

## 新自由感覺：貪婪年代的情感政治

### Feeling Neoliberal: The Politics of Affect in the Age of Greed

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#### 摘要

一般認為，新自由主義的歷史系譜，係海耶克與傅利曼的論點，透過國際貨幣基金與世界銀行在全球的運作，並於學術界與各種機構中發展其思想與相關政策。然而，新自由主義的生產，不僅僅只是透過這些思想論述與體制運行，更同時訴諸人的幻想與感覺。本次演講，我將追溯這種新自由感覺，如何藉由不斷維持種族殖民主義的幻想，促成婚姻親屬關係與企業慾望的性別化運作。面對全球未來新自由情感的發展，我們視新道德主義的多種變化為最核心、必須受到檢視的主題。

#### Abstract

Genealogies of neoliberalism generally trace the intellectual and institutional histories of ideas and policies from Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, through the global practices of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. But consent for neoliberal practices is generated as much through invocations of fantasy and feeling as through ideas and institutions. This lecture will trace the paths of neoliberal feeling through the persistent fantasies of racial colonialism, to the gendered practices of marital kinship and entrepreneurial desire. Neomoralism's many variations will be examined as central projects in the continuing global afterlife of neoliberal affect.

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### 一、前言：新自由主義與（新）道德主義政治

這場會議提出了以下問題：全球新自由主義與道德主義的當代政治之間關係為何？這套主導的政治經濟理性體系與親密關係、種族化的生育與親屬形式之間，又有何牽連？為何新自由主義菁英對於庶民階級私人領域的性生活念念在茲，甚至透過意識形態、制定法律來加以操控？廣義來說，傅科曾提出「生命政治學」（bio-politics）來探討影響人口生死的日常規範條件是如何成形，或可作為解答上述問題的思考路徑。但在此時此刻的特殊局勢之下，我們面臨了一個令人困惑的難題。新自由主義菁英提倡了兩種自相矛盾的道德觀：他們一方面崇尚婚姻以傳宗接代為目的的家庭價值，挾宗教力量向全球宣揚各種形式的「傳統」道德；另一方面，卻又在個人貪欲、財團可無限累積資本的政治上，追求一種「自私自利的美德」。

其實，新自由主義者擁護的「傳統」道德一點也不傳統，正如本次會議標題所揭示：新自由主義的道德觀，是一種新發明的道德觀，在這個金融化年代（有時被樂觀地稱為「晚近」資本主義）下，其最終目的在於促進資本累積。最終，貪婪的倫理化解了 21 世紀資本主義道德觀的矛盾，家庭價值和個人主義在新自由主義的「私有化」過程中被連結起來，財富與權力也因此不斷向上分配。如同新自由主義結構調整政策之下的社會福利契約，私人家庭成為社會和個人價值的理想實踐場域，社會成本也因此被轉移至個體家戶。在這套轉移策略之下，家庭負擔起照護眷屬的義務，老百姓用來支付社福成本的稅金，也被轉化為財團的獲利。同時，「貪婪就是好」的倫理使社會生產的財產被私有化，組織性公共生活空間亦大量地被私人企業壟斷。

翁愛華（Ong 2006）曾提醒我們，上述過程在不同時空的發展並不一致，全球各地殊異的政經歷史條件，使新自由主義及其道德教條展現出迥然不同的樣貌。在這場演講中，我將概述「新自由主義」一詞的歷史，整理它在當代英語學界中的各種涵義與應用，並檢視私有化的文化工程之下，新自由主義的道德規範是如何自相矛盾。此外，我將以小說家艾茵蘭德（Ayn Rand）作品中「英雄企業家精神」所虛構出來的幻想的流通，來說明 2008 年的金融危機之後，貪婪如何轉變為一種道德信念。最後，我將檢視全球南方國家中道德主義歷經的政治轉型，並附和保羅阿瑪爾（Paul Amar, 2013）的看法，指出我們此刻所面臨的局勢已不再只是「新自由主義」，而是以一種稱作安全國家（security state）為形式的政經

結構。在這個新的脈絡之中，道德規範的運作情境和意義也隨之改變，造就新型態的發展不均與政治衝擊。

## 二、新自由主義的歷史系譜

新自由主義一詞首度出現於 1930 年代，在 1990 年代被廣為使用，用來指稱「自由市場」與國家干預最小化的烏托邦意識形態、一連串削減社會服務與促進跨國企業利益的政策、支持財團全球化與金融化的（新自由化）動態進程、或者一種為 70 年代以來金錢與權力向上重分配建立贊同認可的文化工程。但新自由主義應被理解為涵蓋上述政治目標的一種全球社會運動。在英語學界中，此一概念描述並且批判了當今的全球政治潮流，因而逐漸變得風行，儘管其背後的多重意義已然消失。

「新自由主義」一詞在各社會科學與人文領域的用法並不相同，但大致被視為一種 1970 年代起以美國與盎格魯歐洲為中心、在全球各地發展程度不一的激進資本帝國主義。回顧新自由主義的知識系譜，多數學者追溯至朝聖山學社（Mont Pelerin Society）與海耶克（Friedrich Hayek, 1994）、米塞斯（Ludwig von Mises, 1949）和奧地利經濟學派的思想，以及芝加哥學派與傅利曼（Milton Friedman, 1962）等人自 1940 年代發展和流通的著作與活動。這些經濟學家捍衛古典自由主義與以個人主義為導向的市場經濟，對於政府集中化的規管、資本主義福利國家以及社會主義國家所提供的重分配的社福政策，加以口誅筆伐。

1970 年代起，這些少數的聲音逐漸成為主流。首先，在傅利曼為首的「芝加哥幫」（Chicago Boys）建議與美國中情局協助之下，智利軍方與政府高層推翻了民主民選、社會主義路線的阿連德（Salvador Allende）政府。在暴力鎮壓異議者的同時，他們也完成一連串新自由主義改革，包括：國營企業民營化、開放外資持股與企業盈餘外流、縮減社會福利。當這些政策面臨 1970 年代中期經濟發展停滯而有所修正時，新自由主義作為國家政策（而非與國家對立的烏托邦理論），逐漸轉變為一套回應全球社會運動衝擊、鞏固資本主義的實務策略，讓菁英階級得以掌控更多政經權力。依據哈維（David Harvey, 2007）與克萊恩（Naomi Klein, 2007）所描述的系譜，新自由主義陣營自智利政變後啟動一連串的實驗：以美帝模式榨取各國資源（例如早先對眾多國家如尼加拉瓜、伊朗內政的干預）、建立無法究責的治理制度、將累進稅制所支撐的社福體系資金轉化為自身獲利、並且持續擴大社會不平等。

這些活動與手段製造出一波波危機，使之成為測試新自由主義理論核心經濟假設的實驗溫床；同時，政治體系與決策模式也強化了新自由主義權力掮客的地位。這些實驗還包括：1975 年紐約市財政危機造成社福預算削減，並讓銀行家與投資客擁有前所未見的市府財政控制權；1980 年代在國際貨幣基金組織的運作下，對拉丁美洲強加「結構調整」（structural adjustment）政策，製造並利用拉美國家的外債，讓投資客得以掌控其政治運作；2003 年

美國入侵伊拉克後，聯軍行政長官布雷默（Paul Bremer）主導大批國營企業的私有化，開放外資的介入操控。美帝強權在其勢力邊緣實驗發展出的這些政策，之後亦可能反饋強權中心，為其所用，例如國內層面而言則用於紐奧良卡崔娜颶風（Katrina）的災後重建，跨國層面則於 2008 年經濟危機與衰退後對歐盟實施的各種財政緊縮政策。到了 1990 年代，上述政策被適切地命名為華盛頓共識（Washington Consensus）。

在美帝勢力範圍及其主導的全球性機構（國際貨幣基金、世界銀行、世界貿易組織）的政策之中，這些新自由主義政策持續呈現出緊張與矛盾的態勢。作為一種以激進形式呈現的古典自由主義意識形態復興，它抨擊了二十世紀的資本主義福利國家，以及其效果有限的財富重分配與企業管制措施。新自由主義知識份子與政務菁英將矛頭對準凱因斯（John Maynard Keynes, 1936），大力撻伐他在 1930 年代經濟大蕭條時提倡的福利國家自由資本主義，以及 1940 至 80 年代風行於美國與盎格魯歐洲的凱因斯式經濟政策。新自由主義作為一套推行已久、經過反覆試驗與犯錯、文攻武嚇以取得認可的戰略，其實際運作早已偏離學術界的理論內涵。有時甚至會和新保守主義提倡的國家安全政策重疊，佈署中央集權的軍事力量來發動帝國暴力與戰爭。因此，回顧新自由主義的歷史痕跡，會發現它並非一套定義明確的思想和理論，而是一個促進財富與權力向上分配的內在矛盾體系、以及一種帝國用來榨取南方國家資源的延伸手段。

然而，美帝強權並非推動全球新自由主義改革的唯一勢力。1980 年代中國對世界資本市場的開放、俄國在蘇聯解體興起的新經貿模式、1990 年代廢除種族隔離制度後的南非、到歐盟於 1992 年簽訂馬斯垂特條約後實施的政策……許多全球、本土和國族勢力，在各自的時空脈絡之中，都拓展出程度不一的新自由主義版圖。部份學者認知到這樣的不平均發展，但更重視 1980 年代以來全球新自由主義展現的統攝力量，在其著作中聚焦於主導的經濟體系如何改造全球的社會和政治情勢（Harvey 2010）。有些學者雖然認可全球新自由主義的歷史力量，但更強調相對於新自由主義的各種例外，並指出新自由主義在世界上某些經濟體系中，本身就是一種特例。在這群研究者之中，許多人不僅熱中於記錄新自由主義所發揮的影響力，也想追蹤它運作時的種種限制（Ong 2006）。

儘管對新自由主義的關注充滿歧異，學界普遍認同它的基礎成因與長遠效應。因應二十世紀中葉資本主義霸權所面臨的政經衝擊，新自由主義整合了發展不均、甚至相互矛盾的全球跨國企業與政治菁英的勢力，以維繫並集中權力。無疑地，其效果是擴大了全球不平等（Galbraith 2012; Stiglitz 2013）。儘管學術界對新自由主義有此共識，採取的研究途徑卻是五花八門。社會學、地理學與都市學者傾向結構取向的研究方法，著重新自由主義政策擴及各個年代、地域時的整體邏輯和影響力（Smith 1983; Brenner 2004）。人類學家則關注這些政策的不確定性，以及它們在全球各地（尤其是南方國家）所遭遇的反抗勢力（Sawyer 2004; Tsing 2011）。人文學者傾向分析新自由主義的文化工程，以及其主體塑造模式和情感痕跡

(Harkins 2009; Berlant 2011)。在這些學科之外，亦有其他不同的理論路線，馬克斯主義學者提出政經衝突與變遷的論述，聚焦於階級鬥爭所造成的資本主義和國家型態改變(Harvey 2007; Smith 1983; Brenner 2004)。受傅柯(Michel Foucault)理論影響的學者則檢視了權力如何在各種管制機構(學校、監獄、醫療照護產業、流行文化與媒體)之中廣佈擴散，以及它們如何生產出服從新自由主義教條的自我規訓主體(Rose 1999; Povinelli 2011)。

在這些學科之中，後殖民與跨國研究學者，對於一般認為新自由主義霸權於1970年代起開始散播的說法，提出最尖銳的質疑。這群學者關注的焦點並非晚期資本主義、傾財團的全球化以及金融化，如何對各個國家、經濟體、文化與日常生活造成結構性的衝擊，他們指出：挑戰西方殖民現代性的力量，並非僅是抵抗新自由主義的思想及運作，同時也透過無數種方式形塑了新自由主義的樣貌。這群學者在後殖民與去殖民研究的理論基礎上，回顧了種族分類學、性別化敘事、性相論述的文化效應，是如何塑造出16世紀以降西方帝國與現代性的主導形貌(McClintock 1995; Stoler 2010; Alexander 2005)，並進一步指出，去殖民、女性主義、酷兒、生態環保的社運勢力、以及階級與工人政治，與統治體系之間產生了不斷變化的雙向應對(Grewal 2005; Reddy 2011)。

這群學者對社會的變遷提出了寬廣的思考路徑，循此一脈絡，我們將能跳脫新自由主義霸權、發展不均、統治與抵抗……等陳舊論述，理清這些錯綜交織的權力軸線，追溯它們互動牽連的軌跡。

### 三、公共道德、私人貪欲

在理解新自由主義的「新道德主義」時，我們必須要留意其參差不均的內涵差異。從種族階層的重塑到表面包容的多元文化主義、從擁護性別化的一夫一妻婚姻制到「解放」情欲的消費主義，新自由資本主義的文化工程，時常有南轅北轍的迥異面貌。在不同的情境條件下，往往其主張會在兩個極端之間劇烈地轉換，而非漸進變化。

2008年金融危機發生時，新自由主義看似因嚴重失靈而面臨崩潰。當「私人」金融部門明顯陷入一片混亂又不斷推諉卸責，誰還會主張解除金融管制？然而，新自由主義不但沒有崩潰，反而還乘勢再起。殭屍新自由主義從金融危機的死灰中復燃，拖著它衰微的意識形態包袱與失敗政策前行。其關鍵的道德矛盾也隨之更為鮮明。在全球許多地方，反對同性戀者與女性生育自主權的勢力日益壯大，但同時間，協助家庭外生殖與性別彈性化的科技與藥品，卻也在全球更加普及(Preciado 2013)。

這些矛盾都被新自由主義政策的私有化驅力所化解。同性戀的基本權擴張是透過婚姻與子女撫養權的重新定義，同性伴侶將如生養子女的異性戀家庭一般，將社會再生產的成本私

有化。回顧長遠的殖民歷史，此種同化模式一直是用來收編種族異己的手段（Findlay 2000; Shah 2001）。同時，對「唯我優先」的個人晉升策略的大量關注，以及對財團企業家精神的頌揚，使得那群能夠輕鬆卸除社會撫養責任拖累的優勢階級得以快速累積致富（正如同紐約大學專業進修學院的宣傳標語：我是「我」的企業總裁）。

但貪婪與漠視他人福祉如何成為一種道德？近年學界所發展的情感研究就顯得格外重要。無論是研究公眾感知、情緒政治、或者如觸動等未個人化情感的傳播，阿梅德（Sara Ahmed, 2004）、柯婁（Patricia Clough, 2007）、貝蘭特（Lauren Berlant, 2011）、茨薇柯維琪（Ann Cvetkovich, 2012）等理論家已歸納出政治經濟體的核心如何動員調度感覺、幻想、感受、激情，來產生關鍵性的影響。接下來的演講中我將聚焦於哲學家與小說家艾茵蘭德的虛構世界，來說明尤其自 2008 年後，新自由主義如何將貪婪美化為一種德性，並強調此現象的獨特重要性。

艾茵蘭德是活躍於 1940 至 50 年代冷戰時期的俄國反共知識份子，因政治因素而流亡海外，但她為當代新自由主義政策與政治帶來重大的影響。在回溯這些政策的相關著作與思想史時，通常會分析知識份子、意識形態擁護者、以及政客帶來的影響，但強硬派新自由主義權力政治的成員中，有不少比例的人都曾在高中時讀過蘭德小說《阿特拉斯聳聳肩》（*Atlas Shrugged*）的譯本。

作為客觀主義的創始人，她宣稱這套純粹理性的哲學闡釋了資本主義的道德基礎，但比起這些長篇論述，她的小說及其譯本才真正被廣為流傳與閱讀。受早年擔任好萊塢編劇的工作經驗影響，她的小說涵蓋了通俗羅曼史、英雄主義、幻想元素——替之後成為英雄企業家的主角，打造出一個原慾式的夢幻人生，使他可以不帶任何同理心與團體意識，獲取純粹的創造性成就。蘭德在她的小說中塑造了一種感覺結構，一種在資源匱乏與衝突的情境中帶有道德教誨與愉悅快感的貪婪政治。

艾茵蘭德的作品打造出一種英雄式的企業家主體認同（無論性別），其在面臨失望與逆境時，不帶感情地信仰著資本累積的道德教化功效，踐踏著競爭者與工人的屍體前行（無論就實質或隱喻而言）。蘭德在好萊塢曾經歷一段沒有工作、沒沒無聞、與世隔絕的低潮期，這段時間，她在日記中大篇幅地紀錄了自己對二十世紀初一位連續殺人魔——希克曼的崇拜。

威廉·愛德華·希克曼（William Edward Hickman）曾犯下偽造文書、持械搶劫、綁架與連環謀殺案。1927 年，十九歲的希克曼在一所洛杉磯公立學校以對方父親發生車禍，要帶她去醫院探視為由，誘拐了十二歲的少女瑪莉安帕克（Marian Parker）。之後幾天，瑪莉安的雙親收到一封封語帶嘲弄的勒索信，當她父親交付籌來的贖金時，他在希克曼離去的車

上看見了女兒的身影，最後卻發現她的屍體被丟棄在街尾。希克曼將她的屍體切為兩半，將血放乾，並將內臟摘除，用毛巾填滿她的身軀，最後再用鐵線將她的眼睛撐開，讓她看似還活著。後來，她的屍塊被發現遍佈在洛杉磯的各處。

蘭德在日記中描繪出她未來小說中英雄主角們的性格時，也用大段文字紀錄了她對希克曼的喜愛：「當他在你面前，他壞男孩般的迷人笑容會讓你無時無刻喜愛他。」同時又坦承自己「不管他做了什麼，仍不由自主、無可抵抗地對他感到同情。」當希克曼在受審時宣稱：「我就像國家一樣，只要對我而言是好的，就是對的。」蘭德對此寫道：「即便他這年紀的人不該有這種態度，但能如此言之有理，值得肯定。」（Harriman 1997; Burns 2009; Prescott, 2012）

借用貝蘭特的新書名稱《殘酷的樂觀主義》（*Cruel Optimism*, 2013），我們也許可以稱此一情感模式為「樂觀的殘酷」（*optimistic cruelty*），使人們面對眼前的挫敗時，能掩蓋其所受的痛苦與受挫的自戀情結。或許，這正好解釋了蘭德小說中的主角們，為什麼都和希克曼有些許相似。許多閱讀她的小說時感到欣喜的讀者，日後也都宣揚貪婪能夠促進社會利益，顯示此一情感形式不但會讓人贊同惡化的社會不平等與節節升高的暴力，更讓他們積極參與其中，樂觀地相信這些政策將創造出最美好的未來。

相關調查與評論指出，蘭德的《阿特拉斯聳聳肩》是一部在銷售排行榜上長年不衰、被廣泛閱讀且影響力深遠的文本，其銷量甚至在 2008 年的經濟危機後翻升三倍。書中，蘭德將優越的「創造者階級」描寫成支撐福利體系的社會棟樑，卻有一群寄生蟲、強盜、腐敗官僚、和懦弱的企業叛徒，不斷從這群創世巨神（創造工作機會者）身上榨取資源，逼使創造者們捲入這場激烈的爭鬥，與他們對抗；最後，創造者必須從寄生蟲份子和其勢力所控制的政經領域中退出，才能贏得這場戰爭。書中的創造者顛覆勞動價值理論、扭曲了勞動者罷工的策略，藉此證明所有的價值都歸功於偉大的創世巨人；而對創造者圖謀不軌的構陷與暴力，則使得世界分崩離析，陷入混亂與廣大的苦難。

讀者對這個幻想情節的感覺會是什麼？世界的崩壞、苦難與死亡是否讓他們驚覺到自身的敗德，在閱讀時感到震驚與深惡痛絕？其實不，這可是艾茵蘭德的小說！讀者勢必會為這場世界末日歡呼，因為愚蠢和軟弱的群眾、以及討好他們的人都是罪有應得，而性感的創造者英雄與他們引發的災難，讀來都令人雀躍；亞特拉斯一聳肩，人們看見他英姿煥發的精壯肌肉，就興奮得喘不過氣來，而那些阻擋他的人，都將被他身上掉落的巨石給摧毀。

值得注意的是，蘭德的小說不乏女性英雄人物。在《阿特拉斯聳聳肩》中，女主角黛格妮·泰格特是位鐵路企業巨擘，她的勇敢與才智遠勝過週遭所有男性——除了一位名為漢克·瑞爾登的鋼鐵大亨、以及包圍在約翰·高特身邊一幫險惡的資產罷工者。如同蘭德筆下的

其他女性角色，泰格特是位性感、無子女的單身女性，她和已婚的瑞爾登之間的熾熱情愫推展了全書劇情，這些英勇的企業家充滿狂野的熱情與吸引力，而軟弱的寄生蟲份子則臣服於婚姻與政府的控管。泰格特必須將瑞爾登從他的妻子以及政客們身邊解救出來，以便與高特一起為創造者階級的主宰打開新的道路。然而，在這個刻板的二元性別異性戀故事中，卻也處處流露酷兒敘事的張力，書中的職場領域不分男女，性感的女人也並非溫順的賢妻良母，而是衣著光鮮華麗的掌權者。一如研究拉丁美洲種族民族主義的菲歐瑪塔（Licia Fiol-Matta）在其《國家的酷兒母親》（*A Queer Mother for the Nation*, 2002）一書中對智利女詩人蜜斯特拉（Gabriela Mistral）作品所做的精闢分析，她說明了酷兒特質同樣能存在於主流的國家與經濟結構之中並為其服務。蜜絲特拉具備多重混血的母性形象，但蘭德則另行其道，在作品中將酷兒化的女性陰柔氣質，化作一種反叛的性感力量，藉此將資本主義從布爾什維克（Bolshevik）式的官僚鐵腕、或所謂「保姆國家」（nanny state）的馴化監控中解放出來。這正是一種白人酷兒女性主義為新自由主義的資本累積進行服務的例證。

儘管蘭德的擁護者不乏許多有影響力的人士，但她理性主義取向的政策在實行時，卻往往經過大幅的修正。除了一些死忠的自由派（libertarian），人們普遍對她的無神主義信仰視而不見。擁護「家庭價值」的保守主義政客，也時常忽略了她的情欲與性別政治。甚至連她的忠實信徒都經常捨棄她的核心理念，例如前美國聯邦儲備銀行的前主席葛林斯潘（Alan Greenspan）即無視於她對中央銀行系統的深惡痛絕，只為了積極扮演美國最高階中央銀行家的角色。她筆下情欲化的性感企業家角色，反抗家庭化的國家管制，吸引了許多青少年信眾投效新自由陣營。書中企業家陽剛精神對抗陰柔家庭特質，或許可謂是一種純粹的男性陽剛主義幻想；然而，蘭德往往把英雄主角寫成性感女郎，而馴化者則是男性的國家管理者。因此，在分析對新自由主義堅定不移的贊同時，我們最好能深入蘭德的幻想世界，檢視其書寫中強大的情感認同與情緒邏輯。

在此刻的政治情勢中，新自由主義政客與專家擅於結合理性訴求與暴力的社會手段，這大大地造成了多數人在日常生活中無止息的苦難與失落。有股持續、卻不穩定的論述力量，試圖將「不理性」的、因此一點也不樂觀的殘忍暴行（例如在電影院中開槍掃射群眾，或血腥屠村等），與另一種理性、較為樂觀的暴力（例如累退制稅法、殘破的社會福利網、帝國主義戰爭等）進行切割區分。這種論述容易受到奚落攻訐，就像蘭德的散文一樣。但正如同貝蘭特所描述，作為晚期資本主義下核心情感體驗的「殘酷樂觀主義」，其反面的確是「樂觀的殘酷」的陰暗面。更尖銳地說，正因為這種歷史悠久的理性化暴行代表了帝國霸權與跨國菁英的力量，我們或許可稱這一感覺結構為：替新自由主義年代服務的「帝國的樂觀主義」。



#### 四、新自由主義的終結？

然而，我們仍活在新自由主義的年代嗎？時值今日，新自由主義是否仍是全球治理的主導模式、仍是思考新道德主義時最主要的政治經濟框架？對於新自由主義私有化、去管制化、企業精神與個人責任等核心機制是否仍具備影響力的相關辯論，在 2008 年的金融危機之後越演越烈。有些人主張新自由主義實際上變得更為普及，也有人認為它的影響力隨著美帝勢力衰退，更有人堅持新自由主義的治理已經進入了某種殭屍般的狀態，其主導地位消褪的同時，其各方面的運作卻也變得更為強烈。

保羅阿瑪爾在其新書《保安群島：人類的安全國家、性相政治與新自由主義的終結》（*The Security Archipelago: Human Security States, Sexuality Politics and the End of Neoliberalism*, 2013）中，針對後者的論點延伸出進一步的論述。他描述新自由主義退縮回到北半球，繼續從美國與歐洲地區榨取剩餘的公共資源，而它的機構組織與政策制定者卻有越來越多來自於南半球國家。阿瑪爾鎖定埃及、巴西等國，回溯了他所謂「人類安全國家」的誕生，描述 1980 年代產生的「北京共識」（中國政經發展模式）逐漸在 2008 年的經濟危機之後置換了華盛頓共識。

反國家介入、市場導向的治理模式一再失敗，使南方國家爆發了程度不一的反抗運動，諸如拉丁美洲的粉紅浪潮、阿拉伯之春都是其中代表。當以北方國家為主體的全球化與金融化開始鬆動傾陷，社會對於安定的需求，進一步強化了國家與軍警體制。但是阿瑪爾指出，新的治理模式並非僅是父系威權的復辟，而是從對抗殖民主義的歷史遺產上習得教訓，並對呼籲社會公義的群眾運動作出程度不一的回應。這些治理模式結合了反殖民力量的陽剛氣質與女性化、道德化的人道主義，一方面以軍事化手段達成維安目標，同時又宣稱將會保護、解救受苦的大眾。

阿瑪爾的著作對於新自由主義與新道德主義的相關思考而言十分重要，他指出新自由主義在全球正被一種宣稱維繫人類安全的安全國家勢力所置換，其背後的邏輯基礎是道德而非市場。因此，對性別與情欲的管制，在當中的運作便扮演了關鍵的角色。過去傳統宗教道德觀和情慾化企業精神的分歧是新自由主義的特色，但如今這分歧被更矛盾而複雜多變的關係網絡所置換：這關係網絡的一端是以解放為訴求的社會運動，另一端則是號稱拯救、控管受害人口（包括「被迫」從娼的女性與人口販運下的兒童）的國家力量。

當然，新自由主義同樣也已經吸納了社會運動的能量，蘭德小說中狹隘的性別平等形式，正代表了一支重要的新自由女性主義派別。英語世界的同志婚姻平權運動，鼓吹家戶作為扶養親屬私有化核心場域的新自由主義願景，掩蓋了 1970 年代同性戀解放運動的其他目標。美國境內所組織的墮胎權運動，則以爭取私人醫療服務的個人權利，取代了經過廣泛考量

的生育正義。但是，當焦點從新自由主義法則下的個人公民權利，轉移至全球範疇的人權時，全球南方所興起的安全國家，便會透過人道主義為框架、軍警行動為核心的國家政策，和訴求社會正義的群眾運動進行相互影響。

根據阿瑪爾的說法，新自由主義的終結並非一段歷史時期的句點，或是某種生產模式的崩潰，而是全球的權力佈局與焦點視野，從北、西半球移轉至南方國家的一種根本轉變。這個轉變分佈不均、反覆無常、且充滿矛盾，卻也意味著我們未來在思考與書寫當今全球的道德主義政治時，將會有寬廣而多樣的路徑。

**Feeling Neoliberal: The Politics of Affect in the Age of Greed**

Lisa DUGGAN

**I Introduction: Neoliberalism and the Politics of (Neo)Moralism**

This conference asks the question: What is the relationship of global neoliberalism to the contemporary politics of moralism? What does this dominant form of economic and political rationality have to do with forms of intimacy, racialized reproduction and kinship? Why do neoliberal elites care about the personal and sexual lives of the popular classes, enough to promote ideologies and legislation designed to control us? In the broadest sense, Michel Foucault provides a framework for thinking about these relationships through the lens of biopolitics, the everyday shaping of the terms and conditions of the life and death of populations. But in the very particular context of the present moment, we are confronted with something of a puzzle. Neoliberal elites promote apparently conflicting moral frameworks: On the one hand, they endorse and impose globally varying forms of “traditional” religion-based morality organized around the “family values” of marital reproduction, while on the other hand they promote and pursue the “virtue of selfishness” embedded in the politics of unfettered corporate accumulation and individual greed.

Of course the “traditional” morality espoused by neoliberal elites is generally anything but traditional. As signaled in the title of this conference, neoliberal moralities are newly invented neomoralities, organized around the goals of capital accumulation in the era of financialization sometimes optimistically called “late” capitalism. Ultimately, an ethics of greed bridges the apparent contradiction in 21<sup>st</sup> century capitalist moralities. The moralities of family values and individual selfishness are connected via the neoliberal process of *privatization* through which wealth and power continue to be upwardly distributed. As social benefits contract under neoliberal policies of structural adjustment, social costs are privatized through the private household, idealized as the primary site of social and personal values. Through this strategy of transfer, households bear the burden of care for dependents, and wealth can be redirected from taxes supporting social welfare to corporate profits. Meanwhile, the wealth of social production is privatized via the ethics of “greed is good,” as expanding landscapes of organized public life are brought under private corporate ownership.

As Aihwa Ong has reminded us (Ong 2006), these processes do not operate evenly across time and space. Neoliberalism and its moralisms vary enormously, embedded in the economic and political histories of different global regions and localities. In this lecture, I will lay out a general history of the meanings and uses of the term “neoliberalism” in contemporary

English language scholarship. I will then examine neoliberalism's contradictory moral frameworks, embedded within the cultural project of privatization. To highlight the ways that greed has been moralized, particularly in the post 2008 crisis period, I will focus on the circulation of the fictional fantasies of heroic entrepreneurship in the writing of Ayn Rand. I will then conclude with an examination of the morphing politics of moralism in the global south, and suggest (along with Paul Amar, 2013) that we may be confronting new formations beyond the framework of "neoliberalism" in the form of the political economies of security states. Within this altered context, practices of moral regulation shift their meanings yet again, offering new formations of uneven development and political challenge.

## **II Genealogies of Neoliberalism**

The word *neoliberalism*, first used during the 1930s, came into widespread circulation in the 1990s to name a utopian ideology of "free markets" and minimal state interference; a set of policies slashing state social services and supporting global corporate interests; a process (*neoliberalization*) proceeding in company with pro-corporate globalization and financialization; or a cultural project of building consent for the upward redistributions of wealth and power that have occurred since the 1970s. But neoliberalism might best be understood as a global social movement encompassing all of these political goals. In English language scholarship, the concept has gathered force as a description of current tendencies in global politics, even as its meanings have dispersed.

Though the term tends to be used differently across the social sciences and the humanities, there is wide agreement that neoliberalism is a radicalized form of capitalist imperialism, centered in the United States and Anglo-Europe, that has developed unevenly across the globe since the 1970s. Most scholars trace its intellectual genealogy to the Mont Pelerin Society and the ideas of Friedrich Hayek (1944), Ludwig von Mises (1949) and economists of the Austrian school, and to the writing and activities of Milton Friedman (1962) and the Chicago school, developed and circulated since the 1940s. These economists defended classical liberalism and market-based economies grounded in individualism, and published scathing critiques of the centralized government regulation and redistributive social benefits provided by capitalist welfare states as well as socialist societies.

These minority views moved toward centers of power during the 1970s, beginning with the overthrow of the democratically elected socialist government of Salvador Allende in Chile by the Chilean military and internal elites, with the assistance of the CIA and the advice of the University of Chicago based economists surrounding Milton Friedman, often called the "Chicago Boys." Neoliberal reforms – privatization of state enterprises, opening up to foreign business ownership and expatriation of profits, cuts to social services – were accomplished along with

violent suppression of dissent. When these policies were later modified to meet the challenges of economic stagnation in the mid-1970s, neoliberalism as state policy (as opposed to a utopian theory opposed to the state) began to appear as a practical set of strategies for maintaining capitalism in the face of global social movement challenges, and for reinforcing or installing elites with access to an increasing share of economic and political power. As David Harvey (2007) and Naomi Klein (2007) describe the genealogy of neoliberalism since the Chilean coup, successive experiments developed means of extracting resources on the U.S. imperial model (as had occurred in earlier interventions in Nicaragua and Iran, among many others), the installation of unaccountable governing structures, the transfer of profits out of social services supported by progressive taxation, and the maintenance of widening inequalities.

These events and tactics function as experiments by creating or exploiting crisis conditions to test key economic hypotheses central to the theory of neoliberalism, as political institutions and modes of decision making are simultaneously reshaped to entrench neoliberal power brokers. Such experiments include the 1975 New York City fiscal crisis that slashed social services and gave bankers and bond holders unprecedented control over the city's finances; the 1980s "structural adjustment" programs forced on Latin American economies through the practices of the International Monetary Fund that created and exploited sovereign debt to enforce investor domination of the political process; and the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, where the Administrator of the U.S. controlled Coalition Provisional Authority of Iraq, Paul Bremer, presided over massive privatization of state enterprises opened to foreign control. These experiments developed policies in localities at the periphery of U.S. imperial power that might then be generalized for use in the center, both nationally as in the rebuilding of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, and transnationally as in the imposition of austerity policies in the European Union after the 2008 economic crisis and recession. By the 1990s, such policies had been fittingly labeled the Washington Consensus.

Within the imperial purview of the United States and the policies of US-dominated global institutions including the IMF, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization, these neoliberal policies express ongoing tensions and contradictions. As an ideological revival of classical liberalism in radicalized form, neoliberalism constitutes an attack on the twentieth-century capitalist welfare state, with its modest redistributions and state regulation of corporate power. Attacks on the theories of John Maynard Keynes (1936), the welfare state liberalism he championed during the Great Depression of the 1930s, and the Keynesian economic policies dominant in the United States and Anglo-Europe from the 1940s to the 1980s have been a crucial focus of neoliberal intellectual and policy elites. As a set of strategies, set in place over time through trial and error, via both force and consent, neoliberalism-in-practice has often deviated from the theories of the intellectuals. Overlapping at times with

neoconservative security state policies that deploy centralized military power for imperial violence and war, neoliberalism has functioned historically less as a clearly defined set of ideas and theories, and more as an internally contradictory mode of upward redistribution of wealth and power, and an extension of the practices of imperial extraction of resources from economies of the global south.

But US imperial power has not been the sole source of global neoliberal reform. From the "opening" of China to world capitalist markets in the 1980s, through the new business and trade policies of post-Soviet Russia and post-apartheid South Africa in the 1990s, to the policies enacted via the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on European Union, many global, local and national forces have produced the uneven spatial and temporal landscape of neoliberalism. Some scholars acknowledge this unevenness but emphasize the hegemonic force of global neoliberalism since 1980. These writers focus on the power of the dominant economic system in reshaping global societies and politics (Harvey 2010). Others acknowledge global neoliberalism's historical power, but emphasize the highly variable landscape of exceptions to neoliberalism, and of neoliberalism as exception under other economic regimes around the globe. This group includes many researchers who are as interested in tracking the limitations of neoliberalism's influence as in documenting its power (Ong 2006).

Despite these differences, there is wide agreement among scholars on the foundational causes and enduring effects of global neoliberalism. As a response to the economic and political challenges to capitalist dominance in the mid-twentieth century, neoliberalism organized the uneven, contradictory efforts of global corporate and political elites to maintain and concentrate power. The effect of widening global inequalities is indisputable (Galbraith 2012; Stiglitz 2013). But within this consensus, approaches to the study of neoliberalism are broadly various. Sociologists, geographers, and urbanists tend to take a structural approach, emphasizing the overall logic and force of neoliberal policies as they spread over time and space (Smith 1983; Brenner 2004). Anthropologists are more likely to point to the contingencies of those policies, and to the power of resistance to them, especially in the global south (Sawyer 2004; Tsing 2011). Scholars located in the literary humanities tend to analyze the cultural project of neoliberalism, its modes of subject formation, along with its affective traces (Harkins 2009; Berlant 2011). Layered alongside these divisions are other theoretical differences. Marxist scholars offer narratives of political economic conflict and change, focused on the class conflicts that shape the shifting forms of capitalism and the state (Harvey 2007, Smith 1983, Brenner 2004). Writers influenced by Michel Foucault examine the broad dispersion of power among institutions that regulate populations, including schools, prisons, the health care industries, popular culture, and media, and the ways that self-disciplining subjects who comply with neoliberal expectations are produced (Rose 1999; Povinelli 2011).

Across all of these fields, postcolonial and transnational studies scholars have offered the most pointed set of challenges to the standard narratives of spreading neoliberal hegemonies since the 1970s. Rather than focus primarily on the structural impact of late capitalism, pro-corporate globalization, and financialization on states, economies, cultures, and everyday lives, these scholars have noted the myriad ways in which challenges to Western colonial modernity have shaped, rather than simply resisted, the ideas and practices of neoliberalism. These scholars expand upon postcolonial and decolonial studies of the cultural work of racial taxonomies, gendered narratives, and sexual discourses in producing dominant forms of western modernity and empire since the sixteenth century (McClintock 1995; Stoler 2010; Alexander 2005). They have noted the role of decolonization and of feminist, queer, and ecological social movements, as well as of class and labor politics, in producing constantly morphing responses to and from ruling institutions (Grewal 2005, Reddy 2011).

This group of scholars enables expansive ways of thinking about social change. If we follow their lead in going beyond notions of neoliberal hegemony, uneven developments, or dominance and resistance, we can begin to trace the interactions among complexly intertwined axes of power.

### **III Public Morality, Private Greed**

In thinking about the neomoralism of neoliberalism, it is important to keep this unevenness in mind. The cultural projects of neoliberal capitalism vary dramatically from the remaking of racial hierarchies to superficially inclusive multiculturalism, from gendered marital monogamy to sexually “liberated” consumerism. Conditions shift emphases from one pole to another, not along any kind of progressive axis.

During the global financial crisis of 2008, it seemed that neoliberalism might collapse under the weight of its dramatic failures. Who would still advocate deregulation following such clear irresponsibility and chaos in the “private” financial sector? Yet rather than collapse, neoliberalism enjoyed an intensified resurgence. Zombie neoliberalism rose from the ashes of the financial crisis, dragging its exhausted ideological baggage and failed policies along. Its defining moral contradictions also intensified. Attacks on gay people and on women’s reproductive rights expanded their force in many places around the globe, at the same time that technologies and pharmaceuticals marketed to assist extra familial reproduction and gender flexibility also broadened their global reach (Preciado, 2013).

These contradictions have been negotiated via the neoliberal policy imperative of privatization. The expansion of lesbian and gay rights is occurring through redefinition as the rights of marital couples and parents, whose households will privatize the costs of social reproduction in the same manner as heterosexual reproductive couples. This form of inclusion

has a long colonial history as a mode of incorporating racial difference. (Findlay 2000; Shah 2001) At the same time, the ramped up emphasis on Me First strategies of personal advancement and the glorification of corporate entrepreneurship underwrite the fast track to accumulation for those who may shed the burden of responsibility for social dependents (The advertising slogan for NYU's School of Continuing Professional Education is "I am the President of Me, Incorporated.")

But how can greed and disregard for the welfare of others be moralized? Here the importance of recent scholarship in affect studies becomes clear. Whether focusing on public feeling, the politics of emotion, or the circulation of pre-individual affect as sensation, scholars including Sara Ahmed (2004), Patricia Clough (2007), Lauren Berlant (2011) and Ann Cvetkovich (2012) have outlined key mobilizations of feeling and fantasy, sensation and excitement at the heart of political economies. In order to highlight the specific importance of the moralization of greed for neoliberalism, especially post 2008, I will focus on the imaginary universe of philosopher and novelist Ayn Rand.

Ayn Rand was primarily a Cold War intellectual, a Russian émigré anti communist active during the 1940s and 50s. But she has had an enormous influence on contemporary neoliberal policies and politics as well. Most histories of the writing and ideas behind those policies analyze the impact of intellectuals, ideologues and politicians. But a significant percentage of recruits to hard neoliberal power politics start by reading Rand's widely translated novel *Atlas Shrugged*, often in high school.

As founder of Objectivism, she claimed to provide a purely rational philosophy expounding the moral basis of capitalism, but her novels have been much more widely translated, circulated and read than any of her non fiction screeds. Drawing on her early career experience as a Hollywood script writer, what those novels provide is melodramatic romance, heroism and fantasy—a specifically libidinal fantasy life for the would be heroic entrepreneur who eschews empathy and collectivity on the path to pure creative achievement. What Rand's fiction provides is a structure of feeling, a moralized and libidinal politics of joyful greediness in the face of scarcity and conflict.

Ayn Rand's work produces identifications with a heroic entrepreneurial subject (of either gender) who responds to disappointment and set backs with an anti-empathic belief in the moral efficacy of strategies of accumulation that press on over the literal as well as figurative dead bodies of competitors and workers. During her own darkest period of unemployment, obscurity and isolation during her Hollywood days, she wrote extensively in her journals about her worship of an early twentieth century serial killer.



William Edward Hickman was a forger, armed robber, kidnapper and multiple murderer. In 1927, at the age of 19, he appeared at a Los Angeles public school and lured 12 year old Marian Parker into accompanying him supposedly to visit her father, hospitalized after a car accident. Over the next few days he sent her parents a series of taunting ransom notes. Marion's father collected the ransom money and delivered it to Hickman. As he delivered the money, he could see his daughter in the passenger seat of Hickman's car as he drove off, to dump her body at the end of the street. He had sawed her body in half, drained it of blood, cut her internal organs out, and stuffed her torso with bath towels. He had wired her eyes open to make her seem alive. Pieces of her body were found all over LA.

In her journal, where she began outlining the character of her future fictional heroes, Rand includes a long paragraph listing all the things she likes about Hickman: "The fact that he looks like a bad boy with a very winning grin, that he makes you like him the whole time you're in his presence." She confesses her "involuntary, irresistible sympathy for him, which I cannot help feeling ... in spite of everything." About the slogan he announced at trial, "I am like the state: what is good for me is right," Rand writes, "Even if he wasn't big enough to live by that attitude, he deserves credit for saying it so brilliantly." (Harriman 1997; Burns 2009; Prescott, 2012)

In thinking about the forms of what we might call, in a twist on Lauren Berlant's recent book, "optimistic cruelty" -- an affective mode that masks pain and outraged narcissism in moments of defeat in the present -- it may be instructive to consider the broad impact of Ayn Rand's novels, with heroes at their center who bear some resemblances to William Hickman. The glee that these novels elicit in so many readers who go on to promote greed as a social good, might illuminate the forms of feeling that recruit not simply consent but active participation in expanding inequalities and escalations of violence integrated with an optimistic belief that such policies produce the best outcomes.

Surveys and commentaries reveal Ayn's novel *Atlas Shrugged* as a broadly read and deeply influential text with a very long life on the bestseller lists. Sales tripled after the 2008 economic crisis. In *Atlas Shrugged*, Rand represents the mighty producer class upon whom the welfare of all depends. During the course of the novel, the producers are drawn into a fierce war with the moochers, looters, corrupt bureaucrats and craven corporate sellouts. All the latter are sucking on the tit of the creative titans, the job creators. Finally, the only way to win this war is for the producers to withdraw from the political and economic landscape controlled by moocher hordes and their enablers. In a reversal of the labor theory of value and an appropriation of the workers' strategy of the strike, the producers prove that all value is ultimately generated by the titans. As the world collapses, pushed along by producer sabotage and violence, chaos and widespread suffering ensue.

So how are readers to feel about this fantasy scenario? Does the collapse and the suffering and death tar them as immoral, and lead to reader shock and abhorrence? Well, no, this is an Ayn Rand novel! Readers are meant to cheer the apocalypse, because it is deserved by the stupid and weak masses and those who pander to them. The destruction is thrilling, as are the sexy heroic titans who have caused it. Atlas shrugs, and we are left panting lustily at the spectacle of his glittering muscularity as the boulder smashes those who would hold him back.

It is important to note that Ayn Rand's heroes are women as well as men. In *Atlas Shrugged*, Dagny Taggart is a railroad tycoon whose bravery and acumen surpass all the men around her—except for steel magnate Hank Rearden, and the shadowy world of capitalist strikers surrounding John Galt. Like Rand's other female heroes, Taggart is single, childless, and hot. The heat between her and the married Rearden is the central motor of the novel. The heroic entrepreneurs are invested with wild passion and desirability. The weak moochers are domesticated by marriage and the government. Taggart must free Rearden from his wife as well as from the politicians to strike out with Galt toward creative dominance. This is a very gendered heterosexual scenario, but also in many ways a queer dynamic. Work is not gender segregated, the hot women are not domestic or servile, they are powerful, and very well dressed. As Licia Fiol-Matta pointed out in her brilliant analysis of Gabriela Mistral's work on behalf of racial nationalism in Latin America, in her *A Queer Mother for the Nation* (2002), queerness can work within and for dominant formations of the state and economy. Mistral figured as a multi racial maternal figure. Rand heads in quite a different direction. She mobilizes a version of queer femininity as a rebellious sexual energy fighting to free capitalism from the heavy hand of controlling Bolshevik bureaucrats, or from the supervision of a domesticating so-called "nanny" state. This is a version of white queer feminism in the service of neoliberal capitalist accumulation.

Among her many influential followers, Ayn Rand's rationalist policy positions are not taken up without massive revision. Her atheism is generally ignored beyond the hardcore libertarian margins. Conservative politicians set aside her sexual and gender politics in favor of "family values" conservatism. Even her central ideas were often set aside by acolytes including former United States Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, who abandoned her profound rejection of central banks to pursue his role as the supreme central banker of our era. It is her eroticized fantasy figure of the hot entrepreneur rebelling against the domesticating state that pulls in the adolescent recruits to a neoliberal zeitgeist. This might be a purely masculinist fantasy—the entrepreneurial masculine against the feminine domestic. But for Rand, the hero is often a sexy femme, and the domesticators are male state managers as well. In thinking about the resilience of consent to neoliberalism, it might serve us well to dive into Ayn Rand's fantasy world, to examine the affective identifications and emotional logics that are powerfully at work in

her writing.

In our own political moment, the capacity of neoliberal politicians and pundits to tie a commitment to rationality with violent social practices is a core aspect of the ongoingness of suffering and loss in the everyday lives of most people. There is a constant, unstable effort to divide the “irrational” and therefore non optimistic cruelties of, say, a mass shooting in a movie theater, or a massacre in a village, from the more optimistic violence of regressive tax codes, shattered social safety nets, and imperial wars. This effort is easily lampoonable, as is Ayn Rand’s prose. But the flip side of cruel optimism as a central affective experience of late capitalism, as Berlant describes it, is surely the shadow side of optimistic cruelty. Or perhaps even more pointedly, given very long history of such rationalized mayhem on behalf of imperial states and transnational elites, we might consider this structure of feeling the Optimism of Empire for the neoliberal era.

#### **IV The End of Neoliberalism?**

But are we still living in a neoliberal era? Is neoliberalism the dominant logic for global governance, the largest political economic frame for thinking about neomoralism today? Debates about the continuing relevance of the central mechanisms of privatization, deregulation, entrepreneurship and personal responsibility have been raging since the 2008 financial crisis. Some have argued that neoliberalism has actually extended its reach, others that its influence is declining along with US imperial powers. Still others insist that neoliberal governance has entered a kind of zombie phase, intensifying its operations even as its dominance recedes.

In his recent book *The Security Archipelago: Human Security States, Sexuality Politics and the End of Neoliberalism* (2013), Paul Amar extends the latter argument. He describes neoliberalism has retreating to the Global North to suck the remaining public resources from the U.S. and the Eurozone, as its institutions and policy makers are increasingly dispatched from Global South locations. Focusing on Egypt and Brazil, Amar traces the emergence of what he calls the human security state, developing from the Beijing Consensus of the 1980s to displace the Washington Consensus in the years following the 2008 financial crisis.

The increasing failure of anti state, market based modes of governance generated uneven resistance throughout the Global South, expressed through mobilizations like the Latin American Pink Tide and the Arab Spring. The search for stability in the wake of unstable northern based globalization and financialization reinforced institutions of the state, the military and the police. But Amar argues that this is not a simple return to or reinvention of patriarchal authoritarianism. The new modes of governance draw upon legacies of resistance to colonialism, and are unevenly responsive to mass movements for social justice. They combine with anticolonial masculinity of

militarized peacekeeping goals with the feminized and moralized humanitarianism of protection and rescue of victimized populations.

Amar's book is important for us as we think about neoliberalism and neomoralism. He is suggesting that neoliberalism is being displaced via a global shift in power toward the human security state, that is based on **moral** rather than **market** logics. The regulation of gender and sexuality is thus central to its operations. The split between traditional religious moralism and erotic entrepreneurialism that has characterized neoliberalism is replaced by the contradictory, volatile, shifting relations between emancipatory social movements and state rescue and control of victim populations including "prostituted" women and trafficked children.

Of course, neoliberalism has absorbed the energies of social movements as well. The limited form of gender equality in the work of Ayn Rand represents one significant thread of neoliberal feminism. The gay marriage movement in the English speaking world trumps the aspirations of 1970s gay liberation with visions of the neoliberal household as center of privatized care for dependents. The abortion rights movement, as organized within the United States, substitutes an individual right to a private medical service for the movement for broadly conceived reproductive justice. But in a shift in emphasis from individual civil rights under neoliberal rule, to human rights in a global frame, the emerging human security states of the Global South interact with mass movements for social justice through state action framed as humanitarian, centered in police and military action.

According to Paul Amar, the end of neoliberalism is not the end of an historical era, nor the collapse of a mode of production, but a radical shift in the balance of global power and perspective from the North and West to the South. This shift is uneven, volatile, full of contradictions. But also full of implications for the ways we think and write about the politics of moralism around the globe today.

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