

Lingnan University

Digital Commons @ Lingnan University

Theses & Dissertations

Department of History

10-3-2013

Economic factors led to the fall of Jin dynasty : focus on the economic effects after relocation of capital to Kaifeng

Ming Hong WONG

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.ln.edu.hk/his_etd



Part of the [History Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Wong, M. H. (2013). Economic factors led to the fall of Jin dynasty: Focus on the economic effects after relocation of capital to Kaifeng (Master's thesis, Lingnan University, Hong Kong). Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.14793/his_etd.4

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of History at Digital Commons @ Lingnan University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Lingnan University.

Terms of Use

The copyright of this thesis is owned by its author. Any reproduction, adaptation, distribution or dissemination of this thesis without express authorization is strictly prohibited.

All rights reserved.

**ECONOMIC FACTORS LED TO THE FALL OF JIN DYNASTY: FOCUS
ON THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS AFTER RELOCATION OF CAPITAL TO
KAIFENG**

WONG MING HONG

MPHIL

LINGNAN UNIVERSITY

2013

**ECONOMIC FACTORS LED TO THE FALL OF JIN DYNASTY: FOCUS
ON THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS AFTER RELOCATION OF CAPITAL TO
KAIFENG**

by

WONG Ming Hong

A thesis

**submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the Degree of
Master of Philosophy in History**

LINGNAN UNIVERSITY

2013

ABSTRACT

Economic Factors Led To The Fall Of Jin Dynasty:

Focus On The Economic Effects After Relocation Of Capital To Kaifeng

by

WONG Ming Hong

Master of Philosophy

This thesis traces ramifications of the relocation of the Imperial Capital during the Jin dynasty. It argues the decline and fall of the Jin is rooted in this relocation. In 1209-1213 C.E., faced with the Mongol military threat and a dire shortage of grains, the Jin dynasty (1115-1234) was forced to relocate its capital from Zhongdu to Nanjing (Kaifeng). The sudden move, however, crippled effective governance in the former capital and its surrounding areas, the Heshuo region. Here, poor governance was soon followed by swarms of bandits, and in particular led to the rise of the Red Jacket Bandits, decimating the Heshuo economy. In the new capital Nanjing (Kaifeng), the sudden and enormous influx of military households too created serious economic problems. They received large amount of stipend from the state but reluctant to farm. Desperate for resources, the Jurchen waged war against the Southern Song. It was a disaster for the Jin. The southern parts of Henan, a grain basket province of the Jin were ravaged by war, and millions of commoners fled to the Southern Song. More importantly, the Red Jacket Bandits, having received supplies from the Southern Song, managed to conquer large parts of Shandong, another important Jin province. Together, the lost of Shandong and the destruction of Henan, devastated Jin grain production. The Jurchen lost most of the battles against the Mongols partly because of their weaker military. But this thesis argues that their military defeat is also intimately tied to the precipitous decline of Jin grain production. The grains storage in the southern parts of Henan could not provide enough grains for the Jin armies to defend against attack. Eventually, the cities in Henan fell one by one.

DECLARATION

I declare that this is an original work based primarily on my own research, and I warrant that all citations of previous research, published or unpublished, have been duly acknowledged.



SIGNED

(Wong Ming Hong)
10th September, 2013

CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL OF THESIS

**ECONOMIC FACTORS LED TO THE FALL OF JIN DYNASTY:
FOCUS ON THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS AFTER RELOCATION OF CAPITAL
TO KAIFENG**

by
WONG Ming Hong
Master of Philosophy

Panel of Examiners:

SIGNED (Chairman)

Dr James Fichter

SIGNED (External Member)

Dr William Guanglin Liu

SIGNED (Internal Member)

Prof Richard Davis

SIGNED (Internal Member)

Dr Han Xiaorong

Chief Supervisor:
Prof Richard Davis

Co-supervisor:
Dr Lau Chi-pang

Approved for the Senate:

SIGNED

Prof. Jesús SEADE
Chairman, Postgraduate Studies Committee

03 OCT 2013

Date

CONTENTS

LIST OF MAP, TABLES.....	ii
LITERATURE REVIEW.....	1
BACKGROUND.....	15
CHAPTER 1: RELOCATION OF CAPITAL TO NANJING AND THE SITUATION OF HESHUO AFTER RELOCATION OF CAPITAL	32
CHAPTER 2: THE DEVELOPMENT IN HENAN AND ITS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS	42
CHAPTER 3: SOUTHERN EXPEDITION (1217-1224) AND RELATION WITH ECONOMY.	67
CHAPTER 4: ECONOMIC CRISIS ON THE EVE OF THE FALL OF DYNASTY.....	85
CONCLUSION.....	96
APPENDICES.....	107
BIBLIOGRAPHIES.....	113

Maps, Tables

Map

Map of Jurchen After 1142

Tables

Table 1: Comparison on Henan's Prefectures Between 1102 - 1207

Table 2: Tax Collection Could Not Reach the Demand of Military Expenditure

Table 3: Evaluation on the Amount of Tribute

Table 4: Serious Inflation of Grains in Nanjing in the Falling Jin Dynasty


Table 5: Flooding in Rivers since 1163 (Recorded in Treatise of Rivers and Canals)

Table 6: Serious Flooding in Henan

Table 7: Changes of Official Price of Salt Produced in Different Regions

Table 8: Income of Salt Tax in Different Places

Map of Jurchen After 1142



Source: Herbe Franke, edited by Denis Twitchett, *The Cambridge History of China Vol. 6*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978. Pp. 236-237.

Acknowledgement

I hereby thank all parties who have provided help to me during the research, including firstly Prof. Richard Davis, my supervisor, all professors of history department, scholars I met in the conference, senior classmates, friends, etc. I particularly thank Joseph Yau Chun Fai and Leo Kwan Kai Wan, a graduate of Lingnan University and now a Peking University' PhD student, and Xing Chenji, my Peking University classmate, for having devoted their valuable time in revising my thesis. I sincerely give a credit to them. I am solely responsible for all mistakes and misinterpretations in this thesis.

Literature Review

The economic problems of the Jin Dynasty after relocation of the capital to Nanjing (modern Kaifeng) relate to different spheres of disciplines. The fall of the Jin is a complex problem not only due to its economic and military policy, but also to its diplomatic policies - the changing relationship between the Jin and the Southern Song should not be ignored. This literature review will briefly list out the different scholarly arguments in a thematic arrangement.

The Fall of Dynasty

The causes of the fall of Jin Dynasty is a hotly debated topic in Jin history. Several historians have discussed the reasons of the fall of Dynasty.

Guo Renmin's article *The Rise and Fall of Jin Dynasty and its Relationship with Agricultural Production*¹ analyzes the fall of Jin Dynasty was due to the moral corruption of military households who frequently extorted peasants for grain, diminishing the incentive for farmers to expand agriculture. Moreover, the Jurchens also destroyed agricultural production. Guo's interpretation of these events is that the commoner or peasant class had lost their class struggle against the domineering and aristocratic military households. Another essay, *Analyzing the Political Situation of Late Jin and the Causes of its Decline*,² by Ren Chongyue, argues that the most important faultline was government corruption during Xuanzong's reign (1214-1223), while admitting other causes including relocate the capital to Nanjing, corruption of Xuanzong, officials and soldiers' lifestyle, financial problems, foreign relationship with Song and military strategy may have also contributed to the fall of the Jin.

In *Jurchen's Sinicization and the Fall of Great Jurchen Empire*³, Liu Pujiang argues the adoption of Han Chinese lifestyle by the Jurchen, especially their military households, ultimately corrupted the Jurchen and was the primary reason for their fall. Since the state heavily relied on military household, the corrupted army led to the fall of state. Sun Jiangquan's essay *Also on the Hypothesis of "Sinicization*

¹ Guo Renmin 郭人民. "Jin Chao Xing Wang Yu Nong Ye Sheng Chan De Guan Xi" (The Rise and Fall of Jin Dynasty and its Relationship with Agricultural Production), *Proceedings of Song, Khitan and Jurchen Social and Economic History*, Vol. 2, Hong Kong: Song Man Book Store, 1973.

² Ren Chongyue, "Lun Jin Mo Zheng Ju Ji Qi Mie Wang Yuan Yi" (Analyze the Political Situation of Late Jin and the Causes of its Decline), *Journal of Shangqiu Normal Institute*, 1987, Vol. 1.

³ Liu Pujiang, "Nu Zhen De Han Hua Dao Lu Yu Da Jin Di Guo De Fu Wang" (Jurchen's Sinicization and the Fall of Great Jurchen Empire), *China Studies*, Vol. 7. Peking University Publisher, 2000.

Destroyed the Jin Dynasty”⁴ criticizes Liu’s argument with a large body of primary sources, stating there was little relation between sinicization and the corruption of the Jurchen. He points out there might indeed be different factors leading to the fall of the Jurchen, but the corruption of politics and internal divisions from the reign of Zhangzong to Xuanzong (1189-1223), were the major factors.

Tao Jing-shen’s research on *The Jurchen in Twelfth-Century China*⁵ provides a brief academic review on the fall of the state. He quotes Liu Qi and Yuan Haowen’s view that the fall of Jin was due to incomplete sinicization. He also quotes the opposite opinion that the fall of Jin was due to the adoption of the literary culture of Song and the harsh policy of Liao. Tao comments that sinicization was not the cause of the decline of Jin, but is more prominently linked to the mass defections of Chinese and Khitan officials as well as a strong Mongol military machine.

Song Dejin also discusses this topic in *Debate on the Fall of Jin Dynasty*⁶ and provides further quotations of historians’ arguments through quoting several traditional historians’ view on related topic and concluded nine arguments. He quotes Yuan Haowen who witnessed the fall of Jin’s and attribute it to fate, while a similar opinion in Ming Dynasty was also made by He Qiaoxin. The second opinion, raised by Liu Qi, is wide-spread discrimination against Han Chinese. The third opinion, by Kublai Khan, was that the Jin had fell in the hands Confucian scholars. The fourth opinion is Genghis Khan attacked Jin on 1211 weakened the foundation of the state, quoted in *Biography of Chenyu of Jin Shi*. The fifth opinion, raised by the Qing scholar Zhao Yi, is that the Jin violated the peace treaty. The sixth opinion was by another Qing scholar. Li Ciming, who wrote a book review on *Gui Qian Zhi* (*Memoirs of Liu Qi*) and suggests that it was due to Xuanzong who gave up Zhongdu and relocated the capital to Nanjing. The seventh argument, introduced by Li Ye, is about the use of ‘wicked’ generals in the Sanfengshan battle. The eighth argument is about Song scholar Wu Qian’s opinion on the currency and inflation problem caused by large amount of paper money issued. The ninth argument, which was more

⁴ Sun Jiangquan, “Also on the Hypothesis of “the Hanization Destroyed the Jin Dynasty”, *The Proceedings of the International Symposium on the History and Archeology of the Liao and Jin Dynasties*, 2012, Vol. II.

⁵ Tao Jing-shen, *The Jurchen in Twelfth-Century China, A Study of Sinicization*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977. The opinion on the fall of Jin was due to the adoption of the literary culture of Song and the harsh policy of Liao was raised by editor of *Dynastic History of Jin Shi*

⁶ Song Dejin, edited by Han Shiming, “Da Jin Fu Wang Bian” (Debate on the Fall of Jin Dynasty) , *Proceeding of Song Liao Jin*, Beijing: Chinese Social Science Publisher, 2007.

dominated argument, was due to sinicization. This argument raised by Qing's emperor Taizong and Gaozong. Song Dejin pointed out the corruption of military affair after the reign of Zhangzong was the key factor led to the fall of Dynasty. Another important factor was the failure of foreign policy. Recently, Yu Wei's recent research *Relocation of Capital to Yan and Gave up Yan and the Relation to the fall of Jin Dynasty: The Problems of Politics and Geography Raised by the Shift of Political Center of Jin Dynasty*,⁷ based on geographic perspective, point out the relocation of capital to Yanjing (Modern Beijing) was the first step to the weakening of the state. Also, there were several debates on the factors related to relocation of capital. Some thought it was a sound idea for relocation of capital while some opposed the idea. Cai Dongzhou's article *Jin Moved the Capital to Bian and the Survival and Decline of Jin Dynasty*⁸ suggests that it was necessary for the Jurchens to relocate the capital because of geography. At the time, the powerful Mongols were poised to invade China, but large swaths of land near the old capital were not defensible terrain. He stated that it was a sensible decision for Xuanzong to relocate the capital to Kaifeng in order to stabilize Jin central authority. The fact that the Jin were able to muster a strong defense at the new capital, Nanjing (Kaifeng), is evidence that relocating the capital was a decision of foresight. In addition, he opined that the relocation of the capital had little to do with other disastrous events. The war with Southern Song was independent to the relocation of capital, and it was also not related to the loss of Zhongdu. He points out the that it was ten years after the relocation until general Wu Xian 武仙 retreated from the Hebei region. The loss of Zhongdu and Hebei region were not related to the relocation of the capital. It should be noted, nevertheless, the article does not mention the factors that drove the Mongols launching a western expedition, and also does not state that Wu Xian controlled Hebei region in 1225 just because he defect Mongol, assassinated Shi Tianyi, Mongolian general and joined Red Jacket Bandits, Jin actually lost Heshuo in 1220. Huo Mingkun and Hu Ye's article *Analyze Xuanzong Relocation to Kaifeng*⁹ also shows the similar argument as

⁷ Yu Wei, *Qian Yan, Qi Yan Yu Jin Zhi Shuai Wang: Jin Dai Zheng Zhi Zhong Xin Zhuan Yi Zhi Zheng Zhi Di Li Wen Ti (Relocation of Capital to Yan and Gave up Yan and the Relation to the fall of Jin Dynasty: The Problems of Politics and Geography Raised by the Shift of Political Center of Jin Dynasty)*, Seminar published in Chaoxing Website <http://video.chaoxing.com/play_400007062_94865.shtml>

⁸ Cai Dongzhou, "Jin Chao Qian Bian Yu Jin Chao Mie Wang" (Jin Moved the Capital to Bian and the Survival and Decline of Jin Dynasty), *Journal of Guizhou Normal Institute*, 1995. Vol. 1.

⁹ Huo Mingkun, Hu Ye, "Shi Xi Jin Xuanzong Qian Du Kaifeng" (Analyze Xuanzong Relocation to

Cai's article. It analyzes the political and military situation, and then proceeded to debate and discusses the several possible locations for relocation. He refuted all the other opinions, except Nanjing (Kaifeng). This article also stated the advantages of relocating the capital. However, the article did not describe the drawbacks of moving the capital to Nanjing. Furthermore, it quotes *Da Jin Guo Zhi*, an unreliable record, on the debate of relocation of capital. The faults of the article raised criticism from their colleague.¹⁰ Li Fanghao's article *Discussion about the strategy error of Jin dynasty capital moving Kaifeng*¹¹ comments the relocation of capital might not be a good idea because hundreds of court officials turned down the suggestion. Xuanzong decided to relocate the capital just because he trusted Shuhu Gaoqi and his judgment. He also argues that after Xuanzong moved to Nanjing, Xuanzong became complacent. He also points out several problems emerged after the relocation of the capital, including territory lost, financial problems, military crises. He states the Jin moved the capital to Nanjing led to the fall of Dynasty. It was only because the Mongols were preoccupied with their western expeditions that the Jin could continue to survive for twenty years after the relocation of the capital. He suggests the state should stay in Zhongdu which was defensible or move the capital back to Shangjing Huilingfu (Heilongjiang) which was far away from Mongolian invaders. Forty years before Li published his article, this idea was raised by Herbert Franke. He points out "one reason was certainly that from 1219 onward Chinggis Khan directed the greater part of his forces westward in order to attack western Asia; another factor may well have been the fear of the Mongols that united loyal Jurchens and Chinese against a common foe."¹²

Study on Historiographies

There are several predominant scholars who have deep analysis on the primary historical sources related to the topic. Several historians describe the contribution of

Kaifeng), *Northern Antiques*, 2009. Vol. 4.

¹⁰ The research was careless as Yuan Dynasty historian Su Tianjue had pointed out the history recorded in *Jin Guo Zhi* was unreliable. The mistake in the part related to relocation of capital was the most serious. Su Tianjue, *Zi Xi Wen Gao*, Beijing: Chunghwa Book Store, 1997. 25, p. 423. 蘇天爵，滋溪文稿，北京：中華書局。“金國志，皆不及見國史，其說多得於傳聞。蓋遼末金初稗官小說中間失實甚多，至如建元改號，傳次征伐，及將相名字，往往杜撰，絕不可信。如張師顏南遷錄尤為紕繆。”

¹¹ Li Fanghao, *Discussion about the strategy error of Jin dynasty capital moving Kaifeng*, *Historical Studies*, 2012, Vol. 6.

¹² *Cambridge History of China* Vol. 6. P. 259.

private history to the edit of *Jin Shi*. The significant research is Zhang Boquan, Cheng Nina and Wu Ruhuan's article *Zhongzhou Ji and Jin Shi*¹³, Wang Mingsun's article *Edit of State History and the History of Dynastic History of Jin Shi*¹⁴ and Chan Hok-lam's article, *Wang O's contribution to the History of the Chin Dynasty (1115-1234)*¹⁵. On the other hand, scholars of Chinese literature also argue the alternative sources on analysis of Jin Dynasty history, like the study of embassies' record. Such as West Stephen's book *Studies in Chin Dynasty (1115-1234) Literature*¹⁶ and article, *Discarded Treasure: The Wondrous Rocks of Lingbi*¹⁷ and Liu Pujiang's *Song embassy in the Examine the Quotation of Song Dynasty Embassy*¹⁸

Political History

Furthermore, there are several significant historical researches on the political history of Jin Dynasty affected economic development and ruling policies of Jin Dynasty. James T. C. Liu's article *The Jurchen-Song Confrontation: Song Overlooked Points*¹⁹ provides a comparison between Jurchen and Mongolian's invasion and ruling. Wang

¹³ Zhang Boquan, Cheng Nina and Wu Ruhuan, "Zhongzhou Ji Yu Jin Shi" (Zhongzhou Ji and Jin Shi), *Study of Liao Shi, Jin Shi and Yuan Shi*, Beijing: Chinese Encyclopedia Publisher, 2009. It described the contribution of Yuan Haowen's *Zhongzhou Ji* to the edit of *Dynastic History of Jin Shi (Jin Shi)*. It also pointed out the differences in recording historical facts between *Zhongzhou Ji* and *Jin Shi* and the judgment on some of persons. In addition, it stated the importance on using *Zhongzhou Ji* as supplements on studying Jin Dynasty history.

¹⁴ Wang Mingsun, "Jin Xiu Guo Shi Ji Jin Shi Yuan Liu" (Edit of state history and the history of dynastic history of Jin Shi), *Study of Liao Shi, Jin Shi and Yuan Shi*, Beijing: Chinese Encyclopedia Publisher, 2009. It provided the process of records in Jin Dynasty and the referred sources and provided major references of *Jin Shi*.

¹⁵ Chan Hok-lam, Wang O's contribution to the History of the Chin Dynasty (1115-1234), *China and the Mongols*, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1999. It analyzed the role of Wang O in editing *Jin Shi* during Yuan Dynasty and the relationship of his work *Runan Yishi* and *Jin Shi* of late Jin.

¹⁶ West Stephen, *Studies in Chin Dynasty (1115-1234) Literature*, Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms International, 1981. It provided analysis on several important literatures related to Jin Dynasty.

¹⁷ West Stephen *Discarded Treasure: The Wondrous Rocks of Lingbi*. International Conference of Cultural Meanings of Mobility. Mar 2008. It introduced three different diaries wrote by Song embassies, including Zhou Hui's *Record of a Northbound Cart*, Cheng Zhuo's *Record of Being Sent as an Emissary to the North* and Fan Chengda's *Record of Holding the Reins*. In the article, he used literature perspective, provided translation and compared the different perspective on description of Henan.

¹⁸ Liu Pujiang, "Song Dai Shi Chen Yu Lu Kao" (Examine the Quotation of Song Dynasty Embassy), *10-13 Century China's Cultural Shock and Integration*, Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publisher, 2006. It analyzed the writing purposes, types of records and provided an annotated bibliography of the records of the embassies of Song Dynasty.

¹⁹ Liu T. C. James, *The Jurchen-Song Confrontation: Song Overlooked Points*, *China Under Jurchen Rule*, New York: State University of New York Press, 1995. He pointed out the failure policy for Jin Dynasty to abrogate puppet Liu Yu led to the loss of support for Han Chinese to support the conquered whole China. He quoted Wu Xi's defect did not gained support from Han Chinese as example, and contrast with Mongolian's use of Han Chinese generals to conquered China.

Hongzhi's article *Emperor Shizong of the Jin Dynasty and the "Long Xing Peace Agreement"* (Between Southern Song and Jin)²⁰ analyzes Jin Dynasty economic advantages and its economic development after signing peace settlement with Song. On the aspect of general history of Jin Dynasty, He Junzhe's *Jin Dynasty History*²¹ also offers a detail introduction on political and economic historical background. He comments that Xuanzong attempted to solve the economic crisis, even the southern expedition was one of the policies to solve the economy. But these solutions failed to solve the major economic problems.²²

Military History

The success of military campaign was related to military preparation, including supply and logistics of grains. The result of wars further affected the economy. Huang Kuan-chong's *Work Collection of History of Southern Song*²³, *Anti Jin Voluntary Army in Southern Song*²⁴ and *The Regional Military Forces in Southern Song China: Studies of Regional Armies and Local Militias*²⁵ adopt Song's perspective to analyse the effect of these military force contributed to Shandong situation in late Jin. Li Tianming's *Song Yuan War History*²⁶ describes Shandong bandits and Song, Mongol and Jurchen's transition of political situation and their interaction after Jurchen moved to Kaifeng (1214) Public opinions, officials' arguments, geography and military power are analyzed. Han Zhiyuan's *Military History of Southern Song and Jin*²⁷ provides a general description on military system, organization and the wars between Song and Jin. Wang Zengyu also did a research on *Military System of Khitan and Jurchen*²⁸. It was a pioneer and deep research on

²⁰ Wang Hongzhi, "Jin Shizong Yu Long Xing He Yi" (Emperor Shizong of the Jin Dynasty and the "Long Xing Peace Agreement" (Between Southern Song and Jin)), *Proceedings of Liao and Song History* Vol. 2, Beijing: Documents Publisher, 1987.

²¹ He Junzhe, *Jin Chao Shi (Jin Dynasty History)*, Beijing: China Social Science Publisher, 1992.

²² He Junzhe, *Jin Chao Shi (Jin Dynasty History)*, Beijing: China Social Science Publisher, 1992. Pp. 436-437.

²³ Huang Kuan-chung, *Nan Song Shi Yan Jiu Ji (Work Collection of History of Southern Song)*. Taipei: Xin Wen Feng, 1985.

²⁴ Huang Kuan-chung, *Nan Song Shi Dai Kang Jin De Yi Jun (Anti Jin Voluntary Army in Southern Song)*, Taipei: Lian Jing Publisher, 1988.

²⁵ Huang Kuan-chung, *Nan Song Shi Di Fang Wu Li: Di Fang Jun Yu Min Jian Zi Wei Wu Li De Tan Tao (The Regional Military Forces in Southern Song China : Studies of Regional Armies and Local Militias)*. Taipei: Dong Da Gu Fen Tu Shu You Xian Gong Si, 2002.

²⁶ Li Tianming, *Song Yuan War History*, Taipei: Shi Huo Publisher, 1988.

²⁷ Han Zhiyuan, *Nan Song Jin Jun Shi Shi (Military History of Southern Song and Jin)*, Beijing: Military Science Publisher, 1984.

²⁸ Wang Zengyu, *Liao Jin Jun Zhi (Military System of Khitan and Jurchen)*, Baoding: Hebei

military system of Jin Dynasty.

Jin-Song Relationship

In addition, the interaction between Jurchen and Song was interrelated with Jin-Song relation after Jurchen relocated the capital. Zhao Yongcun's *History of Jin-Song Relationship*²⁹ describes the general transition of Jin-Song relationship and provided some comments on these policies. Richard Davis has published two books on Song-Jin relation in Song perspective. In *Court and Family in Sung China 960-1279*³⁰, he analyzes the foreign policies, which were adopted by three Song Prime Ministers from Shi family. In *The Cambridge History of China*³¹, he describes the raise and fall of Red Jacket Bandits in Shandong and the transition of Song's court policy to Jurchen. Wang Gaofei's *The Stop of Jiading Tribute and the Change of Song-Jin Relationship*³² also uses Song's perspective to discuss Song's termination of paying tribute and the deterioration of Song Jin relationship during the reign of Xuanzong (or Song's Jiading). Other work collections wrote by Song's scholars were referred, but there was a lack of analysis on the worsening relation in Jurchen perspective.

Economic History

There are a number of foreign scholars who have conducted deep researches on the economic history related to Jin Dynasty. Takahashi Hiroomi's book, *Study of Monetary History in Song, Jin and Yuan Dynasty*³³, provides a research on the late Jin's currency system. It refers to political and social factors. It also describes the economic problem caused by paper money. Mikami Tsugio's book, *Research on*

University Press, 2011. The research referred to wide ranges of historical documents and work collections and did a careful selection on sources. The research systemically managed the messy information of *Treatise of War in Jin Shi*, described the military household system, cavalryman, military expenditures, weapons, etc.

²⁹ Zhao Yongcun, *Jin Song Guan Xi Shi (History of Jin-Song Relationship)*, Beijing: People Publisher, 2005.

³⁰ Davis Richard Lee, *Court and Family in Sung China, 960-1279: Bureaucratic Success and Kinship Fortunes for the Shih of Ming-chou*, Duke: Duke University Press, 1986.

³¹ *The Cambridge History of China*, Volume 5: The Sung Dynasty and its Precursors, 907-1279 (Part 1), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, political narrative for the reigns of Kuang-tsung, Ning-tsung, and Li-tsung.

³² Wang Gaofei, *The Stop of Jiading Tribute and the Change of Song — Jin Relationship*, Journal of Mianyang Normal University, 2011, vol. 30.

³³ Takahashi Hiroomi, Trans. Lin Songtao. *Song Jin Yuan Huo Bi Shi Yan Jiu (Study of Monetary History in Song, Jin and Yuan Dynasty)*, Shanghai: Shanghai Classical Publisher, 2010.

*Jurchen in Jin Dynasty*³⁴ also presents an in depth analysis on military household system *Mengan Mouke* 猛安謀克 about its corruption, degeneration and economic impact in late Jin Dynasty. Tao Jing-shen's another work, *Analysis on Jurchen History*,³⁵ also discusses the social crisis of Jurchen society since middle Jin Dynasty. It suggests that it was due to the corruption of Jurchen people's lifestyle gained special right. Toyama Gunji's research, *Study of Jin Dynasty History*,³⁶ linked up economic situation to analyze mid-Jin's decision on military actions to Song and Mongol. It also describes the southward movement of Yellow River during the reign of Zhangzong and its effect on the tension between Jurchen and Han Chinese, and stated it might be one of the reasons for the fall of dynasty.

On the general economic history of Jin Dynasty, Herbert Franke describes the political situation of late Jin and introduces the economic development, trading, currencies, transportation and industries of Jin.³⁷ Chinese scholar Zhang Boquan's *General Economic History of Jin Dynasty*³⁸ is an early general economic history of Jin Dynasty done in China. Qi Xia's *General History on Liao Song Xi Xia Jin, Volume of Society and Economy*³⁹ also provides a general introduction of economy during Jin Dynasty.

In the research specific to the commercial development, Wang Depeng's *The Commercial economy research of the Jin Dynasty*⁴⁰ offers a general study of commercial development. He suggests that despite the recovery of economy of the Central Plain during mid Jin Dynasty, the commercial activities could not compare to the level of Northern Song. Furthermore, the research related to late Jin's economic

³⁴ Mikami Tsugio, trans. Jin Qicong. *Jin Dai Nu Zhen Yan Jiu (Research on Jurchen in Jin Dynasty)*, Harbin: Heilongjiang People Publisher, 1984.

³⁵ Tao Jing-shen, *Nu Zhen Shi Lun (Analysis on Jurchen History)*, Banqiao: Daoxiang Publisher, 2010.

³⁶ Toyama Gunji, trans. Li Dongyuan, *Jin Chao Shi Yan Jiu (Study of Jin Dynasty History)*, Harbin: Heilongjiang Choson Ethnic Publisher, 1988.

³⁷ Herbe Franke, edited by Denis Twitchett, *The Cambridge History of China* Vol. 6, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.

³⁸ Zhang Boquan, *Jin Dai Jin Ji Shi Lue (General Economic History of Jin Dynasty)*, Shenyang: Liaoning People's Publisher, 1981. He described the population, industries, business, etc. The book published just after Cultural Revolution, he used a radical socialism perspective to analyse Jin's economic development.

³⁹ Qi Xia, *Liao Song Xi Xia Jin Dai Tong Shi (General History on Liao Song Xi Xia Jin)*, Volume of Society and Economy, Beijing: People Publisher, 2010.

⁴⁰ Wang Depeng, *Jin Dai Shang Ye Jin Ji Yan Jiu (The Commercial Economy Research of the Jin Dynasty)*, Beijing: Documents on Social Science Publisher, 2011. The book includes different industries, trading, tax, etc. A wide range of sources including Song, Jin and Yuan's work collection and archaeological reports were referred. This is also the first study of commercial history of Jin Dynasty.

history include Japanese scholar Katō Shige's *Trading of Song and Jin*⁴¹ which provided a detail research on trading between Song and Jin. It describes the installation of trading, regulations of markets, exchanged product. *Tea, Money and Silk in the Trading Between Song and Jin*⁴² provides further detail in these specific products. He describes the smuggling activities on tea along the Huai River. He also quotes the work collections of Song and Jin to provide addition information on the flow of money. Furthermore, he compares the price of silk between Song and Jin and refers the data of production of silk in northern Song to explain the selling of silk from Jin to Song to exchange for tea. Quan Hansheng's *Smuggle Trading Between Song and Jin*⁴³ based on Katō Shige's research to provide extra sources on analysis. He points out the demand and supply of the above products between two states, and provided a unique argument of the necessary to smuggle for these two states as that there were different products produced in different latitude, but the river travelled in the similar latitude. Since there was strict regulation of markets trading between Song and Jin, thus the problems of smuggling rose. Qiao Youmei's research, *The Struggle of Coins in the Trading between Song and Jin*⁴⁴ further analyzes the change and the purpose of economic competition, and comments that Jin had intention and planning to procure the coins from Song. In 1982, mainland scholar Chen Xinquan also did a research, *Examine on Song-Jin Market Trading*⁴⁵ which is a detail, but highly similar with previous findings by other scholars.

On the specific theme of trading, Japanese scholar Kato Shige was one of the pioneers for the research of Jin Dynasty economic history. His research, *Study of Gold and Silver during Tang and Song Dynasty*⁴⁶ based on his good knowledge of

⁴¹ Katō Shige, *Trading of Song and Jin, Zhongguo Jin Ji Shi Kao Zheng (Examine on Chinese Economic History)*, Beijing: Commercial Publisher, 1963. This research not only referred to *Jin Shi*, but also quoted a large number of Song's sources including *Jiangyan Yi Lai Xi Nian Yao Lu*, *Song Hui Yao*, *Wen Xian Tong Kao*, etc. Thus, it provided a detail analysis on different types of products and the different demands of goods between two states.

⁴² Katō Shige, *Tea, Money and Silk in the Trading Between Song and Jin*, Beijing: Commercial Publisher, 1963.

⁴³ Quan Hansheng, "Song Jin Jiang De Zou Si Mao Yi" (Smuggle Trading Between Song and Jin), *Proceedings of Song, Khitan and Jurchen Social and Economic History*, Vol. 2, Hong Kong: Song Man Book Store, 1973. His research provided on quotations in other chapters in *Song Hui Yao* together with *Treaties of Food and Commodities of Song Shi* together as reference, to analyse the smuggling activity of grains, tea, salt, ginger, military necessities and money.

⁴⁴ Qiao Youmei, "Song Jin Mao Yi ZHONG ZHEN DUO TONG BI DE DOU ZHEN" (The Struggle of Coins in the Trading between Song and Jin), Shenyang: Liaoning People's Publisher, 1985.

⁴⁵ Chen Xinquan, "Song Jin Que Chang Mao Yi Kao Lue" (Examine on Song-Jin Market Trading), *Proceeding of Liao and Jin History*, Shenyang: Liaoning People's Publisher, 1985.

⁴⁶ Kato Shige, translated by Federal Reserve Bank of China, *Study of Gold and Silver during Tang and*

Song's Monetary History, he compares the usage of silver with Song and discusses the development of the regulation of the use of silver and the effect on paper money. American scholar, Chan Hok-lam's *Tea Production and Tea Trade Under the Jurchen-Chin Dynasty*⁴⁷ quotes some Song sources to provide detail analysis on the regulations of cross border markets. Chan also clarified the price of tea purchased from Song, recorded in *Song Shi*. Chan also based on the consumption of large amount of tea from Song to Jin to further explain the lack of resources, weak foundation and highly dependent of economy in Jin Dynasty.

Regional Economic History

Regional economic history could enhance the understanding of the development of Central Plain, but there was a lack of study of the Central Plain of Jin Dynasty. Recently, Chinese scholars have begun to conduct research on regional economic history, to analyze the evolution of the economic and industrial development of the region. However, part of the research just briefly describes Jin Dynasty's economic development. Yuan Ji's article *Commoner's Livelihood in the Northern Region of Yellow River during the Transition between Jin and Yuan Dynasty*⁴⁸ was a pioneer research, providing detail description on the livelihood of commoners under the policy of late Jin and early Yuan government. A wide range of inscription on the gravestone recorded in work collections of early Yuan scholars were quoted, as a valuable supplementary record for the official Jin and Yuan history on basic level of society.

On the economic research on Hebei, Xie Zhicheng has published an article *Jin Dynasty's Development and Recover of Economic in Hebei*⁴⁹. Two years ago, Xing Tie's *Hebei's Economy in Song Liao Jin Period*⁵⁰ provided a general introduction of economy in different aspects in Hebei region. However, the research was lack of

Song Dynasty, Hong Kong: Lung Mun Book Store, 1970.

⁴⁷ Chan Hok-lam, *Tea Production and Tea Trade Under the Jurchen-Chin Dynasty*, *Studies on the Jurchen and the Chin Dynasty*, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1997.

⁴⁸ Yuan Ji, 'Commoners' "Jin Yuan Zhi Ji Jiang Bei Zhi Ren Min Sheng Huo" (Commoners' Livelihood in the Northern Region of Yellow River During the Transition Between Jin and Yuan Dynasty), *Collection of Thesis of Yuan Shi*, Taipei: Taiwan Commercial Press, 1974.

⁴⁹ Xie Zhicheng, "Jin Dai He Bei Jin Ji De Fa Zhan He Hui Fu" (Jin Dynasty's Development and Recover of Economic in Hebei), *Hebei Academic Journal*, 1990, Vol. 3. In the article, he referred to a wide range of Jin and Song sources, including literary sketches, gazetteers and work collections, together with the archaeology report, to offer an overall research on the economic development in Hebei and analyze the rise and fall of the economy there.

⁵⁰ Xing Tie, *Hebei's Economy in Song Liao Jin Period*, Beijing: Science Publisher, 2011.

information and analysis on the rise and fall of the economy. This research has plenty of room for further improvement. On the research on Henan economic history, Cheng Minsheng, Cheng Feng and Ma Yuchen's recent published book *Ancient Henan Economic History*⁵¹ is a general economic history of Henan. It discusses the evolution of Henan's economy. However, it seldom mentions the economic problems of Henan in late Jin. Thus my thesis will mainly analyze the economic problems pertaining to the late Jin period.

Study on Tax

On the study of tax, Herbert Franke's A Note on Wine⁵² described the drinking habit on Jin Dynasty and the wine tax collected. Furthermore, Liu Pujiang also analyzed on the tax of Jin Dynasty in his articles, *Discussion on Properties and Properties Tax in Jin Dynasty*⁵³ and *Analysis on Jin Dynasty's Miscellaneous Levies*.⁵⁴

Population History

Population size is one of the heated discussion topics among Chinese scholars. They have attempted to speculate the amount of grains consumption and tax collection. On the analysis of population and households' history of Jin Dynasty, Wu Songdi's *Chinese Migration History*,⁵⁵ analyzing work collections, gazetteers and official histories, study the southward movement of population during the reign of Zhenyou (1213-1217). The origin and destination of migration are identified, and the number of migration is speculated. It is essential to fill up the gap from the *Jin Shi*. His book, *Chinese Population History*⁵⁶, further elaborates the argument by analyzing the

⁵¹ Cheng Minsheng, Cheng Feng and Ma Yuchen, *Gu Dai Henan Jinji Shi (Ancient Henan Economic History)*, Kaifeng: Henan University Press, 2012.

⁵² Herbert Franke, A Note on Wine, *Studies on the Jurchen and the Chin Dynasty*, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1997. He commented the large consumption of wine was a habit of northern people, similar to Mongols. He quoted several sources of Accounts of Great Jurchen, which might undermine the argument.

⁵³ Liu Pujiang, "Lun Jin Dai De Wu Li Yu Wu Li Qian" (Discussion on Properties and Properties Tax in Jin Dynasty), *Historical Essays on Liao and Jin Dynasty*, Shenyang: Liaoning University Publisher, 1999.

⁵⁴ Liu Pujiang, "Jin Dai Zha Shui Lue Lun" (Analysis on Jin Dynasty's Miscellaneous Levies), *Historical Essays on Liao and Jin Dynasty*, Shenyang: Liaoning University Publisher, 1999. The previous one described the significant of the setup of united property tax and labor service policy, and introduced the detail of the implementation of tax. In the later one, he also provided an introduction on all types of tax recorded in *Jin Shi*.

⁵⁵ Wu Songdi, *Zhongguo Yi Min Shi (Chinese Migration History)*, Volume 4. Fuzhou, Fujian People Publisher, 1998.

⁵⁶ Wu Songdi, *Zhongguo Ren Kou Shi (Chinese Population History)*, Volume 3. Shanghai: Fudan

population density and compare with the previous dynasty, to prove that during mid Jin Dynasty, there was negative population growth in Henan.

Furthermore, the topic of households recorded in the *Treaties of Geography* in *Jin Shi* was a heated debate among historians. Liang Fangzhong's research *Survey on Chinese Historical Households, Farmland and Tax*⁵⁷ based on *Treaties of Geography*, identifies that Jin had an overall population increase in 1223. However, Han Guanghui's *Correctness of Households in Treatise of Geography of Jin Shi*⁵⁸ points out that there was unlikely a sharp population growth in Kaifeng from 1152-1207. He suggests that Kaifeng's households should be around 400,000 during the reign of Zhangzong and the numbers in *Treatise of Geography* was recorded in 1207. The 1,746,210 households recorded in *Treatise of Geography* should be during the reign of Xuanzong. Wang Yumin's *Analysis on households recorded in Treatise of Geography in Jin Shi*⁵⁹ provides supplementary arguments and points out the different number of households recorded in *Treatise of Food and Commodities* and *Treatise of Geography* and notes that the number of households in *Treatise of Geography* should not be recorded in 1208. It also suggests that different regions should be recorded in different time periods. Liu Pujiang's article *Study of Jin Dynasty Households*⁶⁰ suggests the year the household figures recorded in *Treatise of Geography* was in 1207. But this figure did not include the military household. After including the military households, it had a consistence growth rate of household and population by around 9 and 10%, compared with previous year. He also points out register of refugees and migration led to the increase of number. He also speculates that the households in the Central Plain, with reference to *Yuan Shi*, should be around 2.5 million and 13,600,000 people in the period of late Jin. He also proves that the number of households referred to *Treatise of Food and Commodities* as the *Treatise of Geography* was not reliable.

University Press, 2000.

⁵⁷ Liang Fangzhong, *Zhongguo Li Dai Hu Kou, Tian Di, Tian Fu Tong Ji* (*Survey on Chinese Historical Households, Farmland and Tax*), Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publisher, 1980.

⁵⁸ Han Guanghui, "Jin Shi Di Li Zhi Hu SHu Xi Nian Zheng Wu" (*Correctness of Households in Treatise of Geography of Jin Shi*), Beijing: Chinese Encyclopedia Publisher, 2009. He also pointed out the population dropped rapidly after the war in late Jin recorded in biographies, thus the population number should not be recorded in late Jin.

⁵⁹ Wang Yumin, "Jin Shi Di Li Zhi Hu Kou Xi Nian Bian Xi" (*Analysis on households recorded in Treatise of Geography in Jin Shi*), *Study of Liao Shi, Jin Shi and Yuan Shi*, Beijing: Chinese Encyclopedia Publisher, 2009.

⁶⁰ Liu Pujiang, "Jin Dai Hu Kou Yan Jiu" (*Study of Jin Dynasty Households*), *Historical Essays on Liao and Jin Dynasty*, Shenyang: Liaoning University Publisher, 1999.

Geographic History and Studies of Capitals

There was a close connection of selection of capitals with the economic development, transportation and geographic position. The following will describe some of the important researches in related aspect.

On the capital studies, Shi Nianhai's *Chinese Ancient Capitals and Culture*⁶¹ describes the studies of ancient capitals and its criteria. It also discusses the relation between the capital and military, natural factor, economy, transportation and other factors. Wang Hui's *Chinese Geographic History*⁶² also describes ancient capital's purpose of setting and the advantages and disadvantages on setting there. He points out Song still set the capital in Kaifeng because of the convenience of canal transportation.⁶³ Kaifeng was "the essential place for southern goods to transport to the north. There was none of natural barrier. Also it faced the threat from Yellow River. It was for the convenience of canal transportation but lack of long term insight"⁶⁴ Liu Yingchun's *Discover the Secrets of Kaifeng Cities*⁶⁵ is a recent research on the study of the evolution of ancient capital Kaifeng. .

In the studies related to Jin Dynasty transportation, Quan Hansheng's *Transportation Canals and Tang Song Emperor*⁶⁶ argues the use of function of canals transportation during the period of Song Jin confrontation, and the consequences of the interruption of the canals.

Other Studies

Labour services also related to the economic development. Chan Hok-lam's *Labour Service Under the Chin* introduced different types of labour service and the related taxes. It also discussed the labours mobilized through the construction of Kaifeng

⁶¹ Shi Nianhai, *Zhongguo Gu Du He Wen Hua (Chinese Ancient Capitals and Culture)*, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Store, 1998.

⁶² Wang Hui, *Zhongguo Li Shi Di Li (Chinese Geographic History)*, Taipei: Student Book Shop, 1979.

⁶³ Wang Hui, *Zhongguo Li Shi Di Li (Chinese Geographic History)*, Taipei: Student Book Shop, 1979, p. 353

⁶⁴ Wang Hui, *Zhongguo Li Shi Di Li (Chinese Geographic History)*, Taipei: Student Book Shop, 1979, p. 53

⁶⁵ Liu Yingchun, *Jie Mi Kaifeng Cheng Xia Cheng (Discover the Secrets of Kaifeng Cities)*, Beijing: Science Publisher, 2009. It referred to a wide range of sources including work collections, and also archaeological report to analyze the history of Kaifeng region and the construction and repair of the city. It based on archaeological findings to prove the scale of reconstruction of Kaifeng city during the reign of Hailingwang (1150-1161)

⁶⁶ Quan Hansheng, *Tang Song Di Guo Yu Yun He (Transportation Canals and Tang Song Emperor)*, Taipei: Chunghwa Book, 1956.

capital repair on rivers, and other factors.

In this thesis, it will focus on the problems caused by relocation of capital to Kaifeng in late Jin. The research will focus on economic factor, policies and the consequences. There is not doubt that the fall of Jin Dynasty was mainly due to military loss to Mongols. Mongols was the most recent highly uncivilized authority which successfully eliminated one of the most civilized states, Jin Dynasty. It had eliminated 40 states including Xi Xia before the fall of Jin,⁶⁷ and later conquered entire China proper and most region of Eurasia. Thus, the economic factor was interrelated to the military loss. Furthermore, the failure on military strategy during the reign of Weishaowang (1208-1213) caused the damage of Hebei and Shandong was another major reason. However, we should not neglect the factor, particularly the drawbacks of several economic policies implemented after Xuanzong relocated to Kaifeng, including destruction of the economy and social foundation of the state. That further undermined the state's military strength.

⁶⁷ *Runan Yishi*, 2, p. 20.

Background

During mid-Jin Dynasty, the state focused on developing Hebei and Shandong to support Zhongdu, but only few resources spent on Henan. Thus after relocation of capital, the underdeveloped Henan required further development.

In addition, Mongolian invasion and flooding of Yellow River during mid-Jin Dynasty created serious economic destruction to the state, shown by rise of tax rate since 1190s. Fortunately the state did not lose any territory so that the economy could be recovered within years. Zhangzong implemented mild economic policies to handle the worsened economic problems. It was a contrast to the economic policy adopted by Xuanzong after losing northern part of the Central Plain.

Section 1 Economic Development in Zhongdu and Neighboring Regions in Mid Jin Dynasty (1161-1208)

Historians claimed the Jin Dynasty's economic development reached the peak during the two reigns of Shizong and Zhangzong. As early as in the reign of Hailingwang (Reign: 1150-1161), Jin relocated the capital to Zhongdu (Modern Beijing) and Nanjing (Modern Kaifeng) respectively. The next emperor Shizong (1161-1189) returned the capital to Zhongdu. The Central Plains, especially the regions around Zhongdu, Hebei (Jin's Hebei, northern side of Yellow River) had extraordinary economic development. It was explained by well-developed river transportation and busy business activities.

Hebei's River Transportation and Granaries

Zhongdu was convenient for transportation. Hailingwang decided to relocate the capital to Zhongdu because it could easily control the Central Plains.⁶⁸ Hebei and

⁶⁸ Both *Jian Yan Yi Lai Xi Nian Yao Lu* and *Old Story of Beijing* recorded the story. In *Jian Yan Yi Lai Xi Nian Yao Lu*, it recorded that Hailingwang quite admired to the capital set in the Central Plains. Thus, he planned to relocate the capital. Some suggestions pointed out that Yanjing is the centre of territory, which could solve the problems of current remote capital. Thus the emperor decided to move the capital to Yanjing. (*Jian Yan Yi Lai Xi Nian Yao Lu*, 161. P.327-259.) *Story of Hailingwang* 《正隆事跡》 also recorded that officials suggested that Huilingfu 會寧府 of Shangjing was in a remote area. Officials were hard to send the message while people were difficult to go to capital. Yanshan 燕山 was a better option as the centre of the world. The emperor accepted the idea and immediately constructed a capital city in Yanshan. He spent three years to finish it. (*Story of Hailingwang*; as cited

Shandong region transported the grains to the capital through river transportation. *Yuan Yi Tong Zhi* recorded there were more than ten rivers and canals around Dadu (modern Beijing, Jin Dynasty's Zhongdu) connecting neighboring regions in Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368).⁶⁹ The waterways mainly passed through northern part of the Central Plain.⁷⁰ For example, taxes collected from Xianzhou and Qingzhou were transported upstream to Tongzhou, ten more days later arrived to the capital.⁷¹ The cities along the canals set up granaries.⁷² The river transportation system in Hebei could transport dozen thousands to over a million piculs of grains to the capital in short term.⁷³

Moreover, Lugou River development project was implemented in 1170.⁷⁴ It aimed at transferring products from southern circuits to the capital to enhance business activity.⁷⁵ Unfortunately, the project was not successful.⁷⁶ Furthermore, to ensure the smooth transportation of the grains, the government devoted 6000 military laborers to excavating the canals in 1205.⁷⁷ It shows that the river transportation in Hebei and Shandong was crucial to the state's economy.

Grain Supplies from Manchuria

The state also transported the grains from Manchuria to the Central Plain, where the place was rich in grains production. *Yuan Dynasty's Gazetteers on Unification* describes that Liaoyang produced different types of grains products.⁷⁸ The

in Yu Minzhong (edit), *Research on the Old Story of Beijing*, 4, p. 60.) Another source, *The Record of Yangwang in the River* 《楊王江上錄》 also provided detail information about the pretext of moving the capital to Yanjing. Liang Hanchen, inner court servant suggested that Yanjing was an ancient hegemonic place which can supervise The Central Plains, and build up thousand generations of foundation. (*The Record of Yangwang in the River*; as cited in *Research on the Old Story of Beijing*, 4, p. 59.)

⁶⁹ Bei Lanxi, etc. *Yuan Yi Tong Zhi*, Chapter 1, Shanghai: Chunghwa Book Store, 1966. Furthermore, there were several waterways in Hebei and Shandong used for irrigation and transportation, like Juma River in Bazhou, Sha River in Xiongzhou, Beiqing River in Shandong. *JS*, 27, p. 682.

⁷⁰ *JS*, 27, p. 684 The canals passed through three metropolitan prefectures (fu) including Daxing, Daming and Zhangde, 12 prefectures (zhou) and 33 counties (Xian).

⁷¹ *JS*, 27, p. 682

⁷² *JS*, 27, p. 682

⁷³ *JS*, 27, p. 686; *JS*, 27, p. 683; *JS*, 27, p. 682, 684

⁷⁴ *JS*, 27, p. 686.

⁷⁵ *JS*, 27, p. 686.

⁷⁶ *JS*, 27, p. 682.

⁷⁷ *JS*, 27, p. 648

⁷⁸ *Yuan Yi Tong Zhi*, 2, pp. 204-205.

agricultural production in northeast was more than three times of surplus annually. The excess grains were stored. The accumulated storage in granaries was 2,476,000 piculs.⁷⁹ The grains storage in Manchuria granaries were not for relief purpose before 1177.⁸⁰ Thus there was large amount of storage of grains for these granaries sufficient for tens of years.

Through the Grand Canal in Shandong, the grains in Liaodong and Beijing (modern Jinzhou and Inner Mongolia) were transported to Shandong by vessels traveling through the sea.⁸¹ Through the canal, Hebei and the Central Plains could have easily access to the resources in Northeast if the Central Plain was suffered from starvation.

Business in Hebei and Zhongdu

The busy business activity reflected the flourish economic development. The increase of commercial tax collected was also strongly related to the economic growth.

Silk Production Ground and Commercial Activities

Zhongdu had long been a commercial city. Through being Jurchen's capital for 50 years, the place had growing business activities. Jin Dynasty levied commercial tax in 1180, and procured huge amount of tax collected. That became a large proportion of Jin's tax income. Also, *Yuan Dynasty's Gazetteers on Unification* records different types of silk products that were made in Anzhou of Dadu circuit.⁸² The trade of high valued silk product enhanced the commercial activities in the capital as well.

Through the increasingly busy business activity and the raise of commercial tax rate, the state benefitted from around one third increase in tax income. During the reign of Dading (1161-1189), Zhongdu gained 164,440 strings of commercial tax annually. In 1196, the annual commercial tax rose to 214,579 strings.⁸³ There was about 30% increase of the collected commercial tax. If we exclude the 1 to 2% increase in the tax rate, there was still around 28 and 29% of increase in commercial tax, which shows the rapid increase of business activity in Zhongdu.

⁷⁹ *JS*, 50, p. 1122 It recorded there were total amount of 205,000 piculs grains tax collected annually in Shangjing and neighbouring circuits. The annual expenditure was just 66,000 piculs.

⁸⁰ *JS*, 7, p. 166.

⁸¹ *JS*, 27, p. 683

⁸² *Yuan Yi Tong Zhi*, 1, p. 19.

⁸³ *JS*, 49, p. 1110

Wine tax was another important source of income to Jin Dynasty's economy. It was also a sign of the flourish of business activity in Zhongdu and neighbouring metropolitan prefectures. Before 1190, wine tax collected in Zhongdu was 361,500 strings annually, and increased to 405,133 strings in 1195, increased 20%. In Xijing, the original tax collected was 53,467 strings, increased 50% to 107,893 strings in 1195.⁸⁴ It was directly related to the rapid growth of economy in northern China as well.

Food Production in Zhongdu

Food supply is important to measure the economy of the place. *Yuan Yi Tong Zhi* recorded that grains, fishes, ducks, salt were produced in Baodi (Tianjin) while grains were grown in Wanping (Xicheng District of modern Beijing) and Changping (Changping District) near Dadu.⁸⁵ In addition, *Da Yuan Hun Yi Fang Yu Sheng Lan* recorded Daxingfu of Yanjing (Zhongdu) had plenty water supply and the land was fertilized.⁸⁶ There was large amount of wet paddy fields. The wet paddy field benefited from the irrigation system in Zhongdu brought 10,000 hu (5,000 piculs) for the region annually.⁸⁷ Furthermore, there was trial implementation of "Quzongfa" or "Section Planting Method" in the southern region of capital, Hedong and Daizhou.⁸⁸ It showed that the state devoted its attention in Zhongdu's agricultural production.

By analyzing the Hebei's economy before relocation of capital, we can understand that Hebei and Shandong was the pillar of Jin Dynasty's economy.

Section 2 Economic Development in Henan in Mid Jin Dynasty

Henan was not the core of Jin Dynasty's economic development before relocation of capital. During the discussion of the project on Yellow River, Emperor Zhangzong (Reign: 1189-1208) had stated that:

The state had long been considering the flooding in Hebei and dams had been

⁸⁴ *JS*, 49, p. 1106.

⁸⁵ *Yuan Yi Tong Zhi*, Chapter 1, pp. 18-19.

⁸⁶ *Da Yuan Hun Yi Fang Yu Sheng Lan*, 203, p. 23.

⁸⁷ *JS*, 73, p. 2846.

⁸⁸ *JS*, 50, pp. 1123-1124.

constructed...Reviewing the entire state, although the region in Shandong is more important than Henan, all commoners are my son and there should be no differences among them.⁸⁹

Zhangzong's words suggest that Henan was strategically less important than Shandong before Xuanzong relocated the capital to Henan. At that time, Henan was in a remote region and its economy was underdeveloped. Zhangzong's policy of opening up Henan region stimulated a sharp rise of population in Henan, but its economy was still far lagged behind compared with Northern Song. The canal transportation was worse than Northern Song era and also Hebei region. Although there were large areas of land, just a few people lived there, probably due to the instable situation of this border region. The poverty of Henan shows that the state had to put extra resources after relocation of capital.

Song envoy Lou Yue recorded that Henan was still a region of poverty because Jurchen had confiscated commoner's properties during Jinkang incident in 1127 and transferred the treasures to Shangjing, thus there was only little resources left in Henan.⁹⁰ *Bianjing Yi Ji Zhi* also has recorded that all the treasures stored in Bianjing were taken by Jurchen barbarian.⁹¹ The flourish Henan was turned a poor region. Lou commented that it was not worth for Song to recover this barren Henan.⁹² Another Song envoy who visited Jin one year later also commented that the damaged Kaifeng had not been recovered until Hailingwang relocated the capital there. The palace was "beautiful", but the common area was "barren". The new city was still ruined. There was some farmland inside the city.⁹³ Since Nanjing was the economic centre of Nanjinglu, or Henan, the ruined Nanjing showed that Henan was devastated during mid-Jin Dynasty.

Backwarded River Transportation in Henan

Although river and canals transportation in Henan was well developed in Northern

⁸⁹ JS, 27, p. 678. 向慮河北決，措畫堤防，猶嘗置行省，...自國家觀之，雖山東之地重於河南，然民皆赤子，何彼此之間。

⁹⁰ Lou Yue, *Bei Xing Ri Lu*, in Zhao Yongchun edited, *Feng Shi Liao Jin Xing Cheng Lu*, p. 252

⁹¹ *Bianjing Yi Ji Zhi*, 13, 12.

⁹² Ibid, p. 253.

⁹³ Fan Chengda, Lan Pei Lu, in Zhao Yongchun edited, *Feng Shi Liao Jin Xing Cheng Lu*, p. 277

Song, it was obsoleted during mid-Jin Dynasty. In the *Treatise of River and Canals* of *Jin Shi*, the three famous transportation canals around Dongjing (Kaifeng) in Northern Song, namely Guangji River, Bian River and Huimin River traveling to the southern region of Henan were not recorded. Henan's canals was a large contrast to the the usage and maintenance of Hebei's canals in mid-Jin Dynasty. *Bei Xing Ri Lu* described Henan's river did not have any maintenance:

The Yellow River breeched its (Southlake) banks in the fifth month of last year, and there was much damage. The waters of the Yellow River merged with Southlake, washing away the old road. Brushwood was piled on top of it, and then straw and dirt in order to give carts and horses access.⁹⁴

Lou also recorded that the wheat was cultivated in the bottom of Bian River.⁹⁵ It showed part of Bian River was dried up already. Zhou Hui, another Song's envoy also witnessed that the Bian River turned shallow. It was blocked in Biankou. He remembered that in Northern Song, 6,000,000 piculs grains transported from Yangzhou, passed through Yangtze River and Huai River and Bian River to Kaifeng within 40 days. 50 years after the fall of Northern Song, he lamented the river became a drainage.⁹⁶ Moreover, Bian River dried up in Lingbi county (Anhui), region near Suzhou 宿州,⁹⁷ the river could not be functioned for transportation between north and south as the past. *Yuan Yi Tong Zhi* recorded the name of Bian River as Bian Canal (汴渠).⁹⁸ It showed the Bian River turned narrow during Jin Dynasty. In late Northern Song, Wang Anshi had conducted large scale construction work in Bian River in winter for the transportation in winter.⁹⁹ However, the effort was in vain after Jurchen conquered Henan.

Development in Henan During Zhangzong

During the 40 years peaceful period after the signing of peace settlement with

⁹⁴ Lou Yue, Translated by Stephen H. West, *A Diary of My Journey to the North*. Online article < xirugu.com/Beixing3.pdf > 去歲五月，河決所損甚多。河水今與南湖通，衝斷古路，用柴木橫迭其上，積草土以行車馬。

⁹⁵ Lou Yue, *Bei Xing Ri Lu*, p.253.

⁹⁶ Zhou Hui, Bei Yuan Lu, in Zhao Yongchun edited, *Feng Shi Liao Jin Xing Cheng Lu*, p. 312

⁹⁷ Zhou Hui, Bei Yuan Lu, , in Zhao Yongchun edited, *Feng Shi Liao Jin Xing Cheng Lu*, p. 312

⁹⁸ *Yuan Yi Tong Zhi*, Chapter 3, p. 238.

⁹⁹ *Yuan Yi Tong Zhi*, Chapter 3, p. 239.

Southern Song in 1164, Jurchen started to encourage people open up Henan. In 1187, Jin government provided tax exemption and subsidies to encourage refugees to cultivate several prefectures in the southern border like Tangzhou, Dengzhou, Yinzhou, Caizhou, Shuzhou, Sizhou and so on.¹⁰⁰ Henan had large amount of farmland but there was a lack of farmers. Even Hedong (Shanxi) had more population than Henan. Court officials proposed to cultivate the farmland in Henan to solve the overcrowded problem and shortage of farms in neighbor circuits.¹⁰¹ At that time, Henan was benefited from relatively mild climate, (See Appendices) thus the region started to develop. In 1192, Henan still had 63,520 qing of grazing land not yet distributed, while neighboring Shanxi Province had 35,680 qing.¹⁰² The open up policy of Henan region failed. In 1208, the state continued to encourage peasants to open up barren farmland by exempting the tax from one to three years.¹⁰³

We could refer to Liu Pujiang's quotation on the number of households with northern Song's data in 1102 and Jin's data in 1207 from *Song Shi* and *Jin Shi*.

Table 1: Comparison on Henan's Prefectures Between 1102 - 1207

Prefectures	Households in 1207	Households in 1102	Prefectures	Households in 1207	Households in 1102
Guidefu	76389	79741	Ruzhou	35254	41587
Shanzhou	65545	61409	Bozhou	60535	130119
Shanzhou	41010	47806	Chenzhou	26145	32064
Dengzhou	24989	114127	Caizhou	36093	98502
Tangzhou	11031	202172	Xizhou	9685	
Henanfu	55635	127767	Zhengzhou	45657	55976
Songzhou	26649		Yinzhou	16714	78174
Xuzhou	45587	66041	Suzhou	55058	91483
Junzhou	18510		Sizhou	8092	63632

Source: Liu Pujiang, *Study of Jin Dynasty's Households, History Essays on Liao and Jin Dynasty*, p. 160.

Liu Pujiang comments that the prefectures closed to the border with Song like

¹⁰⁰ *JS*, 47, p. 1048.

¹⁰¹ *JS*, 47, p. 1048.

¹⁰² *JS*, 47, p. 1050.

¹⁰³ *JS*, 47, p. 1060.

Tangzhou had only 5.5 % of households compared with 100 years ago. The other border prefectures like Caizhou, Dengzhou and Yinzhou also showed a large contrast compared with northern Song, with around 15% and 40% differences.¹⁰⁴ Thus, it was not surprising to see that Jin's population growth was caused by the large amount of immigration. However, the number of households in Henan in 1207, when the state's population reached the peak,¹⁰⁵ was still largely inferior to that in northern Song. Cheng Minsheng comments that the economy of Henan Jin Dynasty's was not "as poor as we imagine".¹⁰⁶ But we can see that, however, despite the high growth rate, most regions in Henan were underdeveloped before the capital had relocated to there. Henan was still backward when compared with most circuits in the Central Plains.

Section 3: Changing Route of the Yellow River

During mid Jin Dynasty, the state's river management focused on the northern riverbank and neglected the south. That caused the Yellow River changed its course to the south, and later affected Henan region. *Jin Shi* describes that both Huai and Yellow River belonged to Jin's territory after the fall of Liu Yu's authority. Through these dozen years, Yellow River sometimes blocked and sometimes flooded, and changed its route frequently.¹⁰⁷ Flooding not only destroyed residents' properties, but also affected the neighbouring regions. A large number of soldiers and resources were devoted to flood prevention.¹⁰⁸

Jurchen put large amount efforts to monitor and conduct flood prevention project in Yellow River during the reign of Shizong and Zhangzong (1161-1208). Yellow River started diverge its route since the flooding occurred in 1168. 60% of water flowed southward but the state did not intervene the changing of water flow.¹⁰⁹ In 1190, the

¹⁰⁴ Liu Pujiang, *Study of Jin Dynasty's Households, History Essays on Liao and Jin Dynasty*, p. 160. He explained that Since Jurchen occupied Henan, Henan had long been the border with Southern Song. The agricultural production was far inferior to the period ruled by Northern Song because of continuous wars in early Jin Dynasty. P.159

¹⁰⁵ *JS*, 46, p. 1035.

¹⁰⁶ Cheng Minsheng, Cheng Feng and Ma Yuchen, *Ancient Henan Economic History*, Kaifeng: Henan University Press, 2012. P. 270.

¹⁰⁷ *JS*, 27, p. 669

¹⁰⁸ *JS*, 27, p. 670, 672 In the region along the river, the state established 12,000 soldiers for flood prevention, provided them with 1,113,000 bunches of firewood and 1,830,700 bunches of grass for flood preparation.

¹⁰⁹ *JS*, 27, p. 670

state decided to diverge some of water flow to the south.¹¹⁰ Furthermore, the construction project of Yellow River allowed Caozhou and Shanzhou to be flooded but prevent Shandong being flooded in future to minimize labor work¹¹¹ and not to affect the farmland and salt field.¹¹² It showed Jurchen's economic center was in Shandong region. The court aimed to reduce its negative effect on northern riverbank. Under the project, 25 dams were constructed along the river. 6 in the south while 19 in the north.¹¹³ After Zhangzong had determined to take a series of measure to prevent flooding, then Yellow River had not been flooded in Heshuo region after 1194. (See Appendices)

The reparation work successfully protected the northern part of Yellow River. However, Yellow River changed to a southern route, limited the territory of Jin Dynasty after relocation of capital. Li Tianming commented it was the forth changing route of Yellow River amount history.¹¹⁴ Indeed, the two serious flooding in Henan in 1216 and 1220 was probably related to the changed route of Yellow River. The pertaining economic problems would be narrated later.

Section 4 Several Economic Features of Mid Jin Dynasty

Jin Dynasty's economy reached the peak in 1180s and the Jin court reduced the amount of tax on daily necessity since the middle period of the reign of Dading. There were a number of scholars, particularly Xie Zhicheng¹¹⁵, Cheng Minsheng¹¹⁶, Qi Xia and Qiao Youmei, who compares the economic situation in mid Jin Dynasty.¹¹⁷ They points out that the Jin economy reached the peak during Shizong

¹¹⁰ JS, 27, p. 674.

¹¹¹ JS, 27, p. 670.

¹¹² JS, 27, p. 677.

¹¹³ JS, 27, p. 669

¹¹⁴ Li Tianming, *Song Yuan War History*, Taipei: Shi Huo Publisher, 1988. P.3.

¹¹⁵ Xie Zhicheng, Jin Dynasty's Development and Recover of Economic in Hebei, *Hebei Academic Journal*, 1990, Vol. 3. P. 85. Xie Zhicheng suggested during the reign of Shizong to Zhangzong, the economy reached to the peak. It was highly related to Hebei's economic development.

¹¹⁶ Cheng Minsheng, Northern Economy in the Period of Jin and Yuan Dynasty, *Journal of History*, 2003. Vol. 3. Cheng Minsheng also agreed that there were rapid recover of economy in northern China, the economy not only did not downturn under the rule of Jurchen, but it was more flourished. Some of the aspects even surpassed the south.

¹¹⁷ Qi Xia, Qiao Youmei, *Chinese General Economic History Volume of Liao Xia Jin*, Beijing: Economic Press, 1998. P. 427, 374. Qi Xia and Qiao Youmei also pointed out that the economy in The Central Plains was recovered and developed during the ruling of Shizong and Zhangzong, although it could not compared to Northern Song and Liao's achievement; p. 374. They also commented under these two emperors' 50 years ruling, the economy started to recover.

and Zhangzong (1161-1208). Zhang Boquan comments the economy reached the peak during the reign of Mingchang (1190-1196), but the corruption of state led to the downturn of economy.¹¹⁸ Herbert Franke had slightly different opinion. He comments that “under Shih-tsung, the Chin state was able to maintain itself against overwhelming odds in later year.” During the reign of Zhangzong, a serious of natural causes “debilitated the economic foundations of the Chin state.”¹¹⁹ Franke’s opinion was different from other Chinese scholars. Since the government expenditure on military reward highly relied on the tax collected on the daily necessity, through studying the changing tax rate, the economic condition could be analyzed. Jin Dynasty’s economy was fragile during mid-Jin Dynasty through the tax increase and other related economic-related policy adopted during Zhangzong reign. At that time, the state still controlled the entire region of Central Plains and most of region in the Manchuria and the state income kept stable. Thus, the economy could be recovered.

Flash of Ball Pen of the Flourish Economy

In late 1180s, 25 years before the relocation of capital, Jin Dynasty’s economy reached the peak, but it lasted less than ten years. It could be reflected in tax reduction policy. Court official Zheng Yan stated that Jin Dynasty enjoyed long term peace and controlled large amount of households. The reduction of salt tax just reduced the state’s annual income of 1,200,000 strings. He also points out that the storage in the all the granaries had 100,000,000 strings, which was “sufficient for 100 years usage” even if there was deficit in salt tax.¹²⁰ The actual amount of salt tax collection reduced 1,854,000 strings.¹²¹ This could provide a contrast to the rapid deterioration of economy after relocation of capital.

Salt tax rate reduced in 1189. Salt produced from Baodi, Shandong and Cangzhou reduced from 38 wens per catty to 30 wens.¹²² Furthermore, vinegar tax was exempted in 1183.¹²³ In 1190, the state reduced commercial tax rate totally, reduced

¹¹⁸ Zhang Boquan, *Jurchen History Analysis*, Changchun: Jilin Literature and History Publisher, 1986, p. 187.

¹¹⁹ *Cambridge History of China*, Vol. 6, P. 245.

¹²⁰ *JS*, 49, pp. 1097-1098. We did not know if the court official exaggerated the economic status, but it showed the economy of Jin Dynasty reached the peak.

¹²¹ *JS*, 49, p. 1100.

¹²² *JS*, 49, pp. 1097-1098. Also, the Shizong slightly release the crackdown on usage of untaxed salt by commoners since 1187. In 1189, Zhangzong further relived the policy.

¹²³ *JS*, 49, p. 1107

941,000 strings income. Also the state exempted the tax on renting market.¹²⁴ Apart from reduction of commodities tax, in 1189 the state even reduced 10% grain tax for the whole state. The reduction rate reached 30% for low quality farm.¹²⁵ The above tax reduction items on salt and commodities reduced more than 2,700,000 strings income, which was equivalent to incomes of one third of salt field, or twice amount of tributes paid from Song.¹²⁶ At that time, the annual grain tax income was 9 million piculs.¹²⁷ Thus the reduction of grain tax probably reduced about one million piculs grains income.

Background of Tax Rise during the Reign of Zhangzong

Due to the Mongolian invasion and flooding of Yellow River, Jin Dynasty's economic status was rapidly deteriorated. *Jin Shi* comments that the military expenditure was high during the reign of Zhangzong.¹²⁸ Toyama Gunji's research states that the war with Mongols damaged the economy. Furthermore the state also had to spend much income on managing Yellow River, which led to the financial crisis of the state. He analyzes that Zhangzong adopted a more cautious foreign strategy, especially on handling the Song's provocation.¹²⁹ Hearing that Jin was faced with various internal and external problems, Southern Song attacked Jurchen in 1205.¹³⁰

Mongolian Invasion and Heavy Labour Work on Yellow River

Since 1192, Jin prepared for the war with Mongols.¹³¹ The state increased the armies in northern border,¹³² the battle continued until the winter of 1198.¹³³ Mongolian attack increased the expenditure. In 1194, the state mobilized 30,000 extra soldiers for the war.¹³⁴ In 1195, the state sent 500,000 taels silver, 236,900 strings coins to border region for ordinary salary, there was another 50,000 taels of silver, 2,800 taels

¹²⁴ *JS*, 49, p. 1110

¹²⁵ *JS*, 9, p. 211.

¹²⁶ *JS*, 47, p. 1059. However, the reduction of grains tax reached the financial limit and no further reduction of tax could be implemented..

¹²⁷ *JS*, 47, p. 1057.

¹²⁸ *JS*, 46, p. 1028.

¹²⁹ Toyama Gunji, *Study of Jin Dynasty History*, p. 349.

¹³⁰ *SS*, 38, p. 735.

¹³¹ *JS*, 9, 221, as it recorded the state constructed trench in northern border.

¹³² *JS*, 9, 222.

¹³³ *JS*, 11, 249.

¹³⁴ *JS*, 10, 233.

gold bowl, 100 taels of gold medals, 8,000 taels silver medal, 1,000 colorful silk and 446 set clothes were used as award. Xijing, Taiyuan and barbaric tribes was responsible for transportation of military resources.¹³⁵ In 1196, the state offered another rewards to 20,000 northern soldiers with 200,000 tael of silver, 50,000 bolts of silk and 320,000 strings cash.¹³⁶ Different from the war with Song, Jin could not gain the compensation from Mongols after the war. The properties of the affected region also largely reduced 20% in Xijing and Beijing. From the property survey after the war, 66,000 strings property tax income was reduced.¹³⁷ Also, the defense construction was heavy.¹³⁸

In addition, Jurchen put a large number of labour units in dam reparation project since 1190s. The construction work was commented as “the largest scale among history”, as it involved 200,000 laborers and working 50 days annually within five years.¹³⁹

The military conflict with Mongols since 1190s and later with Song, together with the large scale reparation work on Yellow River created financial burden.

The state adopted several ways to solve the economic problems.

Tax Rise

During mid Jin Dynasty, the state increased tax on salt brought the most significant effect on the increase of income for the state.¹⁴⁰ Although the salt tax was dropped in 1189, it rose shortly in 1195. Salt produced in the three salt fields in the Central Plain increased 10% to 33 wen.¹⁴¹ In 1199, salt tax in these 3 fields was further increased

¹³⁵ JS, 10, p. 235

¹³⁶ JS, 10, p. 240.

¹³⁷ JS, 27, p. 1041.

¹³⁸ JS, 11, p. 254. After the war, in 1200 the state continued to prepare for defense construction, spent up 750,000 military labor units to build 600 li wall in Xibei Circuit.

¹³⁹ JS, 27, p. 677 The largest scale of construction work was the one in 1194-1195. In 1189, officials in Henan reported that lots of resident became poverty and fled, due to the heavy labour work in Henan. (p. 674) Some court officials worried the heavy labor work along the river affected the residents' livelihood, and Song captured the opportunity to attack. (p. 670) In 1194, the court reviewed the project. The court discussed Ma Qi's River construction project led to heavy labour work, but could not have achievement. (Large scale of flooding of Yellow River flooded in 1193 and 1194, in northern riverbank. Please refer to Appendices) Emperor also worried that there would be double burden to the residents and state if putting lots of resources to repair the dam, but it continued to flood. The state finally agreed to continue the project. (Pp. 679-680)

¹⁴⁰ JS, 49, p. 1103 Salt tax was a major source for Jin Dynasty to obtain money for government's expenditure. *Treatise of Food and Commodities* recorded that salt was the top of ten taxed commodities. (p. 1094)

¹⁴¹ JS, 49, pp. 1100.

to 42 wens per catty.¹⁴² This highly profitable product was to compensate for the cost.¹⁴³ Referred to the table “Changes of Official Price of Salt Produced” (in Appendices) in the northern salt fields, the price increased from 28% to 67% respectively. Since 1204, all the seven salt fields increased the salt price to 44 wens per catty.¹⁴⁴ It was a sharp rise of salt tax to Liaodong and Beijing salt fields with the increase of 3.5 times compared with five years ago. As the economic situation of Jin Dynasty was getting worse, the government adopted a more strict regulation to crack down on illegal production and selling of unpaid duty salt since 1206.¹⁴⁵ It also allowed merchants to export salt to Song since 1208.¹⁴⁶

Furthermore, the vinegar tax was imposed again in 1193 and turned permanently since 1198 respectively.¹⁴⁷ In 1207, the state increased 1 % of the tax rate on commerce, gold and silver. Other commodities collected 3%.¹⁴⁸ In 1204, commodities tax increased 1%, including wine tax. In 1207, gold and silver tax increased to 3%.¹⁴⁹

The military necessity tax was implemented to increase the income for military expenditure.¹⁵⁰ In 1198, the state raised the military necessity tax, as a supplementary to properties tax which was based on amount of properties. For the Central Plain, every string of new properties had to pay four strings of tax, for northern and northeast region the tax was halved.¹⁵¹

Manipulation on Currency

In addition, the state also obtained the money from issuing new currency and issuing large amount of paper money, mainly for military usage. The state started to issue a

¹⁴² *JS*, 49, pp. 1100.

¹⁴³ *JS*, 49, pp. 1100.

¹⁴⁴ *JS*, 49, p. 1102.

¹⁴⁵ *JS*, 49, pp. 1103.

¹⁴⁶ *JS*, 49, pp. 1104. After the war with Song, in 1208 the state sent an edict to all cross border markets along Huai River to allow officials and commoners to use salt to exchange other products. Originally, Song and Jin banned the exchange of food and grains in the cross border trading ground. Zhangzong's edict meant Xiezhao's salt was formally allowed to export to Song, despite Song's government prohibited its import.

¹⁴⁷ *JS*, 49, p. 1107

¹⁴⁸ *JS*, 49, p. 1110

¹⁴⁹ *JS*, 49, p. 1107; *JS*, 49, p. 1111

¹⁵⁰ *JS*, 44, p. 1005. The tax set up was aimed at collect from commoners for fill up the difference between state's expenditure on military and the storage of government when it could not reach the expenditure.

¹⁵¹ *JS*, 44, p. 1006. Since the tax should be paid in short time, the implementation of this tax largely increased the burden by several times. (*JS*, 10, p.241)

new silver currency Chengan Baohuo in 1197.¹⁵² The purpose of issuing new silver currency was to procure money for military usage temporary.¹⁵³ The increased issue of paper money also had similar function.¹⁵⁴ The large amount of paper money issued led to inflation immediately.¹⁵⁵

Tea Ban Implemented

Tea production was largely related to the excess of foreign import trading with Song. During the reign of Zhangzong, the state implemented a series of policies to tackle the problems and tried to overtake the income of tea from Song.

In 1198, the state set up office to inhibit import of tea to prevent Song benefited from tea trading.¹⁵⁶ In 1199, Shandong and Henan cultivated tea trees, and sold tea with 600 wens per catty and taxed.¹⁵⁷ The tea price soon declined to 300 wens five years later.¹⁵⁸ In 1208, the ban relived slightly, stipulating that using Xiezhou's salt in exchange in order to prevent negative effect on economy.¹⁵⁹ After relocation of capital, there were even strict ban on tea.

Mongols' invasion devastated Jurchen's economy. Fortunately the state still had the entire Central Plains as buffer. Thus the tax increase was relatively mild and affected only in short term, which was a large contrast to Xuanzong's economic policy of increasing tax sharply. For example, Zhangzong particularly urged that the implementation on property survey in 1208 should be cautious. Discount for the newly increased properties tax should be provided, for the interest of state in the following ten years.¹⁶⁰ Probably Zhangzong hoped to prevent the fled of households by heavy tax which caused greater damage to the economy. Secondly, the state carefully implemented policy to limit the inflation and prevent the exchange rate of currency out of control. During Zhangzong reign, despite the inflation, the state strictly controlled the amount of currency issued.¹⁶¹ In addition, soon after the war

¹⁵² *JS*, 10, p. 243

¹⁵³ *JS*, 48, p. 1077.

¹⁵⁴ *JS*, 48, p. 1078.

¹⁵⁵ *JS*, 48, p. 1077.

¹⁵⁶ *JS*, 49, 1108

¹⁵⁷ *JS*, 49, 1108

¹⁵⁸ *JS*, 49, 1108

¹⁵⁹ *JS*, 49, 1108

¹⁶⁰ *JS*, 46, p. 1041

¹⁶¹ *JS*, 48, p. 1075.

with Mongols was over, the state immediately terminated the usage of Chengan Baohuo currency in 1200.¹⁶² Furthermore, in 1208 the state even recalled back the paper money through the means of tax collection.¹⁶³ These measures helped the economy gradually recovered after Mongolian invasion. Another feature was that Zhangzong implemented several measures to prevent possible disaster, including exempting peasants' grains storage under property survey and reducing 20% of properties tax on farmland.¹⁶⁴ Therefore, the state economy could recover in short term as commoners had sufficient grain storage. However, the storage could not benefit the state after relocation, probably due to the Mongols' second invasion.

Five years later Xuanzong also tried to implement similar economic policy through imposing tax and issuing paper money again, but the state no longer had enough economic resources. The tax rapidly increased and the economy was further worsened, and caused serious unfavourable consequences.

In addition, although Weishaowang, Zhangzong's successor was wicked and benefited from Zhangzong's economic policy with large amount of storage in the Central Plain, the state could continue to relieve drought disaster and starvation in four circuits of the Central Plain in 1212.¹⁶⁵ At that time the state had already faced Mongols and Xi Xia's attack and lost large piece of territory. Four years before relocation of capital, the state could even offer Pingyang earthquake victims 3,000 to 5,000 cash subsidy.¹⁶⁶ Starting from 1214 after relocation of capital, the state only collected large amount of tax from commoners, but there was no more relief after natural disaster occurred. It showed the importance of Zhangzong's economic policy and the control of the northern Central Plain to the revival of state.

Section 5 Political and Military Situation of Post Zhangzong era

During the reign of Weishaowang (1208-1213), Jin was defeated by Mongols repeatedly. Mongolian attacked Hebei region since 1209 and the capital started to

¹⁶² *JS*, 48, p. 1077.

¹⁶³ *JS*, 46, p. 1082.

¹⁶⁴ *JS*, 46, p. 1037.

¹⁶⁵ *JS*, 13, p. 295.

¹⁶⁶ *JS*, 13, p. 291.

implement martial law.¹⁶⁷ In 1211, Genghis Khan commanded his army to invade Jin and approached Zhongdu region five months later.¹⁶⁸ During Jin resisted Mongolian invasion, in 1213 Weishaowang was assassinated by General Hu Shahu, who failed to resist Mongols' attack. Xuanzong then succeeded the throne. Later Hu Shahu was also assassinated with the same reason by Shuhu Gaoqi who later became the Prime Minister of Jin Dynasty. Shuhu Gaoqi's defeat by Mongols may show that late Jin's policy of passive defence strategy to Mongols was a complete failure. The attack from Mongols was increasingly intense. In 1214, most of the regions in Shandong and Hebei were lost to Mongols. Jin could only control the following prefectures including Zhendingfu, Damingfu, Qingzhou, Wozhou, Dongping, Xuzhou, Pizhou and Haizhou. Most of the prefectures and counties in Hedong (Shanxi) were destroyed.¹⁶⁹ Zhongdu implemented commandeering grains policy from commoners. The emperor allowed people to donate grains to exchange for a post of an official. Also the capital city enforced martial law. It reflected the tense situation in the capital.¹⁷⁰ Facing increasing threat from Mongol, Jin signed peace treaty with Mongols in return for Mongols' retreat.¹⁷¹

Unrest in Manchuria

On the other hand, the region in Northeast was also highly unrested.¹⁷² As early as Ganghis Khan revolted in 1208, Mongols had already mobilized Yelu Liuge, adherent of Khitan to jointly attack Jin and occupied Dongjing (Liaoyang).¹⁷³ Xuanzong urged Puxian Wannu to garrison in Shenzhou and Guangning¹⁷⁴ for defense in northeast for future retreat.¹⁷⁵ Although Liaodong's army defeated Yelu Liuge in 1215,¹⁷⁶ Puxian Wannu's in Liaodong army soon rebelled against Jin.¹⁷⁷ Shenyang, Dongjing and several important prefectures in Manchuria were occupied

¹⁶⁷ JS, 13, p. 292.

¹⁶⁸ JS, 13, pp. 293-294.

¹⁶⁹ JS, 14, p. 304.

¹⁷⁰ JS, 14, p. 304.

¹⁷¹ JS, 14, pp. 303-304

¹⁷² On the history about the history in northeast, with four distinctive power including Jin struggling for authority there in late Jin, please refer to the following essay: Yang Qinghua, *The Establishment of Province in Northeast in Late Jin, History and Geography of Northeast*, 2007, vol. 1.

¹⁷³ YS, 149, p. 3511.

¹⁷⁴ JS, 14, p. 314.

¹⁷⁵ JS, 103, p. 2276

¹⁷⁶ JS, 14, p. 314.

¹⁷⁷ JS, 14, p. 314.

by rebels.¹⁷⁸ *Cambridge History of China* stated that “For the Chin state the loss of Manchuria, first to Liu-ko and Wan-nu and subsequently to the Mongols, was a severe blow because it cut off the remains of their state in China from their main horse-and cattle-breeding areas and from those regions with a substantial Jurchen population on whose loyalty they could have relied. As the situation was in 1215, Chin had lost not only the grain surplus -- producing areas of northern Hopei but also the regions from which they had obtained a great number of their cavalry horses.”¹⁷⁹ The situation deteriorated after relocation of capital. The loss of Zhongdu indicated the termination of connection with Manchuria.

Red Jacket Bandits Unrest in Shandong

Sheng Wu Qin Zheng Lu recorded that when Mongolian invaders could not take Zhongdu, Genghis Khan together with the prince attacked Hebei and Shandong region. They attacked a number of prefectures including Hejiangfu, Cangzhou, Jinan, and so on.¹⁸⁰ Red Jacket Bandits or Song’s loyal and righteous armies, followed Mongolian invaders to attack Shandong.¹⁸¹ Since then, Shandong became highly unstable.¹⁸² The rise of Red Jacket Bandit could be traced back to Han Tuozou’s invasion in 1207, which Song’s authority stirred up Heshuo’s commoners rebel Jin. Despite the failure of Han’s northern expedition, once there was a disaster, bandits rose immediately.¹⁸³ Groups of rascals robbed the region.¹⁸⁴ For example, Li Quan, bandit leader had provided military aid in Song’s northern expedition in 1207.¹⁸⁵ Yang An’er, with originally about one thousand bandits, rebelled after Mongols’ attack.¹⁸⁶ Shandong rapidly turned into chaos.¹⁸⁷

¹⁷⁸ *JS*, 103, p. 2278.

¹⁷⁹ *Cambridge History of China*, Vol. 6. P. 259

¹⁸⁰ *Sheng Wu Qin Zheng Lu*, Entire Work Collections of Wang Guowei Vol. 11. P. 502.

¹⁸¹ *Jiangyan Yi Lai Chao Ye Za Ji*, 19. P. 848.

¹⁸² *Xu Bian Liang Chao Gang Mu Bei Yao*, 14. P. 270.

¹⁸³ *JS*, 117, p. 2568.

¹⁸⁴ *JS*, 102, p. 2244.

¹⁸⁵ *SS*, 38, p. 738.

¹⁸⁶ *Jiangyan Yi Lai Chao Ye Za Ji*, Chapter. 19. Beijing: Chunghwa Book Store, 2000. Mongolian’s Camp. P. 851.

¹⁸⁷ *JS*, 102, p. 2244.

Chapter 1 Relocation of Capital to Nanjing and the Situation of Heshuo after Relocation of Capital

In 1214, the capital had been besieged by Mongols forces. Neighboring prefectures were destroyed. Grains in Zhongdu were almost used up.¹⁸⁸ Also generals refused to accept military order because soldiers were spoiled by the precedent emperor Weishaowang.¹⁸⁹ In addition, the Central Plains suffered from serious natural disaster from 1211 to 1214, leading to the sharp rise in grains price.¹⁹⁰ That in turn stimulated a discussion on relocating the capital.

Under the military threat from Mongols, Jurchen still kept several regions which were potentially the location of the new capital. After relocation of capital, Jin focused the defence on the sphere of Nanjing but ignored other regions, which eventually caused the loss of Heshuo again and rose of bandits.

Section 1 Debating about Relocation of Capital

Both the unrests in northeast and eastern part of the Central Plain shared a common feature: the rebellion force cooperated with Mongols to strengthen their power. Zhongdu was still under military threat. Furthermore, the state could not receive the grains supply backup from these two unrested regions. After Mongols invaders retreated, Hebei was destroyed. A number of officials suggested relocating the capital. There was a heated debate on whether moving the capital, and where the new capital should be located.

Opinion 1: Relocate the Capital to Shandong

Zhao Bingwen suggested that relocating the capital to Shandong because China did not have natural barrier in the north. Shandong was wealthy and convenience as it located in near Zhongdu. Through sea transportation it could get to Liaodong and

¹⁸⁸ *JS*, 194, p. 2288.

¹⁸⁹ *JS*, 101, p. 2234.

¹⁹⁰ *JS*, 23. Pp. 541-542. In 1211 and 1212 there was continuously instable climate in Hebei and Shandong, the origin of grain's production, further affected the supply of grains to the capital. The price of grains rose sharply to 1000 wens per peck. In the following two years, Hedong (Shanxi) and Shanxi suffered drought. The price of grains there rose sharply to 8,000 and later 12,000 wens per peck.

kept connecting Shangjing.¹⁹¹ In addition, Shandong could made use of river as natural barrier, and the concrete of the walled city and it was far away from the barbarians (Mongols).¹⁹²

Opinion 2: Relocate the Capital to Hezhong (Shanxi)

Some court official suggested moving the capital to Hezhong region to strengthen the defence for the reason that it was closed to the five provinces near the passes. Also there were plenty of soldiers and horses. Furthermore, it had the barrier of Yellow River and three military towns in Hezhong, like Jiangyang, Pingyang and Taiyuan. Thus enemies could not easily attack. However, the dominant opinion in the court rejected the suggestion because it was located in Heshuo region and there was no palace there.¹⁹³ It revealed that the court's defense strategy largely depended on the natural barrier of Yellow River.

Opinion 3: Relocate to Nanjing (Kaifeng)

Furthermore, there were more officials who suggested moving the capital to Henan. Wanyan Bi, high ranking general suggested that there should be well-prepared for the planning of defence under the cease-fire agreement with Mongols, and consider relocate the capital to prevent the people suffering economic burden if Mongols invade again.¹⁹⁴ He urged the emperor to move the capital to Nanjing, which can monitor the Yangtze River and Huai and hence defend the Yellow River. Also it could control Tongguan to strengthen the defence.¹⁹⁵ Later, three high ranking Henan officials sent a proposal to emperor to urge for moving the capital to the Nanjing thrice. Xuanzong then accepted their proposal.¹⁹⁶ The relocation of capital revealed that the state's economy and security were fragile as it was geographically too close to Mongols. However, Natan Moujia opposed that idea because of the insufficient land and the lack of fertility in Henan. Also, it might risk the joint attack from Song and Xi Xia, and then Hebei would loss.¹⁹⁷ He suggested dozens thousands soldiers

¹⁹¹ *Yuan Haowen Quan Ji*, 17, P. 479

¹⁹² *Yuan Haowen Quan Ji*, 17, P. 479

¹⁹³ *JS*, 111, p. 2445.

¹⁹⁴ *JS*, 102, p. 2253.

¹⁹⁵ *JS*, 102, p. 2253.

¹⁹⁶ *JS*, 101, p. 2232.

¹⁹⁷ *JS*, 104, p. 2288.

should fight with Mongol.¹⁹⁸ Furthermore, there were four hundred university students who urged Xuanzong not to relocate the capital. However, their petition was rejected.¹⁹⁹

Section 2 Analysis on Policy on Heshuo Region after Relocation of capital

Zhangzong had commented that the capital was the rite of the world.²⁰⁰ The place of capital setting was critical for the development of the state. The setting of capital is highly related to the economic development and even the fate of dynasty. The grain supply was an important consideration, together with the transportation of grains from neighbouring regions to the capital. It could be demonstrated through the policies adopted by Jin after relocation of capital. Shi Nianhai analysed the criteria for establishing capitals, including natural environment like climate, terrain, agricultural products and rivers together with economic factors, like population, agricultural production, and grain transportation.²⁰¹ Thus, the relocation of capital was an important issue for the interest of the state. The military aspect was important, but it could not ignore the economic aspect.

Loss of Zhongdu and Heshuo Destroyed

After moving the capital to Nanjing, The mission of Zhongdu's canals to transport the grains from Damingfu through Yu River to Tongzhou for Jin Dynasty completed.²⁰² When the Mongols attacked Jin again, prefectures along the canals were under military risk, which led to the starvation in Heshuo. Also, Henan and Shanxi was too far to support Zhongdu. The emperor soon recalled the Imperial Prince to Nanjing for defending Zhongdu.²⁰³ Before the fall of Zhongdu, Jurchen had tried to dispatch troops to relieve Zhongdu with grains²⁰⁴ but the garrison forces of the city surrendered and the grains could not reach the capital, thus people in Zhongdu resorted to cannibalism, and generals were fled.²⁰⁵ Later, the court also

¹⁹⁸ JS, 104, p. 2288.

¹⁹⁹ JS, 101, p. 2232.

²⁰⁰ JS, 12, p. 285.

²⁰¹ Shi Nianhai, *Chinese Ancient Capitals and Culture*, pp. 190-196.

²⁰² JS, 104, p. 2293.

²⁰³ JS, 102, p. 2254.

²⁰⁴ JS, 14, p. 306.

²⁰⁵ *Sheng Wu Qin Zheng Lu*, Wang Guowei Quan Ji, 11. P. 505.

refused to assist Zhongdu to prevent the loss of imperial troops. Thus Zhongdu was fallen.²⁰⁶ During the middle period of the reign of Xuanzong, the state's policy was mainly defense, particularly in Henan and Shanxi region, due to the lack of power and Heshuo's cities were destroyed.²⁰⁷ In 1217 Xuanzong claimed that he wanted to return to the capital to Zhongdu.²⁰⁸ This was just a good wish of Xuanzong. Even if the state would offer Prince Title for those local and loyalist generals who could recover Zhongdu,²⁰⁹ none could meet this target. Until 1218, Jin court continued to discuss the matter and aimed at connecting Manchuria region,²¹⁰ but there was no any concrete plan.

Mongols destroyed the entire Heshuo. They massacred all the inhabitants after capturing the city. All the treasures were confiscated.²¹¹ They captured all the resources once attacked a place.²¹² After relocation of capital, under the ruling from Prime Minister Shuhu Gaoqi, Jurchen did not have the plan to recover the lost land.²¹³ Heshuo region left disrepair. In addition, Heshuo's local officials planned to flee.²¹⁴ Local prefectures and counties governors also fled to Henan.²¹⁵ Furthermore, the state encouraged commoners to relocate to Henan,²¹⁶ and later inhibit the new immigrants to return their Heshuo hometown.²¹⁷ Cities there were implemented scorched earth policy,²¹⁸ destroyed and burned everything, and retreated immediately. That in turn led to over 70% of grains damaged and therefore the anxiety of inhabitants. The military households lost their job as they abandoned their properties. Also the local people were also disturbed.²¹⁹ For example, both soldiers and commoners in Hejianfu were ordered to move to Qingzhou for grains as it had become an isolated city.²²⁰ Zhangdefu (Anyang) was also abandoned by military generals. Xuanzong agreed with the move as it was meaningless to defend a

²⁰⁶ *JS*, 14, p. 309

²⁰⁷ *JS*, 118, p. 2573.

²⁰⁸ *JS*, 15, p. 332

²⁰⁹ *JS*, 14, p. 313.

²¹⁰ *JS*, 104, p. 2297.

²¹¹ *Meng Da Bei Lu Jiao Zhu*, Wang Guowei Quan Ji, 11. P. 349.

²¹² *Hei Da Shi Lue*, Wang Guowei Quan Ji Vol. 11.

²¹³ *JS*, 109, p. 2412

²¹⁴ *JS*, 102, p. 2256.

²¹⁵ *JS*, 109, p. 2414

²¹⁶ *JS*, 14, p. 306.

²¹⁷ *JS*, 14, p. 358.

²¹⁸ *JS*, 109, p. 2414.

²¹⁹ *JS*, 109, p. 2412

²²⁰ *JS*, 14, p. 310

indefensible city.²²¹ Furthermore, the picked troops garrisoning in Heshuo had to assist Nanjing,²²² which in turn undermined the defence of Heshuo region. Soon after the relocation of capital, Hebei already became ruined.²²³ Censor Xu Gu pointed out the retreat of military households affected the recovery plan of Heshuo region.²²⁴ The rapid retreat of armies in Heshuo and gave up the cities caused the raise of bandits and serious shortage of grains for loyalist army garrisoning in Hebei and Shandong region.

Conferring Duke Title to Loyalist for Protection in Heshuo

Despite the fact that Jin gave up the territory in Hebei and Shandong region, there were nine major local powers attempted to recover the lost land and prefectures. Wu Xian, loyalist of Zhending and Zhang Kai, loyalist of Qingzhou had the strongest financial and military power.²²⁵ At the beginning, the state continued to reward local power with 2,000,000 strings in order to eliminate Red Jacket Bandits.²²⁶ But of the lack of income, the state could only conferred loyalists high ranking of knight title, with full special rights.²²⁷ In 1216, the state decided to follow the footstep of Song by conferring official title to Li Quan, the head of Red Jacket Bandit,²²⁸ and high ranking knights to Jin Dynasty's loyalists.²²⁹ These nine Dukes provided military service to the state, and acted as buffer of Henan. These nine Dukes were de facto warlords. They had high degree of autonomy, such as tax collection, laws implementation and recruitment of officials.²³⁰ Sometimes they even requested grains from the central government. Also they had discretion of make military decisions and whether accepting government's order or not. Local officials were in no position to affect the warlord's decision.²³¹ Although these loyalists offered voluntary military service to the state, the state reluctantly support them both in terms of finance and armies. The state also had no intention to improve the water transportation in Heshuo region for easier access of grains. Loyalist Zhang Kai

²²¹ *JS*, 14, p. 330.

²²² *JS*, 14, p. 320.

²²³ *JS*, 14, p. 307.

²²⁴ *JS*, 109, p. 2412.

²²⁵ *JS*, 118, p. 2589.

²²⁶ *JS*, 102, p. 2256.

²²⁷ *JS*, 46, p. 1030.

²²⁸ *JS*, 118, p. 2574.

²²⁹ *JS*, 118, p. 2754.

²³⁰ *JS*, 118, p. 2574.

²³¹ *JS*, 114, p. 2510.

garrisoned in Hebei, and urged for improving the river transportation in Anyang but rejected.²³² Eventually there was a lack of grain supplies for his army. In addition, the limitation of grains supply in Heshuo also affected the grains supply to army garrisoned there. In 1214, the garrison forces in Heshuo region did not have enough grains support. For instance, Tian Zuo's army were 2,500 people in size. They did not receive enough salaries, even though it was at the expense of commoner's food supplies.²³³ Also, the court hardly assisted Heshuo's loyalist, with the excuse of insufficient Henan soldiers.²³⁴ Thus, the achievement of loyalists was extremely limited. Later Wu Xian and Zhang Kai lost and surrendered to Mongols and Red Jacket Bandits respectively.

Increased Intensity to Plunder Heshuo's Resources

In addition, the state set up various measures to grab the wealth from commoners in Heshuo. That caused serious starvation in the affected region.

A year after the state relocated to Nanjing, the state implemented policy to collect 80% tax of the transportation of grains from Henan to Heshuo through setting up customs along the Yellow River.²³⁵ Commoners, soldiers and even travelers could not directly transfer grains to Heshuo.²³⁶ In addition, Xuanzong noticed Hebei's commoners had large amount of cash.²³⁷ Thus, the court decided to strictly limit the grains supply to the region to increase the price of grains and obtain the money there.²³⁸ The policy led to the price of grains in Guanzhou and Cangzhou sharply rose to 10 tael of silver, and people resorted to cannibalism in 1216.²³⁹ Also, merchants could not gain benefit and did not transport the grains there. That led to starvation in Heshuo in the same year.²⁴⁰ In 1217, Xuanzong allowed to reduce the taxation, by just collecting half amount of grains transferring to Heshuo.²⁴¹ However,

²³² *JS*, 118, p. 2589.

²³³ *JS*, 102, p. 2249.

²³⁴ *JS*, 118, p. 2576.

²³⁵ *JS*, 14, p. 311.

²³⁶ *JS*, 50, p. 1119.

²³⁷ *JS*, 50, p.1119.

²³⁸ *JS*, 50, p. 1119.

²³⁹ *JS*, 50, p.1119.

²⁴⁰ *JS*, 14, p. 318.

²⁴¹ *JS*, 50, p. 1120.

it could not solve the problem of lack of available grains in Hebei in 1220.²⁴² Xuanzong's policy caused hard lifestyle to people who stayed in Heshuo, thus increasing people joined the bandits to against Jin.

Economic Loss of Losing Heshuo Region

Hebei and Shandong were rich in resources. These regions did not only produced silk, but also the production ground of rare metal and salt which could yield large amount of tax income. The reduced territory decreased the financial income of the state.

Loss of Silver Supply

After Zhongdu fall, Jurchen lost all the silver mine. *Treatises of Food and Commodities* described since 1165 the state ordered Baoshan County to conduct silver mining to encourage the mining.²⁴³ During 1189-1208, the state opened up 113 of silver mine in Fengshan and Xiyinshan near Zhongdu.²⁴⁴ *Treatise of Geography* also provided that Daxing fu (modern Beijing) produce gold, silver, copper and iron.²⁴⁵ *Yuan Yi Tong Zhi* also recorded that silver and iron were produced in Wanping County of Dadu.²⁴⁶ It revealed that both Hebei and Zhongdu were the major silver production regions.

Furthermore, Song stopped paying tribute to Jin also terminated the import of silver. It seriously affected the state's ability to reward the armies and officials. Chief Chancellor Desheng pointed out silk and silver used to reward soldiers.²⁴⁷ Part of soldiers' salaries of was paid with cash as well. Thus, Jin Dynasty attempted to get back some of silver and financial support to the state, at the expense of peaceful relationships with the Southern Song.

It could be proved that the lack of silver production in Henan affected Jin's market trading. In 1215, there was a debate on using silver as currency on the cross-border market and collecting the tax directly from it. Prime Minister Shuhu Gaoqi pointed out that the ban of silver should be continued in border market, for the reason that

²⁴² *JS*, 16, p. 358.

²⁴³ *JS*, 50, p. 1116.

²⁴⁴ *JS*, 50, p. 1116

²⁴⁵ *JS*, 24, p. 573.

²⁴⁶ *Yuan Yi Tong Zhi*, 1, p. 18.

²⁴⁷ *JS*, 50, p. 1115

there was no silver mine within territory after Mongols invasion and it could prevent further loss of silver.²⁴⁸ This source clearly pointed out that Jin did not have enough storage of silver after relocation of capital and no longer be able to produce silver as the silver mining was not in the territory of the state. During Mid Jin Dynasty, silver was the major source of currency while coins were only limited supply. Kato Shige stated that Jin did not have the production ground of copper which was produced in Jiangnan region. Thus it had to use silver as currency instead, and paper money was used as supplementary.²⁴⁹ Therefore, after relocation of capital and losing silver, the rapid drop of the supply of rare metal and resources, seriously damaged the economic structure of state. The prohibition of the use of coins caused the rapid devaluation of paper money. That would be discussed in chapter 2

Losing Baodi and Manchuria's Salt Income

During peaceful period, salt tax income was the most important and stable tax incomes of the state, as shown in the table "Income of Salt Tax in Different Places" listed in Appendices. After relocation of capital, Jin lost control to northeast and Zhongdu region, the loss of households and population reduced the state's income from salt tax. First of all, the salt tax from Baodi supplying Zhongdu circuit, Liaodong, Beijing (Inner Mongolia) and Xijing (Datong) supplying northern and northeast regions lost. losing 2,352,224 strings based on calculation of *Jin Shi* data.²⁵⁰ On the other hand, Jin also lost Shandong to Red Jacket Bandits, further losing Shandong and Cangzhou salt fields which could yield 4,334,184 strings and 2,766,636 strings respectively. Jin only kept Xiezhou salt field and sent soldiers to protect this salt field.²⁵¹ The huge loss of salt tax had to be compensated by other means.

Jin Dynasty abandoned the territory in Hebei, just like providing the resources for enemies to attack back, enhanced expanding Mongols' power. In 1230, Mongols Prime Minister Yelu reported to emperor that

Your Majesty will have Southern Expedition. All the military cost came from

²⁴⁸ *JS*, 50, p. 1115

²⁴⁹ Kato Shige, *Study of Gold and Silver during Tang and Song Dynasty*, 1970, p. 181.

²⁵⁰ *JS*, 49, p. 1101.

²⁵¹ *JS*, 16, p. 366.

the Central Plains' tax income, like land tax, commercial tax, salt, wine, mining, and the benefit from mountain and lakes. The government can gain 500,000 taels silver, 80,000 bolts of silk and 400,000 piculs of grains for every year. This is plenty for supporting the army.²⁵²

The above data showed Mongols conquered the northern part of the Central Plain, they could gain this amount of tax, already enough to support its southern expedition armies.

Loss of Wealth After Relocation of Capital

The loss of Zhongdu meant all the important storage of Jin Dynasty was lost, it was due to the relocation of capital was too sudden. Xu Gu commented that after losing Zhongdu, treasures stored more than hundred years were all lost.²⁵³ Song also noted that Jurchen left lots of treasures in Hebei.²⁵⁴ When Mongols overtook Zhongdu, the treasures in the palace originally owned by Jin were confiscated.²⁵⁵ Mongols General Samohe could sleep in golden bed and wore gold made shoes.²⁵⁶

Furthermore, the grains storage was also lost. During mid-Jin Dynasty, when Zhangzong started the war with Mongol in 1194, there were still large amount of storage. Official reported that the state had 33,430,000 strings equivalent to two years expenditure, while all the 519 granaries stored 37,863,000 piculs of corns, which was sufficient for five years of expenditure of officials and soldiers. The rice storage was 8,100,000 piculs which was equal to four years of expenditure.²⁵⁷ After the loss of Heshuo's territory and the intensity of wars with neighbouring regions, probably most of the storage used up or lost to Mongols through the loss of wars. Mongols used to drink milk and ate goats for their diet during their invasion, once they captured some cities in China they started to eat grains and rice as meal.²⁵⁸ After conquering the Central Plain, the Mongols obtained a stable source of grain supplies to provision their forces.

²⁵² YS, 146. p. 3458. 「陛下將南伐，軍需宜有所資，誠均定中原地稅、商稅、鹽、酒、鐵冶、山澤之利，歲可得銀五十萬兩、帛八萬匹、粟四十余萬石，足以供給，何謂無補哉？」

²⁵³ JS, 109, p. 2412

²⁵⁴ SS, 413, p. 12394.

²⁵⁵ *Chinggis Khan : the Golden History of the Mongols*, P. 163.

²⁵⁶ *Jiangyan Yi Lai Chao Ye Za Ji*, 19. P. 852.

²⁵⁷ JS, 50, p. 1121-1122.

²⁵⁸ Zhao Gong, *Meng Da Bei Lu Jiao Zhu*, Wang Guowei Quan Ji Vol. 11. P. 350.

Chapter 2 The Development in Henan and its Economic Problems

After the Mongols' invasion and the relocation of capital, the economic status between Hebei and Henan shifted. In 1215, Gao Ruli commented that after Mongols' invasion, lots of people died or fled away from Hebei and the economy and agriculture was seriously destroyed. On the other hand, after the emperor moved to Henan, it attracted lots of commoners to migrate there, and cultivated the virgin land.²⁵⁹ However, commoners did not feel secured after they moved to Nanjing. Liu Qi recorded that despite Nanjing was flourishing, it consistently had demons.²⁶⁰ According to Yuan Haowen, "There must have propitious sign for a raising state, and there must have demons for falling state."²⁶¹ It is difficult to prove whether it had demons in Nanjing at that time, but it is sure that people did not have the sense of security, and they might think that it's the sign of the fall of dynasty. In addition, Jin Dynasty put lots of manpower to defend Nanjing since there was no alternative place to flee. After Jin Dynasty moved to Nanjing, censor Wanyan Sulan urged the emperor to be more careful and should not make the same mistake again.²⁶² However, the short sighted economic policy of the government after relocation of capital led to the doom of Jin Dynasty.

Section 1 Migration and Immigrant Policies

A. Relocating the Armies to Nanjing

Jin Dynasty adopted a passive defend strategy after relocation of capital, and the armies retreated from Hebei to Henan. It not only affected the defense in Hebei, but also affected the economy in Henan. In the first stage, three hundred thousand soldiers originally garrisoned in Hebei relocated to Henan. The state ordered to preserve the power of army to protect Nanjing.²⁶³ The huge number of soldiers also burdened food supply. Despite the fact that some officials and even the emperor himself suggested it may be better for the army to garrison in the northern side of the Yellow River, Shuhu Gaoqi opposed the idea of protecting Hebei. In 1216,

²⁵⁹ *JS*, 107, p. 2356.

²⁶⁰ *Gui Qian Zhi*, 7, p. 69.

²⁶¹ *Yuan Haowen Quan Ji*, 46. P. 270.

²⁶² *JS*, 109, p. 2798

²⁶³ *JS*, 44, p. 999

around a million soldiers were in the state with their relatives receiving subsidy.²⁶⁴ All these measures after relocation of capital created heavy economic burden for the state.

B. Transferring the Relatives of Military Households to Henan

Under the state policy, the relatives of military households were also forced to transfer to Henan. They had to abandon all their properties. According to Gao Ruli, the drawbacks include the abandon of the household's farm and land, the difficulty of transfer, and rumours that would possibly lead to the instability of the society.²⁶⁵ Feng Bi criticized the rush implementation of policy of retreat and migration created chaos and disturbances.²⁶⁶ The flowing population thus heavily burdened Henan and its economy.

C. Transferring Commoners to Henan

A lot of commoners fled to Henan, but could not settle for farming due to the shortage of farmlands. Neither were they allowed to return. Thus, a number of commoners suffered from starvation.

Jin Dynasty immediately let the population to migrate into Henan after ceasefire with the Mongols.²⁶⁷ In the following year, the state also urged local officials accept all commoners from Hebei to migrate to Henan and provided aid to them.²⁶⁸ Some of Heshuo people were recruited to the army. For example, 10,000 Xijing (Datong) refugees who moved to Henan were enrolled in army.²⁶⁹ The policy continued till 1221 when the entire Hebei and Shandong region were almost lost. Moreover, most loyalists retreated to Henan due to serious starvation.²⁷⁰

Apart from the above measures, the state also strongly encouraged the officials to accept more immigrants. For example, the officials who originally defected to Mongols and returned were allowed to be re-admitted in order to welcome all people to move to Henan.²⁷¹ At the same time, the state rewarded to local officials who

²⁶⁴ *JS*, 47, p. 1054.

²⁶⁵ *JS*, 107, p. 2354

²⁶⁶ *Yuan Haowen Quan Ji*, 19, p. 521.

²⁶⁷ *JS*, 14, p. 306

²⁶⁸ *JS*, 14, p. 309.

²⁶⁹ *JS*, 102, p. 2249.

²⁷⁰ *JS*, 16, p. 358.

²⁷¹ *JS*, 14, p. 307

could encourage immigration and increase the number of households.²⁷² Moreover, Ji Wenlong relocated to Dengzhou region to escape from battlefield and moved to Southern Song later.²⁷³

Wu Songdi's research pointed out that most people moved from Hebei and Zhongdu, and some from Shanxi and they were mainly moved to Henan, and little of them moved to Shandong.²⁷⁴ He also proved that there were around three to four million people, including military households and commoners moved to Henan.²⁷⁵

The state attempted to transfer the population, but there were not sufficient farmlands because the state put the priority to distribute lands to military households. For example, Song Zizheng migrated to Henan during the reign of Zhenyou (1213-1217), but returned due to insufficient spaces.²⁷⁶ Certain amount of military was not distributed farmlands, let alone commoners without properties.

To prevent spy, Jin Dynasty banned commoners from southern bank of Yellow River to their Heshuo hometown since 1215.²⁷⁷ Wang Yi moved from Hebei to Henan during the reign of Zhenyou. However, he could not sustain his life. He planned to move to Linzhou to farm where the place had been fallen to Mongols. Wang was sentenced to death for treason.²⁷⁸ People were not dared to go back their hometown after they moved to Henan even if financially they could not support themselves. It partly explained the rise of bandit.

Immediate Effects on Relocating Population to Henan

Large amount of immigrants and commandeering of grains caused inflation. Since 1214, as people from other provinces all gathering in Henan to buy, there was a sharp rise of grain's price on the way the emperor Xuanzong travelling to Nanjing. Gao Ruli stated it was due to too many paper money issued and not enough grains available in market. He suggested encouraging commoners to contribute the grains.²⁷⁹ Thus, the state implemented the first commandeering of grains

²⁷² JS, 14, p. 310.

²⁷³ Su Tianjue, *Zi Xi Wen Gao*, 14, p. 219.

²⁷⁴ Wu Songdi, *Chinese Migration History*, p. 157.

²⁷⁵ Wu Songdi, *Chinese Migration History*, p. 156.

²⁷⁶ Su Tianjue, *Guo Chao Ming Chen Shi Lue*, p. 205.

²⁷⁷ JS, 15, p. 339

²⁷⁸ Yuan Haowen *Quan Ji*, 19, p. 510.

²⁷⁹ JS, 107, p. 2353

immediately after relocating the capital to Nanjing in that year.²⁸⁰ Xu Gu stated the problems of garrisoning heavy armies in the capital affected the food storage of commoners.²⁸¹ To support the state's extra expenditure on subsidizing military households, Gao Ruli suggested that double tax collected apart from ordinary tax.²⁸² As people were starving, they had to eat rubber or even exchange their children for diet.²⁸³ In addition, for commoners who moved to Henan under the policy of relocation, lots of them became jobless. Some even turned into bandits and created instability. The state probably intended to increase the manpower for farming, to contribute for tax, but there was not enough available farmlands for commoners, the jobless peasants turned bandits later further created trouble for the state.

Section 2 Cost on Development on the Underdeveloped Henan

As previously described, Henan was underdeveloped during mid Jin. After relocation of capital, most Jurchen and some commoners from Hebei were migrated to Henan. The state gave up Hebei and Shandong and devoted more resources to opening up Henan, including open up barren land for farming, develop wet paddy field, water transportation system and construct defense unit in Henan. However, the economic achievement could not cover up the development cost, and could not reach the consumption from the large amount of new immigrant.

Open up barren land

After relocation of capital, large amount of new immigrants arrived Henan. As most of high quality farmland were occupied, there were only grazing land, which was barren for long time and difficult to be cultivated. They did not have cattle and farming tools as well.²⁸⁴ Thus the state suspended the policy and continued to provide them grains subsidy.²⁸⁵ Gao Ruli also pointed out soldiers could not earn much from the distributed land and impossible to confiscate commoner's land as

²⁸⁰ *JS*, 107, p. 2365

²⁸¹ *JS*, 109, p. 2414

²⁸² *JS*, 47, p. 1052.

²⁸³ Su Tianjue, *Guo Chao Ming Chen Shi Lue*, p. 166.

²⁸⁴ *JS*, 114, p. 2517.

²⁸⁵ *JS*, 47, pp. 1053-1054.

they had to pay triple tax together with heavy labour work.²⁸⁶ In addition, once commoners finished farming, they had to provide labour and transportation services. Thus they did not have spare resources to open up more farmland for military households.²⁸⁷ Eventually, the court decided to encourage commoners to cultivate official barren land, and have of the reward was owned by them, the other half would turned into military households.²⁸⁸ Until 1220, six years after relocation of capital, some of military households still not yet distributed farmlands.²⁸⁹ The policy of distributing farmlands to military households affected the livelihood of commoners who rented the official lands. Half of farmlands in Henan were state owned land, and there were large amount of Henan's commoners renting state owned farmland. Since 1215, the tax was heavy for peasants for those years. Peasants would no longer rent the official farmland and reluctantly handover the land to army if there were further increase on the tax.²⁹⁰ The policy led to increasing amount of commoners fled.

Implementation of Wet Paddy Field

In addition, the state tried to promote wet paddy field in Henan for higher yield since 1208. In Pizhou and Qizhou, 600 qin of land was cultivated, and the harvest was several times than ordinary farm.²⁹¹

In 1216, Cheng Yuan proposed to implement wet paddy field in Xishan County to collect 100,000 piculs tax by collecting one third from harvest. In 1221, Li Guorui, Nanyang governor reported that the place had opened more than 400 qin of farmland.²⁹² Originally, the tax was three times higher than the ordinary agricultural tax which collected one tenth of income, but later the state decided to widely promote this policy to Shanxi, and the tax was the same as land field.²⁹³ In 1222, wet paddy field was further promoted to whole Henan region.²⁹⁴

Discussion on Diverging Yellow River To Solve Land Crisis

The serious shortage of available farmlands forced the court to consider

²⁸⁶ *JS*, 47, pp. 1053-1054.

²⁸⁷ *JS*, 47, pp. 1053-1054.

²⁸⁸ *JS*, 47, pp. 1053-1054.

²⁸⁹ *JS*, 47, p. 1055.

²⁹⁰ *JS*, 107, p. 2354.

²⁹¹ *JS*, 50, p. 1122.

²⁹² *JS*, 50, p. 1122.

²⁹³ *JS*, 50, p. 1123.

²⁹⁴ *JS*, 50, p. 1123.

diverging the Yellow River to flow in a northern route, which was an original route after the capital moved the Nanjing for military strategy.

Before Jin decided to move the capital, Zhao Bingwen suggested changing the route of river for defense. He suggested that reviewing Northern Song, Yellow River passed Hebei and Shandong, joining other rivers to the sea. The contemporary Yellow River flowed in southern way through Xuzhou, Pizhou. It was easy to diverge the route of river through small scale of construction then the river could follow the original path and merged Shandong and Henan together. Even if enemy invades, the natural barrier can block them.”²⁹⁵ In 1215, the following year after relocated to Nanjing, the court raised a debate on whether diverging Yellow River to the north. Yanzhan Tianze, governor of Shanzhou commented that it should make use of present’s dam to let the Yellow River flow in northern way as defensive strategy. The land originally covered by river would be turned into fertile land and could yield double the harvest. Otherwise, there would not be enough grain supply for soldiers in Henan, and the state would loss the population in Hebei and Shandong.²⁹⁶ Another Henan official Wensan Kexi of Yanzhou governor also suggested diverge the Yellow River to original route to increase the territory of Henan. He pointed out after the project, prefectures in Shandong and Damingfu would belong to Henan. Furthermore, there were half of prefectures in Hebei could be gained, for the defensive purpose and the foundation of recovering the state.²⁹⁷ This proposal was rejected by court officials, arguing that the route of river was difficult to control and defend.²⁹⁸ However, through the discussion we could understand the serious shortage of lands and resources in Henan, due to the state gave up Heshuo region, and too obsessive to rely on the natural barrier of Yellow River.

Development of Henan’s River and Canal Transport

As analysed in previous chapter, river transportation was not common in Henan because Henan was a relatively poverty region during middle of Dynasty, Hebei’s river transportation was more important than Henan to transfer the grains to the capital. At the moment of relocation of capital, the river transportation in Henan was

²⁹⁵ *Yuan Haowen Quan Ji*, 17, P. 479

²⁹⁶ *JS*, 27, p. 681.

²⁹⁷ *JS*, 27, p. 681.

²⁹⁸ *JS*, 27, pp. 681-682

not well developed. There was lack of vessels in the river for transportation,²⁹⁹ and even assisted by land transportation like cow and carts instead.³⁰⁰

After moving the capital to the south, Henan's river transportation became increasingly important for transportation of grains from Shanxi. *Yuan Yi Tong Zhi* recorded in 1214, Jin Dynasty diverge Jinshui River to Nanjing city.³⁰¹ However, the scale was largely smaller than Northern Song era and also Zhongdu. The transportation of grains from Shanxi to Henan had been using land transport. There were mountainous areas in Hedong when the grains transferred from Shanxi to Henan,³⁰² transporting 100,000 piculs grains annually to Nanjing.³⁰³ To increase the efficient of transporting grains from Shanxi to Henan, vessels were used although it risked Mongols' attack to travel through Yellow River.³⁰⁴

In 1223, the state followed to the past experience of Hebei's canals and set up a granary in Guidefu to support the prefectures in eastern region.³⁰⁵ Large vessels started to be built in the same year to increase the efficient and reduce the amount of labours. It could transfer 350 hu grains by each vessel, transferring 7000 hu by only using 100 sailors in few days to eastern region.³⁰⁶ At the same time, granary was set up in Biling County, through the use of a newly constructed canal to transfer grains from Wangan Lake to Bianjing and Sizhou for grains storage.³⁰⁷

The grains supply for Henan took a higher priority than Hezhong or Shanxi region. Once there was deficient of grains in Henan, Shanxi immediately offered supply to the region.³⁰⁸ On the other hand, even if there was starvation in Xiezhou, the customs in Shanxi and Hezhong did not allow the grains to transport to support Xiezhou.³⁰⁹ People suffered from starvation and the granaries were emptied.³¹⁰ Compared with the canals transportation around Zhongdu before relocation of capital, Shanxi's river transportation's scale was much smaller and lagged behind.

Furthermore, the loss of Heshuo region even put river transportation was under threat

²⁹⁹ *JS*, 27, p. 685

³⁰⁰ *JS*, 27, p. 685

³⁰¹ *Yuan Yi Tong Zhi*, 3, p. 231.

³⁰² *JS*, 108, p. 2375

³⁰³ *JS*, 27, p. 685

³⁰⁴ *JS*, 27, p. 685

³⁰⁵ *JS*, 27, p. 685

³⁰⁶ *JS*, 27, p. 685

³⁰⁷ *JS*, 27, p. 686

³⁰⁸ *JS*, 27, p. 685

³⁰⁹ *JS*, 50, p. 1125.

³¹⁰ *JS*, 50, p. 1125.

by Mongols invaders. In 1220, the emperor urged the prince to ensure the safety of transferring the grains from Zhongjing (Luoyang), the vessel had to be decorated as if transferring armies to deceive the enemy.³¹¹ Also, the vessels were ported in the southern riverbank if there was any military alarm.³¹² Quan Hansheng pointed out that the Grand Canals original used to connect Yangtze River and Yellow River. The confrontation between Song and Jin terminated this several hundred years' old north and south transportation pathway. It no longer link up the military base and weakened the economic centre. The dispersal of power was not powerful to against the later rising nomadic Mongolian ethnics.³¹³ After relocating the capital, Henan could merely provide sufficient resources to defend to Mongols and neighbouring three forces, but the southern expedition terminated the Jin and Southern Song to exchange for materials, including grains and other major necessity.

Construction for Defensive Building

After relocation of capital, the state aimed at retaining the sovereignty by keeping Henan, thus Jurchen decided to enhance the defence. However, it did not only consume much manpower without considering the affordability of the state, but also overly abused the commoners in Henan, which affected the agricultural production.

Jin had spent lots of resources for constructing inner city, aimed at strengthened the defence. Shuhu Gaoqi claimed that Nanjing city having 80 square li was so large that was not easy to defence. Thus an inner city of Nanjing city wall with 40 square li was proposed to construct.³¹⁴ In summer 1219, the state started to construct the inner city.³¹⁵ The construction last for more than half a year until winter.³¹⁶ The working progress delayed, seriously affected the agricultural production and even the storage in the granaries.³¹⁷ Lots of houses were destroyed.³¹⁸ The delay of work progress eventually increased the labours up to 100,000. During autumn, large amount of

³¹¹ *JS*, 27, p. 685

³¹² *JS*, 27, p. 685

³¹³ Quan Hansheng, *Transportation Canals and Tang Song Emperor*, P. 123.

³¹⁴ *Gui Qian Zhi*, 7, p. 68

³¹⁵ *JS*, 15, p. 344.

³¹⁶ *JS*, 15, p. 347.

³¹⁷ *JS*, 15, p. 3468.

³¹⁸ *Gui Qian Zhi*, 7, p. 68

workers were infected.³¹⁹ After the project finished, the state offered subsidy to commoners for four months.³²⁰ As the construction undermined the productivity of Henan, the emperor Xuanzong knew the influence of construction work upon the economy of commoners, and eventually loss of the sense of security.³²¹ During the falling Jurchen in 1230s, Mongols' forces entered Henan. The court decided to defend the outer city. However, the Mongols captured the outer wall, and no one could escape.³²² Liu Qi commented that the strong outer city was constructed by Song. He criticized the stupid idea to build inner wall of Nanjing that when Mongols attacked, Jin Dynasty could not give up the other wall, so the inner city is useless.³²³ In fact, the defensive ability of inner wall could not be tested, as the fall of city was due to starvation after being besieged by Mongols.

In late Jin Dynasty, the state also put lots of effort to construct military unit. In 1224, the state constructed Zhongjing city (Luoyang).³²⁴ In 1225, the state spent several million labour units to construct military department office of Guide metropolitan prefecture (Shangqiu). Later the state only reduced one third of labour work.³²⁵ The intense labour work affected the productivity of commoners.

Jin relocated the capital to the poverty Henan where the place developed too late, increased the burden of development expenditure. Despite the state put lots of effort to develop, the expenditure was even higher and there was no surplus for the state.

Section 3 Economic Burden Created by Relocation of Military Households

The state provided large amount of subsidizes to military households once they relocated to Henan. The purpose was to enhance their loyalty, which may also compensate their properties loss in Hebei region. It could be known through Xuanzong's suggested that grains must be provided to military households to award them for their contribution to defend Mongols invaders. Either farmlands or grains

³¹⁹ *Yuan Haowen Quan Ji*, 18, p. 495.

³²⁰ *JS*, 15, p. 248.

³²¹ *JS*, 106, p. 2344.

³²² *JS*, 113, p. 2488.

³²³ *Gui Qian Zhi*, 7, p. 68

³²⁴ *JS*, 17, p. 378.

³²⁵ *JS*, 114, p. 2504.

were supplied to them.³²⁶ In 1218, Zhang Xinxin described the state providing whole family of every soldier subsidy aimed at enhancing their loyalty, but created the burden of the state. He even pointed out the problems that some military households without man but still received subsidies.³²⁷ It showed the state waste lots of resources. After the government implementing the law of commandeering grains, all family members of a soldier would be subsidized to enhance the unity of soldiers. Also all of their family members were allowed to enter the capital. However, after several years they did not have enough to eat.³²⁸ Since 1222, the state implemented measures for military households in seven Henan's prefectures, including Zhongjing (Luoyang), Tangzhou, Dengzhou, Shangzhou, Xuzhou, etc. to move to Jingzhaofu (Xian) and prefectures nearby to eat.³²⁹ It was probably Tangzhou and Dengzhou lack of grains supply after the failure of southern expedition. The farmlands distributed were far away, some were even several hundred li away from where they were garrisoned. Military Department commented it was not convenient for military households to farm themselves, so they had to hire someone to farm, and collect the rents in several hundred miles apart.³³⁰ Thus the state suspended the policy about distribution of farmland to military households.³³¹ It showed the drawback of relocating all the military households. Too much people received subsidizes from the state, spent up most of the grains of the storage in Henan and created economic. Later, the loss of Shanxi and Hezhong eventually further imposed burden on Henan. In 1331, the state relocated population from Jingzhaofu (Xian) to Henan before the place was attacked by Mongols.³³² The loss of Jingzhaofu and the return of the population created the burden of grains supply of Henan again.

Subsidizes to Military Households

The state consumed large amount of grains to Jurchen military households. At the early stage, there was a larger amount of subsidy provided to military households. In 1215, there were few millions population of military households fled to Henan.³³³

³²⁶ *JS*, 107, p. 2354.

³²⁷ *JS*, 44, pp. 1009-1010

³²⁸ *JS*, 44, p.998.

³²⁹ *JS*, 16, p. 361

³³⁰ *JS*, 47, pp. 1053-1054.

³³¹ *JS*, 47, pp. 1053-1054.

³³² *JS*, 17, p. 383.

³³³ From other sources, it could prove the number should be around one million population of military

The government supplied every people with one litre of rice daily. The annual expenditure on this is 3,600,000 piculs. Half of the amount paid by cash money, it also need to pay 3,000,000 picul grains. In Henan, 240,000 qing (24,000,000 mu) of land was lent, while the income of rent was only 1,560,000 piculs. Therefore the emperor ordered officials to distribute barren land and grazing land, which could be cultivated to military households, with everyone 30 mou.³³⁴

The regulation of monthly salary of ordinary soldiers before relocation of capital was one picul and seven pecks to seven pecks, depended on different types of soldiers.³³⁵

The salary was provided per person. In addition, military households had to pay small amount of tax. It was different from the situation after relocation of capital the salary was provided for every family member, including elderly and child. Base on the average of 7.8 populations of every military household,³³⁶ with daily one liter of grains supply, the monthly salary for every household is 2 piculs and 3 pecks, which is 2-3 times higher than before. The military farm policy was not popular to some of military households. Some military households used to have corrupted lifestyle. Before relocation of capital, they drank whole day but not farm.³³⁷ Some also lend the farmland to others because they addicted to wine but cannot farm.³³⁸ Emperor tried to inhibit their practice but not success. Thus some military households did not farm. When the state planned to distribute farmlands to them to replace subsidy and consulted them, their respond was to reduce half of subsidy rather than distribute them farmland.³³⁹ Some particularly worried that the implementation of military farming would affect their subsidy, thus Xuzhou and Suzhou armies particularly rejected this policy.³⁴⁰ In fact, before Jin conquered the Central Plains, every soldier had to farm without exception.³⁴¹ However, their lifestyle turned corrupt and it was difficult for them to farm, particularly on the uncultivated land. Thus, the state

households moved to Henan, suggested by other scholars on population history.

³³⁴ *JS*, 47, p. 1052.

³³⁵ *JS*, 44, p. 1008-1009.

³³⁶ According to *Jin Shi*, in 1183 there are 202 Meng'an, 1878 Mouke, with 615,624 households and 6,158,636 people. For this population, there were 4,812,669 ordinary people and 1,345,967 slaves. There were 1,690,380 qin farmland, and 1154313 livestock. For each household, it had an average of 7.8 ordinary people, (According to the Niu Tou Tax (Tax for military households), three cows unit equal to one tools) which had a slightly higher population density than ordinary households.

³³⁷ *JS*, 7, pp. 161, 179; 47, p. 1047.

³³⁸ *JS*, 7, p. 1047.

³³⁹ *JS*, 47, pp. 1053-1054.

³⁴⁰ *JS*, 15, p. 334.

³⁴¹ *JS*, 44, p. 991.

continued to provide them subsidy, half by grains and half by money.³⁴² In 1216, the court's report that there were 448,000 populations under military household still receiving the grains subsidy.³⁴³ Assume that they received the minimum subsidy, that every people obtain just one liter of grains daily, the annual expenditure of the state was 1,635,200 piculs, which used up large proportion of income of the state.

There was increasing demands from court and military officials, proposed the implement military farming policy for military households and reduce the expenditure by the state. In 1217, there were several hundred thousands of soldiers garrisoned in Henan together with several times of jobless relatives just opened their month for feeding. He urged for distribute farmlands to military households to soldiers, and reduce the size of armies. If the state could save one million soldiers, then it could reduce 3,600,000 million hu of grains annually.³⁴⁴ In 1221, there were still around 400,000 populations of elderly and children under military households living in the Henan and consumed the state 1,400,000 picul grains annually. They did nothing but just eating up the rent by other commoners.³⁴⁵ This amount of grains was equivalent to the annual storage by the state at that year, or the annual income of Jingnanlu (Southern region of Henan). However, the large consumption of grains by military households still not yet solved. Some soldiers with whole family including the elderly and teenagers who were originally unemployed joined the armies together. The reduction of soldiers might risk undermined the fighting will of the team,³⁴⁶ because some family's member combating together for the safety of their relatives.³⁴⁷ In addition, some local military officials were highly corrupted and collect extra amount of subsidizes, wasting the state's resources.³⁴⁸

Jin had kept large amount of forces for defense, and the expenditure of sustaining large armies was high, particularly if we compared with Song. For example, in the last two years of Jin Dynasty, the state still had 200,000 armies around the capital, distributing to different generals. Also, their monthly salary was 1.5 piculs.³⁴⁹ The salary was five times higher than one liter ordinary daily salary of soldiers. We could

³⁴² *JS*, 47, pp. 1053-1054.

³⁴³ *JS*, 47, pp. 1053-1054.

³⁴⁴ *Yuan Haowen Quan Ji*, 18, p. 505.

³⁴⁵ *JS*, 44, pp. 1009-1010

³⁴⁶ *JS*, 102, p. 2250.

³⁴⁷ *JS*, 107, p. 2261.

³⁴⁸ *JS*, 108, p. 2391.

³⁴⁹ *JS*, 17, pp. 385-386.

compare the situation with Northern Song. Based on Cheng Minsheng's research, Northern Song's entire number of army from 378,000 to 1,410,000 increased with time. Kaifeng capital mostly garrisoned 200,000 to 400,000 armies.³⁵⁰ In 1040, Shanxi garrisoned 300,000 soldiers which relied on the state to supply grains. Ouyang Xiu criticized this phenomenon that the national power must be weakened if there were 400,000 to 500,000 soldiers relied on the state to subsidize the grains.³⁵¹ After this comparison, Jin Dynasty had more than double, that was more than million populations of military household population received grains subsidize from the state. Also there was large amount of soldiers garrisoned around Nanjing, compared with the Northern Song. Thus it showed the high demands of grains from the huge number of garrisoned soldiers, together with the fewer resources and available farmlands, raised serious economic burden to the state.

Officials strongly proposed military farm, however it was not efficient to gain high yields. We could compare the situation with Northern Song, referring to Zuo Chaoneng's study. Northern Song implemented this policy for Hebei soldiers but they reluctantly cultivate the farms. The average production per person was less than 2 piculs annually, and the average yield per mou was just around 1 picul annually.³⁵² Jin Dynasty forcefully implemented this policy affected the livelihood of tenants as their farmlands were recalled by the state. Eventually the production of grains in Henan region reduced and led to increasing number of commoners fled because they lost their land. Also the state originally collected Niu Tou Tax from military households, after relocation of capital there was no record on collecting this tax, but just offering them subsidizes. It showed the state reduced the tax income after implementing military farm.

Tax Collection Could Not Reach the Demand of Military Expenditure

There was continuous shortage supply of grains in Henan. Herbert Franke referred to Jurchen official Hou Zhi's data to comment Henan's agricultural production that "The intensity of agriculture obviously varied from region to region. Honan, in

³⁵⁰ Chen Minsheng The Disposition of Troops in the Song Dynasty, *Collected Papers of History Studies*, 2009, vol. 5. Pp. 66-71.

³⁵¹ Chen Minsheng The Disposition of Troops in the Song Dynasty, *Collected Papers of History Studies*, 2009, vol. 5. P. 68. 自古未有四五十万之兵连年仰食而国力不困者也。

³⁵² Zuo Chaoneng, Analysis on Northern Song's Tun Tian Military Farming Policy, *Hechi Education Institution Journal*, 1995, vol. 1. Pp. 66-67.

particularly the area around Kai-feng, was the definite center of agricultural production. In 1219, when the territory of Chin had been drastically reduced, Honan had 1.97 million ch'ing of arable land, of which less than half, only 960,000 *ch'ing*, was cultivated...The total grain yield (millet and rice) in the state can be estimated at about 90 million shih per annum, one-tenth of which went to the government as land tax...In other words, the average yield from the lands in the whole state could just feed the population adequately".³⁵³ Cheng Minsheng's work further elaborated this point that the farm cultivated in Henan was three times more than the period of Northern Song. The development surpassed Northern Song.³⁵⁴ Despite the different perspective of their analysis, they pointed out the production was enough for expenditure, which I could not agree.

Their data referred to *Jin Shi*, recorded that in 1219, Hou Zhi, Minister of Three Divisions promotion of implementing military farm, and said, "All military and commoners in Henan had a total 1,970,000 qing of farmlands (197,000,000 mou). 960,000 qing were cultivated. (96,000,000 mou) High quality farm can harvest 1 picul and 2 pecks per mou, middle quality is 1 picul and low quality is 8 pecks. Government collected 10% tax. Annually the government can gain 9,600,000 piculs."³⁵⁵

Hou Zhi's argument's context was to promote military farm. Both Herbert Franke and Cheng Minsheng ignored that the 9,600,000 piculs tax was just proved ideally assumed all the farmlands cultivated and had optimum harvest. Furthermore, if the land turned into military households, the state could not collect tax, thus the state's income was not as ideal as Hou Zhi described, and quoted by Franke. It was not usual to increase of the annual income of the state six times compared with the data in 1215 that the income of rent only had 1,560,000 picul, mentioned by Gao Ruli. Here provide a data for the tax collection in 1222. In that year, Jingnanlu (newly set up circuits in southern part of Henan) had to provide 1,400,000 piculs to the capital.³⁵⁶ Local officials commented this target was difficult to achieve on time.³⁵⁷ In 1221, Governor Shimo Wolu described originally 398,500 qing farmlands were cultivated, including 99,000 qing of government owned land in Nanjing Circuit.

³⁵³ *Cambridge History of China*, Vol. 6. P. 292.

³⁵⁴ Cheng Minsheng, Cheng Feng and Ma Yuchen, *Ancient Henan Economic History*, p. 237.

³⁵⁵ *JS*, 47, p. 1055

³⁵⁶ *JS*, 47, p. 1062.

³⁵⁷ *JS*, 47, p. 1062.

However there were large number of people fled and the situation was similar in Jingdong, Jingxi and Jingnan Circuit.³⁵⁸ The fled of households already affected the income seriously. Thus, he suggested distributing the land for military households to reduce subsidy to them.³⁵⁹

Also, in Henan there was large proportion of newly opened up barren farmlands, which would lower the yield. Also, in the flooding in 1220, the state could not relieve the victims. Only half of tax income was from Henan.³⁶⁰ In addition, they ignored the extra consumption of grains due to the war with neighbouring regions. The lack of economic foundation forced Xuanzong rejected the Department of State Affairs's suggestion to increase military storage in that year. Instead he ordered to reduce the size of armies because the tax created maximum burden of commoners.³⁶¹ The economic problem was so serious that the state preferred to reduce the burden to commoners rather than strengthening the military.

We can also compare this source with the reign in Dading (1161-1189). At that period the state had all the territory including northeast, Shandong, Hebei region, and collect the same amount of tax compared with the reign of Xuanzong to show the heavy tax during the reign of Xuanzong. Shizong commented that the annual income of the state was 9,000,000 piculs. 2,000,000 piculs of the income were reserved for relief during natural disaster.³⁶² At that time, there were nineteen circuits in the state. In average, around 470,000 piculs grains collected for each circuit. Circuits in the Central Plain might collect a higher proportion. After relocation of capital, Jin lost control to at least eleven circuits, including Hebei, Shandong and Manchuria region which were the important region of grains production. If Herbert Franke quoted Hou Zhi's data was true, then Henan and the western region both responsible for 4,500,000 piculs of tax, which was about ten times increase. Although officials commented the tax was three times increased after relocation of capital, it might not reach ten times increase within ten years.

The economy just seemed to be improved in 1223, with 1,800,000 piculs grains storage, which was three times than previous year, probably with the effective economic policy. The official commented the storage was sufficient for the state, but

³⁵⁸ *JS*, 47, pp. 1053-1054.

³⁵⁹ *JS*, 47, p. 1054.

³⁶⁰ *JS*, 47, p. 1054.

³⁶¹ *JS*, 15, p. 346.

³⁶² *JS*, 47, p. 1057.

the heavy levies caused the fled of households.³⁶³

Table 2: Tax Collection Could Not Reach the Demand of Military Expenditure

Year	Annual income		Sources
1219	9,600,000 piculs	The total amount of farmland in Henan was 1,970,000 qing. High quality farm could collect 1 picul 2 peck, average was 1 picul while low quality farmland was eight pecks. The tax collected one tenth, annual income was 9,600,000	JS, 47, p. 1055.
1161-1189 (Reign of Dading)	9,000,000 piculs	Annual collection was 9,000,000 piculs (Whole Nation)歲取九百萬石	JS, 47, p. 1057
1215	1,560,000 piculs	240,000 qing of Henan under rent, annual income was just 1,560,000 河南租地計二十四萬頃，歲租才一百五十六萬	JS, 47, p. 1052
1222	1,400,000 piculs (Jingnanlu only)	Now southern circuit had to transport 1,400,000 piculs grains to the capital, and grass 4,500,000 bunches 今南路當輸秋稅百四十餘萬石，草四百五十餘萬束	JS, 47, p. 1062
1220	N/A	Now there is flooding in Henan, lots of people fled, less than 50,000 qing wheat cultivated, less than half of ordinary year 今河南罹水災，流亡者眾，所種麥不及五萬頃，殆減往年	JS, 47, p. 1055

³⁶³ JS, 47, p. 1062.

		太半	
--	--	----	--

Expenditure on military households after relocation of capital

Year	Amount of expenditure		
1215	3,600,000 piculs	Several million populations of Hebei military households relocated to Henan, every people gain 1 litre, annual expenditure is 3,600,000 piculs. Part of them pay by cash, the state also had to spend 3,000,000 piculs 河北軍戶徙居河南者幾百萬口，人日給米一升，歲費三百六十萬石，半以給直，猶支粟三百萬石。*	JS, 47, p. 1052
1216	1,635,200 piculs (Assume every people receive 1 liter grain)	Now 448,000 population of military households should be offered grains 今軍戶當給糧者四十四萬八千餘口	JS, 47, pp. 1053-1054.
1221	1,400,000 piculs (on old and child military household only)	For Jingnan, Jingdong and Jingxi three circuit, there were 400,000 old and child military household population, costing 1,400,000 grains expenditure 京南、東、西三路，屯軍老幼四十萬口，歲費糧百四十餘萬石	JS, 47, p. 1055

* Note: There might be incorrect for several million population of military households to Henan, the number probably be around one million, as described in the compiler's notes. (JS, 47, p. 1053)

Section 4 Increased Tax Collection to Cover the Expenditure

Increased Miscellaneous Levies

The worsened economy of the state compelled the court to implement miscellaneous

levies. The compilers of *Jin Shi* commented that late Jin Dynasty suffered the most serious shortage of economy. Despite Jin aimed at implement policy concerning commoners, the policy was serious which could not increase the wealth of the state. The fall of Jin Dynasty was due to the heavy tax implemented, including the commandeering of grains and obtaining grains from customs, to amass resources from commoners³⁶⁴ Liu Pujiang had stated that Jin Dynasty had three ordinary tax, including land tax, properties tax and tax on commodores. The taxes other than the above three types of tax were miscellaneous levies, usually implemented in specific regions under special situation, usually in warfare.³⁶⁵ According to Liu Pujiang's research, more than twenty miscellaneous levies imposed to collect money in different names.³⁶⁶ He also pointed out Jin Dynasty economic foundation were destroyed in Hebei, led to the loss of large amount of tax on commodores. The deficits were compensated by these ten types of miscellaneous.³⁶⁷

The military necessity tax imposed after relocation was one of the heavy taxes to collect from the military expenditure. Once the storage of the state could not afford the expenditure on military, then the military necessity tax implemented.³⁶⁸ The tax on "Horses cultivation" and "military necessity" collected in the reign of Zhenyou was aimed at collecting silver to balance the value of paper money to enhance its circulation.³⁶⁹ It showed the state aimed at collecting the silver from the public through the implementation of this tax.

Increased Properties Tax

After relocation of capital, the state started to do property survey, commoners hid their properties and fled to escape tax. Gao Ruli urged the state should not do the property survey immediately to prevent affecting farmers.³⁷⁰ Also, heavy tax was imposed on cattles during 1218. Thus farmers hid their cattles and affected

³⁶⁴ *JS*, 46, p. 1030. 而國用之屈，未有若金季之甚者。金之為政，常有卹民之志，而不能已苛征之令，徒有聚斂之名，而不能致富國之實。及其亡也，括粟、闌糴，一切掊克之政靡不為之。

³⁶⁵ Liu Pujiang, Analysis on Jin Dynasty's Miscellaneous Levies, *History Essays on Liao and Jin Dynasty*, Shenyang: Liaoning University Publisher, 1999. Pp. 281-283.

³⁶⁶ Liu Pujiang, Analysis on Jin Dynasty's Miscellaneous Levies, *History Essays on Liao and Jin Dynasty*, Shenyang: Liaoning University Publisher, 1999. Pp. 284-303.

³⁶⁷ Liu Pujiang, Analysis on Jin Dynasty's Miscellaneous Levies, *History Essays on Liao and Jin Dynasty*, Shenyang: Liaoning University Publisher, 1999. Pp. 281-283.

³⁶⁸ *JS*, 44, p. 1005.

³⁶⁹ *JS*, 48, p. 1078.

³⁷⁰ *JS*, 107. P. 2357.

agricultural production. Thus there were large piece of barren land in Xincal.³⁷¹ In addition, the state further imposed tax on population, properties and ability of reproduction, to provide the necessity for military usage. Part of commoners fled because they could not afford the burden.³⁷² Thus, the state imposed a heavy tax eventually affected agricultural production and the collection of tax.

Collection of Double Amount of Grain Tax

Apart from collecting miscellaneous levies from commoners to compensate for large amount of military expenditure, Emperor Aizong also collected double amount of summer grain tax in 1228, after Mongols attacked Pingyang³⁷³ It showed the lack of storage of the state. Different from previous experience, the collection of extra tax was in both grain tax and money tax, to obtain the grains from commoners in short time.

Other Means to Collect Money

Jin Dynasty also confers official title to those who donated the grains. Starting from 1214, the state set up the regulations on donation of grains to obtain confer of official title. For ordinary people who donated from 150 piculs to 20,000 piculs could receive different rewards.³⁷⁴ Two years later, the state even allowed middle aged empirical examination candidates aged 45 or above to donate for graduated title.³⁷⁵ In addition, the state also accepted temples and monks and Taoist priest to donate for official conferred title and religious official position. The amount required was 10 piculs to 70 piculs annually, depended on the classes.³⁷⁶

Proposed to Tax on Cooking Oil Production

To further seizing the resources from commoners to support the expenditures of the state, some officials even proposed to tax on cooking oil to obtain several hundred thousand taels of silver, which was nearly equivalent to the amount of tribute paid by Song. It showed the greed and urgency of the state to obtain money from commoners.

³⁷¹ Su Tianjue, *Guo Chao Ming Chen Shi Lue*, p. 197.

³⁷² *JS*, 48, p. 1088.

³⁷³ *JS*, 17, p. 378

³⁷⁴ *JS*, 50, p. 1125.

³⁷⁵ *JS*, 50, p. 1125.

³⁷⁶ *JS*, 50, p. 1126.

Wang Sanxi, Tax Minister, proposed the idea and was supported by Shuhu Gaoqi based on the large expenditure of the state.³⁷⁷ The purpose was to obtain dozen thousands taels of silver annually.³⁷⁸

This proposal raised heated debate. Gao Ruli refuted that after started the war with Mongols, the tax in Henan rose several times, and there was further extra tax on different items and labour services, all were collected from commoners. In fact, taxing on oil the state could receive several hundred thousand taels of silver annually, but the tax came from commoners, it further increased their burden.³⁷⁹ There were 26 officials who supported Shuhu's proposal, including household minister, vice military of labour and Kaifeng governors. On the other hand, several court officials and Transportation official in Nanjing Province opposed the idea. The opposite opinion basically argued it was nonsense to prohibit the use of commonly used commodores, which was never happened in the previous dynasty.³⁸⁰ Thus the emperor turned down the proposal.³⁸¹

Actually, the proposal seems ridiculous, but there were still a number of court officials supported it. The proposal showed the characteristic of the greedy and short-sighted policy and the state was seriously lack of resources.

Issuing of Paper Money

Compensate the Military Expenditure

The major reason for Jin to implement paper money was to compensate military expenditure. *Jin Shi* recorded that eighty-four carts of goods for military reward were used in the battle of Huihe 會河之役 against Mongols' invaders in 1211. The result was a disaster, but the government did not have intention to solve the economic crisis. The value of banknotes was so low that it could hardly be used in the market.³⁸² The problem was worsened after relocation of capital. Furthermore, there was frequent warfare. This led further devalue of currency.³⁸³

Rapid Devalue of Paper Money

³⁷⁷ *JS* 107, p. 2359-2360

³⁷⁸ *JS*, 15, p. 345.

³⁷⁹ *JS* 107, p. 2359-2360

³⁸⁰ *Yuan Haowen Quan Ji*, 18, p. 495.

³⁸¹ *JS*, 107, pp. 2359-2360

³⁸² *JS*, 48, p. 1082.

³⁸³ *JS*, 48, p. 1082.

The state lost the source of silver after relocation of capital. It had to increase the intensity to collect money for military expenditures on increasing wars, thus the state started to issue paper money and banned the usage of coins gradually to increase collect the wealth from public. Starting from 1215, the paper money gradually replaced the coins. The usage of coins was fate out to ensure the circulation of paper money.³⁸⁴ The banning of using coins aimed at manipulating the value of paper money with issuing a new one in order to obtain more silver from the public.³⁸⁵ The value of paper money immediately dropped because it could not exchange for coins, but it affected of business activities and even affected the selling of grains in capital. Different from Song, Jin implemented paper money without offering interest, but it collect raw material fee 15 wen per strings.³⁸⁶ There was no expire date on the paper money, but the state assumed commoners renew it half year.³⁸⁷ There were nearly ten types of new paper money issued after relocation of capital. Every paper money had the similar feature that it had high value at the beginning, but devalued soon. At the beginning of relocation of capital to Nanjing, a banknote Jiao Chao of ten strings (10,000 wens) could only exchange for ten wens. Other types of paper money ranged from 20 strings to 1000 strings. Usually one year after the issue, then the paper money devalued to worthless.³⁸⁸ Later even it was made by silk called Zhenhuo and Diyin, but the frequently changing different paper money continued until the fall of state.^{389 390}

Most of the paper issued in the reign of Xuanzong, showed under his reign the state increased the intensity to collect from commoners. In 1222, the state issued Yuanguang Zhenhuo, together with silver as the legal currency.³⁹¹ This was an issue to collect silver from commoners.

Collecting Capitals for Paper Money

To balance the over-issued paper money, the state imposed a tax named as “mulberry paper money tax”. The state first collected 70,000,000 strings tax from public to

³⁸⁴ *JS*, 48, p. 1092.

³⁸⁵ *JS*, 48p. 1086.

³⁸⁶ *JS*, 48, p. 1075.

³⁸⁷ *JS*, 48, p. 1081.

³⁸⁸ *JS*, 48, p. 1092.

³⁸⁹ *Gui Qian Zhi*, p. 109

³⁹⁰ *Gui Qian Zhi*, p. 109

³⁹¹ *JS*, 16, p. 336.

support the annual expenditure. Later the Tongbao turned stagnation of circulation, double the stated collected double amount.³⁹² All these just happened within the same year 1217 when the state started war with Song. Commoners did not only suffered from devalue of paper money, but also had to pay the price of bad economic management of the state.

Affecting Market Trading

Jurchen strongly prohibited commoners criticizing monetary policy since mid Jin Dynasty.³⁹³ After relocation of capital, although the rapid devalue of paper money, commoners were forced to use it.³⁹⁴ To strongly implement paper money, the government stipulated that one tael of silver could not exceed 300 strings of the value of Bao Quan. For the goods which the value is lower than three taels could not use silver. For the goods with higher value, only could be paid by one third value in silver, others had to pay by paper money. Anyone who ignored the regulation received punishment. After the order implemented, the market closed and business activity stopped.³⁹⁵ Also, after relocation of capital and the state used paper money to replace coins, giant merchants suffered most as they lost most of their properties due to the change of banknotes system.³⁹⁶ The frequent changing paper money seriously affected business activities.

Similar to other policies implemented by late Jin, the frequently changing of paper money and forcefully collecting capitals eventually exceeded of commoners' effort and they fled. The paper money also reduced businessman's capital and hit the commercial activities. Gao Ruli stated the problems that if the commoners fled, it would further worsen the military storage and the paper money system. The consequence was more far-reaching than devaluation of paper money.³⁹⁷ However, the state continuously manipulating the value of paper money through rapidly issue new one showed Gao's opinion was not accepted, and there was fled of households continued, joined the bandit and became rebellion force. These heavy taxes similar to killing the goose that lays the golden eggs.

³⁹² *JS*, 48, p. 1088.

³⁹³ *JS*, 48, p. 1079.

³⁹⁴ *JS*, 48, pp. 1084, 1087.

³⁹⁵ *JS*, 48, p. 1090.

³⁹⁶ *Gui Qian Zhi*, p. 109.

³⁹⁷ *JS*, 48, p. 1088.

It could Jin had to wage war with Song just for collecting back the tributes to solve part of its economic problems.

Section 5: Heavy Tax and Economic Problems Led to Fled

The heavy labor works and tax caused serious financial problems to ordinary people. In 1215, Censor Tian Jiangxiu 田迺秀 reported to emperor that all the funding of military and the state was responsible by Henan. Local officials did not concern the affordability of commoners and tax collected in short period. For those who could not pay the tax was punished by hitting with sticks. Commoners emptied all their properties but still insufficient to pay tax. So they fled to other place. They used up their money. Families were separated and died. Government tried to prohibit it but cannot stop the problems.³⁹⁸ The hard life of commoners could be seen in the work collections and writings by contemporary scholars. For example, Zhang Dehui's family lost all their properties after the war started in the reign of Zhenyou.³⁹⁹ In 1217, two third of Henan's peasants households could not fulfill the amount of tax payment that year. They had to sell the grains they eat in order to pay enough amount of tax.⁴⁰⁰ In 1220, the state had sufficient storage, but the problems of the escaped households still existed. Also the military tax was too high threatened refugees to return their hometown and resume their work.⁴⁰¹

Eventually, the heavy tax was several times of the past, caused the fled of households. In Bozhou, there were only one tenth of households existed, while other fled.⁴⁰² In Caizhou and Xizhou, 80-90% of households fled. Chenzhou and Yinzhou, 100 li from the capital only had few amount of households. The agricultural production was abandoned, but there were rising of bandits. Officials commented the rise of bandits was due to heavy tax and labour work.⁴⁰³ In addition, the tax originally had to pay by the fled households turned into existing one.⁴⁰⁴ Thus there was slippery slope effect for the population to flee. The significant effect of the fled of households was

³⁹⁸ JS, 47, p. 1060.

³⁹⁹ Su Tianjue, *Guo Chao Ming Chen Shi Lue*, Xuanwei Zhanggong, p. 205.

⁴⁰⁰ JS, 48, p. 1088.

⁴⁰¹ JS, 47, p. 1061.

⁴⁰² JS, 104, p. 2294.

⁴⁰³ JS, 108, p. 2391

⁴⁰⁴ JS, 46, p. 1036.

seriously affected supply to armies.⁴⁰⁵ Furthermore, the heavy tax and the famine in Suzhou led the fled of households. The consequence was the lack of grains supply in Guidefu, Pizhou, Suzhou, Xuzhou, Sizhou.⁴⁰⁶ The lack of grains supply was one of the cause led to the military failure. Song's source pointed out part of them fled to Song to contribute for Song's military farm and later attacked back.⁴⁰⁷

State Lack of Relief on Flooding after Relocation of Capital

In addition, through analyzing the state's relief policy to the serious flooding in Henan, we could notice the heavy tax of the state, together with the lack of ability for the state to provide aid.

In Appendices section, we could know that there were two serious floods in 1216 and 1220 after relocation of capital. The flooding in 1216 affected the eastern part of Henan. The affected region had serious starvation, together with the heavy supply to Pizhou's soldiers preparing for southern expedition, led to the fled of households.⁴⁰⁸ The state only exempted 160,000 piculs tax of escaped households in Zhongjing (Luoyang), Songzhou and Ruzhou.⁴⁰⁹ On the other hand, the flooding in 1220 affected around ten prefectures in Henan and seriously affected agricultural production. The flooding forced more households in affected region fled.⁴¹⁰ The state exempted the grains tax, purchase of grains, labor work and mulberry paper money tax.⁴¹¹ For example, the state exempted 100,000 piculs grain tax in Bozhou.⁴¹² However, the state could just do these policies to relief the burden of victims. Different from the flooding occurred in the reign of Dading and Zhangzong, the state could not offer aid to the affected region. It could only encourage wealthy people to offer loans to peasants.⁴¹³ Only two years later, the heavy tax returned, Jingnanlu (southern Henan) had to respond for 1,400,000 piculs autumn tax without any exemption.⁴¹⁴ Through the Jurchen court's respond to natural disaster, it showed the military expenditure damaged the economy seriously, and could not offer significant

⁴⁰⁵ *JS*, 104, p. 2294.

⁴⁰⁶ *JS*, 102, p. 2256.

⁴⁰⁷ *SS*, 412, p. 12370.

⁴⁰⁸ *JS*, 47, 1061.

⁴⁰⁹ *JS*, 47, p. 1061.

⁴¹⁰ *JS*, 47, p. 1055.

⁴¹¹ *JS*, 16, pp. 353-354.

⁴¹² *JS*, 47, p. 1061.

⁴¹³ *JS*, 47, p. 1055.

⁴¹⁴ *JS*, 47, p. 1062.

relief to victims as before.

On the other hand, during that period Song provided plenty grains and medicine to victims of flooding in Shandong and border region.⁴¹⁵ Furthermore, Song's emperor accepted refugee from Jin,⁴¹⁶ and Meng Zongzheng, Song's Xiangyang general recruited dozens thousand immigrants from the Central Plain (Jin), provided them subsidizes, distributed them farmland and implement military farm.⁴¹⁷ Huai region and the Central Plain were geographically closed, but there was a great contrast of commoners' social welfare between Song and Jin. The increasing number of people in Jin fled to Southern Song showed the failure of economic policy of Jin, and the serious consequence Jurchen would face.

⁴¹⁵ SS, 39, pp. 751-754; 40, pp. 779-780.

⁴¹⁶ SS, 41, p. 789.

⁴¹⁷ SS, 403, p. 12213.

Chapter 3: Southern Expedition (1217-1224) and Relation with Economy

Relocation of capital, the worsened economy and southern expedition is interrelated. It was raised by Song terminated paying tributes to Jin. It was also based on limited resources of Jin and increased expenditure after relocation of capital, including the stipend on military households and the combat between Mongol and Shandong bandits. Thus, Jin invaded Song during 1217-1224.

Song refused to pay tribute to Jin after Jin relocated the capital, Jin Dynasty started to discuss on invading Song from 1215. Song's historians commented Jin invaded Song was due to the loss of territory.⁴¹⁸ Jurchen historians also had similar arguments, but they further criticized the southern expedition.⁴¹⁹ Yuan Haowen criticized that the military strategy was not workable for resisting the powerful enemy, but only suitable for plundering Southern Song through southern expedition.⁴²⁰ Liu Qi commented that after moving the capital to the south, it frequently attacked Song. Because the territory in Henan and Shanxi was small, it planned to capture the land in Jiangnan. He criticized that Jin could not preserve its property but only could plan to deprive from others. Furthermore, the war continued for years without any significant progress.⁴²¹ Compiler of *Treatise of Food and Commodities* also lamented, quoting the *Zuo Zhuan* that "If there is not enough foundation to collect tax, then the state had the problems of greed. If the state was based on greed, what the problems would be like."⁴²² These commentaries could provide an alternative view for us to consider Jurchen's pretext for invading Song, which was largely related to relocation of capital and the economic crisis. Even though Xuanzong later claimed that invading Song was due to the breaching the settlement of Southern Song and not for the territory,⁴²³ it was clearly that Jin's southern expedition planned to regain the tribute from economic perspective. With the pretext that Song's bandit, which in fact was largely rascals and Jurchen's refugee, and Song's refusal of paying tribute,⁴²⁴ Shuhu Gaoqi considered invading Song to compensate the lost in the north.

⁴¹⁸ *Jiangyan Yi Lai Chao Ye Za Ji*, 19. P. 845.

⁴¹⁹ *Gui Qian Zhi*, 7, p. 74.

⁴²⁰ *Yuan Haowen Quan Ji*, 18, pp. 498-499.

⁴²¹ *Gui Qian Zhi*, 7, p. 71.

⁴²² *JS*, 46, p. 1030.

⁴²³ *JS*, 15, p. 343.

⁴²⁴ *SS*, 414, p. 12428.

Section 1: Southern Song Terminated Paying Tribute to Jin

Briefly Analyzing Jin-Song Relation before 1217 Southern Expedition

After Jin relocated the capital, Song already noticed the problems faced. Song clearly understood the politics in Jin and also Mongols invaders through the intelligent from Xi Xia, Shandong and Mongolia. Song court noticed that Jin's strength was weakened.⁴²⁵ Starting from 1214, Jin sent envoys to announce the news of relocation of capital and urged Song to pay back the tribute.⁴²⁶ This issue stimulated discussion in Song court.

In fact, Song was alert to Jin after its relocation of capital and well prepared for defence.⁴²⁷ The Song court asked for proposal to respond to Jin.⁴²⁸ The public opinion from Song was almost one sided: to refuse paying tribute. Zhen Dexiu, who he had been envoy to Jin in 1212, first urged the state to stop paying tribute. At that time Mongols' was invading Jin, he witnessed the corruption of Jurchen.⁴²⁹ Zhen and Lou Yue had similar ideas to terminate tributes and prepared defence in Huai region.⁴³⁰ Imperial University students even protested for sending envoys to Jin.⁴³¹ Some were angry that Jurchen polluted Song's old capital, and it would be shame to send envoys to there.⁴³² Some looked down upon Jurchen after relocation of capital, arguing that the Song no longer had obligation to pay the tribute to Bian (Kaifeng).⁴³³ Some even noticed Jin already suffered economic problems and noticed that Jin's valuable item was stored in Hebei, and predicted Jin was faced with unfavourable consequence as Henan did not have natural barrier.⁴³⁴ General Zhao Fang, Jia She and Chu Yuzhi all predicted Jin would attack Song, as Jin was already suffered from Mongols' attack.⁴³⁵ Jia She even pointed out that Jin had used up its money and grains. He suggested Song not to return tribute to Jin to prevent strengthening Jin's power and attack Song again.⁴³⁶ Shi Miyuan also agreed the

⁴²⁵ *Jiangyan Yi Lai Chao Ye Za Ji*, 19., pp. 848, 850.

⁴²⁶ *SS*, 39, pp. 760-761.

⁴²⁷ *SS*, 39, p. 759.

⁴²⁸ *SS*, 413, p. 12394.

⁴²⁹ *SS*, 437, p. 12957.

⁴³⁰ *SS*, 401, p. 12172.

⁴³¹ *SS*, 39, p. 761.

⁴³² *SS*, 397, p. 12101.

⁴³³ *SS*, 415, p. 12415.

⁴³⁴ *SS*, 437, p. 12957.

⁴³⁵ *SS*, 403, p. 12204; 406, p. 12258.

⁴³⁶ *SS*, 403, p. 12207.

installation of military defense and storage of grains to prepare.⁴³⁷

Qiao Xingjiang, on the other hand, suggested that “If one of two interdependent things falls, the other is in danger”. He argued that Mongols was raising, its power was strong enough to eliminate the Jurchen. The Jurchen, once had been the Song’s enemy, became the barrier of greater enemy now. Song and Jin shared the common lots, and should temporary provide Jin tribute to enable Jurchen to resist the Mongols. Shi Miyuan nearly accepted his long term plan. However, a group of university students urged the court to prosecute Qiao Xingjian for his suggestion.⁴³⁸

Contemporary scholars Lu Zhong also strongly criticized Qiao’s suggestion.⁴³⁹

Since the public opinion supported Zhen Dexiu’s suggestions that not to pay tribute to Jin, Shi Miyuan decided to accept the opinion from majority. In fact, in 1215 Song’s emperor had requested Jin to reduce the amount of tribute, but Xuanzong rejected the request.⁴⁴⁰ In 1215, Song rejected Jin’s envoys in Huai Region, thus Jin prepared to invade Song.⁴⁴¹

Evaluation on the Amount of tribute

Because Jurchen used the pretext that Song did not pay the tribute for invading Song, the following will analyse the evaluated amount of tribute in Jin Dynasty economy.

Table 3: Evaluation on the Amount of Tribute

Items	Evaluated Value		Sources
300,000 taels silver	600,000 strings	One tael of silver equal to 2 strings 遂改鑄銀名「承安寶貨」，一兩至十兩分五等，每兩折錢二貫	JS, 48, p. 1076.

⁴³⁷ SS, 414, p. 12417.

⁴³⁸ *Si Chao Wen Jian Lu*, A, p. 228.

⁴³⁹ *Song Shi Quan Wen*, 30. P. 2100.

⁴⁴⁰ JS, 62, p. 1482.

⁴⁴¹ *Yuan Haowen Quan Ji*, 19, p. 519.

300,000 bolks of silks	750,000 strings	High quality silk was 2 strings 500 wen, one tael of silk was 250 wen, in Anyang 問絹帛價，雲好絹 每疋二貫五百文， 絲每兩百五十文”	Lou Yue, Daily Records on Traveling to the North 樓鑰，《北行日錄》，in Zhao Yongchun edited, Records on ambassadors travelling to Liao and Jin, (趙永春編，《奉使遼金 行程錄》) Chang Chun: Jilin Literature and History Publisher, 1995. P. 266.
Total	1,350,000 strings		

Notes:

1. The silver price is constant, while the price of silk is 1170
2. There might be inflation of silk's price, particularly after Jin's lost Hebei, the major production region of silk

The total amount of tribute that Song paid to Jin was roughly worth 1,350,000 strings. Since silk was produced mainly in Hebei region,⁴⁴² the value would be higher due to lack of resources and loss of production ground in Hebei probably further increased the value. At that time, the state imposed ban on drinking tea for saving several hundred thousand taels silver annually. Thus this tribute was an important source of Jin's financial income of late Jin.⁴⁴³ Chan Hok-lam stated that Jin Dynasty used valuable products like silk and silver, mainly from Song's tribute, to exchange for tea. Song's manipulation on the market and price of tea could get back the lost from the

⁴⁴² *Yuan Yi Tong Zhi*, 1, p. 19

⁴⁴³ *JS*, 49, p. 1109. Import of tea from Song also strictly banned since 1223. The local governors stated that tea was produced from Song. Jin had to use silk or gold to purchase tea. 50 prefectures in Jin annually consumed 300,000 taels to buy tea. Court official assumed daily consumption of tea was 20 pockets for every prefecture.

Chan Hok-lam stated this source had problems in calculation. The price might be two taels per packet of tea or it cost Jin to spend 700,000 taels silver. He pointed out if the later value was true, then it would be a significant burden to the state. Chan Hok-lam, *Tea Production and Tea Trade Under the Jurchen-Chin Dynasty*, P. 119.

tribute. However the northern territory lack of resources thus Jin had to rely heavily on South.⁴⁴⁴ Since Song stopped paying tribute to Jin, to prevent the net loss of silver and silk, Jurchen had to prohibit purchase of tea.⁴⁴⁵

At the same time, Jurchen lost most of the sources of silver, as Hebei's silver mines were lost to Mongols. Therefore, Song's refusal of paying tribute further undermined Jin's economy.

Section 2 Jin's Decision to Invade Song

The discussion on whether invading Song or not two years after Jurchen relocated the capital mainly based on economic consideration, while some arguments was about preserving the dignity of the state. There was a heated discussion in the court of Jin Dynasty. Lots of censors and some generals who have good understanding of Song opposed to invade Song; while Prime Ministers and several generals who had participate the southern invasion during the reign of Zhangzong supported the invasion. The following will provide an analysis on this issue to discuss the economic loss of the deterioration of relation between Song and Jin.

A. Pro-war Opinions

There were several generals and Jurchen officials suggested to start a war with Song. Shuhu Gaoqi strongly urged the court to invade Song after receiving the suggestion from Wang Shian to invade Xuyi and Chuzhou, and summoned Song and Red Jacket Bandit to surrender. Shuhu Gaoqi had participated in invade Song during 1206, eliminated dozen thousands of Song's armies and received large amount of military awards.⁴⁴⁶ In 1217, Shuhu Gaoqi urged the Jin court to invade Song to increase the territory of Jin. Xuanzong originally rejected the idea, as he commented that he just wanted to keep the ancestor's heritages.⁴⁴⁷ Natan Moujia also suggested invading Song.⁴⁴⁸ However, in summer the emperor ordered to attack Song and send the general Wugulun Qingshou and Wanyan Saibu to prepare invading Song. From that

⁴⁴⁴ Chan Hok-lam, *Tea Production and Tea Trade Under the Jurchen-Chin Dynasty*, Pp. 120-121.

⁴⁴⁵ Chan Hok-lam, *Tea Production and Tea Trade Under the Jurchen-Chin Dynasty*, Pp. 120-121.

⁴⁴⁶ *JS*, 106, p. 2340

⁴⁴⁷ *JS*, 109, p. 2344; *JS*, 15, p. 327

⁴⁴⁸ *JS*, 104, p. 2288

moment the Song Jin relationship terminated forever.⁴⁴⁹

B. Anti-War Opinions

The opposite opinion was also based on economic consideration. The court officials mainly pointed out Jin might not successfully gain from southern expedition. Furthermore, some even comparing Song's situation and analysed Jin might face the loss of war. For example, Prime Minister Li Ge pointed out the state should maintain peace to enhance the storage. Otherwise, the state could not afford any invasion.⁴⁵⁰ Some officials commented the weaken Jurchen might not gain victory. Minister Yang commented that Song had large amount of resources backup in Sichuan and Jiangnan region. Jin might not win again as the southern expedition in 1206-1207. He warned that Jin's southern expedition would invite Mongols' attack again and Jin might be facing a two-front war.⁴⁵¹ Yang Yungyi was a pro-peace official. Even the state had relatively better economic and military condition in the reign of Taihe (1201-1208), he had already suggested the Jin court not to invade Song at that time because it was difficult to defend the occupied region in Huainan region as Song might block Huai River, which might block the supply route of Jin.⁴⁵² Zhangzong partly agreed with his idea. Thus, after gaining military success Jurchen immediately terminated the war and renewed the peace settlement in 1207. However, Xuanzong did not accept his suggestions and continued the wars with Song.

At the outset of the war with Song, Xu Gu already noticed that Song treated Jin Dynasty as barrier of Mongols invaders. He suggested seizing this opportunity to maintain peace with Song. He noticed Song did not dare to deeply invade Jin. He suggested Jin should build rapprochement with Song and attacks Song only if Song continued its provocation.⁴⁵³ Xu Gu's argument reflected the contemporary situation of Song, probably his hometown was in Nanyang closed to Jin-Song border.⁴⁵⁴ Xu Gu commented that Jin should seize the opportunity when Mongols invaders took rest, to keep peace in southern Song, then Jin could enjoy peace soon. He referred to history that Jin enjoyed more than thirty years peace after Shizong and Zhangzong

⁴⁴⁹ *JS*, 106, p. 2344.

⁴⁵⁰ *JS*, 99, p. 2198.

⁴⁵¹ *Yuan Haowen Quan Ji*, 18, pp. 498-499.

⁴⁵² *Yuan Haowen Quan Ji*, 18, pp. 498-499.

⁴⁵³ *JS*, 109, p. 2415.

⁴⁵⁴ *Yuan Yi Tong Zhi*, 3, p. 297.

signed peace settlement in 1165 and 1208. Jin benefited from the treaties to ensure the plenitude of the state for more than 30 years. Jurchen actively urged for ceasefire and gained huge success after peace was reached.⁴⁵⁵ He also analyzed by weighing the gain and loss of the state's economy, and compared the situation with Southern Song. He said Song's army stayed in the city, Jin's army would gain nothing but used up the grains. Furthermore, Jin only had one province in Henan, and had to obtain the military funding by forcefully taxing people. He urged the emperor put all forces to be well prepared for Mongols' attack, but not making another troubles at the back.⁴⁵⁶ Xu Gu clearly pointed the that Jin could not easily get the victory and it would risk the damage of economy through southern expedition. He also introduced some suggestions to strengthen the economy. Zhang Xinxin also pointed out the state should consider its economic situation before southern expedition.⁴⁵⁷ Although Jin accepted their suggestions to send envoy to Song to negotiate for peace, Song returned them in Huai border.⁴⁵⁸

Some Jin generals also noticed Jin's economic problem and attempted to maintain a better relation with Song. On the issue of punishment to Song's illegal immigration, General Shujia Tuoluhui relieved their death penalty. He explained that after the state moved to Henan, the territory was smaller and commoners were poor. Fortunately the border region was peace, thus people can take a rest. If these bandits were executed, conflict in the border would be happened.⁴⁵⁹ General Xu Ding also opposed the southern expedition. When he sent the armies from Qinzhou, Gongzhou and Fengxiang to attack Song, he still wrote a petition to emperor to oppose the invasion. He said that it was urgent to point out the interest of Jin Dynasty by not invading the south. He commented the peace with Song could strengthen the nation. Mongols invaders eliminated Jurchen's armies power to one tenth and damaged lots of weapons. Commoners were exhausted by heavy labour work. Also the frequent transferring of armies affected Jin but not the enemy. Also, the Mongols might capture the opportunity to attack Jin. Moreover, he pointed out Song had been well prepared for military defence after their failure on northern expedition in 1208. Furthermore, when Jin Dynasty's capital moved to Bianjing, it was closed to the

⁴⁵⁵ *JS*, 109, pp. 2416-2417

⁴⁵⁶ *JS*, 109, pp. 2416-2417

⁴⁵⁷ *JS*, 107, p. 2367

⁴⁵⁸ *JS*, 102, p. 2246.

⁴⁵⁹ *JS*, 124, p. 2698.

territory of Song. Song had well prepared as they treated it as threat. In addition, Jin would not gain any resources as Song already relocated the border residents to inland.⁴⁶⁰ He also pointed out that the southern expedition might damage of economy and agricultural production led to crisis. He stated that that Song had long term hatred against Jin. They still did not forget to recover the old land and revenge for their shame, but they feared the Jin and failed to estimate Jin's actual strength, thus they did not easily start a war with Jin. Even if Jin could win the war, if there were no storage, still it could not be defence. Fifth, the state might not gain additional grain through southern expedition because the wars already spent lots of labor forces for transportation. Also the heavy tax led to the fled of households, and they might turn into bandits. Sixth, farming activities would be affected. He suggested enhance the defence and military storage. The state should first self-strengthen and then recover the lost land, and Song could be conquered later.⁴⁶¹ His argument had certain extents similar to the policy of Song which was focus on defence and strengthened the state only. Furthermore, Jin's southern territory had potential to be developed if keeping peace with Song. In other section, we could see that after the war, Tangzhou and Dengzhou were destroyed and became lack of grains supply and commoners had to move to other region for grains, as censors predicted.

C. Decision on Southern Expedition

However, Gao Ruli, the Prime Minister, insisted to invade Song. He criticized Song was crafty and violated the regulation thus no room to negotiate with Song. Otherwise Jurchen would be slandered by them.⁴⁶² Emperor accepted Gao Ruli and Shuhu Gaoqi's idea and gave up the chance to negotiate with Song.

Gao Ruli was a Prime Minister who is an expert to economic issues. During the reign of Zhangzong (1189-1206), he had been censor and transportation minister in Shanxi, Xijing, Beijing, Hebei and Zhongdu.⁴⁶³ He should have most of his knowledge on the economic situation in the Central Plain.⁴⁶⁴ He had been the envoy to Song in 1208.⁴⁶⁵ He should have certain understanding on Song. However his respond on discussion

⁴⁶⁰ *JS*, 108, pp. 2379-2380

⁴⁶¹ *JS*, 108, pp. 2379-2380

⁴⁶² *JS*, 107, p. 2357

⁴⁶³ *JS*, 107, p. 2353.

⁴⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶⁵ *JS*, 12, p. 284.

of relationship with Song shown that he did not make good use of his knowledge of economy. He was just based on patriotic sentiment, or obedient to Shuhu Gaoqi, but neglected the economic and political problems that Jin Dynasty was facing. The compilers of *Jin Shi* criticized Gao Ruli although he was an honest and careful official, he did not oppose the invasion and even banned the negotiation with Song.⁴⁶⁶ Gao's stance on southern expedition was harmful to the state's fate.

Section 3 Jin Lost Heshuo During Southern Expedition

In summer of 1217, Jin attacked Song because Song had attacked it several times and refused to pay tribute.⁴⁶⁷ The southern expedition lasted eight years until Jin sent an official letter to Song that Jin would not attack the South again in 1224.⁴⁶⁸ Although Jurchen gained some victory at the outset, it could not threaten the Song. Probably Jin's armies aimed at plundering rather than attacking military strategic places. On the other hand, Song accepted Red Jacket Bandits and provisioned them. Thus Shandong gradually fell to bandits.

Wars for Grains

The economic factors largely explained Jurchen's invasion against Song. After the war, *Jin Shi* stressed on recording the prizes captured through southern expedition. Just at the beginning of the war, Jurchen attacked Chenzhou (Gansu) and gained 70,000 hu grains and 40,000 strings.⁴⁶⁹ Also, they captured Song's granaries for 9,000 piculs and 300,000 armours. In 1218, the army gained victory in Shouzhou, gaining 2000 piculs of grains.⁴⁷⁰ Shanxi gained greater victory, which captured 90,000 hu grains, thousand millions of coins and large amount of army supplies.⁴⁷¹ Despite the military funding were provided by commoners, the spoils were distributed to soldiers.⁴⁷² The state and commoners alike did not gain much. The small scale victory at the beginning might encourage the state to continue the war. Song's official teased Jurchen for the reason that it was similar to a group of angry

⁴⁶⁶ *JS*, 107, p. 2371.

⁴⁶⁷ *JS*, 15, p.331

⁴⁶⁸ *JS*, 17, p. 375.

⁴⁶⁹ *JS*, 113, p. 2484.

⁴⁷⁰ *JS*, 15, p. 334.

⁴⁷¹ *JS*, 15, p. 336.

⁴⁷² *JS*, 113, p. 2480; 102, p. 2248.

bird travelling in forest, and the general leading the starving exiled refugees to fight.⁴⁷³ The practice by Jurchen's army showed Jin was seriously lack of grains led to the expedition.

However, the state did not have sufficient financial support led to military failure. The invasion spent large amount of money and undermined agricultural production. The military farm adopted by some generals could not cover up the expenditure.⁴⁷⁴ In 1220, Wang Fu garrisoned in Qingzhou defected to Red Jacket Bandits due to the isolated of the city.⁴⁷⁵ General of Dongpingfu's requested to send Henan's army and Heshuo's grains supply to recover Cangzhou, but rejected by the court.⁴⁷⁶ In 1221, Jin's army originally could approach Haozhou, but eventually returned due to the lack of grains.⁴⁷⁷

Lack of Grains Supports to Warlords Led to Military Failure

The state had long been failure to provide enough subsidizes to loyalists, caused the military failure. Zhang Kai requested to implement military farming in Hebei when the armies faced problems of deficient of grains, together requested 300 donkeys, but the court rejected, until Zhang Kai struggle for several times then received the permission.⁴⁷⁸ He requested 20,000 piculs grains from the state, but the state only supplied 10% to him. He was jealous to another warlord Wu Xian who received more subsidizes from the court.⁴⁷⁹ At the same time, another warlord Guo Minzheng garrisoned in Northwest border also lack of grains due to the barren of farmland in garrisoned region. The state ordered Zhang Kai to provide grains subsidise to Guo but rejected by Zhang. Guo failed and later Zhang also failed due to the isolate of power.⁴⁸⁰ The limitation of grains supply from the state led to the warlords failed to cooperate together to against enemies and eventually failed.

Another warlord who failed due to deficient of grains and defected to Red Jacket Bandit was Wang Fu, Duke of Canghai. In 1220, Red Jacket Bandits and Song's joint armies attacked Heshuo region. After combating a period of time, Wang Fu defected

⁴⁷³ *Gui Qian Zhi*, 7, p. 71

⁴⁷⁴ *JS*, 108, p. 2381.

⁴⁷⁵ *JS*, 118, p. 2575.

⁴⁷⁶ *JS*, 118, p. 2576.

⁴⁷⁷ *JS*, 16, p. 356.

⁴⁷⁸ *JS*, 118, p. 2589.

⁴⁷⁹ *JS*, 118, p. 2590.

⁴⁸⁰ *JS*, 118, p. 2590.

due to the isolation of the city.⁴⁸¹ After losing Qingzhou, the state refused General of Dongpingfu's request to send Henan's army and Heshuo's grains supply to assist recovering Cangzhou,⁴⁸² where it was the important prefecture of Shandong having salt fields. The state just kept Henan.

Jin Shi compiler commented that Jin had conquered China by military means, but also lost it in the same means.⁴⁸³ Despite the fact that the warlords were relatively strong, the lack of grains undermined their defence against Mongols. In addition, the struggling of the grains among warlords undermined the unity and cooperation of the loyalists, eventually they were eliminated one by one.

Heshuo Loss after Southern Expedition

Comparing with southern expedition during mid Jin Dynasty, now the Jurchen faced invasion from several enemies including Xi Xia, Song, Red Jacket Bandits and Mongols. Shujia Tuoluhui concluded the situation that Shanxi was being attacked by Mongols after Jin invaded the south, led to the frequent of war, the loss of soldiers, commoners suffered from intensive labor service. Also, Shouzhou and Sizhou were connected to the base of Red Jacket Bandit Xuyi and Chuzhou.⁴⁸⁴ *Jin Shi* commented that previously Jin had increased 100 square li of territory daily, but during the reign of Xuanzong, the state also lost 100 square li of territory daily, and eventually fall.⁴⁸⁵ Thus, Jin's military power was diverged, and the southern expedition was eventually loss.

Also, one year after Jurchen's southern expedition, the Mongols invaded Cizhou, which was 200 kilometers north of Nanjing.⁴⁸⁶ Xuanzong was worried.⁴⁸⁷ In the spring of next year, Taiyuan had been lost in 1220.⁴⁸⁸ Zhending (Zhengding)'s General Wu Xian defected to Mongols.⁴⁸⁹ Also, Tangzhou and Dengzhou were destroyed by Song's army. In addition, the entire Shandong lost to Red Jacket Bandits in 1220.

Just after relocation of capital, the increasing tax led to the raise of private security

⁴⁸¹ *JS*, 118, p. 2575.

⁴⁸² *JS*, 118, p. 2576.

⁴⁸³ *JS*, 117, p. 2568.

⁴⁸⁴ *JS*, 124, p. 2698.

⁴⁸⁵ *JS*, 16, p. 370.

⁴⁸⁶ *Ibid*, p. 332

⁴⁸⁷ *JS*, 106, p. 2345

⁴⁸⁸ *JS*, 15, p. 342.

⁴⁸⁹ Su Tianjue, *Guo Chao Ming Chen Shi Lue*, p. 166.

groups and rebel the authority.⁴⁹⁰ Feng Bi suggested Jurchen should recover Shandong because there had strong horses and elites. Also there was large amount of grain production.⁴⁹¹ In 1215, Jin's army eliminated 30,000 armies led by Red Jacket Bandit's head Yang An'er⁴⁹² and killed Liu Erzu and his 10,000 army.⁴⁹³ Besieged by Jurchen armies, they lacked food supplies, even though they had "mountains of treasures".⁴⁹⁴ In addition, Song, based on the treaty with Jin, rejected these bandits.⁴⁹⁵ Thus, Red Jacket Bandits were isolated severely undermined.

The situation changed after Jurchen southern expedition. When Jin was preparing to attack Song, Red Jacket Bandits launched attack on prefectures in Shandong.⁴⁹⁶ Song accepted Zhao Fang's suggestion to attack Jin and accept the bandits.⁴⁹⁷ Song also accepted Jia She's proposal to provide 10,000-20,000 subsidy quota to bandits. Thus they could survive and threaten Jin.⁴⁹⁸ Song also recruited bandits from Huai region.⁴⁹⁹ Song was rich in resources, they even increased the subsidy to encourage the bandits fight against Jurchen.⁵⁰⁰ Furthermore, these bandits contributed in relieving Song's armies from Jurchen's attack to establish military merit.⁵⁰¹ Li Quan also turned to Song.⁵⁰² Jin's General Wanyan Eke and Shi Quan invaded Song from Yinzhou and Shouzhou, originally they occupied several counties and gained some livestock. Due to the infiltration by Red Jacket Armies, Jin's armies were totally defeated by Song.⁵⁰³ Song frequently rewarded them.⁵⁰⁴ Thus, Jurchen could not capture any cities through southern expedition. Also, Jurchen's cavalry had approached Jiangkang. (Nanjing) but Li Quan and Song's loyalist General Ji Xian attacked them back.⁵⁰⁵ On the other hand, Song captured entire Shandong with 2 metropolitan prefectures, 9 prefectures and 40 counties through the contribution from

⁴⁹⁰ SS, 475, p. 13817.

⁴⁹¹ *Yuan Haowen Quan Ji*, Chapter 19, p. 520. Inscription of Tomb of Feng Gong

⁴⁹² JS, 14, p. 307.

⁴⁹³ JS, 14, p. 308.

⁴⁹⁴ SS, 475, p. 13818.

⁴⁹⁵ SS, 406, p. 12260, 39, p. 763.

⁴⁹⁶ JS, 14, p.316.

⁴⁹⁷ SS, 40, p. 768.

⁴⁹⁸ SS, 403, p. 12207.

⁴⁹⁹ SS, 403, p. 12208.

⁵⁰⁰ SS, 475, 13817.

⁵⁰¹ SS, 475, p. 13819.

⁵⁰² SS, 40, p. 769.

⁵⁰³ JS, 46, p. 1030.

⁵⁰⁴ SS. 40 p. 779.

⁵⁰⁵ SS, 40, p. 772.

bandits in 1220.⁵⁰⁶ Thus, Cai Dongzhou's comment that Jurchen lost Heshuo in 1225 was incorrect.⁵⁰⁷ Later Wu Xian rebelled Mongol in 1225, but the city was conquered by Mongols again just after half year.⁵⁰⁸ It is clear that even Jin could obtain a defected metropolitan prefectures, it could not provision it.

Termination of Sea Transportation Connecting Northeast

The unrest in Shandong led to the suspension of sea transportation. Background chapter had described during mid Jin the state used sea route to transport the grains from northeast to Shandong and then to the capital. Upraise of Red Jacket Bandits occupied the sea route. Jin's general commented that the sea route connecting northeast must pass through Enzhou and Bozhou.⁵⁰⁹ Toyama Gunji suggested that because Mongols armies occupied Shandong, thus Jin lost the connection to northeast through the sea route. Jurchen could not retreat to its origin.⁵¹⁰ Herbert Franke suggested that Jin lost the horses supplies for cavalry forces.⁵¹¹ Jin Dynasty devoted considerable amount of efforts in recovering the coastal prefectures but failed.

The problems of transportation also affected Korea paying tribute to Jin together with market trading. Korean used to have good relationship with Jurchen.⁵¹² In 1219, Korea planned to submit tribute to the Jin but without success because of the problem of transportation and the war.⁵¹³ In 1218, the emperor especially pointed out the idea planned to reopen market with Korea, and urged the province to manage it despite the difficulty of the blockage of the route. He hoped to borrow grains and open the market with Korea, as Korea had long been used to submitting and paying tribute to the Jin.⁵¹⁴ These sources reveal that the route to Northeast was blocked because of the unrest in the region. Thus there was a lack of connection to the Jin's

⁵⁰⁶ Zhou Mi, *Qi Dong Ye Yu*, Vol. 9, Pp. 102-103.

⁵⁰⁷ Cai Dongzhou, Jin Moved the Capital to Bian and the Survival and Decline of Jin Dynasty, *Journal of Guizhou Normal Institute*, 1995. Vol. 1.

⁵⁰⁸ Su Tianjue, *Guo Chao Ming Chen Shi Lue*, p. 166.

⁵⁰⁹ *JS*, 102, p. 2258.

⁵¹⁰ Toyama Gunji, *Study of Jin Dynasty History*, p. 43.

⁵¹¹ *Cambridge History of China*, 6. P. 266.

⁵¹² *JS*, 135, p. 2889.

⁵¹³ *JS*, 15, p. 343 After Xuanzong moved the capital to Nanjing, route to Liaodong terminated. Liaodong province reported that Korea still hope paying tribute to the court. Xuanzong sent envoy to there but returned due to transportation problem. The route could not be reopened and there was no more Korean embassy pay tribute to Jin. (*JS*, 135, p. 2889.)

⁵¹⁴ *JS*, 109, p. 2401

territory in Manchuria.

Since the Manchuria region was very important, but the loss of Zhongdu terminated the land route, and it was impossible for the state to recover Zhongdu, the recovery of sea route was a more possible option. In late 1210s, generals in Shandong attempted to recover the prefectures in order to connect northeast again.⁵¹⁵ In 1222, Jurchen's loyalist armies recovered some prefectures in Shandong, particularly Xinan which was 200 li away from the pier, the state attempted to use sea route to reconnect Liaodong, for access to northeast region.⁵¹⁶ However, *Jin Shi* had no record on communication between the Central Plain and Manchuria later on, showed the transportation to northeast terminated.

Section 4 Economic Loss Through Southern Expedition

Through southern expedition, the victory of war could not benefit to the state but the lost led to serious consequences of the military and financial ability. It led to the loss of picked troops and created financial problems. Once Mongols armies attack, Jin's army could not be defended.⁵¹⁷ Officials pointed out the heavy tax and labor work in Henan after invading Song, and suggested to terminate the war to recover Heshuo, train the armies and increase the storage.⁵¹⁸ Thus, the economic policy described in previous chapter could not boost up the development in Henan.

Losing Shandong Salt Fields

The loss of Shandong brought significant effect to the state. Jurchen originally had 5,000 loyalist armies garrisoned there.⁵¹⁹ In Dongping, there were more than 10,000 soldiers, and used the salt produced in Binzhou to exchange for salt.⁵²⁰ Shandong General Hou Zhi used salt to exchange for grains and enhanced business activity, which could sustain the army without disturbing commoners.⁵²¹ It showed the importance of Shandong's salt field to support the loyalists.

In the Table "Income of Salt Tax in Different Places" in Appendices, we can see that

⁵¹⁵ *JS*, 102, p. 2258.

⁵¹⁶ *JS*, 118, p. 2576.

⁵¹⁷ *JS*, 46, p. 1030.

⁵¹⁸ *JS*, 104, p. 2291.

⁵¹⁹ *JS*, 102, p. 2259.

⁵²⁰ *JS*, 104, p. 2291.

⁵²¹ *JS*, 108, p. 2388.

Shandong and Cangzhou salt field yielded 4,334,184 strings and 2,766,636 strings respectively, which originally contributed to more than two-third of whole state's salt tax income during peaceful era. It showed that there was significant income from the salt to the state. However, the entire Shandong lost to Red Jacket Bandits during southern expedition. The salt field also lost to bandits and strengthened their power. For example, rebelled General Zhang Lin garrisoned in Qingzhou with salt field, he owned six salt fields for profit. Wang Fu, another rebelled "loyalist" of Jurchen, rewarded by collect unlimited amount of salt profit.⁵²² When Li Quan's army passed through Cangzhou, salt were distributed to them as reward.⁵²³ Zhang Lin even submitted 200,000 strings to Song.⁵²⁴ It is clearly that the salt was valuable to sustain the army.

Tangzhou and Dengzhou Destroyed

The southern expedition led to the serious damage to Henan's border region, particularly Tangzhou and Dengzhou several times during 1219-1220.⁵²⁵ It was due to Song's strategy of relieve of besieged by besieging prefectures of Jurchen adopted by Zhao Fang. Song's army did not aimed at deeply penetrating into Jin, but just seizure of the storage and destroying the defence of these cities.⁵²⁶ For example, when Jurchen armies attacking Qizhou and Huangzhou, Song's General Zhao Fan besieged Tangzhou and Dengzhou, and pursued Jurchen when they retreated.⁵²⁷ Meng Zongzheng, Hu Zaixing and Xu Guo also adopted similar strategy.⁵²⁸ This strategy weakened the foundation of Jin, and Jurchen did not dare to attack Xiangyang, Zaoyang and Han.⁵²⁹ Thus, these regions' population reduced and agricultural production affected. Lu Gan pointed out several hundred thousand soldiers garrisoned in border in the south. Most of residents living near the border regions in Tangzhou, Dengzhou, Shouzhou and Sizhou, as well as certain amount of soldiers fled, led to the reduction of population.⁵³⁰ Part of these populations fled to

⁵²² *SS*, 475, p. 13823.

⁵²³ *SS*, 475, p. 13821.

⁵²⁴ *SS*, 406, p. 12246.

⁵²⁵ *SS*, 40, pp. 771, 774, 776

⁵²⁶ *SS*, 403, p. 12206

⁵²⁷ *SS*, 417, p. 12505.

⁵²⁸ *SS*, 403. P. 12211.

⁵²⁹ *SS*, 402, p. 12211.

⁵³⁰ *JS*, 106, pp. 2344-2345

Song.⁵³¹ 10 years later, Tangzhou and Dengzhou lost because of the deficient of grains in these regions.

Trading with Song Terminated

Treaties on Commodities emphasized the importance of the cross-border trading ground. Goods could be exchanged and the tax collected could be largely benefit for the state's income.⁵³² Shuo Zhou General Chu Bian pointed out previously he had proposed rapprochement with Song and established market for trading. Thus there was plenty supply of food for armies and commoners.⁵³³

Since Jin-Song peace settlement signed in 1208, seven markets along border restored.⁵³⁴ The restoration of Yanzhou market in 1213 gained more than 100,000 strings tax annually.⁵³⁵ However, these markets were finally closed during Jin's invasion since 1217. Song seriously prohibited pirate activities to Jin. Also, they increase the price of tea and horses to inhibit Jurchen purchase.⁵³⁶ Lu Gan pointed out after the expedition, Sizhou's market's income lost several thousand bolts of cloths and several hundred taels of silver.⁵³⁷ The closure of these markets led to the loss of several hundred thousand strings of tax income. Quan Hansheng suggested that during Northern Song era grain was transported from the south to the north through canals. During the Southern Song era, the Song court prohibited supplying the grains to the north. The supplies of grain to Jin reduced.⁵³⁸ The ban of market and imposed river ban during Jin's southern expedition affected the exchange of grains in southern boundary. That reduced the resources supplying to Henan.

Jin Failed to Support Loyalist Army

Song introduced Red Jacket Bandits to defend Jurchen's attack. Jin also followed Song's practice, and kindly treated loyalists with three times salary compared with ordinary armies. In 1219 when Jurchen was losing Shandong, the state provided military subsidy to loyalist army originally from Pizhou and Haizhou to organize a

⁵³¹ SS, 406, p. 12257.

⁵³² JS, 50, p. 1113

⁵³³ *Ruman Yi Shi*, 2, p. 22.

⁵³⁴ JS, 50, p. 1115

⁵³⁵ JS, 50, p. 1115

⁵³⁶ SS, 406, p. 12261.

⁵³⁷ JS, 50, p. 1115

⁵³⁸ Quan Hansheng, Smuggle Trading Between Song and Jin, *Proceedings of Song, Khitan and Jurchen Social and Economic History*, Vol. 2, Hong Kong: Song Man Book Store, 1973. Pp. 239-240.

team “victory army”. Every loyalist soldier received 30 mou of land; the strong one received 50 mou. They received two litre of grains daily subsidy.⁵³⁹ Originally there were only 1,000 loyalist soldiers, and the number of loyalist forces rapidly increased to 7,000 at the end of dynasty.⁵⁴⁰ The rapid increase of soldiers imposed burden upon the state, thus later the salary was reduced to the half.⁵⁴¹ After the division of Red Jacket Bandits, despite Xuyi controlled by Red Jacket Bandits defected to Jin, Song court considered that Jurchen could not sustain the loyalist army.⁵⁴²

During Jurchen’s southern expedition, Xuanzong was confused by Song people’s unwillingness to surrender to Jin while Jin people easily surrounded to Mongol.⁵⁴³ The lack of resources was perhaps the answer. On the other hand, Song’s royal family donated 1,500,000 to reward armies.⁵⁴⁴ In the falling stage of Jin Dynasty, Guo Anyong, a defected general of Red Jacket Bandits and Mongols’ general,⁵⁴⁵ returned to Song due to the lack of grains.⁵⁴⁶ Jin did not gain much achievement through keeping these loyalist army.

Jurchen further lost its territory after southern expedition and destructed its fragile economy, but Xuanzong’s court just waiting Song to negotiate for peace, probably aimed at increasing the bargaining power. They did not know under the pressure of the public opinion in Song it was impossible to continue paying tribute to Jin again, particularly Jin no longer could threaten Song after losing entire Heshuo to bandits. Jin’s general Shujia Tuoluhui pointed out Song was hatred to Jin. It was not their original wills to be subordinate and respecting to Jin.⁵⁴⁷ Until Aizong came to the throne, it adopted peace policy with Song. Thus there were another ten years of peaceful period with Song until Mongols invaders arrived Henan and then Song began to invade again.⁵⁴⁸ During that period, Red Jacket Bandits were divided, which consequently diverged Song and bandits’ attention. That allowed the Jurchen to recover slightly for the following few years. However, the state’s economy was so

⁵³⁹ *JS*, 15, p. 346

⁵⁴⁰ *JS*, 44, p. 1000.

⁵⁴¹ *JS*, 44, p. 1000

⁵⁴² *SS*, 417, p. 12508.

⁵⁴³ *JS*, 15, p. 342

⁵⁴⁴ *SS*, 41, p. 793.

⁵⁴⁵ *JS*, 117, p. 2561.

⁵⁴⁶ *JS*, 117, p. 2564.

⁵⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴⁸ *Runan Yi Shi*, p. 50

fragile that it could not be strengthened to prepare for another military threat.

Chapter 4: Economic Crisis on the Eve of the Fall of Dynasty

The failure of southern expedition led to the damage of southern part of Henan, together with the fled of households, seriously affected agricultural production. In addition, there was excessive soldiers defending Nanjing and relatives of military households receiving subsidy, led to the capital could not have enough grains storage. Once the Mongols surrounded the capital, the shortage of grains supply led to the fall of Nanjing rapidly. Also, the starvation situation led to Aizong made an unwise decision to flee to weak city Caizhou just because of grains supply.

The compiler of *Jin Shi* commented that the fall of Jin dynasty related to economic problems, and Jin was even the worst compared to all the dynasties since Zhou Dynasty.⁵⁴⁹ Aizong, the last emperor of Jin Dynasty also concluded that after the 20 years of relocation of capital, Henan's people had sold their properties and wife, and put most of their effort to subsidize the armies.⁵⁵⁰ Generals and loyalists tried their efforts to prolong the rule of the state, but the lack of resources of the state eventually led to failure. Here will introduce the grain supply crisis of Nanjing city led to the relocate the capital to Caizhou and fall of Jurchen authority.

Section 1 Lack of Grains Storage in the Capital

The state garrisoned too much army led to the shortage of grains supply because of southern expedition. It could be shown in the policy of grains commandeering and the sharp rise of grains price. The commandeering of grains and serious inflation showed the weak foundation of grains supply in Nanjing. It also showed the state did not have a good management on the income and storage of surplus for emergency usage after relocation of capital. The Mongols besieged Nanjing city was an examination to the economy of the late Jin Dynasty.

Policies On Capturing Grains to Capital and Reduce Grains Expenditure

There was increasing demand on grains in the capital after relocation of capital to

⁵⁴⁹ *JS*, 46, pp. 1029-1030.

⁵⁵⁰ *JS*, 113, p. 2494.

Nanjing. The commandeering the grains from private's storage for military use led to the merchants did not sell the grains there.⁵⁵¹ Shi Gaoyi had pointed out the storage of grains in Nanjing city was not sufficient as counting the storage of the government and the private, it was less than one percentage compared to the past of Zhongdu.⁵⁵² The state implemented several measures to invite wealthy people carrying grains to live Nanjing, at the same time drove away poverty people and reduced the soldiers garrisoned in capital to reduce the grains burden of the city. The state implemented the policy to ensure the net income of grains to the capital.

Through migration policy, the state only allowed commoners to bring sufficient grains to move in Nanjing since 1216. The state assisted the transportation of grains and storage.⁵⁵³ In 1221, the fled households' farmland in Henan was confiscated to provide for military households.⁵⁵⁴ In 1227, the state encouraged wealthy population to move into the capital and monitor the collection of autumn tax.⁵⁵⁵ Two years later, the state also allowed commoners to farm on the imperial hunting grounds around the capital which had size of 100 li.⁵⁵⁶ All the above measures showed the state tried to capture the grains and increase the production around the capital.

Commandeering Grains in Nanjing

After the Mongols started to besiege the city, the state started to commandeer the grains and also expelled dozens thousands of population out of the capital.⁵⁵⁷

In 1232, after Jin failed to sign peace sentiment with Mongol, it recruited commoners to defend and confiscated the grains in Bianjing. The reason was some officials said there were 970,000 piculs storage of grains in the capital.⁵⁵⁸ Some suggested to commandeering the grains to obtain million piculs of grains.⁵⁵⁹ Wanyan Zhushu warned citizens that if there was lack of grains supply, then the family members would be executed and eaten up by military. One widow who had a son with a husband died, stored just three liters excessive amount of beans, was beaten to death and all the grains were confiscated. Other people discarded their grains to toilet after

⁵⁵¹ *JS*, 109, p. 2414

⁵⁵² *JS*, 106, p. 2343

⁵⁵³ *JS*, 14, p. 321.

⁵⁵⁴ *JS*, 16, p. 355.

⁵⁵⁵ *JS*, 17, p. 378.

⁵⁵⁶ *JS*, 17, p. 382.

⁵⁵⁷ *JS*, 17, p. 384.

⁵⁵⁸ *JS*, 114, p. 2506.

⁵⁵⁹ *JS*, 114, p. 2515; 119, p. 2494.

knowing the news. Eventually less than 30,000 hu (or 15,000 piculs) grains were obtained.⁵⁶⁰ Both wealthy and poor people were all starved to death. Liu Qi stayed in Nanjing and witnessed the the siege of the city. Nanjing's granaries were emptied and citizens were anxiety on the rumors. Every people were only allowed to store three pecks grains. The searching team was led by censor and General brought weapons to search everywhere in the house, including the ground. Royal family including emperor's brother and imperial concubine did not have exception. There was no legitimacy of the state. Some of the rascals became spy for enemies. It was the sign of the fall of dynasty.⁵⁶¹ The amount of grains commandeered was hundred times less than expected. The price was all residents and officials lived in the capital was suffered from starvation.

Here will provide the amount of monthly consumption of the grains by every people. During the reign of Zhangzong, people consumed around 5 pecks of grains per month.⁵⁶² These eight pecks grains could only provide commoners to withstand for just more than one or two months. It did not have enough support on the long term defense. People in the capital started to eat human being, and the state then allowed soldiers and commoners to move out the city for food.⁵⁶³ Also, the state ordered commoners to sell their grains to pay the military necessity tax of next year in advanced. Grain tax of upper households could replace for cash tax.⁵⁶⁴ In 1232, the state even reduced the amount of imperial armies. Hungry soldiers killed the gateman and fled out the city.⁵⁶⁵ Originally, lots of people brought the grains to the capital and the poor were driven out the city. However the high grains consumption in the capital seems used up the grains shortly. After long term war with Mongols, there were still 1.47 million populations in the city, including refugees.⁵⁶⁶ Just before the fall of the city, Nanjing had outbreak a large scale of plague, led to more than one million people died.⁵⁶⁷ It showed that during the fall of Nanjing, it had more than 2.5 million people including refugees stayed there. Assume that every people had eight pecks in their home. The 15,000 piculs grains commandeered showed every person only

⁵⁶⁰ *JS*, 114, p. 2516.

⁵⁶¹ *Gui Qian Zhi*, p. 125

⁵⁶² *JS*, 46, p. 1035.

⁵⁶³ *JS*, 18, p. 394.

⁵⁶⁴ *JS*, 17, p. 393.

⁵⁶⁵ *JS*, 18, p. 393.

⁵⁶⁶ *YS*, 146, p. 3459.

⁵⁶⁷ *JS*, 64, p. 1533.

responded 6 litre of grains to the state during the grains commandeering policy. After the plague, the state even doubled the tax from doctors, monks and coffin makers who gained profit through the plague.⁵⁶⁸ All the excessive resources were captured by the state.

Serious Inflation

The price of grains also reflected the shortage of grains supply. Liu Qi recorded the terrible situation of citizens suffered from starvation.

Commoners consumed up all their grains. The price of grains rose sharply to two taels of silver. Poverty people had to eat dead body and they ate all the flesh part within one night, while officials used carts to transfer the grains out of city daily. Gentlemen and ladies had to beg on the street, some even ate their child. Valuable items like high silk clothes and classical tools could not even exchange several litres of rice. People worried they would be killed by hungry people thus they did not come back home late. Old friends and relative gathered together just for one meal. Furthermore, people killed their horses and cows, and even cooked the cages, saddles which made by leather to eat the skin. Everything which could eat was cooked. The woods in wealthy family and restaurants were all demolished for sell. The city turned into ruins, and the past flourish no longer existed. Officials fled to the north with their family, shown the state soon would be fallen soon.⁵⁶⁹

During 1232 when the grains' price rose to two taels of silver, people did not care the value of gold and silver to exchange for food. They sold their pearls and jades, dedicated decorations and clothes in Tianjin Bridge Market, just wanted to buy litre of rice or beans for emergency use. Liu Qi remembered his family used a very nice silk suit to exchange for 8 pecks rice. He also used a gold hairpin to exchange a

⁵⁶⁸ *JS*, 17, p. 384.

⁵⁶⁹ *Gui Qian Zhi*, 11, p. 127 百姓食盡，無以自生，米升直銀二兩，貧民往往食人殍，死者相望，官日載數車出城，一夕皆剮食其肉淨盡。縉紳士女多行勾於街，民間有食其子。錦衣、寶器不能易米數升。人朝出不敢夕歸，懼為饑者殺而食。平日親族交舊，以一飯相避於家。又日殺馬牛乘騎自啖，至於箱篋、鞍轡諸皮物，凡可食者皆煮而食之。其貴家第宅與夫市中樓館木材皆撤以爨。城中觸目皆瓦礫廢區，無複向來繁侈矣。朝官士庶往往相結攜妻子突出北歸，眾謂不久當大潰。

shoulder size of beef. He lamented the grains were more valuable than treasures and experienced old people idiom that firewood is Chinese cinnamon while rice is pearl.⁵⁷⁰

We could compare the problem of inflation of the falling Northern Song's capital faced the surrounding by Jin's army 100 years ago. Wang Zengyu quoted the northern Song's *San Chao Bei Meng Hui Bian* and suggests that at the early stage when Dongjing (Kaifeng) was surrounded by Jin invaders, every peck of rice worth 1,200 wen, wheat was 1,000. After half a year surrounded by Jin, the price of rice rose to 2,000 wen, while wheat increased to 2,400 per hu (5 pecks).⁵⁷¹ Referring to *Gui Qian Zhi*, the price was two taels, which was equivalent to four strings. The inflation was double than northern Song facing the same situation.

Table 4: Serious Inflation of Grains in Nanjing in the Falling Jin Dynasty

Year	Price		Sources
1232	2 taels per peck, or 4000 wen	Rice sharply increased to 2 taels silver 米升直銀二兩	<i>Gui Qian Zhi</i> , p. 127
1233	10 teals platinum per peck	10 teals platinum per peck 斗米白金十兩	<i>Runan Yi Shi</i> , p. 35
1170	corns with hard surface: 120 per pecks Rice: 240 wen per pecks	The price of flour is 210 wens per catty, grain with hard surface was 120 per peck, corn's price was double, and wheat was 60. 面每斤二百一十，粟穀每斗百二十，粟米倍之，陌以六十	<i>Bei Xing Ri Lu</i> , P. 266.
1183	134 wen per peck (National price)	Annual tax was 64,000 strings, equivalent to 86,000 piculs 有司上其數，歲約給六萬四千餘貫，計折粟八萬六千餘石。	<i>JS</i> , 47, p. 1058.
1127	Rice: 1200 per	Rice 1200 per peck, wheat 1000	<i>San Chao Bei</i>

⁵⁷⁰ *Gui Qian Zhi*, 11, p. 138

⁵⁷¹ Wang Zengyu, The Fall Torment and Opposition of Kaifeng at the End of Northern Song, *Journal of Hebei University*, 2005, vol. 3.

(Northern Song, when Bianjing was besieged)	peck, Wheat: 1000 per peck	per peck, donkey meat 1500 per catty, goat meat 4000 per catty, pork: 3000 per catty 雪雨不止, 物價日翔: 米斗一千二百、麥斗一千、驢肉. 一斤一千五百、羊肉一斤四千、豬肉一斤三千, 今不復有也。	<i>Meng Hui Bian</i> , 76.
1127 (Northern Song, after Bianjing was besieged for half year)	Rice: 2000 per peck, Wheat: 480 per peck	Rice 2000 per peck, wheat 2400 per hu (5 peck), goat meat 7000 per catty, pork 4000 per catty, donkey meat and fish 2500 per catty 城被圍半年, 至是斗米二千, 斛麥二千四百, 羊肉一斤七千, 豬肉一斤四千, 驢肉一斤二千五百, 魚亦如之。	<i>San Chao Bei Meng Hui Bian</i> , 87.

Through Liu Qi's record of food supply in Nanjing after the city was surrounded by Mongols, it showed that there was a large number of people and insufficient food supplies. The situation was even more serious, compared with the Zhongdu. We can refer to *Yuan Yi Tong Zhi* to analyse the food produce and supply from neighbouring region. As previous chapter described, Dadu (Zhongdu) had large amount of grains production, also Baodi supplied poultry and seafood, the region around Kaifeng, which only produced pear.⁵⁷² *Bianjing Yi Ji Zhi* quoted *Song Shi Bi Duan Lun Bianjing Nan Shou* that Bianjing was not a suitable place to be foundation of state, because it did not extraordinary in production.⁵⁷³ Although the grains production increased after the implementation of wet paddy field, the fall of southern Henan showed the deficient of grains. Therefore, despite residents in Nanjing was relatively wealthy with storage of lots of treasure, everyone still suffered from starvation, due to the lack of food supply.

⁵⁷² *Yuan Yi Tong Zhi*, Chapter 3, p. 272.

⁵⁷³ *Song Shi Bi Duan Lun Bianjing Nan Shou*; in *Bianjing Yi Ji Zhi*, 13, 11.

Section 2 Jin Failed to Rapprochement and Song's Counterattack

The eight-year war with Song worsened the relationship with Song seriously. The ceasefire agreement with Song was reached in 1224,⁵⁷⁴ but it did not mean a full rapprochement with Song. Jin and Song did not send envoys to each other anymore. Jin's envoy or representatives were returned by Song's border generals. In addition, Song even did not trust Jin's ceasefire agreement at the beginning, until Jin's court continuously sent edict to the border region not to invade the south for ten years, then Song started to accept and prepare for rapprochement.⁵⁷⁵ Jin's generals had attempted to show their goodwill to Song to attack the rebelled Red Jacket Bandits together and not to accept the surrendered bandits,⁵⁷⁶ but Song rejected the request.

After Jin Dynasty southern expedition ended, when Jin's generals faced deficient of grains, they requested Song's generals garrisoned along Xiangyang and Huai border to borrow grains, but all the Jin's representatives was rejected by bordering generals. In 1231, when Jin noticed that the Mongols had bypassed Hebei and attacked from the west, the Jin originally invited Southern Song to jointly attack Mongol, and aimed at requesting grains subsidize. The communication problem worsened the build-up relationship with Song.⁵⁷⁷ Eventually, the cooperation with Song failed. In addition, after Aizong fled to Caizhou, Jin's warlord Wu Xian moved to Dengzhou for grains. When there was a shortage of grains in Dengzhou's granaries, Wu Xian sent representatives to borrow grains from Song's general Shi Songzhi. The poor communication of both sides not only led to the failure of grain procurement, but also undermined the relationship between Southern Song and Jin.⁵⁷⁸

In 1233, Aizong was worried as he knew that Mongols' envoy had visited Song.⁵⁷⁹ Naizu Ahudai suggested the state should prevent Song and Mongols join together to attack Jin. Jin should make use of the opportunity to enhance the relationship with Song after the state fled to Caizhou, to request for military assistant, or borrow the grains, or at least not to assist Mongol to prevent being attacked in both sides.

⁵⁷⁴ *JS*, 17, p. 375.

⁵⁷⁵ *JS*, 112, p. 2468.

⁵⁷⁶ *SS*, 477, pp. 13850-13851.

⁵⁷⁷ *JS*, 112, pp. 2468-2469.

⁵⁷⁸ *JS*, 118, pp. 2579-2580.

⁵⁷⁹ *JS*, 18, p. 400.

Emperor Aizong sent him to Song, with message pointed out Song and Jin shared a common lot. Song subsidizing Jin was similar to protecting Song itself. Aizong's argument was similar to Song's official Qiao Xingjian stated in the court in 1214 and Hu Qu's suggestion around twenty years ago. Jin suggested that Song should lend them one million piculs of grains.⁵⁸⁰ Song rejected the proposal, and soon started to respond Mongols' request by attacking Tangzhou and later Caizhou. Tangzhou was fallen because of insufficient food shortage.⁵⁸¹ Dengzhou also surrendered to Song.⁵⁸² Actually if Song fulfilled Jin's request, it could help Jin a lot. In Xiangyang, Song rejected Jin's request but they provided ten thousand soldiers led by Meng Gong and Jiang Hai with three hundred thousand piculs of grains to assist its enemy Mongols.⁵⁸³ It strengthened the force to eliminate Jin.

The joint attack from Song and Mongols attack to Nanjing and Caizhou was the worst situation to Jin. The reason was Song had advantage of war during spring and summer while Mongols had advantage during autumn and winter. Both of armies could take turns to take rest. Furthermore, Song provided grains support to Mongols helped Mongolian invaders had a long term surrounding the Jin Dynasty capital. As warned by officials before, Jin moved to Henan would increase the chance of conflict with Song, and there were no more way to retreat.

Section 3 Relocating Caizhou For Grains and The Fall of Dynasty

The lack of grains in Henan and the weak defence of the city also affected generals' decision to save the capital. The agricultural activity in Henan was suspended, and there was no hope for reinforcement.⁵⁸⁴ Wu Xian originally was the strongest warlords at the beginning of conferring the nine Dukes.⁵⁸⁵ After Wu Xian returned back to Jin, he was still one of the strongest existing warlords in the late Jin. After Jin failed in the battle of Sanfengshan, the situation of Nanjing worsened. Despite Jin sent 15,000 soldiers to assist Wu Xian,⁵⁸⁶ Wu Xian refused to assist Jin to defend the capital as he was the most-wanted man of Mongols. He worried that during the

⁵⁸⁰ *Runan Yi Shi*, p. 20.

⁵⁸¹ *Runan Yi Shi*, p. 20

⁵⁸² *SS*, 41, p. 798.

⁵⁸³ *JS*, 18, p. 402.

⁵⁸⁴ *JS*, 114, p. 2510.

⁵⁸⁵ *JS*, 118, p. 2577.

⁵⁸⁶ *JS*, 113, p. 2398.

emergency of the state, he would be captured to send to Mongols.⁵⁸⁷ During the falling state in Caizhou, the state ordered warlord Wu Xian to defend the capital, but Wu Xian continued to reject due to the lack of grains and limited route there.⁵⁸⁸ It showed the lack of grains around the capital also affected loyalist armies to save the capital. Wu Xian's worry was true because both Caizhou and Nanjing could not provide enough grains for the armies. Other generals either refused to assist or being defeated. Thus there was no more reinforcement went to Nanjing.⁵⁸⁹

Aizong was frustrated that there were increasing enemies but the grains running out.⁵⁹⁰ He also disappointed that warlords did not assist the capital. In 1232, Aizong decided to flee to the regions having enough grains supply, without serious considering the long termed defensive ability. His bodyguards and the officials already suffered from long term starvation.⁵⁹¹ The starving emperor, officials and soldiers decided to leave Kaifeng and fled to Caizhou for grains, despite there were lots of disadvantages to garrison at there. Caizhou's general Wugulun Hao sent 400 hu grains to Guidefu to invite the emperor to there, and the emperor accepted.⁵⁹² 400 hu grains was just a insignificant number, compared with Song's supply of million piculs of grains to Xiangyang when it was being besieged by Mongols dozen years later.⁵⁹³ Aizong's decision to relocate to Caizhou reflected the serious shortage of grains in Henan. Jin attempted to recover two cities in Hebei due to the deficient of grains in Nanjing. However, the 60,000 armies were defeated by Mongols.⁵⁹⁴

Caizhou was not a place excellent for military defend, as Guo Anyong, defected Red Jacket Bandit general immediately pointed out, together with the arguments that the difficult of grains supply if the city was surrounded by armies, and the close distance to Song would risk the loss of grains to enemy. Court officials rejected his opinion to relocate to Shandong.⁵⁹⁵ Guo also suggested the second choice for emperor to relocate to Guidefu. He pointed out Caizhou at that time had more food storage than Guidefu, but in long term Guidefu had substantial supply of fish and vegetable.⁵⁹⁶

⁵⁸⁷ *JS*, 118, p. 2578.

⁵⁸⁸ *JS*, 118, p. 2577.

⁵⁸⁹ *JS*, 113, p. 2494.

⁵⁹⁰ *JS*, 119, p. 2595.

⁵⁹¹ *Runan Yi Shi*, p. 1

⁵⁹² *JS*, 18, p. 398.

⁵⁹³ *SS*, 46, p. 909.

⁵⁹⁴ *Sheng Wu Qin Zhen Lu*, Entire Work Collections of Wang Guowei Vol. 11. P. 527.

⁵⁹⁵ *Runan Yi Shi*, p. 5

⁵⁹⁶ *Runan Yi Shi*, p. 5

However, Bai Hua commented the problems that grains would be consumed up in Guidefu⁵⁹⁷ In addition, General Wanyan Zhongde had suggested relocate to Qin and Gong region, as there were plenty of grains. Also, it could prepare for conquered Sichuan and Xingyuan. He had been prepared armies and cavalries for western expedition.⁵⁹⁸ However, Aizong and his bodyguards refused to move in order not to affect their family and business.⁵⁹⁹ Later, Song's General Meng Gong blocked the road to Sichuan,⁶⁰⁰ the chance to fled to the west lost.

Although Caizhou originally had more grains supply, soon Caizhou also faced food shortage problems after the city was surrounded by joint armies of Song and Mongol. Jin needed to reduce the excessive amount of officials and soldiers and the salary paid for them.⁶⁰¹ All the officials under court officials, their monthly salary were reduced to only less than six pecks of grains. At the same time, the state confiscated city residents' grains.⁶⁰² The salary was merely enough for monthly consumption for one person, which was slightly lower than the maximum amount of allowed storage per person. The state issued new type of paper money, but eventually the state issued too much amount paper money devalued the currency after it was implemented for just more than one month.⁶⁰³ In 1233, Jurchen drove away the old and young citizens out the city.⁶⁰⁴ Also, the state implemented the Grains Commandeering Measures, that every adult could only store eight peck of grains while children aged ten allowed storing maximum of five peck. Death penalty implemented for illegal storage of excessive one litre grains. These officials dig the ground and removed the wall to search. There was huge amount of people who ignored the regulation and received penalty, and 25,000 piculs of grains was confiscated.⁶⁰⁵ It was just a repeat with previous practice in Zhongdu and Nanjing. Later, the shortage of grains was even more serious than Nanjing, with one peck of rice valued 10 taels of platinum. Hungry people resorted to cannibalism.⁶⁰⁶ It was a great contrast to Mongols' invaders

⁵⁹⁷ *JS*, 114, p. 2511.

⁵⁹⁸ *JS*, 119, pp. 2606-2608.

⁵⁹⁹ *JS*, 119, p. 2608.

⁶⁰⁰ *SS*, 412, p. 12370.

⁶⁰¹ *Runan Yi Shi*, p. 33

⁶⁰² *Runan Yi Shi*, p. 34

⁶⁰³ *Runan Yi Shi*, p. 35

⁶⁰⁴ *JS*, 18, p. 401.

⁶⁰⁵ *Runan Yi Shi*, p. 34

⁶⁰⁶ *Runan Yi Shi*, p. 35

having party to celebrate Chinese New Year outside Caizhou.⁶⁰⁷ On the eve of the fall of Jin, as revealed by *Song Shi*, Caizhou was lack of grains. Old and child were being eaten. Armies ate bones and grasses with muds. They were even extracted as “Human fueled Canons” for defense.⁶⁰⁸ Whole lost troops were executed due to the lack of grains, thus most of soldiers wanted to surrender.⁶⁰⁹ Eventually, under the strong attack from Song and Mongols’ joint army, Caizhou was fallen, and Jurchen was eliminated.

Referring to the fall of dynasty, Yuan historian Yao Sui argued that the state confiscated grains to support the army to prolong its falling fate, to defend a growing power, created serious burden for people.⁶¹⁰ It described the heavy tax and labor work, together with commandeering of grains reduced people’s willing to defend. They even preferred the Mongols to conquer the place as soon as possible in order to solve the grain crisis. It revealed that the worsening economy speeded up the collapse of the state.

Caizhou was not a good defensive city, thus it was fallen under the strong attack by the joint armies from Song and Mongol. It was not a wise decision for Aizong to flee from Nanjing to Caizhou, however there was no alternative choices due to the lack of grains in Nanjing. As the fall of Jin Dynasty, the millions of starving soldiers and commoners relieved as they were pardoned by Mongols’ General Ashu and were allowed to migrate to cross the Yellow River to farm at the “paradise” for food.⁶¹¹ The serious grain crisis could be shown in Song providing one million grains to Henan after they conquered the region. In the region, agricultural production “was abandoned” and people suffered from starvation.⁶¹²

⁶⁰⁷ *JS*, 119, p. 2610.

⁶⁰⁸ *SS*, 412, p. 12373.

⁶⁰⁹ *SS*, 412, p. 12373.

⁶¹⁰ Yao Shui, Collection of Mu An, *Inscription on the Tomb of Zhanggong*, as cited in Yuan Ji, Commoners’ Livelihood in the Northern Region of Yellow River During the Transition Between Jin and Yuan Dynasty, *Collection of Thesis of Yuan Shi*, p. 60.

⁶¹¹ *Guo Chao Ming Chen Shi Lue*, Vol. 2, P. 24,

⁶¹² *SS*, 41, p. 799.

Conclusion

As described by officials, the relocation of capital to Nanjing raised lots of problems. The mistakes in policy-making further significantly undermined the economy, shaken the foundation of the state. That largely explained the fall of Jin Dynasty.

Mistake on Relocate the Capital to Henan

Nanjing was convenient for transportation if the state was united between North and South. In terms of water transportation, Nanjing located the junction region. During the reign of Mingzong of Later Tang, General Shi Jintang had commented that Yimen (Kaifeng) was the important military strategic place.⁶¹³ The geographical advantage of Bianliang also attracted Hailingwang to move the capital there. Hailingwang planned to construct and relocated to Bianjing, as a base to invade Southern Song to unify China.⁶¹⁴ However, it was not a suitable place to defend invader's attack. Prime Minister Zhang Xinxin pointed out that since five dynasties the dynasties setting the capital in Kaifeng just made use of Yellow River as natural barrier, but not for the purpose of military expedition. Northern Song had most of the Central Plains together with the whole regions of the southern part of rivers. However, Jin did not conquer the south, thus most of the canals travelling in north and south direction were useless. Thus the advantage of Kaifeng capital could not be well used.

Also, the cost on keeping large amount of soldiers to defend the capital was excessively high. Although it had a constructed palace, the price was that the natural barrier was not as obvious as in Hezhong region. Thus the state had to garrison around several hundred thousand soldiers there. Eventually, the long term expenditure far outweighed the cost of constructing a palace.

Western Region Offered Backup to Henan

During the debate of relocation of capital, the emperor rejected relocating the capital to Hezhong. In fact, Hezhong closed to mountainous western region, the natural barrier was more useful. It could reduce the expenditure for keeping

⁶¹³ *Xin Wu Dai Shi*, Chapter 8, Beijing: Chunghwa Book Store, 1974, p. 78.

⁶¹⁴ *Jiangyan Yi Lai Xi Nian Yao Lu*, Chapter 179. P. 327-532

large amount of soldiers.

Shanxi was rich in grains production. It had exported large amount of grains to Song previously. Quan Hansheng referred to Song's documents and described that Jin had exported the grains from Shanxi region to Song to exchange for 200,000 strings of coins in early Jin.⁶¹⁵ It showed the sustainable grain supply in that region. In addition, after losing Heshuo region, Xiezhou salt field in Hezhong became the only existed salt field of the state until the end of Dynasty. Jin seriously protect this salt field,⁶¹⁶ to capture the income. Also, it would be an advantage for Jurchen armies to defend if any invaders attacked from downstream, that is in eastern side, as it had the advantages of look down from a height. Jin gained series of victory in its southern expedition in the western front during Taihe expedition (1207) to the southern expedition during Xuanzong.

Weak Defence in Hezhong and the Loss of the Region

Despite Hezhong was a military strategy region, the court ignored the defence there. Thus it was destroyed by Mongols' invaders and the economy was hard to recover.

In the winter of 1216, the Mongols occupied Tongguan, and later it captured Songzhou and Rujian. Censor Shi Gaoyi warned that the failure of wars along Yellow River was mainly the result of the state inactive response to Mongolian's attack. Thus the enemy deeply penetrated into Jin's territory. He pointed out that Jin had several hundred thousands of well-trained soldiers in the capital but none was deployed to defending the Mongols.⁶¹⁷ Zhang Xingxin suggested the state should well manage Guanzhong (Shanxi) and Heshuo for future recover the lost territory and for self-strengthening. Otherwise, it would be difficult to defend Kaifeng.⁶¹⁸ Feng Bi also pointed out if Hezhong lost, then Henan and Shanxi would be in dangerous situation.⁶¹⁹ However, Xuanzong sent a wicked general Wanyan Aludai to garrison in Hezhong region worsened the situation. Around 1216-1217, Aludai worried the attack from Mongolian invaders, he spent large amount of labour forces

⁶¹⁵ Quan Hansheng, *Smuggle Trading Between Song and Jin, Proceedings of Song, Khitan and Jurchen Social and Economic History*, Vol. 2, Hong Kong: Song Man Book Store, 1973. Pp. 239-240.

⁶¹⁶ *JS*, 16, p. 366.

⁶¹⁷ ⁶¹⁷ *JS*, 106, p. 2343.

⁶¹⁸ *Yuan Haowen Quan Ji*, 20, P. 431

⁶¹⁹ *Yuan Haowen Quan Ji*, 19, p. 521.

to construct the wall but gave up the defence on Hezhong soon after Jiangzhou was fallen. Thus, Hezhong region was destroyed by Mongols' attack. After Aizong succeeded the throne, there was a discussion on whether repair Hezhongfu. Some censors opposed because it was destroyed, and insufficient to defend it.⁶²⁰ The state accepted these scholars'. Furthermore, Aizong also passively defended Hezhong and Shanxi region, which refused to fight with Mongols.⁶²¹ Thus after Mongol attacked from the west, Jurchen army was besieged in Henan.

Confrontation with Xi Xia

Furthermore, Xuanzong did not intend to terminate the war with Xi Xia, thus the armies could not focus on defending Mongols and eliminating bandits. The war started since 1213 until 1224,⁶²² terminated eighty years peace between two states, led to the loss of packed troops of both states.⁶²³ During the war, Xi Xia had captured Huizhou.⁶²⁴ Up to several hundred thousands of soldiers were involved in the war.⁶²⁵ Song joined Xi Xia's army since 1219 after Jin's southern expedition worsened the situation.⁶²⁶ Both side neither gain nor loss, but it created economic burden to the state. For example, the recovery plan of Huizhou required 30,000 piculs of rice and 9000 weighing unit of grass monthly, and not less than 100,000 labors to transport the materials. The amount would be further increased if the army could not conquer the city within the time. Also, Lintao circuit was emptied by bandits, affected agricultural production.⁶²⁷ Also, the termination of trading with Xi Xia affected the supply of horses.

The Loss of Hezhong and Critical Condition of Henan

In 1231, Mongol's strong force with advanced war-ship equipped with canons, Hezhongfu eventually lost despite Jin's general Wanyan Eke put most of the effort to defended for three months.⁶²⁸ As Hezhongfu lost, the Mongols immediately crossed

⁶²⁰ *JS*, 17, p. 374. *JS*, 109, p. 2409.

⁶²¹ *JS*, 17, pp. 378-379.

⁶²² *JS*, 134, p. 2876.

⁶²³ *JS*, 134, p. 2876.

⁶²⁴ *JS*, 14, p. 303

⁶²⁵ *JS*, 15, p. 343.

⁶²⁶ *SS*, 40, p. 771.

⁶²⁷ *JS*, 108, pp. 2390-2391

⁶²⁸ *JS*, 111, pp. 2445-2446.

Yellow River through Heqing County.⁶²⁹ Jurchen lost its natural barrier which they relied on. Jin had mobilized large amount of soldiers to defend Mongols in the battle of Sanfengshan to resist Mongols' attack but failed in result.⁶³⁰ Two months later Mongols' reached Nanjing and started to besiege the city.⁶³¹ Hezhong originally provided grains and protection to Nanjing. Once Hezhongfu loss, Nanjing became isolated and there was a shortage of grain within the city.

On the other hand, parts of the garrison armies of Jin Dynasty strongly resisted Mongols armies, particularly in the western region. Sources recorded that after the fall of Jin Dynasty, the Mongols attacked the remaining prefectures, but twenty prefectures in Qinzhou and Gongzhou still could be defended.⁶³² It showed that Shanxi still had enough resources to resist the enemies, while Nanjing lacked the necessary resources to defend. During the last year of Jin Dynasty, Aizong lost the opportunity to move to western region, thus the Jin court lost the chance to revive the state.

Jin's scholar Liu Qi commented that it was a mistake to move the capital to Kaifeng. If the Jin court had defended Guanzhong, it might extend the reign for several generations. Also the state did not prepare for revival, but survive just for the sake of several years after moved to Nanjing.⁶³³ The loss of Hezhong and Nanjing after sieges, thus, was directly the wrong choice of capital location and military strategy.

Short Sighted Strategy of Southern Expedition

After the relocation of capital, Jin-Song relationship deteriorated, and southern expedition was followed. Some historians suggests that it was related to the confrontation between Jurchen and Han ethnics. In fact, Jurchen's southern expedition probably related to Shuhu Gaoqi's acceptance of greedy civil servants' opinion, while Song's attitude was due to their long term hatred to Jurchen.

Promotion of Wicked Civil Servants

Jurchen's decision on southern expedition was independent from ethnic problem. In

⁶²⁹ *JS*, 17, p. 384.

⁶³⁰ *JS*, 17, p. 384.

⁶³¹ *JS*, 17, p. 385.

⁶³² Su Tianjue, *Guo Chao Ming Chen Shi Lue*, p. 80.

⁶³³ *Gui Qian Zhi*, 12, p. 136

Jurchen court, Han and Jurchen's status was similar, which was different from Qing Dynasty. (1636-1911) It was common that Han and Jurchen nominate each other without ethnic boundary.⁶³⁴ Also, it was not related to military and Confucianism. As analyzed before, there were some Han economic officials suggested to attack Song, while there were also some Jurchen generals against it. It showed in Jin Dynasty, the southern expedition was based on economic consideration.

The southern expedition was directed by Shuhu Gaoqi. His policy to foreign state was highly related to his experience. He had successfully defeated Song in the 1207. On the other hand, he lost in the war with the Mongols in 1213, and almost faced death penalty. His policy mainly gave up Heshuo region to prevent direct conflict with Mongols. At the same time, he thought that the state could defeat Song as previous, but did not know that Jin had used whole nation's effort to attack Song during 1206-1207,⁶³⁵ while Jin's army was distracted by Mongols, Xi Xia and Red Jacket Bandits.

The policies also related to Shuhu Gaoqi preferred to promote civil servants instead of scholars. Lin Huangda analyzed the difference between scholars and civil servants in traditional China and pointed out civil servants were greedier and proposed short-sighted plan.⁶³⁶ The southern expedition together with other economic policies showed these characteristics, aimed at gaining financial incomes in short time but ignored the long termed consequences, like the fled of households. However, Xuanzong acceptance of the suggestions caused inevitable consequences. Compiler of Biographies of *Jin Shi* also commented that after relocation of capital, it was just a weak state. Shuhu Gaoqi preferred civil servants but hate scholars; he likes wars but not peace. The state was rapidly heading to fall.⁶³⁷ Shuhu Gaoqi was responsible for military issue, while Gao Ruli was for economy and promotion of officials. Both of them were corrupted and expelled the opposites. Furthermore, Shuhu Gaoqi's pursuit of military power led to southern expedition. They did not planned to recover Hebei, but putting strong armies in Henan.⁶³⁸ Thus, it could explain Jin insisted to

⁶³⁴ *JS*, 108, p. 2382. Xu Ding had nominated Jurchen official Bahulu, but Xuanzong rejected because Bahulu was lack of experience.

⁶³⁵ *JS*, 12, p. 275

⁶³⁶ Lin Huangda, Analyze Minority Ethnic's Influence on Chinese Bureaucratic System Through the Post of Assistant Manager of Jin Dynasty, *10-13 Century China's Cultural Shock and Integration*, Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publisher, 2006.

⁶³⁷ *JS*, 106, p.2347

⁶³⁸ *JS*, 106, p. 2346

implement southern expedition because of the selfish Prime Ministers.

Zhao Yongcun commented that Jin should adopt a friendly policy to Song, including leaving the tributes temporary and even return some of the territory to Song in order to capture the support from Song.⁶³⁹ His suggestion was somehow idealistic. Song terminated the tributes already hurt the weakened economy of Jin. Also the limited territory of Jin after relocation of capital make the option “return some territory to Song” impossible.

The possible option for Jin Dynasty was following Xu Ding and Xu Gu’s suggestion by keeping peace with Song to rapidly develop the prefectures closed to southern boundary to fight against Mongols. If Jin devoted more effort to developing these regions, it might provide plenty capitals and manpower for defending Mongols. Also Jin could benefit from the trading with Song to obtain more resources to fiancé the war and the state’s economy.

Furthermore, the heavy taxation severely affected production. It was a dilemma for Jurchen commandeering farmlands from talents renting state owned land to distribute for military households or increase tax collected from talents to support for military households. Jurchen government chose to implement military farm, it affected large amount of peasants’ livelihood, large amount of commoners fled to Song or turned into bandits.

We can compare the achievement of military farm in Song’s Xiangyang implemented in similar period. Shi Songzhi and Meng Zongzheng implemented military farm in Xiangyang and later Zaoyang since 1228. Meng accepted 10,000 refugees, providing them subsidy and farmland.⁶⁴⁰ Later he further recruited 20,000 Henan’s refugees.⁶⁴¹ His son Meng Gong’s military farm could yield 150,000 piculs annually.⁶⁴² Under the policy, the accumulated grain production in these regions was 680,000 piculs.⁶⁴³ Furthermore, Jurchen recruited Jin’s refugees as soldiers and implemented military farm to enhance military storage.⁶⁴⁴ Thus, when Xiangyang fell to Mongols, it still had 300,000 cash and grains.⁶⁴⁵ After comparison, we can notice the low efficiency of implementation of military farm in Jurchen. It might be due to the loss of manpower

⁶³⁹ Zhao Yongcun, *Jin Song Guan Xi Shi*, p. 326.

⁶⁴⁰ SS, 403, p. 12213.

⁶⁴¹ SS, 412, p. 12370.

⁶⁴² SS, 412, p. 12370.

⁶⁴³ SS, 414, p. 12423; SS, 41, p. 792.

⁶⁴⁴ SS, 437, p. 12959.

⁶⁴⁵ SS, 417, p. 12507.

or the frequent of war with Song. Jurchen did not accept several censors' opinion, and lost the chance to implement military farm in southern region of Henan. Thus, Jurchen lost due to the deficient of grains supply. It suggested that the Jin's economic means and performance was far from satisfaction, particularly when comparing with its neighbouring nation, the Southern Song.

Song's Careful Foreign Policy by Prime Minister Shi Miyuan

The court in Southern Song was dominated by conservative Shi Miyuan. Song was very alert to the political situation and changes of Jin Dynasty, because of the reference of political consequences after the failure of northern expedition in 1207. Song rejected envoys representing Genghis Khan's invitation about jointly attack Jin in 1214⁶⁴⁶ and executed He Jiuling who attacked Jin arbitrarily. His body was ranged on the boundary in high tone.⁶⁴⁷ After Jin's invasion, Shi Miyuan subsidized the bandits only in low profile.⁶⁴⁸ Li Tianming pointed out that Shi Miyuan refused to recruit loyalist army in high profile because he worried the failure would bear political responsibility. Song just used the loyalist army as barrier and wanted to keep a distance to them.⁶⁴⁹ Thus, Song witnessed the weakening Jurchen and without concrete plan to eliminate it. In 1228, Song noticed the strong Mongol attacked Jin, but it only strengthened the defense in the border region.⁶⁵⁰ At the very end which Jin was nearly eliminated in 1234, the court in Southern Song still did not have intention to eliminate Jin, probably due to the strong enemy Mongol was behind Jin.

In the dominant opinion in Song's court, after Hu Qu proposed to negotiate with Jin rejected, there were no more suggestions on supporting Jin.⁶⁵¹ In addition, most of Song's generals were against negotiation with Jin. Song's General Meng Gong, who had contributed a lot on eliminating Jin in 1230s. In fact, his father had been captured by Jurchen during Jin's southern expedition in late 1210s.⁶⁵² It may lead to his hatred to Jurchen. Actually, in 1232, just before the fall of Jin, Song was shocked by

⁶⁴⁶ *Xu Bian Liao Chao Gang Mu Bei Yao*, 14. P. 255.; *Jiangyan Yi Lai Chao Ye Zha Ji*, 19. P. 848.; *Meng Da Bei Lu, Wang Guo Wei Quan Ji*, Vol. 11. P. 356.

⁶⁴⁷ *SS*, 39, p. 760.

⁶⁴⁸ *SS*, 475, p. 13819.

⁶⁴⁹ Li Tianming, *Song Yuan Zhan Shi*, pp. 16; 195-200.

⁶⁵⁰ *Song Ji San Chao Zheng Yao Jian Zheng*, 2010. Pp. 35-36.

⁶⁵¹ Construction Minister Hu Qu suggested to negotiate with Jin, and was accused by bachelor students. (*Song Shi Quan Wen*, 2005. P. 2114.)

⁶⁵² *SS*, 412, p. 12369.

Mongol's invasion to Sichuan region.⁶⁵³ Just after Shi Miyuan died, Lizong immediately held discussion on the important political issue with Zhao Fan and Zhao Kui, particularly on the border issue. They urged the state to remember the history of signing settlement with Jurchen in 1120.⁶⁵⁴ Through their conversation, they still remember the fall of Northern Song after uniting Jurchen to eliminate Khitan. Lizong accepted Zhao's suggestion to strengthen the force first and later revenge the Shame of Jinkang.⁶⁵⁵ Although Zhao's family strongly against negotiation with Jurchen before, their attitude changed. It was probably due to their notice on stronger Mongols through elimination of Red Jacket Bandits. Zhao previously had accepted Jurchen's negotiation after the failure of rebellion of Red Jacket Bandits.⁶⁵⁶ Richard Davis explained in his book *Court and Family in Sung China 960-1279*, "his (Shi Mi-yuan) insistence that the south not intervene in the expanding Mongol-Jurchen conflict to the north. For the most part, the court was not inclined to depart from this general principle. Not until his very last year in power-by which time Cheng Ch'ing-chih had already assumed many of Shih Mi-yuan's former responsibilities as chief councilor-did there occur the necessary adjustments to effect a Sung-Mongol alliance against the Jurchen."⁶⁵⁷ Thus, Song's court carefully handled its relations with Jurchen, and there was no large scale expedition against Jurchen. In 1233-1234, only Meng Gong's 15,000 armies sent to eliminate Jin, but Jin was too weak and fallen.

Raise of Bandits Due to Economic Problems

Southern expedition and raise of bandits was interrelated. Jurchen official pointed out Song and Jurchen were enemy for several generations. Song did not forget to recover the lost land, thus Jurchen had to aware Song subsidize the bandits.⁶⁵⁸ It revealed that Jurchen worried Song's patriotism led to the instability of border region.

Historians used to point out the confrontation between Jurchen and Song related to ethnic conflict. Li Tianming pointed out the raise of bandits was due to their 100 years hatred to Jurchen.⁶⁵⁹ Huang Kuanchong suggested that people in the Central

⁶⁵³ *Song Shi Quan Wen*, 32. Pp. 2176-2177.

⁶⁵⁴ *Song Shi Quan Wen*, 32. Pp. 2187-2188.

⁶⁵⁵ *SS*, 41, p. 799.

⁶⁵⁶ *JS*, 114, p. 2507.

⁶⁵⁷ Davis Richard, *Court and Family in Sung China, 960-1279: Bureaucratic Success and Kinship Fortunes for the Shih of Ming-Chou*, Durham: Duke University Press, 1986. P. 130.

⁶⁵⁸ *JS*, 108, p. 2380.

⁶⁵⁹ Li Tianming, *Song Yuan Zhan Shi*, p. 4.

Plains think of Song, under the depression from Jurchen and their hometown was demolished through wars, then they escaped into countryside and rebelled.⁶⁶⁰ He also quoted that Li Quan “preferred to be ghost in Jiang Huai rather being Jurchen’s official.”⁶⁶¹ Their research showed commoners in Shandong had strong anti-Jurchen sentiment. After relocation of capital, Jurchen did not recover the prefectures destroyed by Mongols, but Jurchen’s suppress to the bandits affected commoners. Jurchen General Tian Zuo garrisoned in Heshuo collected too much from commoners, thus people hated Jurchen’s authority.⁶⁶² On the other hand, another official in Zizhou (Zibo) collected tax under regulation, thus bandits could not expend in that region.⁶⁶³ Shandong turned poverty after Mongols’ attack, but Jurchen increased intensity to collect from public, thus commoners turned into bandits.

Huang also acknowledged that the rebellion force conducted business activity, and strengthened their power through pirate activity.⁶⁶⁴ These bandits rebelled did not for the sake of Han ethnic, but just for their own interest. For example, Li Quan in fact benefited from pirate activity through controlling Shandong region.⁶⁶⁵ Also, after the division of bandits, Xia Quan, Wang Yishen, Fang Chengjin, head of bandits defected to Jin. Li Quan also planned to negotiate with Jurchen.⁶⁶⁶ Jurchen officials also noticed Li Quan was crafty that bullying Song by flaunting Mongols’ power.⁶⁶⁷ In fact he had intention to defect to Jin.⁶⁶⁸ Thus, these bandits just based on poverty and damage of Shandong, and called on people to join the rebellion force to against Jurchen, and to lobby for subsidy from Song with the title of “loyalist”. In fact they were just taking economic advantages through the chaotic situation between Mongols, Jurchen and Song. Huang stated the rebellion of bandits led to the fall of Jurchen authority.⁶⁶⁹ It’s true that the bandits occupied Shandong, and assisted Song to defend Jurchen attack. Thus, Jurchen’s southern expedition failed. Later the collapse of bandits led to the Mongols to take over the region, providing an alternate route for them to approach Henan.

⁶⁶⁰ Huang Kuan-chong, *Anti Jin Voluntary Army in Southern Song*, P. 212.

⁶⁶¹ Huang Kuan-chong, *Anti Jin Voluntary Army in Southern Song*, P. 180.

⁶⁶² *JS*, 102, p. 2252.

⁶⁶³ *JS*, 102, p. 2252.

⁶⁶⁴ Huang Kuan-chong, *Anti Jin Voluntary Army in Southern Song*, P. 192.

⁶⁶⁵ *SS*, 475, p. 13823.

⁶⁶⁶ *JS*, 114, pp. 2503-2504.

⁶⁶⁷ *JS*, 114, p. 2504.

⁶⁶⁸ *JS*, 102, p. 2260.

⁶⁶⁹ Huang Kuan-chong, *Anti Jin Voluntary Army in Southern Song*, P. 179.

Lack of Horses to Suppress Bandits

The lack of war horses also undermined the military power. It was due to the loss of horse's breeding ground and import from Xi Xia.

Heshuo and Manchuria were the breeding ground of war horses. Horses were bred in Heshuo region, including Hebei, Zhongdu and Xijing,⁶⁷⁰ but not in the southern region. The state had to offer large amount of cash to buy the horses from commoners.⁶⁷¹ Song also increased the price of horses to limit Jurchen purchase horses after southern expedition.⁶⁷² The limited supply of horses reduced the power of cavalry and limited the power to suppress bandits. Tao Jing-shen pointed out Jin could not suppress the bandits because of lack of horses supply and thus there was no cavalry.⁶⁷³ Sun Jiangquan's stated the sources of horses from Hebei and trading with Xi Xia, thus there was crisis on supplying horses for cavalry.⁶⁷⁴ The loss of horses supply explained why Jurchen could not field much cavalry in Shandong. Jin had mobilized most of the cavalry to defend the capital and Shanxi.⁶⁷⁵ Some were put in the battlefield against Mongols. Thus, Jurchen's loss of the supply of cavalry explained the revival of Red Jacket Bandits.

Xuanzong failed to Revival the State

Xuanzong aimed to revive the state and extending the achievement of mid Jin Dynasty. The compiler of biographies of three censors commented that when Xuanzong succeeded the throne, he planned to revive the state so that it could be as strong as it was during the reign of Shizong (1161-1189). But his actions did not fit his lofty words.. The southern expedition during the reign of Zhenyou led to a massive loss of life. The Censors Xu Gu, Wanyan Sulan and Chen Gui all pointed out the problems. Xuanzong knew they were loyal but rejected their opinion. Thus it was difficult to revive the state similar to Shizong.⁶⁷⁶ Xuanzong adopted similar economic policies compared with Zhangzong, including the southern expedition, and

⁶⁷⁰ JS, 44, p. 1005.

⁶⁷¹ JS, 44, p. 1005.

⁶⁷² SS, 406, p. 12261.

⁶⁷³ Tao Jing-shen, *The Jurchen in Twelfth-Century China, A Study of Sinicization*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977, p. 91.

⁶⁷⁴ Sun Jiangquan, *A Brief Analysis on War Horses' Supply and Policy in Late Jin, North-East History and Geography*, 2010, vol. 3.

⁶⁷⁵ JS, 14, p. 311

⁶⁷⁶ JS, 109, p. 2418.

the increase of tax. However, most policies were poorly executed and administered, and eventually deteriorated overall governance. Xuanzong lamented that Shuhu Gaoqi and Tuanduo damaged the interest of the states, and was arrested with remorse in his later life.⁶⁷⁷ Both of them were punished, eventually, but the eight years of ruling by these two wicked officials meant losing the opportunity to recover. In its southern expedition, the court of Xuanzong acted like a mad gambler. At first, the Jurchens did gain a few victories here and there in their southern expedition. But as the war progressed, they continued their campaign even as the supplies were reduced, in the hope that a larger victory would allow them to demand more favourable terms at the negotiation. Yet, they even refused to terminate the war when they lost Heshuo region to the Red Jacket Bandits. Eventually, the fleeing of households destroyed the remaining economic foundation of Jin Dynasty.

After relocation of capital, Jurchen suffered a server lack of resources. Xuanzong intended to solve it through the southern expedition, but the expedition itself was already beyond the resources capacity of the Jin to support. The fleeing of households and loss of Heshuo and Shandong fundamentally undermined the state's strength. The Jurchen. by then, not only had lost the ability to recover lost territory, but also no longer had the means to support its army for defense purposes.

⁶⁷⁷ *JS*, 106, p. 2346

Appendices

Table 5: Flooding in Rivers since 1163 (Recorded in *Treatise of Rivers and Canals*)

Year	River	Region	Effects
1168	Yellow River	Ligudu 李固渡 , Anyang	Affecting Caozhou and Danzhou in Shandong, court send Water minister Liang Shu to seek for solution. Ligudu constructed a dam
	Hutuo River 滹沱河	Zhengding 真定	Spent twenty-eight thousand labor to repair the dam
1171	Yellow River	Wangcun 王村 Xingyang 滎陽	Affected Henan's Mengzhou and Weizhou
1177	Yellow River	Baigou, Hebei	Used 11500 manpower daily to spend 60 days to repair the dam
	Hutuo River	Baimagang	Spent 500 labor to repair
1180	Yellow River	Weizhou and Jingdong dam in Yanjing	Affected Guide. Spend 24000 manpower working 70 days to construct a dam from Weizhou to Guide. Tax was exempted in that year
1181	Yellow River	NIL	River flowed in new path
1185	Lugou River	Xiangtongzhai and Shangyangcun	Ordered the labors located 300 li around Zhongdu to repair, but suspended after it flooded again
1186	Yellow River	Weizhou	Damaged the dam in Weizhou and destroyed the city. Later affected Daming fu
1189	Yellow River	Caozhou	Used six million and eighty thousand work unit to construct dam. Four million and three hundred thousand of them are commoner's labor, others are military manpower. Each work unit paying one hundred and fifty wen. The daily expenditure for official's salary was fifty

			wen with half litter of rice ⁶⁷⁸
1189	Lugou River		Divert the river
1191	Lugou River and Zhang River		Two Years later, spend three hundred and eighty thousand work unit to repair the dam, recruit the refugee as labor
1194	Yellow River	Yangwu, Hebei	Affected Fengqiu

Source: *Jin Shi*, Chapter 27, pp. 669-688.

⁶⁷⁸ Jin Shi, Chapter 27, Treatise of Rivers and Canals, p. 674

Table 6: Serious Flooding in Henan

Year	Region	Effects
1171	Wangcun 王 村 Xingyang 滎陽, Henan	Affected Henan's Mengzhou and Weizhou
1216	Sizhou, Henan	Lots of people die along the road. People only eating grass root and tree bark ⁶⁷⁹
1220	Henan	Half of households fled, led to farmlands uncultivated, affect the government's income. Government exempted tax and encourage farming ⁶⁸⁰

Source: *Jin Shi*, Chapter 23, pp. 537-545.

⁶⁷⁹ JS, 47, p. 1060.

⁶⁸⁰ JS, 47, p. 1054.

Table 7: Changes of Official Price of Salt Produced in Different Regions

Salt Production Regions	Price (per piculs, or 120 catty)	New Price in 1199 (per piculs, or 120 catty)	Increased %
Shandong, Baodi and Cangzhou	3 strings and 600 wen [#]	5 strings and 160 wen	43
Xiezhou	5 strings [*]	6 strings 400 wen [*]	28
Liaodong	900 wen	1 string and 500 wen	67
Beijing	900 wen	1 string and 500 wen	67
Xijing	2 strings	2 strings 800 wen	40
Mixed salt 撈鹽	1 string 500 wen	2 strings	33

^{*}The weight unit is 1 xi, with 116 catty

[#] It was calculated by the price in 1189, that the salt selling 30 wen per catty

Source: *Jin Shi*, 49, pp. 1100-1101.

Table 8: Income of Salt Tax in Different Places

	Previous Tax Income	New Tax Income (since 1199)	Increased %
Shandong	2,547,336 strings	4,334,184 strings	70.1
Cangzhou	1,531,200 strings	2,766,636 strings	80.7
Baodi	887,558 strings 600 wen	1,348,839 strings	52.0
Xiezhou	814,657 strings	1,321,520 strings 256 wen	62.2
Liaodong	131,572 strings 800 wen	376,970 strings 256 wen	186.5
Beijing	213,892 strings 500 wen	346,151 strings 617 wen 2 fen	61.8
Xijing	100,419 strings 696 wen	280,264 strings 608 wen	179.1
Total	6,226,636 strings 566 wen	10,774,512 strings 137 wen	73.0

Source: *Jin Shi*, 49, p. 1101

Conversion of Measurements

Weight

Picul 石 = 31 kg

Hu 斛 = 15.5 kg

Peck 斗 = 3.1 kg

Litre 升 = 310g

Catty 斤 = 258.24g

Cash

Taels 兩 = 2 strings

String 貫 = 1000 wen

Wen 文

Area

Qing 頃 = 100 mu

Mu 畝 = 666.66 m²

Sources: Endymion Porter Wilkinson, *Chinese History: A Manual*, Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2000.

Bibliographies

A. Primary Sources

- Anonymous. *Yuan Chao Mi Shi (Chinggis Khan : the Golden History of the Mongols)* 元朝秘史, Taibei: Taiwan Commercial Publisher, 1968.
- Anonymous. *Xu Bian Lian Chao Gang Mu Bei Yao* 續編兩朝綱目備要 (*Continuation of Edit on Outlines of Two Reigns*), Beijing: Chung Hwa Book Store, 1995.
- Anonymous. *Sheng Wu Qin Zheng Lu (Records of Genghis Khan's Expedition)* 聖武親征錄, *Wang Guowei Quan Ji*, Vol. 11, Hangzhou: Zhejiang Education Publisher, 2010.
- Anonymous. *Song Ji San Chao Zheng Yao Jian Zheng* 宋季三朝政要箋證, Beijing: Chunghwa Book Store, 2010.
- Anonymous. *Song Shi Quan Wen* 宋史全文, Harbin: Heilongjiang People's Publisher, 2005.
- Bei Lanxi 李蘭盼, etc. *Yuan Yi Tong Zhi (Yuan Dynasty's Gazetteers on Unification)* 元一統志, Chapter 1, Shanghai: Chunghwa Book Store, 1966.
- Bi Yuan 畢沅. *Xu Zi Zhi Tong Jian* 續資治通鑑 (*Continuation to Comprehensive Mirror to Aid in Government*), Beijing: Zhonghua Book Store, 1957.
- Fan Chengda 范成大. *Lan Pei Lu* 攬轡錄, in Zhao Yongchun 趙永春 edited, *Feng Shi Liao Jin Xing Cheng Lu* 奉使遼金行程錄 (*Records on Ambassadors Travelling to Liao and Jin*), Chang Chun: Jilin Literature and History Publisher, 1995.
- Li Lian 李濂, *Bianjing Yi Ji Zhi* 汴京遺跡志, Beijing: Zhongguo Shudian, 1959.
- Li Xinchuan 李心傳. *Jiangyan Yi Lai Chao Ye Za Ji* 建炎以來朝野雜記, Chapter. 12. Beijing: Chunghwa Book Store, 2000.
- Li Xinchuan 李心傳. *Jiangyan Yi Lai Xi Nian Yao Lu* 建炎以來系年要錄, *Complete Library in Four Branches of Literature* 欽定四庫全書, Shanghai: Shanghai Classical Books Publisher, 1992.
- Liu Qi 劉祁. *Gui Qian Zhi* 歸潛志, Beijing: Chung Hwa Book Store, 1983.
- Liu Yingli 劉應李. Zhan Youliang ed 詹友諒改編, *Da Yuan Hun Yi Fang Yu Sheng Lan* 大元混一方輿勝覽 (*Overall Geographical Chronicle of Great Yuan*), Chengdu, Sichuan University Press.
- Lou Yue 樓鑰. *Bei Xing Ri Lu* 北行日錄 (*Daily Records on Traveling to the North*), in Zhao Yongchun 趙永春 edited, *Feng Shi Liao Jin Xing Cheng Lu*, Chang Chun: Jilin Literature and History Publisher, 1995.
- Peng Daya 彭大雅. *Hei Da Shi Lue* 黑鞑事略 (*Story of Mongolian*), in *Wang Guowei Quan Ji*, Vol. 11, Hangzhou: Zhejiang Education Publisher, 2010.
- Song Lian 宋濂. *Yuan Shi (Dynastic History of Yuan Dynasty)* 元史, Beijing: Chung Hwa Book Store, 1976.
- Su Tianjue 蘇天爵. *Zi Xi Wen Gao* 滋溪文稿, Beijing: Chunghwa Book Store, 1997.
- Su Tianjue 蘇天爵. *Yuan Chao Ming Chen Shi Lue* 元朝名臣事略 (*Story of*

- Famous Officials in Yuan Dynasty*), Vol. 1, Beijing: Chunghwa Book Store, 1996.
- Toqto'a 脫脫. *Jin Shi (Dynastic History of Jin Dynasty)* 金史, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Store, 1985.
- Toqto'a 脫脫. *Song Shi (Dynastic History of Song Dynasty)* 宋史, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Store, 1985.
- Wang E 王鶚. *Runan Yi Shi 汝南遺事(Story in Runan)*, Beijing: Chung Hwa Book Store, 1985,
- Ye Shaoweng 葉紹翁. *Si Chao Wen Jian Lu 四朝聞見錄(Stories of Four Reigns)*, Beijing: Zhonghua Publisher, 1989.
- Yu Minzhong 于敏中, ed. *Ri Xia Jiu Wen Kao 日下舊聞考(Research on the Old Story of Beijing)*, Beijing: Beijing Classical books Publisher, 1983.
- Yuan Haowen 元好問. *Yuan Haowen Quan Ji 元好問全集(Collection of Yuan Haowen)*, Taiyuan: Shanxi People Publisher, 1990.
- Zhao Gong 趙珙. *Meng Da Bei Lu Jiang Zheng 蒙鞑備錄箋證(Notes on Accounts of Mongolian)*, Wang Guowei *Quanji*, Vol. 11, Hangzhou: Zhejiang Education Publisher, 2010.
- Zhou Hui 周輝. *Bei Yuan Lu 北轅錄*, in Zhao Yongchun 趙永春 ed, *Feng Shi Liao Jin Xing Cheng Lu*, Chang Chun: Jilin Literature and History Publisher, 1995.
- Zhou Mi 周密. *Qi Dong Ye Yu 齊東野語*, Vol. 9, Jinan, Qilu Publisher, 2007.

B. Secondary Sources

Books

- 10-13 *Shi Ji Zhongguo Wen Hua De Peng Zhuan Yu Rong He* 10-13 世紀中國文化的碰撞與融合 (*10-13 Century China's Cultural Shock and Integration*), Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publisher, 2006.
- Chan Hok-lam, *China and the Mongols*, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1999.
- Cheng Minsheng 程民生, Cheng Feng 程峰 and Ma Yuchen 馬玉臣, *Gu Dai Henan Jinji Shi 古代河南經濟史(Ancient Henan Economic History)*, Kaifeng: Henan University Press, 2012.
- Davis, Richard Lee. *Court and Family in Sung China, 960-1279: Bureaucratic Success and Kinship Fortunes for the Shih of Ming-chou*, Duke: Duke University Press, 1986.
- Han Zhiyuan 韓志遠. *Nan Song Jin Jun Shi Shi 南宋金軍事史(Military History of Southern Song and Jin)*, Beijing: Military Science Publisher, 1984.
- He Junzhe 何俊哲. *Jin Chao Shi 金朝史(Jin Dynasty History)*, Beijing: China Social Science Publisher, 1992.
- Twitchett, Denis, ed. *The Cambridge History of China Vol. 6*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.
- Tillman, Hoyt Cleveland and Stephen H. West (Edit), *China Under Jurchen Rule*, New York: State University of New York Press, 1995.
- Huang Kuan-chung 黃寬重. *Nan Song Shi Yan Jiu Ji 南宋史研究集(Work Collection of History of Southern Song)*. Taipei: Xin Wen Feng, 1985.
- Huang Kuan-chung 黃寬重. *Nan Song Shi Dai Kang Jin De Yi Jun 南宋時代抗*

- 金的義軍(*Anti Jin Voluntary Army in Southern Song*), Taipei: Lian Jing Publisher, 1988.
- Huang Kuan-chung 黃寬重. *Nan Song Di Fang Wu Li: Di Fang Jun Yu Min Jian Zi Wei Wu Li De Tan Tao* 南宋地方武力：地方軍與民間自衛武力的探討(*The Regional Military Forces in Southern Song China : Studies of Regional Armies and Local Militias*). Taipei: Dong Da Gu Fen Tu Shu You Xian Gong Si, 2002.
- Katō Shige 加藤繁. *Zhongguo Jin Ji Shi Kao Zheng* 中國經濟史考證(*Examine on Chinese Economic History*), Beijing: Commercial Publisher, 1963.
- Kato Shige 加藤繁. translated by Federal Reserve Bank of China 中國聯合準備銀行調查室譯, *Tang Song Shi Dai Jin Yin Zhi Yan Jiu* 唐宋時代金銀之研究(*Study of Gold and Silver during Tang and Song*), Hong Kong: Lung Mun Book Store, 1970.
- Li Tianming 李天鳴. *Song Yuan Zhan Shi* 宋元戰史(*War History between Song-Yuan*), Taipei: Shi Huo Publisher, 1988.
- Liang Fangzhong 梁方仲. *Zhongguo Li Dai Hu Kou, Tian Di, Tian Fu Tong Ji* 中國歷代戶口、田地、田賦統計(*Survey on Chinese Historical Households, Farmland and Tax*), Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publisher, 1980.
- Liu Yingchun 劉迎春. *Jie Mi Kaifeng Cheng Xia Cheng* 揭秘開封城下城(*Discover the Secrets of Kaifeng Cities*), Beijing: Science Publisher, 2009.
- Mikami Tsugio 三上次男, trans. Jin Qicong 金啟琮. *Jin Dai Nu Zhen Yan Jiu* 金代女真研究(*Research on Jurchen in Jin Dynasty*), Harbin: Heilongjiang People Publisher, 1984.
- Liao Jin Shi Lun Ji Di Er Ji* 遼金史論集第二輯(*Proceedings of Liao and Song History Vol. 2.*), Beijing: Documents Publisher, 1987.
- Song Liao Jin She Hui Jin Ji Shi Lun Ji* 宋遼金社會經濟史論集(*Proceedings of Song, Khitan and Jurchen Social and Economic History*), Vol. 2, Hong Kong: Song Man Book Store, 1973.
- Qi Xia 漆俠. *Liao Song Xi Xia Jin Dai Tong Shi* 遼宋西夏金代通史(*General History on Liao Song Xi Xia Jin*), Volume of Society and Economy, Beijing: People Publisher, 2010.
- Qi Xia 漆俠. Qiao Youmei 喬幼梅, *Zhong Guo Jin Ji Tong Shi* 中國經濟通史(*Chinese General Economic History Volume of Liao Xia Jin*), Beijing: Economic Press, 1998.
- Quan Hansheng 全漢昇. *Tang Song Di Guo Yu Yun He* 唐宋帝國與運河(*Transportation Canals and Tang Song Emperor*), Taipei: Chunghwa Book, 1956.
- Robert Hartwell, *A Guide to Sources of Chinese Economic History A.D. 618-1368*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Printing Department, 1984.
- Shi Nianhai 史念海. *Zhongguo Gu Du He Wen Hua* 中國古都和文化(*Chinese Ancient Capitals and Culture*), Beijing: Zhonghua Book Store, 1998.
- Liao Shi, Jin Shi, Yuan Shi Yan Jiu* 遼史、金史、元史研究(*Study of Liao Shi, Jin Shi and Yuan Shi*), Beijing: Chinese Encyclopedia Publisher, 2009.
- Takahashi Hiroomi 高橋弘臣. Trans. Lin Songtao 林松濤. *Song Jin Yuan Huo Bi Shi Yan Jiu* 宋金元貨幣史研究(*Study of Monetary History in Song,*

- Jin and Yuan Dynasty*), Shanghai: Shanghai Classical Publisher, 2010.
- Tao Jing-shen 陶晉生. *Nu Zhen Shi Lun* 女真史論(*Analysis on Jurchen History*), Banqiao: Daoxiang Publisher, 2010.
- Tao Jing-shen, *The Jurchen in Twelfth-Century China, A Study of Sinicization*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977.
- The Cambridge History of China*, Volume 5: The Sung Dynasty and its Precursors, 907-1279 (Part 1), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009
- Toyama Gunji 外山軍治. Translated by Li Dongyuan 李東源, *Jin Chao Shi Yan Jiu* 金朝史研究(*Study of Jin Dynasty History*), Harbin: Heilongjiang Choson Ethnics Publisher, 1988.
- Wang Depeng 王德朋. *Jin Dai Shang Ye Jin Ji Yan Jiu* 金代商業經濟研究(*The Commercial Economy Research of the Jin Dynasty*), Beijing: Documents on Social Science Publisher, 2011.
- Wang Fuzhi 王夫之. *Song Lun* 宋論(*Analysis on Song*), Beijing: Chunghwa Book Store, 1964.
- Wang Hui 王恢. *Zhongguo Li Shi Di Li* 中國歷史地理上冊(*Chinese Geographic History*), Taipei: Student Book Shop, 1979.
- Wang Zengyu 王曾瑜. *Liao Jin Jun Zhi* 遼金軍制(*Military System of Khitan and Jurchen*), Baoding: Hebei University Press, 2011.
- West, Stephen. *Studies in Chin Dynasty (1115-1234) Literature*, Ann Arbor, Mich. : University Microfilms International, 1981.
- Wilkinson, Endymion Porter. *Chinese History: A Manual*, Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2000.
- Wu Songdi 吳松弟. *Zhongguo Yi Min Shi* 中國移民史(*Chinese Migration History*), Volume 4. Fuzhou, Fujian People Publisher, 1998.
- Wu Songdi 吳松弟. *Zhongguo Ren Kou Shi* 中國人口史(*Chinese Population History*), Volume 3. Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2000.
- Xing Tie 邢鐵. *Hebei's Economy in Song Liao Jin Period*, Beijing: Science Publisher, 2011.
- Yu Jie 于傑 and Yu Liangdu 于亮度. *Jin Zhongdu* 金中都, Beijing: Beijing Publisher, 1989.
- Zhang Boquan 張博泉. *Jin Dai Jin Ji Shi Lue* (*General Economic History of Jin Dynasty*)金代經濟史略, Shenyang: Liaoning People's Publisher, 1981.
- Zhang Boquan 張博泉. *Nu Zhen Shi Lun* 女真史論(*History Analysis*), Changchun: Jilin Literature and History Publisher, 1986.
- Zhao Yongchun 趙永春 comp. *Feng Shi Liao Jin Xing Cheng Lu* 奉使遼金行程錄(*Records on Ambassadors Travelling to Liao and Jin*), Chang Chun: Jilin Literature and History Publisher, 1995.,
- Zhao Yongcun 趙永春. *Jin Song Guan Xi Shi* 金宋關係史(*History of Jin-Song Relationship*), Beijing: People Publisher, 2005.

Journal Articles

- Cai Dongzhou 蔡東洲. "Jin Chao Qian Bian Yu Jin Chao Mie Wang" 金朝遷汴與金朝滅亡(*Jin Moved the Capital to Bian and the Survival and Decline of Jin Dynasty*), *Journal of Guizhou Normal Institute* 貴州師範大學學報, 1995. Vol. 1

- Chan Hok-lam. "Tea Production and Tea Trade Under the Jurchen-Chin Dynasty", *Studies on the Jurchen and the Chin Dynasty*, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1997.
- Chan Hok-lam, "Wang O's contribution to the History of the Chin Dynasty (1115-1234)", *China and the Mongols*, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1999.
- Chen Xinquan 陳新權. "Song Jin Que Chang Mao Yi Kao Lue" 宋金榷場貿易考略(Examine on Song-Jin Market Trading), *Proceeding of Liao and Jin History*, Shenyang: Liaoning People's Publisher, 1985.
- Cheng Minsheng 程民生. "Shi Lun Jin Yuan Shi Qi De Bei Fang Jin Ji" 試論金元時期的北方經濟(Northern Economy in the Period of Jin and Yuan Dynasty), *Journal of History* 史學月刊, 2003.Vol. 3.
- Franke, Herbert. "A Note on Wine", *Studies on the Jurchen and the Chin Dynasty*, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1997.
- Guo Renmin 郭人民. "Jin Chao Xing Wang Yu Nong Ye Sheng Chan De Guan Xi" 金朝興亡與農業生產的關係, (The Rise and Fall of Jin Dynasty and its Relationship with Agricultural Production) *Proceedings of Song, Khitan and Jurchen Social and Economic History*, Vol. 2, Hong Kong: Song Man Book Store, 1973.
- Han Guanghui 韓光輝. "Jin Shi Di Li Zhi Hu SHu Xi Nian Zheng Wu" 《金史。地理志》戶數系年正誤(Correctness of Households in *Treatise of Geography of Jin Shi*), *Study of Liao Shi, Jin Shi and Yuan Shi* 遼史、金史、元史研究, Beijing: Chinese Encyclopedia Publisher, 2009.
- Huo Mingkun 霍明琨, Hu Ye 胡曄. "Shi Xi Jin Xuanzong Qian Du Kaifeng" 試析金宣宗遷都開封(Analyze Xuanzong Relocation to Kaifeng), *Northern Antiques* 北方文物, 2009. Vol. 4.
- Li Fanghao 李方昊. "Discussion about the Strategy Error of Jin Dynasty Capital Moving Kaifeng," *Historical Studies*, 2012, Vol. 6.
- Lin Huangda. 林煌達. "Cong Jin Dai Zhu Shi Yi Zhi Kan Bian Jiang Min Zhu Dui Zhongguo Guan Liao Ti Xi De Ying Xiang" 從金代主事一職看邊疆民族對中國官僚體系的影響(Analyze Minority Ethnic's Influence on Chinese Bureaucratic System Through the Post of Assistant Manager of Jin Dynasty) , *10-13 Century China's Cultural Shock and Integration* 10-13 世紀中國文化的碰撞與融合, Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publisher, 2006.
- Liu Pujiang 劉浦江. "Jin Dai Zha Shui Lue Lun" 金代雜稅論略(Analysis on Jin Dynasty's Miscellaneous Levies), *History Essays on Liao and Jin Dynasty* 遼金史論, Shenyang: Liaoning University Publisher, 1999.
- Liu Pujiang 劉浦江. "Lun Jin Dai De Wu Li Yu Wu Li Qian" 論金代的物力與物力錢(Discussion on Properties and Properties Tax in Jin Dynasty), *History Essays on Liao and Jin Dynasty* 遼金史論, Shenyang: Liaoning University Publisher, 1999.
- Liu Pujiang 劉浦江. "Song Dai Shi Chen Yu Lu Kao" 宋代使臣語錄考(Examine the Quotation of Song Dynasty Embassy), *10-13 Century China's Cultural Shock and Integration* 10-13 世紀中國文化的碰撞與融合, Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publisher, 2006.

- Liu Pujiang 劉浦江. “Nu Zhen De Han Hua Dao Lu Yu Da Jin Di Guo De Fu Wang” 女真的漢化道路與大金帝國的覆亡(Jurchen's Sinicization and the Fall of Great Jurchen Empire), *China Studies* 國學研究, Vol. 7. Peking University Publisher, 2000.
- Liu Pujiang 劉浦江. “Jin Dai Hu Kou Yan Jiu” 金代戶口研究(Study of Jin Dynasty Households), *History Essays on Liao and Jin Dynasty* 遼金史論, Shenyang: Liaoning University Publisher, 1999.
- Liu T. C. James. “The Jurchen-Song Confrontation: Song Overlooked Points”, *China Under Jurchen Rule*, New York: State University of New York Press, 1995.
- Qiao Youmei 喬幼梅. “Song Jin Mao Yi ZHONG Zhen Duo Tong Bi De Dou Zhen” 宋金貿易中爭奪銅幣的鬥爭(The Struggle of Coins in the Trading between Song and Jin), *Proceeding of Liao and Jin History*, Shenyang: Liaoning People's Publisher, 1985.
- Quan Hansheng 全漢昇. “Song Jin Jiang De Zou Si Mao Yi” 宋金間的走私貿易(Smuggle Trading Between Song and Jin), *Proceedings of Song, Khitan and Jurchen Social and Economic History*, Vol. 2, Hong Kong: Song Man Book Store, 1973.
- Ren Chongyue 任崇岳. “Lun Jin Mo Zheng Ju Ji Qi Mie Wang Yuan Yi” 論金末政局及其滅亡原因(Analyze the Political Situation of Late Jin and the Causes of its Decline), *Journal of Shangqiu Normal Institute* 商丘師專學報, 1987, Vol. 1.
- Song Dejin 宋德金, Han Shiming ed 韓世明主編. “Da Jin Fu Wang Bian” 大金覆亡辯(Debate on the Fall of Jin Dynasty), *Proceeding of Song Liao Jin* 遼宋金論集, Beijing: Chinese Social Science Publisher, 2007.
- Sun Jiangquan 孫建權. “Lue Lun Jin Mo Zhan Ma De Gong Ying Yu Ma Zheng” 略論金末戰馬的供應與馬政(A Brief Analysis on War Horses' Supply and Policy in Late Jin), *North-East History and Geography* 東北史地, 2010, vol. 3.
- Sun Jiangquan. “Also on the Hypothesis of “the Hanization Destroyed the Jin Dynasty”, *The Proceedings of the International Symposium on the History and Archeology of the Liao and Jin Dynasties*, 2012, Vol. II.
- Wang Gaofer, *The Stop of Jiading Tribute and the Change of Song — Jin Relationship*, Journal of Mianyang Normal University, 2011, vol. 30.
- Wang Hongzhi 王宏志. “Jin Shizong Yu Long Xing He Yi” 金世宗與“隆興和議”(Emperor Shizong of the Jin Dynasty and the “Long Xing Peace Agreement” (Between Southern Song and Jin)), *Proceedings of Liao and Song History* Vol. 2 遼金史論集第二輯, Beijing: Documents Publisher, 1987.
- Wang Mingsun 王明蓀. “Jin Xiu Guo Shi Ji Jin Shi Yuan Liu” 金修國史及金史源流(Edit of state history and the history of dynastic history of Jin Shi), *Study of Liao Shi, Jin Shi and Yuan Shi* 遼史、金史、元史研究, Beijing: Chinese Encyclopedia Publisher, 2009.
- Wang Yumin 王育民. “Jin Shi Di Li Zhi Hu Kou Xi Nian Bian Xi” 《金史。地理志》戶口系年辨析(Analysis on households recorded in Treatise of Geography in Jin Shi), *Study of Liao Shi, Jin Shi and Yuan Shi* 遼史、金

- 史、元史研究, Beijing: Chinese Encyclopedia Publisher, 2009.
- West, Stephen. "Discarded Treasure: The Wondrous Rocks of Lingbi." *International Conference of Cultural Meanings of Mobility*. Mar 2008.
- West, Stephen. "Chilly Seas and East-Flowing Rivers", *China Under Jurchen Rule*, New York: State University of New York Press, 1995.
- Xie Zhicheng 謝志誠. "Jin Dai He Bei Jin Ji De Fa Zhan He Hui Fu" 金代河北經濟的發展和恢復 (Jin Dynasty's Development and Recover of Economic in Hebei), *Hebei Academic Journal* 河北學刊, 1990, Vol. 3.
- Yuan Ji 袁冀. "Jin Yuan Zhi Ji Jiang Bei Zhi Ren Min Sheng Huo" 金元之際江北之人民生活 (Commoners' Livelihood in the Northern Region of Yellow River During the Transition Between Jin and Yuan Dynasty), *Collection of Thesis of Yuan Shi* 元史研究論集, Taipei: Taiwan Commercial Press, 1974.
- Yang Qinghua 楊清華. "Jin Mo Dong Bei Di Qu Xing Sheng She Ji Kao" 金末東北地區行省設置考 (The Establishment of Province in Northeast in Late Jin), *History and Geography of Northeast* 東北史地, 2007, vol. 1.
- Zhang Boquan 張博泉, Cheng Nina 程尼娜, and Wu Ruhuan 武玉環. "Zhongzhou Ji Yu Jin Shi" 《中州集》與《金史》 (Zhongzhou Ji and Jin Shi), *Study of Liao Shi, Jin Shi and Yuan Shi* 遼史、金史、元史研究, Beijing: Chinese Encyclopedia Publisher, 2009.

Others

- Yu Wei 余蔚. *Qian Yan, Qi Yan Yu Jin Zhi Shuai Wang: Jin Dai Zheng Zhi Zhong Xin Zhuan Yi Zhi Zheng Zhi Di Li Wen Ti* 遷燕、棄燕與金之衰亡：金代政治中心轉移所涉之政治地理問題 (*Relocation of Capital to Yan and Gave up Yan and the Relation to the fall of Jin Dynasty: The Problems of Politics and Geography Raised by the Shift of Political Center of Jin Dynasty*), Seminar published in Chaoxing Website <
http://video.chaoxing.com/play_400007062_94865.shtml>