初步構思,” 3 November 1999, *Apple Daily*, Disney feature, main news.

¹¹ 李兆富, “蘋論：國企主題公園令香港蒙羞,” 3 February 2006, *Apple Daily*, A06, editorial; “落閘開閘混亂 樂園令港蒙羞,” 3 February 2006, *Sing Pao*, A04, editorial.

¹² Government Information Centre, “Hong Kong Disneyland Final Agreement Signed,” HKSAR government’s press release on 10 December 1999, <http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/199912/10/1210286.htm> (accessed 5 August 2006).

¹³ Stuart Hall, “Encoding/Decoding,” in *Culture, Media, Language*, edited by Hall, Hobson, Lowe, and Willis (London: Hutchinson, 1980), pp. 128-138.

¹⁴ John M. Findlay, *Magic Lands: Western Cityscapes and American Culture after 1940* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p. 70.

¹⁵ Siegfried Kracauer, *Theory of Film: The Redemption of Physical Reality* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 28. Further references

are in parentheses in the text.

¹⁶ André Bazin, *What is Cinema?* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1967), p. 37. Further references are in parentheses in the text.

¹⁷ Georg Lukács, "The Zola Centenary," in *The Nineteenth-Century Novel: A Critical Reader*, edited by Regan (London, NY: Routledge, 2001), p. 384.

¹⁸ Stephen Heath, *Questions of Cinema* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981).

¹⁹ Bill Nichols, *Ideology and the Image* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981).

²⁰ Tom Gunning, "The Cinema of Attractions: Early Film, Its Spectator, and the Avant-Garde," in *The Film Studies Reader*, edited by J. Hollows, P. Hutchings, and M. Jancovich (London: Arnold, 2000), p. 162. Emphasis added.

²¹ Kevin Rafferty and Bruce Gordon, *Walt Disney Imagineering: A Behind the Dreams Look at Making the Magic Real* (New York: Disney Enterprises, 1996), p. 11.

²² Judy Chung Chuihua, "Disney Space," in *Harvard Design School Guide to Shopping*, edited by Chung, Inaba, Koolhaas, and Leong (Koln: TASCHEN, 2001), p. 276.

²³ Beth Dunlop, *Building a Dream: The Art of Disney Architecture* (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1996), p. 14, quoting Judy Chung Chuihua, "Disney Space," in *Harvard Design School Guide to Shopping*, edited by Chung, Inaba, Koolhaas, and Leong (Koln: TASCHEN, 2001), p. 276.

²⁴ Roland Barthes, *S/Z* (New York: Hill & Want, 1974), p. 60, 80; Roland Barthes, "The Reality Effect," *The Rustle of Language* (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1986), pp. 141-8.

²⁵ "Walt Disney Parks and resorts to debut new attractions and entertainment in 2007: Will bring great stories to life—and expand to new and different places," Disney Corporate News Release 2007, http://corporate.disney.go.com/news/corporate/2007/2007_0105_new_attractions_debut.html (accessed 28 February 2007). The Walt Disney Company in its press release said that it, for the first time, will launch "Where Dreams Come True" in all Disney parks and resorts worldwide in October 2007. The goal will be to build up Disney parks as "a magical escape" for "families everywhere."

²⁶ This is a remark made by Disney designer and artist John Hench. John M. Findlay, *Magic Lands: Western Cityscapes and American Culture after 1940* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p. 78.

²⁷ Michael Wallace, "The Politics of Public History," *Past Meets Present*, p. 44; quoted from Jackie R. Donath, "The Gene Autry Western Heritage Museum: The Problem of an Authentic Western Mystique," *American Quarterly* 43, issue 1 (1991), p. 90.

²⁸ Jackie R. Donath, "The Gene Autry Western Heritage Museum: The Problem of an Authentic Western Mystique," *American Quarterly* 43, issue 1 (1991), p. 90.

²⁹ Richard E. Foglesong, "Walt Disney World and Orlando Deregulation as a Strategy for Tourism," in *The Tourist City*, edited by Judd and Fainstein (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1999).

³⁰ Richard E. Foglesong, *Married to the Mouse: Walt Disney World and Orlando* (New Haven, London: Yale University Press). Further references are in parentheses in the text.

³¹ "強迫除帽除肩章食環署督察屈從 迪士尼太霸道," 10 September 2005, *Apple Daily*, A01; "迪士尼太霸道 食環署太軟弱," 10 September 2005, *Sing Pao*, A04; "衛生督察進園須除帽脫襟章迪士尼霸道 食環署受辱," 10 September 2005, *Sing Tao Daily*, A02; 鄭美姿, "「霸道」阻執法 迪士尼道歉 食環署查中毒 被促脫帽除襟章," 10 September 2005, *Hong Kong Economic Times*, A02; "迪士尼霸權惹公憤 督察被迫除帽 食環署重申職權," 10 September 2005, *Ta Kung Pao*, P04; "迪士尼罔顧法紀 巡查衛生督察被要求除帽除章," 10 September 2005, *The Sun*, A08; "法治面前 迪士尼無特權," 10 September 2005, *Ming Pao Daily News*, A03; "食環署督察脫帽除章才可入園 迪士尼被轟特權心態," 10 September 2005, *Wen Wei Po*, A24.

³² Patsy Moy, May Chan, and Dennis Eng, "Disney under fire for asking inspectors to dress down," 10 September 2005, *South China Morning Post*, EDT1; "Disneyland 'no right' to obstruct officials," 10 September 2005, *China Daily* (Hong Kong Edition), P02; "迪士尼玩殘衛生幫 入園查食物中毒 食環署兩員脫徽除帽," *Sing Pao*, 10 September 2005, A02; "迪士尼倒數第二日 頭條: 強迫除帽除肩章食環署督察屈從 迪士尼太霸道," 10 September 2005, *Apple Daily*, A01; "食環署查案要脫帽除襟章 迪士尼道歉," 10 September 2005, *Hong Kong Daily News*, A01.

³³ "Disneyland 'no right' to obstruct officials," 10 September 2005, *China Daily* (Hong Kong Edition), P02.

³⁴ Matthew Lee, "Disney sorry for action over food bug pair," 10 September 2005, *The Standard*, A08.

³⁵ "迪士尼倒數第二日 頭條: 強迫除帽除肩章食環署督察屈從 迪士尼太霸道," 10 September 2005, *Apple Daily*, A01.

³⁶ Matthew Lee, "Disney sorry for action over food bug pair," 10 September 2005, *The Standard*, A08.

³⁷ "學者: 美式文化作祟," 10 September 2005, *Oriental Daily News*, A30; "迪士尼霸權惹公憤 督察被迫除帽 食環署重申職權," 10 September 2005, *Ta Kung Pao*, P04; 鄭美姿 "「霸道」阻執法 迪士尼道歉 食環署查中毒 被促脫帽除襟章," 10 September 2005, *Hong Kong Economic Times*, A02.

³⁸ I interviewed two reporters, Keith and Sammie, who had researched and written stories on HKDL, and one daily-news TV executive producer, David, about their views on media coverage of HKDL. I interviewed Keith in June 2006 and Sammie in Oct. 2006 respectively. For details on Keith, see this chapter's endnote 40. For details on Sammie, see endnote 26 in chapter Four. As for David, I interviewed him three times: in December 2002, December 2005, and December 2006 respectively.

For details, see chapter Four, endnote 15.

³⁹ As for Disneyland Paris (the previous name of Euro Disneyland), the Walt Disney Company controlled 49% of the Euro Disney S.C.A. (Société en Commandite par Actions), which was the public holding company that owned the theme park, and investors purchased the remaining 51% of all shares. Of these latter shares, half were offered to French investors and the other half were distributed around the rest of Europe. Under French law, the structure of S.C.A. provides “a clear distinction between the Gérant who is responsible for operating the Company and the supervisory board, which oversees the management of the Company.” For details, please read Andrew Lainsbury, *Once Upon an American Dream: The Story of Euro Disneyland* (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2000), pp. 43-5; “Corporate Governance: Shareholding Structure,” in Euro Disney S.C.A. website, <http://www.eurodisney.com/en/0131.php> (accessed 4 March 2007).

⁴⁰ The name “Keith” is a pseudonym. Keith had been a reporter since 2004. The interview took place in June 2006, nine months after the official opening of HKDL. He took part in developing several news stories about HKDL, including (1) HKDL’s request that government dog catchers round up and kill about 45 stray dogs, some of which were believed to have been adopted by construction workers and used as unofficial guard dogs on the site during construction, (2) HKDL’s demand that two health inspectors submit to a dress down before entering the park two days before the official opening, and (3) HKDL’s refusal to allow more than two thousand people holding valid entry tickets to enter the park on 1 and 2 February 2006 and the ensuing chaos. I discuss the latter two issues in this chapter. He also developed several feature stories himself about HKDL, including a news report on HKDL’s limited provision of handicap facilities, a news report on the ways in which HKDL management strove to “save” the Disney image, and a news report on taxi drivers’ perception of HKDL after HKDL, in a bid to promote the park, had offered them free entry therein. In the interview, I asked Keith to discuss his own perception of HKDL management and asked him whether or not he thought that media had tarnished the HKDL image. I had not known Keith prior to the interview and I did not know his perception of Disney at the time of the interview. I knew only that he had developed several stories on Disney, and through the snowballing method, I invited Keith to be my respondent. Keith graciously accepted my invitation.

⁴¹ A reply offered by the Secretary for Economic Development and Labour, Mr. Stephen Ip, to a question posed by the Hon. Margaret Ng in the Legislative Council on 14 December 2005, http://www.edlb.gov.hk/edb/eng/papers/ue_question/com_upload/Q169/q1eng.pdf (accessed 20 April 2006).

⁴² Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, “Commissioner for Tourism Explains Disney Theme Park Project,” HKSARG, <http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/199911/02/1102218.htm> (accessed 17 October 2005).

⁴³ Wang Ko, a business professor, had the chance to study two summaries of the joint-venture agreement and criticized the assumptions of the agreement as “absolutely ridiculous” because the true cost of the establishment had not been

disclosed. See Chester Yung and Doug Crets, "Disney deal anger mounts," 12 September 2005, *Hong Kong Standard*, A10.

⁴⁴ 賴偉家、張岳弢, "「這3天我的工作便是跟著你, 沒有其他工作了。」款待員3對1侍候記者," 11 September 2005, *Ming Pao Daily News*, A09.

⁴⁵ I interviewed Sammie in October 2006 and with several follow-up phone talks. In the interview, I mainly asked her how she made up her news story and how her encounter with Disney staff affected the story contents. For details, see endnote 26 in chapter Four.

⁴⁶ 'Edith' is a pseudonym. Edith was one of the HKDL workers dealing with HKDL media relations.

⁴⁷ TV news program has covered this issue. See TVB Pearl, "Behind the Magic," *Pearl Report* (Hong Kong: Pearl, 2005) 17 July 2005.

⁴⁸ "Character integrity" is important for the maintenance of Disney magic. Every new Disneyland staffer needs to take Disney orientation, which introduces "Disney tradition," with a manual entitled *Disney Tradition* and published by Disney University. Orientation informs the new staffers that they should protect "character integrity" in order to produce a "flawless and professional" show. See Disney University, *Disney Traditions*, p. 13.

⁴⁹ 葉蔭聰 and 施鵬翔, 迪士尼不是樂園(香港: 進一步多媒體有限公司, 1999).

⁵⁰ Sammie's news report was published in July 2005. Because she knew that HKDL management would get angry if she reported different views of Disney, she phoned Edith about the change of the structure of her news story a week or two before publication of the story. According to Sammie, Edith on the phone did not know how to respond because Edith had not expected Sammie would change the reportage structure. A few days later, according to Sammie, the assistant controller of Sammie's division came to Sammie to tell her that HKDL management had talked to another department of the company and had asked Sammie to describe solely the HKDL cultural representatives' lives. HKDL management had also stated that HKDL could arrange for Sammie to interview other cultural representatives inside HKDL. However, Sammie refused the proposed arrangement. She suggested to her boss that she would seek legal advice before the story hit the presses. Also, she omitted some words that the interviewees had used, such as "sweatshop laborers," prior to publication. In addition to Sammie, other reporters wrote about HKDL's manipulative acts. See "迪士尼曾阻傳媒採訪 警車泊後門," 12 October 2005, *AM730*, M01.

⁵¹ Daniel Wu, "Boycott Disneyland! / 杯葛迪士尼樂園," Alive blog, <http://www.alivenotdead.com/archive/2005/8/23> (accessed 5 October 2006). In the Alive blog, Daniel Wu wrote, "... the Disney staff specifically the ones from America were very rude and impolite. They spoke disrespectfully to us and were constantly nagging the camera crew. We all thought this was a terrible attitude to have since we were all there working to help promote Disneyland for free! They didn't have to treat us like superstars but they could have at least treated us with some courtesy and respect." See Daniel Wu, "Boycott Disneyland! / 杯葛迪士尼樂園," Alive blog, <http://www.alivenotdead.com/archive/2005/8/23> (accessed 5

October 2006).

⁵² “樂園拍 MV：絕不夢幻 Kelly 拒再宣傳迪士尼,” 10 September 2005, *Apple Daily*, C12; “杯葛美國迪士尼 今後拒合作 Kelly:員工態度極差,” 10 September 2005, *Ta Kung Pao*, C03; “拍攝 MV 夢幻旅程變激氣之旅 陳慧琳轟迪士尼苛刻待 杯葛抗議,” 10 September 2005, *Wen Wei Po*, A44.

⁵³ “三成青少年批迪士尼霸道,” 22 October 2005, *Apple Daily*, A17; 何美華, “迪士尼 CEO 搵 Dr Lo 「輔導」 公關劣開壞頭 得罪全世界,” 9 November 2005, *Hong Kong Economic Times*, A16; “迪士尼應變無方管理層誤己累港,” 3 February 2006, *Ming Pao Daily News*, A02, editorial; 杜可風, “盡快擴建香港迪士尼,” 6 February 2006, *Ta Kung Pao*, A18; “迪士尼傲慢失客 米老鼠被迫彎腰,” 8 November 2005, *Oriental Daily*, A31, editorial.

⁵⁴ The change in HKDL media policy may be due to the change in the occupant of the position of HKDL Public Affairs Vice President. In June 2006, Irene Chan relocated to Beijing and P. C. Lo became the new Vice President of the department. See “迪士尼公關大換班,” 13 June 2006, *Ming Pao Daily News*, A24; “盧炳松任迪士尼副總裁,” 13 June 2006, *Ta Kung Pao*, A08; 鍾環友, “公關名將加盟迪士尼,” 13 June 2006, *Hong Kong Daily News*, A10; “迪士尼公關大員換將,” 13 June 2006, *Headline Daily*, P18; “盧炳松掌迪園公共事務,” 13 June 2006, *Hong Kong Commercial Daily*, B01; “盧炳松接掌迪士尼公關,” 13 June 2006, *Sing Tao Daily*, A10; “迪士尼委任新要員,” 13 June 2006, *Metropolis Daily*, P02.

⁵⁵ It is a normal custom in Hong Kong that organizers send out premiums to guests and to journalists in press conferences and in gallery exhibitions. For example, in the opening of the new attraction “Autopia,” HKDL prepared a bag, an umbrella, a notebook, a handkerchief, 3 booklets (introducing the attraction and the sponsor Honda Company) for each of the journalists.

⁵⁶ 張慧慈, “公關不同廣告” in the column entitled “主播看世界,” 12 September 2006, *Headline Daily*, p. 13.

⁵⁷ 張慧慈, “公關不同廣告,” p. 13.

⁵⁸ “Show,” “good show,” and “bad show” are Disney phrases to describe the ways in which HKDL workers as cast members treat visitors of Disneyland as guests and perform “good show.” Although journalists cannot be described as “guests,” they should be treated as guests. A “bad show” means the performance or the service is not up to Disney’s high standards of excellence.

⁵⁹ “記者齊心杯葛 無禮職員認錯,” 11 September 2005, *Sing Pao*, A02; 盧駿, “迪士尼囂張 辣聲記者,” 11 September 2005, *Sing Tao Daily*, A13.

⁶⁰ Wendy Leung, “Protesters rain on the Disney parade,” 13 September 2006, *The Standard*, M03; “迪士尼周歲 安排傳媒雨中採訪遭杯葛,” 13 September 2006, *Metropolis Daily*, P02; “濕身訪問 傳媒拉隊離場,” 13 September 2006, *Wen Wei Po*, A15.

⁶¹ Ocean Park is a marine park. Opened on 10 January 1977, the park was built with donations from the Royal Hong Kong Jockey Club (now the Hong Kong Jockey

Club). Before 1 July 1987, the main sources of income for the park were the ticket revenues and the funding from the Jockey Club. On 1 July 1987, the government separated Ocean Park from the Jockey Club and established a HK\$200 million trust from the funding of Jockey Club and established Ocean Park Corporation, a not-for-profit organization. Since then, Ocean Park has been responsible for its own income and can use commercial means to operate the park. From 1997 to 2001, Ocean Park ran a deficit for four consecutive years. After the official announcement of the establishment of HKDL, news stories reported that only locals might visit the new park. However, the increase in the number of mainland travelers and the change in Ocean Park's marketing strategy helped the park run an HK\$15 million operating surplus in the 2001-02 fiscal year. In the 2004-05 fiscal year, the park recorded four million visitors and a profit of \$119.5 million; in the 2005-06 fiscal year, the park recorded 4.38 million visitors and HK\$156.5 million, the greatest profits since the park's opening in 1977. For the changes in attendance and revenue, see Felix Chan, "Ocean Park announces pay freeze," 14 December 2001, *South China Morning Post*, EDT6; Michael Ng, "Ocean Park splashes back into the black," 15 November 2002, *The Standard*, A10; Felix Chan, "Ocean Park posts profit on back of big crowds," 15 November 2002, *South China Morning Post*, EDT8; Vivienne Chow, "Visitors pour into Ocean Park," 15 December 2004, *South China Morning Post*, EDT4; Dikky Sinn, "Ocean Park sees best profit in its 28-year history," 24 November 2005, *South China Morning Post*, EDT3; "Ocean Park scales new heights in attendance," 30 November 2006, *The Standard*, A05.

⁶² "葉澍堃考慮增一獨立董事 議員轟迪士尼「五宗罪」," 29 November 2005, *Sing Tao Daily*, A08.

⁶³ "殘疾人士滿意設施 海洋公園勝迪士尼," 6 March 2006, *Ming Pao Daily News*, A13; "殘疾人士滿意設施 海洋公園勝迪士尼," 6 March 2006, *Sing Pao*, A10.

⁶⁴ "市民批評形如趕客 樂園狂加價政府應監察," 16 April 2006, *The Sun*, A20; "迪士尼食品加價達 5 成," 15 April 2006, *Wen Wei Po*, A15; "迪士尼任玩搶客未奏效 海洋公園迫爆香隧一度封閉," 2 July 2006, *Hong Kong Daily News*, A08.

⁶⁵ "每小時一千人次入場 水母館長龍先贏米奇老鼠一仗," 15 April 2006, *Sing Tao Daily*, A12; "海洋公園水母打敗米奇 遊客破 403 萬 創出歷史新高," 29 May 2006, *Hong Kong Daily News*, A04; "海洋公園 Vs. 迪士尼暑期水戰爆發," 17 July 2006, *Sing Tao Daily*, E01;

⁶⁶ Anita Lam, "Ocean Park record dispels fears of Disney challenge," 29 May 2006, *South China Morning Post*, CITY1; "五萬人湧海洋公園創紀錄," 16 April 2006, *Oriental News Daily*, A24.

⁶⁷ Wendy Leung, "Disney set to miss mark on visitors," 5 September 2006, *The Standard*, M03; Linda Choy and Dennis Eng, "5 million visit Disney park, short of target," 5 September 2006, *South China Morning Post*, EDT1, headline; "迪士尼 500 萬客量少預期一成," 5 September 2006, *Ming Pao Daily News*, A08; "首年遊客 500 萬暑假逾半內地客 迪士尼入場人次未達標," 5 September 2006, *Apple Daily*, A08; "迪士尼 500 萬客未達標," 5 September 2006, *Oriental Daily News*, A04; "香港迪士尼全年客量難達標," 5 September 2006, *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, P05; 黃勁文, "迪士尼「欠經驗」 人流未達標 少於 560 萬人次 安明

智寄望明年好轉,” 5 September 2006, *Hong Kong Economic Times*, A04; “首年僅五百萬將推年票谷客 迪士尼入場人數未達目標,” 5 September 2006, *The Sun*, A10; “開幕一年客量 500 萬近目標迪士尼推年票迎萬聖節,” 5 September 2006, *Sing Tao Daily*, A10; “訪客 500 萬 港迪園難達標,” 5 September 2006, *Hong Kong Commercial Daily*, A01; “迪士尼首年遊客未達標 暑假狂谷僅達 500 萬 政府欣然收貨,” 5 September 2006, *Hong Kong Daily News*, A10; “迪士尼優惠派飛谷人數仍未達 560 萬,” 5 September 2006, *AM730*, M02; “下周開業一周年 安明智料 9 月底接近 560 萬目標 迪士尼入場人次未達標,” 5 September 2006, *Wen Wei Po*, A06; “Hong Kong Disneyland falls short of 5.6 million target,” 5 September 2006, *Metropolis Daily*, P32, English news digest. Only four local newspapers stated that HKDL attendance figures were above 5 million. See “迪士尼逾 500 萬人入場每月 45 萬人免費遊 有業界指「篤數」,” 5 September 2006, *Sing Pao*, A08; “迪士尼 入場人次逾 500 萬,” 5 September 2006, *Sing Tao Daily*, F03; “暑假入場佔半酒店評價最好內地客撐起迪士尼樂園開業將近一年逾五百萬人次入場,” 5 September 2006, *Ta Kung Pao*, A02; “迪士尼首年入場 500 萬人次近目標,” 5 September 2006, *Headline Daily*, P06.

⁶⁸ “迪士尼配套運輸全慘淡,” 10 September 2006, *Sing Tao Daily*, A04; “迪士尼未帶旺酒店業,” 10 September 2006, *Hong Kong Daily News*, A10; “迪士尼刺激經濟效果遜預期,” 11 September 2006, *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, P09.

⁶⁹ Max Weber, “Bureaucracy,” in *Critical Studies in Organization and Bureaucracy*, edited by Fischer and Sirianni (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1984), p. 5.

⁷⁰ To protect confidentiality, the name “Andrew” is a pseudonym and I cannot disclose in detail what he actually did when he worked for the Hong Kong Disney production office. I conducted two telephone interviews with Andrew in August 2006. Andrew worked as a production staffer in the Hong Kong Disney production office named Walt Disney Company (Asia Pacific) limited. Because he was sometimes involved in the production of HKDL attractions, I asked him about his working experiences in his company and about his relations with HKDL staff. Because his job requirements forced him to fly from place to place and, thus, to spend little time in Hong Kong, he had no time to talk to me in person.

⁷¹ The name of the Hong Kong Disney office is Walt Disney Company (Asia Pacific) Limited. The Hong Kong office is the regional headquarter. Andrew worked for Walt Disney Company (Asia Pacific) Limited instead of for the company managing HKDL issues, Hong Kong International Theme Park Company.

⁷² The name “Julia” is a pseudonym. Julia had worked as an HKDL customer services staff member for six months. I conducted one interview with her, in August 2006, and a follow-up phone interview, in October 2006. In August 2006, she had already quit the HKDL job. In the interview, I asked her about the HKDL orientation program, about her on-job training experiences, about the specific experiences that she had had as an HKDL customer-services worker, about her worker-based evaluation of HKDL, about her reasons for quitting the job, and about her idea of an HKDL labor union.

⁷³ In the interview, Keith gave me an example that contrasted with HKDL’s slow

response. The example concerns a local ferry company, New World First Travel. An accident in a ferry left an old woman injured. Before reporters went to interview her, the boss went with some reporters to the hospital to visit her. The boss apologized and, at the end of the visit, kissed the woman, who was pleased with the boss' response. When reporters asked the woman about her health, she did not criticize the ferry company and reporters could not sensationalize the end.

⁷⁴ "Disneyland should lower its capacity," *Ming Pao Daily News*, 6 September 2005, D08, editorial.

⁷⁵ "大批市民坐地鐵往迪士尼," 4 September 2005, *ATV Home*, news headlines; "淹沒欣澳站逼爆迪士尼," 5 September 2005, *The Sun*, A04; "降低接待人數 培養迪士尼口碑," 5 September 2005, *Wen Wei Po*, A02.

⁷⁶ "現樽頸," 5 September 2005, *Ming Pao Daily News*, A04.

⁷⁷ 黃勁文, "「玩遊戲排 4 小時 慘過輪米」 入場上限 3 萬人 遊人議員促減半," 5 September 2005, *Hong Kong Economic Times*, A03.

⁷⁸ Although HKDL management had already added six hundred restaurant seats, one hundred restaurant tables, and twenty food stalls, visitors had to wait in the rain for hours for a ride and about thirty minutes for fast-food. The lack of dining tables also forced patrons to use dustbins as dining tables. See "容納上限試玩大亂 三萬人癱瘓迪士尼 遊客：慘過輪米," 5 September 2005, *Ta Kung Pao*, A03; "迪士尼惹怒火 為香江為旅客 宜降人數上限," 5 September 2005, *Ming Pao Daily News*, A04, editorial.

⁷⁹ According to the *Hong Kong Economic Times*, at 9 a.m. on 4 September 2005, Disney's MTR station needed crowd control. After 10 a.m., because of the lack of security, the HKDL entrance was bursting with patrons who were waiting to enter the park. Around noon, some attractions such as Buzz Lightyear and Space Mountain had long queues and chaos ensued. Around 1:30 p.m., all restaurants had long queues; all food providers had sold out of sandwiches and turkey legs. Details see 黃勁文, "「玩遊戲排 4 小時 慘過輪米」 入場上限 3 萬人 遊人議員促減半," 5 September 2005, *Hong Kong Economic Times*, A03; 賴偉家, 利嘉茵, "2.9 萬人 迪士尼玩出火," 5 September 2005, *Ming Pao Daily News*, A04.

⁸⁰ "市民狠批不尊重顧客 畀足錢入場被用作測試," 6 September 2005, *The Sun*, A08.

⁸¹ "容納上限試玩大亂 三萬人癱瘓迪士尼 遊客：慘過輪米," 5 September 2005, *Ta Kung Pao*, A03.

⁸² Information Services Department, "財政司司長談迪士尼總綵排," Hong Kong SAR Government 5 September 2005 Press Release, <http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200509/05/P200509050270.htm> (accessed 21 October 2006).

⁸³ Information Services Department, "Rehearsal Days of Hong Kong Disneyland," Hong Kong SAR Government 5 September 2005 Press Release, <http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200509/05/P200509050247.htm> (accessed 21 October 2006).

⁸⁴ Economic Development and Labour Bureau, 23 February 2006, “Operation of the Hong Kong Disneyland,” paper for discussion on 27 February 2006 at the Legislative Council Panel on Economic Services, CB(1)934/05-06(05), <http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/es/papers/es0227cb1-934-5e.pdf> (accessed 7 October 2006), pp. 1-2, point 4.

⁸⁵ There are three types of theme-park tickets: (1) Regular Day tickets for weekdays; (2) Peak Day tickets for weekends and public holidays in general; and (3) Date-specific tickets for Special Days designated by the HKITP. See Economic Development and Labour Bureau, “Operation of the Hong Kong Disneyland,” paper for discussion on 27 February 2006 at the Legislative Council Panel on Economic Services, CB(1)934/05-06(05), <http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/es/papers/es0227cb1-934-5e.pdf> (accessed 7 October 2006), pp. 1-2, point 4; *Hong Kong Hansard*, 6 July 2005, <http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr04-05/english/counmtg/hansard/cm0706ti-translate-e.pdf> (accessed 7 October 2006), pp. 9525-6.

⁸⁶ Economic Development and Labour Bureau, 23 February 2006, “Operation of the Hong Kong Disneyland,” p. 2, point 6.

⁸⁷ In 1999, the government and the Walt Disney Company (TWDC) formed the joint venture Hong Kong International Theme Park Ltd (HKITP). At the same time, another company wholly controlled by TWDC called Hong Kong Disneyland Management Limited (HKDML) was set up. HKDML is responsible for the day-to-day operation of the theme park whereas the Board of HKITP, containing nine members, exercises a supervisory role. The government appoints five board directors, comprising the Financial Secretary, the Secretary for Economic Development and Labour, the Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury, the Secretary for the Environment, Transport, and Works, and the Commissioner for Tourism; the other four members are appointed by the TWDC. Two non-executive independent directors may sit on the board if the two parties agree on the appointment.

⁸⁸ Economic Development and Labour Bureau, 23 February 2006, “Operation of the Hong Kong Disneyland,” p. 3, point 9.

⁸⁹ Of 2 February 2006 news, only *Sing Pao*, *Hong Kong Commercial Daily*, and *Hong Kong Economic Times* made the HKDL chaos a front-and-center headline. The more popular press such as *Ming Pao Daily News*, *The Sun*, *Oriental Daily*, and *Apple Daily* did not feature the story in their headlines; instead, these newspapers placed the story in the Hong Kong-news section or in the center spread. See “迪士尼爆滿拒半年票進場 遊客鼓譟,” 2 February 2006, *Sing Pao*, A03; “爆滿持票亦被拒有人攀欄圖強闖 迪士尼拉閘千人鼓譟,” 2 February 2006, *Hong Kong Daily News*, A03; “迪士尼超賣門票遊人鼓譟,” 2 February 2006, *Hong Kong Commercial Daily*, A03; 曾秋文、黃勁文, “迪士尼爆滿 旅客爬閘硬闖 千人持票吃閉門羹 鼓譟擲水樽,” 2 February 2006, *Hong Kong Economic Times*, A04; “攀欄衝閘擾攘四句鐘 迪士尼人滿封園 逾千客門外鼓噪,” 2 February 2006, *Headline Daily*, P06; “迪士尼爆滿落閘千人鼓譟 持半年有效票未能入場 旅客攀欄硬闖,” 2 February 2006, *Ming Pao Daily News*, A07; “人滿提早關門員工爆入場人數近三萬四 千遊客鼓噪衝擊迪士尼,” 2 February 2006, *Sing Tao*

Daily, A09; “爆滿被拒入場千人門外鼓譟 迪士尼落閘遊客怒吼,” 2 February 2006, *The Sun*, A14; “千遊客衝擊迪士尼,” *Oriental Daily News*, 2 February 2006, A21; “千人持門票被拒入場鼓譟 客滿中午關門迪士尼玩殘遊客,” 2 February 2006, *Apple Daily*, A20.

⁹⁰ Dennis Eng, “Come back another day, visitors told,” 2 February 2006, *South China Morning Post*, CITY1; Dennis Eng and Winnie Yeung, “Hundreds locked out in Disney ticket chaos,” 2 February 2006, *South China Morning Post*, CITY1.

⁹¹ “逾千客園外鼓譟財爺急唔高層謀改善「小人球」闖迪士尼險象生,” 3 February 2006, *Sing Tao Daily*, A02; “迪士尼亂足三日玩殘遊客 港府發火,” 4 February 2006, *Oriental Daily News*, A01; “連續兩日落閘 一句遺憾算數 迪士尼玩殘遊客,” 3 February 2006, *Sing Pao*, A01; “迪士尼爆滿再度拒客被指違約,” 3 February 2006, *Metropolis Daily*, P01; “逾千客園外鼓譟財爺急唔高層謀改善「小人球」闖迪士尼險象生,” 3 February 2006, *Sing Tao Daily*, A02; “連日苦候吃「閉門羹」直斥嚴重損害港形象 迪園再拒客 千人推閘強闖,” *Wen Wei Po*, 3 February 2006, A03; “內地客兩度吃閉門羹：不是迪士尼，是氣死你,” 3 February 2006, *Ming Pao Daily News*, A05; 黃勁文、霍青庭、黎凱欣、王惠芳, “迪士尼「騷動」恐損港形象 國際傳媒報道「怒潮」唐英年急商補鑊,” 3 February 2006, *Hong Kong Economic Times*, A04; “迪士尼再拒客入場 群情洶湧高舉小童爬欄硬闖,” 3 February 2006, *AM730*, M01; “連續兩天發生港府關注樂園三招急救 迪士尼爆滿關門旅客攀欄闖入,” 3 February 2006, *Apple Daily*, A05; “持票被拒入場千人爬閘硬闖 迪士尼安排失當香港蒙羞,” 3 February 2006, *The Sun*, A06; “連續兩天在門外乾等,” 3 February 2006, *Ta Kung Pao*, A01; “千人提早清晨排隊霸位,” 4 February 2006, *Hong Kong Commercial Daily*, A01.

⁹² “迪士尼應變無方管理層誤己累港,” 3 February 2006, *Ming Pao Daily News*, A02, editorial; 李兆富, “蘋論：國企主題公園令香港蒙羞,” 3 February 2006, *Apple Daily*, A06, editorial; “迪士尼文化是關門放狗趕客?” 3 February 2006, *Ta Kung Pao*, A02, editorial; “落閘開閘混亂 樂園令港蒙羞,” 3 February 2006, *Sing Pao*, A04, editorial.

⁹³ Keith Bradsher “Chinese overwhelm Disneyland: Hong Kong’s park miscalculates appeal,” 4 February 2006, *International Herald Tribune*, Paris, p. 5; Keith Bradsher, “At Hong Kong Disneyland, the Year of the Dog Starts With a Growl,” 4 February 2006, *New York Times*, New York, A5; Jane Macartney, “Disneyland overwhelmed as Chinese flock to see Mickey,” 4 February 2006, *The Times*, London, p. 47.

⁹⁴ According to the *South China Morning Post*, Bill Ernest, executive vice-president and managing director of HKDL, said, “We are very sorry some of our guests have not been able to visit Hong Kong Disneyland over the past few days, and fully understand their disappointment. But to ensure guest safety and preserve the unique guest experience, we have had to limit guest entry at certain times.” See Dennis Eng and Anita Lam, “Uproar as Disneyland locks its gates to ticket holders again,” 3 February 2006, *South China Morning Post*, EDT1.

⁹⁵ Information Services Department, “Government concerned about operation of the Hong Kong Disneyland during the Chinese New Year Golden Week,” Hong Kong

SAR Government 2 February 2006 Press Release,
<http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200602/02/P200602020226.htm> (accessed 7 October 2006).

⁹⁶ Press reported that Henry Tang felt angry because of HKDL senior management's reluctance to hear advice from the HKSAR government, which had told the senior management early on that the two days should be designated as special days and that HKDL should account for Mainland tourists' travel plans in Hong Kong by communicating with the necessary travel agencies. However, HKDL management did not listen to the government's advice. A legislator revealed that Tang, himself, had referred to HKDL management as Americanism. See "財爺不開心 親電美總部投訴," 4 February 2006, *Hong Kong Economic Times*, A04; "財爺矢言要加強監管 連日混亂迪士尼激鬻特首," 4 February 2006, *Apple Daily*, A06; Dennis Eng and Helen Wu, "Officials are not amused by Mickey Mouse chaos," 4 February 2006, *South China Morning Post*, CITY1; "財爺早警告迪士尼新春爆棚 曾蔭權指經驗最豐富不明為何出問題," 4 February 2006, *Ming Pao Daily News*, A04.

⁹⁷ *Apple Daily* commented that the quality of HKDL service had been neither sincere nor cordial. *The Hong Kong Economic Times* criticized HKDL's neglect of proper crowd-control measures. See 李兆富, "蘋論：國企主題公園令香港蒙羞," 3 February 2006, *Apple Daily*, A06; "監督米奇 港府不能老鼠拉龜," 4 February 2006, *Hong Kong Economic Times*, A03.

⁹⁸ "迪士尼文化是關門放狗趕客?" 3 February 2006, *Ta Kung Pao*, A02.

⁹⁹ According to *The Standard*, "A Disney spokeswoman said Friday [on 3 February 2006] that the company has learned from the *unruly* behavior over the Lunar New Year, and will consider making changes to ticket arrangements for peak holidays." See Wendy Leung, "Disneyland may change ticket system after protests," *The Standard*, 4 February 2006, A06, my emphasis.

¹⁰⁰ Legislator and chairperson of the political party Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong Ma Lik said that HKDL discriminated against Chinese because of HKDL's Americanism. See "財爺不開心 親電美總部投訴," 4 February 2006, *Hong Kong Economic Times*, A04; "財爺矢言要加強監管 連日混亂迪士尼激鬻特首," 4 February 2006, *Apple Daily*, A06; "馬力：迪士尼喪權辱港," 4 February 2006, *Hong Kong Daily News*, A06. Press also noted that HKDL's Americanism encouraged HKDL to neglect Chinese festivals and caused the New Year chaos. "大美國主義忽視中國節慶," 9 February 2006, *Oriental Daily*, A12.

¹⁰¹ Pamela Shockley-Zalabak and Sandra Buffington Burmester, *The Power of Networked Teams: Creating a Business within a Business at Hewlett-Packard in Colorado Springs* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

¹⁰² Economic Development and Labour Bureau, 23 February 2006, "Operation of the Hong Kong Disneyland," paper for discussion on 27 February 2006 at the Legislative Council Panel on Economic Services, CB(1)934/05-06(05), <http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/es/papers/es0227cb1-934-5e.pdf> (accessed 7 October 2006), p. 2, point 6.

¹⁰³ As visitors would normally attend the government's grand celebration activities such as parades on the first day (30 January 2006) and a grand fireworks display on the second day (31 January 2006) of the Lunar New Year, the park was very likely to reach capacity between 1 and 5 February 2006.

¹⁰⁴ “設計師：建「幻想世界」如砌積木,” 11 September 2005, *Sing Pao*, A07.

¹⁰⁵ Carrie Chan, “Dishes galore are on the way at Disneyland,” 11 August 2004, *South China Morning Post*, EDT 3; “旺角街頭小食殺入迪士尼 樂園明年中聘 1500 餐飲員工,” 11 August 2004, *Sing Pao*, A 15; “300 道菜亞洲主打 香港迪士尼美食最多元化,” 11 August 2004, *Ming Pao Daily News*, A 15.

¹⁰⁶ Tokyo Disneyland opened in 1983. In 2001, another Disney park, Tokyo DisneySea, owned and managed by Oriental Land Company (OLC), opened in 2001. After the opening of Tokyo DisneySea, the original name “Tokyo Disneyland” was changed to “Tokyo Disneyland Park,” and the whole entertainment project was called “Tokyo Disney Resort,” TDR.

¹⁰⁷ HKDL's *Stitch Encounter* is similar to *Turtle Talk with Crush* at Epcot and at Disney's California Adventure Park: the real-time animated turtle Crush in *Finding Nemo* talks to guests in a “digital under-water world.” See “Turtle talk with Crush,” Walt Disney World Resort—Epcot attractions, <http://disneyworld.disney.go.com/wdw/entertainment/entertainmentDetail?id=TurtleTalkwithCrushEntertainmentPage> (accessed 22 October 2006).

¹⁰⁸ Rebecca is another staff member working for Walt Disney Company (Asia Pacific) Limited. The name is a pseudonym. Her job also provides her chances to work with HKDL workers. I conducted one interview with Rebecca, in August 2006 in a restaurant near her office, and three follow-up phone interviews. In the interviews, I asked her about her experiences working both inside the Disney company and with HKDL workers.

¹⁰⁹ The Disney Imagineers can ask the local Disney production office to handle matters concerning voices and translations. *Jungle River Cruise*, another attraction at HKDL, is provided in three languages: English, *Putonghua*, and Cantonese. Different from *Stitch Encounter*, the producer asked the local Disney production office to manage the translation. Therefore, different rides may or may not involve the local Disney production office, but it is up to the Imagineers to decide whether or not they want to involve the local production office in the management of the matter. With regard to *Stitch Encounter*, the local Disney production office helped to train the cast to perform *Stitch*, but the contribution of the local office may be limited to the operational level.

¹¹⁰ Andrew commented on the difficulty of working on a Cantonese version of a Disney movie; it was this frustration that, in part, compelled Andrew to leave the company. Rebecca told me stories about the HKDL attraction *Stitch Encounter*. Both Andrew and Rebecca cited “Americanism” while describing their work experiences.

¹¹¹ Tim Delaney, vice president and executive designer of Walt Disney Imagineering, told this to the reporter. Wendy Leung, “Disney considers annual pass idea,” *The Standard*, 13 July 2006, M03.

¹¹² “迪士尼新遊戲爆「羅生門」,” 13 June 2006, *Sing Tao Daily*, A13.

¹¹³ On 25 October 2006, the numbers of attractions listed in various Disneyland parks’ websites are as follows. Because some parks treat different vehicles in the park as various attractions and other parks treat the different vehicles as one attraction, I treat vehicles as one attraction and treat the park’s railroad, though it traverses many “lands,” also as one attraction. Under this standard, there are twenty five attractions in HKDL, thirty six in Paris Disneyland, forty three in Orlando Magic Kingdom, fifty one in Anaheim Disneyland, and forty two in Tokyo Disneyland. Anaheim DL website: http://disneyland.disney.go.com/disneyland/en_US/parks/listing?name=DisneylandParkAttractionsListingPage; Paris Disneyland: http://www.disneylandparis.com/uk/disneyland_park/index.htm; TDL website: <http://www.olc.co.jp/en/company/resort/tokyodisneyland/sheet.html>; Orlando Magic Kingdom: <http://disneyworld.disney.go.com/wdw/parks/parkListing?id=MKAttractionListingPage> (all websites accessed 25 October 2006).

¹¹⁴ P. Blake, “Walt Disney World,” *Architectural Forum* 136 (1972), p. 40; cited in Stacy Warren, 1994, “Disneyfication of the Metropolis: Popular resistance in Seattle,” *Journal of Urban Affairs* 16, issue 2 (1994), p. 94.

¹¹⁵ John M. Findlay, *Magic Lands: Western Cityscapes and American Culture after 1940* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 52-116.

¹¹⁶ HKDL management and the HKSAR government never announced the exact size of the park, excluding two Disney hotels, the parking area, and the backstage. According to C. Y. Jim, the size of HKDL is about 15.21 hectares, the size of the 2 hotels is about 16.53 hectares, and the size of the car parks and the transport is about 17.91 hectares. “學者：迪士尼細過維園 當局三緘其口 議員要求交代,” 15 September 2005, *Hong Kong Daily News*, A04.

¹¹⁷ Kevin Rafferty and Bruce Gordon, *Walt Disney Imagineering: A Behind the Dreams Look at Making the Magic Real* (New York: Disney Enterprises, 1996), p. 176. In Tokyo Disneyland, the nostalgia theme has changed because the nostalgia surrounding 1920s America is irrelevant to Japanese patrons, but Disney Imagineers has done Main Street U.S.A. to the nostalgia theme in HKDL.

¹¹⁸ The Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong conducted a survey that involved about 430 patrons between 30 August and 2 September 2005. These were rehearsal days. According to the survey, respondents demanded more covered leisure areas. See “八成港人總評分合格,” 8 September 2005, *The Sun*, A07.

¹¹⁹ Dennis Eng and Quinton Chan, “Canny Hongkongers do Disney on the cheap,” 2 September 2005, *South China Morning Post*, EDT6.

¹²⁰ HKDL management and staff call all HKDL workers “cast members” because these staff work by performing onstage. A cast-members trainer is an HKDL worker who trains cast members.

¹²¹ At HKDL, the organizational hierarchy comprises Host (which can be divided into Host 2 and Host 1, where Host 2 is the junior staff member, and most HKDL

employees inside the park are Host 2), Lead (a supervisor and a peer coach of hosts), Guest Service Manager, Operations Managers, and executives in increasing importance in the management hierarchy.

¹²² Wendy Leung, "Park's technological trickery is no small matter," 12 September 2005, *The Standard*, A10.

¹²³ Stella Lee, "Locals want classic-style Disneyland," 21 February 2001, *South China Morning Post*. In the conference, the Tourism Association chairperson Selina Chow also said that the research revealed English to be the park's language of choice. She also added that HKDL should not follow Tokyo Disneyland as a model because foreign visitors accounted for less than three percent of Tokyo Disneyland's annual attendance.

¹²⁴ "Pooh's Hunny Hunt," on the website "Tokyo Disney Resort," http://www.tokyodisneyresort.co.jp/tdl/english/7land/fantasy/atrc_pooh.html (accessed 25 October 2006).

¹²⁵ This is a remark made by Eddie Sotto, the Executive Designer of Tokyo Disneyland. Marc Borrelli, "Land of the rising Mickey," 2 April 2001, <http://www.laughingplace.com/News-ID110045.asp> (accessed 31 October 2006).

¹²⁶ The remark was made by a former WDI executive, Gertz, who supervised an expensive attraction, *Mission: SPACE*, at Epcot. Scott Kirsner, "Rebuilding Tomorrowland," *Wired*, issue 10.12, December 2002, <http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/10.12/rebuilding.html> (accessed 31 October 2006).

¹²⁷ One HKDL operation staff respondent told me that the cost of Tokyo Disneyland's *Pooh's Hunny Hunt* was nine times more expensive than HKDL's *The Many Adventures of Winnie the Pooh*. He is very familiar with the attraction *The Many Adventures of Winnie the Pooh*.

¹²⁸ When I visited the Disneyland Resort Paris in November 2003, I played the ride *The Many Adventures of Winnie the Pooh*. The attraction was extravagantly decorated, with a large Winnie the Pooh book as the attraction's backdrop. The ride was very similar to HKDL's *Pooh* attraction. Both Paris and Hong Kong attractions are designed and produced by Walt Disney Imagineering. The attraction seems to be closed or temporarily closed, for the website of Disneyland Resort Paris does not introduce this attraction. See "Fantasyland: attractions," http://www.disneylandparis.com/uk/disneyland_park/fantasyland/attractions.htm (accessed 25 October 2006).

¹²⁹ Janet Wasko and Eileen R. Meehan, "Dazzled by Disney? Ambiguity in Ubiquity," in *Dazzled by Disney? The Global Disney Audiences Project*, edited by Wasko, Phillips, and Meehan (London, NY: Leicester University Press, 2001), p. 339.

¹³⁰ Elizabeth Bell and others, eds., *From Mouse to Mermaid: The Politics of Film, Gender, and Culture* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995).

¹³¹ Henry A. Giroux, *The Mouse That Roared: Disney and the End of Innocence* (Lanham, Boulder, NY, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999).

¹³² Alan Bryman, *The Disneyization of Society* (London, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publishers, 2004).

¹³³ Zukin and Hannigan argue that Disney redevelops urban public space for private social control; Bryman argues that companies and governments follow Disney's lead and, thereby, transform public space according to Disney's three chief principles: theming, hybrid consumption, and merchandizing. Details of the arguments are discussed in chapter Two. Sharon Zukin, *Landscapes of Power: From Detroit to Disney World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); John Hannigan, *Fantasy City: Pleasure and Profit in the Postmodern Metropolis* (London, NY: Routledge, 1998); Alan Bryman, *The Disneyization of Society* (London, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publishers, 2004).

¹³⁴ "Disneyland 'no right' to obstruct officials," 10 September 2005, *China Daily* (Hong Kong Edition), P02.

¹³⁵ Information Services Department, "Government concerned about operation of the Hong Kong Disneyland during the Chinese New Year Golden Week," Hong Kong SAR Government 2 February 2006 Press Release, <http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200602/02/P200602020226.htm> (accessed 7 October 2006).

¹³⁶ 查小欣, "一歲," 13 September 2006, *Sing Tao Daily*, E08.

¹³⁷ "迪士尼涉剝削員工 假日要當義工文職兼任接待," 3 September 2005, *The Sun*, A12; 何美華, "迪士尼涉剝削員工 假日要當義工文職兼任接待," 7 September 2005, *Hong Kong Economic Times*, A06; 李卓人, "剝削勞工不可成為特權," 19 September 2005, *Sing Tao Daily*, A13; "迪園涉刻薄員工「六宗罪」," 12 October 2005, *Wen Wei Po*, A18; "逾百員工投訴迪園「十宗罪」," 11 November 2005, *Hong Kong Commercial Daily*, B02.

Chapter Seven

Work and Consumption: Pixie Tricks of Cultural Globalization

I discuss in chapter Six how Disney management practices—namely, Disney Realism, Disney’s bureaucratic system, and Disney’s transnational but US-based hierarchical power distribution—turn localization into a fairy tale; local media actors (such as local journalists, stars, and production workers), on the other hand, publicly characterize “Disney” as arrogant, highhanded, and Americanism. In this way, the local media actors try to counter certain HKDL business practices. In this chapter, I turn to the perspectives of HKDL workers and consumers.

Few HKDL staff respondents characterized the park as Americanized. Some HKDL workers, especially those who had worked in Orlando Disney parks before HKDL opened in September 2005, felt disappointed with the local park’s *loss* of the American flavor. To them, HKDL’s middle management was one major factor leading to the un-Disneyfied park, while local consumption acts constituted another major factor. After working at HKDL, some acknowledged their “mistaken” views on a “famous” “big company”: they believed that such a “big company” as Disney should possess—but, in fact, lacked—a good and fair system that provides workers with good working conditions. Facing a toilsome job every day and sometimes unfair treatment from management, some HKDL workers joined the HKDL labor union, voiced their grievances to the media, and demanded better treatment from the company, but many other workers remained silent and stayed out of the labor union. However, workers’ reluctance to join the union does not mean that the HKDL management exercised full control over its workers; on the contrary,

workers turned their smiling faces into sullen faces and appropriated Disney's scripted spiel to air grievances to the visitors.

Disneyland sells happiness, but happiness needs cooperation from customers to make the sale work. Visitors' behavior is the most difficult park-related aspect for HKDL management to tame and control. As with other Disney parks, the space of HKDL derives from a rational design (by Disney Imagineers) and functions to encourage HKDL visitors to consume. However, customers unpredictably disrupt both the orderly, other-worldly, consumerist Kingdom and HKDL workers' "show" by taking photos in the "onstage" space, by queue jumping, and by engaging in other caviling and thrifty behavior. Enthusiastic mass consumption unexpectedly ruins mass entertainment, Disney's Hong Kong Magic Kingdom.

This chapter divides into two large sections—one on work inside HKDL, and the other on consumption activities inside HKDL. In the first section, I examine the orientation training in which HKDL forges high-quality performers, and I then discuss the ways in which frontline workers consciously or unconsciously resist being "Disneyfied" and thus affect HKDL's service standards. In the second section, I first examine the ways in which different local and transnational social campaigns challenge HKDL's wholesome and innocent image. Then, I examine the limitations of a local anti-Disney group's efforts to attract collective support in a local context. Finally, I then go back to examine how local mass-consumption activities disrupt the Disney magic inside the Disney park.

Semi-Disneyfied HKDL work system and management practices

*“You can dream, create, design and build
the most wonderful place in the world...
but it requires people to make the dream a reality,”* said Walt Disney.¹

Disney has won fame as the “epitome of excellent customer service,”² and this praise gave rise to the 1986 establishment of the Disney Institute, which provides courses about the Disney service-management approach to leadership development, quality service, customer loyalty, people management, organizational creativity, and teambuilding.³ In an ex-Disney manager’s view,⁴ Disney’s reputation for service that exceeds visitors’ expectations rests on several factors. Two of those factors are managers’ well-stated mission to communicate with workers and the cultivation of a positive team-spirit work environment. For many scholars, however, Disney’s mobilization of workers who adhere to the Disney way of service⁵ may rather be due to strong organizational discourse developed in staff training, scientific management practices targeting the part-timers,⁶ peer pressure, and strong supervision and surveillance⁷ from supervisors over frontline workers’ interactions with visitors.

My interviews with ten HKDL staff respondents show that HKDL workers’ possession of a common Disney language and a strong organization discourse stems partly from training and the manual.⁸ All HKDL workers must receive orientation training before they can work in a specific division; and all HKDL workers, during orientation training, must read the manual *Disney Traditions*, which contains information on topics such as corporate values, traditions, behaviors, and Walt Disney history. Given the importance of this manual in the all-important orientation training, I compare three versions of *Disney Traditions*: the HKDL

version, the Orlando Disney parks' version, and the Walt Disney World College Program version.⁹ My objective is to identify any similarities and any differences pertaining to Disneyland work philosophy as it operates outside Hong Kong and as it operates in Hong Kong.

The teaching content and the format of the three versions of *Disney Traditions* are largely the same.¹⁰ Trainees need to fill in important points to remember the model answer. For example, the “common goal” for the three versions is the same: “We create happiness by providing the finest entertainment for people of all ages everywhere.”¹¹ All three versions introduce “4 keys to Disney quality standards,” also known as the SCSE codes: safety, courtesy, show, efficiency.¹² In the section on courtesy, for example, Disney training emphasizes that every visitor is a “guest” and a “VIP”: a very important person. Regarding “show,” the Orlando manual is blank, but the HKDL manual teaches trainees the meaning of “show,” that workers are not workers but “cast members” dressing in “costume” in the “onstage” space—the area where visitors visit. Cast members should perform a “good show,” meaning that they have “to deliver flawless and professional presentations everyday, for every guest, and to maintain a clean, neat, and organized work location.” The manual also states that a good show needs “cleanliness,” “the Disney look,” and “character integrity.” Regarding “efficiency,” the manual emphasizes team work and team spirit by asking workers to remember two words: *reliability* and *communication*. The three versions also have “7 service guidelines for guest service”¹³: “Make eye contact and smile,” “Greet and welcome each guest,” “Seek out interaction with guests,” “Provide immediate service recovery,” “Display a sincere and friendly tone of voice and body language,”¹⁴ “Preserve the integrity of the ‘magical’ guest experience,” and “Sincerely thank

each and every guest.” The “7 service guidelines for guest service” are so important that they were printed in a pocket booklet for the rehearsal days of HKDL between 16 August and 8 September 2005.

The difference among these three versions of the *Disney Traditions* manual lies in HKDL’s relative neglect of workers’ safety and rights. The two Orlando versions devote three pages respectively to the meanings of and the official responses to sexual harassment,¹⁵ equal employment opportunities,¹⁶ and general complaints,¹⁷ but the HKDL manual mentions not one of these three issues. The HKDL manual’s neglect of workers’ rights suggests that HKDL management may be comparatively unaware of two important managerial functions: to listen to staff members’ demands and to provide staff members with a good working environment.

Aviad E. Raz¹⁸ argues that the manual is important to Disney’s strong organizational culture. In the case of Tokyo Disneyland, the service manual is integral to the organization, which comprises enormous numbers of part-timers, for the service manual reminds workers of the service standards. In the case of HKDL, HKDL orientation training helped my ten HKDL staff respondents correctly identify the common goal of Disneyland workers (to create happiness). In our conversations, many respondents always used Disney words such as ‘CM’ (cast members, meaning HKDL workers), ‘guests’ (visitors), ‘good show’, ‘LOB’ (line of business), and ‘GSM’ (guest service manager) to describe their work. Many also remembered, in varying sequences, the “4 keys to Disney quality standards” (safety, courtesy, show, efficiency). One respondent could even articulate the “7 service guidelines for guest service,” and other respondents mentioned two to four guidelines (one respondent explained that the “7 service guidelines” facilitate the annual appraisals of HKDL staff members’ work performance). Disney orientation

helped my respondents, so they stated, to grasp certain corporate values and standards, but the respondents' knowledge did not necessarily translate into their wholehearted adherence to the guest-service guidelines.

Of all my ten HKDL staff respondents, two enjoyed working at HKDL,¹⁹ but all respondents, to different degrees, criticized the park, and four of the ten respondents had quit the HKDL job, one planned to quit the job for studies, one planned not to renew his contract with HKDL, and one worked as a seasonal worker at HKDL during the peak season. Of the remaining three HKDL staff respondents, all three had worked as HKDL cultural representatives in Orlando, two had been promoted to Lead, and one had been promoted to Host 1. Among these three same respondents, two enjoyed working at HKDL and one had tried—but failed—to find another job and thought that her lack of a bachelor's degree explained the failure. In short, of the ten respondents, seven had already quit or planned to quit, and only two enjoyed working at HKDL. Respondents' criticisms of work conditions fall into one of three categories, two of which concern culture: physical hardship, dissatisfaction with the “un-Disneyfied” management system and practices, and dissatisfaction with the “un-Disneyfied” HKDL visitors.

Physical hardship seems to be universal in every Disney park.²⁰ My respondents, especially those who worked or had worked in the park's operations division, commented that HKDL during the early operations period had had an inadequate workforce. Workers' long shifts (ten to twelve hours) and infrequent short breaks²¹ (workers had access only to undersized, overcrowded break rooms²²) caused physical problems for some HKDL workers. For example, workers whose job was to endlessly repeat spiels or to stand for hours at a time experienced throat problems or joint and muscle aches and pains respectively.²³ Only a few days after

the official opening of the park, the non-government organization the Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions received one hundred and forty HKDL workers' inquiries and complaints about long shifts and chaotic shift duties.²⁴

Regarding HKDL management, the interviewed staff members' criticisms fall into two categories: management-system issues and management-practices issues. Respondents found that the management contradicted the Disney-management philosophy, according to which the management should maintain meritocratic, participatory, and good working conditions for junior staff. To provide good working conditions, a staff booklet introducing HKDL states: "we provide opportunities for all Cast Members to ... quickly progress to senior positions."²⁵ In general, the internal promotion system and senior management's success stories help workers believe that HKDL provides a meritocratic work system; indeed, the system articulates Hong Kong people's general belief in the overall meritocracy of the Hong Kong class structure. People "may not have believed in the complete equality of chances, openness and fairness of their society ... but they believe it to be the case to such a degree that they will strive hard to better themselves and their families."²⁶ In HKDL, the organizational hierarchy (from least important to most important) comprises "Host" (which can be divided into Host 2 and Host 1, and Host 2 is the junior staff member, and most HKDL employees inside the park are Host 2), Lead (supervisor), Guest Service Manager (GSM), Operations Manager, and executives.²⁷ After working inside the park, some workers realize that HKDL's internal promotions are not as plentiful as they expected and HKDL's pay policy and promotion policy may be based not on meritocracy but on seniority and on friendships with managers; workers who spend their two-year vocational training in food and beverages work inside the kitchen and receive a lower salary than do

frontline workers, who attained only high school (form five) qualifications; hosts speaking three languages (English, Cantonese, and *Putonghua*) receive the same salary as do those who speak only Cantonese; character performers playing the same characters as show performers receive lower salaries.²⁸

Another criticism that my respondents raised concerned the “un-Disneyized” management practices of the local mid-level managers (GSMs). Inside the team “Park Operation,” each “land”—namely, Fantasyland, Adventureland, and Tomorrowland plus Main Street U.S.A.—has about eighty-five Host 2s, five or six Host 1s, eight Leads,²⁹ four GSMs, and one Operations Manager, a list that reflects the positions’ relative importance, from least to greatest, in the management hierarchy. HKDL managers do not receive these positions through internal promotions; rather, HKDL employs the managers from outside HKDL. Many of the managers had previously worked for government departments such as the Hospital Authority or for big companies such as MTR Corporation, Cathay Pacific Airways, and the Airport Authority. By June 2006, according to my HKDL worker-respondents, only three out of twenty GSMs³⁰ trained in Orlando. Some disgruntled HKDL workers who had trained with Disney in Orlando alleged that these GSMs knew but neither believed in nor performed Disney values. HKDL requires, as do other US Disney parks, that once a month managers dress and perform as Hosts so that the managers can experience junior workers’ problems. However, these managers initially opposed the idea; when their opposition failed, they resisted by performing as Hosts for only a few hours instead of for a full day’s shift.

According to my respondents, some managers would ask junior workers to perform the “7 guest service guidelines” but would not perform the guidelines themselves: the managers would request that junior workers keep the onstage area

clean but would not even clean tables; they would ask junior workers to create magic—unexpected happiness for guests—but could not or would not do so themselves. In dealing with industrial relations, because HKDL provides no clear specification as to what mistakes lead to what disciplinary actions, each team can develop its own disciplinary system, and different managers exercise disciplinary action differently; consequently, junior workers suffer unfair disciplinary actions.³¹ In October 2005, some HKDL “divisions” managers listed ten workers who had applied for the most sick leaves in their divisions on the division’s own notice board. It is possible that such action violated the Disability Discrimination Ordinance.³² In short, some hosts were dissatisfied with contradictions between HKDL’s relatively open organizational structure emphasizing communication (such as the Cast Advisory Council and the Cast Forum where junior staffers voice suggestions and criticisms) and HKDL’s strong GSM-developed hierarchical organizational culture.³³

My respondents also recounted to me stories about some grossly unsatisfactory workplace conditions. Because of the inadequate workforce during the park’s early days, managers prohibited some of my respondents from using the restroom and one respondent waited for forty-five minutes and another for two hours to relieve themselves. Annie,³⁴ who worked as a log raft and boat skipper for two attractions, *Tarzan Island* and *Jungle River Cruise* in Adventureland, commented, “We all hate the environment a lot. There are so many mosquitoes, and you got no way to escape from the sun. It burns us.” Annie, together with her colleagues, had asked their managers to request a parasol for them but one manager immediately refused their request because a parasol would not suit the theme of Adventureland. When the park was still under construction, Annie was employed as

a test-and-adjust (T & A) operator. She needed to ride the log raft for contractors between the main dock and the island dock to construct *Tarzan's Treehouse*, the artificial tree covered in vines and moss. One day, it rained heavily. All contractors received raincoats but no junior staff had one. Annie asked her manager to provide raincoats for her and her colleagues. Upon request, the managers sent her three raincoats although there were more than ten junior workers working on the site. Once, Annie's colleagues demanded a greater number of short breaks because boat skippers in *Jungle River Cruise* needed to deliver spiels and, consequently, developed throat irritation, but according to her, the manager said, "You always go to sing karaoke and have no throat problems, so why do you have problems now?" Annie was disappointed with the manager's inconsiderate refusal and eventually left the company although she loved the Orlando Disney workplace life.

The third major problem that HKDL workers face is the varying client profile. If Disneyland has stages on which its characters and cast members perform in front of and, indeed, among guests, the guests are also performers on the stage. To provide and sell happiness to guests, HKDL hosts need to follow their guest-service guidelines—to smile, to greet, to interact with guests, and to thank them profusely. However, the service guidelines, as James Watson argues in the case of McDonald's restaurants,³⁵ assume that customers have been educated and disciplined, as it were—that they, as guests, know the proper scripts and the grateful behavior expected of them. But if customers deliver off-script performances, and if hosts do not receive "appropriate" responses from guests (for example, no "you're welcome" smiles or statements), these hosts can hardly see their service guidelines through to completion. In other words, both hosts and guests need to know and to follow their scripts well in order to have a "good

show”—in order to generate Disneyland happiness.³⁶ HKDL’s major clients are Hong Kong people and Mainland Chinese, and some of these guests may be unfamiliar with the Disneyland culture. In these cases, problems often occur. Many of these local customers differ from local Orlando customers insofar as the former are unaccustomed, in particular, to the culture of “service with a smile.” My respondents said that when hosts make eye contact and smile at local customers, customers may feel suspicious of the smile and some even feel intimidated and reply, “What are you laughing at?” Others may feel nervous and go away.

To create an entertainment park that makes movie magic a reality, HKDL workers need to encourage visitors to immerse themselves in the fairy-world atmosphere. If rides are out of order, HKDL staff should not tell visitors the truth but make up a story (a practice that is taught in training) so as not to break the magic spell. During the early days of HKDL, HKDL staff said “Buzz Lightyear suddenly feels uncomfortable and he needs to have a rest. He will lead visitors to journey to infinity” if the ride *Buzz Lightyear Astro Blasters* was out of order; for another popular ride, *The Many Adventures of Winnie the Pooh*, HKDL staff would say, “Winnie the Pooh has broken the honey pot and he is cleaning up the place” if the ride was out of order. As stated by my respondents, Orlando visitors, after hearing the spiel, may just keep compliantly waiting in line; in HKDL, however, visitors criticized HKDL management by declaring that it had lied to cover up management’s faults. For the ride *Jungle River Cruise*, the skipper needs to present a humorous narration as he or she leads on “the adventurous journey through an African jungle.”³⁷ When skippers do their job, they expect visitors to feel joyful and to laugh. Many local visitors, however, ignore the skippers’ spiel and take photos instead, and some visitors loudly declare that the spiel is not funny and that the

animatronic scenes look fake.³⁸ Many of my HKDL staff respondents, especially those whose work required them to be in contact with customers, told me that they had been chastised, offended, or intimidated by local customers to different degrees. Some Hong Kong visitors spoke foul language, and some visitors jumped queues. One visitor even told one of my respondents to watch her back when she left the park. Audrey, who was still working at HKDL and who wanted to quit the job but could get no interview, said:

Guests are so important. Initially I wanted to have a happy and smiling face to serve them, but then I was greeted with rude responses and foul language. I didn't do anything, so why are you yelling at me? The problems [of malfunctioning machines and queue jumping] weren't my fault. And I can't help you even though you're yelling at me. I can't say that I'm disappointed with the park because, now, I don't have much hope for HKDL.

Disneyland demands that customers line up, behave in an orderly manner, enjoy themselves, smile, and interact with others in a friendly way; the park design and hosts' guest-service guidelines are ways in which HKDL leads visitors to meet these expectations. Without discipline from the visitors, the park can hardly be a fantasyland for *both* visitors and HKDL workers.

Localized services

Disgruntled workers negotiate with HKDL working conditions and management practices in various ways. Some workers voice their grievances directly to journalists and some workers established the labor union. The Hong Kong Disneyland Cast Members' Union (HKDLCMU) was established on 29 November 2005,³⁹ but no respondents in my study had joined the HKDLCMU, and no respondents knew any colleagues who had joined the union. According to Elaine

Hui, the Organizing Secretary of HKDLCMU, around one hundred junior workers out of five thousand HKDL workers had joined HKDLCMU, and Elaine noted that more than ninety-five of them worked as Host 2s and that fewer than five union members were Host 1s. No Leads, GSMs, or higher-ranking employees had ever joined the labor union.

My respondents provided me with different reasons for their decision not to join the union: they said that the union gathered incomprehensive information about HKDL employment conditions (that not all divisions treat workers badly⁴⁰ and that there are different work loads among HKDL workers⁴¹); they feared that their participation in the labor union would negatively affect their careers; and they suspected that the union's negotiation power was weak.⁴² Besides, although workers may see the social relation between HKDL management and themselves as a relation of domination and subordination, their attitude toward HKDL management is ambivalent. Although some respondents in my study experienced management's unfair practices, HKDL's management problems such as the semi-meritocratic system and management's unfair treatment of workers, the respondents said that HKDL's management problems were, in a general form, common among other companies. Some respondents found that the HKDL's employee benefits (such as medical insurance and overtime payment) were superior to those offered by local small enterprises; and most of my HKDL staff respondents enjoyed the workers' relationships with one another and the team spirit inside the park. And as I mentioned earlier, HKDL management would hold a Cast Forum every quarter and a Cast Advisory Council at which junior staff could raise questions, make demands, and voice criticisms. Improvements may be small but junior staff members, in general, have an impression that the company—through its management—is

responding to employees' needs and demands gradually. The establishment of more break rooms, for example, greatly pleased park employees, who praised management for the improvement.

For my respondents, "labor union," however, implied "resistance," which in turn implied a confrontational stance toward the HKDL management. Workers' ambivalent attitudes, in addition to their limited job alternatives, encouraged workers to avoid taking risks and, thus, to avoid challenging authorities. Before the establishment of the HKDLCMU, a university-based, student-organized anti-Disney group, Disney Hunter, helped the Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions (HKCTU) distribute leaflets to HKDL workers. The leaflets were to encourage the workers to establish a labor union. Some HKDL workers told HKCTU members that if Disney Hunter involved itself in the establishment of an HKDL labor union, the workers would not join it because they were not confrontational toward the management even though they disapproved of some HKDL-management practices. As a result, workers' ambivalence toward HKDL management, labor unions' reputation for confrontation, and workers' fear that labor-union membership would negatively affect their careers, all resulted in the labor union's low participation rate. Believing in the free market and free choice, some of my HKDL staff respondents did not join the union and, moreover, asked dissatisfied workers to resign; some of my respondents also criticized workers' demands for pay raises or for additional employee benefits because, according to these respondents, the dissatisfied workers were making demands that lay outside the lawful status of the contract.

Many workers faced physically toilsome work, certain inconsiderate management practices, undesirable visitors, and conflicting beliefs concerning

social fairness, meritocracy, rule by contract, rule by law, and free choice in a market economy. In light of these themes, as well as the workers' overall hesitation toward labor unions, many of the workers chose to leave HKDL. HKDL staff's turnover rate is high,⁴³ especially in the park's operations, merchandise, and hotel services divisions. As one of my respondents noted, during one particular month in Adventureland, ten of one hundred hosts left HKDL; in Fantasyland, some workers would leave within seven days of starting, and some would leave after completing only their three-month work probation.⁴⁴

But some choose to stay, with resentment. Because some HKDL workers cannot find a better job despite several months of frustrating searching, these workers may react to their unsatisfying work in a passive way. According to Elaine Hui, the Organizing Secretary of the HKDLCMU, HKDL workers know that the labor union cannot solve many management problems in which no violation of labor laws has taken place; therefore, some workers do not join the labor union but make use of the union forum to voice grievances. Sometimes, workers strategically use the forum to retaliate against their supervisors because the workers know that senior management, human resources officers, and public affairs officers read the forum regularly. For instance, security officers complain in the forum that their managers are lazy, unfair, authoritarian, immoral in their private lives, and so on. One story was that the managers cut off internet access inside the security room after learning about the allegations that workers had raised in the forum.⁴⁵

In the work environment, cast members work in their own way to make their work life happier. The most common way for HKDL workers to escape from physical hardship and emotional distress is to take a two-day official sick leave every month. In Fantasyland, for example, almost half of the workers take a two-

day sick leave every month. There should be about fifty-five workers working inside Fantasyland at any given time; however, in the most extreme case, about eight to ten of the needed fifty-five workers call in sick on one day. It is generally the case that, during the end of the month or on busy days, these workers call in sick. During peak times, supervisors (Leads) need to rearrange manpower immediately, and as a result, the workers may have fewer breaks and experience an even more unpleasant work environment.

Many Disneyland workers know that “they are part of the product being sold,” argued Van Maanen.⁴⁶ These workers may respond to their various grievances by putting on a glum face for customers, as I mentioned. Because the four most important keys to Disney quality standards are, as I have mentioned, safety, courtesy, show, and efficiency (ordered in decreasing importance), all workers know that safety is the most important element in Disneyland. Smiling or courtesy is not. From their experience, workers also know that there is a high possibility that they will be chastised if they make mistakes relating to safety issues, but a low possibility that they will receive even one warning if they fail to return a smile or if they pout on the job. One respondent, as a Lead, told me that the stricter the managerial discipline, the more frequent the workers’ passive-aggressive actions. Once she asked a Host 2 to greet a guest, but as soon as she turned her back, the worker would offer visitors a glum face; when another colleague—exemplifying Disney’s surveillance method—informed my respondent of the worker’s passive-aggressive behavior, she could only ask the worker to leave the onstage area and to take a break backstage. During busy periods, many HKDL workers exhibit indifference so that visitors will be less likely to seek help from them. On one busy day during Christmas in 2005, I was queuing up for fastpass

tickets for *Buzz Lightyear Astro Blasters*, but the fastpass ticket machine broke down. I told an HKDL worker about the problem, and she just said, “How many tickets?” I said “five,” and she gave me the tickets and went away immediately. She said nothing other than “How many tickets?” In fact, she did not bother even to look at my face, and I could find only indifference from her demeanor. No smile. No interaction. And it was clear to me, as well, that she wanted to convey indifference at that moment. Normally, junior workers do not exhibit such indifference in front of the Lead or the manager, whose duties include appraising the junior workers’ professionalism: a bad appraisal can negatively affect a pay raise.⁴⁷

To protect the junior workers or to reduce the turnover rate, some HKDL managers (as did a trainer in Disneyland Paris⁴⁸) would tell the hosts, “If you don’t want to smile, don’t. But you must ensure the proper execution of safety procedure.” Staff members’ smiles become a bonus instead of a mandate for HKDL management. “Hard-core” safety procedures include detailed inspections of machines and unerring enforcement of safety-belt rules. Almost all HKDL workers strictly adhere to the operation manual’s safety regulations. In addition, workers must communicate—out loud—the safety rules to visitors: “Please remain seated” or “Please fasten your seatbelt.” These spoken narratives are requisite, even for a relatively safe ride like *Cinderella Carousel*. However, my numerous visits to HKDL revealed that even during the slow season, some workers would give the safety spiels so fast that I could not make out a single word. When it comes to safety, workers act according to instruction and operation guidelines, but their performances vary.

HKDL workers can also alter or shorten spiels to make their lives easier and less disappointing. For HKDL's ride *Jungle River Cruise*, the boat skipper should finish the ride in about eight minutes. When some skippers notice that the whole boat is full of bored visitors who would prefer simply to take photos rather than listen to the spiel, the skippers may shorten their humorous narration and ride to different scenes, where visitors can witness explosions and an animatronic elephant spurting water. The skippers reduce the spiel to simplify their lives—and to save their sore throats. Because they are allowed to ad-lib comments to create a funny atmosphere, skippers may make use of their self-created spiel to express their work conditions. Once, I took the ride, and after the skipper went back to the unloading area, we—the audience—applauded, and she said, “Please come back and visit me more frequently. I think that I’ll end up working on this ride forever. I never get a shot at a promotion.”

HKDL workers may try to lighten their work life by showing up for work without committing to the work: according to one of my respondents, “to do the important basic tasks only [to offer spiels about safety and to perform safety checks] and to pass the time by waiting for the next break, by talking, by joking around with colleagues during a shift, by waiting for the end of a shift, and by going out with colleagues after work.” Junior park operators and hotel waiters usually have small-group gatherings after work twice a week. Talking to each other during shifts and outside of shifts seems to be one of the greatest comforts that workers take from their work at HKDL.

Global consumer politics and the local anti-Disney movement

After 1999, Hong Kong people grew enthusiastic about the establishment of HKDL. Basking in this enthusiasm, Disney management perhaps registered surprise when they learned that some people in Hong Kong were struggling against some Disney business practices and that these people had spread their protest worldwide to stop or to intervene in these practices. A case in point: HKDL planned to serve shark's fin soup for wedding banquets and drew fire from environmentalists. In May 2005, the conservation organizations Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF), Greenpeace, and Hong Kong Marine Conservation Society requested that Disney reverse its decision, but the management rejected the appeal and said "Hong Kong Disneyland takes environmental stewardship very seriously and we are equally sensitive to the local cultures."⁴⁹ Green groups threatened to mount a global boycott of Disneyland until Disney reversed the decision.⁵⁰ WWF Hong Kong intended to organize a 20,000-person (mostly local students) petition; alongside it would be held a global online signature petition targeting its five million members, starting at the end of June 2005. WildAid and Peter Hughes Diving also took part in the action; and nearly one thousand people from around the world, including Disney shareholders and scuba divers, sent e-mail complaints to Disney's board of directors to protest against its decision to serve shark's fin at HKDL. Under pressure, HKDL said it served only that shark's fin that came from "sustainable" shark fisheries; HKDL added that it would still serve shark's fin soup by request. Because HKDL management said that the park's decision to serve shark's fin soup at wedding banquets was to be "sensitive to the local cultures," in late June 2005, more than five hundred primary and secondary students drew up a petition against Disney's use of Chinese culture as a scapegoat for Disney's decision in this regard, and the students called for a boycott of HKDL until Disney dropped shark's fin soup from

the menu.⁵¹ On 24 June 2005, Disney announced its decision to abide by the demands.⁵²

Another case in point centers on Students and Scholars Against Corporate Misbehavior (SACOM), which accused Disney of global outsourcing of manufacturing to supplier factories in China, without “independent and participatory monitoring and training mechanisms.”⁵³ SACOM went on to argue that the outsourcing had resulted in the maltreatment of Mainland workers and a flouting of workers’ rights. A local NGO founded in June 2005, SACOM is a variation of American human-rights groups and American labor groups that, especially in the early 1990s, have exposed and protested sweatshop conditions attributable to Nike and Gap, two major companies in the apparel industry; SACOM’s activities are similar, also, to American college and university students’ anti-sweatshop movement, which took off after 1995. These students demanded that “workers who make these goods be paid a living wage, no matter where in the world industry operates.”⁵⁴ On 18 August 2005, SACOM organized a press conference and released a report named “Looking for Mickey Mouse’s Conscience: A Survey of the Working Conditions of Disney’s Supplier Factories in China.” The group studied four of Disney’s supplier factories in Shenzhen, Zhongshan and Dongguan in July 2005 and found that workers in Disney’s supplier factories were forced to work long hours, were paid below the minimum wage, and were denied holiday pay, overtime, and maternity pay. Industrial accidents were common in these sweatshops. For instance, crushed fingers were common injuries at Nord Race Paper International Limited.⁵⁵ The group stated that Disney’s “corporate social responsibility” overlooked sweatshop conditions and that Disney’s self-monitoring

system enabled factories to produce fake pay slips, fake time sheets, and fake copies of contracts.

“Would the American people ever associate this book [Disney’s story book] with crushed fingers?” asked Charles Kernaghan, the executive director of the National Labor Committee. He posed the question in New York on 19 August 2005, just twelve hours after Hong Kong SACOM’s anti-Disney-sweatshop press conference. Collaborating with SACOM, the US group held a protest in front of a Disney store on Fifth Avenue in Manhattan, with three activists dressing as Mickey Mouse, Minnie Mouse, and Winnie the Pooh. Owing in large part to the SACOM video documentary *Those with Justice*,⁵⁶ which brought mainland workers’ voices to the front stage of the campaign, the story became globalized and made headlines in *The International Herald Tribune*,⁵⁷ in *The New York Times*,⁵⁸ on *Fox News*,⁵⁹ on *BBC News*,⁶⁰ in *The Washington Post*,⁶¹ in *Forbes Magazine*,⁶² in *The Guardian*,⁶³ and on *CNN*,⁶⁴ among others.⁶⁵ Disney swung into emergency-response mode and pledged investigations. It responded by commissioning Verité [*sic*], a non-profit social auditing and training organization that analyzed and built Gap’s extensive system of factory monitoring. Verité issues the detailed annual Social Responsibility Report about violations of labor rights in Gap’s supply chain and how Verité handles violations. Verité’s objective is to investigate relevant claims and to “take the appropriate actions to remediate violations found.”⁶⁶ According to SACOM, although a representative from the Disney Asia Pacific Region Corporate Social Responsibility Department contacted SACOM, and although the two parties met several times to discuss their views and concrete worker-based monitoring systems, Disney refused to provide a public list of contractors and their addresses. Disney also declined to provide a detailed report of Verité’s findings, but Disney

revealed that two factory owners had refused to cooperate and that Disney had subsequently stopped doing business with them.⁶⁷ Verité helped the remaining factories improve safety conditions, deliver training to workers, and set up a worker helpline.

The partial success of these efforts to mitigate or to stop certain Disney business practices reflects the convergence of two critical factors: consumption and the expanding role of citizenship in consumer societies. Consumption may help big business spread “the ideology of choiceoisie”⁶⁸ in Probyn’s words: consumers may believe that we can choose our lifestyle by consumption, but our consumption acts maintain the *status quo* because we lose control over the provision of commodities. Politicized consumption activities, however, extend civil activities from organized resistance against the state to organized resistance against the marketplace. The market gives consumer citizens some chances to say “no” to corporations whose behavior clashes with their lifestyles and beliefs in justice, equity, and the environment. According to Antony Giddens’ “politics of lifestyle,”⁶⁹ we consumers may turn our everyday private and mundane activities—our consumption—into meaningful public acts to stimulate change in corporate policy, and, in Yúdice’s words, we do so “to counter alienation in at least one sense: the separation of the consumer from the rest of society.”⁷⁰

Also critical is the strategy behind the successes of politicized consumption: transnational protest and campaigns. Environmentalists’ victory in the shark-fin issue is attributable to the threatening *global* protest targeting, of all things, Disney. Supporting this protest was a host of green-group websites, e-mails, and blogs that aimed to hit the company’s profits. Also of support were children, who threatened to boycott the Disney market. By contrasting different consumer models of

different countries, Yúdice argues that a country's successful and influential consumer movement needs to fulfill three objectives: first, the country needs to institute affirmative action laws; second, the country's culture should support and promote the reproduction of political identity through consumption; and third, markets should be extensive. For example, consider Yúdice's comments:

... if Latinos can sue Disney World over "English Only" policies, and if deaf people have sought recognition not as a handicapped minority but as an autonomous culture, it is because there is an imbrication of politics and culture that works through the terrain of state, media, and market that has been internally structured, so to speak, in radically different ways than in Brazil and, for that matter, other developed nations such as Britain, as is evident in a comparative study of McDonald's U.S. and McDonald's U.K. John Gabriel cites not only the existence of affirmative action laws in the United States as a fundamental distinguishing feature, accounting for the greater number of minority franchises than in Britain, but he also notes that the size of minority communities cannot be overlooked when considering the bottom line.⁷¹

Politicized consumerism alone could not successfully put sweatshops on to the world political agenda. The catalyst was the White House's initiation of the Apparel Industry Partnership (AIP), which comprises apparel firms, several nonprofit organizations, and various trade unions. The AIP released a set of monitoring guidelines. Because of the strength of the anti-sweatshop movement across the country,⁷² the AIP helped create the Fair Labor Association, which agreed to try to improve working conditions worldwide to a certain extent.⁷³ The coalition among student unions, organized labor unions, human rights groups, and institutional investors stimulated big companies to be socially and environmentally responsible.⁷⁴ In the case of Hong Kong, there are close ties between university students and labor organizations, Christian and Catholic human rights organizations,⁷⁵ and women's groups. However, since the Handover, the HKSAR

government has removed laws to protect collective bargaining and anti-union discrimination; organized and influential consumer leagues and institutional investors are almost extinct species in Hong Kong.

In evaluating the success of the US-campus anti-sweatshop movement, an anti-sweatshop student activist Rachel Paster commented that the success of the movement was due to the moderate character of the student groups, or it would not have gained vast support from so many students on the campuses:

One of the biggest reasons why USAS [United Students Against Sweatshops] and local student groups opposing sweatshops have been as successful as we have been is that opposition to sweatshops *isn't* that radical.... If we were a “radical” group, university administrations would have brushed us off.... The fact that they don't is a testament to the fact that we have support, not just from students on the far left, but from students in the middle ground who don't consider themselves radicals. Without those people we would *never* have gotten as far as we have.⁷⁶

If the campus anti-sweatshop movement owes its success, in part, to the moderate character of the movement, then perhaps we can infer why a confrontational Disney Hunter failed to attract the vast support of local Hong Kong university students. Given this possible explanation, we can examine Hong Kong culture more widely in relation to politicized consumerism.

When the HKSAR government signed its contract with the Walt Disney Company about the establishment of HKDL in 1999, scholars and activists published a book called *Disney Is Not a Happy Land* (written in Chinese)⁷⁷ arguing against Disneyfication of the landscape and striving for alternatives. Concern was raised, but no group or organized action objected to HKDL until mid-2005. Around this time, university professors initiated a group, the Disney Concern Group, which students then wholly organized. During April and June of 2005, the group delivered

talks at different universities to raise students' interests and critical views on HKDL's effects on Hong Kong. On 23 June 2005, eighty days before the opening of HKDL, students concerned about Disney's labor exploitation, environmental vandalism, and cultural colonization formed the group Disney Hunter to monitor Disneyland's operation and to organize public-oriented educational campaigns about the many facets of this transnational giant. As of this writing, the group comprises about twenty students, and I am one of the members.⁷⁸

Fig. 1: Disney Hunter

In contrast to the US-campus anti-sweatshop movement, Hong Kong's Disney Hunter lacks mass support. To begin with, the group's membership is small. Its "resistant" image—its logo features a black silhouette of Mickey Mouse, with the ears on fire and the silhouette drawn inside a gun's sight (figure 1)—and its adversarial stance toward Disney corporate policy politically, economically, and culturally⁷⁹ may explain the group's lack of popular support. Starting in June 2005, Disney Hunter undertook many activities to communicate their message to the public: they held a press conference, conducted university and secondary school talks, wrote articles for newspapers, participated in interviews held by the media, participated in demonstrations, organized a public forum, joined the Hong Kong

Confederation of Trade Unions to ask HKDL workers to establish a union, and protested at the park entrance twice in 2005.

Although the group has kept on participating in newspaper interviews, radio talks, and school talks, local public support remains limited, as is most evident, again, from the group's membership numbers. On the Disney Hunter internet forum, web visitors argued against Disney Hunter's criticism of HKDL management practices. Believing in "professionalism" and free choice, some visitors argued that the smile-ready culture and all its offshoots constitute not exploitation but professionalism; laborers can quit the job if they do not like wearing heavy character costumes and the like at HKDL.⁸⁰ In our school and university tours, when we argued that the private park discriminates against people of the lower classes, students argued that a certain degree of material inequality provides incentive for economic production. Regarding cultural issues such as gender stereotypes, many audience members found the argument strange because they did not find stereotypical images problematic. And not a few disagreed that Disney has a gradually but extensively expanding influence over our subjectivity, on the grounds that such concentrations of power are offset by the entertainment market's and the media market's provision of extensive choices and "alternatives" to consumers.

On 11 September 2005, Disney Hunter protested at the HKDL park entrance and faced a violent response from HKDL security. The security guards used water hoses to crush protestors. Disney Hunter members videotaped the whole process, broadcasting the footage through the local independent media web publisher Inmedia and sent video footage to TVB news, the most popular free TV station in Hong Kong, but TVB did not broadcast the video footage,⁸¹ nor did it report HKDL

securities' violent acts. Many newspapers sent only photojournalists to cover the story, but many of these left before HKDL management reacted to the student demonstration violently. News media's coverage of the demonstration was negligible.

Sense and sensibility: contested feelings, compartmentalized acts

Among members of Disney Hunter, Susanna,⁸² Billy,⁸³ and I have experienced tension between our affection for certain Disney characters and our participation in Disney Hunter. We criticize certain Disney practices but sometimes remain silent on other issues, especially the cultural ones, because the multi-faceted, contested, and contradictory nature of Disney offerings provides us comfort, identification, and even empowerment at different times in our lives. That is, we like Disney, as well as object to it.

We three are attracted to the extraordinary characteristics of the ordinary characters: Belle in *Beauty and the Beast*, Winnie the Pooh, and Mickey Mouse. Initially, it was Belle's beauty—and her yellow gown—that attracted Susanna to the character; but then she found that Belle differed from other Disney princesses: that Belle was born an ordinary village girl but that she transformed into an extraordinary queen because of her love, courage, learnedness, and innate intelligence. As a middle-class hard-working girls-school student, Susanna identified with and aspired to be like Belle. Susanna joined the Disney Concern group, the precursor of Disney Hunter, because she both liked Disney and wanted to know more about this company. It was out of curiosity, then, that Susanna joined the group.

Another member, Billy, has been in love with Mickey since he was about five. Referring to the time when he was about eight or nine, Billy stated, “I read some Mickey books, and Mickey has many roles. He’s a detective and a magician. He’s knowledgeable. He’s a smart hero, but he’s not as exaggerated as superman, not as aggressive or masculine. He’s ordinary but still a hero.” Mickey became Billy’s “hero” and “friend” with whom Billy could identify. Billy joined Disney Hunter out of curiosity and out of responsibility. As a Mickey lover, as Acting Chairman of the Social Movement Resource Centre of the Hong Kong Federation of Students, and as the City University Representative of the Management Committee, Billy did not know how to position himself in facing both Disney as a company and the establishment of HKDL when many members inside the Hong Kong Federation of Students Resources Committee abhorred Disney. The Disney Concern Group was to hold a public lecture in the City University of Hong Kong. Billy, as a student union representative, considered it his responsibility to make contact between the student union and university students. So he went to the talk and participated in the first joint-school Disney Concern Group student meeting. In his eyes, the first student meeting was chaotic because, perhaps, students were unused to being organizers. Soon thereafter, he decided to participate in the group, whose name had changed to Disney Hunter in June 2005.

As was the case with Susanna, I was attracted to Belle because she reads. To me, Belle is like Jo in *Little Women*. Jo has fascinated me since I was about ten. Another favorite, Winnie the Pooh, is a figure with which I identify in order to resist contemporary lifestyles that promote specific brands of efficiency and of competitiveness; Piglet, Pooh’s friend in Disney’s *The Many Adventures of Winnie the Pooh*, is tiny in size and timid in personality but the cleverest of all when it

comes to solving problems in the Hundred Acre Wood. Pooh and Piglet are my and my husband's companions, with whom we play and talk everyday, and through whom we develop our intimate selves and our relationship with each other. I joined Disney Hunter in August 2005, but before the group established itself, a member of the Disney Concern Group invited me to give an HKDL-themed talk in April 2005 to her group members.

Because of our love of particular Disney characters or Disney movies, conflicts are an inevitable outcome of our anti-Disney acts. Both Susanna and Billy are active members in Disney Hunter. Susanna explicitly articulated her struggle in our anti-Disney action:

I like Disney things, though I don't consider myself a Disney fan. I think I really like Disney products.... I can't imagine myself hating Disney because I consume so much Disney merchandise. Actually, I can't accept seeing myself pitted against Disney. Whenever we have direct confrontations, I get all wound up inside and feel conflicted.

To lessen his contested feelings, Billy told Disney Hunter members and the press clearly that what he resisted was the Disney Company, not the Mouse. Declaring that Mickey Mouse had done no wrong, Billy swore that he would not allow Disney Hunter to smear Mickey's image.⁸⁴ My own participation in Disney Hunter hinges on my research efforts and my related public presentations. My presentations on behalf of Disney Hunter focused on Disney's global media domination, HKDL's unequal deal with the HKSAR government, and HKDL's simultaneous use of public money and refusal to disclose its financial accounts. I did not focus on Disney's homogenizing effect on people's, especially children's ideas of imaginary and real worlds.

We three have not only affection for certain Disney characters but also a great deal of Disney merchandise. After joining the group, we changed our consumption practices regarding Disney merchandise. Although Susanna felt happy whenever she wore clothes featuring her favorite Disney characters, she stopped buying Disney merchandise; after learning from the press that Disney might sue Disney Hunter for infringement of intellectual property rights, Susanna became increasingly hostile to things related to Disney and she stopped using her Disney stationery and stopped wearing Disney clothes. Although Billy's affection for Mickey Mouse has not diminished, he hesitates to buy Mickey merchandise because he is afraid that its existence owes much to exploited Chinese labor. I try my best to buy neither Pooh dolls nor Piglet dolls, but recently, some well-made dolls tempted me, and, after joining Disney Hunter, I bought one Pooh doll in Japan, wishing that my purchase might not be a sweatshop product.

If this kind of tension and compartmentalization characterizes Disney Hunter members, it is not surprising to see much of the Hong Kong public similarly compartmentalize their responses, sometimes criticizing HKDL's various policies and sometimes defending Disney. That is, at times, the Hong Kong public plays the role of citizen, critical of unjust practices; at other times, the Hong Kong public plays the role of consumer, desirous of attractive goods and pleasing services. Although Disney may not be as innocent as the public thought in the past, a survey by John Ap shows that the respondents criticized certain HKDL management practices but kept on visiting the park.⁸⁵ Ap conducted a phone survey of 524 residents between 13 and 16 March 2006. The survey shows that 70% of respondents held impressions of HKDL that had turned more negative and that 63% thought that the park's benefits outweighed its costs, down thirteen points from

2004. Only 27% of respondents agreed that the Disney-HKSAR government HKDL deal was fair, almost half (47%) disagreed with the assertion that Disney is a socially responsible company, 93% agreed that HKDL should be accountable to the Hong Kong public for the publicly funded project in question, and—in contrast—86% supported HKDL’s further development, the highest support for this question among related surveys since 2000. Finally, approximately one-third (31%) of these respondents, with all their criticisms and disappointments, had already visited the park.

This issue of compartmentalization is critical and merits more attention here. HKDL’s performance in its early days further illustrates the Hong Kong public’s self-compartmentalization insofar as the public criticized HKDL’s poor public image and then, gently placing their dissatisfaction to the side, visited the park. Although people’s impression of HKDL grew increasingly negative, over one million people, 14,000 people a day on average, visited HKDL between 12 September and 27 November 2005, seventy-seven days after HKDL’s official opening.⁸⁶ With all the allegations concerning, for instance, chaotic management and even Americanism (see chapter Six), Hong Kong people constituted a relative majority of the patrons: the projection was that they would account for 40% of patrons, but in fact, they accounted for 49%; only 26% were from the Mainland,⁸⁷ far below the projected 44%.

My middle-class-parent respondents’ expression of their consumer identity differed from their expression of their citizen identity. Of five mothers whom I interviewed, two simply considered themselves consumers and declared that they have what Bauman calls “right to enjoy, not a duty to suffer.”⁸⁸ Their decision about whether or not they should visit HKDL rested on a cost-benefit *happiness*

analysis instead of on an *ethics* deliberation concerning, for example, HKDL's practice of Americanism.⁸⁹ Cathy, who enjoyed her Anaheim Disneyland and Disneyland Paris trip in the past (see chapter Four), said that she, as a consumer, cared only about the effect that a day inside the park would have on her happiness. If she experienced unhappiness in the park, she would not go there again; but if she felt happy in the park, she would visit again even if the park management was arrogant and disobeyed local laws. Ada, another mother who had little interest in visiting the theme park but who had enjoyed her Tokyo Disneyland trip because her daughter had been happy on the trip, said that the negative HKDL image has some influence on her interest in visiting the park, but because her child's many classmates had already gone to HKDL, for her child's sake, she visited the park. Lisa, who tried best to struggle against the Disney consumer products but who used *Disney's World of English* in teaching her two daughters English, shifted between her role as consumer and her role as citizen according to the topic at hand. She criticized the park's management practices (commenting that, by asking journalists to conduct an interview in the rain, the management had exhibited its arrogance). However, Lisa also recounted the story in which she, as a consumer, had joyfully experienced the park during her first visit to HKDL around Christmas 2005:

It [the HKDL visit] was a happy trip. Very happy. We saw Buzz. He's funny. We played *Buzz Lightyear Astro Blasters* twice. This was my first time [visiting Disney park]. We were so happy. Very happy. We were really very happy. Even adults were very happy. I was most happy to see the Parade. It's like every character walks right in front of you. We were so happy that once my daughter waved her hands at Chip and Dale, and they waved back. Very happy....

In briefly recounting her HKDL experiences, Lisa used the word ‘happy’ nine times, and of all the features in the park, Disney characters most appealed to her. Again as a consumer, Lisa commented that the park was worth the price of admission. In our casual talk in September 2006, she said that she and her husband planned to visit HKDL again in the coming Christmas in 2006 because she had missed some shows the last time. When I asked her whether or not she would support HKDL’s further development if the HKSAR government, as the biggest shareholder, needed to invest in the park again, Lisa quickly shifted from her role as consumer to her role as Hong Kong citizen, declaring “no” and explaining that a government should not pour money into a private corporation. On this topic, she and I had the following conversation:

Lisa: My husband and I agree that, if the government needs to shell out money again, the government should invest in Ocean Park. As for HKDL, the management is so bad. Since Ocean Park is not supported by a big corporation and its conservation philosophy is good, we agreed that the government should support Ocean Park. But HKDL belongs to Disney and Disney is a corporation, and of course, we should not support a corporation by drawing from the public coffers.

Kim: But many people have said that if we don’t further develop HKDL, the coming Shanghai Disneyland may surmount HKDL and HKDL may need to close.

Lisa: But we can’t just keep on investing in a private company only because HKDL can’t compete with others. If that’s the case, HKDL should fold up. And it [HKDL] is not the only thing that makes Hong Kong attractive.

Lisa’s consumer-to-citizen shift is evident in the above passage. As consumers and as citizens, the remaining two mothers brought the roles together, but the mothers differed from each other regarding their comments and their actions. Judy, the left-wing feminist mother, politicized her consumption practices by boycotting HKDL. In this way, she expressed her anti-Disney attitude. As was the

case with Lisa, Judy disagreed with the government's further investment in the park's further development. Betty, a Disney fan, was not enthusiastic about HKDL from the outset (see chapter Four), and she was dissatisfied with HKDL's highhanded and chaotic management. However, she visited the park twice during HKDL's first year in operation. Although Betty was not excited about her HKDL trips, she said that she would definitely visit HKDL because she is a Hong Kong person. HKDL is a joint venture between the HKSAR government and Disney, and HKDL represents Hong Kong; its failure would suggest Hong Kong's failure. To her, HKDL had already settled in Hong Kong, so that the souring image of Disney, the boycott of Disney merchandise, and low attendance at HKDL would only bring harm instead of benefits to Hong Kong society. To express her love of Hong Kong, Betty chose to visit HKDL.

As a result, of the five middle-class families that I studied in relation to their family consumption of Disney products, two families had already visited HKDL twice within the first year of the park's September 2005 opening; one family had visited the park during Christmas 2005 and was already planning to stay in one HKDL hotel for two nights during Christmas vacation in 2006; one family had not visited the park but also was planning to visit HKDL and to stay in a HKDL hotel for a night during the 2006 Christmas; only one family (that of Judy) had never visited and had no plans to visit HKDL.

Because of the *organized* threat of a global boycott and because of shareholders' pressure, HKDL shifted its policy, both declaring that the park would not serve shark's fin soup and pledging to investigate the China supply chains. Participants in the green movement and others see themselves as responsible consumers and see consumption as not just an activity expressing individual rights

but an ethical and civil responsibility to the environment, to society, and to justice.⁹⁰ Nevertheless, three critical sources of evidence—my discussions with Susanna and Billy, my own internal struggles over Disney, and my parent-respondents' different reasons for visiting HKDL—show that our consumption activities regarding HKDL can equally well be grounded in individual expressions of identity (i.e., our civil and our consumer identities), in our emotions over Disney characters, or in communal expressions of identity (involving the development of family and group bonds).⁹¹ Consumer interests are neither coherent nor unified.⁹² Hong Kong people may criticize Disney's highhanded and non-transparent management practices and its smallness and lack of rides, but for reasons ranging from self gratification to children's instant enjoyment to the Hong Kong-Disney link, many people do not want to see HKDL record low attendance and many people, in spite of their qualms, keep on visiting HKDL.

Mass consumption, enjoyment, disruption, and disillusionment

Not many Hong Kong people politicize their consumption practices and oppose Disney by boycotting HKDL for its ecological damage, its labor exploitation, its non-transparent accounts, or its highhanded practices. However, this absence of politicized opposition does not mean that HKDL visitors either passively submit to the Disneyland landscape or actively conform to Disney management wishes. Disney and Disneyland sell not just rides but also—in the abstract sense of fantasy—good times, communal experiences of togetherness, inter-generational bonding, consumer value, spectacle, and pleasure of the product. To create a clean, orderly, beautiful, safe, fun, and perfect fantasyland, Disneyland needs patrons' cooperation. Patrons need to follow Disney's moral regulations—to queue up and

wait in line in an orderly and peaceful way, to follow ride instructions, to smile back, and to interact with such strangers as cast members, to refrain from smoking except in a designated area, to stay clear of cast members' areas: in short, to respect and adhere to the organized and rationalized processes of fun consumption and to the spatial practices provided and controlled by the park. In return, patrons can find release from everyday life tension inside the organized and controlled park. As Eco argues:

An allegory of the consumer society ... Disneyland is also a place of total passivity. Its visitors must agree to behave like its robots. Access to each attraction is regulated by a maze of metal railings which discourages any individual initiative. The number of visitors obviously sets the pace of the line; the officials of the dream, properly dressed in the uniforms suited to each specific attraction, not only admit the visitor to the threshold of the chosen sector, but, in successive phases, regulate his every move ("Now wait here please, go up now, sit down please, wait before standing up," always in a polite tone, impersonal, imperious, over the microphone). If the visitor pays this price, he can have not only "the real thing" but the abundance of the reconstructed truth.⁹³

Alan Bryman argues that behind all these controls and regulations is Disneyization's heart: the enhancement of consumption.⁹⁴ Disneyland's site design asks visitors to immerse themselves in the park's total themed narrative, wherein work cedes place to a merger between entertainment and consumption activities. The instructions are simple: treat consumption as fun and have fun—that is, consume.

For different reasons, Hong Kong people have indeed visited HKDL. But if one of HKDL's design aims is to squeeze money from patrons' pockets, local patrons also invent ways to consume Disney fantasy without paying. To ensure consumption of Disney food and beverages, the park does not allow patrons to

bring in food; nevertheless, patrons bring empty bottles to the park and then fill them up with free drinking water. In most rollercoaster rides, Disney Imagineers have installed cameras that capture visitors' enjoyment of the ride. These images are purchasable, bringing HKDL considerable profits; yet again, local visitors sidestep the expense, this time by using their own cameras to capture the monitor image—for free. The money-saving strategies can be ingeniously simple: parents place their children next to a balloon seller and then photograph the posed group so that the family, having purchased not one single balloon, will have a photo of the balloon-framed children.

Inside the Disney stores, many people buy Disney merchandise, but many do not. Many treat HKDL's stores as a playground. Without buying anything, some children play with and touch almost all the displayed toys and dolls before their parents insist that they leave; adult visitors, as do child consumers, hold the dolls, wear the characters' wigs, smile, and take photos. During the summer, because of the scorching heat and the humid weather and HKDL's lack of shaded areas, many children and adult visitors stay more than thirty minutes in air-conditioned stores to browse and to touch merchandise without buying. "Serious" consumers may not buy merchandise because of these window-shopping consumers. Several times, I witnessed consumers give up buying their favorite soft doll because they saw sweaty children holding it tightly and posing for photos with it. These children used the doll, itself, to wipe off their sweat. The "serious" consumers asked staff to give them a new doll from the storeroom, but all the toys and the dolls were on display; in the end, the would-be consumers purchased nothing.

Casual consumers like to play, to touch, and to try on the Disney merchandise without paying, whereas sophisticated and serious consumers do not

feel interested in shopping at the HKDL shopping mall because of the ordinary quality of the merchandise. Two of my respondents, Agnes⁹⁵ and Katie,⁹⁶ who were fans of Disney characters, who would bid on limited-edition Disney merchandise on the net, and who regularly visited Tokyo Disneyland (TDL) as a shopping destination commented that HKDL's merchandise is ordinary in terms of design and quality. The costlier, higher-quality Disney merchandise that HKDL sold—merchandise such as Swarovski Disney jewelry—was not designed and sold exclusively for HKDL. But shoppers can shop for particular Lenox or Wedgwood handmade Disney china-bone tableware only at Orlando's Walt Disney World or can shop for Seiko watches only at TDL, for example. The ordinary design and the ordinary quality of HKDL merchandise, according to my respondents, lacked “sincerity.”

HKDL faces problems not only in luring consumers to consume as much as possible but also in maintaining HKDL's orderliness and cleanliness, the signature of Disneyland, especially during the early days after the park opened. By comparing Disneyland and the Centre Georges Pompidou, Baudrillard argues that the Pompidou center's transparent structure (of displaying air conditioning ducts, water pipes, and electricity lines, for example) suggests the dream of democratization of culture—a transparent structure. When it opened in 1977, the public structure incited the fervent masses to flock in and to consume the mass culture on display. Baudrillard sees visitors' passionate behavior as a sign of their actual desire to destroy the building and as, in fact, a cultural death:

The masses rush toward Beaubourg as they rush toward disaster sites, with the same irresistible elan. Better: they *are* the disaster of Beaubourg. Their number, their stampede, their fascination, their itch to see everything is

objectively a deadly and catastrophic behavior for the whole undertaking. Not only does their weight put the building in danger, but their adhesion, their curiosity annihilates the very contents of this culture of animation. This rush can no longer be measured against what was proposed as the cultural objective, it is its radical negation, in both its excess and success. It is thus the masses who assume the role of catastrophic agent in this structure of catastrophe.⁹⁷

In the early days after the opening, HKDL also found the public's passionate welcome threatening, if not fatal, to the orderly but mass entertainment environment in which zealous visitors fancy all things Disney. Before the park opened, the HKDL management taught staff ways in which they could ask patrons to smoke in a designated area and to avoid squatting when using the restroom facilities. However, the staff then realized that Mainland patrons urinate not in toilets but in basins or even in lakes. The patrons do this when the park is jam-packed because they want to avoid squandering their precious time—they want to play every HKDL attraction possible—and because they do not care to urinate in public restrooms. Once, one of my HKDL staff respondents was riding the boat for the ride *Jungle Ride Cruise*, and she saw a Mainland child urinating at the end of the boat. In this way, the child succeeded in attending to bodily functions and in seeing the sites—simultaneously. In Baudrillard's words, "The consumerist man is haunted by the fear of 'missing' something, some form of enjoyment or other."⁹⁸

Another HKDL staff respondent commented that the destructive power of Mainland patrons is so great that they would love to touch and examine every decor, but that the act of touching fades the painted surface. Another prominent example is the Lunar Year chaos that took place between 1 and 3 February 2006. The angry Mainland ticket holders brawled outside the park, rocked the main gates, climbed over the high fences, and helped children over them. As was the case during the

early days of the Pompidou center, consumers' enthusiasm for consuming everything Disney, the mass culture of Disney, turns into an all-out assault on the supposedly fun-filled fantasyland.

Because some local and Mainland guests aim at playing all HKDL attractions within the one-day time limit, queue jumping becomes a necessary trick for them. If crowd control is supposedly famous in Disneyland, then HKDL's queue jumping undoubtedly does Disney management a disservice. Queue jumping is usual in HKDL. Every time I visited HKDL, I observed visitors (adult Mainlanders or Mainland children without accompanying adults) jumping queues. Hong Kong patrons, however, were no better, but they broke the rules cunningly. One or two patrons enter a queue on behalf of a large group of patrons who are elsewhere in the park; then, the remaining members of the group suddenly appear at that point in the queue and quibble with other patrons who are behind them in the queue that no park rule prohibits the use of *queue representatives*: that is, no park rule prohibits one or two people from holding an advanced place in a queue for a large group of people who are enjoying rides elsewhere. Staying in the park as long as possible is an option for patrons who do not jump the queue but who want to play as many attractions as possible. After nearly twenty dry runs, HKDL management found that Hong Kong visitors spend 9.3 to 9.4 hours at the park on average, and more than 90% of the visitors remain until 9 p.m. to see the fireworks displays. This figure is 30% greater than corresponding figures at Disney's other theme parks.⁹⁹ Hong Kong visitors also stay longer in restaurants than Americans do, and some occupy a table for a whole day, using it as a base camp where they can periodically rest. Long queues form in both attractions and restaurants.

Clashes between HKDL's scientific management practices and HKDL consumers' unscientific and sometimes uncontrollable acts result in tremendously long queues and in ride suspensions. Under its scientific management, HKDL, just like other Disney parks, emphasizes the hourly operational ride capacity to ensure efficiency and standards. For attractions labeled as "E" ticket rides¹⁰⁰ such as *Space Mountain* and *The Many Adventures of Winnie the Pooh*, workers need to handle two thousand visitors an hour. The management controls not only the duration of each ride but also the period of loading and unloading. And patrons also need to get on and get off the ride within a certain period. However, HKDL visitors do not allow such scientific management practices to govern their ordinary ways of consumption. As Hong Kong people like to take pictures, visitors may snap one or two before getting off a ride, and this action slows the disembarkation past the allotted period of time set for the computerized ride; consequently, the ride is automatically suspended.¹⁰¹ In short, the scenario is thus: during the ride, patrons get out of their barricaded seats to take pictures, the breach automatically halts the ride, and the computer system requires a reboot that further elongates the period of suspension. Local visitors' long stay and their enjoyment in photographing every object for posterity both clash with HKDL's scientific management and result in long queues and in ride suspensions.

When all is said and done, Disneyland sells happiness. While the HKDL website promises visitors that the park is "the happiest kingdom of them all,"¹⁰² visitors' disappointments over crowdedness, queue jumping, and seating disputes are typical emotions that interweave with visitors' joyful encounters with Disney characters. One hot spot is the fairytale castle during the "Disney in the Stars" Fireworks, because patrons used to sit on the floor to look at the firework display,

the laser performance, and Disney character projections on the wall of the Sleeping Beauty Castle altogether, but some might stand up and obstruct others' view. The hot-blooded patrons demand that the standing patrons sit down, and the standing patrons refuse to do so, and then a fight breaks out. Brawls also take place during "Disney on Parade" where floats, dancers, and costumed performers offer extravaganzas and excellent photo and video opportunities; zealous patrons jump the queue to fight for and to occupy better positions, and assaults ensue. On my numerous visits to the park, I observed that passionate mass consumption threatened to put an end to many patrons' desire to journey through Disneyland. For instance, people initially lined up properly for the musical *Festival of the Lion King*, but when more than two hundred people wound up having to wait *outside* the official line for the musical, enchanted visitors turned into restive visitors. Once operators started to let the disgruntled visitors enter the theater, I heard some Hong Kong twenty-something visitors saying, "Let's squeeze in!" They then squeezed through the dense crowd to enter the theater as fast as possible and to get seats with better views. I got increasingly frightened while, for more than ten minutes, people pushed and plunged into the hut-like theater. And at the firework displays, I was one of the many spectators who were booing a pair of lovers blocking our view.

Because certain visitors conduct themselves—or "perform"—in an improper way, the park is the site of frequent frustration, verbal disputes, and even physical assaults. My HKDL staff respondents said that there is at least one fight inside HKDL every day and that, between January and September 2006, eighty-two fights involving the police had broken out inside the park.¹⁰³ Quarrels and fights not only undermine the park's cheerful and relaxed atmosphere and visitors' happy journey, but also can cause delays and even suspensions of park rides and shows.

For example, newspapers widely reported a fight that broke out over seating disputes and that led to the delay and the shortening of the live show when families were celebrating the Mid-Autumn Festival inside HKDL.¹⁰⁴

To complicate the situation further, these conflicts and fights often take place between locals and Mainlanders. Locals lament Mainlanders' lack of etiquette—smoking wherever they like, spitting, littering, talking loudly in public, queue jumping, and so on. My visits informed me, however, that both Mainlanders and locals perform queue jumping, compete for desirable seats, and speak loudly: at the same time, I also met some friendly Mainland and Hong Kong visitors with whom I had pleasant chats. I even witnessed a Mainland lady cleaning up a sink after she had used it as a toilet. In fact, all my HKDL staff respondents said that they found Hong Kong people more difficult to serve than Mainlanders because Hong Kong people would criticize everything; they always broke regulations (such as queue jumping) but quibbled that their vexatious conduct was proper. Some respondents even said that Mainland visitors were “more lovely” than Hong Kong visitors because the former immersed themselves in the Disneyland environment and listened to cast members' spiels and even took cast members' advice. Facing so many visitors every day, most of my HKDL staff respondents said that they had changed their essentialist views on Mainlanders and on Hong Kong people, learning that Mainlanders can be considerate and Hong Kong people can be unimaginably unreasonable and troublesome. Because there are so many different personalities and characteristics within any one cultural group, the common Hong Kong way of thinking about Hong Kong-Mainland cultural differences and about Hong Kong cultural superiority is a naïve one.

My HKDL staff respondents explained to me that Hong Kong people and Mainlanders may simply have different ideas on the proper way of lining up. Because the width between railings must be wide enough for a wheelchair to pass through, there is always space between people in the line. Whenever there is certain amount of space, some Mainland visitors will occupy that space, and because they do not push other visitors, they do not consider the act to be “jumping queue.” Many Mainlanders stop (although sometimes grudgingly) occupying these spaces whenever workers clarify the rules about these spaces. But the workers must, first of all, catch the attention of the Mainlanders, speak audibly, and use the *Putonghua* accent, which gives the Mainlanders a sense of *zamen*, meaning “we.” Conflicts always occur between Hong Kong and Mainland visitors because Hong Kong people speak in an exceptionally loud voice to express their hostile attitudes, and Mainlanders may not understand *Putonghua* spoken in a Hong Kong accent. Tensions rise when the Hong Kong people keep on criticizing Mainlanders but fail to realize that the criticized party may not understand the criticizing party’s *Putonghua*; moreover, Mainland visitors sometimes feel that the residents of Hong Kong are discriminating against the Mainlanders as outsiders. Once I witnessed a quarrel between a Hong Kong visitor and a Mainland visitor. In a loud voice and in his Hong Kong-style *Putonghua*, the Hong Kong visitor accused the Mainlander of having jumped the queue. In response, the Mainland visitor yelled back and finally exclaimed, “You think that you’re different from us because of your brief colonial history, you stupid Hong Kong people!”

Although both Mainland visitors and Hong Kong visitors break the rules (though somewhat differently, in general), it is typically the Mainlanders whom Hong Kong media blame when singling out problematic HKDL visitors. Whenever

the topic “Disneyland” comes up in my casual talks with my local friends who do not work inside HKDL, the subject of Mainlanders automatically comes up, as well: the talk strays onto the subjects of Mainlanders’ loud talking, of Mainlanders’ queue jumping, and of Hong Kong people’s strategies for escaping from Mainland tourists at the park (i.e., entering the park not in the morning but after lunch because Mainland visitors always visit the park early but leave the park around 3 or 4 p.m.). In fact, these interlocutors often caution me not to visit the park during the peak season (because the news reported that some Mainland thieves had bought HKDL summer passes and had then stolen visitors’ wallets inside the park¹⁰⁵). Most Hong Kong-centered conversations about Mainlanders in the park reaffirm the Hongkonger identity as “Chineseness plus” (etiquette) or as “Chineseness minus” (infractions) and mark the difference between the two parties, whether or not the discrimination is accurate. Hong Kong people appropriate “cultural differences” in order to legitimize Hong Kong people’s discriminatory attitudes and acts.

Disneyland’s park design is supposedly a “continuous reproduction of a ‘happy present’,”¹⁰⁶ a placeless hyper-real fantasy environment offering everything timelessly better and brighter, helping visitors “escape their unnatural present day cares, ‘drop their defenses,’ and ‘become more like themselves’,”¹⁰⁷ and “nurture a better human nature.” By fortifying boundaries of cultural particularity, patrons’ behaviors in HKDL—laden with *real* cultural and ethnic supremacist thinking, misunderstanding, prejudice, and tension—inject into HKDL a Hong Kong-specific anxiety.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I describe several types of resistant acts at HKDL, from formal labor-union negotiations and consumer politics (a global boycott) to informal mundane everyday work (taking sick leave, replacing smiling faces with sullen ones, changing and shortening scripts) and consumer practices (play-but-no-purchase, disruptive play leading to mechanical breakdowns, confrontational behavior sapping environments of their happiness). In the concluding section, I would like to review first, the incongruity between formal resistance politics and popular sentiments and, second, the political connotations of these acts.

The lack of labor support and of public support for the HKDLCMU and for Disney Hunter, as shown by the two organizations' small membership size, illustrates the limitation of existing local formal politics in addressing the ambivalent attitude of HKDL workers and of Hong Kong people in general toward HKDL. Moreover, this lack demonstrates the entwined relationship between the Hong Kong people and HKDL in relation to their livelihood and their popular pleasures. The HKDLCMU may wish to position itself not as a party whose chief function is to resist Disney management but as a labor union whose chief function is to negotiate with the management for the improvement of laborers' working conditions via union-company negotiation. However, the composition of the union's membership (only junior-grade staffers) together with the media portrayal of the union as a confrontational party have colored many HKDL workers' perceptions of the union. Moreover, most of these workers have neither a good understanding of the labor union nor easy access to the union. In the end, the workers view the union as an organization that either opposes whatever acts the

management implements or as a promoter of vexatious workers' unreasonable demands.

Disney Hunter situates itself as the counter-culture in the “bipolar logic of resistance,”¹⁰⁸ in Tony Bennett's words, and criticizes Disney's labor exploitation, environmental vandalism, and cultural domination and colonization in the globe. By holding an alternative truth, we, the university students and teachers with better access to information, presume to know better and clearer than the public of the destructive Disney effects on selves and on society. The varied ways in which Disney Hunter resists—through school presentations, public forums, street drama—demonstrate the limitations that impose themselves on the group's general notion of resistance. Implicitly assuming a dichotomous model of truth versus false consciousness, *we*, the Disney Hunter members, need to educate *them*, the public, to confront critically their “commonsense,” and *we* need to help *them* to construct critical consciousness by which they might resist Disney's political, economic, and cultural power. The total-resistance approach fails to receive collective support from Hong Kong people who, for the most part, find popular culture liberating instead of dominating. Also, the total-resistance approach fails to acknowledge consumers' active interpretation of and active *appropriation* of Disney offerings, regardless of whether the offerings are movies, merchandise, or theme parks. Users' appropriations of Disney offerings are often a contingent result of the interplay among multiple sets of power networks—and rarely of non-contingent brain-numbing consumption. It is not surprising to see the public, including the HKDL workers, feel skeptical about Disney Hunter's defensive sermons and annoyed by its allegations over Disney power.

Michel de Certeau's idea of tactics provides another way to account for people's everyday creative efforts to adapt the external world "to their own interests and their own rules"¹⁰⁹ when "individuals [are] already caught in the nets of 'discipline'" (p. xv). To develop his idea of tactics, de Certeau contrasts it with another idea, "strategy," which refers to administrative projects and systems based on "political, economic, and scientific rationality" (p. xvi). Strategies are able to "produce" and "tabulate" places (p. 30) because places are the property of institutional power (p. 36). Tactics, in contrast, occur fleetingly in time, and not in place. In de Certeau's words:

I call a "tactic," ... a calculus which cannot count on a "proper" (a spatial or institutional localization).... The place of a tactic belongs to the other. A tactic insinuates itself into the other's place, fragmentarily, without taking it over in its entirety, without being able to keep it at a distance.... The "proper" is a victory of space over time. On the contrary, because it does not have a place, a tactic depends on time—it is always on the watch for opportunities that must be seized "on the wing." Whatever it wins, it does not keep. It must constantly manipulate events in order to turn them into "opportunities." (p. xix)

To illustrate the idea of tactics, de Certeau provides us ample examples that range from talking and reading to shopping, cooking, and walking. When we read, we turn reading into a silent production where we interpret and improvise meanings; when we cannot own a home owing to structural and institutional constraints, we rent an apartment that we furnish so that it reflects our goals and our memories (p. xxi). In a similar string of thought, HKDL's size, attractions, and spatial design derive from the Walt Disney Company's "strategic" plans, not from any notable participation of either the HKSAR government or the public;¹¹⁰ the aims, the values, the workers' behavior, and the scientific operating procedures all reflect

“standards” set by the HKDL management; visitors’ behavior is also under surveillance, and only certain “proper” types of behavior—of performance—are allowed. Disney created HKDL and imposed its own standards on HKDL by relying on structural and institutional domination. HKDL workers and consumers, however, appropriate their model of permissible behavior and convert it in time into behavior that resists the dominant-subordinate relationship in time. In Japan, lower-ranking female office workers recognize their poor job prospects and use *kawaii* to justify or to inform their slouching on the job—or simply to face these less-than-desirable prospects;¹¹¹ at HKDL, some workers in a similar situation use characteristically immature and irresponsible behavior to face their poor job prospects and to circumvent HKDL standards: unjustified sick leaves, moody interactions with visitors, abbreviated scripts and spiels, and grievance-laden scripts and spiels.

As consumers, we consume, which is most important to corporations, but we also appropriate the structural domination through play and creative interventions: we take photos, jump queues, and engage in play-but-not-purchase behavior. Through consumption practices, we simultaneously confirm and disrupt the system’s smooth operation.¹¹² These consumption practices aim not at rejecting and transforming¹¹³ but at hijacking and disrupting the existing dominant system guaranteed by Disney’s spatial, structural, and institutional control. Disney trades in signs, but consumption practices re-signify Disneyland’s meaning through improvisation and disruption.

Mass passionate consumption does not always construct passive subjects who obey the park’s controlled representation of space; some zealous consumers’ uptake can be destructive in breaking the fantasyland’s magic spell; likewise,

consumption tactics are not always celebratory. To get their way in a number of regards, visitors use a number of tactics inside HKDL: visitors jump queues to play all the HKDL attractions within the one-day time limit, and Hong Kong visitors use “cultural difference” both to escape from Mainland visitors inside the park and to legitimize Hong Kong people’s discriminatory attitudes and acts. These tactics “are not intelligibly described as resistive,” in Tony Bennett’s words.¹¹⁴

De Certeau reminds us also that the populist approach of tactics operates fleetingly and has little effect on structural and institutional change. In the case of HKDL, the visitors’ tactics seem to have little effect on Disney’s spatial, structural, and institutional control. After all, HKDL visitors purchase the tickets, purchase the park’s food and drink (one HKDL rule is that visitors cannot bring “food, alcoholic beverages, and beverages in cans or bottles” into the park¹¹⁵), and sometimes purchase the park’s merchandise. If Hong Kong residents argue that the HKSAR government-Disney deal regarding HKDL is unfair and non-transparent, and if the residents criticize certain HKDL management practices (including environmental damage, the non-accountability of a publicly funded project, labor exploitation) but keep on visiting HKDL as shown in Ap’s 2006 survey (p. 354), and if HKDL can maximize its bottom line, HKDL management has no need to change its strategy.

Organized workers’ tactics, however, may have some effects on the corporation-worker relationship, and sometimes these tactics could change certain Disney-management policies. On 10 April 2006, some HKDL character performers, with the help of the labor union, staged a press conference where they railed against the working conditions and they demanded a pay raise. Moreover, eighty of the one hundred and twenty character performers responsible for the daily parade and the meet-and-greet visitors’ sessions had signed a petition demanding that their pay and

the pay for character performers hired for the live stage show be equitable.¹¹⁶ In late April, some HKDL character performers told journalists that they were considering hijacking a daily costumed parade with banners to demand higher pay.¹¹⁷ In June 2006, HKDL raised character performers' salaries from HK\$9,000 to \$10,000 and extended the breaks between performances during the summer months.¹¹⁸ Because of HKDL character performers' organized threat of disrupting the park parade, HKDL management changed certain management policies. This incident signaled a dynamic power relation between HKDL management and HKDL frontline workers, although there was no structural or institutional change of the power relation between workers and management, and although workers' tactics and criticisms regarding long working hours, occupational hazards, and insufficient compensation have not changed the HKSAR government's labor laws.

In the absence of profound structural and institutional changes, we should not lose sight of the fact that the interactions between Disney and Hong Kong people (whether they are journalists, workers, or consumers) produce and complicate the images and the meanings of "Disney." Through journalists' articles, activists' calls, workers' on-the-job behavior, and visitors' consumption behavior, local actors have multiplied, expanded, and complicated the meanings of 'HKDL'—meanings that range from "the unfair American corporation-HKSAR government deal" and "the non-transparent, non-accountable, and sometimes exploitative park-management practices" to "the small, chaotic, and insufficient attractions and sophisticated merchandise at HKDL." As argued by Doreen Massey, there is "mutual interaction" between local forces and wider processes.¹¹⁹ Local actors' quotidian acts in HKDL may affect the wider process of Disney expansion.

The production and the circulation of multiple meanings of “Disney” condition the future Disneyland development in Hong Kong.

In May 2007, in reporting results for the second-quarter revenues of 2007, Disney said that its parks-and-resorts division had an operating income of US\$254 million, up 19% from the previous year. However, Disney also said that the increases were partially offset by a decline at HKDL during the second quarter, which ended 31 March 2007: “Hong Kong Disneyland recognizes the attendance and guest spending have fallen short of initial expectations.”¹²⁰ Besides, the California-based Disney said in a filing with the US securities regulator that “Hong Kong Disneyland may require alternative sources of financing to meet its operating and development needs.”¹²¹ Because additional funds from the HKSAR government need approval from the Legislative Council, the spokesperson of HKDL said that the discussion between the Walt Disney Company and the HKSAR government regarding financial options “does not involve seeking additional funds from the government,” and the Tourism Commission said that the HKSAR government had no plans to use public funds to increase its investment in the Hong Kong Disneyland joint venture.¹²² In other words, in considering whether or not to expand the park and to build more attractions as ways to lure visitors, the California-based Disney, rather than ask the HKSAR government for public funding, has expected to provide HKDL with additional funding as part of HKDL’s new financial arrangement with the HKSAR government. It seems that locals’ tactics have had some important effects: Hong Kong taxpayers at least are less likely to pay the bill for HKDL’s further development because HKDL has acquired a relatively bad public image and because the HKSAR government’s huge investment in HKDL (HK\$23 billion plus a HK\$6 billion loan) has created less

concrete economic benefits for Hong Kong society than Hong Kong people and the government had expected. However, legislator Fred Li wondered whether or not the HKSAR government's reluctance to put money into HKDL development was due to the fact that such a government act, requiring approval from the Legislative Council, would compel legislators to request HKDL's disclosure of financial records.¹²³ In other words, the HKSAR government's decision not to put money into HKDL development could still maintain the non-transparent and non-accountable management practices of HKDL.

If the HKSAR government publicly monitors HKDL's operations, then the government should institutionally and legislatively change some local company laws and labor laws. Legislators in the Legislative Council should press the government to be more transparent in HKDL management issues; facing a transnational company, NGOs need to organize—and have successfully organized—global pressure among shareholders, workers, and consumers to confront Disney for its labor exploitation and for its degradation of the environment. However, in advancing a politics of everyday life, I also assert that an elitist pedagogy may not always be effective, especially in the Hong Kong context, in which people feel that they can *know* nothing under non-transparent governance, and that they can *do* nothing under existing institutional and political constraints.¹²⁴

Furthermore, my study of actual HKDL happenings shows that we should not only study local Disney power dynamics but also problematize the very idea of “local.” First, “local” is not a single entity; second, it has no necessary correlation with authenticity and empowerment; third, local views can be conservative, progressive, ambiguous, egalitarian, or discriminatory. In the case of HKDL, under the post-colonial context, some Hong Kong people use HKDL as another *stage* on

which they perform exclusionary acts that target Mainlanders: the foundation of these acts goes by the name of “cultural differences.” If “democracy” means more than universal suffrage, if “democracy” means transparent governance and accountable governance and citizens’ acceptance of pluralistic ideas, then Hong Kong people’s exclusionist cultural beliefs and practices are themselves major obstacles toward the democratization process. In studying popular culture, if we should not reduce locals’ consumption of HKDL to simply mind-numbing activities, we should also be, as Nick Stevenson argues, “accepting [of] the legitimacy and complexity of popular pleasures while protesting against material and cultural exclusion.”¹²⁵

In the next and concluding chapter, I argue that although global-local power relationships should be viewed and examined as dynamic and as varied, domestication or localization does not necessarily translate into empowerment of locals. Struggles against increasing corporate power over the landscape must be accompanied by the struggle for democratization and for greater transparency and accountability of, in this case, the HKSAR government. By using Nick Stevenson’s idea of cultural citizenship, I further argue that the entitlement of citizenship rights is a necessary condition for the development of democratic society, but that having citizenship rights is not sufficient to encourage people either to participate in public policy or to embrace pluralistic culture.

NOTES

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- ¹ Disney University, *Disney Traditions* (Hong Kong: HKDL, 2005), p. 1.
- ² Nguyen Hoai Anh and Brian H Kleiner, "Effective Human Resource Management in the Entertainment Industry," *Management Research News* 28, issue 2/3 (2005), p. 100.
- ³ With its fame, Disney Institute's clients include Duke University, American Express Corporate Services, Hankyu Department Stores, IBM, Illinois Power Company, McDonald's, Phillip Morris Incorporated, Pricewaterhouse Coopers, Prudential Securities, Sony Electronics, and Volvo. See "Our clients," Disney Institute, <http://www.disneyinstitute.com/clients.asp> (accessed 31 October 2006).
- ⁴ Jim Poissant, *Creating and Sustaining a Superior Customer Service Organization: A Book About Taking Care of the People Who Take Care of the Customers* (Westport, Connecticut, London: Quorum Books, 2002).
- ⁵ Jane Kuenz, "Working at the Rat," in *Inside the Mouse: Work and Play at Disney World*, edited by The Project on Disney (Durham, London: Duke University Press, 1995), p. 125.
- ⁶ See Aviad E. Raz, *Riding the Black Ship: Japan and Tokyo Disneyland* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard, 1999), chapters Three and Four.
- ⁷ John Van Maanen, "The Smile Factory: Work at Disneyland," in *Reframing Organizational Culture*, edited by Frost and others. (Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications, 1991), p. 59.
- ⁸ See Raz, *Riding the Black Ship*, p. 92.
- ⁹ There are different versions of the manual *Disney Traditions*. Of the three manuals I have collected, one is for HKDL workers, one is for Orlando Disney parks' workers, and the last one is for the Walt Disney World College Program's workers. I collected the HKDL manual in July 2005 and the two Orlando manuals in October 2004. No manual states the date of publication, and therefore, it becomes difficult to trace the development of the manual. The publication of the Hong Kong version, however, should be in 2005. Disney University, *Disney Traditions* (Hong Kong: 2005); Disney University, *Disney Traditions* (Orlando: unknown); Disney University, *Disney Traditions: Walt Disney World College Program* (Orlando: unknown).
- ¹⁰ Regarding the manuals' format, the major difference is that the HKDL manual is bilingual whereas the Orlando manual is only in English.
- ¹¹ Disney University, *Disney Traditions* (Hong Kong: 2005), p. 6; Disney University, *Disney Traditions* (Orlando: unknown), p. 4; Disney University, *Disney Traditions: Walt Disney World College Program* (Orlando: unknown), p. 8.
- ¹² Disney University, *Disney Traditions* (Hong Kong: 2005), p. 10; Disney University, *Disney Traditions* (Orlando: unknown), p. 14; Disney University, *Disney Traditions: Walt Disney World College Program* (Orlando: unknown), p. 12.

¹³ There are some differences in the selected themes or the wording in different *Disney Traditions*. Disney University, *Disney Traditions* (Hong Kong: 2005), pp. 10-13; Disney University, *Disney Traditions* (Orlando: unknown), pp. 14-17; Disney University, *Disney Traditions: Walt Disney World College Program* (Orlando: unknown), pp. 12-16.

¹⁴ The “7 guidelines for guest service” that I quote here are from the HKDL manual. In the Orlando manual, the fifth guideline is “display appropriate body language at all times.” The HKDL manual specifies cast members’ tone, but the Orlando manual highlights cast members’ need to display appropriate body language “at all times.” Disney University, *Disney Traditions* (Hong Kong: 2005), p. 13.

¹⁵ Disney University, *Disney Traditions* (Orlando: unknown), p. 9; Disney University, *Disney Traditions: Walt Disney World College Program* (Orlando: unknown), p. 9.

¹⁶ Disney University, *Disney Traditions* (Orlando: unknown), p. 10; Disney University, *Disney Traditions: Walt Disney World College Program* (Orlando: unknown), p. 10.

¹⁷ Disney University, *Disney Traditions* (Orlando: unknown), p. 11; Disney University, *Disney Traditions: Walt Disney World College Program* (Orlando: unknown), p. 11.

¹⁸ Aviad E. Raz, *Riding the Black Ship: Japan and Tokyo Disneyland* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard, 1999), pp. 109-10.

¹⁹ One is Josephine, the ex-accountant who went to Orlando and worked as a cultural representative (see chapter Four for details). She feels proud and enjoys working at HKDL because of Disneyland’s high standards and the joy of meeting different guests. However, Josephine’s degree of pride in working at HKDL decreased as she noticed HKDL’s “small size, few attractions, highhanded management, and bad press image,” in her words. She told me that if five stood for the maximum degree of pride, then her pride had been five before HKDL’s opening; she then told me that, following HKDL’s premiere, her pride had dropped from five to three. Another respondent, Xavier, enjoyed working at HKDL as a dancer in one of the HKDL musicals. His enjoyment stemmed from the opportunities that HKDL has offered Hong Kong performers and from HKDL’s salary, which is higher than that offered by television stations.

²⁰ Many criticisms expressed by my respondents are similar to criticisms expressed by workers at other Disneyland parks. Common objections include monotonous jobs, the lack of macro views of the park’s operations (that is, the excessive division and subdivision of jobs), the internal promotion system’s promotion of an excessively competitive atmosphere among workers, and the lack of communication among hosts, leads, and managers. John Van Maanen, “The Smile Factory: Work at Disneyland,” in *Reframing Organizational Culture*, edited by Frost and others (Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications, 1991), pp. 58-76; Jane Kuenz, “Working at the Rat,” in *Inside the Mouse: Work and Play at Disney World*, edited by The Project on Disney (Durham, London: Duke University Press, 1995), pp. 110-62; Raz, *Riding the Black Ship*, chapters Three and Four.

²¹ HKDL workers officially can have one fifteen-minute break (called “short

breaks”) every four hours, but during the early days after HKDL’s opening, workers could not even go to the restroom. The situation, after one-year of operation, was improving. The managers would try to arrange more short-breaks for the frontline workers, the Host 1s, and the Host 2s—for example, a short break once every two hours. In the United States, since the parks were established, workers have normally had a short break every two hours, although officially American workers can have a fifteen-minute break every four hours in the first eight working hours, and a fifteen-minute break every two hours after eight hours of working. “「香港迪士尼樂園職工會」正式成立,” press release <http://www.hkdldcmunion.org/?p=12> (accessed 6 December 2006).

²² HKDL’s break rooms are tiny. Although HKDL receives criticism for its smallness, the backstage is much bigger than the onstage. In comparison with the sheer enormousness of the backstage, staff members’ break rooms are particularly small. The lack of space in the cast’s break rooms seems to be a common problem for many HKDL operation staffers. In the published “Hong Kong Disneyland Cast Forum,” which lists issues that workers raised in the Cast Forum in late March 2006, five out of eight break rooms—the Royal Banquet Hall, Main Street Emporium, Main Street, U.S.A., Tomorrowland, and Fantasyland—came under fire for being too small. I conducted a fieldwork visit to the HKDL backstage once in October 2006. Inside Tomorrowland, one break room was about 200-300 square feet. At about 11:30 a.m., I observed more than ten park operation workers who, while having their lunch, were crammed together for lack of space. Because of this lack of space, workers also needed to sit in folding chairs. During peak hours, workers just did not have enough space to take a break, have their lunch or dinner, and catch a snippet of television (luckily, workers can choose TV channels other than the Disney channel). Hong Kong Disneyland, “Hong Kong Disneyland Cast Forum” Hong Kong: HKDL (2006), p. 12.

²³ After operating for a year, HKDL still received criticism from workers and the work union regarding work-related muscle pains. “迪士尼再爆 3 宗罪 「米老鼠」指身體勞損被炒,” 8 September 2006, *Ming Pao Daily News*, A12; 黃勁文, “迪士尼前員工 控樂園 6 宗罪 戲服重頸勞損 首宗申請法援入稟,” 8 September 2006, *Hong Kong Economic Times*, A28.

²⁴ Some HKDL workers stated that their employment conditions were worse than their American counterparts’ employment conditions. For example, Orlando workers receive two times the payment if they work during holidays whereas HKDL workers receive normal pay; American colleagues can get double pay if they continuously work on the 7th day, whereas HKDL workers get normal pay. On the other hand, HKDL management does not adopt the local Hong Kong customs wherein workers at catering outlets receive free meals: at HKDL, caterers need to pay for their meals. Other workers’ dissatisfaction included both HKDL management’s refusal to increase the number of physiotherapists and the unpaid forty-five-minute lunch period. See HKDLCMU press statement, “「香港迪士尼樂園職工會」正式成立,” HKDLCMU website, <http://www.hkdldcmunion.org/?p=12> (5 November 2006); “迪士尼百四員工投訴做到殘,” 23 September 2005, *Oriental Daily*, A34; “人手緊絀工時過長編更混亂 迪士尼員工吐苦水起離心,” 23 September 2005, *The Sun*, A22; “稱早上 10 時吃

午飯一直工作至晚上 迪士尼員工二手飯充飢,” 23 September 2005, *Apple Daily*, A10; “迪士尼苛政恐釀辭工潮,” 23 September 2005, *Sing Tao Daily*, A25; “迪士尼員工投訴工時過長,” 23 September 2005, *Wen Wei Po*, A22; “樂園員工投訴逾 140 宗,” 23 September 2005, *Hong Kong Daily News*, A10; “迪士尼員工投訴達 140 宗,” 23 September 2005, *Sing Pao*, A09.

²⁵ Hong Kong Disneyland, *Hong Kong Disneyland: Join Us and Become Part of the Magic!* (Hong Kong: HKDL, 2005), p. 8.

²⁶ Thomas W. P. Wong, “Personal Experience and Social Ideology: Thematization and Theorization in Social Indicators Studies,” in *Indicators of Social Development: Hong Kong 1990*, edited by Lau and others (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1990), p. 231. In another piece of research, Wong finds that Hong Kong people’s belief in meritocracy is quite strong and that the work-is-rewarded theme “is both a recognition of, and an impetus to, these success stories.” Thomas W. P. Wong and David A. Levin, “The Social Structure,” in *The Business Environment in Hong Kong* (Third Edition), edited by Lethbridge and Ng (New York: Oxford, 1995), p. 54.

²⁷ Hong Kong Disneyland, *Hong Kong Disneyland: Join Us and Become Part of the Magic!* (Hong Kong: HKDL, 2005), p. 8.

²⁸ After several months of negotiations, press conferences, and a protest petition from character performers, character performers, with the help of the labor union, received an 11-percent pay raise, from \$9,000 to \$10,000, starting in June, 2006. At my time of writing, there was still a \$1,000 salary difference between character performers and show performers. “工會努力爭取改善 · 迪士尼積極回應,” Hong Kong Disneyland Cast Members’ Union press release on 20 May 2006, <http://www.hkdclmunion.org/?p=55> (accessed 9 November 2006); “Pay rise for Mickey & Co a happy result all round,” 21 May 2006, *South China Morning Post*, EDT10; Simon Parry, “Disney costume workers get \$1,000 pay rise,” 21 May 2006, *South China Morning Post*, EDT2.

²⁹ In every attraction, the Lead is the one to arrange hosts’ execution of different tasks: greetings, monitoring of onstage lines, ensuring that the fastpass machine is in order, ushering crowds into ride vehicles or theaters, and spieling. Tomorrowland has twelve instead of eight Leads because the managers said they have two new attractions, *Autopia* and *Stitch Encounter*; popular existing rides were *Space Mountain* and *Buzz Lightyear Astro Blasters*. However, workers from Fantasyland found the management practices unfair because Fantasyland had the most rides in the park, and *The Many Adventures of Winnie the Pooh* was very popular, too.

³⁰ There are three big teams inside “Park Operations”: (1) Guest Relations, Main Entrance, and Resort and Transport, (2) Fantasyland and Adventureland, and (3) Main Street U.S.A. and Tomorrowland. In total, there are twenty GSMs, but only three went to Orlando for training.

³¹ According to my HKDL worker-respondents, in HKDL, management can dismiss a staff member after he or she receives two written warnings. However, the standards that govern mid-level managers’ issuing of warnings differ from one

manager to the next: some managers are lenient on staff members who are late by three to five minutes, whereas some managers can be very strict with a staffer who is late by only one minute; and yet again, some managers have double standards for the same behavior performed by different staff members: one may receive a pat on the back; the other may receive a written warning.

³² The sick-leave lists became another source of negative news for HKDL. This issue received news coverage in mid-February 2006. Anita Lam, "Sick-leave lists could backfire on Disney," 11 February 2006, *South China Morning Post*, City 1; "迪士尼涉歧視請病假員工," 11 February 2006, *Apple Daily*, A12; "工會指迪士尼涉殘疾歧視," 11 February 2006, *Oriental Daily*, A18.

³³ Workers' comments on HKDL's contradictory management practices appear in both my interviews and news reports. Wendy Leung, "Disney staff in row with supervisors," 30 November 2005, *Hong Kong Standard*, A11; "稍有不從厲聲喝斥 員工投訴：上層要求嚴苛," 12 October 2005, *Sing Tao Daily*, A02; "大劈炮員工插爆迪士尼：遊客屎尿!" *Easyfinder*, no. 712, 14 September 2005, EF036.

³⁴ Annie, as discussed in chapter Four, is another cultural representative whom I met in September 2006. I made her acquaintance about six months after Annie had quit her HKDL job. After the interview, Annie left Hong Kong, and we wrote each other through e-mail to keep in touch.

³⁵ James L. Watson, "Introduction: Transnationalism, Localization, and Fast Foods in East Asia" in *Golden Arches East: McDonald's in East Asia*, edited by Watson (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1997), p. 27.

³⁶ Service management theory emphasizes that if the employee and the customer have similar expectations regarding both the order of events and the way in which each party should behave, then a "stronger standardized and well-rehearsed script" results. If the consumer is unfamiliar with the expected script, interferences may ensue. Mary Jo Bitner, Bernard H. Booms, and Lois A. Mohr, "Critical service encounters: the employee's viewpoint," in *Services Marketing: A European Perspective*, edited by Lovelock, Vandermerwe, and Lewis (London: Prentice Hall, 1999), p. 80.

³⁷ Government Information Centre (HKSAR Government), "Disney and HKSAR Government Announce Hong Kong Disneyland Opening Day (Special New Family Entertainment Revealed)," press Release, 23 November 2004, http://www.hketo.ca/news/pages/Nov-23-2004_dis.html (accessed 6 November 2006).

³⁸ My respondents said that Mainland customers are better than Hong Kong customers in the way that Mainlanders listen to a skipper's spiel and immerse themselves in the fantasy world; whereas Hong Kong customers focus only on the degree of fakeness.

³⁹ "「香港迪士尼樂園職工會」正式成立," Confederation of Trade Unions press release, 29 November 2005, <http://www.hkctu.org.hk/contentr.php?orgtopicid=508> (accessed 4 November 2006).

⁴⁰ One of my interviewees said that her division managers were good and that,

within a few months of HKDL's opening, the managers' workers got one fifteen-minute break for every two hours worked. And she stated that she had not experienced chaotic shift duties. However, the labor union representative Elaine Hui said that the above problems were endemic throughout HKDL management.

⁴¹ My fieldwork visit to the HKDL backstage area revealed that not every job inside HKDL was toilsome—that some jobs and some environments are worse than others. Staff members who are responsible for operating or performing shows such as *Festival of the Lion King*, *The Golden Mickeys*, and *Stitch Encounter* do not need to work continuously as do operation staffers in other attractions. Because there are about four to six shows a day, after finishing the show, frontline operation staff stay in their break rooms or control rooms, sleeping, playing computer games, playing cards, watching TV, or talking with friends on phones.

⁴² The negotiation power of union representatives in the United States is larger than that of HKDLCMU because the US Disney union is an independent panel made up of Disney management and the US Disney union, whereas there is only a consultation board at HKDL. In Hong Kong, HKSAR labor laws do not grant labor unions including HKDLCMU the lawful right of collective negotiation. Staff members express their reservations and suspicions regarding the labor union in the HKDLCMU forum. “各位 cast member,” in HKDLCMU forum, with send DL. Free-Talk, <http://www.hkdldcmunion.org/forum/viewtopic.php?t=3> (accessed 4 November 2006).

⁴³ HKDL management said in its Cast Forum that as recently as March 2006, “90 percent of Cast Members who worked at HKDL during the Grand Opening are still with us.” News reported that the retention rate dropped from 90% to 80% during March and August 2006. However, 80 or 90% of the retention rate is not equal to 10 or 20% of the turnover rate, because an 80% retention rate means that 80% of the *posts* are retained: the remaining 20% of the posts, such as the character performer post, the merchandise post, and the park operation post, can experience repeated turnover. According to *The Hong Kong Economic Times*, 80 to 90% of Cultural Representatives left HKDL in one year. Hong Kong Disneyland, Hong Kong Disneyland Cast Forum (Hong Kong: 2006), p. 4; “不足一年千人離職 迪士尼員工劈炮率倍增,” 26 August 2006, *Apple Daily*, A17; 黃勁文, “迪士尼 500 文化大使 9 成離職 夢想破滅承諾未兌現 樂園：無收投訴,” 12 September 2006, *Hong Kong Economic Times*, A28.

⁴⁴ In Fantasyland, for example, many new frontline workers are graduates from vocational schools. They applied for an HKDL job because they thought that working inside HKDL would be fun. After experiencing all the physical and mental hardship that comes with the job, many frontline service workers decided to leave HKDL as soon as another job offer came in.

⁴⁵ “保安部西西主管遂個數,” HKDLCMU forum, <http://www.hkdldcmunion.org/forum/viewtopic.php?t=384&postdays=0&postorder=asc&start=0> (accessed 8 November 2006).

⁴⁶ John Van Maanen, “The Smile Factory: Work at Disneyland,” in *Reframing Organizational Culture*, edited by Frost and others (Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications, 1991), p. 72.

⁴⁷ Starting in September 2006, many HKDL workers who work for a year receive a 2 to 5% pay raise. “開幕前入職員工大部分加薪 2%至 5% 迪士尼留職率約八成,” 26 August 2006, *Sing Pao*, A10.

⁴⁸ In the website about secrets and fun facts of Disneyland Paris, a staff member who worked in both Orlando and Paris said that in the training session “Disney Traditions,” her instructor “told us, ‘If you don’t feel like smiling, don’t’.” <http://www.oitc.com/Disney/Paris/English/Secrets.html> (accessed 7 November 2006).

⁴⁹ Simon Parry, “Defiant Disneyland puts shark’s fin on the menu,” 23 May 2005, *South China Morning Post*, EDT1.

⁵⁰ “End this ‘barbaric and cruel waste’,” 31 May 2005, *Hong Kong Standard*, A13.

⁵¹ Simon Parry, “Student activists first to hear Disney U-turn,” 27 June 2005, *South China Morning Post*, EDT3.

⁵² Chester Yung and Teddy Ng, “Disney ditches shark’s fin,” 25 June 2005, *Hong Kong Standard*, A08; Simon Parry, “Shark’s fin off the menu for Disney,” 25 June 2005, *South China Morning Post*, EDT1; Simon Parry, “Student activists first to hear Disney U-turn,” 27 June 2005, *South China Morning Post*, EDT3.

⁵³ “Introduction to SACOM,” <http://www.sacom.org.hk/> (accessed 11 May 2006).

⁵⁴ Richard Appelbaum and Peter Dreier, “The Campus Anti-sweatshop Movement,” in *Cultural Studies: From Theory to Action*, edited by Leistyana (Malden, Oxford: Blackwell publishing, 2005), p. 133.

⁵⁵ Students and Scholars Against Corporate Misbehavior (SACOM), “Looking for Mickey Mouse’s Conscience: A Survey of the Working Conditions of Disney Factories in China,” (Hong Kong, 12 August 2005), http://www.nlcnet.org/news/china/pdfs/SACOM_Report.pdf (accessed 9 November 2006), p. 9.

⁵⁶ The eleven-minute video footage of *Those with Justice* has been put on web, http://www.nlcnet.org/resources/VIDEO/china_video.shtml (accessed 11 January 2007).

⁵⁷ Roben Farzad, “Group calls Disney site sweatshop,” 19 August 2005, *The International Herald Tribune*, <http://www.ihf.com/articles/2005/08/19/business/disney.php> (accessed 18 November 2006).

⁵⁸ Laura M. Holson and Roben Farzad, “Disney Adds a Qualifier for Serving on Its Board,” 20 August 2005, *The New York Times*, <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/19/business/media/19disney.html?ex=1147665600&en=427df935b5091afe&ei=5070> (accessed 18 November 2006).

⁵⁹ “Disney to Investigate Sweatshop Claims,” 19 August 2005, *Fox News*, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,166220,00.html> (accessed 18 November 2006).

⁶⁰ “Disney probes China labor claims,” 19 August 2005, *BBC News*, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4165654.stm> (accessed 18 November 2006).

⁶¹ Lynne Duke, "The Man Who Made Kathie Lee Cry," 31 July 2005, *Washington Post*, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/30/AR2005073001413.html> (accessed 18 November 2006).

⁶² "Chinese factories supplying to Hong Kong Disneyland exploiting workers," 19 August 2005, *Forbes*, <http://www.forbes.com/business/feeds/afx/2005/08/19/afx2185802.html> (accessed 18 November 2006).

⁶³ David Teather, "Disney accused of labour abuses in Chinese factories," 19 August 2005, *The Guardian*, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/story/0,3604,1552932,00.html> (accessed 18 November 2006).

⁶⁴ "Disney sweatshops alleged," 18 August 2005, *CNN Money*, (US) http://money.cnn.com/2005/08/18/news/international/disney_china/index.htm?section=money_latest (accessed 18 November 2006).

⁶⁵ "Disney looking at Chinese labor claims," 19 August 2005, *Bizjournals* (LA), <http://losangeles.bizjournals.com/losangeles/stories/2005/08/15/daily41.html>; Jego R. Armstrong, "Disney books tagged with sweatshop label," 19 August 2005, *New York Daily News*, <http://www.nydailynews.com/news/local/story/338674p-289201c.html>; "Disney inquiry on 'sweatshop' claims," 19 August 2005, *Evening Standard*, http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/news/article.html?in_article_id=403083&in_page_id=2 (accessed 6 May 2007).

⁶⁶ Krista-Ann Staley, "Disney investigates Hong Kong labor abuse allegations," 19 August 2005, Jurist Legal News and Research, <http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2005/08/disney-investigates-hong-kong-labor.php> (accessed 14 May 2006).

⁶⁷ To SACOM, this was a setback because SACOM does not want Disney to stop its business with these problematic suppliers: if the business were to cease, so too would the livelihood of the suppliers' most vulnerable workers. After several meetings with Disney representative from the regional office, SACOM spokesperson Vivien Tze said that these meetings accomplished little afterward.

⁶⁸ Elspeth Probyn, "New Traditionalism and Post-Feminism: TV does the Home," in *Feminist Television Criticism: A Reader*, edited by Brunsdon, Acci, and Spigel (Oxford: Clarendon Press), p. 131.

⁶⁹ Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 214.

⁷⁰ George Yúdice, *The Expediency of Culture: Uses of Culture in the Global Era* (Durham, London: Duke University Press, 2003), p. 169.

⁷¹ Yúdice, *The Expediency of Culture*, p. 180.

⁷² Jay R. Mandle, *Globalization and the Poor* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), chapter 7. Not all scholars believe that the anti-sweatshop movement's

goal is to alleviate poverty. Mandle argues that the problem of impoverished clothing workers in the third world should not be reduced to entrepreneurial greed. He further argues that, if a nation allows collective bargaining and if there is an enforced international agreement regarding union rights, then the liberalization of markets may lead to the creation of jobs instead of to income disparity.

⁷³ “Workplace code of conduct,” from Fair Labor Association website, <http://www.fairlabor.org/all/code/index.html> (accessed 13 November 2006).

Although garment firms control both most of the Apparel Industry Partnership’s seats (AIP) and the board’s decision-making, Fair Labor Association member companies agreed to ban forced labor, to ban child labor, to prohibit harassment or abuse, and to respect employees’ freedom of association and collective bargaining.

⁷⁴ Faith-based institutional investors such as religious communities, pension funds, endowments, hospital corporations, economic development funds, asset management companies, unions, and colleges group together and press big companies to be socially and environmentally responsible. At the 2006 shareholder meeting, the New York City Employees Retirement System, acting as shareholders, requested that Disney “review and report to shareholders by September 2006, on the adherence of Disney’s suppliers in China to Disney’s corporate code of conduct, to the provisions of the Chinese government’s Labor Law, and to the core conventions of the International Labor Organization (ILO). This report should be prepared at reasonable expense and contain no proprietary information.” New York City Employees Retirement System, “Labor Standards – China 2006 – Disney (Aalt) Company / ABC,”

http://www.iccr.org/shareholder/proxy_book06/MEMBER%20INITIATED/LABORSTANDCHINA_DISNEYDRAFT.HTM (accessed 16 May 2005).

⁷⁵ There is a long historical involvement of churches in Hong Kong society. The Church had a leading role in providing social services such as building schools and hospitals for the poor and sick. In the seventies, some churches were involved in various social issues, including workers’ rights (Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee was founded in 1968 to promote workers’ rights) and housing issues (such as the Yaumatei resettlement movement in 1970s for providing housing for boat residents). See Linda Butenhoff, *Social Movements and Political Reform in Hong Kong* (Westport, London: Praeger, 1999), chapter Five.

⁷⁶ Richard Appelbaum and Peter Dreier, “The Campus Anti-sweatshop Movement,” in *Cultural Studies: From Theory to Action*, edited by Leistyna (Malden, Oxford: Blackwell publishing, 2005), p. 137.

⁷⁷ 葉蔭聰 and 施鵬翔, *迪士尼不是樂園* (香港: 進一步多媒體有限公司, 1999).

⁷⁸ Most members participate in different student organizations and pressure groups: some members occupied executive positions in the Hong Kong Federation of Catholic Students (which has a long local history as a pressure group demanding social justice), the Hong Kong Federation of Students, the People’s Panel on West Kowloon, university student unions, university working-class concern groups, and university environmental concern groups.

⁷⁹ Disney Hunter resists Disney insofar as Disney is a transnational corporation that oppresses workers and that culturally dominates the globe including one’s place in

the natural landscape. Disney Hunter also criticizes the HKSAR government's authoritarian governance and condemns the establishment of Hong Kong Disneyland as a sign of cronyism.

⁸⁰ On the Disney Hunter message board, some people ask Disney Hunter to fold and argue that the park is very good (#221 message); some argue against HKDL's labor exploitation (#222, #214-7); some found that Disney is not worse than other companies (#206), and so on. For details, see the Disney Hunter message board, <http://personal.ie.cuhk.edu.hk/~clmak4/DISNEYHUNTER/guest/index.php?page=23&PHPSESSID=a5092266a2d3370d61444c0224258f81> (accessed 22 May 2006).

⁸¹ It was I who sent tapes to TVB News that night. Before I sent them the tapes, different reporters or camera persons asked me the same question: "is the conflict violent?" And the tape showing Disney security guards using barricades to crush students has not been shown.

⁸² Before joining the local anti-Disney group Disney Hunter, which was established in June 2005, Susanna was the executive member of the Hong Kong Federation of Catholic Students and an active member in a university labor concern group. I interviewed Susanna in February 2006. In the interview, I asked Susanna why she had joined Disney Hunter and what student and social movements she had participated in before joining Disney Hunter. Since Susanna had quite a lot of Disney merchandise, in the interview, I asked her which Disney characters were her favorites and why she loved them. I also asked her whether or not, since joining Disney Hunter, she had changed her views on Disney and her Disney-related consumption acts. With permission, I use Susanna's real name instead of a pseudonym in this thesis.

⁸³ I interviewed Billy in February 2006. During that year, Billy was an acting chairperson of the Hong Kong Federation of Students Resources Committee and a university student-union representative. As I did with Susanna, I asked Billy about his reasons for joining Disney Hunter, about his social-movement experiences, and about whether or not, after joining Disney Hunter, he had changed his views on Disney and on Disney characters. With permission, I use Billy's real name instead of a pseudonym in this thesis.

⁸⁴ 洗韻姬, "「獵奇行動」七一上街反迪士尼," 25 June 2005, *Hong Kong Economic Times*, A22.

⁸⁵ John Ap, "Residents have mixed opinions towards Hong Kong Disneyland," press embargo (Hong Kong, 4 April 2006); "七成人對迪士尼印象差 五名市民遊園一人不滿意," 5 April 2006, *Sing Pao*, A11; "市民對迪士尼印象轉差," 5 April 2006, *Hong Kong Daily News*, A07; "九成市民指 迪士尼要增溝通," 5 April 2006, *Singtao Daily*, A08; "迪士尼開業半年 七成人指形象變差," 5 April 2006, *Ming Pao Daily News*, A14; May Chan, "Disneyland's image has soured since its opening," 5 April 2006, *South China Morning Post*, City 3.

⁸⁶ 黃勁文, "迪士尼日 1.4 萬人 遜預期 董事局研加獨立人士 增透明度," 29 November 2005, *HK Economic Times*, A36.

⁸⁷ Disney Parks and Resorts chairman Jay Rasulo announced the figure. See Wendy

Leung, "Disney claims million mark," 25 November 2005, *Hong Kong Standard*, Front page, A01, A11. "首期工程有餘款：迪士尼擴建毋須再注資," 28 November 2005, *Ming Pao Daily News*, A 12; "羅彬深承認內地客較預期少，故稍後會再到上海及北京催谷," 25 November 2005, *HK Economic Times*, A24.

⁸⁸ Zygmunt Bauman, *Work, Consumerism, and the New Poor* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998), p. 31.

⁸⁹ "Americanism" was mentioned by my respondents—but not by me—in our interviews.

⁹⁰ Néstor García Canclini, *Consumers and Citizens: Globalization and Multicultural Conflicts* (Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 2001); George Yúdice, *The Expediency of Culture: Uses of Culture in the Global Era* (Durham, London: Duke University Press, 2003); Nick Stevenson, *Cultural Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Questions* (Maidenhead, England: Open University Press, 2003).

⁹¹ Eric Arnould, "Daring Consumer-oriented Ethnography," in *Representing Consumers: Voices, Views, and Visions*, edited by Stern (London, NY: Routledge, 1998); Daniel Miller, "Consumption and Its Consequences," in *Consumption and Everyday Life*, edited by Mackay (London: Sage, 1997); Rob Shields, "Spaces for the Subject of Consumption," in *Lifestyle Shopping: The Subject of Consumption*, edited by Shields (London, New York: Routledge, 1992).

⁹² Matthew Hilton and Martin Daunton, "Material Politics: An Introduction," in *The Politics of Consumption: Material Culture and Citizenship in Europe and America*, edited by Hilton and Daunton (Oxford, New York: Berg, 2001), p. 2.

⁹³ Umberto Eco, *Travels in Hyper Reality: Essays* (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986), p. 48.

⁹⁴ Alan Bryman, "The Disneyization of Society," *Sociological Review* 47, issue 1 (1999) pp. 25-47; Alan Bryman, *The Disneyization of Society* (London, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publishers, 2004), p. 158. I discussed Bryman's ideas in chapter Two. For details, please see pp. 66-9.

⁹⁵ Agnes was twenty-seven years old in 2006 and has been my friend. Among Disney characters, Agnes loves Winnie the Pooh the most. Because I knew that Agnes was a Winnie the Pooh fan and because every time I saw her, she had some new Pooh merchandise around her (a key holder, a cell phone holder, a wallet, a watch, a cell phone), I invited her to be my interviewee, and she kindly accepted my offer. I made a home visit in March 2006 and found that Agnes' apartment was decorated as a Pooh apartment: I could find Pooh products in every corner of her apartment: carpets, curtains, figurines, snowglobes, house utensils, and other aspects of the apartment were Pooh-related. The name Agnes is a pseudonym.

⁹⁶ Katie was forty years old in 2006, and I had not known Katie before my research. Katie was a Donald Duck fan. Unlike Agnes, Katie did not use all things Donald. However, Katie's Donald collections were so enormous that a local magazine interviewed her about her collection. She had many Donald plush dolls, a Donald figurine by Armani, Wedgwood handmade Disney china bone tableware, and even a fine-art painting of Disney. I interviewed Katie and asked her about her views on

HKDL. The name Katie is a pseudonym.

⁹⁷ Jean Baudrillard, *Simulacra and Simulation (The Body, in Theory: Histories of Cultural Materialism)* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), p. 66, author's emphasis.

⁹⁸ Jean Baudrillard, *The Consumer Society: Myths and Structures* (London: Sage, 1998), p. 80.

⁹⁹ Wendy Leung, "Disney 'yes' to extended hours drive," 8 September 2005, *The Standard*, A10.

¹⁰⁰ Starting in the 1950s, Disneyland and Walt Disney World referred to rides that were the most thrilling of all as E ticket ride. E ticket rides were also the most expensive and the most popular rides inside Disney parks.

¹⁰¹ The loading and the uploading of the ride Space Mountain roller coaster, for example, must be completed within twenty-two seconds or the ride will be suspended. Dennis Eng, "Disney visitors may face long waiting times," 9 September 2005, *South China Morning Post*, EDT3.

¹⁰² "Destination of dreams," Hong Kong Disneyland website, http://park.hongkongdisneyland.com/hkdl/en_US/parks/overview?name=ParkOverviewPage (accessed 21 May 2006).

¹⁰³ "議員憂大嶼山治安惡化," 28 October 2006, *Ming Pao Daily News*, L03.

¹⁰⁴ "迪士尼首個中秋釀打鬥 遊園客指欠節日氣氛睹爭執感掃興," 19 September 2005, *Ming Pao Daily News*, A04; "迪園表演 清場頻惹嘔聲 機動遊戲「如常」故障 爭位推撞累及觀眾," 19 September 2005, *Wen Wei Pao*, A05; May Chan and Agnes Lam, "Disney in holiday swing but visitors are in short supply," 19 September 2005, *South China Morning Post*, EDT3.

¹⁰⁵ "「夏日通行證」 谷客谷出禍迪士尼變扒手樂園," 14 August 2006, *Sing Pao*, A01.

¹⁰⁶ Shunya Yoshimi, "The Politics of Disneyland: Tokyo Disneyland and Commercial Culture in Contemporary Japan," paper read at a conference in Mexico (1993), p. 19.

¹⁰⁷ John Hench, interview by Jay Horan, 3 December 1982, transcript, WDA, p. 39; quoted from John M. Findlay, *Magic Lands: Western Cityscapes and American Culture after 1940* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p. 67.

¹⁰⁸ Tony Bennett, *Culture: A Reformer's Science* (London, Thousand Oaks: Sage publications, 1998), p. 177.

¹⁰⁹ Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. xiv. Further references are in parentheses in the text.

¹¹⁰ As discussed in chapter Six, Dr Sarah Liao, the Secretary for the environment, transport and work, said "TWDC [The Walt Disney Company] undertook the planning of all facilities in the HKD [Hong Kong Disneyland]." *Hong Kong Hansard*, 30 November 2005, <http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/counmtg/hansard/cm1130ti-translate-e.pdf> (accessed 7 October 2006), p.

62 in PDF file, p. 2505 in *Hong Kong Hansard*.

¹¹¹ Sharon Kinsella, "Cuties in Japan," in *Women, Media, and Consumption in Japan*, edited by Skov and Moeran (Surrey: Curzon Press, 1995), p. 242 and p. 251.

¹¹² Mark Poster, *Cultural History and Postmodernity: Disciplinary Readings and Challenges* (NY: Columbia University Press, 1997), p. 125.

¹¹³ Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 32.

¹¹⁴ Bennett, *Culture: A Reformer's Science*, p. 169.

¹¹⁵ Hong Kong Disneyland, "Park Rules & Regulations," in *Guidemap: Autopia*, Summer (2006).

¹¹⁶ Dennis Eng, "Mickey and friends call for a better work environment," 10 April 2006, *South China Morning Post*, CITY3; Simon Parry, "Revolt in the Magic Kingdom," 23 April 2006, *South China Morning Post*, EDT15.

¹¹⁷ Simon Parry, "Disney staff weigh costumed protest," 23 April 2006, *South China Morning Post*, EDT4.

¹¹⁸ During June and September, performers can have a forty-minute break instead of a thirty-minute break, in line with the practice in overseas parks. Simon Parry, "Disney costume workers get \$1,000 pay rise," 21 May 2006, *South China Morning Post*, EDT2; "Pay rise for Mickey & Co a happy result all round," 21 May 2006, *South China Morning Post*, EDT 10; HKDLCMU press statement on the change in working conditions of HKDL character performers, "工會努力爭取改善 · 迪士尼積極回應," 20 May 2006, <http://www.hkd lcmunion.org/?p=55> (accessed 18 November 2006).

¹¹⁹ Doreen Massey, *Space, Place, and Gender* (Cambridge: Polity press, 1994), p. 131.

¹²⁰ Dennis Eng, "Disney chiefs will not ask taxpayers to foot bill for park expansion," 10 May 2007, *South China Morning Post*, CITY4.

¹²¹ Benjamin Scent, "Disney facing finance poser," 10 May 2007, *Hong Kong Standard*, A03.

¹²² Scent, "Disney facing finance poser."

¹²³ 吳雋妍, "逾 250 億備用貸款今年九月檢討 迪士尼虧蝕港府無意注資," 10 May 2007, *Sing Tao Daily*, A08.

¹²⁴ It is an improvisation of Baudrillard's words, "The mass knows that it knows nothing, and it does not want to know. The mass knows that it can do nothing, and it does not want to achieve anything." From Jean Baudrillard, "The Masses: The Implosion of the Social in the Media," in Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings, edited by Poster (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), p. 216.

¹²⁵ Nick Stevenson, *Cultural Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Questions* (Berkshire, English: Open University Press, 2003), p. 135.

Chapter Eight

Remade in Hong Kong: Our Place, Our Park

When I started this Disney research in October 2001, I was not hostile to Disney offerings; rather, my most favorite character was (and still is) Winnie the Pooh, and in the 1990s, I enjoyed watching Disney movies (in particular, *Beauty and the Beast* and *Pocahontas*, as well as the contemporary version of Cinderella, *Pretty Woman*). Believing that every cultural text is polysemic in nature and that audiences interpret and use a particular text in their own ways, I started this research by studying not Disney's global media domination but how local parents consume and use Disney products in a domestic context. In my first post-graduate presentation in January 2003, I discussed how Disney attempted to insert itself into local rituals through its Christmas functions (as discussed in chapter Five), and how local families' practices de-commodified Disney commercial culture. In the question-and-answer session, one member of the teaching staff in the Department of Cultural Studies, Ip Iam Chong (who had co-edited the Chinese book *Disney Is Not a Happy Land* in 1999), asked me why I did not discuss any issues concerning the HKDL project. I still remember my answer at that time: "I'm just not prepared for it. It's not the right time for me, but I will examine the HKDL project soon."

I must admit that after over one year's part-time study, I was still "not prepared" to examine the HKDL project critically. Although I did not think that Disney belonged to my generation (I had grown up with Japanese animated cartoons, Japanese comics, and Hong Kong TV dramas and movies), I resisted studying how popular culture—including Disneyland, as I had visited Anaheim Disneyland, Disneyland Paris, and Tokyo Disneyland before starting this study—

dumbs down a people (including me). However, cultural studies (in particular, studies that attack the “consumption-is-passive-and-disempowering” line) and recent globalization studies (emphasizing cultural flows instead of domination and homogenization) seemed to provide me with legitimate approaches to Disney: approaches that did not deny me my own pleasures and my own agency in using popular cultural texts.

However, the more I studied *real* world cases (especially the Orlando case) about how Disney’s private corporate practices have negatively affected the public domain, the more I began to realize that the study of popular culture should not restrict itself to the study of the production, the circulation, and the usage of popular cultural texts: these studies should also address matters of politics—in this case, how corporate practices affect civil society. In my research on Disney, I should study not only Disney offerings but also how Disney’s corporate practices, under specific Hong Kong conditions and in Hong Kong political and institutional contexts, sometimes articulate and sometimes challenge Hong Kong society, and how Hong Kong people perceive, interpret, and react to (appropriate, negotiate, and challenge) these Disney practices.

Doreen Massey’s concepts of space-time and of a simultaneous multiplicity of spaces affected the way I examined Disney power. Her concept of space-time asks researchers to examine the spatial production of social effects and history. Accordingly, the Disney space in Hong Kong is not static and researchers should study Disney power in *process*. Furthermore, Massey’s concept of a multiplicity of spaces challenged me to look at Disney spaces in a plural sense, because Disney has many facets (as entertainment provider, as employer, as cultural marker) and because different local actors (as consumers, as workers, as seekers for distinction)

occupy different social-spatial relationships with Disney. By integrating ethnographic research in my study of how various locals (government, media, parents, HKDL cultural-representatives, Disney employees in general) use Disney in their specific conditions, I not only challenge the concept of a “global-local” dichotomy but also study how locals *use* Disney and HKDL to develop their own notions of self, identity, and place.

In the following, I once again appropriate Massey’s concepts of space-time and of a multiplicity of spaces to conclude my research on three aspects in particular. The first aspect is the changing social-spatial relationship between Hong Kong people and Disney between 1999 and 2007: between 1999 and mid-2005, Disney articulated the HKSAR government’s desire and many Hong Kong people’s desire to distinguish Hong Kong from other cities, especially Chinese cities. However, since mid-2005, Disney has tended to negotiate with and sometimes to live in tension with Hong Kong people. Second, rather than examine the Hong Kong-Disney encounter in a general framework of cultural globalization, I examine the Hong Kong-Disney relationship in a more specific sense. That is, I review how the multiple spaces that Disney occupies in Hong Kong (spaces such as entertainment and consumption-goods provider, as media corporation, as global employer, and as American cultural babysitter) interact with Hong Kong people’s consumption behavior, work-services culture, media practices, and the larger idea of local, national, and cosmopolitan culture. These encounters suggest that HKDL, to a certain degree, has indeed become a local theme park that reflects Hong Kong’s cultural specificity; whereas Hong Kong people’s consumption behavior, work-service practices, media practices, and larger cultural bearings have not correspondingly undergone a significant change. In the third and final section, I

evaluate the effects that Hong Kong people's uses of HKDL have had on Hong Kong's limited development of a more participatory community and on Hong Kong's prospects for a more participatory political culture.

Remade in Hong Kong: The HK-Disney relationship, HKDL, and HK culture

Over time, changes in the relative power dynamics between Hong Kong and Disney have developed within the wider, and also changing, Hong Kong-Disney relationship. In 1999, even though many newspapers commented that the HKSAR government-Disney deal regarding HKDL was non-transparent, and even though some newspapers labeled the deal unfair, HKDL won considerable public support in Hong Kong. I have argued that this support resulted from Disneyland's self-representation as "the happiest place in the world" and as a boon for Hong Kong's cosmopolitan image and for Hong Kong's tourist economy. The utopian appeal that the HKDL project created for Hong Kong people hinged on a promise of globalness plus happiness, a globalness plus cosmopolitan aspirations, and a globalness plus economic development.

In 1999, the HKSAR government used the Hong Kong people's fear of disappearance and their desire for cosmopolitanism in order to earn public support for its HKDL joint-venture with Disney. Hong Kong's local press supported the deal because of the local economic downturn, because Hong Kong and Shanghai were competing with each other for the right to host Disneyland, and because Hong Kong was competing for economic power, in general, with other Chinese cities, with Singapore, and with Taipei. Many of my respondents supported the HKDL project not just because of the government's economic promise but also because Disney's investment in Hong Kong signaled the maintenance and even the re-

establishment of the *city* status of Hong Kong as a *cosmopolitan* city after the Asian financial crisis and Hong Kong's economic downturn.

On a more personal level, globalization encourages some Hong Kong middle class youth and middle-aged parents to aspire not simply to acquire modernized Western consumer products but also Western- and Chinese-language skills and cultural sensitivity so that these Hong Kong people might better “survive” in their locality, as well as in the world. In my interview process, I found that many respondents, in fact, revealed no “Hong Kong supremacist” local consciousness; instead, they considered themselves to be victims of a “Hong Kong-lack”: a lack of English-language skills and of *Putonghua*-language skills, a lack of exposure to foreign culture, a lack of “world” visions, and thus a lack of competitiveness and of job opportunities. My respondents tried to acquire and to possess different kinds of cosmopolitan sensitivities by participating in exchange programs such as Disney's international program and by undertaking English-language studies with the aid of such materials as *Disney's World of English* educational kits. Their perception of the globalization process as inter-city competition reinforced their desire to connect with the culturally and economically powerful Disney. In other words, the cultural and economic power of Disney articulated my respondents' desires to be cosmopolitan in a global economy.

In mid 2005, as the opening date of HKDL was approaching, many Hong Kong people realized that their views on Disney were in need of a reality check. HKDL, after all, is a theme park for entertainment. However, HKDL is the smallest Disney park and provides the fewest rides among all Disney parks in the world. The HKSAR government initially expected that the HKDL project would bring Hong Kong not only the “hardware,” the actual Disney theme park, but also the

“software,” Disney’s famed and branded management philosophy and management practices. However, it seems that, to a large extent, HKDL has not “upgraded” Hong Kong service standards to the level of Disneyfied services; indeed, the local labor union and the media criticized HKDL management as an exploiter of workers. Furthermore, despite maintaining Disney Realism, HKDL’s non-transparent media policy and HKDL’s slow media response created a tense relationship between HKDL management and media practitioners. In 2005, local media turned the local millennium Disney dream (globalness plus happiness, globalness plus wealth, and globalness plus fame) into “Americanism” and “Hong Kong shame.” In summary, HKDL’s settlement process shows that local-Disney power has relied less and less on articulation and more and more on negotiation and on domestication, although always in tension with each other.

To delineate the aforementioned multiple local-global encounters, I would also like to ask what particular aspects of Hong Kong people’s cultural practices may have domesticated particular Disney practices, and whether Disney corporate practices have, conversely, Disneyfied some of Hong Kong people’s specific cultural practices; and whether, also, some specific Disney corporate practices and Hong Kong people’s cultural practices have escaped change and, yet, live in tension together. I focus my closing examination here on three levels of analysis: consumption, work, and ideology.

At the level of consumption, I will argue that, on the surface, Disney has localized HKDL but that Disney’s main aim for profit maximization has not changed. However, while Disney is famous for luring visitors into pronounced spending patterns, HKDL has not “Disneyfied” Hong Kong visitors in the sense that it has not successfully encouraged them to engage in excessive spending.

Moreover, Hong Kong people's prejudicial and exclusionary practices have also changed and remade the park atmosphere. At the level of work (specifically service-labor and management practices) I argue that neither has Disney successfully Disneyfied HKDL service culture nor have local media accepted Disney's corporate practice of Disney Realism. At the third level, the ideology level, I argue that Hong Kong people's encounter with Disney, the American cultural babysitter, has aroused not their national sentiments but their various cosmopolitan aspirations.

Before delving deeper into the discussion, I would like to stress once again that, as Massey's concept of "a multiplicity of spaces" suggests, each level (consumption, work, and ideology) involves various particular groups, and because of these different social groups' different structural positions, their responses toward the multifaceted Disney are necessarily different. In other words, different local respondents direct various and sometimes even contradictory responses toward the same global corporation, Disney.

Consumption

At the level of consumption, I argue that if Disney Imagineers localized the design of HKDL, the design's aim would be to lure park visitors into conspicuous spending patterns. However, Disney, despite its dominant position in the children's consumer market, its massive advertising, and its fame, has failed to successfully Disneyfy Hong Kong people's consumption behavior, to turn them into great spenders; rather, Hong Kong people "Hong Kongized" Disney offerings by practicing both their money-saving strategies and (in the "happiest place in the world") their exclusionary cultural practices toward Mainland visitors.

As a global corporation, Disney aims at maximizing profits and making consumers consume. Since 2001, Disney has been applying its synergistic marketing policies to Hong Kong. To boost its local image and to insert itself into local rituals, Disney placed its icons in major local celebrations, including those for the Lunar New Year, for Christmas, and for the mid-Autumn festival. As for HKDL, in 2001, Disney conducted research whose findings showed that respondents in both Hong Kong and Mainland China expressed a strong desire for classic Disney characters and themes.¹ As a result, Walt Disney Imagineers, on the one hand, recreated the “original” version of Walt Disney’s Disneyland and, on the other hand, localized the park to signify respect for the local culture. They consulted *feng shui* masters to design HKDL; HKDL has provided visitors with various Asian foods and Hong Kong-Western hybrid foods such as *char siu* pork-burger; HKDL even built a certain number of squat toilets to accommodate Mainland tourists’ personal hygiene habits. All of these glocal changes, however, have not changed Disney’s central aim: to earn as much profit as possible. Beginning in 2007, to increase visitors’ spending, HKDL management in fact abandoned the localized carts imitating Mong Kok hawkers selling snacks inside the park. This decision pressed visitors to purchase and consume food inside HKDL’s restaurants.

Given Disney’s dominant market position, my parent-respondents purchased some Disney merchandise for fun-seeking consumption and for pragmatic American-English learning, but they also resisted Disney’s promotion of consumerist behavior and Disney’s representation of mischievous characters and screen violence. Despite Disney’s global media domination, these parents did not accept Disney values as a total cultural package.

HKDL has also failed to lure Hong Kong people into making repeated visits to the park and into making extravagant purchases inside the park. According to HKDL's park-attendance figures and operating-income figures, HKDL management seemed to miscalculate the degree of cosmopolitan-consumerist experiences and practices already available to Hong Kong people. Because of Hong Kong people's experienced cosmopolitan consumer behavior (many of them had visited other Disneyland parks in the past) as well as because of the HKSAR government's huge investment in HKDL, local media widely reported on the smallness of the park only three or four days after HKDL's official opening.² The media revealed that HKDL had two major distinctions: it was the smallest Disneyland park in the world, and it provided the fewest attractions. Regarding the operating income that Disney could draw from HKDL, except for big festivals such as Christmas and the Lunar New Year, HKDL attendance figures were not satisfactory. The figures did not meet HKDL's first-year target of 5.6 million,³ and Disney admitted that a decline at HKDL offset an increase in the operating income of Disney's parks-and-resorts division during the second quarter of 2007.⁴

Disney miscalculated not only the attendance projections but the guest spending as well. My ethnographic research inside the park revealed that visitors have used various ways to consume park "facilities" without paying more than the ticket price. Hong Kong visitors bring empty bottles and fill them up with free drinking water inside the park; they play with toys inside HKDL's shops and wear characters' wigs for photos but purchase neither the toys nor the wigs. As a result, HKDL's guest spending also fell short of Disney's initial expectations.⁵ In order to play all HKDL's attractions within the one-day time limit, Hong Kong visitors have spent more per-day time in HKDL than visitors spend in other Disney parks. Long

queues, queue jumping, disputes, and even fights have thus resulted in the “happiest place in the world.” These fights often take place between locals and Mainlanders. Rather than “nurture a better human nature” through park design and control, HKDL is a site where Hong Kong people’s prejudice has remade the park into a veneer of Hong Kong-specific cultural tensions. In short, at the consumption level, HKDL has been localized on the surface. However, Disney’s profit-driven aim has not changed; and neither have Hong Kong people inside HKDL evolved into big spenders nor have Hong Kong people’s cultural prejudicial practices toward Mainlanders changed—even though Disneyland was designed to control human behavior.

Work

At the level of work, I have examined the encounter between HKDL and Hong Kong culture by dividing my discussion into two types of spatial-social relations: first, the relationships among HKDL junior workers, mid-level managers, and the Disney organization system; second, the relationships between local journalists and Disney management. The HKSAR government expected that its import of HKDL would also be an import of Disney’s famous human-resource and management skills. Disney, too, expected to transplant the general Disneyland work culture in Hong Kong, and in late 2004, nine months before HKDL officially opened, Disney employed five hundred Hong Kong people so that they would work as HKDL cultural representatives in Orlando, would introduce HKDL to the Orlando park visitors, would learn about Disney work culture, and would spread their learnt Disney culture to Hong Kong. My study, however, finds that Disney management has failed, to a large extent, to Disneyfy HKDL workers’ work practices; in fact,

some aspects of HKDL's management and work policies (the service ethos in particular) have been Hong Kongized. As for the relationship between journalists and HKDL management, Disney media culture and local media culture have maintained their relationship in tension. Disney has maintained its non-transparent corporate practices, and local journalists have consistently used widespread and entrenched Hong Kong attitudes to evaluate the practices of HKDL management.

HKDL is operated and managed by the Disney company, and the park's service quality supposedly expresses the Disney company's Disneyfied world-class standard of excellence. However, because HKDL senior management employed local mid-level managers from Hong Kong businesses, these mid-level managers, according to my HKDL cultural representative respondents, neither believed in nor performed Disney values. As a result, HKDL workers seldom actually provide Disney services, such as Disney's "magical moments," to HKDL guests. And because the senior management has provided the local mid-level managers with a relatively high degree of autonomy in which they can implement team-based policies relating to disciplinary actions, some junior workers suffer unfair disciplinary actions. Without providing a positive work environment, junior staff may indeed fail to provide Disneyfied service.

Because of physical hardship, toilsome workloads, sometimes unfair disciplinary actions, and un-Disneyfied visitors, junior workers may wear a glum face rather than convey Disney's "magical moments" to visitors. And this deviance occurs although all workers learn—and many remember—the "4 keys to Disney quality standards" (safety, courtesy, show, efficiency) and although a good number remember the "7 service guidelines for guest services." However, I do not mean to suggest that HKDL workers have completely escaped being Disneyfied because in

my conversations with HKDL staff respondents, they used Disney terms such as “guests,” “cast members,” “good show,” and “magical moments” to describe their work. Nevertheless, I do not believe that the evidence suggests that HKDL’s Disneyfication of HKDL workers has been successful.

HKDL’s top management recognized that guest services were un-Disneyfied, and, in late 2006, the management started to ask the mid-level managers to train their team members to produce “magical moments.” In early 2007, different teams (merchandise, park operations, food and beverages, guest relations, hotel operations) appointed twenty representatives in total to study how to improve and “Disneyfy” HKDL guest relations. A concrete example of these efforts is illuminating here. Starting in November 2006, Fantasyland managers asked each team member to perform at least one magical moment once a week. Ironically, the managers finally eliminated this practice in February 2007, not simply because of workers’ resistance to it but also because of the reduction of the number of employees. According to my HKDL worker respondents, Fantasyland had about ninety junior staffers in 2006. This number declined to about sixty by May 2007. The decline reflects Disney’s efforts to reduce HKDL’s operating costs. Before February 2007, there were two shifts among junior workers (Host 2). The first batch started at 9:15 a.m. and ended between 4:30 p.m. and 6 p.m.; the second batch started between 12 p.m. and 2 p.m. and ended at 9 p.m. The shortest shift in the past had been seven hours. Since February 2007, however, there has been only one shift, and almost all junior workers start working at 9:15 a.m. and end their work between 7 p.m. and 9 p.m.

All of these figures mean that HKDL workers need to work between nine and eleven hours a day, without counting the forty-five-minute no-pay lunch break.

In an extreme case, workers may work for eleven hours forty-five minutes, without counting the forty-five-minute no-pay lunch break. Because HKDL management reduced workers' paid sick leaves from two days per month to six days every six months starting in January 2007, some HKDL workers have applied for not fewer than four consecutive days of sick leave. This trend stems from the fact that workers in Hong Kong are eligible for sickness allowance under the Employment Ordinance if the sick leave taken is not less than four consecutive days and if the sick leave is supported by an appropriate medical certificate.⁶ According to my respondents, of sixty junior workers at Fantasyland, about five to six workers took not fewer than four consecutive days of sick leave between January and May 2007.

I suspect that HKDL top management can never "Disneyfy" HKDL workers so long as HKDL workers need to work even longer hours than in the past. Besides, according to my HKDL worker respondents, HKDL started to employ permanent part-timers in 2007, and the hourly payment decreased from sixty-three dollars per hour at Christmas 2006 to forty-six dollars in May 2007. Given the longer working hours, the reduced payment, and the regular low-paid part-timers, I cannot see how HKDL management can create a positive team-spirit work environment in which workers can meet Disney's guest-service standards. In summary, at the work level, both mid-level managers and junior staffers, to a large extent, have not been Disneyfied, and I suspect that no such Disneyfication will occur in the near future provided that HKDL management does not improve the work environment.

Disney's world-famous media management practices, as well, have met challenges in Hong Kong. Most famous among these practices is Disney Realism. I argued in chapter Six that, after receiving negative coverage about its early operations, which were chaotic, crisis-prone, and disrespectful of local lived

experiences and the rule of law, HKDL modified its media policies to some degree. For example, after drawing fire from government officials, legislators, and scholars regarding HKDL security's demand that two health inspectors "dress down," HKDL management apologized and said that HKDL would adhere to Hong Kong law. After a series of negative press reports discussed HKDL's smallness, highhandedness, Americanism, manipulative acts toward journalists, and exploitation of workers, the HKDL management attempted to become more "transparent." For example, a few days before the official first-year anniversary of HKDL, the executive vice-president and the managing director of HKDL, Bill Ernest, announced that HKDL's annual attendance was "well over five million visitors ... and we're getting close to our attendance target."⁷ However, these concessions do not suggest to me that HKDL management has abandoned its efforts to implement Disney Realism in Hong Kong; in fact, after these press-based revelations, HKDL management sought to escape from further questions on attendance figures by declining, in 2006, to disclose not only the real attendance figures but also the management's projected figures.⁸ In this respect, the non-transparent business practices of HKDL have worsened, not improved.⁹

HKDL management has not changed Disney's major management practices, nor have local journalists been so Disneyfied that they report news only favorable to HKDL; rather, journalists criticize HKDL management's highhandedness and Americanism, as I have mentioned. However, local journalists ask neither general questions about the power of global companies in the global economy nowadays, nor more specific questions about, for example, private companies' power in post-colonial Hong Kong; the journalists turn their criticisms regarding Disney's management practices into an over-generalized

anti-Americanism. By simply criticizing Disney corporate practices as “Americanism,” local journalists neglect *general* critical issues concerning, for example, local laws’ ineffectual monitoring of companies’ acts, and also *specific* critical issues concerning, for example, the dampening effect that the close relationship between Hong Kong businesspeople and the HKSAR government has had on public monitoring of HKDL’s acts.

Owing to concern for the public interest, in 2001 the HKSAR government-appointed Standing Committee on Company Law Reform proposed to amend the law so as to require all private companies in Hong Kong to file their financial statements for public inspection, a reform that would lead to “annual disclosure in the form of the annual directors’ report, profit and loss account.”¹⁰ Given the significant role that private companies play in the Hong Kong economy, the Committee has seen the change of company law as “one of the key elements in good corporate governance.”¹¹ The Committee showed that different countries vary in their filing requirements for company financial statements. Jurisdictions in the United Kingdom and Singapore require private companies to file financial statements at the Companies House (the UK) and at the Registry of Companies and Business (RCB, Singapore), each of which is equivalent to the Companies Registry in Hong Kong. The Committee proposed that “private companies with limited liability should file their financial statements with the Companies Registry (CR) for public inspection.”¹² The government, however, has not amended the Company Law. In other words, Hong Kong law does not require the Hong Kong International Theme Park (HKITP) company, a joint-venture of the HKSAR government and Disney, to disclose its financial statements related to HKDL because the HKITP company is private.

While severely limiting the public's access to Hong Kong private companies' financial records, current Hong Kong laws also fail to guarantee workers' economic and union rights.¹³ In May 2001, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights commented on the HKSAR government's neglect of citizens' economic rights:

The Committee also raised questions regarding policies in relation to unfair dismissal, rest breaks, maximum hours of work, equal pay for equal work and overtime pay rates. The HKSAR was asked to review its policy and legislation in relation to these areas, and to ensure that they are in line with its obligations under the Covenant.¹⁴

Before the Handover, the colonial Legislative Council passed laws guaranteeing that workers would have collective-bargaining rights and that workers whose employer had dismissed them for union activities would be reinstated. On 30 June 1997, the Chinese government dissolved Hong Kong's Legislative Council, which had been elected in 1995, and replaced it with the pro-Beijing provisional Legislative Council. In July 1997, the Provisional Legislative Council suspended the above-mentioned laws that the late colonial Legislative Council had passed; in October 1997, the Provisional Legislative Council repealed the above laws under the Employment and Labour Relations (Miscellaneous Amendments) Ordinance. Without a legal-institutional framework for either collective bargaining or union recognition, the current legislation renders both employees and labor unions weak in relation to management. And because current Hong Kong labor law sets neither maximum working hours nor minimum wages, HKDL management breaks no laws when it requires staff to work long hours. Because the current Occupational Safety and Health Ordinance does not categorize the physical pain suffered by

many HKDL employees as an occupational injury, those suffering employees who need hospital treatment cannot obtain compensation from HKDL management under the Employees' Compensation Ordinance.¹⁵

However, local journalists have failed to grasp the major factors that allow HKDL's management practices to be non-transparent and sometimes exploitative: these practices are not "Americanism," as many journalists have argued, but are rather reflective of local company practices and local labor laws: the practices undermine citizenship rights tenaciously, and the laws protect those same rights ineffectively. Local laws' failure to protect citizens' rights is due largely to the partnership between local government and businesspeople—a partnership that maintains the "corporatist democracy" model, in Alvin So's term.¹⁶ Hong Kong people under current laws cannot influence the policies of either Disney or the HKSAR government. Rather than ask the HKSAR government to intervene in the non-transparent and exploitative market, local journalists' criticism regarding HKDL's "Americanism" is, to a certain extent, merely an expression of "Hong Kongism." Their generalized cultural criticisms reinforce a widespread belief in Hong Kong about Hong Kong's self-fashioned success: small government, big markets, and a culture of self-reliance. For example, in criticizing HKDL's slow response to the Lunar New Year chaos, *Apple Daily's* editorial criticized HKDL as a government enterprise, the idea being that the *government* aspects of the enterprise resulted in a highhanded and slow-to-respond attitude:

Any Hong Kong people who traveled in the Mainland in the 1980s must remember the [Mainlanders'] non-merit-pay service attitude. These uncivilized phenomena, which follow from state-run enterprises, should have been eliminated through competition. However, in Hong Kong, highly acclaimed as "the world's freest economy," the government dug up this

hangover, the state-run enterprise, from socialism's garbage dump ... and once again exposed to visitors the state-run service attitude, which should be found only in history books. Hong Kong people, in fact, experienced HKDL's chaos and humiliation during its rehearsal days ... during HKDL's two days of Lunar New Year chaos, HKDL fully displayed its deeply rooted tendency to operate as would a state-run business: it sits on its laurels and has no desire to improve itself.... If private enterprise cannot or is not willing to run a business, state-run enterprise will only make things worse!¹⁷

Local media actors seldom reflect upon their own Hong Kong cultural bearings, but criticize Disney management on the basis of a general belief widespread in Hong Kong, that small government and big markets generate efficiency, profit, and thus the Hong Kong success story. The commentator who authored the above-cited passage saw markets as the only legitimate platform for the distribution of resources, and he argued that governments' intervention in markets will lead only to degeneracy.

Ideology

At the third level, that of ideology, I argue that my respondents' encounters with Disney offerings (including HKDL) have not aroused the respondents' national sentiments; rather, the respondents' particular approaches to Disney demonstrate the respondents' different cosmopolitan aspirations.

In my study, two respondents (a couple) raised concerns about the spread of Disney's Americanized notions of combat and of heroism. My parent respondents also raised concerns about screen violence in general, consumerism, and mischief. However, no respondents in my study ever voiced any worry or concern to me that Disney culture was invading *Chinese* culture or that Disney offerings were Disneyfying Chinese culture.

These findings contrast vividly with others that I came across while teaching a graduate class in 2007. The class had twenty students and about half of them came from the Mainland. In one student presentation, a Mainland student discussed the Disney animated cartoon *Mulan*. She pointed out more than twenty “mistakes” that Disney made about Chinese culture. For example, in the film, the manner in which Chinese folklore heroine Mulan writes Chinese characters is inaccurate; the side character dragon Mushu has a snake tongue; and in a match-making scene, Mulan and other girls wear geisha makeup. When I asked how my students felt about these “misrepresentations,” the Hong Kong students did not say much but one Mainland student expressed anger over the “mistakes” that Disney had made, especially the inaccurate conflation of Japanese culture with Chinese culture—always an issue that triggers fierce resentment insofar as imperial Japan militarily invaded China in the 1930s. Compared with the Mainland students, the Hong Kong students and I exhibited a lower *national* cultural sensitivity in our examination of the Disneyfication of Chinese folktales, although all the Hong Kong students and all the Mainland students in my class knew well the *Mulan* poem and the story. In my class, the Hong Kong students also displayed less upset about the Disneyfication of *Mulan* than did the Mainland students. I would finally note here that, among my respondents, very few expressed upset over Disney animated cartoons’ Disneyfied representations of different ethnic groups. Such cultural conflict, whether isolated or writ large at the national level, is not expressly discernable in my study.

Whereas my respondents’ Disney consumption has not aroused their national identification, their varied use of Disney (its merchandise and its symbolic power culturally and economically) demonstrates their varied cosmopolitan

aspirations. My research suggests that after experiencing a few years of local economic doldrums, Hong Kong people's widely held view that the globalization process fuels the ferocity of competition among cities and individuals has intensified Hong Kong people's desire to become cosmopolitan. At the same time, however, some local scholars, university students, and activists attempted to use HKDL's settlement to induce Hong Kong people to think about global corporations' exploitative acts in other places.

My HKDL cultural representative respondents and my middle-class parent respondents aspired to possess cosmopolitan language skills and cosmopolitan cultural skills in order to survive in Hong Kong and in the world. Perceiving the globalization process as an intensification of competition among workers and cities around the world, these two types of respondents tended to possess and to develop relatively high levels of cosmopolitan cultural skills and of sensitivity to earning potential, whether in Hong Kong or in another part of the world.

Affirming their pragmatic mindset and self-reliance ethic, the parents used Disney merchandise specifically to improve their children's English-language skills, their children's competitiveness, and their children's future career choices. In fact, parents' pragmatic use of "cosmopolitan" cultural goods (that is, of English-language learning kits and of English- and *Putonghua*-language classes) may broaden the children's cosmopolitan horizon, but I suspect that these "cosmopolitan" encounters have nurtured in neither the children nor even in their parents an elevated concern for humanity at large. For example, Lisa's use of the products helps her critically examine neither the values promoted by those products nor, indeed, her own cultural values (such as her cultural prejudice toward Mainlanders). Her mode of Disney usage reinforces Hong Kong

pragmatic values, authoritarian parenting methods, and the family-based self-reliance ethic. I call this type of cosmopolitan aspiration “pragmatist cosmopolitanism,” because the chief purpose underlying Hong Kong people’s acquisition of cosmopolitan cultural skills is capital accumulation.

Whereas the respondent parents’ use of Disney learning kits helped the parents’ children acquire economically viable cultural skills, the six-month Orlando work experiences that my HKDL cultural-representative respondents had brought them positive pragmatic returns (confidence and living skills) and positive cultural returns (a wider vision of their surroundings and self reflections on how Hong Kong culture bears on their actions). In the case of Olivia, cultural clashes between her Hong Kong-style work-hard-play-hard behavior and what she perceived as her US colleagues’ laid-back behavior created certain unhappy incidents between her and her colleagues. After six months’ American training, Olivia felt that she not only had acquired certain cosmopolitan cultural capital (such as better oral English), but also had broadened and deepened her self-reflections on her own cultural bearings and had become more accepting toward different cultures. I call this “reflexive cosmopolitanism.” Although the Orlando experiences of none of my HKDL cultural representative respondents led the respondents to question Disney Realism or to encourage them to think about the effects of private and corporate governance over the public domain, some respondents rethought Hong Kong culture’s emphasis on efficiency, instrumental rationality, and the self-reliance ethic. This, too, exemplifies what I would call a “reflexive” cosmopolitanism.

These two kinds of cosmopolitanism, in my view, have long existed in Hong Kong, so that HKDL’s points of reference complement—rather than

corrupt—Hong Kong people’s existing belief systems. However, because of the settlement of HKDL, some university teachers, students, and activists grasped the chance to strengthen the Hong Kong public’s concerns about global companies’ sometimes exploitative acts around the world. These people’s protests have been transnational, and the orientation of their concerns has been cosmopolitan in a third and different sense. Related activities include petitions and even threats to mount a global boycott against Disney because HKDL planned to serve shark’s fin soup for wedding banquets and because Disney’s global-outsourcing practices resulted in mistreatment of Mainland workers, in violation of their rights. In my view, these transnational activist campaigns have functioned in three ways. First, they have pressed Disney to change its corporate acts. Second, their campaigns strengthened the Hong Kong public’s concerns about certain global issues. Third, these anti-global companies’ global exploitative acts encouraged Hong Kong people to question their common-sense beliefs: namely, the widely held assertion that a free-market economy yields social benefits that outweigh social drawbacks.

Besides, environmentalists’ and SACOM’s resistant acts against Disney constitute *recent* acts by *local* activists who use *globally networked* tactics in the struggle against transnational corporate acts; and Disney Hunter is the first local activist movement to struggle against a particular transnational company. The establishment of HKDL has prompted local movements to embrace an even greater *cosmopolitan* orientation. I call the practices of these recent local, globally networked activist campaigns that possess a cosmopolitan orientation “activist cosmopolitanism.” However, activist cosmopolitanism has not yet achieved significant popularity in Hong Kong. For example, in 2005, the Disney Hunter group could boast only about twenty members, a number that did not significantly

increase after one year of school and street campaigns. In fact, as I mentioned in chapter Seven, some HKDL workers told the labor-union workers that if Disney Hunter had involved itself in setting up the HKDL labor union, they would not have joined it because they themselves were not confrontational toward HKDL management.

In summary, then, since the opening of HKDL in 2005, the local-Disney power has relied less and less on articulation (Disney's cultural and economic power articulated with Hong Kong people's desires for cultural distinction and economic revitalization) and more and more on negotiation (Disney Realism and HKDL management's relatively slow media practices in conflict with Hong Kong media's expectations) and on domestication (HKDL junior workers' localized services). Nevertheless, Disney and various local actors always remain in tension with each other. At the consumption level, although HKDL management localized certain HKDL practices, Disney's global profit-making goal of course remains unaltered; HKDL's park design also fails to change local cultural prejudice against Mainland visitors. At the work level, although HKDL workers have been Disneyfied to a certain extent, their managerial practices and guest-service standards are still local. At the ideological level, Disneyfied representations of Chinese folklore neither aroused nor agitated my respondents' national identification; rather, my respondents' cosmopolitan aspirations, because of the globalization process, manifested themselves through the respondents' use of Disney merchandise and the respondents' US work experiences. Their cosmopolitan aspirations varied (from pragmatic to reflexive to activist), but only a handful of the respondents stated that their "allegiance is to the worldwide community of human beings."¹⁸

Hong Kong people use HKDL for entertainment, for an income source, for acquiring cosmopolitan cultural skills, or for exposing global companies' profit-driven and sometimes exploitative corporate acts. And, indeed, not a few Hong Kong people use HKDL for a combination of these reasons. These various uses are expressions of Hong Kong culture; many of these cultural practices are not cultures Disneyfied by Disney. Nevertheless, HKDL has remade and has complicated Hong Kong people's perception of Disney itself. No longer just about "happy" entertainment, Disney is now a quasi-public enterprise that has brought to Hong Kong both the fewest Disneyland attractions of any park and disappointing economic returns.

Hong Kong culture and the development of a democratic pluralistic society

The settlement of HKDL in Hong Kong reveals that a global corporate power such as that of Disney may be so enormous that its possessor could ask the local government to grant it financial subsidies, to support infrastructural setup, to surrender management control, and to consider future changes in legislation. However, we should note that, except for the above mentioned "special" rights, the HKSAR government-Disney joint venture concerning the HKITP company enjoys certain other "rights" which include the right of non-transparency and which have their justification in Hong Kong laws. *Local* company laws and *local* labor laws contain no requirements either that Disney disclose HKDL's annual financial statements or that Disney reduce HKDL workers' working hours and provide the workers with more breaks. It is difficult to change these practices in the absence of both legislative reform and intermediary quasi-public watchdog bodies. I turn here, then, to the wider implications of my research.

The struggles for citizenship rights and for legislative reforms are important in the democratization process of Hong Kong society generally, and culture plays a vital role in the way in which citizens may push government for various reforms. According to T. H. Marshall,¹⁹ societies that grant their people a modicum of political rights, civil rights, and social rights are, in effect, entitling the people to full and equal participation via legal frameworks. However, the people's entitlement to rights does not automatically transform the people into actively engaged citizens who exercise their rights; a society enjoying the possession of these rights does not necessarily become a community of openness and communication. As Nick Stevenson argues, the definition of 'citizenship' should not rest exclusively on political meanings because culture strongly influences the meaning of citizenship in different contexts and in shaping the ways in which people exercise their rights:

Whether we define citizenship through questions of rights, notions of obligation and duty, membership of overlapping communities or normalization, questions of culture are not far away.²⁰

Stevenson argues that citizenship should denote not only entitlements and obligations but also "questions of imagination, identity, recognition and belonging" (p. 36). He argues that societies, in order to strengthen global conceptions of cultural citizenship, address "the need to create and revive a radical model of the public sphere" (p. 152), and he makes it clear that his model does not emphasize rationality and "consensus" alone, because civil society "is not merely an institutional realm, but is constructed through symbolic codes of inclusion and exclusion" (p. 23). Therefore, cultural citizenship concerns the

symbolic dimension of inclusion and marginalization. Stevenson further emphasizes the role that affect plays in constructing an active civil society. The term ‘cultural’ in Stevenson’s “cultural citizenship” refers to Raymond Williams’ model of cultural democracy, in particular the latter’s idea that popular participation should be encouraged through new democratic institutions and communicative channels to develop a common culture capable of promoting reflexivity and pluralism (pp. 19-20) as well as community and belonging (pp. 32-3). For the context of globalization, Stevenson fleshes out this model to make an important point: rather than limit itself to the national level, civic solidarity should strive for a cosmopolitan civil society based on human rights. However, Pedro Nunes notes the important point that Stevenson provides “no *systematic* account of what, in practical terms, constitutes cultural citizenship.”²¹

When I bring the idea of cultural citizenship to bear on my study of my respondents’ various uses of and responses to HKDL, the majority of their cultural practices seem to have little relationship with cultural citizenship in Stevenson’s sense. First, my respondents, in general, believed in market individualism and the culture of (family-based) self-reliance. The culture of community belonging and of organized collective action (such as industrial action) was not popular among the respondents. This observation is consistent with some surveys on Hong Kong values.²² Second, their responses suggest that the respondents prioritized material values (such as “economic and physical security”) over other post-materialist enjoyments (the “self expression and the quality of life”²³). Perhaps for this reason, organized and politicized consumption activities have had a difficult time taking root in Hong Kong. Third, my study of HKDL shows that some of my respondents had a relatively low level of tolerance toward people of different cultures,

especially toward Mainlanders. Possibly consistent with my finding, a survey reveals that a majority of Hong Kong people do not accept different lifestyles (such as homosexuality) either.²⁴ These Hong Kong attitudes may negatively affect the development of a democratic society that embraces pluralistic cultures.

First, as discussed in chapter Seven, my HKDL staff respondents were reluctant to join a labor union to negotiate either pay raises or additional employee benefits, and I would argue that underlying their reluctance in this instance was their own ambivalent attitude toward HKDL management. Although my respondents admitted that some HKDL workers, especially the character performers, might face undesirable work conditions (long working hours, chaotic shifts, and occupational injuries or diseases without company compensation), these same respondents also insisted that not every division treats its staff poorly and that they themselves felt no compelling need to join the labor union: why give voice to other workers' problems, challenge authorities, and risk a backlash that would negatively affect their own careers? Believing in market individualism and self-reliance, some of my respondents preferred to ask those dissatisfied workers to resign rather than organize protests against the company. In other words, it seems unlikely that, in the near future, HKDL workers will concertedly undertake negotiations with the management.

The middle class parents whom I interviewed emphasized that individuals should rely on themselves to negotiate their own economic value. Some of the parents relied on *Disney's World of English*, private English lessons, *Putonghua* lessons, piano lessons, and sometimes their own child-rearing disciplinary actions in order to shape their children into competitive market agents, to solidify their class position, or just "to earn a living" in the globalized economy. Because some

parents in my study saw local culture as “non-educational” (i.e., local popular culture is mind-numbing and it lacks cultural capital for economic viability), they tried to distance their children from Hong Kong local popular culture. Middle-class-parent respondents demonstrated an instrumental mindset according to which they would train and mold their children to be cosmopolitan—that is, to “survive” in the globalized world. If this training were to be successful, it is likely that the children would rarely consider themselves as exponents of Hong Kong culture. If democratic civil order depends not only on citizens’ rational consensus regarding civic values but also on “the possibility of passionate encounter” as Nick Stevenson argues,²⁵ I wonder whether or not the decrease in children’s encounters with local popular culture will reduce the potential means by which the children will relate their popular-culture affect to a local identity and a place-based sense of community.

Second, because Hong Kong people, according to Ho and Leung, “tend to focus on economic stability, economic growth and maintaining order,” and because Hong Kong’s economic affluence has not yet fostered in Hong Kong people a strong sense of environmental awareness,²⁶ I argue that politicized consumption activities are not popular among the Hong Kong people when their embrace of material values is stronger than their embrace of post-material priorities.

Facing HKDL’s non-transparent corporate practices, sometimes exploitative management practices, and as yet unfulfilled economic promises, the Hong Kong people to whom I spoke generally exhibited little eagerness to say “no” to HKDL. Although my parent respondents criticized certain HKDL corporate practices (such as HKDL’s violation of the rule of law and HKDL’s long working hours), only Judy’s family had decided to boycott HKDL; indeed, Judy had been actively

participating in a local feminist movement for more than thirteen years. All the parents—except Judy’s family—agreed that HKDL should expand, despite HKDL’s environmental damage and the non-transparent quasi-public nature of the enterprise. This finding parallels the findings from John Ap’s March 2006 survey (as I discussed in chapter Seven). Many respondents (70%) indicated that their “opinions toward HK Disneyland have become more negative due to the problems that have been experienced since its opening,”²⁷ but 86% of the respondents still expressed “support for the development of Hong Kong Disneyland,” and this percentage of support was actually the highest recorded when he compared it with his previous surveys since 2000.

Third, my study of HKDL respondents’ aspirations to become cosmopolitan shows that their life-strategy changes (the acquisition of *Putonghua* and English, as well as of Mainland and cosmopolitan sensitivity) did not necessarily change the respondents’ conception of what Hong Kong is and should be, nor did the life-style changes necessarily change how the respondents perceived Hong Kong and the Other, especially the Mainlanders. The exclusionary cultural practices of many Hong Kong people extend to the people’s vast support for the HKSAR government’s limits on family-reunion immigration.²⁸ In 2005, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights “urged the Government to extend the protection afforded by a proposed racial discrimination law to internal migrants from the mainland.”²⁹ In fact, Hong Kong people perform exclusionary practices against not only Mainlanders but also non-Chinese ethnic minorities such as Nepalese, Filipinos, and Indonesians. Barry Sautman characterizes Hong Kong people’s exclusionary practices as “Hong Kong semi-ethnocracy.”³⁰

Given Hong Kong people's exclusionary everyday practices, I find it difficult to imagine a Hong Kong society that can turn away from discrimination and toward a functioning inclusive community: one where people embrace critical dialogues and "accept the 'other' without expecting them to conform," in Stevenson's words.³¹ A Hong Kong whose culture fails to embrace critical dialogues with people of different cultures, especially those of the marginalized, is a Hong Kong where the idea and the practice of human rights and of cultural democracy will find unfertile soil. I argue, further, that without such an open environment, Hong Kong society will find it difficult, if not impossible, to transgress its cultural boundaries and broaden its cosmopolitan sensitivity.

Conclusion

At the beginning of this concluding chapter, I confessed that, during the initial stage of my PhD study, I resisted examining Disney in a critical way. I was narrowly characterizing cultural studies as a field of inquiry whose exclusive focus is on people's agency in regulating their own cultural consumption. Through this narrow characterization, I placed myself over a metaphorical safety net because cultural practices usually do entail a certain degree of agency. However, at that time, I missed the point that an active cultural practice is not a necessarily socially progressive and subversive practice.

At the consumption level, as I have argued in chapter Five, parents' consumption acts and parents' use of Disney offerings can be seen as acceptance, an uptake, or resistance, depending on what aspects of power researchers address. If we view these acts in terms of "agency," all these acts display a certain degree of consumer agency. In other words, "agency" as a concept is not subversive by

nature. Furthermore, even though my parent respondents resisted Disney's promotion of consumerist behavior, screen violence, and mischievous acts, the resistance was not political resistance. Disney is famous as family entertainment, and parents' uses of Disney or parents' resistance to Disney derives usually from this established idea—the idea of Disney's fame as a manufacturer of fun. The parents resist certain Disney products because these offerings, in the parents' view, create a bad learning environment for their children's personality development. The parents' resistance has little relation to such larger and political questions as Disney's global media domination, Disney's private governance over public land, and the potential harmful effects of Disney Realism. Certainly, the parents' resistance is real and helps us understand that Disney's media domination in children's entertainment does not necessarily lead to cultural homogenization. However, it is quite futile to argue that this *media-consumption* resistance can evolve into *political* resistance, which would, in turn, challenge Disney's dominant position as a media outlet—rather than challenge, here and there, simply a few of the outlet's offerings. In other words, consumer agency and consumer resistance do not necessarily lead to political resistance.

I have noticed that this chasm between consumer resistance and political resistance surfaces in other HKDL-related settings. My HKDL worker respondents' local resistance against management did not evolve into political resistance. I have observed many HKDL visitors flout and disrupt Disney's orderly park rules, but I have neither observed nor interviewed nor, for that matter, read about even marginal numbers of Hong Kong visitors who transformed their on-site resistance into political resistance. And although it is true that many local media practitioners set out to change the meaning of “Disney” from “Hong Kong

dream” to “Hong Kong shame” and to “Americanism,” it is also true—and quite telling—that these media practitioners never united to extend their critique from HKDL’s operations to the political context that made HKDL possible. In short, all these acts and assertions of resistance seem to have little relationship to the development of human rights, democracy, and pluralistic culture, which Hong Kong people lack under the present regime.

Here, I am not suggesting that Hong Kong people *possess* consumption-related agency, work-related agency, or speech-related agency but that they simultaneously *lack* political agency. Rather, I argue that the concept of the relationship between agency and resistance—a concept that cultural studies scholars such as John Fiske³² highlight—in fact fails to address people’s resistance to resistant activities. As consumers, my respondents resisted performing or supporting any politicized consumption activity; none of my HKDL-worker respondents stated that they had ever thought of joining the HKDL labor union; and the anti-Disney group of which I am a member received precious little popular support, as demonstrated by the group’s small membership. In fact, the long, winding course of my research has convinced me that many of my respondents resist adopting a citizen-based political identity and that the concept of the relationship between agency and resistance cannot, by itself, help us to address, in comprehensive or rigorous ways, my respondents’ overt refusal to politicize their everyday acts, transforming or extending these into political acts.

Here, therefore, I reject the paradigm of resistance, which can easily evolve into a paradigm of “populist” resistance. To conduct and frame my research, I have preferred to use Massey’s concept of a multiplicity of spaces and Paula Saukko’s dialogic-research strategy.³³ As I stated in the introductory

section, my own initial resistance to studying Disney's real power in Hong Kong may have been due to my fear that this type of study would require me to deny my popular-culture pleasures and thus my identity. Both Massey's concept of a multiplicity of spaces and Saukko's emphasis on polyvocality, however, have helped me live with my internal tension: I sometimes enjoy Disney offerings but I also detest Disney's non-transparent and sometimes inhumane corporate practices. The concept of a multiplicity of spaces points to not only diverse local actors who occupy, interpret, and respond diversely among diverse spatial social relations, but also the possibility that each actor may occupy more than one space. Thus, just as Disney can be entertainment, a global corporation, and a local employer, so too can an individual person occupy several diverse spaces in relation to Disney. Therefore, it is possible that I love Winnie the Pooh and detest Disney's policies at the same time. In fact, it is possible for me both to love Pooh and to question Pooh. My critical study of Disney, in the end, results not in self-denial but in self-affirmation: I understand more about how I, by using different perspectives, differently perceive and differently respond to different issues in relation to Disney. This is not an ambivalent attitude but a multiplicity of attitudes grounded on a multiplicity of spaces.

As a cultural studies student, I have learned from my study of HKDL that *engaged* cultural research means *personal involvement* in a particular site (real, symbolic, and imaginary). The goal should be, through communication, to get different voices heard, recognized, and accepted in a culture of openness; *engaged* cultural research means neither that views should submit to homogenization within an overly consensual framework nor that the researcher

should impose his or her own political or theoretical agenda onto people's behavior. This is the openness of cultural studies that enables researchers to act.

The Hong Kong people's contradictory views about HKDL's development (development leads to environmental damage, but park improvements should stem from park development) show that Hong Kong people commonly negotiate among different discourses. The contestation of various discourses poses a challenging question for cultural studies scholars who examine the role that culture plays in shaping particular social events and in intersecting power with culture in a variety of social contexts. If cultural studies is not simply about the study of culture but about the politics of cultures, then we should study "how power works where people live their lives," in Meaghan Morris' words.³⁴ In several chapters, I attempted to situate concrete concerns in the materiality of peoples' lives, limitations, and aspirations, especially as these people responded to economic arrangements, emotional structures, and cultural discourses³⁵ within the broad, complex webs of power relations forming the domestic, national, and international spheres.

If we only keep on criticizing certain government policies or certain corporate acts in a particular way without understanding people's diverse opinions, as in Disney-focused criticism that polarizes without accounting for the majority of Hong Kong people's ambivalence toward HKDL, then our characterization of "reality" does an injustice to these different views and to itself. In short, by dismissing views as irrelevant or as misled, our struggle may also tarnish our ideal for an open and pluralistic society.

My study on the establishment, the operation, and the consumption activities of Hong Kong Disneyland constitutes only a starting point from which

researchers (1) can integrate cultural perspectives into any number of allegedly revitalizing projects such as HKDL, (2) can understand people's different views and uses of Disney's Hong Kong offerings in relation to the local-global framework of Hong Kong's political handover, and (3) can examine the HKDL project's cultural and political effects on Hong Kong people's citizenship rights and on Hong Kong people's encounters with diverse cultures.

My study is far from exhaustive in that many of my respondents—be they reporters, media producers, Disney and HKDL consumers, or HKDL workers—had attained a tertiary education: strong contrasts may characterize the opinions held by people of different classes. In my examination of HKDL as a work place, I did not collect information from managers or from senior-ranking officers. In this regard, I do not—and indeed cannot—assert that my study offers a comprehensive understanding of HKDL management policy. Also, the lack of information supplied from HKDL public relations officers and from higher-ranking HKDL staff means that my study lacks sufficient pluralism, although this “lack” is simultaneously a structural feature of Disney's operations in Hong Kong.

One of my study's strengths is another setback: my focus on respondents' diverse cultural understandings both of Hong Kong as a city and of some Hong Kong people's behavior. My research opens little space in which respondents could creatively imagine what Hong Kong society and Hong Kong people should be like or become in the future. In the case of Disneyland, I seldom conducted research on people's diverse visions of what an ideal park should be. Yet as I have been working on the final draft of this thesis, workers have been dredging mud and sand every day at the Phase II reclamation site of Penny's Bay: sixty new hectares of land will be in existence by 2009.³⁶ If the Hong Kong

government is going to build another park on this land, then the government-Disney joint-venture company (the Hong Kong International Theme Park Company, HKITP) has the right to buy the Phase II site at any time during the twenty years following HKDL's 2005 opening.³⁷ The government also expects that upon completion of Phases I and II, Penny's Bay will have two private theme parks, five resort hotels, and 74,400 square meters of rentable retail, dining, and entertainment complexes.³⁸

Is the above-mentioned development our ideal development of Penny's Bay? Do we still want to spend millions from the public coffers to build a private park for some vague economic promise whose proclaimed future effects are speculative at best? Can we foresee no project better than a private park that has no obligation to address community needs and concerns? Do we still want to struggle with Disney's non-transparent management practice, which hides from us—the common shareholders—the park's profits and the park's losses? Do we want to build another park over whose master-planning neither the people nor the biggest shareholder—the government—exercises respectable power? To answer these questions, we should not rely chiefly on opinion surveys, which cannot promote critical pluralistic culture or participatory democracy; Hong Kong Disneyland cannot be called the people's park, not because of its foreign or American characteristics but because of the publicly funded park's reinforcement of the HKSAR government's undemocratic governance and because of the publicly funded park's private operation, which excludes public participation. In the midst of urban redevelopment and suburban development, scholars should conduct further research to work out different plans for building up a place-

based³⁹ inclusive park that respects citizens' rights, voices, and differences.

People's participation, after all, is the basis of cultural citizenship and democracy.

NOTES

¹ Stella Lee, "Locals want classic-style Disneyland," 21 February 2001, *South China Morning Post*.

² "學者揭破政府急補鑊迪士尼最多容僅五千人," 16 September 2005, *Sing Tao Daily*, A28; 聞峰, "迪士尼面積 確細過維園," 16 September 2005, *Hong Kong Daily News*, A09; "學者: 迪士尼細過維園 當局三緘其口 議員要求交代," 15 September 2005, *Hong Kong Daily News*, A04.

³ Wendy Leung, "Disney set to miss mark on visitors," 5 September 2006, *The Standard*, M03; Linda Choy and Dennis Eng, "5 million visit Disney park, short of target," 5 September 2006, *South China Morning Post*, EDT1, headline.

⁴ Dennis Eng, "Disney chiefs will not ask taxpayers to foot bill for park expansion," 10 May 2007, *South China Morning Post*, CITY4.

⁵ Eng, "Disney chiefs will not ask taxpayers to foot bill for park expansion."

⁶ HKSAR government, Labour Department, "Notes for preparing an employment contract," <http://www.labour.gov.hk/eng/public/wcp/NoteSampleEC.pdf> (accessed 22 May 2007).

⁷ Wendy Leung, "Disney set to miss mark on visitors," 5 September 2006, *The Standard*, M03.

⁸ In early November 2006, economic journalists received an HKDL invitation to an HKDL press conference to be held on the 14th of that month. The invitation stated that HKDL management would review HKDL's first year of operations and would announce HKDL's forthcoming ticketing and marketing strategies. In the meeting, Josh D'Amato, Hong Kong Disneyland's vice president for sales and travel-trade marketing, told the press that HKDL had successfully sold ten-thousand annual pass tickets since late September 2006. However, he declined to project the coming year's attendance figures. A journalist commented in his column that HKDL management is like "The Boy Who Cried Wolf" in *Aesop's Fables*. In other words, HKDL management attracts journalists to a conference by declaring that they will gain access to important figures there, but the declaration turns out to be a deception: the figures given are not of great importance to Hong Kong people and certainly do not include HKDL's attendance figures or HKDL's earnings figures, but rather only figures that are favorable to HKDL's image. See Dennis Eng, "Disney launches super annual pass," 29 September 2006, *South China Morning Post*, CITY4; Wendy Leung, "Disney passes aim to lure visitors," 29 September

2006, *The Standard*, M04; 小琴, “迪士尼口密 拒講營運數據,” 15 November 2006, *Ming Pao Daily News*, B06.

⁹ However, HKDL management’s refusal to present to the public the attendance figures cannot stop journalists either from continually asking the same questions or from rigorously comparing the projected figures presented by the government in 1999. According to the HKSAR government, there should be 5.47 million people who visit HKDL during the 2006-7 period, which constitutes HKDL’s second year in operation. Economic Analysis Division, 1999, “Economic Assessment on Building a Walt Disney Theme Park in Hong Kong,” Economic Analysis Division (Financial Services Bureau, Government Secretariat). <http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr99-00/english/panels/es/papers/a321e04.pdf> (accessed 28 November 2006), p. 20.

¹⁰ The Standing Committee on Company Law Reform, 2001 (July), “Corporate Governance Review by the Standing Committee on Company Law Reform: A Consultation Paper on Proposals Made in Phase I of the Review,” http://www.cr.gov.hk/en/standing/docs/Rpt_e.pdf (accessed 26 April 2006), 21.03, p. 77.

¹¹ The Standing Committee on Company Law Reform, 2001 (July), “Corporate Governance Review,” 21.02, p. 76.

¹² The Standing Committee on Company Law Reform, 2001 (July), “Corporate Governance Review,” 21.01 (a), p. 76; 22.01 – 22.04, pp. 77-8.

¹³ The only issue regarding which the Labour Department took a relatively intractable stance concerned character costumes. By the end of November 2005, the Labour Department had sent six advice letters and two warning letters to the HKDL management, advising the park either to purchase additional lycra bodysuits and cooling vests, which the workers could wear beneath their character costumes to reduce body heat, or to face possible prosecution if the situation did not improve. Technically speaking, it is difficult for the Labour Department to prosecute cases of this sort because the prosecutors need the prosecuted employer’s staff to testify in court against the employer. For the HKDL case, see 張嘉雯, “建議善待員工多購戲服免汗濕, 勞處兩度發信警告迪士尼,” 13 December 2005, *Apple Daily*, A22; “漠視職安勞處擬告迪士尼,” 13 December 2005, *Oriental Daily*, A29.

¹⁴ International Service for Human Rights (ISHR), “Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Reports by States (25th Session),” (Geneva, 23 April to 11 May 2001), <http://www.ishr.ch/About%20UN/Reports%20and%20Analysis/CESCR/CESCR-25thSession.htm> (accessed 27 November 2006).

¹⁵ In contrast to Hong Kong, the right of collective bargaining and various labor laws in the United States and France constitute a safeguard against corporate abuse of citizens’ economic and social rights. Beginning in 1999 in Orlando, Disney failed to pay workers for time spent changing into and out of costumes or uniforms, and in response, unions representing about 25,000 workers at Walt Disney World took Disney to a federal mediator who ruled in the unions’ favor in May 2001. In the early days of Euro Disneyland, as I discussed in chapter Two, Disney management presented the dress code as an attachment to the employee contract,

but under French labor law, such a code should be written directly into the contract and should be subject to the government's approval; therefore, a government labor inspector lodged a formal complaint against Disney. Finally, Euro Disneyland toned down the wording of the code and restructured their French dress code so that it does not require Euro Disneyland workers to adhere to Disney's dress-code regulations. As for the US case, see "Off to work we go—smiling?" 2 June 2001, *South China Morning Post*, Focus. As for the Euro Disneyland case, see Lyn Bourgement, "Walt Disney Company's Euro Disneyland Venture: A study in corporate foreign expansion" (1995), <http://www.hiddenmickeys.org/Paris/English/LynEuroDisney.html> (accessed 6 November 2006); J. Stewart Black and Hal B. Gregersen, "Labor Relations at Euro Disneyland," in *Readings and Cases in International Human Resource Management*, edited by Mendenhall and Oddou (Cincinnati, OH: South-Western College Pub, 1998), p. 304.

¹⁶ Alvin Y. So, "Hong Kong's Problematic Democratic Transition: Power Dependency or Business Hegemony?," *Journal of Asian Studies* 59, issue 2 (2000), p. 368. Alvin So uses a "corporatist democracy" model to examine the difficult democratization process of Hong Kong, and it helps explain the HKSAR government's reluctance to amend current company law that shields firms from public disclosure and the HKSAR government's determination to repeal laws that protect the Hong Kong people's economic rights and social rights. Under British colonial rule, there was a close expatriate-business alliance between senior government officials and commercial establishments. The alliance was institutionalized through the appointment of British and pro-British businesspeople to the Legislative Council and the Executive Council and ensured the maintenance of Britain's dominance of Hong Kong's economy. Starting in the 1980s, the expatriate-business alliance ceded place to an alliance between Beijing and Hong Kong big business because of the increasing business networking and opportunities in China and because of their mutual interest in maintaining Hong Kong's economic prosperity and political stability. The alliance between Hong Kong business and the Chinese government was institutionalized when the Chinese government appointed many of Hong Kong's powerful businesspeople to positions of influence: the Basic Law committees in the 1980s; the Preliminary Working Committee (which would lay the groundwork for the Handover) in the 1990s; the Preparatory Committee (which selected the HKSAR government's new chief executive) in the 1990s; and the Provisional Legislative Council (which would replace the Legislative Council) in the 1990s. Consequently, the Basic Law and the electoral rules imposed by the Provisional Legislative Council ensure business dominance and hinder Hong Kong's democratization process. Although the annex of the Joint Declaration contains the terms "accountability" and "election," the Chief Executive is elected by a four hundred-member electoral commission selected by the pro-Beijing and pro-business Preparatory Committee. And the electoral rules ensure business dominance of the Legislature. For the first term of the Legislative Council (1998-2000), only one-third were elected directly by popular election and half were elected indirectly by "functional constituents" (occupational groups); for the third term (2004-2008), half have been elected by popular election and half by "functional constituents." According to So, businesspeople significantly undermine Hong Kong's democratization process.

¹⁷ 李兆富, “蘋論: 國企主題公園令香港蒙羞,” 3 February 2006, *Apple Daily*, A06, editorial.

¹⁸ Bruce Robbins, “Introduction Part I: Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism,” in *Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation*, edited by Cheah and Robbins (Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), p. 2, quoting Martha C. Nussbaum, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism,” In *For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism* (Boston: Beacon, 1996), p. 4.

¹⁹ T. H. Marshall and Tom Bottomore, *Citizenship and Social Class* (London: Pluto press, 1992).

²⁰ Nick Stevenson, *Cultural Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Questions* (Maidenhead, England: Open University Press, 2003), p. 1. Further references are in parentheses in the text.

²¹ Pedro Nunes, “Nick Stevenson, Cultural Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Questions,” *Media, Culture and Society* 28, issue 5 (2006), p. 804, emphasis added.

²² 何國良, “香港特區管治模式,” in *社會發展的趨勢與挑戰: 香港與台灣的經驗*, edited by 劉兆佳、尹寶珊、李明堃、黃紹倫 (香港: 香港中文大學香港亞太研究所, 2006), p. 165. Ho Kwok Leung re-reads the 1999 Social Indicators Survey and he shows that 67.2% of the 823 respondents agreed that Hong Kong’s capitalist system allows everyone to compete in a fair basis; and 44.3% opposed workers who organize industrial action to demand pay raises and working-condition improvements.

²³ I borrow these two terms from Inglehart. Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 4.

²⁴ Thomas Wong argues that two Hong Kong Indicators surveys, in 1988 and 1995 respectively, show that Hong Kong people have had low levels of tolerance for people whose lifestyles or sexual orientations differ from mainstream lifestyles or sexual orientations. According to Thomas Wong, in 1988, there were 58.2%, 47.1%, and 92.6% of respondents who did not accept cohabitation, divorce, and homosexuality respectively; in 1995, there were 83.9% and 85.9% of respondents who did not accept female homosexual and male homosexual relationships respectively. 黃偉邦, “核心價值: 香港社會指標研究的啓示 (1988-2001),” in *社會發展的趨勢與挑戰: 香港與台灣的經驗*, edited by 劉兆佳、尹寶珊、李明堃、黃紹倫 (香港: 香港中文大學香港亞太研究所, 2006), p. 110.

²⁵ Stevenson, *Cultural Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Questions*, p. 24.

²⁶ Ho Kwok Leung and Leung Sai Wing, “Postmaterialism Revisited,” in *Indicators of Social Development: Hong Kong 1995*, edited by Lau and others (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1997), p. 340.

²⁷ John Ap, “Residents Have Mixed Opinions Towards Hong Kong Disneyland,” Press Embargo (Hong Kong, 4 April 2006), p. 1.

²⁸ Leung Hon Chu, “Politics of Incorporation and Exclusion: Immigration and Citizenship Issues,” in *Remaking Citizenship in Hong Kong: Community, Nation*

and the *Global City*, edited by Ku and Pun (London, New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), p. 108.

²⁹ International Service for Human Rights (ISHR), "Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Reports by States (34th Session)," (Geneva, 25 April to 13 May 2005)

<http://www.ishr.ch/About%20UN/Reports%20and%20Analysis/CESCR/CESCR-34thSession.pdf> (accessed 27 November 2006), p. 3.

³⁰ Barry Sautman, "Hong Kong as a Semi-Ethnocracy: 'Race', Migration, and Citizenship in a Globalized Region," in *Remaking Citizenship in Hong Kong: Community, Nation and the Global City*, edited by Ku and Pun (London, New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), p. 121.

³¹ Stevenson, *Cultural Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Questions*, p. 63.

³² John Fiske, *Understanding Popular Culture* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989).

³³ Paula Saukko, *Doing Research in Cultural Studies: An Introduction to Classical and New Methodological Approaches* (London: Sage, 2003), pp. 19-20, 29-33.

³⁴ Meaghan Morris, "A Question of Cultural Studies," in *Back to Reality: Social Experience and Cultural Studies*, edited by McRobbie (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 43.

³⁵ Saukko, *Doing Research in Cultural Studies*, p. 51.

³⁶ Civil Engineering and Development Department (HKSAR government), "Major projects," <http://www.cedd.gov.hk/eng/projects/major/c004lae5687cl.htm> (accessed 5 December 2006).

³⁷ Government Information Centre (HKSAR government), 1999, "Hong Kong Disneyland: Briefing Paper," paper presented in House Committee on 3 and 5 November 1999, <http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr99-00/english/hc/papers/brief.pdf> (accessed 6 December 2006), p. 10.

³⁸ Environmental Protection Department (HKSAR government), "Project description," www.epd.gov.hk/eia/register/report/eiareport/eia_0412000/Doc/theme_park-section2.htm (accessed 6 December 2006), point 2.1.1.

³⁹ Doreen Massey, *Space, Place and Gender* (Cambridge: Polity press, 1994), pp. 141, 167-8.

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Glendy Chu
Director, Media Relations
Hong Kong Disneyland
Penny's Bay, Lantau Island, HK

Wing Yee Choi
Kwan Fong Cultural Research & Development Programme (KFCRD)
Room 320, B. Y. Lam Building
Lingnan University
8 Castle Peak Rd
Tuen Mun NT

2 October 2006

Dear Ms Chu:

Subject: Invitation for an Interview

I am a Junior Research Associate at Lingnan University. My research is about the development of Hong Kong Disneyland and its localization process.

There is a consensus that Disneyland theme park has been unique in popular culture phenomenon. The Disney Magic has been wide-reaching for over 50 years and it continues to attract audience not only in America but also worldwide. Disney's transnational success has made it a global model for service and management culture. Terms such as "Disneyfied" and "Disney version" are invented to describe Disney's enormous influence.

My research is concerned with cultural globalization – how transnational companies localize their offerings by adapting to local tastes and how local consumers appropriate transnational offerings for their own use. In my thesis I investigate how local families interpret Disney characters and movies, using Disney merchandise in their daily lives to

realize a particular type of good life. Further, I try to examine how Hong Kong Disneyland adapts to local tastes by modifying its park design; for example, by consulting *feng shui*, establishing Fantasy Gardens for photo-taking, and providing a wide variety of Asian cuisine inside the park.

It is bound to be challenging to plant a US cultural and corporate institution in Chinese territory, especially when it is a theme park project involving Hong Kong \$23 billion. As a new organization in Hong Kong, Hong Kong Disneyland anticipated and experienced cultural challenges from locals, visitors and the media, yet the park continually makes itself attractive and culturally sensitive. Therefore, to present a balanced view of these issues in my dissertation, I would like to interview Hong Kong Disneyland about how the park has adapted to local play culture, work culture and media culture. Since my research is exclusively about how global culture localizes, an interview with the company would be indispensable and invaluable to my understanding of the complicated decisions that global companies face.

My research is the first serious, academic project on the localization of Disney culture in Hong Kong. I sincerely wish and hope that the company might grant me an interview chance.

My correspondence address, phone number, fax number and email address are as follows:

Address:	Kwan Fong Cultural Research & Development Programme (KFCRD), Room 320, B. Y. Lam Building, 8 Castle Peak Road, Fu Tei, Tun Mun, Hong Kong.
Phone number:	91XX 44XX
Fax number:	25XX 51XX
Email address:	choiwy@ln.edu.hk

Best regards,

Wing Yee Choi
Junior Research Associate
KFCRD, LU

June 10, 2005

Major Ian Swan,
Educational Services Secretary,
Educational Services Department,
The Salvation Army Hong Kong and Macau Command.

Dear Major Swan,

I am an instructor working in the City University of Hong Kong and a PhD candidate doing research at the Lingnan University of Hong Kong. I sincerely hope that you can grant me a visit of your school, to observe students' behavior when they play, and to talk to them about their favorite leisure activities.

My research is about the intricate relation between globalization process and local appropriations. My focus is on the setup of Disneyland Hong Kong and the cultural effects of the global circulation of Disney merchandize in our local lives, especially in the domestic sphere. There is always a strong association between Disney, childhood, and family. Part of my research is about how Disney and its transmedia products insert into our lives and how parents make use of Disney toys and edutainment merchandize to build up intimate relationship with their children and to develop children's personality.

Since peer groups have great influence on children's favorites and personality development, I would very much like to go to a kindergarten school to observe and experience how children play with each other in a school setting, to talk to them to see how their favorites (toys, characters, TV programs) have been influenced by their peers, and how they interpret their favorite Disney movies and characters.

I have already done several case studies and the findings have been presented in an international conference “Crossroads 2004 in Cultural Studies” held in the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, titled “Disney, Hong Kong families, and the formation of children’s subjectivities.” My research focus on the local appropriation of the global offerings receives major academic attention in the UK and USA, but has been relatively neglected in Hong Kong until recently. My research is indeed the first of its kind locally. The substance of the study would be tremendously enhanced if you can grant me a chance to visit your school and to talk to your students.

My correspondence address and phone number are as follows:

Address: Department of Cultural Studies,
Lingnan University,
Tuen Mun, Hong Kong.
Phone no.: 91XX 44XX

Attached please find a copy of the Crossroads 2004 conference abstract for your reference. If you have any questions on the research, please feel free to contact me.

Yours sincerely,

Kimburley Choi